Wills and Succession Casses

Deans Circle
2016
Digested by: DC 2016 Members
Editors:
Tricia Lacuesta
Lorenzo Gayya
Cristopher Reyes
Macky Siazon
Janine Arenas
Ninna Bonsol
Lloyd Javier
WILLS AND
SUCCESSION
First Semester Cases
Wills and Succession Deans Circle
2016
Table of Contents
Testamentary Capacity .......................................................................................................................................................... 2
Construction of Wills............................................................................................................................................................... 5
Law Governing Formalities of Wills.................................................................................................................................. 6
Formalities of Wills .................................................................................................................................................................. 7
Holographic Wills .................................................................................................................................................................. 13
Alteration .................................................................................................................................................................................. 15
Foreign Wills ........................................................................................................................................................................... 16
Revocation of Wills and Testamentary Dispositions .............................................................................................. 17
Probate....................................................................................................................................................................................... 19
Preterition ................................................................................................................................................................................ 24
Substitution of Heirs ............................................................................................................................................................ 28
Conditional Institution ........................................................................................................................................................ 31
Legitime ..................................................................................................................................................................................... 32
Reserva Troncal ..................................................................................................................................................................... 34
Disinheritance ......................................................................................................................................................................... 41
Intestate Succession ............................................................................................................................................................. 43
Partition..................................................................................................................................................................................... 56
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WILLS AND SUCCESSION
Testamentary Capacity
JULIANA BAGTAS v. ISIDRO PAGUIO, ET AL.

G.R. No. L-6801, March 14, 1912, TRENT, J.
Perfect soundness of mind is not essential to testamentary capacity. Neither age, nor sickness,
nor extreme distress, nor debility of body will affect the capacity to make a will, if sufficient
intelligence remains.
Facts:
The last will and testament executed by Pioquinto Paguio who died a year and five months
from the execution, was propounded by by the executrix, Juliana Bagtas, widow of Paguio. But
Paguios son and several grandchildren by a former marriage opposed the probate asserting that
Paguio was not in the full of enjoyment and use of his mental faculties and was without the mental
capacity necessary to execute a valid will. According to them, Paguio suffered from a paralysis of the
left side of his body. This resulted to the impairment of his hearing, lost of the power of speech and
uncontrolled saliva discharge. Despite the paralysis, Paguio retained the use of his right hand and
was able to write fairly well. Through the medium of signs Paguio was able to indicate his wishes to
his wife and to the other members of his family.
Issue:
Whether or not paralysis would establish mental incapacity that would disqualify the
testator from executing a valid will.
Ruling:
No. Neither age, nor sickness, nor extreme distress, nor debility of body will affect the
capacity to make a will, if sufficient intelligence remains. The law does not require that a person
shall continue in the full enjoyment and use of his pristine physical and mental powers in order to
execute a valid will. Perfect soundness of mind is not essential to testamentary capacity. Even the
failure of memory is not sufficient to create the incapacity, unless it be total, or extend to his
immediate family or property because if such were the legal standard, few indeed would be the
number of wills that could meet such exacting requirements. The presumption of law is in favor of
the mental capacity of the testator and the burden is upon the contestants of the will to prove the
lack of testamentary capacity. On the case at hand, it does not appear that Paguios conduct was
irrational in any particular and he seems to have comprehended clearly what the nature of the
business was in which he was engaged. Therefore, mental incapacity which renders the will invalid,
cannot be established.
ANTONIO B. BALTAZAR, SEBASTIAN M. BALTAZAR, et al. v. LORENZO LAXA

G.R. No. 174489, April 11, 2012, DEL CASTILLO, J.
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The state of being forgetful does not necessarily make a person mentally unsound so as to render him
unfit to execute a Will.
Facts:
Paciencia was a 78-year-old spinster when she made her last will and testament. She bequeathed all
her properties to respondent Lorenzo Laxa and his wife Corazon Laxa and their children. Lorenzo was the
nephew of Paciencia and was treated as her own son. More than four years after the death of Paciencia,
Lorenzo filed a petition for probate proceedings. Antonio Baltazar opposed the petition, alleging that the
subject properties should belong to Nicomeda Regala Mangalindan, his predecessor-in-interest. Rosie Mateo,
one of the petitioners, testified that Paciencia was referred to as magulyan or forgetful, because she would
sometimes leave her wallet in the kitchen then start looking for it moments later, hence she was mentally
incapable to make a will at the time of its execution.
Issue:
Whether or not Pacencia had no testamentary capacity to execute her last will and testament for
having been forgetful.
Ruling:
No. The state of being forgetful does not necessarily make a person mentally unsound so as to
render him unfit to execute a will. Forgetfulness is not equivalent to being of unsound mind. As provided
under Art. 799 of the Civil Code, to be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in full possession
of all his reasoning faculties, or that his mind be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by disease,
injury or other cause. It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the will to know the
nature of the estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of his bounty, and the character of the testamentary
act. Furthermore, Rosies conclusion that Paciencia was magulyan was only based on her personal
assessment in contrast to Dra. Limpins testimony as to the soundness of mind of Paciencia when the latter
went to Judge Limpins house and voluntarily executed the Will. The testimony of subscribing witnesses to a
Will concerning the testators mental condition is entitled to great weight where they are truthful and
intelligent. Lastly, the burden to prove that Paciencia was of unsound mind at the time of the execution of the
will lies on the shoulders of the petitioners.
CATALINA BUGNAO v. FRANCISCO UBAG, ET AL.

G.R. No. 4445, September 18, 1909, CARSON, J.
Mere weakness of mind, or partial imbecility from the disease of body, or from age, will not
render a person incapable of making a will.
Facts:
Prior to Domingo Ubags death, the latter executed his last will and testament which named
his widow, Catalina Bugnao, as the sole beneficiary therein. The last will and testament was signed
by Ubag in the presence of three subscribing and attesting witnesses and appears upon its face to
have been duly executed in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. However,
the probate was contested by the appellants, who are brothers and sisters of Ubag. They claimed
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that Ubag lacks testamentary capacity because at that time of the execution of the will was
extremely ill, in an advanced stage of tuberculosis complicated with severe intermittent attacks of
asthma and that he needed assistance even to rise himself to a sitting position.
Issue:
Whether or not physical weakness establish lack of testamentary capacity.
Ruling:
No. Testamentary capacity is the capacity to comprehend the nature of the transaction
which the testator is engaged at the time, to recollect the property to be disposed of and the person
who would naturally be supposed to have claims upon the testator, and to comprehend the manner
in which the instrument will distribute his property among the objects of his bounty. Mere
weakness of mind, or partial imbecility from the disease of body, or from age, will not render a
person incapable of making a will, a weak or feeble minded person may make a valid will, provided
he has understanding memory sufficient to enable him to know what he is about, and how or to
whom he is disposing of his property. A sound mind does not mean a perfectly balanced mind. The
question of soundness is one of degree. For testamentary incapacity to be established, the weakness
should really disqualify one from knowing or appreciating the nature, effects, or consequences of
the act he is engaged in.
TRINIDAD NEYRA v. TEODORA NEYRA, PILAR DE GUZMAN and MARIA JACOBO VDA. DE
BLANCO
C.A. No. 4, March 21, 1946, DE JOYA, J.
Where it appears that a few hours after the execution of the will, the testator intelligently and
intelligibly conversed with other persons, it is said that the testator was in a perfectly sound mental
condition at the time of executing the will.
Facts:
Encarnacion Neyra died of a heart attack after suffering from Addisons disease for 2 years.
Prior to her death, Encarnacion reconciled with her sister Trinidad. A new will and testament was
executed naming Trinidad and Eustaquio Mendoza as beneficiaries therein. Teodora Neyra, Pilar de
Guzman, and Maria Jacobo Vda. de Blanco, who had not been named as beneficiaries in said will,
filed on opposition to the probate stating that Encarnacion had no longer possessed testamentary
capacity by reason of her illness. However, in the course of a cross-examination, Presentacion
Blanco admitted having talked to Encarnacion after the signing of the instrument.
Issue:
Whether or not Encarnacions conversation with another person after the execution of the
will, proves that she has testamentary capacity.
Ruling:
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No. It was proved that at about 6 o'clock in the afternoon of November 3, 1942, the same
date where the instrument was signed, Blanco was able to talk to Encarnacion and they understood
each other clearly. This showed that the testatrix was really of sound mind, at the time of the
signing and execution of the agreement and will in question. Moreover, the mental faculties of
persons suffering from Addison's disease, like the testatrix in this case, remain unimpaired, partly
due to the fact that, on account of the sleep they enjoy, they necessarily receive the benefit of
physical and mental rest. And that like patients suffering from tuberculosis, insomnia or diabetes,
they preserve their mental faculties until the moments of their death.
Construction of Wills
In the Matter of the Petition to Approve the Will of Leodegaria Julian, Felix Balanay, jr. v.
Hon. Antonio M. Martinez, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch VI; Avelina B.
Antonio and Delia B. Lanaban
G.R. No.L-39247 June 27, 1975, Aquino, J.
Invalidity of one of several dispositions contained in a will does not result in the invalidity of the
other dispositions, unless it is to be presumed that the testator would not have made such other
dispositions if the first invalid disposition had not been made.
Facts:
Leodegaria Julian (Leodegaria) died on February 1973. She was survived by her husband,
Felix Balanay, Sr.(husband), and by their six legitimate children named Felix Balanay, Jr.(Felix Jr.),
Avelina B. Antonio, Beatriz B. Solamo, Carolina B. Manguiob, Delia B. Lanaban and Emilia B.
Pabaonon. Felix Jr. filed a petition for probate of his mothers notarial will in the RTC. In that will,
she declared that she is the owner of the southern half of nine conjugal lots; and that it was her
desire that her properties should not be divided among her heirs during her husband's lifetime and
that their legitimes should be satisfied out of the fruits of her properties. Furthermore, paragraph V
thereof stated that after her husband's death her paraphernal lands and all the conjugal lands
should be divided and distributed in the manner set forth in her will. She devised and partitioned
the conjugal lands as if they were all owned by her. She disposed of in the will her husband's one
half share of the conjugal assets. The husband conformed to the wifes will and renounced his
hereditary rights to his one-half conjugal share and thus it became the property of Leodegaria. The
RTC however, declared that the will is void because of certain provisions in the will that is of
doubtful validity.
Issue:
Whether or not the will is void.
Ruling:
No. Invalidity of one of several dispositions contained in a will does not result in the invalidity
of the other dispositions, unless it is to be presumed that the testator would not have made such
other dispositions if the first invalid disposition had not been made.
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In this case, the statement of the testatrix that she owned the southern half of the conjugal
lands is contrary to law because, although she was a co-owner thereof, her share was inchoate
and pro indiviso. But that illegal declaration does not nullify the entire will. It may be disregarded.
The provision of the will that the properties of the testatrix should not be divided among her heirs
during her husband's lifetime but should be kept intact and that the legitimes should be paid in cash
is contrary to article 1080 of the Civil Code. The conformity of the husband had the effect of
validating the partition made in paragraph Vwithout prejudice, of course, to the rights of the
creditors and the legitimes of the compulsory heirs. To give effect to the intention and wishes of the
testatrix is the first and principal law in the matter of testaments. Testacy is preferable to intestacy.
As far as is legally possible, the expressed desire of the testator must be followed and the
dispositions of the properties in her will should be upheld.
Law Governing Formalities of Wills
In re: Will and Testament of the deceased REVEREND SANCHO ABADIA.

SEVERINA A. VDA. DE ENRIQUEZ, ET AL v.
MIGUEL ABADIA, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-7188, August 9, 1954, MONTEMAYOR, J.
The validity of a will as to its form depends upon the observance of the law in force at the time
it is made.
Facts:
On September 6, 1923, Father Sancho Abadia executed his Last Will and Testament marked
as Exhibit "A". He died on January 14, 1943 and left properties estimated at P8,000 in value. Andres
Enriquez, one of the legatees in Exhibit "A", filed a petition for its probate. Some cousins and
nephews who would inherit the estate of the deceased if he left no will, filed an opposition. The
learned trial court found and declared Exhibit "A" to be a holographic will. However, at the time
Exhibit A was executed and at the time of the testator's death, holographic wills were not permitted
by law. The law at the time imposed certain requirements for the execution of wills which were not
complied with by Father Abadia. When the case was to be decided the new Civil Code was already
in force, which Code permitted the execution of holographic wills.
Issue:
Whether or not the new Civil Code will apply to the probate of Exhibit A.
Ruling:
No. Art 795 of the New Civil Code expressly provides: The validity of a will as to its form
depends upon the observance of the law in force at the time it is made. Although the will operates
upon and after the death of the testator, the wishes of the testator about the disposition of his estate
among his heirs and among the legatees is given solemn expression at the time the will is executed,
and in reality, the legacy or bequest then becomes a completed act. From the day of the death of the
testator, if he leaves a will, the title of the legatees and devisees under it becomes a vested right,
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protected under the due process clause of the constitution against a subsequent change in the
statute adding new legal requirements of execution of wills which would invalidate such a will.
Formalities of Wills
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE PROBATE OF THE LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT
OF ENRIQUE S. LOPEZ RICHARD B. LOPEZ v. DIANA JEANNE LOPEZ, MARYBETH DE LEON and
VICTORIA L. TUAZON
G.R. No. 189984, November 12, 2012, PERLAS-BERNABE, J.
The attestation must state the number of pages used upon which the will is written, being the
only check against perjury.
Facts:
Before Enrique Lopez death, he executed a Last Will and Testament. Richard Lopez, son of
Enrique filed a petition for the probate. This was opposed by a compulsory heir, Marybeth de Leon,
who contended that the purported last will and testament was not executed and attested as
required by law. The RTC disallowed the probate of the will for failure to comply with Art. 805 of
the Civil Code which requires a statement in the attestation clause of the number of pages used
upon which the will is written. The statement in the Acknowledgment portion of the subject last
will and testament that it "consists of 7 pages including the page on which the ratification and
acknowledgment are written" although the will actually consists of 8 pages including its
acknowledgment.
Issue:
Whether or not the failure to state the number of pages of the will in the attestation clause
was fatal.
Ruling:
Yes. Under Art 809, in the absence of bad faith, forgery, or fraud, or undue and improper
pressure and influence, defects and imperfections in the form of attestation or in the language used
therein shall not render the will invalid. But such rule must be limited to disregarding those defects
that can be supplied by an examination of the will itself. It answers questions on whether all the
pages are consecutively numbered; whether the signatures appear in each and every page; whether
the subscribing witnesses are three or the will was notarized. However, on the case at hand the
discrepancy cannot be explained by mere examination of the will itself but through the
presentation of evidence aliunde. The total number of pages, and whether all persons required to
sign did so in the presence of each other, must substantially appear in the attestation clause, being
the only check against perjury in the probate proceedings.
In re estate of Piraso, deceased SIXTO ACOP v. SALMING PIRASO, ET AL.

G.R. No. L-28946, January 16, 1929, ROMUALDEZ, J.
A will written in a language not known to the testator is sufficient to invalidate the same.
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Facts:
The probate of the last will and testament of the deceased Piraso was denied because the
RTC decided that the will in question, which was written in the English language, should have been
drawn up in the Ilocano dialect to be valid. According to the appellants, the judgment revealed that
Piraso knew how to speak the Ilocano dialect imperfectly while he did not know the English
language.
Issue:
Whether or not the will is invalid for not having been written in the Ilocano dialect.
Ruling:
Yes. Sec 628 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that, No will shall be valid to pass any
estate, real or personal, nor charge or affect the same, unless it be written in the language or dialect
known by the testator. In addition, the presumption that the testator is presumed to know the
dialect of the locality where he resides, cannot be appreciated since there was proof to the contrary.
It was established that there is no proof that English is the language of Baguio City where the
deceased Piraso lived and where the will was drawn. What was only proved was that Piraso knew
no other language than the Igorrote dialect, with a smattering of Ilocano. Having been written in
English which the supposed testator Piraso did not know, is sufficient to invalidate the will
according to the clear and positive provisions of the law, and inevitably prevent its probate.
EUTIQUIA AVERA v. MARINO GARCIA, and JUAN RODRIGUEZ, as guardian of the minors Cesar
Garcia and Jose Garcia
G.R. No. 15566, September 14, 1921, STREET, J.
The signing on the right margin by the testator and the witnesses does not invalidate the will.
Facts:
The probate of the will of Esteban Garcia was contested by Marino Garcia and Juan
Rodriguez, the latter in the capacity of guardian for the minors Jose Garcia and Cesar Garcia.
According to Garcia and Rodriguez, the will in question is rendered invalid by reason of the fact that
the signature of the testator and of the three attesting witnesses are written on the right margin of
each page of the will instead of the left margin as provided under Sec 618 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2645.
Issue:
Whether or not a will is invalid by the fact that the signatures were written on the right
margin instead of the left.
Ruling:
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No. It can make no possible difference whether the names appear on the left or on the right
margin, provided they are on one or the other. By the mode of signing, every page and provision of
the will is authenticated and guarded from possible alteration in exactly the same degree that it
would have been protected by being signed in the left margin. Such deviation must be considered
too trivial to invalidate the instrument. The object of the solemnities which is to avoid substitution
of will and guarantee their truth and authenticity is not lost by having signed in the right margin. It
is not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will. Any other
interpretation whatsoever, that adds nothing but demands more requisites entirely unnecessary,
useless and frustrative of the testator's last will, must be disregarded.
Testate estate of the late VICENTE CAGRO. JESUSA CAGRO v. PELAGIO CAGRO, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-5826, April 29, 1953, PARAS, C.J.
An unsigned attestation clause negates the witnesses participation and renders the will fatally
defective.
Facts:
Vicente Cagro died leaving his last will and testament. The CFI admitted the probate of the
will. However, it was contested that the will is fatally defective, because its attestation clause is not
signed by the attesting witnesses. The signatures of the three witnesses to the will do not appear at
the bottom of the attestation clause, although the page containing the same is signed by the
witnesses on the left-hand margin.
Issue:
Whether or not the failure of the witnesses to sign the attestation clause renders the will
invalid.
Ruling:
Yes. The attestation clause is a memorandum of the facts attending the execution of the will'
required by law to be made by the attesting witnesses, and it must necessarily bear their
signatures. An unsigned attestation clause cannot be considered as an act of the witnesses, since the
omission of their signatures at the bottom thereof negatives their participation. If an attestation
clause not signed by the three witnesses at the bottom thereof, be admitted as sufficient, it would be
easy to add such clause to a will on a subsequent occasion and in the absence of the testator and
any or all of the witnesses.
TEODORO CANEDA, LORENZA CANEDA, TERESA CANEDA et al. v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS
and WILLIAM CABRERA, as Special Administrator of the Estate of Mateo Caballero
G.R. No. 103554, May 28, 1993, REGALADO, J.
The absence of that statement that the witnesses signed the will and every page thereof in the
presence of the testator and of one another is a fatal defect or imperfection which must necessarily
result in the disallowance of the will.
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Facts:
Mateo Caballero, a widower without any children, executed a last will and testament leaving
by way of legacies and devises his real and personal properties to persons who do not appear to be
related to him including Benoni G. Cabrera who sought his appointment as special administrator of
the testator's estate. Petitioners, claiming to be nephews and nieces of Caballero opposed the
probate claiming that the formality required on the attestation clause was not complied with. They
alleged that the instrument fails to specifically state the fact that the attesting witnesses and the
testator sign the will and all its pages in their presence and that they, the witnesses, likewise signed
the will and every page thereof in the presence of the testator and of each other.
Issue:
Whether or not failure to include the statement that the witnesses signed the will and every
page thereof in the presence of the testator and of one another is fatal.
Ruling:
Yes. The words in the presence of the testator and in the presence of each and all of us
may, at first blush, appear to likewise signify and refer to the witnesses, it must, however, be
interpreted as referring only to the testator signing in the presence of the witnesses since said
phrase immediately follows the words "he has signed. Under Article 809, the defects and
imperfections which will not render the instrument invalid must only be with respect to the form of
the attestation or the language employed therein. In other words, defects must be remedied by
intrinsic evidence supplied by the will itself. This is in contrast to a situation where the attestation
clause totally omits the fact that the attesting witnesses signed each and every page of the will in
the presence of the testator and of each other. In such a situation, the defect is not only in the form
or language of the attestation clause but the total absence of a specific element required by Article
805 to be specifically stated in the attestation clause of a will. In the case at bar, proof of the acts
required to have been performed by the attesting witnesses can be supplied by only extrinsic
evidence thereof, since an overall appreciation of the contents of the will yields no basis whatsoever
from with such facts may be plausibly deduced.
AGAPITA N. CRUZ v. HON. JUDGE GUILLERMO P. VILLASOR, Presiding Judge of Branch I, Court
of First Instance of Cebu, and MANUEL B. LUGAY
G.R. No. L-32213, November 26, 1973, ESGUERRA, J.
The notary public before whom the will was acknowledged cannot be considered as one of the
third instrumental witnesses since he cannot acknowledge before himself his having signed the will.
Facts:
Agapita N. Cruz, the surviving spouse of the deceased Valente Cruz, opposed the allowance
of the will alleging that the will was executed through fraud because one of the three witnesses,
Atty. Angel H. Teves, Jr., was at the same time the Notary Public before whom the will was supposed
to have been acknowledged.
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Issue:
Whether or not an attesting witness may be the notary public himself who will acknowledge
the will.
Ruling:
No. If the third witness were the notary public himself, he would have to avow, assent, or
admit his having signed the will in front of himself. This cannot be done because he cannot split his
personality into two so that one will appear before the other to acknowledge his participation in the
making of the will. Furthermore, the function of a notary public is, among others, to guard against
any illegal or immoral arrangements. That function would be defeated because he would then be
interested in sustaining the validity of the will as it directly involves himself and the validity of his
own act. To allow the notary public to act as third witness, or one of the attesting and
acknowledging witnesses, would have the effect of having only two attesting witnesses to the will
which would be in contravention of the provisions of Article 805 requiring at least three credible
witnesses and of Article 806 which requires that the testator and the required number of witnesses
must appear before the notary public to acknowledge the will.
IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE JOSEFA VILLACORTE.

CELSO ICASIANO v. NATIVIDAD ICASIANO and ENRIQUE ICASIANO
G.R. No. L-18979, June 30, 1964, REYES, J.B.L., J.
The inadvertent failure of one witness to affix his signature to one page of a testament, due to
the simultaneous lifting of two pages in the course of signing, is not per se sufficient to justify denial of
probate.
Facts:
Jose Villacorte died leaving his last will and testament in duplicate. The probate was
admitted and Celso Icasiano was appointed as the executor, the person named therein. However,
Natividad and Enrique Icasiano, the children of the testatrix filed their opposition. The records
showed that the original of the will does not contain the signature of one of the attesting witnesses,
Atty. Jose V. Natividad, on page three thereof although the duplicate copy was signed on every page.
Issue:
Whether or not failure of a witness to sign on one page of the instrument, is sufficient to
justify denial of probate
Ruling:
No. The law should not be so strictly and literally interpreted as to penalize the testatrix on
account of the inadvertence of a single witness over whose conduct she had no control, where the
purpose of the law to guarantee the identity of the testament and its component pages is
sufficiently attained, no intentional or deliberate deviation existed, and the evidence on record
attests to the full observance of the statutory requisites. Otherwise, witnesses may sabotage the
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will by muddling or bungling it or the attestation clause. Impossibility of substitution of this page is
assured not only the fact that the testatrix and two other witnesses did sign the defective page, but
also by its bearing the coincident imprint of the seal of the notary public before whom the
testament was ratified by testatrix and all three witnesses.
GERMAN JABONETA v. RICARDO GUSTILO, ET AL.

G.R. No. 1641, January 19, 1906, CARSON, J.
The true test of vision applicable between a testator and a witness, stating that is enough for
the testator to might have seen a witness sign, equally applies in determining whether the witnesses
signed the instrument in the presence of each other.
Facts:
Isabelo Jena, a witness to the execution of Macario Jabonetas last will and testament,
testified that after having signed the instrument and after having witnessed the signing of the
second witness, he hurriedly left. However, he claimed that he saw Julio Javellana, another witness,
took the pen in his hand and put himself in position to sign the will as a witness. The probate
thereafter was denied because the court found that Javellana, did not attach his signature thereto in
the presence of Jena, as required by the provisions of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Issue:
Whether or not the act of leaving of one witness while another is about to sign, does not
comply with the statutory requisite as to the execution of the instrument.
Ruling:
No. The tests of presence as between the testator and the witnesses are equally applicable
in determining whether the witnesses signed the instrument in the presence of each other. The
generally accepted tests of presence are vision and mental apprehension. The true test of vision is
not whether the testator actually saw the witness sign, but whether he might have seen him sign,
considering his mental and physical condition and position at the time of the subscription. Jena,
having seen Javellana moving his hand and pen in the act of affixing his signature to the will, taken
together with the testimony of the remaining witnesses which shows that Javellana did in fact there
and then sign his name to the will, proves that the signature was affixed in the presence of Jena. The
fact that Jena was in the act of leaving, and that his back was turned while a portion of the name of
the witness was being written, is of no importance.
BEATRIZ NERA, ET AL. v. NARCISA RIMANDO

G.R. No. L-5971, February 27, 1911, CARSON, J.
It is sufficient that the witness was actually and physically present and in such position where
the testator could see everything that took place by merely casting his eyes in the proper direction and
without any physical obstruction to prevent his doing so.
Facts:
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The court admitted the last will and testament of Pedro Rimando to probate. However, the
validity of the will was questioned since it was alleged that one subscribing witness was outside,
some eight or ten feet away, in a large room connecting with the smaller room by a doorway, across
which was hung a curtain which made it impossible for one in the outside room to see the testator
and the other subscribing witnesses in the act of attaching their signatures to the instrument
in the small room.
Issue:
Whether or not the presence of the witness in a room separated by any physical obstruction
from the room where the execution of the will took place, invalidates the instrument.
Ruling:
Yes. However on the case at hand, a majority of the members of the court is of opinion that
this subscribing witness was in the small room with the testator and the other subscribing
witnesses. Had this subscribing witness been proven to have been in the outer room at the time
when the testator and the other subscribing witnesses attached their signatures to the instrument
in the inner room, it would have been invalid as a will, the attaching of those signatures under
circumstances not being done in the presence of the witness in the outer room. This is because the
line of vision from this witness to the testator and the other subscribing witnesses would
necessarily have been impeded by the curtain separating the inner from the outer one at the
moment of inscription of each signature. The position of the parties with relation to each other at
the moment of the subscription of each signature, must be such that they may see each other sign if
they choose to do so. The doctrine laid down does not mean that their eyes were actually cast upon
the paper at the moment of its subscription by each of them, but that at that moment existing
conditions and their position with relation to each other were such that by merely casting the eyes
in the proper direction they could have seen each other sign.
Holographic Wills
SPOUSES ROBERTO AND THELMA AJERO v. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND CLEMENTE SAND
G.R. No. 106720, September 15, 1994, PUNO, J.
The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad
faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and
authenticity. Therefore, the laws on this subject should be interpreted in such a way as to attain these
primordial ends. But, on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is not the object
of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will. So when an interpretation
already given assures such ends, any other interpretation whatsoever, that adds nothing but demands
more requisites entirely unnecessary, useless and frustrative of the testator's last will, must be
disregarded.
Facts:
Annie Sand executed a holographic will in which she named as devises petitioners and
respondents. Petitioners filed a petition for the probate of the holographic will of Annie, but it was
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opoposed by the respondents, claiming that it contained alterations and corrections which were not
duly authenticated by the testator. The trial court admitted the will for probate. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals reversed, saying that the holographic will fails to meet the requirements of
Articles 813 and 814, thereby invalidating the will. The appeallate court alluded to certain
dispositions in the will which were either unsigned and undated, or signed but not dated. It also
found that the earasures, alterations and cancellations made thereon had not been authenticated.
Issue:
Whether or not failure to comply with Articles 813 and 814 invalidates a will.
Held:
No. A reading of Article 813 of the New Civil Code shows that its requirement affects the
validity of the dispositions contained in the holographic will, but not its probate. If the testator fails
to sign and date some of the dispositions, the result is that these dispositions cannot be effectuated.
Such failure, however, does not render the whole testament void. Likewise, a holographic will can
still be admitted to probate, notwithstanding non-compliance with the provisions of Article 814. In
such case, the erasure or correction would not be considered.
It should also be noted that the requirements of authentication of changes and signing and
dating of dispositions appear in provisions (Articles 813 and 814) separate from that which
provides for the necessary conditions for the validity of the holographic will (Article 810). This fact
is significant, considering that the there was no such separation in the old Civil Code.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF MELECIO LABRADOR.

SAGRADO LABRADOR (Deceased), substituted by ROSITA LABRADOR, ENRICA LABRADOR,
and CRISTOBAL LABRADOR v. COURT OF APPEALS, GAUDENCIO LABRADOR, and JESUS
LABRADOR
G.R. Nos. 83843-44, April 5, 1990, PARAS, J.
The law does not specify a particular location where the date should be placed in the will and
its inclusion in the will whether in an unusual place constitutes sufficient compliance.
Facts:
Melecio Labrador executed his last will and testament before he died. Sagrado Labrador
substituted by his heirs, filed a petition for probate which was opposed by Jesus and Gaudencio
Labrador. Jesus and Gaudencio claimed that on September 30, 1971, that is, before Melecio's death,
for the consideration of P6,000 Pesos, testator Melecio executed a Deed of Absolute Sale
transferring in their favour, Lot No. 1916. Sagrado alleged that he had already acquired the lot by
devise from their father under a holographic will executed on March 17, 1968. The said date was
written by Melecio himself the first paragraph of the second page of the holographic will.
Issue:
Whether or not the date not being written in its usual place renders the will valid.
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Ruling:
Yes. The intention to show 17 March 1968 as the date of the execution of the will is plain
from the tenor of the succeeding words of the paragraph. As aptly put by petitioner, the will was not
an agreement but a unilateral act of Melecio Labrador who plainly knew that what he was executing
was a will. The law does not specify a particular location where the date should be placed in the
will. The only requirements are that the date be in the will itself and executed in the hand of the
testator. This requirement is in compliance with Art 810.
Alteration
ROSA K. KALAW v. HON. JUDGE BENJAMIN RELOVA, Presiding Judge of the CFI of Batangas,
Branch VI, Lipa City, and GREGORIO K. KALAW
G.R. No. L-40207, September 28, 1984, MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.
Ordinarily, when a number of erasures, corrections, and interlineations made by the testator in
a holographic will not been noted under his signature, the will is not thereby invalidated as a whole,
however, the holographic will in dispute had only one substantial provision, which was altered by
substituting the original heir with another, the effect must be that the entire will is voided or revoked
for the simple reason that nothing remains in the will after that which could remain valid.
Facts:
Gregorio Kalaw filed a petition for probate of the holographic will of his deceased sister,
Natividad Kalaw, claiming that he is the sole heir of his deceased sister. The holographic will, as first
written, named the Rosa Kalaw, a sister of the testatrix as her sole heir. Rosa opposed probate
alleging that the holographic will contained alterations, corrections, and insertions without the
proper authentication by the full signature of the testatrix as required by Art. 814 of the Civil Code.
The trial court denied the petition for probate filed by Gregorio. A motion for reconsideration filed
by Gregorio was denied on the ground that Article 814 of the Civil Code being, clear and explicit, it
requires no necessity for interpretation.
Issue:
Whether or not the original unaltered text after subsequent alterations and insertions were
voided by the CFI for lack of authentication by the full signature of the testatrix, should be probated
with Rosa as sole heir.
Ruling:
No. Ordinarily, when a number of erasures, corrections, and interlineations made by the
testator in a holographic will not been noted under his signature, the will is not thereby invalidated
as a whole, but at most only as respects the particular words erased, corrected or interlined.
However, when as in this case, the holographic will in dispute had only one substantial provision,
which was altered by substituting the original heir with another, but which alteration did not carry
the requisite of full authentication by the full signature of the testator, the effect must be that the
entire will is voided or revoked for the simple reason that nothing remains in the will after that
which could remain valid. To state that the will as first written should be given efficacy is to
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disregard the seeming change of mind of the testatrix. But that change of mind can neither be given
effect because she failed to authenticate it in the manner required by law by affixing her full
signature.
The ruling in Velasco, must be held confined to such insertions, cancellations, erasures or
alterations in a holographic will, which affect only the efficacy of the altered words themselves but
not the essence and validity of the will itself. As it is, with the erasures, cancellations and alterations
made by the testatrix herein, her real intention cannot be determined with certitude.
Foreign Wills
SALUD TEODORO VDA. DE PEREZ v. HON. ZOTICO A. TOLETE in his capacity as Presiding
Judge, Branch 18, RTC, Bulacan
G.R. No. 76714, June 2, 1994, QUIASON, J.
What the law probits is joint wills, but joint probate of two wills are allowed.
Facts:
Dr. Jose Cunanan and Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan (Dr. Evelyn), who became American
citizens, executed their respective wills in New York, containing provisions on presumption of
survivorship. The entire family died in a fire that gutted their home. Dr. Rafael G. Cunanan, Jr. (Dr.
Rafael) as trustee of the two wills, filed separate proceedings for the probate in New York which
admitted the two wills to probate and letters testamentary were issued in his favor.
Salud Perez (Salud), mother of Dr. Evelyn, also filed a petition for reprobate in Bulacan of
the two wills alleging that she was the sole heir of her daughter. Dr. Rafael opposed the petition
alleging that Salud was not an heir according to New York law, and that since the wills were
executed in New York, New York law should govern.
The RTC disallowed the reprobate of the two wills, recalling the appointment of petitioner
as special administratrix and declaring all pending incidents moot and academic.
Issue:
Whether or not the reprobate of the wills should be allowed.
Ruling:
Yes. The respective wills of the Cunanan spouses, who were American citizens, will only be
effective in this country upon compliance with the following provision of Art. 816 of the Civil Code
which states that the will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made with
the formalities prescribed by the law of the place in which he resides, or according to the
formalities observed in his country, or in conformity with those which this Code prescribes. Thus,
proof that both wills conform to the formalities prescribed by New York laws or by Philippine laws
is imperative. The evidence necessary for the reprobate or allowance of wills which have been
probated outside of the Philippines are as follows: (1) the due execution of the will in accordance
with the foreign laws; (2) the testator has his domicile in the foreign country and not in the
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Philippines; (3) the will has been admitted to probate in such country; (4) the fact that the foreign
tribunal is a probate court, and (5) the laws of a foreign country on procedure and allowance of
wills.
There is merit in petitioners insistence that the separate wills of the Cunanan spouses
should be probated jointly. What the law expressly prohibits is the making of joint wills either for
the testators reciprocal benefit or for the benefit of a third person (Civil Code of the Philippines,
Article 818). In the case at bench, the Cunanan spouses executed separate wills. Since the two wills
contain essentially the same provisions and pertain to property which in all probability are conjugal
in nature, practical considerations dictate their joint probate. As this Court has held a number of
times, it will always strive to settle the entire controversy in a single proceeding leaving no root or
branch to bear the seeds of future litigation.
Revocation of Wills and Testamentary Dispositions
TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE ADRIANA MALOTO, ALDINA MALOTO CASIANO, CONSTANCIO
MALOTO, PURIFICACION MIRAFLOR, ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH OF MOLO, AND ASILO DE
MOLO v. COURT OF APPEALS, PANFILO MALOTO AND FELINO MALOTO
G.R. No. 76464, February 29, 1988, SARMIENTO, J.:
It is clear that the physical act of destruction of a will, like burning in this case, does not per se
constitute an effective revocation, unless the destruction is coupled with animus revocandi on the part
of the testator. It is not imperative that the physical destruction be done by the testator himself. It may
be performed by another person but under the express direction and in the presence of the testator. Of
course, it goes without saying that the document destroyed must be the will itself.
Facts:
Adriana Maloto (Adriana) died leaving as heirs her niece and nephews, the petitioners
Aldina Maloto-Casiano (Aldina) and Constancio Maloto (Constancio), and the private respondents
Panfilo Maloto (Panfilo) and Felino Maloto (Felino). Believing that the deceased did not leave
behind a last will and testament, the heirs instituted an intestate proceeding for the settlement of
their aunt's estate. They executed an agreement of extrajudicial settlement of Adriana's estate,
deciding to divide the estate into four equal parts. The trial court approved the settlement.
Three years later, Atty. Sulpicio Palma discovered a document entitled "KATAPUSAN NGA
PAGBUBULAT-AN (Testamento)," purporting to be the last will and testament of Adriana. While
Panfilo and Felino are still named as heirs in the said will, Aldina and Constancio are given much
bigger and more valuable shares in the estate of Adriana than what they received by virtue of the
agreement of extrajudicial settlement. The will also give devises and legacies to other parties,
among them being the petitioners Asilo de Molo, the Roman Catholic Church of Molo, and
Purificacion Miraflor. When the case reached the CA, it held that the presence animus revocandi in
the destruction of the will had been sufficiently proven.
Issue:
Whether or not the will was revoked by Adriana.
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Ruling:
No. While animus revocandi or the intention to revoke, may be conceded, for that is a state
of mind, yet that requisite alone would not suffice. Animus revocandi is only one of the necessary
elements for the effective revocation of a last will and testament. The intention to revoke must be
accompanied by the overt physical act of burning, tearing, obliterating, or cancelling the will carried
out by the testator or by another person in his presence and under his express direction. There is
paucity of evidence to show compliance with these requirements. For one, the document or papers
burned by Adriana's maid, Guadalupe, was not satisfactorily established to be a will at all, much less
the will of Adriana Maloto. For another, the burning was not proven to have been done under the
express direction of Adriana. And then, the burning was not in her presence. Both witnesses,
Guadalupe and Eladio, were one in stating that they were the only ones present at the place where
the stove was located in which the papers proffered as a will were burned.
The respondent appellate court in assessing the evidence presented by the private
respondents as oppositors in the trial court, concluded that the testimony of the two witnesses who
testified in favor of the will's revocation appear inconclusive. Nowhere in the records before the
Court does it appear that the two witnesses, Guadalupe Vda. de Corral and Eladio Itchon, both
illiterates, were unequivocably positive that the document burned was indeed Adriana's will.
Guadalupe, The Court believed that the papers she destroyed was the will only because, according
to her, Adriana told her so. Eladio, on the other hand, obtained his information that the burned
document was the will because Guadalupe told him so, thus, his testimony on this point is double
hearsay.
Testate Estate of the Deceased MARIANO MOLO Y LEGASPI. JUANA JUAN VDA. DE MOLO v.
LUZ, GLICERIA and CORNELIO MOLO
G.R. No. L-2538, September 21, 1951, BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.
The rule on dependent relative revocation is established that where the act of destruction is
connected with the making of another will so as fairly to raise the inference that the testator meant
the revocation of the old to depend upon the efficacy of a new disposition intended to be substituted,
the revocation will be conditional and dependent upon the efficacy of the new disposition; and if, for
any reason, the new will intended to be made as a substitute is inoperative, the revocation fails and the
original will remains in full force.
Facts:
Mariano Molo died on January 24, 1941 was survived by his wife, the petitioner Juana Vda.
de Molo (Juana), and by his nieces and nephew, Luz Gliceria Molo and Cornelio Molo. Mariano left
two wills, one executed in 1918, and another executed in 1939. Juana filed with the CFI a petition to
probate the will executed by the deceased in 1939. There being no opposition, the will was
probated. But upon the opposition filed by Luz and Cornelio, the order of the court admitting the
will to probate was set aside. In view of the disallowance of the will, Juana filed another petition for
the probate of the will executed by the deceased in 1918 with the same court. Luz and Cornelio filed
an opposition to the petition based on three grounds: (1) that Junana is now estopped from seeking
the probate of the will of 1918; (2) that said will has not been executed in the manner required by
law and (3) that the will has been subsequently revoked. The CFI issued an order admitting the will
to probate.
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Issue:
Whether or not Mariano will of 1918 was subsequently revoked by the decedent's will of
1939.
Ruling:
No. A subsequent will, containing a clause revoking a previous will, having been disallowed,
for the reason that it was not executed in conformity with the provisions of section 618 of the Code
of Civil Procedure as to the making of wills, cannot produce the effect of annulling the previous will,
inasmuch as said revocatory clause is void. It is based on the premise that where the second will is
invalid on account of not being executed in accordance with the provisions of the statute, or where
the testator who has not sufficient mental capacity to make a will or the will is procured through
undue influence, or the such, in other words, where the second will is really no will, it does not
revoke the first will or affect it in any manner (Mort vs Baker University).
The oppositors also failed to prove that the testator deliberately destroyed the 1918 will.
But even if, for the sake of argument, the testator really did destroy the 1918 will, it would still not
have the effect of revoking the same based on the principle of Dependent Relative Revocation. The
doctrine is as follows: The rule is established that where the act of destruction is connected with
the making of another will so as fairly to raise the inference that the testator meant the revocation
of the old to depend upon the efficacy of a new disposition intended to be substituted, the
revocation will be conditional and dependent upon the efficacy of the new disposition; and if, for
any reason, the new will intended to be made as a substitute is inoperative, the revocation fails and
the original will remains in full force.
Probate
In re Estate of the deceased Gregorio Tolentino. ADELAIDA TOLENTINO v. NATALIA

FRANCISCO, ET AL.
G.R. No. L-35993, December 19, 1932, STREET, J.
When a will is contested it is the duty of the proponent to call all of the attesting witnesses, if
available but the validity of the will is no wise depends upon the united support of the will by all of
those witnesses. A will may be admitted to probate notwithstanding the fact that one or more of the
subscribing witnesses do not unite with the other, or others, in proving all the facts upon which the
validity of the will rests. It is sufficient if the court is satisfied from all the proof that the will was
executed and attested in the manner required by law.
Facts:
Gregorio Tolentino was married to Benita Francisco and had a very considerable estate
considering that they had no children. When Benita died, Gregorio made a will stating that the bulk
of his estate should be given to Adelaida Tolentino de Concepcion as his universal heir. Jose Syyap,
Agustin Vergel de Dios, and Vicente Legarda were the attesting witnesses stated on the will. After
the will was executed, Gregorio requested to the witnesses that not to let anyone know the contents
of this will. Gregorio kept his will in his private compartment at the Oriental Safe Deposit and
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remained there until withdrawn by order of the court. Several days after, Gregorio was found dead
in his bed being killed an assassin.
During the probate of Gregorios will, the witnesses claimed that they had signed the will at
different places. Jose claimed that Gregorio brought the will to his house on the afternoon where
Gregorio requested him, as a mere matter of compliance, to sign the will which he did. While, Vergel
had another story claiming that he signed the will in the evening of October 22 at the Hospital of
San Juan de Dios in Intramuros.
Issue:
Whether or not the conflicting testimonies of the witnesses as to the place of the execution
of the will affects its validity.
Ruling:
No. The court was unable to give any credence to the testimony of these two witnesses on
this point, the same being an evident fabrication designed for the purpose of defeating the will. In
the first place, the affirmative proof showing that the will was properly executed is adequate,
consistent, and convincing, consisting of the testimony of the third attesting witness, Vicente
Legarda, corroborated by Miguel Legarda and Urbana Rivera, two disinterested individuals,
employees of La Previsora Filipina, who were present in Legarda's office when the will was
executed and who lent a discerning attention to what was being done. Moreover, each of the seven
signatures affixed to his will by Syyap appear to the natural eye to have been made by using the
same pen and ink that was used by Legarda in signing the will. The same is also probably true of the
seven signatures made by Vergel de Dios. This could hardly have happened if the signatures of
Syyap and Vergel de Dios had been affixed, as they now pretend, at different times and places.
Lastly, Both Syyap and Vergel de Dios are impeached by proof of contradictory statements made by
them on different occasions prior to their appearance as witnesses in this case. In this connection
the court note that, after the murder of Gregorio Tolentino, and while the police authorities were
investigating his death, Nemesio Alferez, a detective, sent for Syyap and questioned him concerning
his relations with the deceased. Upon this occasion Syyap stated that Gregorio Tolentino had lately
made a will, that it had been executed at the office of La Previsora Filipina under the circumstances
already stated, and that he himself had served as one of the attesting witnesses.
These circumstances and other incidents revealed in the proof leave no room for doubt in
our mind that Syyap and Vergel de Dios have entered into a conspiracy between themselves, and in
concert with the opponents, to defeat the will of Gregorio Tolentino although they are well aware
that said will was in all respects properly executed; and the trial court, in our opinion, committed
no error in admitting the will to probate. In this case we feel well assured that the contested will
was properly executed and the order admitting to it probate was entirely proper.
ANTILANO G. MERCADO v. ALFONSO SANTOS, Judge of First Instance of Pampanga and

ROSARIO BASA DE LEON, ET AL.
G.R. No. 45629, September 22, 1938, LAUREL, J.
The probate of a will by the probate court having jurisdiction thereof is usually considered as
conclusive as to its due execution and validity, and is also conclusive that the testator was of sound and
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disposing mind at the time when he executed the will, and was not acting under duress, menace, fraud,
or undue influence, and that the will is genuine and not a forgery.
Facts:
Antilano Mercado filed with a petition for the probate of the will of his deceased wife, Ines
Basa. Without any opposition, the court admitted the will to probate. Almost three years later,
Rosario Basa de Leon et al. moved ex parte to reopen the proceedings, alleging lack of jurisdiction,
but this was denied. Thereafter, Rosario filed a case against Antilano for falsification or forgery of
the will probated for four times with different courts. Antilano interposed a demurrer on the
ground that the will alleged to have been forged had already been probated. The demurrer was
denied. The CA denied the petition for certiorari with writ of preliminary injunction filed by
Antilano.
Issue:
Whether or not the probate of the will of Antilanos deceased wife is a bar to his criminal
prosecution for the alleged forgery of the said will.
Ruling:
Yes. At the outset, the Supreme Court discussed the nature of probate proceedings as being
in rem. This means that through the publication of the petition for the probate of the will, the court
acquires jurisdiction over all such persons as are interested in said will; and any judgment that may
be rendered after said proceeding is binding against the whole world. The Court also cited Sec. 625
of the then Code of Civil Procedure: Allowance Necessary, and Conclusive as to Execution. No
will shall pass either the real or personal estate, unless it is proved and allowed in the Court of First
Instance, or by appeal to the Supreme Court; and the allowance by the court of a will of real and
personal estate shall be conclusive as to its due execution. Hence, Antilano cannot be prosecuted
for the crime of falsification of the will of Ines Basa for the reason that the court has already
admitted the will for probate.
REMEDIOS NUGUID v. FELIX NUGUID and PAZ SALONGA NUGUID

G.R. No. L-23445, June 23, 1966, SANCHEZ, J.
As a rule, in a probate of a will, the courts area of inquiry is limited to the examination and
resolution of its extrinsic validity. The exception is when the will is patently void.
Facts:
Rosario Nuguid died without any descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. Surviving her were
her legitimate parents, Spouses Felix and Paz Nugid and six brothers and sistersAlfredo, Federico,
Remedios, Conrado, Lourdes and Alberto. Remedios, who was instituted as sole heir by Rosario,
filed a petition for probate. Felix and Paz opposed on the ground that they were preterited. The
probate court declared the will null and void and held that the rules on intestacy shall govern the
estate of the deceased.
Issue:
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Whether or not the court properly ruled on the intrinsic validity of the will.
Ruling:
Yes. As a rule, in a probate of a will, the courts area of inquiry is limited to the examination
and resolution of its extrinsic validity: due execution, testamentary capacity and compliance with
the requisites or solemnities by law. The exception is when the will is patently void, because if the
case were to be remanded for probate of the will, nothing will be gained. On the contrary, litigation
will be protracted. And for aught that appears in the record, in the event of probate or if the court
rejects the will, probability exists that the case will come up once again before us on the same issue
of the intrinsic validity or nullity of the will. Result: waste of time, effort, expense, plus added
anxiety. These are the practical considerations that induce us to a belief that the court might as well
meet head-on the issue of the validity of the provisions of the will in question.
Art. 854 of the Civil Code states that the preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the
compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born
after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall
be valid insofar as they are not inofficious. A reading of Article 854 leads to the conclusion that the
universal institution of petitioner to the entire inheritance results in totally abrogating the will,
because, the nullification of such institution of universal heirwithout any other testamentary
disposition in the willamounts to a declaration that nothing at all was written.
The Incompetent, CARMEN CAIZA, represented by her legal guardian, AMPARO

EVANGELISTA v. COURT OF APPEALS (SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION), PEDRO ESTRADA and his
wife, LEONORA ESTRADA
G.R. No. 110427, February 24, 1997, NARVASA, C.J.
A will is essentially ambulatory; at any time prior to the testator's death, it may be changed or
revoked; and until admitted to probate, it has no effect whatever and no right can be claimed
thereunder, the law being quite explicit.
Facts:
Carmen Caiza was declared incompetent because of her advanced age, so her niece,
Amparo Evangelista, was appointed her legal guardian. Pursuant to her authority, Amparo
commenced an ejectment suit against Spouses Estrada who were occupying a house belonging to
Carmen. The Spouses argued that they have been occupying the house in consideration of their
faitfuly service to Carmen, and that, in fact, Carmen had already executed a will bequeathing to
them the disputed property. When the case reached the CA, it ruled in favor of the Spouses, holding
that though not yet probated, the will was indicative of intent and desire on Carmens part that the
Spouses were to remain and continue in their occupancy and possession, so much so that Carmens
supervening incompetency cannot be said to have vested in Amparo, her guardian, the
right/authority to drive them out.
Issue:
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Whether or not the holographic will, though not yet probated, vested title to the Spouses
Estrada.
Ruling:
No. Under law, no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and
allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court. An owner's intention to confer title in the future to
persons possessing property by his tolerance, is not inconsistent with the former's taking back
possession in the meantime for any reason deemed sufficient.
In this case, that there was sufficient cause for the owner's resumption of possession is
apparent: she needed to generate income from the house on account of the physical infirmities
afflicting her, arising from her extreme age.
SOFIA J. NEPOMUCENO v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, RUFINA GOMEZ, OSCAR

JUGO ANG, CARMELITA JUGO
G.R. No. L-62952 October 9, 1985, Gutierrez, Jr., J.
The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the court's area of inquiry is limited to an
examination and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the will. Given exceptional circumstances,
however, the probate court is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon
certain provisions of the will.
Facts:
Martin Jugo died, leaving a will where he devised to his forced heirs his estate, namely, his
legal wife Rufina Gomez and his children Oscar and Carmelita and the free portion to Sofia
Nepomuceno. It was clearly stated in the will that Jugo had been estranged from his lawful wife and
had been living with Nepomuceno as husband and wife. Nepomuceno filed a petition for probate
which Gomez opposed. The lower court denied probate on the ground that Jugo admitted in his will
to cohabiting with Nepomuceno and thus, the invalidity of its intrinsic provisions is evident. The CA
reversed and held that the will is valid except that the devise in favor of Nepmuceno is void.
Nepomuceno contends that the validity of the testamentary provision in her favor cannot be passed
upon in the probate proceedings.
Issue:
Whether or not the probate court was correct in passing upon the intrinsic validity of the
will
Ruling:
Yes. The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the court's area of inquiry is limited to
an examination and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the Will. The rule, however, is not
inflexible and absolute. The exception is when on the face of the will it appears to be intrinsically
void, because in such case, the probate of the will would become an idle ceremony.
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In this case, it is clear that the devise in favor of Nepomuceno was void for violating Art. 739
of the Civil Code (in relation to Art. 1028) which provides that a donation made between persons
who were guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation shall be void.
LOURDES L. DOROTHEO v. CA, NILDA D. QUINTANA, for Herself and as Attorney-in-Fact of

VICENTE DOROTHEO and JOSE DOROTHEO
G.R. No. 108581, December 8, 1999, YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.
It does not necessarily follow that an extrinsically valid last will and testament is always
intrinsically valid.
Facts:
Vicente and Jose were the legitimate children of Alejandro and Aniceta. Aniceta died and
Alejandro died thereafter. Lourdes, who claims to have taken care of Alejandro before he died, filed
a special proceeding for the probate of the latter's last will and testament. RTC admitted the will for
probate. Vicente and Jose filed a Motion To Declare The Will Intrinsically Void on the ground that
Lourdes is not the lawful wife of the testator. The RTC granted the motion and declared the will
intrinsically void. Lourdes argued that the RTC erred in nullifying the will which was already
admitted to probate.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC may declare a will, which was earlier admitted to probate,
intrinsically void.
Ruling:
Yes. Probate proceedings deals generally with the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be
probated. Due execution includes a determination of whether the testator was of sound and
disposing mind at the time of its execution, that he had freely executed the will and was not acting
under duress, fraud, menace or undue influence and that the will is genuine and not a forgery, that
he was of the proper testamentary age and that he is a person not expressly prohibited by law from
making a will. The intrinsic validity is another matter and questions regarding the same may still be
raised even after the will has been authenticated. Thus, it does not necessarily follow that an
extrinsically valid last will and testament is always intrinsically valid. Even if the will was validly
executed, if the testator provides for dispositions that deprives or impairs the lawful heirs of their
legitime or rightful inheritance according to the laws on succession, the unlawful
provisions/dispositions thereof cannot be given effect.
Here, Alejandros will may be extrinsically valid but the intrinsic provisions thereof were
void, thus the rules of intestacy apply.
Preterition
In re of Dolores Coronel, deceased. LORENZO PECSON v. AGUSTIN CORONEL, ET AL.

G.R. No. L-20374, October 11, 1923, ROMUALDEZ, J.
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If the testator possesses the requisite capacity to make a will, and the disposition of his
property is not affected by fraud of undue influence, the will is not rendered invalid by the fact that it is
unnatural, unreasonable, or unjust.
Facts:
Lorenzo Pecson filed a petition for the probate of the will of Dolores Coronel who named
Lorenzo, the husband of her niece, as the sole heir. Dolores other collateral relatives opposed,
contending that the will is not Dolores as it is not natural that she would completely exclude her
blood relatives from her vast estate, in order to will the same to one who is only a relative by
affinity, there appearing no sufficient motive for such exclusion. It turned out that Dolores had once
suspected some of her nephews as having been accomplices in a robbery committed against her.
Issue:
Whether or not the will is valid.
Ruling:
Yes. The liberty to dispose of one's estate by will when there are no forced heirs is rendered
sacred by the civil Code in force in the Philippines since 1889. Any person who has no forced heirs
may dispose by will of all his property or any part of it in favor of any person qualified to acquire it.
CONSTANTINO C. ACAIN v. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (Third Special Cases

Division), VIRGINIA A. FERNANDEZ and ROSA DIONGSON
G.R. No. 72706, October 27, 1987, PARAS, J.
Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of them
either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as
heirs nor are expressly disinherited.
Facts:
Constantino Acain filed a petition for the probate of the will of the late Nemesio Acain. In
that will, Constantino and his siblings were instituted as heirs. Meanwhile, Nemesios widow (Rosa
Diongson) and his adopted daughter (Virginia Fernandez) opposed the probate on the ground that
they were preterited.
Issue:
Whether or not there is preterition.
Ruling:
Yes, with respect to the adopted daughter but no with respect to the widow. Art. 854 of the
Civil Code provides that the preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in
the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the
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testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devisees and legacies shall be valid insofar as
they are not inofficious.
Under Art. 39 of PD No. 603, known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, adoption gives to
the adopted person the same rights and duties as if he were a legitimate child of the adopter and
makes the adopted person a legal heir of the adopter. It cannot be denied that Virginia was totally
omitted and preterited in the will of the testator, and she was not disinherited. Hence, there is
preterition.
Insofar as the widow is concerned, there is no preterition as she does not ascend or descend
from the testator, although she is a compulsory heir. Stated otherwise, even if the surviving spouse
is a compulsory heir, there is no preterition even if she is omitted from the inheritance, for she is
not in the direct line.
Administration of the estate of Agripino Neri y Chavez. ELEUTERIO NERI, ET AL. v. IGNACIA
AKUTIN AND HER CHILDREN
G.R. No. L-47799, June 13, 1941, MORAN, J.
Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of them,
either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither instituted as
heirs nor are expressly disinherited.
Facts:
Agripino Neri indicated in his will that he was leaving all of his properties by universal title
to his children by his second marriage with preterition of his children by his first marriage namely
Eleuterio, Agripino, Agapita, Getulia, Rosario and Celerina, stating that his children by the first
marriage shall have no longer any participation in his estate, as they had already received their
corresponding shares during his lifetime.
Issue:
Whether or not the children of the first were preterited.
Ruling:
Yes. Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or anyone of
them, either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned, they are neither
instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited.
In this case, while the children of the first marriage were mentioned in the will, they were
not accorded any share in the hereditary property, without expressly being disinherited. It is,
therefore, a clear case of preterition as contended by appellants. The omission of the forced heirs or
anyone of them, whether voluntary or involuntary, is a preterition if the purpose to disinherit is not
expressly made or is not at least manifest.
Except as to legacies and betterments which shall be valid in so far as they are not
inofficious, preterition avoids the institution of heirs and gives rise to intestate succession. In the
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instant case, no such legacies or betterments have been made by the testator. Mejoras or
betterments must be expressly provided, according to Articles 825 and 828 of the [Old] Civil Code,
and where no express provision therefor is made in the will, the law would presume that the
testator had no intention to that effect. In the will here in question, no express betterment is made
in favor of the children by the second marriage; neither is there any legacy expressly made in their
behalf consisting of the third available for free disposal. The whole inheritance is accorded the heirs
by the second marriage upon the mistaken belief that the heirs by the first marriage have already
received their shares. Were it not for this mistake, the testator's intention, as may be clearly
inferred from his will, would have been to divide his property equally among all his children.
REBECCA VIADO NON, JOSE A. NON and DELIA VIADO v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, ALICIA N. VIADO, CHERRI VIADO and FE FIDES VIADO
G.R. No. 137287, February 15, 2000, VITUG, J.
Where the preterition is not attended by bad faith and fraud, the partition shall not be
rescinded but the preterited heir shall be paid the value of the share pertaining to her.
Facts:
Spouses Julian Viado and Virginia Viado owned several pieces of property, among them a
house and lot located in Quezon City. Virginia died ahead of Julian who died three years later.
Surviving them were their children namely Nilo, Leah, Delia, and petitioners Rebecca, married to
Jose Non, and Delia Viado. Nilo died on 22 April 1987 leaving behind as his own sole heirs,
respondents Alicia Viado, his wife and their two children Cherri and Fe Fides. They shared a
common residence which was previously owned by the. Julian and Virginia. Soon, however, tension
would appear to have escalated between Rebecca and Alicia after Rebecca had asked that the
property be equally divided between the two families to make room for the growing children.
Alicia and her children, forthwith, claimed absolute ownership over the entire property and
demanded that petitioners vacate the portion occupied by the latter. Alicia and her children filed a
case for partition before the RTC, claiming absolute ownership over the subject property on two
documents, a deed of donation executed by the late Julian covering his one-half conjugal share of
the property in favor of Nilo and a deed of extrajudicial settlement in which Julian, Leah, and
petitioner Rebecca waived in favor of Nilo their rights and interests over their share of the property
inherited from Virginia. Rebecca and Jose attacked the validity of the instruments, contending that
that the exclusion of her retardate sister, Delia Viado, in the extrajudicial settlement, resulted in the
latter's preterition that should warrant its annulment.
The RTC adjudged Alicia and her children as being the true owners of the disputed property,
which was affirmed by the CA.
Issue:
Whether or not the preterition by Delia Viado will result to the annulment of the
extrajudicial settlement of the property
Ruling:
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No. When Virginia P. Viado died intestate in 1982, her part of the conjugal property, the
Isarog property in question included, was transmitted to her heirsher husband Julian and their
children Nilo Viado, Rebecca Viado, Leah Viado and Delia Viado. The inheritance, which vested from
the moment of death of the decedent, remained under a co-ownership regime among the heirs until
partition. Every act intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devisees
would be a partition although it would purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, a donation
or an extrajudicial settlement.
The exclusion of Delia Viado, alleged to be a retardate, from the deed of extrajudicial
settlement verily has had the effect of preterition. This kind of preterition, however, in the absence
of proof of fraud and bad faith, does not justify a collateral attack on Transfer Certificate of Title No.
373646. The relief, as so correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, instead rests on Article 1104
of the Civil Code to the effect that where the preterition is not attended by bad faith and fraud, the
partition shall not be rescinded but the preterited heir shall be paid the value of the share
pertaining to her. Again, the appellate court has thus acted properly in ordering the remand of the
case for further proceedings to make the proper valuation of the Isarog property and ascertainment
of the amount due petitioner Delia Viado.
Substitution of Heirs
CARMEN G. DE PEREZ, trustee of the estate of Ana Maria Alcantara v. MARIANO

GARCHITORENA, and JOSE CASIMIRO, Sheriff of the Court of First Instance of Manila
G.R. No. L-31703, February 13, 1930, ROMUALDEZ, J.
Fideicommissary substitution requires three things: (1) a first heir called primarily to the
enjoyment of the estate; (2) An obligation clearly imposed upon him to preserve and transmit to a
third person the whole or a part of the estate; (3) A second heir; and (4) The fideicommissarius be
entitled to the estate from the time the testator dies, since he is to inherit from the latter and not from
the fiduciary.
Facts:
Mariano Garchitorena held a judgment for an amount of money against the deceased
Joaquin Perez, the husband of Carmen Perez. The sheriff, pursuant to the writ of execution issued in
said judgment, levied an attachment on said amount deposited with La Urbana, which is registered
in Carmens name. Carmen opposed the levy claiming that said deposit belongs to the
fideicommissary heirs of her deceased aunt-in-law Ana Maria Alcantara whose will instituted
Carmen as her universal heiress but contained a provision to the effect that the whole estate shall
pass unimpaired to Carmens surviving children.
The RTC held that said La Urbana deposit belongs to the Carmen's children as
fideicommissary heirs of Ana Maria Alcantara. Mariano argued that there was no fideicommissary
substitution but a mere simple substitution.
Issue:
Whether or not there was a fideicommissary substitution in the will of the late Ana Maria
Alcantara.
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Ruling:
Yes. The fact that the will provides that Carmen shall receive and enjoy the estate is not
incompatible with a fideicommissary substitution. In fact the enjoyment of the inheritance is in
conformity with the idea of fideicommissary substitution, by virtue of which the heir instituted
receives the inheritance and enjoys it, although at the same time he preserves it in order to pass it
on the second heir. Fideicommissary substitution requires three things: (1) a first heir called
primarily to the enjoyment of the estate; (2) An obligation clearly imposed upon him to preserve
and transmit to a third person the whole or a part of the estate; (3) A second heir; and (4) The
fideicommissarius be entitled to the estate from the time the testator dies, since he is to inherit
from the latter and not from the fiduciary.
All the above elements are present in this case. Moreover, that the fideicommissarius or
second heir should be entitled to the estate from the time of the testator's death, which in the
instant case, is, rather than a requisite, a necessary consequence derived from the nature of the
fideicommissary substitution, in which the second heir does not inherit from the heir first
instituted, but from the testator. By virtue of this consequence, the inheritance in question does not
belong to the heiress instituted, the plaintiff herein, as her absolute property, but to her children,
from the moment of the death of the testatrix, Ana Maria Alcantara.
JOHNNY S. RABADILLA v. COURT OF APPEALS AND MARIA MARLENA COSCOLUELLA Y

BELLEZA VILLACARLOS
G.R. No. 113725, June 29, 2000, PURISIMA, J.
Substitution is the designation by the testator of a person or persons to take the place of the
heir or heirs first instituted.
Facts:
This case is about the last will and testament of Aleja Belleza. In her codicil, she bequeathed two
parcels of land in Bacolod to Jorge Rabadilla. It was provided in the codicil that should Jorge die
ahead of the testator, the property properties shall be inherited and acknolwedge by the children
and spouse of Jorge. The testator also imposed obligations and conditions upon Jorge:
o Every year, he must give to Maria Marlina Conscolluela 75 piculs of export sugar and 25
piculs of domestic sugar until Maria dies.
o Should Jorge die, his heir shall have the obligation to still give the sugar to Maria.
o The property shall not be sold, leased, mortgaged, to anybody except for the testators near
decendants and her sister. And that should the property be sold, leased, mortgaged as
buyer, lessee, mortgagee, as the case may be, must give 100 piculs of sugar every year (75
piculs of export and 25 piculs of domestic).
o Should any of the conditions in the will be violated, Maria Marlena may immediately seize
the properties.
Jorge eventually died and was survived by his wife and children, among whom was Johnny
(petitioner herein). Maria Marlena sued the heirs of Jorge, alleging that the conditions provided in
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Alejas will was violated. She claimed that one of the lands was mortgaged to the PNB and Republic
Planters Bank, and they failed to comply with their obligation to deliver the 100 piculs of sugar.
The trial court ruled in favor of Johnny, holding that the action was prematurely filed, and that
Maria must instead initiate intestate proceedings to establish the heirs of Jorge Rabadilla and in
order to give full meaning and semblance to her claim under the codicil. The CA reversed. Hence,
this petition. Johnny claimed that Art. 882 of the Civil Code regarding modal institution is not
applicable as this was a case of substitution.
Issue:
Whether or not this was a case of modal institution governed by Art. 882.
Held:
Yes. Substitution is the designation by the testator of a person or persons to take the place
of the heir or heirs first instituted. Under substitutions in general, the testator may either (1)
provide for the designation of another heir to whom the property shall pass in case the original heir
should die before him/her, renounce the inheritance or be incapacitated to inherit, as in a simple
substitution, or (2) leave his/her property to one person with the express charge that it be
transmitted subsequently to another or others, as in a fideicommissary substitution. The Codicil
sued upon contemplates neither of the two.
The Court noted that this case can not be that of a fideicommissary substitution because one
important element is missing. Under Article 863, the second heir or the fideicommissary must not
be beyond one degree from the first heir or the fiduciary. In the case under scrutiny, the near
descendants are not at all related to the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.
The applicable provision is Art. 882 of the Civil Code which is known as modal institution
wherein the testator states (1) the object of the institution, (2) the purpose or application of the
property left by the testator, or (3) the charge imposed by the testator upon the heir. A "mode"
imposes an obligation upon the heir or legatee but it does not affect the efficacy of his rights to the
succession. On the other hand, in a conditional testamentary disposition, the condition must happen
or be fulfilled in order for the heir to be entitled to succeed the testator. The condition suspends but
does not obligate; and the mode obligates but does not suspend. To some extent, it is similar to a
resolutory condition.
From the provisions of the Codicil litigated upon, it can be gleaned unerringly that the
testatrix intended that subject property be inherited by Dr. Jorge Rabadilla. It is likewise clearly
worded that the testatrix imposed an obligation on the said instituted heir and his successors-in-
interest to deliver one hundred piculs of sugar to the herein private respondent, Marlena
Coscolluela Belleza, during the lifetime of the latter. However, the testatrix did not make Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla's inheritance and the effectivity of his institution as a devisee, dependent on the
performance of the said obligation. It is clear, though, that should the obligation be not complied
with, the property shall be turned over to the testatrix's near descendants. The manner of
institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under subject Codicil is evidently modal in nature because it
imposes a charge upon the instituted heir without, however, affecting the efficacy of such
institution.
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Conditional Institution
ELENA MORENTE v. GUMERSINDO DE LA SANTA

G.R. No. L-3891, December 19, 1907, WILLARD, J.
Art. 790 of the Civil Code provides that testamentary provisions may be made conditional and
Art. 793 provides that a prohibition against another marriage may in certain cases be validly imposed
upon the widow or widower.
Facts:
The will of Consuelo includes the following clauses: (1) I hereby order that all real estate
which may belong to me shall pass to my husband, Gumersindo; (2) That my said husband shall not
leave my brothers after my death, and that he shall not marry anyone; should my said husband
have children by anyone, he shall not convey any portion of the property left by me, except the 1/3
part thereof and the two remaining thirds shall be and remain for my brother Vicente or his
children should he have any; (3) After my death I direct my husband to dwell in the camarin in
which the bakery is located, which is one of the properties belonging to me.
Gumersindo, married again within four months from the death of Consuelo. Elena, a sister of
the deceased, filed a petition to annul the legacy made to him on the basis of his second marriage.
The RTC denied the petition and ruled that the husband having married, he had the right to the use
of all the property during his life and that at his death 2/3s thereof would pass to Vicente, a brother
of the testatrix, and 1/3 thereof could be disposed of by the husband. Elena claims that by the mere
act of marriage the husband at once lost all rights acquired by the will. It is neither alleged nor
proven that any children have been born to the husband since the death of the testatrix.
Issue:
Whether or not Gumerisindo forfeits the legacy to him by reason of his second marriage.
Ruling:
No. Article 790 of the Civil Code provides that testamentary provisions may be made
conditional and article 793 provides that a prohibition against another marriage may in certain
cases be validly imposed upon the widow or widower. It is to be observed that by the second clause
she directs that her husband shall not leave her sisters. It is provided in the second clause that he
must continue to live in a certain building. It is provided in the second clause that he shall not marry
again. To no one of these orders is attached the condition that if he fails to comply with them he
shall lose the legacy given to him by the first clause of the will. There is nothing in the will that says
that if he violates any of the clauses, he will forfeit the property given to him. It merely states that if
he has children by anyone, 2/3s of that property shall pass to Vicente.
The will should be construed with reference to all the clauses contained therein, and there
is nothing in the will which supports the argument of Elena.
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Legitime
REGINA FRANCISCO AND ZENAIDA PASCUAL v. AIDA FRANCISCO-ALFONSO

G.R. No. 138774, March 8, 2001, PARDO, J.
A compulsory heir can not be deprived of her share in the estate save by disinheritance as
prescribed by law.
Facts:
Aida is the only daughter of spouses Gregorio and Cirila, who are now both deceased. Regina
and Zenaida on the other hand, are daughters of the late Gregorio with his common law wife Julia.
Gregorio owned 2 parcels of residential land. When Gregorio was confined in a hospital, he confided
to Aida that the certificates of title of his property were in the possession of Regina and Zenaida.
After Gregorio died, Aida inquired about it from her half sisters. They informed her that Gregorio
had sold the land to them. After verification, Aida learned that there was indeed a deed of absolute
sale in favor of Regina and Zenaida. By virtue of the sale, the RD issued the TCTs under Regina and
Zenaida. Aida filed a complaint for annulment of sale with damages and alleged that the signature of
her late father on the Kasulatan sa Ganap na Bilihan was a forgery. RTC dismissed. CA reversed.
Issue:
Whether or not a legitimate daughter may be deprived of her share in the estate of her
deceased father by a simulated contract transferring the property of her father to his illegitimate
children.
Ruling:
No. Even if the Kasulatan was not simulated, it still violated the Civil Code provisions insofar
as the transaction affected Aidas legitime. The sale was executed in 1983, when the applicable law
was the Civil Code, not the Family Code. Obviously, the sale was Gregorios way to transfer the
property to his illegitimate daughters at the expense of his legitimate daughter. The sale was
executed to prevent Aida from claiming her legitime and rightful share in said property. Before his
death, Gregorio had a change of heart and informed his daughter about the titles to the property.
According to Art. 888 of the Civil Code: The legitime of legitimate children and descendants
consists of 1/2 of the hereditary estate of the father and of the mother. The latter may freely
dispose of the remaining half subject to the rights of illegitimate children and of the surviving
spouse as hereinafter provided. Gregorio Francisco did not own any other property. If indeed the
parcels of land involved were the only property left by their father, the sale in fact would deprive
Aida of her share in her fathers estate. By law, she is entitled to half of the estate of her father as his
only legitimate child. The legal heirs of the late Gregorio must be determined in proper testate or
intestate proceedings for settlement of the estate. His compulsory heir can not be deprived of her
share in the estate save by disinheritance as prescribed by law.
SPOUSES NICANOR TUMBOKON (deceased), substituted by: ROSARIO SESPEE and their
Children, namely: NICANOR JR., NELIA, NEMIA SEGOVIA, NOBELLA, NABIGAIL TAAY,
NAZARENE MONTALVO, NORGEL, NEYSA, SILVESTRE, NORA MILCZAREK, NONITA CARPIO,
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NERLYN S. TUMBOKON, and NINFA T. SOLIDUM v. APOLONIA G. LEGASPI, and PAULINA S. DE

MAGTANUM
G.R. No. 153736, August 12, 2010, BERSAMIN, J.
A decedents compulsory heirs in whose favor the law reserves a part of the decedents estate
are exclusively the persons enumerated in Article 887.
Facts:
A parcel of land was originally owned by the late Alejandra, who had had 2 marriages. The
1st marriage was to Gaudencio, by whom she bore Ciriaca, whose husband was Victor. The 2nd
marriage was to Jose, by whom she bore Apolonia, who married Primo. Alejandra died intestate and
was survived by Apolonia and Crisanto, the son of Ciriaca and Victor. The ownership and
possession became controversial after Spouses Nicanor and Rosario asserted their right in it by
virtue of their purchase of it from Cresenciana, who had supposedly acquired it by purchase from
Victor. The spouses filed this suit for recovery of ownership and possession of real property. RTC
ruled in favour of the spouses. CA reversed and ruled that the claim of Victor of being the sole heir
is obviously false and erroneous for Alejandra had more than one intestate heir and Victor as a
mere son-in-law could not be one of them.
Issue:
Whether or not Victor, the decedents son-in law is a compulsory heir.
Ruling:
No. A decedents compulsory heirs in whose favor the law reserves a part of the decedents
estate are exclusively the persons enumerated in Article 887: The following are compulsory heirs:
(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and ascendants;
(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to their legitimate
children and descendants; (3) The widow or widower; (4) Acknowledged natural children, and
natural children by legal fiction; (5) Other illegitimate children referred to in article 287.
Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4, and 5 are not excluded by those in Nos. 1 and 2; neither
do they exclude one another. In all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly proved.
The father or mother of illegitimate children of the three classes mentioned, shall inherit from them
in the manner and to the extent established by this Code.
Only two forced heirs survived Alejandra upon her death, namely: Apolonia, her daughter,
and Crisanto, her grandson. The latter succeeded Alejandra by right of representation because his
mother, Ciriaca, had predeceased Alejandra. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by
virtue of which the representative is raised to the place and the degree of the person represented,
and acquires the rights which the latter would have if she were living or if she could have
inherited. Herein, the representative(Crisanto) was called to the succession by law and not by the
person represented(Ciriaca); he thus succeeded Alejandra, not Ciriaca.
Natividad P. Nazareno, Maximino P. Nazareno, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, Estate of Maximino A.

Nazareno, Sr., Romeo P. Nazareno and Eliza Nazareno
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G.R. No. 138842 October 18, 2000, Mendoza, J.
When there is an implied trust by virtue of a donation or any other gratuitous title received by
the heir from the decedent, the property subject of such donation or gratuitous title shall be subject to
collation.
Facts:
Maximino Nazareno, sr. (Maximino, sr.) and Aura Poblete(Aura), husband and wife acquired
several parcels of land during their lifetime. After the death of Maximino sr. and Aura, an intestate
proceeding was filed by their son Romeo Nazareno (Romeo). Romeo was appointed administrator
of his parents estate. In that proceeding, Romeo found out that several deeds of sale was issued by
his parents in favour of her sister Natividad Nazareno (Natividad) covering several parcels of land.
By virtue of the deeds of sale, title was issued to Natividad alone. Romeo contended that the deeds
of sale are null and void for lack of consideration; further, he stated that their parents never
intended to sell the lots to Natividad but she was only to hold the lots in trust for her siblings.
Romeo testified that a same deed of sale was executed in his favour but covering a different parcel
of lot, and it was also without consideration. The same kind of deed of sale was executed in favour
of Natividad. The deeds of sale were only executed to avoid payment of inheritance tax.
Issue:
Whether or not Natividad is the owner of the parcels of lot by virtue of the deeds of sale
executed in her favour.
Ruling:
No, Natividad is not the owner of the parcels of lot. It was proven that the deeds of sale were
executed without consideration and therefore null and void. Maximino and Aura executed the
Deeds of Sale in favor of Natividad because the latter was the only female and the only unmarried
member of the family. She was thus entrusted with the real properties in behalf of her siblings. As
she herself admitted, she intended to convey some lots to one of her siblings in the event the latter
returned from abroad. There was thus an implied trust constituted in her favor. Article 1149 of the
Civil Code states: There is an implied trust when a donation is made to a person but it appears that
although the legal estate is transmitted to the donee, he nevertheless is either to have no beneficial
interest or only a part thereof.There being an implied trust, the lots in question are therefore
subject to collation in accordance with Art. 1061 which states: Every compulsory heir, who
succeeds with other compulsory heirs, must bring into the mass of the estate any property or right
which he may have received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation,
or any other gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime
of each heir, and in the account of the partition.
Reserva Troncal
ENCARNACION FLORENTINO, ET AL. v. MERCEDES FLORENTINO, ET AL.

G.R. No. L-14856, November 15, 1919, TORRES, J.
Ascendants do not inherit the reservable property, but its enjoyment, use or trust, merely for
the reason that said law imposes the obligation to reserve and preserve same for certain designated
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persons who, on the death of the said ascendants reservists, acquire the ownership of said property in
fact and by operation of law in the same manner as forced heirs, said property reverts to said line as
long as the aforementioned persons who, from the death of the ascendant-reservists, acquire in fact
the right of reservatarios and are relatives, within the 3rd degree, of the descendant from whom the
reservable property came.
Facts:
Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II married twicethe first with Antonia Faz de Leon and the
second with Severina Faz de Leon. During the first marriage, he begot nine children (the petitioners
in this case). And, during the second marriage, he bogot two childrenMercedes, and Apolonio III
who was born after Apolonio II died. During his lifetime, Apolonio executed a will before the notary
public, instituting as his universal heirs his aforementioned 10 children, the posthumos Apolonio III
and his widow Severina. Apolonio III died and his mother, Severina succeeded. Severina died and
instituted as her universal heiress, Mercedes. Mercedes took possession of the properties including
the reservable property of Apolonio that was inherited by Apolonio III. Petitioners claimed that
such property inherited by Apolonio III from Apolonio was a reservable property and Mercedes in
inheriting it from Severina, who inherited it from Apolonio III was duty bound to respect its
reservable character and therefore entitles Encarnacion, et. al. also to share in the said property.
Issue:
Whether or not the property left at the death of Apolonio III was invested with the character
of reservable property when it was received by his mother, Severina.
Ruling:
Yes. Ascendants do not inherit the reservable property, but its enjoyment, use or trust,
merely for the reason that said law imposes the obligation to reserve and preserve same for certain
designated persons who, on the death of the said ascendants reservists, acquire the ownership of
said property in fact and by operation of law in the same manner as forced heirs, said property
reverts to said line as long as the aforementioned persons who, from the death of the ascendant-
reservists, acquire in fact the right of reservatarios and are relatives, within the third degree, of the
descendant from whom the reservable property came. Any ascendant who inherits from his
descendant any property, while there are living, within the third degree, relatives of the latter, is
nothing but a life usufructuary or a fiduciary of the reservable property received. He is, however,
the legitimate owner of his own property which is not reservable property and which constitutes
his legitime. But if, afterwards, all of the relatives, within the third degree, of the descendant die or
disappear, the said property becomes free property, by operation of law, and is thereby converted
into the legitime of the ascendant heir who can transmit it at his death to his legitimate successors
or testamentary heirs. This property has now lost its nature of reservable property, pertaining
thereto at the death of the relatives, called reservatarios, who belonged within the 3rd degree to the
line from which such property came.
When it passed by operation of law into the hands of his legitimate mother, Severina, it
became reservable property. Severina did not thereby acquire the dominion or right of ownership
but only the right of usufruct or of fiduciary with the necessary obligation to preserve and to deliver
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or return it as such reservable property to her deceased son's relatives within the third degree,
among whom is her daughter, Mercedes. Reservable property neither comes, nor falls under, the
absolute dominion of the ascendant who inherits and receives same from his descendant, therefore
it does not form part of his own property nor become the legitimate of his forced heirs. It becomes
his own property only in case that all the relatives of his descendant shall have died in which case
said reservable property loses such character. With full right Severina Faz de Leon could have
disposed in her will of all her own property in favor of her only living daughter, Mercedes, as forced
heiress. But whatever provision there is in her will concerning the reservable property received
from her son Apolonio III, or rather, whatever provision will reduce the rights of the other
reservatarios, the half-brothers and nephews of her daughter Mercedes, is unlawful, null and void,
inasmuch as said property is not her own and she has only the right of usufruct or of fiduciary, with
the obligation to preserve and to deliver same to the reservatarios, one of whom is Mercedes. The
reservable property, left to Mercedes, does not form part of the inheritance left by her death nor of
the legitimate of the heiress Mercedes. Just because she has a forced heiress, with a right to her
inheritance, does not relieve Severina of her obligation to reserve the property which she received
from her deceased son, nor did same lose the character of reservable property, held before the
reservatarios received same.
MARIQUITA O. SUMAYA and LAGUNA AGRO-INDUSTRIAL COCONUT COOPERATIVE, INC. v.

THE HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, and AMADEO, SANCHO, DONATO, LUIS,
ERASTO, LUISA, JOSE and DOLORES, all surnamed BALANTAKBO
G.R. No. 68843-44, September 2, 1991, MEDIALDEA, J.
The jurisprudential rule requiring annotation in the Registry of Property of the right reserved
in real property subject of reserva viudal insofar as it is applied to reserva troncal stays despite the
abolition of reserva viudal in the New Civil Code.
Facts:
Raul died intestate, single, without any issue, and leaving only his mother, Consuelo, as his
sole surviving heir to the real properties. Consuelo adjudicated unto herself the said properties in
an affidavit which was registered with the Register of Deeds. Thereafter, Consuelo sold the land
received by Raul from his father to Sumaya. It was subsequently sold by Sumaya to VHDCI. VHDCI
transferred and assigned its rights over the property in favor of Agro-Industrial. Also, Consuelo sold
the land Raul received from his deceased maternal grandmother to VHDCI. The latter in turn
transferred and assigned all its rights to the properties in favor of Laguna Agro-Industrial. The
certificates of titles covering the said properties do not contain any annotation of its reservable
character. Later, Consuelo died and brothers of Raul in the full blood and the surviving children of
deceased Jose, filed civil cases to recover the properties described in the respective complaints
which they claimed were subject to a reserva troncal in their favor. RTC ruled in favor of the
brothers.
Issue:
Whether or not it is necessary to annotate the reservable interest of the reservee in the
properties covered by certificates of title subject of litigation.
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Ruling:
Yes. Because, otherwise, the reservable character of a property may be lost to innocent
purchasers for value. Moreover, the obligation imposed on a widowed spouse to annotate the
reservable character of a property subject of reserva viudal is applicable to reserva troncal.
Consistent with the rule in reserva viudal where the person obliged to reserve (the widowed
spouse) had the obligation to annotate in the Registry of Property the reservable character of the
property, in reserva troncal, the reservor (the ascendant who inherited from a descendant property
which the latter inherited from another descendant) has the duty to reserve and therefore, the duty
to annotate also.
The jurisprudential rule requiring annotation in the Registry of Property of the right
reserved in real property subject of reserva viudal insofar as it is applied to reserva troncal stays
despite the abolition of reserva viudal in the New Civil Code.
SEGUNDA MARIA NIEVA and ANGEL ALCALA v. MANUELA ALCALA and JOSE DEOCAMPO
G.R. No. L-13386, October 27, 1920, JOHNSON, J.
Reserva troncal treats of blood and legitimate relationship.

Facts:
Juliana (ORIGIN), the alleged natural mother of Segunda, married Francisco. Of said
marriage Alfeo was born. Juliana died intestate and Alfeo (PREPOSITUS), inherited from her, ab
intestate, the parcels of land. Alfeo died. Thereupon the two parcels of land passed to his father,
Francisco (RESERVISTA). Thereafter, Francisco married Manuela, of which marriage was born Jose.
Francisco died, whereupon his widow and son, took possession of the parcels of land, under the
claim that Jose had inherited the same, ab intestate, from his deceased father. Segunda claiming to
be an acknowledged natural daughter of the said Juliana (RESERVATORIOS), instituted the present
action for the purposes of recovering the parcels of land invoking the provisions of article 811 of
the Civil Code. RTC held that Segunda was not entitled to the property because an illegitimate
relative has no right to reserva troncal.
Issue:
Whether or not an illegitimate relative within the third degree is entitled to the reserved
property under the rule on reserve troncal.
Ruling:
No. Segunda would have been entitled to the property had she been a legitimate daughter of
Juliana. Reservation in reserva troncal is established in favor of the parents who are within the
third degree and belong to the line from which the properties came. It treats of blood relationship,
which is applicable to questions on succession. It could not be otherwise, because relationship by
affinity is established between each spouse and the family of the other, by marriage, and to admit it,
would be to favour the transmission of the properties of the family of one spouse to that of the
other, which is just what the law intends to prevent. It also treats of legitimate relationship. The
person obliged to reserve it a legitimate ascendant who inherits from a descendant property which
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proceeds from the same legitimate family, and this being true, there can be no question, because the
line from which the properties proceed must be the line of that family and only in favor of that line
is the reservation established.
MARIA MENDOZA, et al. v. JULIA POLICARPIO DE LOS SANTOS, et al.

G.R. No. 176422, 20 March 2013, Reyes, J.
There are three lines of transmission in reserva troncal: (1) By gratuitous title, whether by
inheritance or donation, from an ascendant/brother/sister to a descendant or the prepositus; (2) By
operation of law from the prepositus to the other ascendant or reservista; (3) From the reservista to
the reservatarios who must be relatives within the third degree from which the property came. The
lineal character of the reservable property is reckoned from the ascendant from whom the prepositus
received the property by gratuitous title.
Facts:
Maria et al. are the grandchildren of Placido and Dominga (PD). They alleged that the
disputed three parcels of land were part of PDs properties which are the subject of an oral partition
case and which were subsequently adjudicated to Exequiel (one of PDs children). When Exequiel
died, these were passed on to his spouse, Leonor ,and only daughter, Gregoria. Leonor and Gregoria
died, with the latter dying intestate. Maria, et al. are claiming that after Gregorias death, Julia, who
is Leonors sister, adjudicated unto herself all of these properties as the sole surviving heir of her
sister and Gregoria. Hence, they claim that the properties should have been reserved by Julia in
their behalf and must revert it back to them, under the rule on reserva troncal. The RTC ruled in
favor of Maria, et al, but the CA reversed and ruled that it cannot be subject to reserva troncal as
neither Exequiel predeceased PD nor did Gregoria predecease Exequiel.
Issue:
Whether or not the properties are subject to reserva troncal.
Ruling:
No. There are three lines of transmission in reserva troncal: (1) By gratuitous title, whether
by inheritance or donation, from an ascendant/brother/sister to a descendant or the prepositus;
(2) By operation of law from the prepositus to the other ascendant or reservista; (3) From the
reservista to the reservatarios who must be relatives within the third degree from which the
property came. The lineal character of the reservable property is reckoned from the ascendant from
whom the prepositus received the property by gratuitous title.
In this case, reserva troncal is not applicable. What was clearly established in this case is
that the properties in dispute were owned by Exequiel (ascendant). After his death, Gregoria
(descendant/prepositus) acquired the properties as inheritance. Article 891 provides that the
person obliged to reserve the property should be an ascendant (reservista) of the
descendant/prepositus. Julia, however, is not Gregorias ascendant; rather, she is Gregorias
collateral relative. Gregorias ascendants are her parents, Exequiel and Leonor, her grandparents,
great-grandparents and so on. On the other hand, Gregorias descendants, if she had one, would be
her children, grandchildren and great-grandchildren. Not being Gregorias ascendants, both,
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therefore, are her collateral relatives. In determining the collateral line of relationship, ascent is
made to the common ancestor and then descent to the relative from whom the computation is
made. Thus, Julia is Gregorias collateral relative within the 3rd degree and not her ascendant. Also,
Maria, et. al. are fourth degree relatives and are therefore disqualified from being reservatarios, as
it is required for them to be within the third degree.
CELEDONIA SOLIVIO vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and CONCORDIA JAVELLANA
VILLANUEVA
G.R. No. 83484, February 12, 1990, Medialdea, J.
The persons involved in reserva troncal are: The person obliged to reserve is the reservista, the
ascendant who inherits by operation of law property from his descendants; The persons for whom the
property is reserved are the reservatarios, relatives within the third degree counted from the
propositus and belonging to the line from which the property came. The propositus, the descendant
who received by gratuitous title and died without issue, making his other ascendant inherit by
operation of law.
Facts:
Esteban Jr. died and his only surviving relatives are his maternal aunt, Celedonia, the
spinster half-sister of his mother, Salustia and Concordia, sister of his deceased father, Esteban Sr.
Salustia died, leaving all her properties to her only child, Esteban, Jr., including a house and lot,
where she, her son, and her sister lived. RTC declared Celedonia as the sole heir of Esteban Jr.
Concordia filed a MR because she claims to also be an heir of the deceased.
Issue:
Whether or not the decedent's properties were subject to reserva troncal in favor of
Celedonia, his relative within the third degree on his mother's side from whom he had inherited
them.
Ruling:
No. The persons involved in reserva troncal are: The person obliged to reserve is the
reservista, the ascendant who inherits by operation of law property from his descendants; The
persons for whom the property is reserved are the reservatarios, relatives within the 3rd degree
counted from the propositus and belonging to the line from which the property came.
The propositus, the descendant who received by gratuitous title and died without issue, making his
other ascendant inherit by operation of law. Clearly, the property of the deceased, Esteban Jr., is not
reservable property, for Esteban, Jr. was not an ascendant, but the descendant of his mother,
Salustia, from whom he inherited the properties in question. Therefore, he did not hold his
inheritance subject to a reservation in favour of his aunt, Celedonia, who is his relative within the
3rd degree on his mother's side. The reserva troncal applies to properties inherited by an ascendant
from a descendant who inherited it from another ascendant or a brother or sister. It does not apply
to property inherited by a descendant from his ascendant, the reverse of the situation covered by
Article 891.
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Since the deceased died without descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, surviving
spouse, brothers, sisters, nephews or nieces, what should apply in the distribution of his estate are
Articles 1003 and 1009 of the Civil Code. Both Concordia and Celedonia being relatives of the
decedent within the 3rd degree in the collateral line, each, therefore, shall succeed to the subject
estate 'without distinction of line or preference among them by reason of relationship by the whole
blood,' and is entitled 1/2 share and share alike of the estate.
FRANCISCA TIOCO DE PAPA, MANUEL TIOCO, NICOLAS TIOCO and JANUARIO PAPA v.
DALISAY TONGKO CAMACHO, PRIMO TONGKO and GODOFREDO CAMACHO
G.R. No. L-28032, September 24, 1986, NARVASA, J.
Reserva troncal merely determines the group of reservatarios to whom the property should be
returned; but within that group, the individual right to the property should be decided by the
applicable rules of ordinary intestate succession.
Facts:
Dalisay (niece), Francisca, Manuel and Nicolas(grandaunt and granduncles), have as a

common ancestor the late Balbino Tioco. Balbino died intestate, in the partition of his estate, three
parcels of land were adjudicated as the inheritance of the late Toribia, but as she had predeceased
her father, Balbino, the said 3 parcels of land devolved upon her two legitimate children Faustino
and Trinidad in equal pro-indiviso shares. Faustino died intestate, leaving his 1/2 pro-indiviso
share in the seven parcels of land above-mentioned to his father, Eustacio, as his sole intestate heir,
who received the said property subject to a reserva troncal. Trinidad died intestate, and was
succeeded by her only legitimate child, Dalisay. Eustacio died intestate, survived by his only
legitimate descendant, Dalisay. Dalisay now owns 1/2 of all the seven parcels of land as her
inheritance from her mother and claims them by virtue of the reserva troncal imposed thereon but
Francisca, et. al. oppose her said claim because by virtue of their being also 3rd degree relatives of
Faustino, they are also entitled. RTC declared Dalisay and Francisca, et. al. entitled, as reservatarios,
to of the seven parcels of land in dispute.
Issue:
Whether or not all relatives of the praepositus within the third degree in the appropriate
line succeed without distinction upon the death of the reservista.
Ruling:
No. Dalisay is entitled to the entirety of the reversionary property to the exclusion of
Francisca, et. al. and the rules on intestate succession applies. Following the order prescribed by
law in legitimate succession when there are relatives of the descendant within the third degree, the
right of the nearest relative, called reservatarios over the property which the reservista should
return to him, excludes that of the one more remote. The right of representation cannot be alleged
when the one claiming same as a reservatario of the reservable property is not among the relatives
within the third degree belonging to the line from which such property came, inasmuch as the right
granted by the Civil Code in Article 811 is in the highest degree personal and for the exclusive
benefit of designated persons who are within the third degree of the person from whom the
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reservable property came. Therefore, relatives of the fourth and the succeeding degrees can never
be considered as reservatarios, since the law does not recognize them as such. Reserva
troncal merely determines the group of reservatarios to whom the property should be returned;
but within that group, the individual right to the property should be decided by the applicable rules
of ordinary intestate succession, since Art. 891 does not specify otherwise. This conclusion is
strengthened by the circumstance that the reserva being an exceptional case, its application should
be limited to what is strictly needed to accomplish the purpose of the law.
Reversion of the reservable property being governed by the rules on intestate succession,
Francisca, et. al. must be held without any right thereto because, as aunt and uncles, of the
praepositus, they are excluded from the succession by his niece, Dalisay, although they are related
to him within the same degree as the latter. Under Article 1009, the absence of brothers, sisters,
nephews and nieces of the decedent is a precondition to the other collaterals (uncles, cousins, etc.)
being called to the succession. Under our laws of succession, a decedent's uncles and aunts may not
succeed ab intestato so long as nephews and nieces of the decedent survive and are willing and
qualified to succeed.
Disinheritance
RAMON S. CHING AND PO WING PROPERTIES, INC. v. HON. JANSEN R. RODRIGUEZ, in his
capacity as Presiding Judge of the RTC Manila, Branch 6, JOSEPH CHENG, JAIME CHENG,
MERCEDES IGNE AND LUCINA SANTOS, substituted by her son, EDUARDO S. BALAJADIA
G.R. No. 192828, November 28, 2011, REYES, J.
Disinheritance can be effected only through a will wherein the legal cause therefor shall be
specified.
Facts:
Joseph Cheng, et. al. filed a Complaint against Ramon Ching, et. al. for "Disinheritance,
Declaration of Nullity of Agreement and Waiver, Affidavit of Extra-Judicial Settlement, Deed of
Absolute Sale, Transfer Certificates of Title with Prayer for the Issuance of a TRO and a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction. Joseph, et. al. are the heirs of Antonio Ching/Cheng and they averred that
Ramon misrepresented himself as Antonio's and Lucina's son when in truth and in fact, he was
adopted and his birth certificate was merely simulated. Antonio died of a stab wound. Police
investigators identified Ramon as the prime suspect and he now stands as the lone accused in a
criminal case for murder filed against him. From the foregoing circumstances and upon the
authority of Art. 919 the Civil Code, they concluded that Ramon can be legally disinherited, hence,
prohibited from receiving any share from the estate of Antonio who died intestate.
Issue:
Whether or not there can be disinheritance in intestate succession.
Ruling:
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No. Disinheritance can be effected only through a will wherein the legal cause therefor shall
be specified. While the respondents in their Complaint and Amended Complaint sought the
disinheritance of Ramon, no will or any instrument supposedly effecting the disposition of
Antonio's estate was ever mentioned. Hence, despite the prayer for Ramon's disinheritance, the
Civil Case does not partake of the nature of a special proceeding and does not call for the probate
court's exercise of its limited jurisdiction. Moreover, the issue of disinheritance, which is one of the
causes of action in the Complaint, can be fully settled after a trial on the merits. And at this stage, it
has not been sufficiently established whether or not there is a will.
FILOMENA PECSON, administratix of the last will of Florencio, et al. v. ROSARIO MEDIAVILLO
G.R. No. 7890, September 29, 1914, JOHNSON, J.
Disinheritance shall only take place for one of the causes expressly fixed by law, which is why
courts may properly inquire whether the disinheritance has been made properly and for the causes
provided for by law.
Facts:
Rosario and Joaquin are grandchildren of Florencio. Rosario was disinherited by her
grandfather according to clause 3 of the will. RTC ruled in favor of Rosario and held that before the
death of the testator, Rosario became insane in 1895, when she went to Nueva Caceres to study in
college, and it has been proved that it was previous to this date that she disobeyed her grandfather
and raised her hand against him, and, as the testator states in the 3rd paragraph of his will, he
disinherited her. This court understands that this Rosario, who was then 14 years of age, and who
shortly afterwards became insane, was not responsible for her acts and should not have been
disinherited by her grandfather.
Issue:
Whether or not the disinheritance of Rosario has legal cause.
Ruling:
No. The Civil Code provides that disinheritance shall only take place for one of the causes
expressly fixed by law. It also provides for the cases or causes for disinheritance. Disinheritance
can only be effected by the testament, in which shall be mentioned the legal grounds or causes for
such disinheritance. Thus, it would seen to follow that the courts might properly inquire whether
the disinheritance has been made properly and for the causes provided for by law. The proof of the
truthfulness of the reason for disinheritance shall be established by the heirs of the testator, should
the disinherited person deny it. It would appear then that if the person disinherited should deny the
truthfulness of the cause of disinheritance, he might be permitted to support his allegation by proof.
In this case, when Rosario Mediavillo was about 14 years of age, she had received some
attentions from a young man that she had received a letter from him and that her grandfather,
Florencio Pecson, took occasion to talk to her about the relations between her and the said young
man; that it was upon that occasion when, it is alleged, the disobedience and disrespect were shown
to her grandfather, and that was the cause for her disinheritance by her grandfather. Soon after said
event she lost the use of her mental powers and that she has never regained them, except for very
brief periods, up to the present time. Taking into consideration her tender years, and the fact that
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she very soon thereafter lost the use of her mental faculties, reached the conclusion that she was
probably not responsible for the disrespect and disobedience shown to her grandfather.
Intestate Succession
HEIRS OF PASCASIO URIARTE, namely, ROSELYN URIARTE, MADRILYN and LOURDES

URIARTE, and FELOMINA BUNIEL URIARTE, and HEIRS OF PRIMITIVA ARNALDO and HEIRS
OF GREGORIO ARNALDO, represented herein by FELISA ARNALDO SULLANO and LUPECINO
ARNALDO v. CA and BENEDICTO ESTRADA
G.R. No. 116775, January 22, 1998, MENDOZA, J.
A nephew is considered a collateral relative who may inherit if no descendant, ascendant, or

spouse survive the decedent. That he is only a half-blood relative is immaterial. This alone does not
disqualify him from being his aunt's heir.
Facts:
Justa left upon her death a piece of land. Benedicto is the son of Agatonica, whose parents
were Pedro and Ursula. Upon the death of Pedro, Ursula married Juan by whom she had another
daughter, the decedent Justa. Benedicto is thus the nephew of Justa by her half-sister Agatonica.
Heirs of Pascasio, are the widow and daughters and Pascasio was one of the sons of Primitiva and
Conrado. Heirs of Pascasio are thus grandchildren, the relatives within the 5th degree of
consanguinity, of Justa by her cousin Primitiva. Benedicto claimed to be the sole surviving heir of
Justa, on the ground that the latter died without issue. He complained that Pascasio who, he
claimed, worked the land as Justa's tenant, refused to give him his share of the harvest. He
contended that Pascasio had no right to the entire land of Justa but could claim only 1/2 of the 0.5
hectare land which Justa had inherited from her parents. The heirs denied to be mere tenants and
claimed that the entire land, was originally owned by Ambrocio, their great granduncle. It was
allegedly bequeathed to Domingo and Juan, Ambrocio's nephews, in a holographic will executed by
Ambrocio. The heirs claimed that the land had always been in their possession and that in her
lifetime Justa never asserted exclusive right over the property but only received her share of the
harvest from it. RTC ruled in favour of the heirs of Pascasio. CA reversed.
Issue:
Whether or not Benedicto, a third degree relative excludes the heirs, who are fifth degree
relatives of Justa.
Ruling:
Yes. Benedicto is the son of Agatonica, the half-sister of Justa. He is thus a third degree
relative of Justa. On the other hand, the heirs are the sons and daughters of Justa's cousin. They are
thus fifth degree relatives of Justa. Applying the principle that the nearest excludes the farthest,
Benedicto is the lawful heir of Justa. The fact that his mother is only a half-sister of Justa is of no
moment.
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As already stated, Benedicto is the son of Justa's half-sister Agatonica. He is therefore Justa's
nephew. A nephew is considered a collateral relative who may inherit if no descendant, ascendant,
or spouse survive the decedent. That he is only a half-blood relative is immaterial. This alone does
not disqualify him from being his aunt's heir. The determination of whether the relationship is of
the full or half blood is important only to determine the extent of the share of the survivors.
INTESTATE ESTATE OF PETRA, IRENEA ROSALES v. FORTUNATO, MAGNA, ACEBES,

MACIKEQUEROX and ANTONIO ROSALES
G.R. No. L-40789, February 27, 1987, GANCAYCO, J.
Intestate or legal heirs are classified into two groups: those who inherit by their own right and
those who inherit by the right of representation. There is no provision in the Civil Code which states
that a widow (surviving spouse) is an intestate heir of her mother-in-law.
Facts:
Petra died intestate. She was survived by her husband Fortunato and their 2 children Magna
and Antonio. Another child, Carterio, predeceased her, leaving behind a child, Macikequerox and his
widow Irenea. Magna instituted the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the deceased.
RTC declared Fortunato, Magna, Macikequerox and Antonio as the legal heirs of the deceased.
Irenea insisted in getting a share of the estate in her capacity as the surviving spouse of the late
Carterio, son of the deceased, claiming that she is a compulsory heir of her mother-in-law.
Issue:
Whether or not a widow (surviving spouse) is an intestate heir of her mother-in-law.
Ruling:
No. Intestate or legal heirs are classified into two groups: those who inherit by their own
right and those who inherit by the right of representation. There is no provision in the Civil Code
which states that a widow (surviving spouse) is an intestate heir of her mother-in-law. The entire
Code is devoid of any provision which entitles her to inherit from her mother-in- law either by her
own right or by the right of representation. The provisions of the Code which relate to the order of
intestate succession (Articles 978 to 1014) enumerate with meticulous exactitude the intestate
heirs of a decedent, with the State as the final intestate heir. The conspicuous absence of a provision
which makes a daughter-in-law an intestate heir of the deceased all the more confirms Our
observation. If the legislature intended to make the surviving spouse an intestate heir of the parent-
in-law, it would have so provided in the Code.
Article 887, which enumerates the compulsory heirs, refers to the estate of the deceased
spouse in which case the surviving spouse (widow or widower) is a compulsory heir. It does not
apply to the estate of a parent-in-law. Indeed, the surviving spouse is considered a third person as
regards the estate of the parent-in-law. Article 971 explicitly declares that Macikequerox Rosales is
called to succession by law because of his blood relationship. He does not succeed his father,
Carterio who predeceased his grandmother, Petra, but the latter whom his father would have
succeeded. Irenea cannot assert the same right of representation as she has no filiation by blood
with her mother-in-law.
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MAURICIO, ROSARIO, BASILISA and REMEDIOS SAYSON and JUANA BAUTISTA v. CA, DELIA
SAYSON, assisted by her husband, CIRILO CEDO, JR., EDMUNDO AND DORIBEL SAYSON
G.R. Nos. 89224-25, January 23, 1992, CRUZ, J.
While it is true that the adopted child shall be deemed to be a legitimate child and have the
same right as the latter, these rights do not include the right of representation.
Facts:
Eleno and Rafaela begot five children: Mauricio, Rosario, Basilisa, Remedios and Teodoro.
Eleno and Rafaela died. Teodoro, who had married Isabel, died. His wife died nine years later. Their
properties were left in the possession of Delia, Edmundo, and Doribel, who claim to be their
children. Delia, Edmundo and Doribel filed a complaint for the accounting and partition of the
intestate estate of Eleno and Rafaela, claiming to be entitled by right of representation. Doribel is a
legitimate child, while Delia and Edmundo are both adopted children.
Issue:
Whether or not Delia, Edmundo and Doribel has the right to represent in the intestate estate
of Eleno and Rafaela (Grandparents).
Ruling:
No. Only Doribel is entitled. Under the law, representation is a right created by fiction of
law, by virtue of which the representative is raised to the place and the degree of the person
represented, and acquires the rights which the latter would have if he were living or if he could
have inherited. The representative is called to the succession by the law and not by the person
represented. He does not succeed the person represented but the one who the person represented
would have succeeded. And should children of the deceased and descendants of other children who
are dead, survive, the former shall inherit in their own right, and the latter by right of
representation.
There is no question that as the legitimate daughter of Teodoro and thus the granddaughter
of Eleno and Rafaela, Doribel has a right to represent her deceased father in the distribution of the
intestate estate of her grandparents. She is entitled to the share her father would have directly
inherited had he survived, which shall be equal to the shares of her grandparents' other
children. But a different conclusion must be reached in the case of Delia and Edmundo, to whom the
grandparents were total strangers. While it is true that the adopted child shall be deemed to be a
legitimate child and have the same right as the latter, these rights do not include the right of
representation. The relationship created by the adoption is between only the adopting parents and
the adopted child and does not extend to the blood relatives of either party.
In the matter of the estate of TOMAS RODRIGUEZ, deceased

MANUEL TORRES, special administrator, and LUZ LOPEZ DE BUENO, heir v. MARGARITA
LOPEZ
G.R. No. L-25966 November 1, 1926, Street, J.
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Accretion takes place in a testamentary succession, first when the two or more persons are
called to the same inheritance or the same portion thereof without special designation of shares; and
secondly, when one of the persons so called dies before the testator or renounces the inheritance or is
disqualifying to receive it.
Facts:
Tomas Rodriguez executed a will leaving all his property to Vicente Lopez and Luz Lopez de
Bueno. Prior to the execution of said will, Rodriguez had been judicially declared incapable of taking
care of himself and Vicente had been appointed guardian. After the execution of said will, Lopez
died. Rodriguez subsequently died as well. The will was admitted to probate, declaring Luz as
entitled to the whole estate. Margarita Lopez was a cousin and nearest relative of Rodriguez. She
contends that as Vicente was incapacitated to inherit as no testamentary provision shall be valid
when made by a ward in favor of his guardian before the final accounts of the latter have been
approved, there has supervened a partial intestacy with respect to the half intended for Vicente.
This half has now allegedly descended to her, as next of kin and sole heir at law of the decedent.
Issue:
Whether or not Margarita is entitled to the half of the estate.
Ruling:
No. The provision made in the will of Tomas Rodriguez in favor of Vicente F. Lopez was not
any general incapacity on his part, but a special incapacity due to the accidental relation of guardian
and ward existing between the parties. Accretion takes place in a testamentary succession, first
when the two or more persons are called to the same inheritance or the same portion thereof
without special designation of shares; and secondly, when one of the persons so called dies before
the testator or renounces the inheritance or is disqualifying to receive it.
In this case, the wills calls Vicente F. Lopez and his daughter, Luz Lopez de Bueno, to the
same inheritance without special designation of shares. In addition to this, one of the persons
named as heir has predeceased the testator, this person being also disqualified to receive the estate
even if he had been alive at the time of the testator's death. This article (982) is therefore also of
exact application to the case in hand; and its effect is to give to the survivor, Luz Lopez de Bueno,
not only the undivided half which she would have received in conjunction with her father if he had
been alive and qualified to take, but also the half which pertained to him. There was no error
whatever, therefore, in the order of the trial court declaring Luz Lopez de Bueno entitled to the
whole estate.
Under paragraph 4 of Art. 912 of the Old Civil Code, intestate succession occurs when the
heir instituted is disqualified to succeed (incapaz de suceder), while, under the last provision in
paragraph 2 of article 982, accretion occurs when one of the persons called to inherit under the will
is disqualified to receive the inheritance (incapaz de recibirla). A distinction is then drawn between
incapacity to succeed and incapacity to take. We are of the opinion that the disability to which
Vicente F. Lopez was subject was not a general disability to succeed but an accidental incapacity to
receive the legacy, a consideration which makes a case for accretion rather than for intestate
succession.
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GAUDENCIO BICOMONG, et al., v. GERONIMO ALMANZA, et al., defendant. FLORENTINO

CARTENA
G.R. No. L-37365 November 29, 1977, Guerrero, J.
Art. 975 of the Civil Code makes no qualification as to whether the nephews or nieces are on
the maternal or paternal line and without preference as to whether their relationship to the deceased
is by whole or half-blood.
Facts:
Maura and Felipa were Simeon Bagsics children with his second wife. Maura died, leaving
an estate which included a one half undivided share in 5 parcels of land left by her mother. She had
no heir, her husband having predeceased her. She was survived by the Bicomongs, Tolentinos and
Francisca Bagsic, her nieces and nephews, children of her half-siblings (by her fathers first
marriage). Her sister Felipa died, survived by her husband Geronimo Almanza and daughter
Cristeta. When Maura died, administration of the properties passed to her niece, Cristeta. When the
latter died, it passed on to her husband, Engracio Manese. When Geronimo died, administration
went to Cartena.
The Bicomongs, Tolentinos and Francisca Bagsic filed a case against Almanza and Manese
for recovery of their lawful shares in the properties left by Maura. The trial court ruled in favor of
Bicomongs et al., declaring them entitled to 10/24 share in the five parcels of land. On appeal,
Cartena contends that since Maura died before Felipa, the latter succeeded to Mauras estate, hence
the Bicomongs have no right.
Issue:
Whether or not the Bicomongs et al. are entitled to the estate of Maura
Ruling:
Yes. In the absence of defendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse,

Art. 1003 of the Civil Code provides that collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the
deceased. It appearing that Maura Bagsic died intestate without an issue, and her husband and all
her ascendants had died ahead of her, she is succeeded by the surviving collateral relatives, namely
the daughter of her sister of full blood and the ten (10) children of her brother and two (2) sisters
of half -blood in accordance with the provision of Art. 975 of the Civil Code.
By virtue of said provision, the aforementioned nephews and nieces are entitled to inherit
in their own right. Nephews and nieces alone do not inherit by right of representation (that is per
stirpes) unless concurring with brothers or sisters of the deceased. Under the same provision,
Article 975, which makes no qualification as to whether the nephews or nieces are on the maternal
or paternal line and without preference as to whether their relationship to the deceased is by whole
or half blood, the sole niece of whole blood of the deceased does not exclude the ten nephews and
nieces of half-blood. The only difference in their right of succession is provided in Article 1008 in
relation to Article 1006, which provisions, in effect, entitle the sole niece of full blood to a share
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double that of the nephews and nieces of half-blood. Such distinction between whole and half-blood
relationships with the deceased has been recognized.
The contention of the appellant that Maura Bagsic should be succeeded by Felipa Bagsic, her
sister of full blood, to the exclusion of the nephews and nieces of half-blood citing Article 1004 is
erroneous for it is based on an erroneous factual assumption, that Felipa Bagsic died in 1955, which
as indicated here before, is not true as she died in 1945, thus she predeceased her sister Maura
Bagsic.
OLIVIA S. PASCUAL and HERMES S. PASCUAL v. ESPERANZA C. PASCUAL-BAUTISTA, MANUEL

C. PASCUAL, JOSE C. PASCUAL, SUSANA C. PASCUAL-BAUTISTA, ERLINDA C. PASCUAL,
WENCESLAO C. PASCUAL, JR., INTESTATE ESTATE OF ELEUTERIO T. PASCUAL, AVELINO
PASCUAL, ISOCELES PASCUAL, LEIDA PASCUAL-MARTINES, VIRGINIA PASCUAL-NER, NONA
PASCUAL-FERNANDO, OCTAVIO PASCUAL, GERANAIA PASCUAL-DUBERT, and THE
HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE MANUEL S. PADOLINA of Br. 162, RTC, Pasig, Metro Manila
G.R. No. 84240 March 25, 1992, Paras, J.
The Family Code has removed the distinction between spurious and natural children. They
are simply to be referred to as illegitimate children.
Facts:
Don Andres Pascual died intestate, survived by his spouse and several siblings. Olivia and
Hermes Pascual, acknowledged natural children of Andress brother Eligio, claim to be heirs to his
estate. A compromise agreement was entered into by the heirs which Olivia and Hermes opposed.
The trial court denied their motion to reiterate hereditary rights. The CA affirmed. Olivia and
Hermes contend that as acknowledged natural children whose illegitimacy is not due to a prior
marriage, Art. 992 of the Code which bars illegitimate children from inheriting from the legitimate
relatives of their parents, does not apply to them but only to spurious children.
Issue:
Whether or not the prohibition under Art. 992 covers acknowledged natural children
Ruling:
Yes, the prohibition covers acknowledged natural children. Article 992 of the Civil Code
provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between
the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said
legitimate child. They may have a natural tie of blood, but this is not recognized by law for the
purposes of Article 992. Between the legitimate family and illegitimate family there is presumed to
be an intervening antagonism and incompatibility.
Eligio Pascual is a legitimate child but petitioners are his illegitimate children. Thus, the
latter cannot represent their father Eligio Pascual in the succession of the latter to the intestate
estate of the decedent Andres Pascual, full blood brother of their father. The term illegitimate
refers to both natural and spurious. Under Art. 176 of the Family Code, all illegitimate children are
generally placed under one category.
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ISABEL DE LA PUERTA v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and CARMELITA DE LA

PUERTA
G.R. No. 77867 February 6, 1990, Cruz, J.
An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and
relatives of his father or mother.
Facts:
Dominga Revuelta died with a will leaving her estate to her 3 children Alfredo, Vicente and
Isabel. The petition for probate filed by Isabel was opposed by her brothers. Alfredo subsequently
died. Vicente then filed a petition to adopt Carmelita de la Puerta, which the CFI granted. Carmelita
was allowed to intervene in the probate proceedings and she filed a motion for payment of a
monthly allowance as the acknowledged natural child of Vicente. The probate court granted the
motion. Before the SC, Isabel contends that Carmelita was not a natural child of Vicente and thus,
cannot inherit from Dominga.
Issue:
Whether or not Carmelita has successional rights to the estate of Dominga
Ruling:
No. Carmelita, though an acknowledged natural child of Vicente, has no successional rights
from Dominga. The first reason is that Vicente de la Puerta did not predecease his mother; and the
second is that Carmelita is a spurious child. In testamentary succession, the right of representation
can take place only in the following cases: first, when the person represented dies before the
testator; second, when the person represented is incapable of succeeding the testator; and third,
when the person represented is disinherited by the testator. In all of these cases, since there is a
vacancy in the inheritance, the law calls the children or descendants of the person represented to
succeed by right of representation.
Not having predeceased Dominga Revuelta, her son Vicente had the right to inherit from her
directly or in his own right. No right of representation was involved, nor could it be invoked by
Carmelita upon her father's death, which came after his own mother's death. It would have been
different if Vicente was already dead when Dominga Revuelta died. Carmelita could then have
inherited from her in representation of her father Vicente, assuming the she was a lawful heir.
However, Carmelita is not a lawful heir. As a spurious child of Vicente, Carmelita is barred
from inheriting from Dominga because of Article 992 of the Civil Code, which lays down the barrier
between the legitimate and illegitimate families. Even as an adopted child, Carmelita would still be
barred from inheriting from Dominga Revuelta for there would be no natural kindred ties between
them and consequently, no legal ties to bind them either. The result is that Carmelita, as the
spurious daughter of Vicente de la Puerta, has successional rights to the intestate estate of her
father but not to the estate of Dominga Revuelta. Her claims for support and inheritance should
therefore be filed in the proceedings for the settlement of her own father's estate and cannot be
considered in the probate of Dominga Revuelta's Will.
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BENIGNO MANUEL, LIBERATO MANUEL, LORENZO MANUEL, PLACIDA MANUEL, MADRONA

MANUEL, ESPERANZA MANUEL, AGAPITA MANUEL, BASILISA MANUEL, EMILIA MANUEL and
NUMERIANA MANUEL v. HON. NICODEMO T. FERRER, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 37, Lingayen, Pangasinan, MODESTA BALTAZAR and ESTANISLAOA MANUEL
G.R. No. 117246 August 21, 1995, Vitug, J.
The legitimate brothers and sisters as well as the children, whether legitimate or illegitimate,
of such brothers and sisters, cannot inherit from the illegitimate child.
Facts:
Antonio Manuel had several legitimate children and one illegitimate child, Juan Manuel. Juan
and his wife did not have a child but raised Modesta Baltazar as their own. Juan and then his wife
died leaving 3 parcels of land. Modesta executed an affidavit of self-adjudication and transferred the
titles in her name. Benigno Manuel et al. filed an action for nullity of the affidavit which the trial
court dismissed on the ground that not being heirs ab intestate of their illegitimate brother Juan
Manuel, Bengino et al. were not real parties-in-interest to institute the suit. Benigno et al. argue that
they are the legal heirs over the half of Juans intestate estate, Juan being their brother.
Issue:
Whether or not the legitimate siblings can inherit from their illegitimate sibling
Ruling:
No. Article 992 enunciates the principle of absolute separation between the legitimate
family and the illegitimate family. It prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between the
illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said legitimate
child. The doctrine rejects succession ab intestato in the collateral line between legitimate relatives,
on the one hand, and illegitimate relatives, on other hand, although it does not totally disavow such
succession in the direct line. What is meant by the law when it speaks of brothers and sisters,
nephews and nieces, as legal or intestate heirs of an illegitimate child? It must be noted that under
Art. 992 of the Code, there is a barrier dividing members of the illegitimate family from members of
the legitimate family. It is clear that by virtue of this barrier, the legitimate brothers and sisters as
well as the children, whether legitimate or illegitimate, of such brothers and sisters, cannot inherit
from the illegitimate child. Consequently, when the law speaks of brothers and sisters, nephews and
nieces" as legal heirs of an illegitimate child, it refers to illegitimate brothers and sisters as well as
to the children, whether legitimate or illegitimate, of such brothers and sisters.
In her answer to the complaint, Modesta candidly admitted that she herself is not an
intestate heir of Juan Manuel. She is right. A ward (ampon), without the benefit of formal (judicial)
adoption, is neither a compulsory nor a legal heir. We must hold, nevertheless, that the complaint
was properly dismissed by the trial court. Petitioners, not being the real parties-in-interest in the
case, had neither the standing nor the cause of action to initiate the complaint.
WENCESLA CACHO v. JOHN G. UDAN, and RUSTICO G. UDAN
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G.R. No. L-19996 April 30, 1965, Reyes, J.B.L., J.
The legitimate relatives of the mother cannot succeed her illegitimate child
Facts:
Silvina Udan died with a will naming her illegitimate son Francisco and one Wencesla Cacho
as sole heirs. Wencesla filed a petition to probate the will which Francisco opposed. Subsequently,
Francisco died. John and Rustico Udan, legitimate brothers of the testatrix Silvina filed their
oppositions to the probate. The trial court disallowed the oppositions. Before the SC, John and
Rustico claim that they are heirs to the estate of their sister and thus, have legal standing to file the
opposition.
Issue:
Whether or not John and Rustico are heirs
Ruling:
No. At the time of her death, Silvina's illegitimate son, Francisco Udan, was her heir
intestate, to the exclusion of her brothers. Collateral relatives of one who died intestate inherit only
in the absence of descendants, ascendants, and illegitimate children. Albeit the brothers and sisters
can concur with the widow or widower under Art. 1101 of the Civil Code, they do, not concur, but
are excluded by the surviving children, legitimate or illegitimate. Thus, John and Rustico Udan had
no standing to oppose the probate of the will, as there was still a descendant, Francisco Udan.
Franciscos death two years after his mothers does not help John and Rustico. The rights
acquired by the Francisco are only transmitted by his death to his own heirs at law not to the
appellants, who are legitimate brothers of his mother, for the reason that the legitimate relatives of
the mother cannot succeed her illegitimate child. Under Article 992, an illegitimate child has no
right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor
shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child.
With respect to the argument that Francisco did not acquire the inheritance until he
accepted it, the Civil Code presumes acceptance of an inheritance if the latter is not repudiated in
due time and that repudiation, to be valid, must appear in a public or authentic instrument, or
petition to the court. In this case, there is no document or pleading in the records showing
repudiation of the inheritance by Francisco Udan.
IN RE SUMMARY SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE OF MELODIA FERRARIS.

FILOMENA ABELLANA DE BACAYO v. GAUDENCIA FERRARIS DE BORROMEO, CATALINA
FERARIS DE VILLEGAS, JUANITO FERRARIS and CONCHITA FERRARIS
G.R. No. L-19382 August 31, 1965, Reyes, J.B.L., J.
In case of intestacy, nephews and nieces of the de cujus exclude all other collaterals (aunts and
uncles, first cousins, etc.) from the succession.
Facts:
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Melodia Ferraris was declared presumptively dead for the purpose of opening her
succession and a petition for summary settlement of her estate was filed. She left no surviving
direct descendant, ascendant or spouse, but was survived only by collateral relatives: Filomena, an
aunt and her nieces and nephew, Gaudencia, Catalina, Conchita and Juanito Ferraris, children of
Melodas brother, who predeceased her. The trial court ruled that Gaudencia et al. as the only
children of Melodias predeceased brother exclude the aunt, Filomena. Before the SC, Filomena
argues that she is of the same degree of relationship as Gaudencia et al, three degrees removed
from the decedent and thus may equally inherit.
Issue:
Whether or not the decedents aunt, Filomena, is excluded by the decedents nieces and
nephew
Ruling:
Yes. As aunt of the deceased, she is of the same degree of relationship, since in the collateral
line to which both kinds of relatives belong degrees are counted by first ascending to the common
ancestor and then descending to the heir. Nevertheless, the trial court was correct when it held that,
in case of intestacy, nephews and nieces of the de cujus exclude all other collaterals (aunts and
uncles, first cousins, etc.) from the succession under Arts. 1001, 1004, 1005 and 1009 of the Code.
Under Art. 1009, the absence of brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces of the decedent is a
precondition to the other collaterals (uncles, cousins, etc.) being called to the succession.
In his commentaries, Tolentino stated: Article 1009 does not state any order of preference.
However, this article should be understood in connection with the general rule that the nearest
relatives exclude the farther. Collaterals of the same degree inherit in equal parts, there being no
right of representation. They succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them on
account of the whole blood relationship. Thus, under our laws of succession, a decedent's uncles
and aunts may not succeed ab intestato so long as nephews and nieces of the decedent survive and
are willing and qualified to succeed.
MANUEL SARITA, ET AL., v. ANDRES CANDIA

G.R. No. L-7768 November 14, 1912, Arellano, C.J.
In inheritance, the nearer relative excludes the more remote, excepting the right of
representation in proper cases.
Facts:
Sps. Apolinario Cedeo and Roberta Montesa owned a parcel of land. During their lifetime,
Andres Candia was leasing said land but later allegedly refused to pay rent and claimed possession
of the land. Apolinario had three brothers and one sister: Macario, Domingo, Leon and Cristeta, the
latter the only one still alive. Macario had 5 children; Leon 4; Domingo 5, among them a daughter
named Sofia, who died leaving a son, Manuel Sarita. All except for Leons children sued Candia for
ownership of the land. The trial court absolved Candia. Manuel Sarita claims to be an heir, in
representation of his mother Sofia, the daughter of Apolinarios brother, Domingo.
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Issue:
Whether or not Manuel Sarita has hereditary rights
Ruling:
No. Such right could only be exercised by Cristeta Cedeo, the children of Macario Cedeo,
and those of Domingo Cedeo, but not by Manuel Sarita, because in inheritance, the nearer relative
excludes the more remote, excepting the right of representation in proper cases (Civil Code, art
921); from which it is inferred that, in pushing forward Cristeta Cedeo, the children of Macario
Cedeo and those of Domingo Cedeo, to exercise such a hereditary right, it should have been
noticed that the personality of these parties as the nearest relatives excluded that of Manuel Sarita,
the son of Sofia Cedeo, of a more remote degree.
THE CITY OF MANILA v. THE ROMAN CATHOLIC ARCHBISHOP OF MANILA and THE
ADMINISTRATOR FOR THE ESTATE OF MARIA CONCEPCION SARMIENTO
G.R. No. L-10033 August 30, 1917, Johnson, J.
Escheat applies only if a person dies intestate.
Facts:
The City of Manila filed an action to escheat five parcels of land. The theory of the city was
that one Ana Sarmiento was the owner of said properties who died in 1668, leaving no heir. The
trial court dismissed the action.
Issue:
Whether or not the properties should be declared escheated
Ruling:
No. Section 750 of Act No. 190 provides that property may be declared escheated when a
person dies intestate, leaving no heir or person entitled by law to the same. In this case, proof
shows that Ana Sarmiento did not die intestate. She left a will. The will provides for the
administration of said property by her nephew as well as for the subsequent administration of the
same. She did not die without an heir nor without persons entitled to administer her estate. It
further shows that she did not die without leaving a person by law entitled to inherit her property.
In view of the facts, therefore, the property in question cannot be declared escheated as of the
property of Ana Sarmiento. If by any chance the property may be declared escheated, it must be
based upon the fact that persons subsequent to Ana Sarmiento died intestate without leaving heir
or person by law entitled to the same.
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OFELIA HERNANDO BAGUNU v. PASTORA PIEDAD

G.R. No. 140975 December 8, 2000, Vitug, J.
Among collateral relatives, except only in the case of nephews and nieces of the decedent
concurring with their uncles or aunts, the rule of proximity of the Code, is an absolute rule
Facts:
In the settlement of the estate of Augusto Piedad, the court awarded the entire estate to
Pastora Piedad, the maternal aunt of Augusto, a collateral relative within the third degree. Ofelia
Bagunu, the daughter of a first cousin of Augusto and thus a collateral relative within the fifth
degree of Augusto, moved to intervene, arguing that under Arts. 1009 & 1010 of the Civil Code,
collateral relatives shall succeed without distinction of lines by reason of relationship by whole
blood and the right to inherit ab intestato shall not extend beyond the fifth degree of relationship in
the collateral line.
Issue:
Whether or not the rule of proximity in intestate succession applies among collateral
relatives
Ruling:
Yes. The rule on proximity is a concept that favors the relatives nearest in degree to the
decedent and excludes the more distant ones except when and to the extent that the right of
representation can apply. Pastora, being a relative within the third civil degree of the late Augusto
H. Piedad excludes Bagunu, a relative of the fifth degree, from succeeding an intestato to the estate
of the decedent.
The invocation of Articles 1009 and 1010 is misplaced. They only mean that among the
other collateral relatives (the sixth in the line of succession), no preference or distinction shall be
observed "by reason of relationship by the whole blood." In fine, a maternal aunt can inherit equally
with a first cousin of the half blood but an uncle or an aunt, being a third-degree relative, excludes
the cousins of the decedent, being in the fourth degree of relationship; the latter, in turn, would
have priority in succession to a fifth-degree relative. Petition denied.
ANSELMA DIAZ, guardian of VICTOR, RODRIGO, ANSELMINA and MIGUEL, all surnamed
SANTERO, and FELIXBERTA PACURSA, guardian of FEDERICO SANTERO, et al., v.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and FELISA PAMUTI JARDIN
G.R. No. L-66574 February 21, 1990, Paras, J.
The right of representation is not available to illegitimate descendants of legitimate children

in the inheritance of a legitimate grandparent.
Facts:
Simona Pamuti Vda. De Santero had one legitimate son, Pablo Santero. Pablo died in 1973,
survived by his mother Simona and six minor natural children 4 with Anselma Diaz and 2 with
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Pacursa. Simona died in 1976. In the settlement of the estate of Simona, Felisa Pamuti-Jardin, a
niece of Simona, was declared the sole legitimate heir to the intestate estate of Simona. Diaz et al.
argue that the NCC gave illegitimate children successional rights, including the right of illegitimate
children to represent their parents in the inheritance of their legitimate grandparents.
Issue:
Whether or not illegitimate children have the right to represent their parents in the
inheritance of their legitimate grandparents
Ruling:
No. The right of representation is not available to illegitimate descendants

of legitimate children in the inheritance of a legitimate grandparent. Art. 992 of the Civil Code
provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestato between
the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of the father or mother of said
illegitimate child. While the New Civil Code may have granted successional rights to illegitimate
children, those articles, however, in conjunction with Article 992, prohibit the right of
representation from being exercised where the person to be represented is a legitimate child. The
determining factor is the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the person to be represented. If the person to
be represented is an illegitimate child, then his descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate, may
represent him; however, if the person to be represented is legitimate, his illegitimate descendants
cannot represent him because the law provides that only his legitimate descendants may exercise
the right of representation by reason of the barrier imposed Article 992.
It is therefore clear from Article 992 that the phrase legitimate children and relatives of his
father or mother includes Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero as the word relative is broad enough to
comprehend all the kindred of the person spoken of. In this case, the only parties who claimed to be
the legitimate heirs of the late Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero are Felisa Pamuti-Jardin and the six
minor natural or illegitimate children of Pablo Santero. Since petitioners herein are barred by the
provisions of Article 992, Felisa Pamuti Jardin is the sole legitimate heir of the estate of Simona
Pamuta Vda. De Santero.
ZOSIMA VERDAD v. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, SOCORRO C. ROSALES, AURORA ROSALES,
NAPOLEON ROSALES, ANTONIO ROSALES, FLORENDA ROSALES, ELENA ROSALES AND
VIRGINIA ROSALES
G.R. No. 109972 April 29, 1996, Vitug, J.
The surviving spouse shall inherit the entire estate, without prejudice to the rights of brothers
and sisters, nephews and nieces, should there be any, under article 1001.
Facts:
Macaria Artega had children from 2 marriages. At the time of her death, she was survived
from the first marriage by Ramon Buerdos, a son and a grandchild, Felicidad; from her second
marriage by 4 children, one of whom is David Rosales, husband of Socorro. David died after
Macaria, without issue. The Buerdoses sold to Zosima Verdad their interest in a lot owned by
Macaria. Socorro discovered the sale and filed an action for legal redemption. The trial court held
55 | P a g e
2016
that the right to redeem had already lapsed. The CA reversed and held that Socorro is entitled to
redeem the inheritance rights over the property. Zosima contends that Socorro, being only a
daughter-in-law of Macaria, has no right to redeem.
Issue:
Whether or not Socorro has the right to redeem
Ruling:
Yes. It is true that Socorro, a daughter-in-law (or, for that matter, a mere relative by
affinity), is not an intestate heir of her parents-in-law; however, Socorro's right to the property is
not because she rightfully can claim heirship in Macaria's estate but that she is a legal heir of her
husband, David Rosales, part of whose estate is a share in his mother's inheritance. David Rosales,
incontrovertibly, survived his mother's death. When Macaria died on 08 March 1956 her estate
passed on to her surviving children, among them David Rosales, who thereupon became co-owners
of the property. When David Rosales himself later died, his own estate, which included
his undivided interest over the property inherited from Macaria, passed on to his widow Socorro
and her co-heirs pursuant to the law on succession:
Socorro and herein private respondents, along with the co-heirs of David Rosales,
thereupon became co-owners of the property that originally descended from Macaria. When their
interest in the property was sold by the Burdeos heirs to petitioner, a right of redemption arose in
favor of private respondents.
Partition
Aznar Brothers Realty Company v. Court of Appeals, Luis Aying, Demetrio Sida, Felomino
Augusto, Federico Abing, and Romeo Augusto
G.R. No. 128102 March 7, 2000, Davide, Jr., CJ
A partition made with preterition of any of the compulsory heirs shall not be rescinded, unless
it be proved that there was bad faith or fraud on the part of the persons interested; a partition which
includes a person believed to be an heir, but who is not, shall be void only with respect to such person
Facts:
Aznar Brothers Realty Co. (Aznar) acquired a lot from the heirs of Crisanta Maloloy-on (heirs
of Crisanta) by virtue of an Extrajudicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale. Herein
private respondents were allegedly allowed to occupy portions of the land by tolerance of Aznar
provided that they leave in the event that Aznar needed land for their private purposes. Later,
Aznar entered into a joint venture with Sta. Lucia Realty Development Corporation for the
development of the subject lot into a multi-million peso housing subdivision and beach resort. As a
result, it requested the private respondents to leave the premises. However, private respondents
contended that they are the successors and descendants of the heirs of the late Crisanta Maloloy-on,
whose names appear as the registered owners in the Original Certificate of Title. They claimed that
the Extrajudicial Partition with Deed of Absolute Sale is null and void because not all known heirs
56 | P a g e
2016
participated in the extrajudicial agreement of partition, and the two parties who participated in the
deed are not heirs.
Issue:
Whether or not the Extrajudicial Partition with Deed of Absolute Sale is null and void
Ruling:
No, the Extrajudicial Partition with Deed of Absolute Sale is valid. Under Art. 1104 of the Civil
Code, a partition made with preterition of any of the compulsory heirs shall not be rescinded,
unless it be proved that there was bad faith or fraud on the part of the persons interested; but the
latter shall be proportionately obliged to pay to the person omitted the share which belongs to him.
In the present case, no evidence of bad faith or fraud is extant from the records. As to the two
parties to the deed who were allegedly not heirs, Article 1105 is in point; it provides: A partition
which includes a person believed to be an heir, but who is not, shall be void only with respect to
such person. In other words, the participation of non-heirs does not render the partition void in its
entirety but only to the extent corresponding to them. The Extrajudicial Partition with Deed of
Absolute Sale is a notarized document. As such, it has in its favor the presumption of regularity, and
it carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its due execution.
57 | P a g e

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WILLS AND SUCCESSION

JULIANA BAGTAS v. ISIDRO PAGUIO, ET AL.

ANTONIO B. BALTAZAR, SEBASTIAN M. BALTAZAR, et al. v. LORENZO LAXA

CATALINA BUGNAO v. FRANCISCO UBAG, ET AL.

Whether or not physical weakness establish lack of testamentary capacity.

Whether or not the will is void.

Law Governing Formalities of Wills

In re: Will and Testament of the deceased REVEREND SANCHO ABADIA.

In re estate of Piraso, deceased SIXTO ACOP v. SALMING PIRASO, ET AL.

IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE JOSEFA VILLACORTE.

GERMAN JABONETA v. RICARDO GUSTILO, ET AL.

BEATRIZ NERA, ET AL. v. NARCISA RIMANDO

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF MELECIO LABRADOR.

Whether or not the reprobate of the wills should be allowed.

Revocation of Wills and Testamentary Dispositions

Whether or not the will was revoked by Adriana.

In re Estate of the deceased Gregorio Tolentino. ADELAIDA TOLENTINO v. NATALIA

ANTILANO G. MERCADO v. ALFONSO SANTOS, Judge of First Instance of Pampanga and

REMEDIOS NUGUID v. FELIX NUGUID and PAZ SALONGA NUGUID

The Incompetent, CARMEN CAIZA, represented by her legal guardian, AMPARO

SOFIA J. NEPOMUCENO v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, RUFINA GOMEZ, OSCAR

LOURDES L. DOROTHEO v. CA, NILDA D. QUINTANA, for Herself and as Attorney-in-Fact of

In re of Dolores Coronel, deceased. LORENZO PECSON v. AGUSTIN CORONEL, ET AL.

Whether or not the will is valid.

CONSTANTINO C. ACAIN v. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (Third Special Cases

Whether or not there is preterition.

Whether or not the children of the first were preterited.

CARMEN G. DE PEREZ, trustee of the estate of Ana Maria Alcantara v. MARIANO

JOHNNY S. RABADILLA v. COURT OF APPEALS AND MARIA MARLENA COSCOLUELLA Y

ELENA MORENTE v. GUMERSINDO DE LA SANTA

REGINA FRANCISCO AND ZENAIDA PASCUAL v. AIDA FRANCISCO-ALFONSO

NERLYN S. TUMBOKON, and NINFA T. SOLIDUM v. APOLONIA G. LEGASPI, and PAULINA S. DE

Whether or not Victor, the decedents son-in law is a compulsory heir.

Natividad P. Nazareno, Maximino P. Nazareno, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, Estate of Maximino A.

G.R. No. 138842 October 18, 2000, Mendoza, J.

ENCARNACION FLORENTINO, ET AL. v. MERCEDES FLORENTINO, ET AL.

MARIQUITA O. SUMAYA and LAGUNA AGRO-INDUSTRIAL COCONUT COOPERATIVE, INC. v.

Reserva troncal treats of blood and legitimate relationship.

MARIA MENDOZA, et al. v. JULIA POLICARPIO DE LOS SANTOS, et al.

Whether or not the properties are subject to reserva troncal.

Dalisay (niece), Francisca, Manuel and Nicolas(grandaunt and granduncles), have as a

Whether or not there can be disinheritance in intestate succession.

Whether or not the disinheritance of Rosario has legal cause.

HEIRS OF PASCASIO URIARTE, namely, ROSELYN URIARTE, MADRILYN and LOURDES

A nephew is considered a collateral relative who may inherit if no descendant, ascendant, or

INTESTATE ESTATE OF PETRA, IRENEA ROSALES v. FORTUNATO, MAGNA, ACEBES,

In the matter of the estate of TOMAS RODRIGUEZ, deceased

Whether or not Margarita is entitled to the half of the estate.

GAUDENCIO BICOMONG, et al., v. GERONIMO ALMANZA, et al., defendant. FLORENTINO

Yes. In the absence of defendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse,

OLIVIA S. PASCUAL and HERMES S. PASCUAL v. ESPERANZA C. PASCUAL-BAUTISTA, MANUEL

ISABEL DE LA PUERTA v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and CARMELITA DE LA

Whether or not Carmelita has successional rights to the estate of Dominga

BENIGNO MANUEL, LIBERATO MANUEL, LORENZO MANUEL, PLACIDA MANUEL, MADRONA

WENCESLA CACHO v. JOHN G. UDAN, and RUSTICO G. UDAN

G.R. No. L-19996 April 30, 1965, Reyes, J.B.L., J.

Whether or not John and Rustico are heirs

IN RE SUMMARY SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE OF MELODIA FERRARIS.

MANUEL SARITA, ET AL., v. ANDRES CANDIA

Whether or not Manuel Sarita has hereditary rights

Escheat applies only if a person dies intestate.

Whether or not the properties should be declared escheated

OFELIA HERNANDO BAGUNU v. PASTORA PIEDAD