Lacson-Magallanes Co., Inc. vs Jose Pao President.

In this case, no reprobation was made hence the decision granting

the land to Pao cannot be reversed.
21 SCRA 895 Political Law Delegation of Control Power to the Executive
Secretary Aratuc vs Comelec

FACTS: G.R. No. L-49705-09 February 8, 1979

Jose Magallanes was permitted to use and occupy a land used for pasture in
Davao. The said land was a forest zone which was later declared as an Facts:
agricultural zone. Magallanes then ceded his rights to Lacson-Magallanes Petitioner Aratuc filed a petition for certiorari, to review the decision of
Co., Inc. (LMC) of which he is a co-owner. respondent Comelec.A supervening panel headed by Comelec had
conducted hearings of the complaints of the petitioner therein alleged
Jose Pao was a farmer who asserted his claim over the same piece of land. irregularities in the election records. In order for the Commission to decide
The Director of Lands denied Paos request. The Secretary of Agriculture properly. It will have to go deep into the examination of the voting records
likewise denied his petition hence it was elevated to the Office of the and registration records and it will have to interview and getstatements from
President. persons under oath from the area to determine whether actual voting took
Executive Secretary Juan Pajo ruled in favor of Pao. LMC averred that the place. The Comelec then rendered its resolution being assailed in these
earlier decision of the Secretary of Agriculture is already conclusive hence cases, declaring the final result of the canvass.
beyond appeal. He also averred that the decision of the Executive Secretary
is an undue delegation of power. The Constitution, LMC asserts, does not Issue:
contain any provision whereby the presidential power of control may be Whether the Comelec committee committed grave abuse of discretion
delegated to the Executive Secretary. It is argued that it is the constitutional amounting to lack of jurisdiction?
duty of the President to act personally upon the matter.
Ruling:
ISSUE:
Whether or not the power of control may be delegated to the Executive No.Under section 168 of the revised election code of the 1978 the
Secretary. commission on elections shall have direct control and supervision over the
board of canvassers. In administrative law, a superior body or office having
HELD: supervision or control over another may do directly what the latter is
Yes. It is true that as a rule, the President must exercise his constitutional supposed to do or ought to have done. The petition is hereby dismissed, for
powers in person. However, the president may delegate certain powers to lack of merit.
the Executive Secretary at his discretion. The president may delegate
powers which are not required by the Constitution for him to perform
personally. The reason for this allowance is the fact that the resident is not
expected to perform in person all the multifarious executive and
administrative functions. The office of the Executive Secretary is an auxiliary
unit which assists the President. The rule which has thus gained recognition
is that under our constitutional setup the Executive Secretary who acts for
and in behalf and by authority of the President has an undisputed jurisdiction
to affirm, modify, or even reverse any order that the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources, including the Director of Lands, may issue.
The act of the Executive Secretary, acting as the alter ego of the President,
shall remain valid until reversed, disapproved, or reprobated by the

Lianga Bay Logging, Co., Inc. v. Enage,
G.R. No. L-30637, July 16, 1987
Facts: The parties are both forest concessionaries whose licensed areas are
adjacent to each other. Since the concessions of petitioner and respondent
are adjacent to each other, they have a common boundary. Reports of
encroachment by both parties on each others concessions triggered a
survey to establish the common boundary of the respective concession areas
and was held that the claim of Ago Timber Corporation runs counter to the
intentions of the Office granting the Timber License Agreement to Lianga Bay
Logging.
Ago Timber appealed to Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources
and set aside the appealed decision of the Director of Forestry and ruled in
favor of Ago. Lianga Bay Logging elevated the case to office of President and
ruling of Agriculture and Natural Resources was affirmed. On Motion for
Recon, decision was reversed and reinstated decision of Director of Forestry.
The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, as department head,
may repeal or modify the decision of the Director of Forestry when advisable
in the public interests, whose decision is in turn appealable to the Office of
the President.
For the respondent court to consider and weigh again the evidence already
presented and passed upon by said officials would be to allow it to substitute
its judgment for that of said officials who are in a better position to consider
and weigh the same in the light of the authority specifically vested in them by
law.
It is a well-settled doctrine that the courts of justice will generally not interfere
with purely administrative matters which are addressed to the sound
discretion of government agencies and their expertise unless there is a clear
showing that the latter acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion or
when they have acted in a capricious and whimsical manner such that their
action may amount to an excess or lack of jurisdiction.

A civil action was instituted by Ago Timber to determine the correct boundary
line of license timber areas. TRO was set in place. Lianga brought the case
to SC on certiorari.

Issue: WON respondent court has jurisdiction over the administrative case

Held: Respondent Judge erred in taking cognizance of the complaint filed by

respondent Ago, asking for the determination anew of the correct boundary
line of its licensed timber area, for the same issue had already been
determined by the Director of Forestry, the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources and the Office of the President, administrative officials
under whose jurisdictions the matter properly belongs.

Section 1816 of the Revised Administrative Code vests in the Bureau of

Forestry, the jurisdiction and authority over the demarcation, protection,
management, reproduction, reforestation, occupancy, and use of all public
forests and forest reserves and over the granting of licenses for game and
fish, and for the taking of forest products, including stone and earth
therefrom.

Gualberto De La Llana vs Manuel Alba
112 SCRA 294 Political law Constitutional Law Political Question if
there is no question of law involved BP 129
FACTS: In 1981, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, entitled An Act Reorganizing
the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for Other Purposes, was
passed. Gualberto De la Llana, a judge in Olongapo, was assailing its validity
because, first of all, he would be one of the judges that would be removed
because of the reorganization and second, he said such law would
contravene the constitutional provision which provides the security of tenure
of judges of the courts. He averred that only the Supreme Court can remove
judges NOT the Congress.
ISSUE: Whether or not a judge like Judge De La Llana can be validly
removed by the legislature by such statute (BP 129).
HELD: Yes. The SC ruled the following way: Moreover, this Court is
empowered to discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least
eight members, order their dismissal. Thus it possesses the competence to
remove judges. Under the Judiciary Act, it was the President who was vested
with such power. Removal is, of course, to be distinguished from
termination by virtue of the abolition of the office. There can be no
tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no
occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who
would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the
standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of security of
tenure does not arise. Nonetheless, for the incumbents of inferior courts
abolished, the effect is one of separation. As to its effect, no distinction exists
between removal and the abolition of the office. Realistically, it is devoid of
significance. He ceases to be a member of the judiciary. In the
implementation of the assailed legislation, therefore, it would be in
accordance with accepted principles of constitutional construction that as far
as incumbent justices and judges are concerned, this Court be consulted
and that its view be accorded the fullest consideration. No fear need be
entertained that there is a failure to accord respect to the basic principle that
this Court does not render advisory opinions. No question of law is
involved. If such were the case, certainly this Court could not have its say
prior to the action taken by either of the two departments. Even then, it could
do so but only by way of deciding a case where the matter has been put in
issue. Neither is there any intrusion into who shall be appointed to the vacant
positions created by the reorganization. That remains in the hands of the
Executive to whom it properly belongs. There is no departure therefore from
the tried and tested ways of judicial power. Rather what is sought to be
achieved by this liberal interpretation is to preclude any plausibility to the
charge that in the exercise of the conceded power of reorganizing the inferior
courts, the power of removal of the present incumbents vested in this
Tribunal is ignored or disregarded. The challenged Act would thus be free
from any unconstitutional taint, even one not readily discernible except to
those predisposed to view it with distrust. Moreover, such a construction
would be in accordance with the basic principle that in the choice of
alternatives between one which would save and another which would
invalidate a statute, the former is to be preferred.
De la Llana vs. Alba, 112 SCRA 294 (1982)
>
The issue in this case is whether or not B.P. 129, An Act Reorganizing the
Judiciary, is unconstitutional, considering that in the time-honored principle
protected and safeguarded by the constitution the judiciary is supposed to be
independent from legislative will. Does the reorganization violate the security
of tenure of justices and judges as provided for under the Constitution?
HELD:
Nothing is better settled in our law than that the abolition of an office within
the competence of a legitimate body if done in good faith suffers from no
infirmity. What is really involved in this case is not the removal or separation
of the judges and justices from their services. What is important is the validity
of the abolition of their offices.
It is a well-known rule that valid abolition of offices is neither removal nor
separation of the incumbents. Of course, if the abolition is void, the
incumbent is deemed never to have ceased to hold office. As well-settled as
the rule that the abolition of an office does not amount to an illegal removal of
its incumbent is the principle that, in order to be valid, the abolition must be
made in good faith.
Removal is to be distinguished from termination by virtue of valid abolition of
the office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition,
there is in law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an
occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from the
standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of security of tenure
does not arise.
U.S. v. Dorr
G.R. 1051 May 19, 1903
FACTS:
1. Herein respondents were alleged to have committed an offense of
writing, publishing and circulating scurrilous libel against the
Government of the U.S. and the Insular Government of the
Philippine Islands in violation of Section 8, Act 292 of the Commission.
2. The alleged libel was published in Manila Freedom issue dated 06
April 1902 as an editorial issue.
3. The editorial is about the appointment of rascal natives (Filipinos) to
important Government positions by the Civil Commission (CC for
brevity).
The following are part of the article:
the Civil Commission has, in its distribution of offices, constituted a
protectorate over a set of men who should be in jail or deportedxxxthis
kind of foolish work that the Commission is doing all over the Island,
reinstating insurgents and rogues and turning down the men who have
during struggle, at the risk of their lives, aided the Americans.
The commission has exalted to the highest position in the Islands Filipinos
who are alleged to be notoriously corrupt and rascally, and men of no
personal character.
it is a notorious fact that many branches of the Government organized by
the Civil Commission are rotten and corruptxxx.
4. Article 292, section 8 has provided modes for committing an offense
against it. However, albeit the article has a virulent attack against the
policy of the CC, the complaint in question cannot be regarded as
having a tendency to produce anything like what may be called
disaffection or a state of feeling incompatible with a disposition to
remain loyal to the Government and obedient to the laws.
5. There is a question as how the term the Insular Government of the
Phil. Islands, is used in Section 8, Art. 292. Is it defined as the existing
law and institutions of the Islands or the aggregate of the individuals
by whom the government of the Islands is administered?
ISSUE: Whether the Article published by the respondents is in violation of the
Art. 292 for it directly attacks the U.S. government and the Insular
Government of the Phil. Island?
RULING:
1. In modern political science, the term government is defined as the
institution or aggregate of institutions by which an independent society
makes and carries out those rulesxxxthe government is the
aggregation of authorities which rule a society (administration).[1]
2. On the other hand, the Sedition Act of 1798, the term government is
used in an abstract sense (e.q. President, Congress), meaning the
existing political system, its laws and institutions. The Court opines that
it is in this sense that the term is used in the enactment (Art. 292) under
consideration.
3. Hence, in Art. 292, the meaning of Insular of the Government of the
Phil. Islands is the government as a system, however, the article in
questions attacks the government as the aggregate of public officials
who run it.
4. The Court ruled that the article in question contains no attack upon
the governmental system of the U.S., by which the authority of the U.S.
is enforced in these Islands per se. In this case, it is the character of
men who are entrusted with the administration of the government which
the writer wants to bring disrepute due to their motives, public integrity,
and private morals and wisdoms of their policy. The publication does
not constitute any seditious tendency being apparent to be in violation
of Art. 292.
Respondents are acquitted.
[1] ADMINISTRATION the aggregate of persons in whose hands the reins
of government are for the time being.

G.R. No. L-10759 May 20, 1957
LEONARDO MONTES, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
THE CIVIL SERVICE BOARD OF APPEALS and THE SECRETARY OF
PUBLIC WORKS AND COMMUNICATIONS, respondents-appellees.
Petitioner-appellant was on and before January, 1953, a watchman of the
Floating Equipment Section, Ports and Harbors Division, Bureau of Public
Works. In Administrative Case No. R-8182 instituted against him for
negligence in the performance of duty (Dredge No. 6 under him had sunk
because of water in the bilge, which he did not pump out while under his
care), the Commissioner of Civil Service exonerated him, on the basis of
findings made by a committee. But the Civil Service Board of Appeals
modified the decision, finding petitioner guilty of contributory negligence in
not pumping the water from the bilge, and ordered that he be considered
resigned effective his last day of duty with pay, without prejudice to
reinstatement at the discretion of the appointing officer.
Petitioner filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila to review the
decision, but the said court dismissed the action on a motion to dismiss, on
the ground that petitioner had not exhausted all his administrative remedies
before he instituted the action. The case is now before us on appeal against
the order of dismissal.
The law which was applied by the lower court is Section 2 of Commonwealth
Act No. 598, which provides:
The Civil Service Board of Appeals shall have the power and
authority to hear and decide all administrative cases brought before it
on appeal, and its decisions in such cases shall be final, unless
revised or modified by the President of the Philippines.
It is urged on the appeal that there is no duty imposed on a party against
whom a decision has been rendered by the Civil Service Board of Appeals to
appeal to the President, and that the tendency of the courts has been not to
subject the decision of the President to judicial review. It is further argued
that if decisions of the Auditor General may be appealed to the courts, those
of the Civil Service Board of Appeals need not be acted upon by the
President also, before recourse may be had to the courts because such a
courts. It is also argued that if a case is appealed to the President, his action
should be final and not reviewable by the courts because such a course of
action, would be derogatory to the high office of the President.
The objection to a judicial review of a Presidential act arises from a failure to
recognize the most important principle in our system of government, i.e., the
separation of powers into three co-equal departments, the executive, the
legislative and the judicial, each supreme within its own assigned powers and
duties. When a presidential act is challenged before the courts of justice, it is
not to be implied therefrom that the Executive is being made subject and
subordinate to the courts. The legality of his acts are under judicial review,
not because the Executive is inferior to the courts, but because the law is
above the Chief Executive himself, and the courts seek only to interpret,
apply or implement it (the law). A judicial review of the President's decision
on a case of an employee decided by the Civil Service Board of Appeals
should be viewed in this light and the bringing of the case to the courts
should be governed by the same principles as govern the judicial review of
all administrative acts of all administrative officers.
The doctrine of exhaustion, of administrative remedies requires where an
administrative remedy is provided by statute, as in this case, relief must be
sought by exhausting this remedy before the courts will act. (42 Am. Jur. 580-
581.) The doctrine is a device based on considerations of comity and
convenience. If a remedy is still available within the administrative machinery,
this should be resorted to before resort can be made to the courts, not only to
give the administrative agency opportunity to decide the matter by itself
correctly, but also to prevent unnecessary and premature resort to the courts.
(Ibid.)
Section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 598 above-quoted is a clear expression
of the policy or principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies. If the
President, under whom the Civil Service directly falls in our administrative
system as head of the executive department, may be able to grant the
remedy that petitioner pursues, reasons of comity and orderly procedure
demand that resort be made to him before recourse can be had to the courts.
We have applied this same rule in De la Paz, vs. Alcaraz, et al., 99 Phil., 130,
52 Off. Gaz., 3037, Miguel et al., vs. Reyes, et al., 93 Phil., 542, and
especially in Ang Tuan Kai & Co. vs. The Import Control Commission, 91
Phil., 143, and we are loathe to deviate from the rule we have consistently
followed, especially in view of the express provision of the law (section 2,
Commonwealth Act No. 598).
The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellant.
The Civil Service Board of Appeals shall have the power and authority to
hear and decide all administrative cases brought before it on appeal, and its
decisions in such cases shall be final, unless revised or modified by the
President of the Philippines.

The above-mentioned provision is a clear expression of the policy or principle

Leonardo Montes vs. The Civil Service Board of Appeals, et.al.
of exhaustion of administrative remedies. If the President, under whom the
G.R. No. L-10759 20 May 1957
Civil Service directly falls in our administrative system as head of the
executive department, may be able to grant the remedy that petitioner
TOPIC: Principle of Exhaustion of Admin Remedies
pursues, reasons of comity and orderly procedure demand that resort be
made to him before recourse can be had to the courts.
FACTS: In Administratice Case No. R-8182 instituted against Montes for
negligence in the performance of duty as a watchman of the Floating
Equipment Section, Ports and Harbours Division of Bureau of Public Works,
the Commissioner of Civil Service exonerated him on the basis of findings
made by a committee. On appeal, the Civil Service Board of Appeals
modified the decision, finding petitioner guilty of contributory negligence in
not pumping the water from the bilge which sunk the dredge under his watch,
and ordered that he be considered resigned effective his last day of duty with
pay, without prejudice to reinstatement at the discretion of the appointing
officer.

Petitioner files an action before the Court of First Instance of Manila to review
the decision. On a Motion to Dismiss, the said court dismissed the action on
the ground that petitioner had not exhausted all his administrative remedies
before he instituted the action as provided in Section 2 of Commonwealth Act
598. Montes argued that there is no duty imposed upon him to appeal to the
President. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not Montes erred in filing the action immediately before
the Court of First Instance of Manila instead of filing an appeal before the
President of the Philippines?

HELD: The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires where

an administrative remedy is provided by statute, as in this case, relief must
be sought by exhausting this remedy before the courts will act. The doctrine
is a device based on considerations of comity and convenience. If a remedy
is still available within the administrative machinery, this should be resorted
to before resort can be made to the courts, not only to give the administrative
agency opportunity to decide the matter by itself correctly, but also to prevent
unnecessary and premature resort to the courts.

Section 2 of Commonwealth Act 598 provides that:


THE UNITED RESIDENTS OF DOMINICAN HILL, INC., vs. COMMISSION ON
THE SETTLEMENT OF LAND PROBLEMS
G.R. No. 135945
March 7, 2001
TOPIC: AN EXECUTIVE AGENCY IS NOT A COURT.
FACTS: Dominican Hills, formerly registered as Diplomat Hills in Baguio City,
was mortgaged to the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB). It was eventually
foreclosed and acquired later on by the said bank as the highest bidder. On 11
April 1983, through its President Eduardo Cojuangco Jr., the subject property
was donated to the Republic of the Philippines. The deed of donation stipulated
that Dominican Hills would be utilized for the "priority programs, projects,
activities in human settlements and economic development and governmental
purposes" of the Ministry of Human Settlements.
On December 12, 1986, then President Corazon Aquino issued EO 85 abolishing
the Ministry of Human Settlements. All agencies under the its supervision as well
as all its assets, programs and projects, were transferred to the Presidential
Management Staff (PMS).
On 18 October 1988, United (Dominican Hills) submitted its application before
the PMS to acquire a portion of the Dominican Hills property. In a MOA, PMS
and United agreed that the latter may purchase a portion of the said property
from HOME INSURANCE GUARANTY CORPORATIO, acting as originator, on a
selling price of P75.00 per square meter.
Thus, on June 12, 1991, HIGC sold 2.48 hectares of the property to UNITED.
The deed of conditional sale provided that ten (10) per cent of the purchase price
would be paid upon signing, with the balance to be amortized within one year
from its date of execution. After UNITED made its final payment on January 31,
1992, HIGC executed a Deed of Absolute Sale dated July 1, 1992.
Petitioner alleges that sometime in 1993, private respondents entered the
Dominican Hills property allocated to UNITED and constructed houses thereon.
Petitioner was able to secure a demolition order from the city mayor. Unable to
stop the razing of their houses, private respondents, under the name
DOMINICAN HILL BAGUIO RESIDENTS HOMELESS ASSOCIATION
(ASSOCIATION, for brevity) filed an actionfor injunction before RTC Baguio City.
Private respondents were able to obtain a temporary restraining order but their
prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction was later denied.
The ASSOCIATION filed a separate civil case for damages, injunction and
annulment of the said MOA. It was later on dismissed upon motion of United.
The said Order of dismissal is currently on appeal with the Court of Appeals.
The demolition order was subsequently implemented by the Office of the City
Mayor and the City Engineer's Office of Baguio City. However, petitioner avers
that private respondents returned and reconstructed the demolished structures.
To forestall the re-implementation of the demolition order, private respondents
filed a petition for annulment of contracts with prayer for a temporary restraining
order before the Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP)
against petitioner, HIGC, PMS, the City Engineer's Office, the City Mayor, as well
as the Register of Deeds of Baguio City. On the very same day, public
respondent COSLAP issued the contested order requiring the parties to maintain
the status quo. Without filing a motion for reconsideration from the
aforesaid status quo order, petitioner filed the instant petition questioning the
jurisdiction of the COSLAP.
ISSUE: W/O COSLAP is empowered to hear and try a petition for annulment of
contracts with prayer for a TRO and to issue a status quo order and conduct a
hearing thereof?
RULING: COSLAP is not justified in assuming jurisdiction over the controversy.
It discharges quasi-judicial functions:
"Quasi-judicial function" is a term which applies to the actions, discretion, etc. of
public administrative officers or bodies, who are required to investigate facts, or
ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them,
as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature."
However, it does not depart from its basic nature as an administrative agency,
albeit one that exercises quasi-judicial functions. Still, administrative agencies
are not considered courts; they are neither part of the judicial system nor are they
deemed judicial tribunals. The doctrine of separation of powers observed in our
system of government reposes the three (3) great powers into its three (3)
branches the legislative, the executive, and the judiciary each department
being co-equal and coordinate, and supreme in its own sphere. Accordingly, the
executive department may not, by its own fiat, impose the judgment of one of its
own agencies, upon the judiciary. Indeed, under the expanded jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court, it is empowered "to determine whether or not there has been
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."

United Residents of Dominican Hills vs. Commission on Settlement of Land
Problems, 353 SCRA 782
Quasi-judicial function is a term which applies to the actions, discretion, etc.
of public administrative officers or bodies, who are required to investigate facts,
or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from
them, as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a judicial
nature. However, it does not depart from its basic nature as an administrative
agency, albeit one that exercises quasi-judicial functions. Still, administrative
agencies are not considered courts; they are neither part of the judicial system
nor are they deemed judicial tribunals.
FACTS:
Some 800 public school teachers undertook mass concerted actions to protest
the alleged failure of public authorities to act upon their grievances. The mass
actions consisted in staying away from their classes, converging at the Liwasang
Bonifacio, gathering in peacable assemblies, etc. The Secretary of Education
served them with an order to return to work within 24 hours or face dismissal. For
failure to heed the return-to-work order, eight teachers at the Ramon Magsaysay
High School were administratively charged, preventively suspended for 90 days
pursuant to sec. 41, P.D. 807 and temporarily replaced. An investigation
committee was consequently formed to hear the charges.
When their motion for suspension was denied by the Investigating Committee,
said teachers staged a walkout signifying their intent to boycott the entire
proceedings. Eventually, Secretary Carino decreed dismissal from service of
Esber and the suspension for 9 months of Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo. In
the meantime, a case was filed with RTC, raising the issue of violation of the right
of the striking teachers to due process of law. The case was eventually elevated
to SC. Also in the meantime, the respondent teachers submitted sworn
statements to Commission on Human Rights to complain that while they were
participating in peaceful mass actions, they suddenly learned of their
replacement as teachers, allegedly without notice and consequently for reasons
completely unknown to them.
While the case was pending with CHR, SC promulgated its resolution over the
cases filed with it earlier, upholding the Sec. Carinos act of issuing the return-to-
work orders. Despite this, CHR continued hearing its case and held that the
striking teachers were denied due process of law;they should not have been
replaced without a chance to reply to the administrative charges; there had been
violation of their civil and political rights which the Commission is empowered to
investigate.
ISSUE:
Whether or not CHR has jurisdiction to try and hear the issues involved
HELD:
The threshold question is whether or not the Commission on Human Rights has
the power under the Constitution to do so; whether or not, like a court of justice,
19 or even a quasi-judicial agency, it has jurisdiction or adjudicatory powers over,
or the power to try and decide, or hear and determine, certain specific type of
cases, like alleged human rights violations involving civil or political rights.
The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power;
and that it was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-
judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of
the latter.
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative
power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact
as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But
fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a
court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of
receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a
judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of
receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be
accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to
the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally
and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided
by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.
Power to Investigate
The Constitution clearly and categorically grants to the Commission the power to
investigate all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights. It
can exercise that power on its own initiative or on complaint of any person. It may
exercise that power pursuant to such rules of procedure as it may adopt and, in
cases of violations of said rules, cite for contempt in accordance with the Rules of
Court. In the course of any investigation conducted by it or under its authority, it
may grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose
possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to
determine the truth. It may also request the assistance of any department,
bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its functions, in the conduct of its
investigation or in extending such remedy as may be required by its findings. But
it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts of
justice, or even quasi-judicial bodies do. To investigate is not to adjudicate or
adjudge. Whether in the popular or the technical sense, these terms have well
understood and quite distinct meanings.
Investigate vs. Adjudicate
"Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or delve
or probe into, research on, study. The dictionary definition of "investigate" is "to
observe or study closely: inquire into systematically. "to search or inquire into: . . .
to subject to an official probe . . .: to conduct an official inquiry." The purpose of
investigation, of course, is to discover, to find out, to learn, obtain information.
Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of settling, deciding or resolving a
controversy involved in the facts inquired into by application of the law to the
facts established by the inquiry.
on the merits" the question of (a) whether or not the mass concerted actions
engaged in by the teachers constitute and are prohibited or otherwise restricted
by law; (b) whether or not the act of carrying on and taking part in those actions,
and the failure of the teachers to discontinue those actions, and return to their
classes despite the order to this effect by the Secretary of Education, constitute
infractions of relevant rules and regulations warranting administrative disciplinary
sanctions, or are justified by the grievances complained of by them; and (c) what
where the particular acts done by each individual teacher and what sanctions, if
any, may properly be imposed for said acts or omissions.
Who has Power to Adjudicate?
These are matters within the original jurisdiction of the Sec. of Education, being
within the scope of the disciplinary powers granted to him under the Civil Service
Law, and also, within the appellate jurisdiction of the CSC.

The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by
step by patient inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to search into; to
examine and inquire into with care and accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition;
examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" "to inquire; to make an
investigation," "investigation" being in turn describe as "(a)n administrative
function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d
Adm L Sec. 257; . . . an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and
collection of facts concerning a certain matter or matters."
"Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate,
judge, decide, determine, resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary defines the term
as "to settle finally (the rights and duties of the parties to a court case) on the
merits of issues raised: . . . to pass judgment on: settle judicially: . . . act as
judge." And "adjudge" means "to decide or rule upon as a judge or with judicial or
quasi-judicial powers: . . . to award or grant judicially in a case of
controversy . . . ."
Manner of Appeal
Now, it is quite obvious that whether or not the conclusions reached by the
Secretary of Education in disciplinary cases are correct and are adequately
based on substantial evidence; whether or not the proceedings themselves are
void or defective in not having accorded the respondents due process; and
whether or not the Secretary of Education had in truth committed "human rights
violations involving civil and political rights," are matters which may be passed
upon and determined through a motion for reconsideration addressed to the
Secretary Education himself, and in the event of an adverse verdict, may be
reviewed by the Civil Service Commission and eventually the Supreme Court.

In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial
authority. To determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;"
and "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or to
sentence or condemn. . . . Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the entry
of a judgment."

Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power "to
investigate," cannot and should not "try and resolve on the merits" (adjudicate)
the matters involved in Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has
announced it means to do; and it cannot do so even if there be a claim that in the
administrative disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in question, initiated
and conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights had
been transgressed. More particularly, the Commission has no power to "resolve

MACEDA v. ERBDOCTRINE:
The ERB, as an administrative body is not bound by the strict or technical rules
of evidencegoverning court proceedings
FACTS:
Because of the outbreak of the conflict on the Persian Gulf, private respondents
oil companies filed with the ERB their applications on oil price increases. The
ERB granted provisional increase (P1.42 per liter).
Petitioner Maceda filed a petition for Prohibition seeking to nullify this provisional
increase. He claims that the increase in prices has to undergo the requirements
of notice and hearing, however in this case the requirements were not complied
with, and therefore Maceda claims he was deprived of due process.
In reaffirming the increase, the lower court ruled that Executive Order 172 does
not preclude the board from ordering ex-parte, a provisional increase.
These provisional increases, however, will be subject to final disposition of
whether or not it should be made permanent, to reduce or increase it, or to deny
the application. In fact, in the same order which authorized the provision
increase, the ERB set the applications for hearing with due notice to all interested
parties.
Petitioners Maceda failed to appear at said hearing and at the second hearing.
The notice of hearing was also published in newspapers of general circulation.
Hearing for presentation of the evidence commences and the ERB outlined the
procedure to be observed in the reception of evidence
Pursuant to Section 8 of E.O. No. 172, while hearing is indispensable, it does
That the oppositors and the board must have all the evidence-in-chief to be
places on record first then the examination will come later and the cross-
examination will come later.
Maceda claims that this order of relaxed procedure for presentation of proof
resulted in a denial of due process because it deprived him of finishing his cross-
examination of the witnesses.
ISSUE:
W/N Maceda, through this relaxed procedure of presentation of evidence was
deprived of due process.
HELD: NO.
The Solicitor General has pointed out that administrative bodies may relax
the procedures in the introduction of evidence in trials. It is not improper. The
ERB, as an administrative body is not bound by the strict or technical rules of
evidence governing court proceedings. In fact, Section 2, Rule I of the Rules of
Procedure Governing Hearings before the ERB provides that
These rules shall govern pleadings, practice and procedure before the ERB in all
matters of inquiry, study, hearing, investigation and/or any other proceeding
within the jurisdiction of the Board. However, in the broader interest of justice, the
Board may, in any particular matter, except itself from these rules and apply such
suitable procedure as shall promote the objectives of the Order.
Ernesto M. Maceda vs. Energy Regulatory Board, et al.
18 July 1991 :: G.R. No. 96266
FACTS:
Upon the outbreak of the Persian Gulf conflict on August 1990, private
respondents oil companies filed with the ERB their respective applications on
oil price increases. ERB then issued an order granting a provisional increase
of P1.42 per liter. Petitioner Maceda filed a petition for Prohibition seeking to
nullify said increase.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the decisions of the Energy Regulatory Board should be
subject to presidential review.
HELD:
not preclude the Board from ordering a provisional increase subject to final
disposition of whether or not to make it permanent or to reduce or increase it
further or to deny the application. The provisional increase is akin to a
temporary restraining order, which are given ex-parte.
The Court further noted the Solicitor Generals comments that the ERB is
not averse to the idea of a presidential review of its decision, except that
there is no law at present authorizing the same. The Court suggested that it
will be under the scope of the legislative to allow the presidential review of
the decisions of the ERB since, despite its being a quasi-judicial body, it is
still an administrative body under the Office of the President whose
decisions should be appealed to the President under the established
principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies, especially on a matter as
transcendental as oil price increases which affect the lives of almost all
Filipinos.