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7/11/2017 NocumvsTan:145022:September23,2005:J.

ChicoNazario:SecondDivision:Decision



SECONDDIVISION


ARMAND NOCUM and THE G.R.No.145022
PHILIPPINE DAILY
INQUIRER,INC., Present:
Petitioners,
PUNO,
Chairman,
AUSTRIAMARTINEZ,
CALLEJO,SR.
versus TINGA,and
CHICONAZARIO,JJ.


Promulgated:
LUCIOTAN,
Respondent. September23,2005
XX


DECISION


CHICONAZARIO,J.:


AssailedinaPetitionforReviewonCertiorariunderRule45ofthe1997RulesofCivil
[1]
Procedurearethedecision oftheCourtofAppealsdated19April2000thataffirmed
theorderoftheRegionalTrialCourt(RTC)ofMakatiCity,Branch56,inCivilCaseNo.
982288,dated19April1999,admittingrespondentLucioTansAmendedComplaintfor
Damages for the alleged malicious and defamatory imputations against him in two (2)

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[2]
articles of the Philippine Daily Inquirer, and its Resolution dated 15 September 2000
denying petitioners Armand Nocum and The Philippine Daily Inquirer, Inc.s motion for
reconsideration.

TheantecedentsaresummarizedbytheCourtofAppeals.

On September 27, 1998, Lucio Tan filed a complaint against reporter
Armand Nocum, Capt. Florendo Umali, ALPAP and Inquirer with the Regional
Trial Court of Makati, docketed as Civil Case No. 982288, seeking moral and
exemplary damages for the alleged malicious and defamatory imputations
containedinanewsarticle.

INQUIRERandNOCUMfiledtheirjointanswer,datedOctober27,1998,wherein
they alleged that: (1) the complaint failed to state a cause of action (2) the
defamatorystatementsallegedinthecomplaintweregeneralconclusionswithout
factualpremises(3)thequestionednewsreportconstitutedfairandtruereporton
the matters of public interest concerning a public figure and therefore, was
privilegedinnatureand(4)maliceontheirpartwasnegatedbythepublicationin
thesamearticleofplaintiffsorPALssideofthedisputewiththepilotsunion.

ALPAPandUMALIlikewisefiledtheirjointanswer,datedOctober31,1998,and
alleged therein that: (1) the complaint stated no cause of action (2) venue was
improperly laid and (3) plaintiff Lucio Tan was not a real party in interest. It
appearedthatthecomplaintfailedtostatetheresidenceofthecomplainantatthe
time of the alleged commission of the offense and the place where the libelous
articlewasprintedandfirstpublished.

Thus,theRegionalTrialCourtofMakatiissuedanOrderdatedFebruary10,
1999,dismissingthecomplaintwithoutprejudiceonthegroundofimpropervenue.

Aggrievedbythedismissalofthecomplaint,respondentLucioTanfiledan
OmnibusMotiondatedFebruary24,1999,seekingreconsiderationofthedismissal
andadmissionoftheamendedcomplaint.Inpar.2.01.1oftheamendedcomplaint,
itisallegedthatThisarticlewasprintedandfirstpublishedintheCityofMakati
(p.53,Rollo,CAG.R.SPNo.55192),andinpar.2.04.1,thatThiscaricaturewas
printedandfirstpublishedintheCityofMakati(p.55,id.).

The lower court, after having the case dismissed for improper venue,
admitted the amended complaint and deemed set aside the previous order of
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dismissal,supra,stating,interalia,that:

Themistakeordeficiencyintheoriginalcomplaintappearsnowto
have been cured in the Amended Complaint which can still be properly
admitted, pursuant to Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
inasmuch as the Order of dismissal is not yet final. Besides, there is no
substantialamendmentintheAmendedComplaintwhichwouldaffectthe
defendantsdefensesandtheirAnswers.TheAmendmentismerelyformal,
contrarytothecontentionofthedefendantsthatitissubstantial.



Dissatisfied, petitioners, together with defendants Capt. Florendo Umali and the Airline
Pilots Association of the Philippines, Inc. (ALPAP), appealed the RTC decision to the
CourtofAppeals.Twopetitionsforcertiorariwerefiled,onefiledbypetitionerswhich
wasdocketedasCAG.R.SPNo.55192,andtheotherbydefendantsUmaliandALPAP
whichwasdocketedasCAG.R.SPNo.54894.Thetwopetitionswereconsolidated.

On 19 April 2000, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision the dispositive portion of
whichreads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED DUE
COURSE and DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Order of the court a quo is
herebyAFFIRMED.



ThemotionsforreconsiderationfiledbypetitionersandbydefendantsUmaliandALPAP
werelikewisedeniedinaresolutiondated15September2000.

Both petitioners and defendants Umali and ALPAP appealed to this Court. Under
considerationisthepetitionforreviewfiledbypetitioners.

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On 11 December 2000, the Court required respondent Tan to comment on the


[3]
petitionfiledbypetitioners.

[4]
Respondentfiledhiscommenton22 January 2001 to which petitioners filed a
[5]
replyon26April2001.

[6]
InaManifestationfiledon19February2001,respondentstatedthatthepetition
filed by defendants Umali and ALPAP has already been denied by the Court in a
[7]
resolutiondated17January2001.

On 20 August 2003, the Court resolved to give due course to the petition and
required the parties to submit their respective memoranda within thirty (30) days from
[8] [9]
notice. Bothpetitionersandrespondentcomplied.

Petitionersassignedthefollowingaserrors:

A. THECOURTOFAPPEALSERREDINRULING(1)THATTHELOWER
COURTHADJURISDICTIONOVERTHECASE(ONTHEBASISOFTHE
ORIGINAL COMPLAINT) NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT THE
LOWER COURT HAD EARLIER DISMISSED THE ORIGINAL
COMPLAINT FOR ITS FAILURE TO CONFER JURISDICTION UPON
THJE COURT AND (2) THAT THE AMENDED COMPLAINT WAS
PROPERLYALLOWEDORADMITTEDBECAUSETHELOWERCOURT
WASNEVERDIVESTEDOFJURISDICTIONOVERTHECASE

B. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE
ORIGINAL COMPLAINT OF RESPONDENT WAS AMENDED
PURPOSELY TO CONFER UPON THE LOWER COURT JURISDICTION
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[10]
OVERTHECASE.



PetitionersstatethatArticle360oftheRevisedPenalCodevestsjurisdictionover
allcivilandcriminalcomplaintsforlibelontheRTCoftheplace:(1)wherethelibelous
articlewasprintedandfirstpublishedor(2)wherethecomplainant,ifaprivateperson,
resides or (3) where the complainant, if a public official, holds office. They argue that
sincetheoriginalcomplaintonlycontainedtheofficeaddressofrespondentandnotthe
latters actual residence or the place where the allegedly offending news reports were
printed and first published, the original complaint, by reason of the deficiencies in its
allegations,failedtoconferjurisdictiononthelowercourt.

The question to be resolved is: Did the lower court acquire jurisdiction over the
civilcaseuponthefilingoftheoriginalcomplaintfordamages?

Weruleintheaffirmative.

It is settled that jurisdiction is conferred by law based on the facts alleged in the

complaint sincethelattercomprisesaconcisestatementoftheultimatefactsconstituting
[11]
the plaintiff's causes of action. In the case at bar, after examining the original
complaint, we find that the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the case when the case was
filed before it. From the allegations thereof, respondents cause of action is for damages
arising from libel, the jurisdiction of which is vested with the RTC. Article 360 of the
[12]
Revised Penal Code provides that it is a Court of First Instance that is specifically
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[13]
designatedtotryalibelcase.

Petitioners are confusing jurisdiction with venue. A former colleague, the Hon.
[14]
FlorenzD.Regalado, differentiatedjurisdictionandvenueasfollows:(a)Jurisdiction
istheauthoritytohearanddetermineacasevenueistheplacewherethecaseistobe
heardortried(b)Jurisdictionisamatterofsubstantivelawvenue,ofprocedurallaw(c)
Jurisdiction establishes a relation between the court and the subject matter venue, a
relationbetweenplaintiffanddefendant,orpetitionerandrespondentand,(d)Jurisdiction
isfixedbylawandcannotbeconferredbythepartiesvenuemaybeconferredbytheact
oragreementoftheparties.

Inthecaseatbar,theadditionalallegationsintheAmendedComplaintthatthearticleand
thecaricaturewereprintedandfirstpublishedintheCityofMakatireferredonlytothe
questionofvenueandnotjurisdiction.Theseadditionalallegationswouldneitherconfer
jurisdictionontheRTCnorwouldrespondentsfailuretoincludethesameintheoriginal
complaintdivestthelowercourtofitsjurisdictionoverthecase.Respondentsfailureto
allegetheseallegationsgavethelowercourtthepower,uponmotionbyaparty,todismiss
thecomplaintonthegroundthatvenuewasnotproperlylaid.

[15]
InLaquianv.Baltazar, thisCourtconstruedthetermjurisdictioninArticle360
oftheRevisedPenalCodeasreferringtotheplacewhereactionsforlibelshallbefiledor
venue.

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[16] [17]
InEscribanov.Avila, pursuanttoRepublicActNo.4363, welaiddownthe
followingrulesonthevenueofthecriminalandcivilactionsinwrittendefamations.

1. General rule: The action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of the
province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published or where
any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the
offense.

2. If the offended party is a public officer with office in Manila at the time the
offense was committed, the venue is Manila or the city or province where the
libelousarticleisprintedandfirstpublished.

3. Where an offended party is a public official with office outside of Manila, the
venueistheprovinceorthecitywhereheheldofficeatthetimeofthecommission
oftheoffenseorwherethelibelousarticleisprintedandfirstpublished.

4.Ifanoffendedpartyisaprivateperson,thevenueishisplaceofresidenceatthe
timeofthecommissionoftheoffenseorwherethelibelousarticleisprintedand
firstpublished.

Thecommonfeatureoftheforegoingrulesisthatwhethertheoffendedpartyisa
publicofficeroraprivateperson,hehasalwaystheoptiontofiletheactioninthe
CourtofFirstInstanceoftheprovinceorcitywherethelibelousarticleisprinted
orfirstpublished.



[18]
Wefurtherrestated therulesonvenueinArticle360asfollows:

1. Whether the offended party is a public official or a private person, the
criminalactionmaybefiledintheCourtofFirstInstanceoftheprovinceorcity
wherethelibelousarticleisprintedandfirstpublished.

2.Iftheoffendedpartyisaprivateindividual,thecriminalactionmayalso
befiledintheCourtofFirstInstanceoftheprovincewhereheactuallyresidedat
thetimeofthecommissionoftheoffense.

3.IftheoffendedpartyisapublicofficerwhoseofficeisinManilaatthe
timeofthecommissionoftheoffense,theactionmaybefiledintheCourtofFirst
InstanceofManila.
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4. If the offended party is a public officer holding office outside of Manila, the
action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he held
officeatthetimeofthecommissionoftheoffense.



WefullyagreewiththeCourtofAppealswhenitruled:

Wenotethattheamendedcomplaintoramendmenttothecomplaintwasnot
intendedtovestjurisdictiontothelowercourt,whereoriginallyithadnone.The
amendment was merely to establish the proper venue for the action. It is a well
establishedrulethatvenuehasnothingtodowithjurisdiction,exceptincriminal
actions.Assumingthatvenuewereproperlylaidinthecourtwheretheactionwas
instituted, that would be procedural, not a jurisdictional impediment. In fact, in
civilcases,venuemaybewaived.

Consequently,bydismissingthecaseonthegroundofimpropervenue,the
lower court had jurisdiction over the case. Apparently, the herein petitioners
recognized this jurisdiction by filing their answers to the complaint, albeit,
questioningtheproprietyofvenue,insteadofamotiontodismiss.

...

We so hold that dismissal of the complaint by the lower court was proper
considering that the complaint, indeed, on its face, failed to allege neither the
residence of the complainant nor the place where the libelous article was printed
andfirstpublished.Nevertheless,beforethefinalityofthedismissal,thesamemay
still be amended as in fact the amended complaint was admitted, in view of the
court a quos jurisdiction, of which it was never divested. In so doing, the court
[19]
actedproperlyandwithoutanygraveabuseofdiscretion.



ItiselementarythatobjectionstovenueinCIVILACTIONSarisingfromlibelmay
be waived since they do not involve a question of jurisdiction. The laying of venue is
proceduralratherthansubstantive,relatingasitdoestojurisdictionofthecourtoverthe
[20]
personratherthanthesubjectmatter.Venuerelatestotrialandnottojurisdiction. Itis
a procedural, not a jurisdictional, matter. It relates to the place of trial or geographical
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locationinwhichanactionorproceedingshouldbebroughtandnottothejurisdictionof
[21]
thecourt. It is meant to provide convenience to the parties, rather than restrict their
[22]
access to the courts as it relates to the place of trial. In contrast, in CRIMINAL
ACTIONS,itisfundamentalthatvenueisjurisdictionalitbeinganessentialelementof
[23]
jurisdiction.

Petitionersargumentthatthelowercourthasnojurisdictionoverthecasebecause
respondent failed to allege the place where the libelous articles were printed and first
publishedwouldhavebeentenableifthecasefiledwereacriminalcase.Thefailureof
the original complaint to contain such information would be fatal because this fact
involvestheissueofvenuewhichgoesintotheterritorialjurisdictionofthecourt.Thisis
nottobebecausethecasebeforeusisacivilactionwherevenueisnotjurisdictional.

[24]
The cases cited by petitioners are not applicable here. These cases involve
amendments on complaints that confer jurisdiction on courts over which they originally
had none. This is not true in the case at bar. As discussed above, the RTC acquired
jurisdictionoverthesubjectmatteruponthefilingoftheoriginalcomplaint.Itdidnotlose
jurisdiction over the same when it dismissed it on the ground of improper venue. The
amendmentmerelylaiddownthepropervenueofthecase.

WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the decision of the Court of Appeals
dated19April2000isAFFIRMEDintoto.Nocosts.

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SOORDERED.

MINITAV.CHICONAZARIO
AssociateJustice








WECONCUR:


REYNATOS.PUNO
AssociateJustice
Chairman



MA.ALICIAAUSTRIAMARTINEZ ROMEOJ.CALLEJO,SR.
AssociateJustice AssociateJustice



DANTEO.TINGA
AssociateJustice



ATTESTATION

IattestthattheconclusionsintheaboveDecisionwerereachedinconsultationbeforethe
casewasassignedtothewriteroftheopinionoftheCourtsDivision.

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REYNATOS.PUNO
AssociateJustice
Chairman,SecondDivision








CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division Chairmans
Attestation,itisherebycertifiedthattheconclusionsintheaboveDecisionwerereached
in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.



HILARIOG.DAVIDE,JR.
ChiefJustice

[1]
Rollo,pp.124132PennedbyAssociateJusticeBernardoP.AbesamiswithAssociateJusticesEugenioS.Labitoriaand
ElviJohnS.Asuncion,concurring.
[2]
Id.at146.
[3]
Id.at147.
[4]
Id.at162175.
[5]
Id.at185194.
[6]
EntitledAirlinePilotsAssociationofthePhilippines,Inc.v.LucioTan,G.R.Nos.14528283.
[7]
Rollo,pp.181183.
[8]
Id.at196197.
[9]
Id.at202221,223239.
[10]
Rollo,pp.1920.
[11]
Salvav.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.132250,11March1999,304SCRA632,652.
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[12]
The Courts of First Instance were replaced by the Regional Trial Courts under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise
knownasTheJudiciaryReorganizationActof1980.
[13]
Jalandoniv.Endaya,G.R.No.L23894,24January1974,55SCRA261,263Bocobov.Estanislao,G.R.No.L30458,
31August1976,72SCRA520,523SeealsoAdministrativeOrderNo.10496dated21October1996.
[14]
RemedialLawCompendium,Vol.1,SixthRevisedEd.,p.6.
[15]
G.R.No.L27514,18February1970,31SCRA552,555.
[16]
G.R.No.L30375,12September1978,85SCRA245,253254.
[17]
AnActtoFurtherAmendArticleThreeHundredSixtyoftheRevisedPenalCode,approved19June1965.
[18]
Agbayaniv.Sayo,G.R.No.L47880,30April1979,89SCRA699,705.
[19]
Rollo,pp.130131.
[20]
Diazv.Adiong,G.R.No.106847,5March1993,219SCRA631,637.
[21]
PhilippineBankingCorporationv.Tensuan,G.R.No.104649,28February1994,230SCRA413,416.
[22]
Rudolf Lietz Holdings, Inc. v. The Registry of Deeds of Paraaque City, G.R. No. 133240, 15 November 2000, 344
SCRA680PhilippineBankingCorporationv.Tensuan,Ibid.TheHeirsofPedroLopezv.DeCastro,G.R.No.
112905,3February2000,324SCRA591.
[23]
Cudiav.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.110315,16January1998,284SCRA173Peoplev.Amadore,G.R.Nos.140669
75and140691,20April2001,357SCRA316Balindongv.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.159962,16December
2004,447SCRA200Peoplev.MetropolitanTrialCourtofQuezonCity,Br.32,G.R.No.123263,16December
1996,265SCRA645UnimasterConglomeration,Inc.v.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.119657,07February1997,
267SCRA759.
[24]
Rosariov.Carandang,96Phil.845CamposRuedaCorp.v.Bautista,G.R.No.L18453,29September1962,6SCRA
240Tamayov.SanMiguelBrewery,Inc.,G.R.No.L17749,31January1964,10SCRA115Gasparv.Dorado,
G.R.No.L17884,29November1965,15SCRA331Versozav.Versoza,G.R.No.L25609,27November1968,
26SCRA78PrudenceRealtyandDevelopmentCorp.v.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.110274,21March1994,231
SCRA379Alvarezv.TheCommonwealthofthePhilippines,65Phil.302.

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