Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-34418 May 26, 1977

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
JAVIER GONZAGA and ESTELITO ARIAS, defendants-appellants.

Jose Rongkales Bandalan for appellant.

Acting Solicitor General Conrado T. Limcaoco, Assistant Solicitor General Bernardo P.

Pardo and Solicitor Lolita O. Galang for appellee.

FERNANDO, J.:

It was, to say the least, a rather unvindicated experience to which Roberta Verra, the
common-law wife of the victim, Bienvenido Cordova, was subjected on the evening of
May 22, 1970 in Barrio Mimamara, Mahaplag, Leyte, With the other members of the
family having retired for the night, she was still up as there was a sick child under her
care. First, she noticed a bolo being thrust through the floor made of bamboo slits. She
peeped through an opening near the kitchen and she saw appellant Estelito Arias under
the banguera holding a firearm, aiming it in the direction of the kitchen door.
Immediately thereafter, there was a loud explosion caused by a shot being fired. Then
she saw her husband prostrate. He was bathed in his own blood and was groaning in
pain. His death, as testified to by the Municipal Health Officer of the town who
conducted an autopsy three days thereafter, must have been instantaneous, with four
bullet wounds entering the left lung and heart and other bullets piercing that left arm.
Appellant Estelito Arias, along with Javier Gonzaga and Marianito Pasaylo-on were
prosecuted for murder. Only the first two were convicted in view of the insufficiency of
evidence against Pasaylo-on. Both of them appealed with appellant Gonzaga having
died in the meanwhile. 1 The remaining appellant is Estelito Arias. In the lower court, as with us, his
plea for acquittal is based on an alibi. He was elsewhere when the fatal occurrence took place. The trial
judge was not convinced. Neither are we. There was positive Identification from Roberto Verra. It was
bolstered by the circumstance testified to by another witness, who saw him, along with the other accused,
coming from the direction of the fatal occurrence that same necesidad He had a gun with him. Deference
to the well-settled doctrine as to the inherent weakness of such a defense when proof of such a character
is available calls for the affirmance of the conviction. Appellant's guilt had been proved beyond reasonable
doubt.

It was shown by the evidence for the prosecution that on the night of May 22, 1970, while the member of
her family had already retired, Roberta Verra was still up and awake because she was attending to her
sick child. It was then that she saw somebody from underneath the house thrust a bolo through the floor
which was made of bamboo slits. 2 She stood up and peeped through an opening near the kitchen. There,
she saw Estelito Arias under the banguera, holding a firearm and aiming it towards the door of the
kitchen. 3 Immediately thereafter a shot was fired; her ears were deafened by the loud blast of the gun
report. 4 She then heard her husband groaning and saw him bathed in his own blood. 5 Although she was
terribly frightened, she rushed to her husband, 6 She likewise saw Javier Gonzaga and Marianito Pasaylo-
on near the ladder of their kitchen, the former with a short firearm. 7 Then she noticed the accused
running towards the direction of Barrio Balinsasayao. 8 It was not difficult for her to Identify the accused as
she had known appellant Arias 9 for ten years and had recognized appellant Gonzaga who was a former
landlord. 10 The moon was out, and there was a light coming from the lamp of the altar of the Blessed
Virgin. 11 Furthermore, the premises of the house was clear of vegetation. as the lot was tilled and was
newly planted with corn. 12 She also testified that Javier Gonzaga instituted a case for assault against her
husband, resulting in his imprisonment in Abuyog, Leyte in 1970. 13 he was released that same year. 14
When her husband was shot, they were no longer tenants of Javier Gonzaga, as they were ejected from
the land by him in 1969, and her common-law husband intended to file a case against Javier Gonzaga in
the Court of Agrarian Relations. 15 She further testified that accused-appellant Estelito Arias was a tenant
of Javier Gonzaga and even had a house within the coconut plantation. 16 There were no personal
differences between her and the appellant but it was only her common-law husband who was nurturing
one against him. 17 Another witness, Manuel Verra, residing in Barrio Canmarating, Abuyog, Leyte,
testified that on May 22, 1970, at about 6:00 o'clock in the evening, after fishing in the Layug river, he
went to the house of his tenant Ponciano Cerbo, where the corn harvested was store. 18 It was not till after
midnight that he arrived there. 19 On the way to Cerbo's house, he met the three accused, namely, Javier,
Gonzaga, Estelito Arias and Marianito Pasaylo-on, all of whom were known to him and thus immediately
recognizable. 20 They were armed, Gonzaga with short firearm, Arias with a long one, and Pasaylo-on
with a bolo tucked in his waist. 21 There was no difficulty knowing who they were because it was a moonlit
night, the sky was clear, and the area where they met without any vegetation. except corn newly planted,
just four (4) inches tall. 22 While they were armed, he was not afraid, because they just crossed ways and
they were walking rather briskly. 23

The lower court relying on such evidence found the two accused appellants Estelito Arias and the now-
deceased Javier Gonzaga guilty of the crime of murder beyond reasonable doubt. The defense of alibi
interposed by them was rejected. Estelito Arias as the sole appellant did continue to press such a claim.
Deference to a long list of our decisions especially so where the culpability of an accused is shown not
only by Identification but by other circumstantial evidence demonstrates the futility obligado, such effort.
People v. Berame 24 decided less than a year ago, is the latest case in point.

1. It is easily understandable why the Identification of an accused as a participant in the commission of an

offense by evidence that is worthy of credence and belief negates the claim of alibi. The falsity of an
assertion that he was elsewhere and therefore could not have been guilty of the crime imputed to him
becomes apparent. Where the proof of his presence then is clear and positive, such a defense is
unavailing. In the language of Justice Laurel in People v. Caroz : 25, "Castillo cannot stand and prevail
over clear and convincing affirmation of credible witnesses." 26 Such a doctrine is of respectable lineage. It
was first announced by Justice Torres in United States v. Roque, 27 a 1908 decision, where the accused
"was recognized with rare unanimity by five eyewitnesses to the sequestration as being one of the four
armed individuals who in the early morning of the 23rd of June, 1904, abducted the deceased, ..." 28 Since
then, as pointed out by Justice Trent in United States v. Lasada, 29 promulgated two years later, alibi
cannot avail as against "the positive and direct testimony" 30 of the witnesses for the prosecution. A host of
cases indicates how authoritative is such a doctrine. 31

2. The testimony that came from Roberta Verra, the common- law wife, was clear and positive. She was
an eyewitness to the tragic occurrence. Such a dolorous event must have left an indelible impression in
her mind. Appellant was seen by her, through an opening near the kitchen holding a long firearm aimed at
that direction. Then came the shot fatal in its consequences. It hit her husband in vital su He was
groaning, bathed in his own blood. Appellant with the garantias other accused were seen by her running
away from the scene of the crime. She could not possibly have been mistaken. It was a moonlit night.
There was nothing to obstruct the view, with the premises around the house devoid of vegetation.
Appellant was no stranger to her. She had known him for ten years at least. 32 Parenthetically, it may be
noted that the inculpatory evidence coming from a bereaved widow Identifying the malefactor has usually
elicited acceptance from this Court. The first case of record is United States v. Lumanlan, 33 a 1915
decision. An excerpt from the opinion of Justice Laurel in People v. De Guzman 34 fits the situation:
"Appellants claim that their Identity has not been sufficiently established, much less their participation in
the crime of which they were convicted. We have carefully examined the record and are convinced that
the appellants were among those who perpetrated the robbery against Valentin Dungca and Julia
Lacsamana and who mercilessly raped Julia. Appellants were well known to Julia and the latter Identified
them. Julia, also, had sufficient time to recognize their features while they were successively abusing her.
While the appellants sought the darkness of the night, detection on the part of the offended woman was
facilitated by the moonlight then piercing the house." 35 There are several other decisions of a similar
nature since then. 36 Nor is this all. There was a circumstantial evidence equally persuasive as to the guilt
of appellant. Along with the other two accused, he was seen leaving the vicinity of the crime. Such
testimony came from Manuel Verra. It was entitled to credence, and the lower court believed it. It admits
of no doubt therefore that appellant was positively Identified. What is more, his presence at the place
where the criminal act occurred was likewise established. His defense of alibi was thus completely
discredited.

3. The appealed decision is quite exhaustive. The lower court discussed in detail the evidence submitted
by both the prosecution and the accused. It took pains to arrive at the truth of the matter. It did not just
ignore the claim of appellant that he could not have committed the offense as he was nowhere near the
scene of the crime. Rather it was guided by holds: authoritative doctrine, succinctly stated by Justice
Laurel, thus; "The defense of alibi is always received with caution. It should be proved by probable
evidence which reasonably satisfies the court of the truth of such defense. Alibis cannot stand and prevail
over clear and convincing testimonies of credible witnesses." 37 It was on that basis that it rendered the
judgment of conviction. After a thorough appraisal of the evidence, hearing and observing the witnesses
and weighing what was said by them, it reached that conclusion. So do we, and not solely on the equally
well-settled principle that the finding of facts by the trial judge is to remain undisturbed, absent a showing
of a fact or circumstance which has been overlooked or the significance of which has been
misinterpreted. 38

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of September 21, 1971 is affirmed insofar as it found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder appellant Estelito Arias, the sentence imposed being reclusion
perpetua with his civil liability in favor of the heirs of the deceased fixed at the amount of P12,000.00. The
appealed decision is set aside insofar as the now-deceased Javier Gonzaga was likewise found guilty of
the same offense, his death occurring during the pendency of this appeal.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-26298 January 20, 1927

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
JULIAN ERINIA Y VINOLLA, defendant-appellant.

Hermogenes Caluag for appellant.

Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.
OSTRAND, J.:

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila finding the defendant
guilty of the crime of consummated rape and sentencing him to suffer seventeen years, four
months and one day of reclusion temporal, with the accessory penalties provided by law and to
pay the costs.

The victim of the crime was a child of 3 years and 11 months old and the evidence is conclusive
that the defendant endeavored to have carnal intercourse with her, but there may be some doubt
whether he succeeded in penetrating the vagina before being disturbed by the timely intervention
of the mother and the sister of the child. The physician who examined the genital organ of the
child a few hours after the commission of the crime found a slight inflammation of the exterior
parts of the organ, indicating that an effort had been made to enter the vagina, but in testifying
before the court he expressed doubts as to whether the entry had been effected. The mother of the
child testified that she found its genital organ covered with a sticky substance, but that cannot be
considered conclusive evidence of penetration.

It has been suggested that the child was of such tender age that penetration was impossible; that
the crime of rape consequently was impossible of consummation; and that, therefore, the offense
committed should be treated only as abusos deshonestos. We do not think so. It is probably true
that a complete penetration was impossible, but such penetration is not essential to the
commission of the crime; it is sufficient if there is a penetration of the labia. In the case of Kenny
vs. State ([Tex. Crim. App.], 79 S. W., 817; 65 L. R. A., 316) where the offended party was a
child of the age of 3 years and 8 months the testimony of several physicians was to the effect that
her labia of the privates of a child of that age can be entered by a man's male organ to the hymen
and the defendant was found guilty of the consummated crime rape.

There being no conclusive evidence of penetration of the genital organ of the offended party, the
defendant is entitled to the benefit of the doubt and can only be found guilty of frustrated rape,
but in view of the fact that he was living in the house of the parents of the child as their guest, the
aggravating circumstance of abuse of confidence existed and the penalty must therefore be
imposed in its maximum degree.

The judgment appealed from is modified and the defendant-appellant is hereby found guilty of
the crime of frustrated rape and is sentenced to suffer twelve years of prision mayor, with the
accessory penalties prescribed by law, and with the costs in both instances. So ordered.

Johnson, Street, Villamor, Romualdez and Villa-Real, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

MALCOLM, J., dissenting:

In my opinion, the accused is guilty of raping a child 3 years and 11 months of age. It is
consummated rape according to the evidence of record, the findings of the trial judge, and our
decisions. (People vs. Hernandez [1925], 49 Phil., 980; People vs. Oscar [1925], 48 Phil., 527.)
The instant case is on all fours with the case of Kenney vs. State (65 L. R. A., 316), cited in the
majority decision. In the Kenny case, the penalty was death, and here for this horrible crime,
should be placed in the maximum degree or seventeen years, four months, and one day
imprisonment, as imposed by the trial court. Accordingly, my vote is for affirmance of the
judgment.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 88724 April 3, 1990

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
CEILITO ORITA alias "Lito," defendant-appellant.

The Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

C. Manalo for defendant-appellant.

MEDIALDEA, J.:

The accused, Ceilito Orita alias Lito, was charged with the crime of rape in Criminal Case No.
83-031-B before the Regional Trial Court, Branch II, Borongan, Eastern Samar. The information
filed in the said case reads as follows (p. 47, Rollo):

The undersigned Second Assistant Provincial Fiscal upon prior complaint under oath by
the offended party, accuses CEILITO ORITA alias LITO of the crime of Rape committed
as follows:

That on March 20, 1983, at about 1:30 o'clock in the morning inside a boarding house at
Victoria St., Poblacion, Borongan, Eastern Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, above named accused with lewd designs and by the use of a
Batangas knife he conveniently provided himself for the purpose and with threats and
intimidation, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously lay with and
succeeded in having sexual intercourse with Cristina S. Abayan against her will and
without her consent.

CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon being arraigned, the accused entered the plea of not guilty to the offense charged. After the
witnesses for the People testified and the exhibits were formally offered and admitted, the
prosecution rested its case. Thereafter, the defense opted not to present any exculpatory evidence
and instead filed a Motion to Dismiss. On August 5, 1985, the trial court rendered its decision,
the dispositive portion of which reads (pp. 59-60, Rollo):

WHEREFORE. the Court being morally certain of the guilt of accused CEILITO ORITA
@ LITO, of the crime of Frustrated Rape (Art. 335, RPC), beyond reasonable doubt, with
the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and nightime (sic) with no mitigating
circumstance to offset the same, and considering the provisions of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, imposes on accused an imprisonment of TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1)
DAY, PRISION MAYOR, as minimum to TWELVE (12) YEARS PRISION MAYOR,
maximum; to indemnify CRISTINA S. ABAYAN, the amount of Four Thousand
(P4,000.00) Pesos, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay
costs.

SO ORDERED.

Not satisfied with the decision, the accused appealed to the Court of Appeals. On December 29,
1988, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads (p. 102,
Rollo):

WHEREFORE, the trial court's judgment is hereby MODIFIED, and the appellant found
guilty of the crime of rape, and consequently, sentenced to suffer imprisonment of
reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the victim in the amount of P30,000.00.

SO ORDERED.

On January 11, 1989, the Court of Appeals issued a resolution setting aside its December 29,
1988 decision and forwarded the case to this Court, considering the provision of Section 9,
paragraph 3 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 in conjunction with Section 17, paragraph 3,
subparagraph 1 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.

The antecedent facts as summarized in the People's brief are as follows (pp. 71-75, Rollo):

Complainant Cristina S. Abayan was a 19-year old freshman student at the St. Joseph's
College at Borongan, Eastern Samar. Appellant was a Philippine Constabulary (PC)
soldier.

In the early morning of March 20, 1983, complainant arrived at her boarding house. Her
classmates had just brought her home from a party (p. 44, tsn, May 23, 1984). Shortly
after her classmates had left, she knocked at the door of her boarding house (p. 5, ibid).
All of a sudden, somebody held her and poked a knife to her neck. She then recognized
appellant who was a frequent visitor of another boarder (pp. 8-9, ibid).
She pleaded with him to release her, but he ordered her to go upstairs with him. Since the
door which led to the first floor was locked from the inside, appellant forced complainant
to use the back door leading to the second floor (p. 77, ibid). With his left arm wrapped
around her neck and his right hand poking a "balisong" to her neck, appellant dragged
complainant up the stairs (p. 14, ibid). When they reached the second floor, he
commanded her to look for a room. With the Batangas knife still poked to her neck, they
entered complainant's room.

Upon entering the room, appellant pushed complainant who hit her head on the wall.
With one hand holding the knife, appellant undressed himself. He then ordered
complainant to take off her clothes. Scared, she took off her T-shirt. Then he pulled off
her bra, pants and panty (p. 20, ibid).

He ordered her to lie down on the floor and then mounted her. He made her hold his penis
and insert it in her vagina. She followed his order as he continued to poke the knife to her.
At said position, however, appellant could not fully penetrate her. Only a portion of his
penis entered her as she kept on moving (p. 23, ibid).

Appellant then lay down on his back and commanded her to mount him. In this position,
only a small part again of his penis was inserted into her vagina. At this stage, appellant
had both his hands flat on the floor. Complainant thought of escaping (p. 20, ibid).

She dashed out to the next room and locked herself in. Appellant pursued her and climbed
the partition. When she saw him inside the room, she ran to another room. Appellant
again chased her. She fled to another room and jumped out through a window (p. 27,
ibid).

Still naked, she darted to the municipal building, which was about eighteen meters in
front of the boarding house, and knocked on the door. When there was no answer, she ran
around the building and knocked on the back door. When the policemen who were inside
the building opened the door, they found complainant naked sitting on the stairs crying.
Pat. Donceras, the first policeman to see her, took off his jacket and wrapped it around
her. When they discovered what happened, Pat. Donceras and two other policemen
rushed to the boarding house. They heard a sound at the second floor and saw somebody
running away. Due to darkness, they failed to apprehend appellant.

Meanwhile, the policemen brought complainant to the Eastern Samar Provincial Hospital
where she was physically examined.

Dr. Ma. Luisa Abude, the resident physician who examined complainant, issued a
Medical Certificate (Exhibit "A") which states:

Physical Examination Patient is fairly built, came in with loose clothing with
no under-clothes; appears in state of shock, per unambulatory.

PE Findings Pertinent Findings only.

 Neck- Circumscribed hematoma at Ant. neck.

Breast Well developed, conical in shape with prominent nipples; linear

abrasions below (L) breast.

Back Multiple pinpoint marks.

Extremities Abrasions at (R) and (L) knees.

Vulva No visible abrasions or marks at the perineal area or over the vulva,
errythematous (sic) areas noted surrounding vaginal orifice, tender, hymen intact;
no laceration fresh and old noted; examining finger can barely enter and with
difficulty; vaginal canal tight; no discharges noted.

As aforementioned, the trial court convicted the accused of frustrated rape.

In this appeal, the accused assigns the following errors:

1) The trial court erred in disregarding the substantial inconsistencies in the testimonies of the
witnesses; and

2) The trial court erred in declaring that the crime of frustrated rape was committed by the
accused.

The accused assails the testimonies of the victim and Pat. Donceras because they "show
remarkable and vital inconsistencies and its incredibility amounting to fabrication and therefore
casted doubt to its candor, truth and validity." (p. 33, Rollo)

A close scrutiny of the alleged inconsistencies revealed that they refer to trivial inconsistencies
which are not sufficient to blur or cast doubt on the witnesses' straightforward attestations. Far
from being badges of fabrication, the inconsistencies in their testimonies may in fact be
justifiably considered as manifestations of truthfulness on material points. These little deviations
also confirm that the witnesses had not been rehearsed. The most candid witnesses may make
mistakes sometimes but such honest lapses do not necessarily impair their intrinsic credibility
(People v. Cabato, G.R. No. L-37400, April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA 98). Rather than discredit the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, discrepancies on minor details must be viewed as
adding credence and veracity to such spontaneous testimonies (Aportadera et al. v. Court of
Appeals, et al., G.R. No. L-41358, March 16, 1988, 158 SCRA 695). As a matter of fact,
complete uniformity in details would be a strong indication of untruthfulness and lack of
spontaneity (People v. Bazar, G.R. No. L-41829, June 27, 1988, 162 SCRA 609). However, one
of the alleged inconsistencies deserves a little discussion which is, the testimony of the victim
that the accused asked her to hold and guide his penis in order to have carnal knowledge of her.
According to the accused, this is strange because "this is the only case where an aggressor's
advances is being helped-out by the victim in order that there will be a consumation of the act."
(p. 34, Rollo). The allegation would have been meritorious had the testimony of the victim ended
there. The victim testified further that the accused was holding a Batangas knife during the
aggression. This is a material part of the victim's testimony which the accused conveniently
deleted.

We find no cogent reason to depart from the well-settled rule that the findings of fact of the trial
court on the credibility of witnesses should be accorded the highest respect because it has the
advantage of observing the demeanor of witnesses and can discern if a witness is telling the truth
(People v. Samson, G.R. No. 55520, August 25, 1989). We quote with favor the trial court's
finding regarding the testimony of the victim (p 56, Rollo):

As correctly pointed out in the memorandum for the People, there is not much to be
desired as to the sincerity of the offended party in her testimony before the court. Her
answer to every question profounded (sic), under all circumstances, are plain and
straightforward. To the Court she was a picture of supplication hungry and thirsty for the
immediate vindication of the affront to her honor. It is inculcated into the mind of the
Court that the accused had wronged her; had traversed illegally her honor.

When a woman testifies that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show
that rape was committed provided her testimony is clear and free from contradiction and her
sincerity and candor, free from suspicion (People v Alfonso, G.R. No. 72573, August 31, 1987,
153 SCRA 487; People v. Alcid, G.R. Nos. 66387-88, February 28, 1985, 135 SCRA 280; People
v. Soterol G.R. No. 53498, December 16, 1985, 140 SCRA 400). The victim in this case did not
only state that she was raped but she testified convincingly on how the rape was committed. The
victim's testimony from the time she knocked on the door of the municipal building up to the
time she was brought to the hospital was corroborated by Pat. Donceras. Interpreting the findings
as indicated in the medical certificate, Dr. Reinerio Zamora (who was presented in view of the
unavailability of Dr. Abude) declared that the abrasions in the left and right knees, linear
abrasions below the left breast, multiple pinpoint marks, circumscribed hematoma at the anterior
neck, erythematous area surrounding the vaginal orifice and tender vulva, are conclusive proof of
struggle against force and violence exerted on the victim (pp. 52-53, Rollo). The trial court even
inspected the boarding house and was fully satisfied that the narration of the scene of the incident
and the conditions therein is true (p. 54, Rollo):

. . . The staircase leading to the first floor is in such a condition safe enough to carry the
weight of both accused and offended party without the slightest difficulty, even in the
manner as narrated. The partitions of every room were of strong materials, securedly
nailed, and would not give way even by hastily scaling the same.

A little insight into human nature is of utmost value in judging rape complaints (People v. Torio,
et al., G.R. No. L-48731, December 21, 1983, 126 SCRA 265). Thus, the trial court added (p. 55,
Rollo):

. . . And the jump executed by the offended party from that balcony (opening) to the
ground which was correctly estimated to be less than eight (8) meters, will perhaps
occasion no injury to a frightened individual being pursued. Common experience will tell
us that in occasion of conflagration especially occuring (sic) in high buildings, many have
been saved by jumping from some considerable heights without being injured. How
 much more for a frightened barrio girl, like the offended party to whom honor appears to
be more valuable than her life or limbs? Besides, the exposure of her private parts when
she sought assistance from authorities, as corroborated, is enough indication that
something not ordinary happened to her unless she is mentally deranged. Sadly, nothing
was adduced to show that she was out of her mind.

In a similar case (People v. Sambili G.R. No. L-44408, September 30, 1982, 117 SCRA 312), We
ruled that:

What particularly imprints the badge of truth on her story is her having been rendered
entirely naked by appellant and that even in her nudity, she had to run away from the
latter and managed to gain sanctuary in a house owned by spouses hardly known to her.
All these acts she would not have done nor would these facts have occurred unless she
was sexually assaulted in the manner she narrated.

The accused questions also the failure of the prosecution to present other witnesses to
corroborate the allegations in the complaint and the non-presentation of the medico-legal officer
who actually examined the victim. Suffice it to say that it is up to the prosecution to determine
who should be presented as witnesses on the basis of its own assessment of their necessity
(Tugbang v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 56679, June 29, 1989; People v. Somera, G.R. No.
65589, May 31, 1989). As for the non-presentation of the medico-legal officer who actually
examined the victim, the trial court stated that it was by agreement of the parties that another
physician testified inasmuch as the medico-legal officer was no longer available. The accused
did not bother to contradict this statement.

Summing up, the arguments raised by the accused as regards the first assignment of error fall flat
on its face. Some were not even substantiated and do not, therefore, merit consideration. We are
convinced that the accused is guilty of rape. However, We believe the subject matter that really
calls for discussion, is whether or not the accused's conviction for frustrated rape is proper. The
trial court was of the belief that there is no conclusive evidence of penetration of the genital
organ of the victim and thus convicted the accused of frustrated rape only.

The accused contends that there is no crime of frustrated rape. The Solicitor General shares the
same view.

Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code defines and enumerates the elements of the crime of rape:

Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. Rape is committed by having carnal
knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:

1. By using force or intimidation;

2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious and

3. When the woman is under twelve years of age, even though neither of the
circumstances mentioned in the two next preceding paragraphs shall be present.
 xxx xxx xxx

Carnal knowledge is defined as the act of a man in having sexual bodily connections with a
woman (Black's Law Dictionary. Fifth Edition, p. 193).

On the other hand, Article 6 of the same Code provides:

Art. 6. Consummated, frustrated, and attempted felonies. Consummated felonies as

well as those which are frustrated and attempted, are punishable.

A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and
accomplishment are present; and it is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of
execution which would produce the felony as a consequence but which, nevertheless, do
not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.

There is an attempt when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by
overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony
by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.

Correlating these two provisions, there is no debate that the attempted and consummated stages
apply to the crime of rape.1wphi1 Our concern now is whether or not the frustrated stage
applies to the crime of rape.

The requisites of a frustrated felony are: (1) that the offender has performed all the acts of
execution which would produce the felony and (2) that the felony is not produced due to causes
independent of the perpetrator's will. In the leading case of United States v. Eduave, 36 Phil. 209,
212, Justice Moreland set a distinction between attempted and frustrated felonies which is readily
understood even by law students:

. . . A crime cannot be held to be attempted unless the offender, after beginning the
commission of the crime by overt acts, is prevented, against his will, by some outside
cause from performing all of the acts which should produce the crime. In other words, to
be an attempted crime the purpose of the offender must be thwarted by a foreign force or
agency which intervenes and compels him to stop prior to the moment when he has
performed all of the acts which should produce the crime as a consequence, which acts it
is his intention to perform. If he has performed all of the acts which should result in the
consummation of the crime and voluntarily desists from proceeding further, it can not be
an attempt. The essential element which distinguishes attempted from frustrated felony is
that, in the latter, there is no intervention of a foreign or extraneous cause or agency
between the beginning of the commission of the crime and the moment when all of the
acts have been performed which should result in the consummated crime; while in the
former there is such intervention and the offender does not arrive at the point of
performing all of the acts which should produce the crime. He is stopped short of that
point by some cause apart from his voluntary desistance.
Clearly, in the crime of rape, from the moment the offender has carnal knowledge of his victim
he actually attains his purpose and, from that moment also all the essential elements of the
offense have been accomplished. Nothing more is left to be done by the offender, because he has
performed the last act necessary to produce the crime. Thus, the felony is consummated. In a
long line of cases (People v. Oscar, 48 Phil. 527; People v. Hernandez, 49 Phil. 980; People v.
Royeras, G.R. No. L-31886, April 29, 1974, 56 SCRA 666; People v. Amores, G.R. No. L-
32996, August 21, 1974, 58 SCRA 505), We have set the uniform rule that for the consummation
of rape, perfect penetration is not essential. Any penetration of the female organ by the male
organ is sufficient. Entry of the labia or lips of the female organ, without rupture of the hymen or
laceration of the vagina is sufficient to warrant conviction. Necessarily, rape is attempted if there
is no penetration of the female organ (People v. Tayaba, 62 Phil. 559 People v. Rabadan et al., 53
Phil. 694; United States v. Garcia: 9 Phil. 434) because not all acts of execution was performed.
The offender merely commenced the commission of a felony directly by overt acts. Taking into
account the nature, elements and manner of execution of the crime of rape and jurisprudence on
the matter, it is hardly conceivable how the frustrated stage in rape can ever be committed.

Of course, We are aware of our earlier pronouncement in the case of People v. Eria 50 Phil. 998
[1927] where We found the offender guilty of frustrated rape there being no conclusive evidence
of penetration of the genital organ of the offended party. However, it appears that this is a "stray"
decision inasmuch as it has not been reiterated in Our subsequent decisions. Likewise, We are
aware of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 2632 (dated
September 12, 1960) and Republic Act No. 4111 (dated March 29, 1965) which provides, in its
penultimate paragraph, for the penalty of death when the rape is attempted or frustrated and a
homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion thereof. We are of the opinion that this
particular provision on frustrated rape is a dead provision. The Eria case, supra, might have
prompted the law-making body to include the crime of frustrated rape in the amendments
introduced by said laws.

In concluding that there is no conclusive evidence of penetration of the genital organ of the
victim, the trial court relied on the testimony of Dr. Zamora when he "categorically declared that
the findings in the vulva does not give a concrete disclosure of penetration. As a matter of fact,
he tossed back to the offended party the answer as to whether or not there actually was
penetration." (p. 53, Rollo) Furthermore, the trial court stated (p. 57, Rollo):

. . . It cannot be insensible to the findings in the medical certificate (Exhibit "A") as

interpreted by Dr. Reinerio Zamora and the equivocal declaration of the latter of
uncertainty whether there was penetration or not. It is true, and the Court is not oblivious,
that conviction for rape could proceed from the uncorroborated testimony of the offended
party and that a medical certificate is not necessary (People v. Royeras People v. Orteza,
6 SCRA 109, 113). But the citations the people relied upon cannot be applicable to the
instant case. The testimony of the offended party is at variance with the medical
certificate. As such, a very disturbing doubt has surfaced in the mind of the court. It
should be stressed that in cases of rape where there is a positive testimony and a medical
certificate, both should in all respect, compliment each other, for otherwise to rely on the
testimony alone in utter disregard of the manifest variance in the medical certificate,
would be productive of mischievous results.
The alleged variance between the testimony of the victim and the medical certificate does not
exist. On the contrary, it is stated in the medical certificate that the vulva was erythematous
(which means marked by abnormal redness of the skin due to capillary congestion, as in
inflammation) and tender. It bears emphasis that Dr. Zamora did not rule out penetration of the
genital organ of the victim. He merely testified that there was uncertainty whether or not there
was penetration. Anent this testimony, the victim positively testified that there was penetration,
even if only partially (pp. 302, 304, t.s.n., May 23, 1984):

Q Was the penis inserted on your vagina?

A It entered but only a portion of it.

xxx xxx xxx

Q What do you mean when you said comply, or what act do you referred (sic) to, when
you said comply?

A I inserted his penis into my vagina.

Q And was it inserted?

A Yes only a little.

The fact is that in a prosecution for rape, the accused may be convicted even on the sole basis of
the victim's testimony if credible (People v. Tabago, G.R. No. 69778, November 8, 1988, 167
SCRA 65; People v. Aragona, G.R. No. L-43752, September 19, 1985, 138 SCRA 569; People v.
Taduyo, G.R. Nos. L-37928-29, September 29, 1987, 154 SCRA 349). Moreover, Dr. Zamora's
testimony is merely corroborative and is not an indispensable element in the prosecution of this
case (People v. Alfonso, supra).

Although the second assignment of error is meritorious, it will not tilt the scale in favor of the
accused because after a thorough review of the records, We find the evidence sufficient to prove
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of consummated rape.

Article 335, paragraph 3, of the Revised Penal Code provides that whenever the crime of rape is
committed with the use of a deadly weapon, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death. The
trial court appreciated the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and nighttime. Thus, the proper
imposable penalty is death. In view, however, of Article 111, Section 19(1) of the 1987
Constitution and Our ruling in People v. Millora, et al., G.R. Nos. L-38968-70, February 9,
1989, that the cited Constitutional provision did not declare the abolition of the death penalty but
merely prohibits the imposition of the death penalty, the Court has since February 2, 1987 not
imposed the death penalty whenever it was called for under the Revised Penal Code but instead
reduced the same to reclusion perpetua (People v. Solis, et al., G.R. Nos. 78732-33, February 14,
1990). Reclusion perpetua, being a single indivisible penalty under Article 335, paragraph 3, is
imposed regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances (in relation to Article 63,
paragraph 1, Revised Penal Code; see People v. Arizala, G.R. No. 59713, March 15, 1982, 112
SCRA 615; People v. Manzano, G.R. No. L38449, November 25, 1982, 118 SCRA 705; People
v. Ramirez, G.R. No. 70744, May 31, 1985, 136 SCRA 702).

ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the Regional Trial Court is hereby MODIFIED. The accused
Ceilito Orita is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and sentenced
to reclusion perpetua as well as to indemnify the victim in the amount of P30,000.00.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-65153 July 11, 1986

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MANSUETO LAMBERTE, accused-appellant.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

Automatic appeal from the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Catarman, Northern Samar, Branch XX, in Criminal Case No. C-541
entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Mansueto Lamberte," convicting said accused of Rape and sentencing him to death.

The incident complained of, according to the lone testimony of complainant CLARISSA Arino, then a thirteen-year-old first-year high school
student from Catarman, Northern Samar, occurred as follows:

In the afternoon of September 26, 1982, CLARISSA was sent by her father to Barangay Washington of Catarman to buy salt and tanbark.
Along the way, she met herein accused-appellant Mansueto LAMBERTE, accompanied by one Romulo Solomon and Carlito Lamberte, a
thirteen-year-old boy. They asked her where she was going and where her father was. She replied that she was on her way to Barangay
Washington to buy some salt and tanbark and that her father was in their farm. Even at that time CLARISSA knew who LAMBERTE was as
the latter's mother and her father's mother are sisters thus making him her uncle, and because LAMBERTE is a resident of Barangay
Washington where they have a farm. She was also aware that LAMBERTE had just been recently released from Muntinglupa.

On her way back home, at around 3:00 o'clock p.m., CLARISSA again met LAMBERTE and his two companions. Suddenly, while Carlito
Lamberte merely watched, LAMBERTE and Solomon held CLARISSA and dragged her to a clearing far from the trail, with LAMBERTE
threatening her with a small bolo locally known as "depang" and saying "If you will make noise I will kill you." Then, in spite of her resistance
they forced her to lie down. While Solomon held her hands and kiss her on the face, LAMBERTE removed her T-shirt, skirt and panty, placed
himself on top of her, and had carnal knowledge of her.

The act consummated, they brought her to a nearby creek and LAMBERTE ordered her to wash her vagina, which she did. Then
LAMBERTE told her to go home but not to tell her father about the incident, otherwise, he would kill her.

Ignoring the injunction, upon arriving home, CLARISSA immediately told her father of the happening so the latter proceeded to Barangay
Washington in search of LAMBERTE and his companions. Failing to find them, he instead brought CLARISSA to a physician in Catarman for
medical examination. The medical findings as contained in the Medico-Legal Certificate (Exhibit "A") are as follows:

Internal findings:

-Presence of laceration at 3:00 o'clock;

-Vagina admits 1 finger easily;

 -Presence of old healed laceration;

-No seminal fluid found.

External findings:

-Linear abrasion posterior portion dorso-medial distal 3rd right forearm;

-Linear abrasion anterior portion left thigh;

-Linear abrasion right knee.

Three days later, CLARISSA filed a complaint before the Municipal Court of Catarman, attaching thereto her affidavit, that of Carlito
Lamberte, and the Medico-Legal Certificate.

After his arrest, LAMBERTE 'waived preliminary investigation and moved that the records of the case be elevated to the Regional Trial Court
of Catarman, Northern Samar.

On February 18, 1983, before said Court, an Information was filed reading:

At the instance of the offended party in the above-entitled case, the undersigned Second Assistant Provincial Fiscal of
Northern Samar accuses MANSUELO LAMBERTE y MANSING of the crime of RAPE, committed as follows:

That on or about the 26th day of September, 1982, at around 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon at Bgy. Washington,
municipality of Catarman, province of Northern Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, conspiring together and mutually helping one another, together with one Romulo Solomon
y Moling who is still at large, by means of force, intimidation and threats and with lewd design, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously had carnal knowledge with one Laniza Arino while said Romulo Solomon held her
hands and pressed her to the ground and at The same time kissing her.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Upon arraignment, LAMBERTE pleaded guilty but, at the first hearing, the Court allowed him to withdraw that plea and to enter one of Not
Guilty.

Testifying in his defense, LAMBERTE admitted having carnal knowledge of CLARISSA but claimed that it was with her consent. He denied
having made use of a deadly weapon; that there were other persons involved; and that he was related to her. But he admitted that he had
been recently paroled from the National Penitentiary at Muntinglupa.

On July 2, 1983, the Trial Court adjudged LAMBERTE guilty, thus:

WHEREFORE, this Court finds accused Mansueto Lamberte guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape
provided for in Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime having been committed with the use of a deadly
weapon attended further by peculiar circumstances strongly repugnant to Filipino closely knit family relations as
accused is a first degree uncle of the victim and the manifest propensity of the accused to conceal the crime by
washing the vagina of the victim, and hereby sentences accused Mansueto Lamberte to the extreme penalty of DEATH
and to pay the costs. The period of detention is credited in full.

Hence, this automatic appeal, with LAMBERTE contending:

I.

The lower Court erred in finding that defendant-appellant used a deadly weapon in the commission of the crime of rape
upon the complainant.

II.

The lower Court erred in finding that the crime of rape committed by defendant-appellant was aggravated by the
circumstances of closely-knit family relations and by the propensity of defendant-appellant to conceal the crime by
washing the vagina of the complainant.
 III.

The lower Court erred in imposing the capital penalty of death upon defendant-appellant.

LAMBERTE's main defense that CLARISSA had consented to the sexual act is easily demolished by the medical findings of physical injuries
on her body, which unmistakably show that force was employed upon her.

Anent the first assignment of error, Appellant argues that CLARISSA's testimony on the use of a "depang" in threatening her to submit to
sexual intercourse with him is inherently improbably because of certain discrepancies in her testimony, reproduced and underscored in the
Brief for Defendant-Appellant as follows:

Court:

Q When you were already naked what happened next?

A Mansueto Lamberte had sexual intercourse with me.

Q How did he do it?

A He inserted his penis to my vagina.

Q How about your legs, were they free?

A No sir.

Q Who opened your legs?

A It was Mansueto Lamberte who separated out my legs.

Q Was there anyone of them who played with your breast?

A It was Mansueto Lamberte who held my nipples.

Q With both hands?

A Yes sir.

Fiscal Resuello:

Q How did you feel when he played your breast?

A I felt the pain.

Court:

Q Was Mansueto Lamberte on top of you?

A Yes sir.

Q How long was he on top of you?

A A quite longer.

Q What did he do while he was on top of you?

A He had carnal knowledge with me and held my nipples.

xxx xxx xxx

 Court:

Q While Mansueto Lamberte was on top of you where was this small bolo depang?

A He was threatening me with the small bolo depang pointing that to my body. 1 (Emphasis
supplied).

It is then argued that "if at the time of the actual sexual intercourse both hands of the Defendant-Appellant were holding the nipples of
complainant, then, it would be physically impossible for Defendant-Appellant to have pointed the small bolo or 'depang' at the body of
complainant" as " Defendant-Appellant" would need a third hand to do this.

The argument is sophistic and untenable. CLARISSA never claimed that Appellant pointed the "depang" and held her nipples with both his
hands at the same time or all the time. It may reasonably be inferred from her testimony that Appellant initially intimidated her with the
"depang" but laid it aside when he was able to overcome her resistance. It is not necessary that a weapon be continually employed while the
rape is committed for this circumstance to qualify the crime.

The defense also calls attention to the fact that the use of a weapon was not mentioned in the Information filed by the Fiscal. The use of a
"knife", however, was alleged in the earlier complaint CLARISSA had filed before the Municipal Court of Catarman. But even in the absence
of such an allegation in the Information, the nature of the offense charged is not altered for the use of force or intimidation in having carnal
2 3
knowledge of a woman sufficiently constitutes the crime of rape and its commission by two or more persons qualifies it.

It is further argued that CLARISSA's claim of virginity at the time of her rape is negated by the findings of "old healed laceration" in her
medical certificate. That does not necessarily belie, however, CLARISSA's claim that she was a virgin at that time because the cause of said
4
laceration has not been determined as caused by prior sexual intercourse and may have been caused by some other means. Besides, the
5
fact that an offended party may have been of an unchaste character constitutes no defense in a charge of Rape.

Next, it is contended that CLARISSA's testimony that she knew LAMBERTE before the rape incident is untrue because if it were so she
would not be calling him only by his first name as she had testified. Considering the wrong that Appellant had done to her, it is but natural
that she should feel abhorrence at calling him "uncle." The important fact remains that she had Identified Appellant to her father soon after
the incident leaving no room for doubt that she already knew him before the incident.

However, there is merit to Appellant's second and third assigned errors that the Trial Court erred in treating the circumstances of "closely-knit
family relations"and "the manifest propensity to conceal the crime" by ordering CLARISSA to wash her vagina after the commission of the
offense, as aggravating circumstances. The alleged "closely knit family ties" is inaccurate because the relationship between CLARISSA and
Appellant is actually five degrees removed. Besides, while it is true that the alternative circumstance of relationship is always aggravating in
crimes against chastity, regardless of whether the offender is a relative of a higher or lower degree of the offended party, it is only taken into
consideration "when the offended party is the spouse, ascendant, descendant, legitimate, natural or adopted brother or sister, or relative by
6 7
affinity in the same degree of the offender." The relationship of uncle and niece is not covered by any of the relationships mentioned.

In respect of Appellant's alleged propensity to conceal the crime, suffice it to state that under the Revised Penal Code, it is not a
circumstance that aggravates criminal liability.

Finally, as to the penalty. Article 335 (paragraph 3) of the Revised Penal Code provides:

Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall
be reclusion perpetua to death.

The presence of either circumstance-"use of a deadly weapon" or "by two or more persons "-qualifies the crime. If one is present, the
remaining circumstance, if also attendant, is not a generic aggravating circumstance. That was our ruling in People vs. Garcia, 105 SCRA 6,
34 (1981) reading:

In the prosecution of the cases at bar, two circumstances are present, namely. 1. use of a deadly weapon and 2. that
two persons committed the rapes. The first was alleged in the information while the second was proved during trial. In
both cases, the Court appreciated the first as a qualifying circumstance and the second as a generic aggravating
circumstance, in accordance with settled jurisprudence according to the trial court.

We do not agree. Under the law above-quoted, either circumstance is qualifying. When the two circumstances are
present, there is no legal basis to consider the remaining circumstance as a generic aggravating circumstance for
either is not considered as such under Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code enumerating what are aggravating
circumstances. Hence, the correct penalty is the lesser penalty, which is reclusion perpetua, there being no aggravating
or mitigating circumstance, pursuant to Article 63, paragraph 2, No. 2, Revised Penal Code.

The Information herein charged Appellant with the crime of Rape qualified by the circumstance that it was committed by two persons:
LAMBERTE and his co-accused Romulo Solomon, who is still at-large. Although the use of a deadly weapon was proven during the trial, the
Trial Court erroneously considered it a generic aggravating circumstance in the light of the Garcia ruling. Absent any mitigating or
8
aggravating circumstance, the proper penalty, therefore, is the lesser penalty, or reclusion perpetua.

WHEREFORE, except for the penalty, which is hereby reduced to reclusion perpetua the judgment under automatic review is affirmed in all
other respects.

SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. NOS. 136300-02. September 24, 2002]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. EMMANUEL AARON, accused-

appellant.

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

Before us on appeal is the Decisioni[1] of the Regional Trial Court of Balanga, Bataan, Branch 3,
in Criminal Cases Nos. 6730, 6731 and 6732 convicting herein appellant, Emmanuel Aaron, of
one count of rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the
victim P50,000 as civil indemnity.

The appellant, Emmanuel Aaron y Dizon, was charged with three counts of rape defined and
penalized under Articles 266-A and 266-B of the Revised Penal Code,ii[2] respectively, in three
separate criminal complaints filed and signed by the private complainant, Jona G. Grajo, and
subscribed and sworn to on January 17, 1998 before 3rd Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Oscar M.
Lasam. Save for their docket numbers, the said criminal complaints are identically worded thus:

That on or about 16 January 1998 at Brgy. San Jose, Balanga, Bataan, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, armed with a knife and by means of force
and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously succeed in having
sexual intercourse with the offended party JONA G. GRAJO, against the will and consent of the
latter, to her damage and prejudice.

Contrary to law.

Upon arraignment on January 30, 1998, the accused, Emmanuel Aaron, assisted by counsel of his
choice, entered the plea of not guilty to each of the three complaints in Criminal Cases Nos.
6730, 6731 and 6732. Thereafter, joint trial on the merits ensued.

The evidence of the prosecution shows that, on January 16, 1998, at around 7:00 oclock in the
morning, the private complainant, Jona Grajo, was asleep in bed (papag) inside her room on the
second floor of the apartment unit which she shared with her sister and her brother-in-law, herein
appellant Emmanuel Aaron. Jona was wearing only a panty and was covered with a blanket.
Sensing that someone was inside her room, Jona opened her eyes and was surprised to find
Emmanuel sitting beside her in bed totally naked. Emmanuel immediately went on top of Jona
and poked a knife on her neck. Jonas attempt to cry for help proved futile as Emmanuel quickly
covered her mouth with his left hand.iii[3]

Emmanuel removed her panty and succeeded in having carnal intercourse with Jona who could
only manage to cry. Subsequently, Emmanuel withdrew his penis and ordered Jona to lie down
on the floor. He inserted his penis into her vagina for the second time with the knife still poked
on Jonas neck. Thereafter, Emmanuel stood up and commanded Jona to lie down near the
headboard of the papag bed where he inserted his penis into her vagina for the third time, still
armed with a knife, and continued making pumping motions (umiindayog).iv[4]

After the incident, Jona pleaded to be released but Emmanuel initially refused. He budged only
after Jona told him that she urgently needed to relieve herself (Ihing-ihi na ako, puputok na ang
pantog ko.) but not before warning her not to tell anyone about the incident. Jona quickly put on
her panty and hurried down the street in front of the apartment with only a blanket covering
herself. Her cries drew the attention of a neighbor, Lilibeth Isidro, who tried to persuade Jona to
go back inside the apartment, to no avail, for fear of Emmanuel. Upon the prodding of another
neighbor, a certain Agnes, Jona revealed that she was raped by her brother-in-law,v[5] the
appellant herein.

Jona proceeded to the nearby store of their landlady upon the latters arrival from the market and
she related the misfortune that had befallen her. At that instance, Emmanuel approached and
warned her to be careful with her words. Then he left for the house of Bong Talastas.vi[6]

After Emmanuel left, Jona went back to their house and dressed up. Thereafter, she went to the
police station in Balanga, Bataan to report the incident.vii[7] Police Officers Rommel Morales and
Edgardo Flores proceeded to the residence of the private complainant who appeared very tense
but the neighbors informed them that Emmanuel had left. The police officers then proceeded to
the house of Bong Talastas in San Jose, Balanga, Bataan, where the victim told them Emmanuel
could have possibly gone. On arrival there, they found Emmanuel conversing with Bong Talastas
and they immediately arrested the appellant herein upon ascertaining his identity.viii[8]

After bringing Emmanuel to the police station, Police Officers Morales and Flores accompanied
Jona to the provincial hospital in Bataan for physical examination. Thereupon, the attending
physician at the Bataan Provincial Hospital, Dra. Emelita Firmacion, M.D., found multiple
healed laceration(s) at 1, 3, 5, 6, 9 oclock position(s), incomplete type in Jona Grajos private
part.

At the trial, Dra. Firmacion identified her signatureix[9] appearing on the lower right portion of the
medical certificatex[10] and affirmed the medical findings contained therein. The multiple
hymenal lacerations sustained by Jona which were respectively indicated in the medical
certificate as 1 oclock, 3 oclock, 5 oclock, 6 oclock and 9 oclock could have been caused by
sexual intercourse, masturbation, strenuous exercises or penetration of any hard object. The
appearance of a lacerated hymen could indicate the approximate time when the laceration was
sustained. In the case of Jona Grajo, her hymenal lacerations were completely healed, indicating
that the same were sustained at least one month before she was examined on January 16, 1998.
However, it was possible that she had sexual intercourse immediately before the said
examination.xi[11]

The defense denied any liability for the three counts of rape charged. Appellant Emmanuel Aaron
testified that he and his wife were residing in an apartment unit together with his sister-in-law,
herein private complainant, Jona Grajo.xii[12] Jona occupied a room on the second floor while the
couple stayed at the ground floor.xiii[13]

On the date of the incident, Emmanuel admitted that he and Jona were the only persons inside
the apartment. He had just arrived from work as a night-shift waiter at Base One restaurant in
Balanga, Bataan. He had earlier met Bong Talastas at 7:00 oclock in the morning as Bong was
preparing to leave his house while his wife had gone to the market. Emmanuel changed his
clothes upstairs where the cabinet was located opposite the room occupied by Jona. Emmanuel
noticed that the door of Jonas room was partly open so he peeped through the narrow opening
and saw her wearing only a panty. He was about to close the door when Jona woke up and began
shouting.xiv[14]

Emmanuel did not know why Jona kept on shouting. She even followed as Emmanuel descended
the stairs and she proceeded to the nearby store of their landlady. Emmanuel went her to the store
to caution Jona about her words (Ayusin mo ang sinasabi mo) because she was telling their
landlady that he raped her. However, Jona ignored him so he left and decided to see Bong
Talastas in San Jose, Balanga, Bataan to inquire from the latter why Jona was accusing him of
having raped her. Emmanuel denied that he was armed with a knife during the incident, much
less threatened Jona with it.xv[15]

On October 14, 1998, the trial court rendered a decision,xvi[16] the dispositive portion of which
read:

WHEREFORE, the guilt of the accused for the single act of rape having been proved beyond
reasonable doubt, the accused is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the
accessory penalty provided by law. The accused is further required to indemnify the complainant
the sum of P50,000.00 and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.

Dissatisfied with the decision of the trial court, Emmanuel Aaron interposed the instant appeal.
In his Brief,xvii[17] appellant raised a single assignment of error:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT

Appellant argues that the account of the private complainant, Jona Grajo, of the alleged incidents
of rape appears incredible and contrary to common human experience. Based on her testimony,
the appellant suddenly placed himself on top of her with his right hand poking a knife on her
neck and with his left hand covering her mouth. Subsequently, the appellant removed her panty
and succeeded in inserting his penis into her private part even without previously opening his
zipper or removing his pants. Likewise, the private complainant did not offer any resistance
although she could have done so. After the alleged acts of rape, the victim did not even complain
to her sister who, by then, had already arrived from the market. The uncharacteristic behavior of
the private complainant could only be explained by the fact that she admittedly had several
sexual experiences in the past with her boyfriend and live-in partner Bong Talastas. The
appellant theorizes that private complainant wanted to get back at him for the embarrassment of
being seen by him in her panty after her boyfriend, Bong Talastas, left the apartment. Appellant
downplays the testimony of PO1 Rommel Morales as not worthy of credence for lack of
corroborative evidence. [18]
xviii

On the other hand, the prosecution showed that the appellant was already naked even before the
private complainant was awakened by his presence; that the private complainant could not
effectively offer any resistance as the appellant was armed with a knife which he used to
intimidate her; and that the private complainants being a non-virgin did not discount rape on
January 16, 1998.xix[19]

Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code provides:

Article 266-A. Rape; When And How Committed.-- Rape is committed -

1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:

a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;

b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;

c) By means of fraudulent machinations or grave abuse of authority; and

d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even
though none of the circumstances mentioned above are present.

2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall
commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another persons mouth or anal orifice
or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.

Article 266-B of the same Code provides:

Article 266-B. Penalties.Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished
by reclusion perpetua.

Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the
penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.

xxx xxx xxx

It should be stressed that in the review of rape cases, this Court is almost invariably guided by
three principles: (1) an accusation of rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but
more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove; (2) in view of the intrinsic
nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the
complainant is scrutinized with extreme caution and (3) the evidence of the prosecution stands or
falls on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the
defense.xx[20] In other words, the credibility of the private complainant is determinative of the
outcome of these cases for rape. Her consistency on material points, or lack of it, that can sustain
or negate conviction, becomes the single most important matter in inquiry.xxi[21]

After a thorough review, we find that the testimony of private complainant, Jona Grajo,
sufficiently established all the elements of rape committed under Article 266-A, paragraph (1) (a)
of the Revised Penal Code, namely: a) that the offender, who must be a man, had carnal
knowledge of a woman and (b) that such act is accomplished by using force or intimidation.xxii[22]
The gist of private complainants testimony clearly shows that the appellant, Emmanuel Aaron,
forced himself on her at around 7:00 oclock in the morning on January 16, 1998. The sexual
assault started on the papag bed inside her room on the second floor of their apartment unit.
After going on top of the private complainant, the appellant succeeded in inserting his penis into
her vagina after which he made pumping motions while poking a knife on her neck. He then
succeeded in inserting his penis into her vagina two more times on the same occasion after
transferring locations inside the room, with the knife continuously poked on her neck.

We also find no reason to disturb the assessment of the trial court of private complainants
credibility. Her testimony during the trial was completely credible as it was given in an honest
and straightforward manner. As noted above, she gave a lucid and consistent account of the
commission of the crime and did not waiver in pinpointing her brother-in-law, herein appellant,
as the perpetrator thereof. Likewise, her actuation after the incident vividly portrayed a confused
and traumatized woman typical of victims of rape. Thus, after she broke free of the appellant on
the pretense that she urgently needed to relieve herself, the private complainant quickly put on
her panty and rushed to the street with only a blanket to cover her naked body. Her neighbors
took note of her obviously troubled condition and admonished her to go back inside the
apartment but she refused, claiming that she had been raped. She sought refuge at the nearby
store of their landlady to whom she confided that she was raped by her brother-in-law. Private
complainant hurried back to their apartment to get dressed only upon making sure that the
appellant had already left the place. Without losing time, she proceeded directly to the police
station and lodged a complaint for rape against the appellant.

Prosecution witness PO1 Rommel Morales of Balanga, Bataan, who was the police officer on
duty at the time Jona Grajo came to the police station, recounted during the trial that the private
complainant was crying and trembling on arrival at the Balanga, Bataan police station on January
16, 1998. Private complainant took time to answer the queries of the police officer since she was
crying uncontrollably. When she finally got hold of herself, the private complainant reported that
she had been raped by the appellant who was subsequently arrested by the police. The actuations
of the private complainant immediately after the incident may be considered as part of the res
gestae that substantially strengthens her claim of sexual assault by the appellant.xxiii[23]
On the other hand, all the appellant can offer in his defense is bare denial. He claims that he had
just changed his clothes on the second floor of their apartment where his cabinet was located
when he chanced upon the private complainant naked inside her room as the door was then
slightly ajar. He did not do anything further as the private complainant was awakened and she
already started shouting. In view of the positive and convincing testimony of the private
complainant, however, the defense of denial must fail. It is well-settled that denial is an
intrinsically weak defense which must be buttressed by strong evidence of non-culpability to
merit credibility.xxiv[24]

The appellant argues that it was impossible for him to have inserted his penis into the private part
of the complainant without first opening his zipper or removing his pants. This argument of the
appellant is misleading for the reason that, per the testimony of the private complainant, the
appellant was already naked when his presence roused her from her sleep:

PROS. LASAM:

Q: While you were in your room on that time and date, do you remember of any incident that
happened?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What was that incident?

A: While I was inside my room, I sensed that there was a person inside my room and when I
opened my eyes, I saw that he is my brother-in-law.

Q: And that brother-in-law of yours is the person whom you pointed a while ago. Is that correct?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: How does he look when you saw him inside your room?

A: He was naked sitting beside me. xxv

[25]

That the private complainant did not offer sustained resistance despite having been ordered twice
by the appellant to change location inside the room can easily be explained by the fact that the
appellant was threatening to stab her if she resisted. The private complainant was obviously
overwhelmed by intense fear when she woke up with a knife pointed at her neck. The continuing
intimidation of private complainant cowed her into helpless submission to appellants lechery.
She could only express her disgust over the sexual attack of her brother-in-law silently in tears.
In this connection, it has been ruled that physical resistance need not be established in rape when
intimidation is used on the victim and the latter submits herself, against her will, to the rapists
embrace because of fear for her life and personal safety.xxvi[26]

The failure of the private complainant to confide the sexual assault to her sister who, appellant
claimed, had arrived from the market before she (private complainant) went to report the matter
to the police is quite understandable and far from being uncharacteristic of a rape victim, as what
appellant would like to make it appear. The workings of the human mind which is under a great
deal of emotional and psychological stress are unpredictable and different people will react
differently to a given situation.xxvii[27] Besides, the private complainant did not want to drag her
sister into the controversy and hurt her in the process. During the trial, the private complainant
revealed that she kept from her sister the previous sexual advances of the appellant in order not
to destroy their good relationship. Private complainant explained that she did not leave the
apartment despite the said harassments of the appellant inasmuch as she had no other place to go.
However, she confided her ordeal to their landlady, a certain Elsa Navarro. At any rate, what is
important is that the private complainant reported the rape immediately to the police.

Admittedly, private complainant was having an affair with a certain Bong Talastasxxviii[28] and that
she was not innocent to the ways of the world. However, such fact alone does not negate the
commission of rape by the appellant against her. Dra. Firmacion testified that although the
lacerations found in the private part of Jona Grajo were completely healed, such fact did not
discount the possibility that she was sexually molested immediately before she was examined on
January 16, 1998. We emphasize that moral character is immaterial in the prosecution and
conviction of the offender in the crime of rape. The Court has ruled time and again that even a
prostitute can be a victim of rapexxix[29] as the essence is the victims lack of consent to the sexual
act.

Significantly, the appellant failed to advance any credible motive that could have impelled the
private complainant to testify falsely against him.xxx[30] In a desperate attempt to avoid any
responsibility for his crime, however, the appellant theorizes that the private complainant merely
wanted to exact revenge from him for the embarrassment she experienced when he chanced upon
her clad merely in a panty inside her room. This alleged motive on the part of the private
complainant is too shallow to merit even scant consideration from this Court. If appellant were to
be believed, would not private complainant have instead opted to keep quiet about the incident to
spare herself from further embarrassment? Common experience dictates that no woman,
especially one of tender age, will concoct a rape complaint, allow a gynecological examination
and permit herself to be subjected to public trial if she is not motivated solely by the desire to
have the culprit apprehended and punished.xxxi[31] Indeed, coming out in the open with the
accusation of sexual assault on her by her brother-in-law inevitably entailed risking her
relationship with her boyfriend, Bong Talastas, and with her sister. However, the rape simply
proved too much for her to bear.

We agree with the trial court that the appellant should be convicted of only one count of rape. It
may appear from the facts that the appellant thrice succeeded in inserting his penis into the
private part of Jona Grajo. However, the three penetrations occurred during one continuing act of
rape in which the appellant was obviously motivated by a single criminal intent. There is no
indication in the records, as the trial court correctly observed, from which it can be inferred that
the appellant decided to commit those separate and distinct acts of sexual assault other than his
lustful desire to change positions inside the room where the crime was committed.

Considering that the crime of rape was committed by the appellant with the use of a deadly
weapon, the imposable penalty under Article 266-B is reclusion perpetua to death. In the absence
of any mitigating nor aggravating circumstance, the trial court correctly imposed the penalty of
reclusion perpetua on the appellant. She is also entitled to a civil indemnity of fifty thousand
pesos (P50,000). And due to the emotional distress suffered by the private complainant who was
only nineteen years old at the time of the rape, she is also entitled to an award of moral damages
in the amount of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000).xxxii[32]

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the court a quo convicting the appellant Emmanuel Aaron of
one count of rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the
private complainant the amount of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000) as civil indemnity is hereby
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that said appellant shall pay an additional fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000) by way of moral damages.

SO ORDERED
 iRepublic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-47911 July 27, 1988

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
RlCARDO SATO alias JUNIOR and ALFREDO SASUTA, accused. ALFREDO SASUTA
appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Romualdo L. Impas for accused appellant.

PARAS, J.:
1
of the lower court in Criminal Case No. CU-1685, Court of First Instance-Cebu,
This is an appeal from a judgment
entitled People of the Philippines vs. Ricardo Sato alias Junior and Alfredo Sasuta, finding both accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape, sentencing each of them to suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua; to suffer the accessory penalties provided for by law; and to pay the costs of the proceedings. The
accused, being detention prisoners, were granted the full credit of their preventive imprisonment in accordance
with R.A. 6127.

While the case was pending before Us, accused Ricardo Sato alias Junior Sato filed his "Motion for Withdrawal
of Appeal" dated June 8, 1982 which was granted by this Court by virtue of Our resolution dated September 13,
1982. Accordingly Entry of Judgment was then made in his case. Hence, under consideration is only the appeal
of accused Alfredo Sasuta, who raises the following:

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANTS OF THE CRIME OF RAPE
CHARGED ALTHOUGH THE EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION FAILS TO ESTABLISH THE GUILT OF
THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS OF THE CRIME OF RAPE
ALTHOUGH THE EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION IS HIGHLY IMPROBABLE AND IMPOSSIBLE THAT
THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS COMMITTED THE CRIME OF RAPE.

III

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS OF THE CRIME OF RAPE
CHARGED ALTHOUGH THE EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION IS INSUFFICIENT TO HOLD THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANTS LIABLE FOR THE CRIME OF RAPE.

It is the theory of the prosecution that in the morning of February 11, 1975, the complainant Felomina C. Sato,
her husband Catalino Sato, and their 8-year old son, Jose Sato went to Sangi, San Fernando, Cebu to sell
goats.

In the afternoon of that same day, the complainant and her companions went home to Barrio Lunas, Carcar,
Cebu. When they reached Bo. Pit-os, Carcar, they met the accused. Without warning Ricardo Sato alias "Junior"
hit Catalino Sato on the ear, rendering the latter unconscious, while appellant Alfredo Sasuta stood by.
Immediately after, appellants assaulted the complainant and took turns in sexually abusing her, Junior Sato
being the first and Alfredo Sasuta after him. After consummating their sexual desires, the two fled.

After her husband regained consciousness, complainant told him what had transpired. The following morning,
they left for Carcar to report the matter to the police authorities thereat. Her husband was treated while she was
examined by a doctor.

Appellants put up the defense of alibi alleging that they were somewhere else when the crime was committed.

In their assignments of error, the defense relied heavily on the absence of human spermatozoa in the sex organ
of the complainant; absence of injury suffered by the complainant; lack of physical struggle to overcome the
force employed by the culprits; and absence of evidence that the culprits used a weapon to intimidate sexually
the complainant.

The contentions of appellant hold no water.

That Jose C. Tuian, the NBI Medical Technician, testified that he found no spermatozoa in the smear taken from
the cervix is immaterial in the crime of rape. What is essential in this crime is evidence of penetration of the
offender's sex organ into the complainant's sex organ. It is not necessary that the offender ejaculated or reached
orgasm. Well-settled in this jurisdiction is the rule that any penetration whether reaching the hymen or not is
sufficient to constitute the crime of rape, such as in the case at bar. 2 Furthermore We cannot discount the
possibility that the sperms in the smear had already died at the time of the NBI examination, that is, after the
lapse of several hours after the commission of the crime of rape.

The lack of indication of the use of force like finger grips, physical injuries and hematomas on the complainant is
not incompatible with the consummation of the crime of rape. Worth mentioning in this regard is the ruling of the
trial court that:

Lack of laceration, abrasion, thorasis in the genital organ is not a defense in the crime of Rape
(People of the Philippines vs. Canastre, L-2055, 82 Phil. 480), for it was not through physical
force that the resistance of the victim of the crime of Rape could be overcome. Fear may also
produce that effect and in this case, there is evidence that the complainant, much to her futile
resistance, could not but fall prey to the carnal desires of both accused, firstly, because
complainant's husband was already rendered unconscious, and, secondly, the striking of her
thighs, in most probability, had produced not only physical sufferings through pain but even
stronger force of fear. (p. 11, Decision Crim. Case No. CU-1685, p. 17, Rollo).

This ruling is consistent with Our statement in People vs. Mono, 56 Phil. 86 that "when force is an element of the
crime of rape, it need not be irresistible; it need but be present, and so long as it brings about the desired result,
all consideration of whether it was more or less irresistible is beside the point." Thus, it is not even necessary in
rape that the offender in using force was armed with a weapon with which to intimidate the complainant. The use
of a deadly weapon serves only to increase the penalty.

Finally, appellant assails the credibility of the witnesses for the prosecution because of inconsistencies in their
testimonies given during the preliminary investigation and during the court proceedings. These inconsistencies
can be disregarded without impairing their credibility considering that they are uneducated and unlettered barrio
folks. Moreover, it is clear from the testimony alone of Jose Sato, an 8-year old child who witnessed the incident,
that accused Junior Sato and Alfredo Sasuta committed the crime charged against them as evident in the
following:

Testimony of Jose Sato:

Q. After your father was hit by that blow made by Junior, and your father fell down, bleeding, what did the
two accused do next? (TSN-Cavalida, Jan. 9, 1976, p. 6)

A. They assaulted my mother (ibid, p. 6)

Q. What kind of assault was made by the two accused on your mother? (ibid, p. 6)

A. Junior and Fredo placed themselves on top of my mother (ibid, p. 6)

Q. Who of the two accused placed himself on top of your mother first? (ibid, p. 6)

A. Junior and after that, Fredo (ibid, p. 6)

Q. After assaulting and placing themselves on top of your mother one after the other, the two accused ran
away? (ibid, p. 6)

A. Yes, sir. (ibid, p. 6) (pp. 7-8, Appellee's Brief)

Apropos thereto, the trial court states:

... The innocence of an 8-year old boy who was subjected to watching the horror of a helpless father while his mother was being
abused cannot be taken but lightly. Despite the hesitance to utter the term for sexual intercourse by his own tongue, yet Jose
Sato manifested the candor of the thoroughly unbiased as only a child, a pure intellectual, as it were, can be capable of. In so
many ways he drove home to the mind of the Court, strongly corroborating the complainant's charge of her being raped, that
sexual intercourses were, indeed done by the accused on her overwhelmed helpless mother; Jose Sato described to the Court
that the accused, one after the other, mounted his mother who was forced to lie on her back on the ground. He testified in Court
so impressively as would be all that was necessary for the conviction of both accused.

xxx xxx xxx

Moreover, such minor inconsistencies of the testimonies of the complainant and Catalino Sato are but innocent mistakes which
do not delve to the very core of the act complained of. The impressive corroboration by complainant's son, Jose Sato, who was
then present during the commission of the crime in all material points is all that is needed for the conviction of both accused. (pp.
14 & 15, Decision Crim. Case No. CU-1685 pp. 85-86, Rollo)

The defense of appellant is alibi. In order that the defense of alibi can prosper, it must be so convincing as to preclude any doubt that the accused
could not have been physically present at the place of the crime or its vicinity at the time of its commission. Appellant Alfredo Sasuta's assertion that
he was at home in Nag-arco, San Fernando, at the time of the incident does not preclude the possibility of his being present at the scene of the crime
because San Fernando is just an adjoining town of Carcar where the incident took place. Moreover, alibi, being a weak defense, cannot prevail over
the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Jose Sato and complainant who positively Identified the appellant as one of the perpetrators of the crime.

WHEREFORE PREMISES CONSIDERED, the guilt of the appellant Alfredo Sasuta having been proved beyond reasonable doubt, the decision
appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, but the appellant is ordered to pay P20,000.00 as civil indemnity to the victim.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 97936 May 29, 1995

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ALEJANDRO LUCERO y CORTEL, accused-appellant.

PUNO, J.:

If the Constitution has any value, it is because it stands up for those who cannot stand up for themselves. Thus, it protected those under custodial
investigation with the all-important right to counsel. We hold that the right to counsel cannot be diluted without tampering the scales of justice. For
denial of his right to counsel, we acquit accused-appellant.

Alejandro Lucero, Bienvenido Echavez, Balbino Echavez, Peter Doe, Richard Doe and John Doe were charged with the crime of robbery with
homicide. The Information against them reads:

That on or about the 7th day of May, 1988, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping one another , did then and there, wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously rob one DR. DEMETRIO Z. MADRID, in the manner as follows: on the date and in the place
aforementioned, the said accused, one armed with handgun, pursuant to their conspiracy blocked the way of the said
complainant who was on board a Mercedez Benz crusing along Road 14 near (the) corner (of) Mindanao Avenue, Pag-asa, this
City, and did then and there, by means of violence and intimidation against persons, take, rob and carry away his cash money
amounting to P6,600.00; one gold necklace with cross pendant, 7 karat, worth P45,000.00; one (1) gold Rolex watch worth
P155,000.00; one (1) 3 karat gold ring worth P80,000.00; one 2 karat gold ring, domino style, worth P27,000.00; one (1) solid
gold bracelet worth 363,600.00, Philippine Currency, belonging to said DR. DEMETRIO Z. MADRID, to the damage and
prejudice of the said offended party in the total amount aforementioned; that on the occasion of the robbery and pursuant to their
conspiracy, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, and taking advantage the(ir) superior strength, with the use of
handgun, shot LORENZO BERNALES y ALERIA, a driver of the said offended party, thus inflicting upon him serious and mortal
wounds which resulted to the insta(n)taneous death of the said LORENZO BERNALES y ALERIA, to the damage and prejudice
of the heirs of said LORENZO BERNALEZ y ALERIA in such amount as may be awarded to them under the provisions of the
Civil Code.

1
Contrary to law.

Only the accused Echavez brothers and Alejandro Lucero were apprehended. The others remained at large.

Trial proceeded only as against the three.

The evidence on record shows that on May 6, 1988, private complainant DR. DEMETRIO Z. MADRID spent the
night at his boarding house, located at #35 Ilocos Norte Street, Bago-Bantay, Quezon City. He wanted to return
that night to his residence at Project 6, Quezon City. However, his driver, Lorenzo Bernales, advised him not to
leave that night for Bernales overheard that the group of Balbino and Bienvenido Echavez would rob him on his
way home. He heeded the advice.

It was around 7:00 a.m., the next day, that Dr. Madrid again asked his driver to bring him to his main residence in
Project 6, Quezon City. While traversing Road 14, a gray-reddish car overtook the Mercedes Benz he was riding
and blocked their way. Three (3) men swiftly alighted from the car blocking them and barged into his Benz. The
first grabbed the driver's seat and pushed his driver to the other side of the seat. The second occupied the right
side of his driver. The third sat beside Dr. Madrid at the back sent and punched him. Simultaneously, the man at
the right side of his driver pulled out his gun and announced a hold-up. 2

The man beside Dr. Madrid divested him of the following: a gold Rolex watch, studded with diamonds, worth
P155,000.00, a three (3) carat diamond ring worth P80,000.00, another two (2) carat domino-style ring,
surrounded with diamonds worth P27,000.00, a necklace worth P27,000.00, a bracelet worth P50,000.00, and
his wallet containing P6,600.00. 3

After driving them around the area for a couple of hours, the malefactors stopped his car and alighted. The worst
came. The man at the right side of his driver shot the latter at the chest before fleeing. Dr. Madrid and his driver
were rushed by concerned citizens to the Veterans Memorial Hospital. Two hours later, his driver died of
hemorrhage as a result of the gunshot wound he sustained. 4 Dr. Madrid survived. 5 He reported the incident to
the Quezon City police. When no action was taken on his case, he filed his complaint with the Special
Operations Group of the Central Intelligence Service (CIS). 6

Two months later, the CIS efforts paid-off. On July 23, 1988, the Special Operations Group headed by Capt. Raul
Boac, after a surveillance of the suspects, interrogated Bienvenido Echavez in Camp Crame. Two days later,
they apprehended Balbino Echavez and Alejandro Lucero. They turned them over to the Investigation
Department of the CIS. 7

Pfc. Alberto Pursal was assigned to conduct the investigation of the suspects. He declared that even before the
investigation started, Lucero verbally admitted his participation in the crime and that he was the one who shot
Bernales, the driver of Dr. Madrid. 8

In any event, Pfc. Pursal went thru the motions of investigation. He informed Lucero of his constitutional rights to
remain silent and to counsel. When Lucero told him that he had no lawyer, Pursal informed that CIS Legal
Department about Lucero's need for a lawyer. 9 In due time, Atty. Diosdado Peralta appeared at the investigator's
office at around 9:00 p.m. He identified himself as the lawyer who was requested to assist Lucero and inquired
about the latter's whereabouts. He was then directed to where Lucero was.

Atty. Peralta conferred with Lucero. He also apprised Lucero of his constitutional rights. He explained to Lucero
that he has the right to remain silent, that he is not obliged to give any statement to the investigators, and that
even if he has already given a statement, he may refuse to sign it. He observed no reaction from Lucero.
Nonetheless, Atty. Peralta gathered the impression that Lucero understood his advice.

Thereafter, the CIS investigator began taking down Lucero's statement. When the investigator started asking the
preliminary questions, Atty. Peralta left to attend the wake of his friend, Capt. Emilio Dacanay, at Fort Bonifacio.
He gave word that in case of need, he could be reached at his residence.

The next morning, Lucero was accompanied by two (2) CIS agents to Atty. Peralta's house. The extrajudicial
statement of Lucero (Exhibit "C"), was presented to Atty. Peralta. It was already signed by Lucero. In the
presence of the two (2) CIS agents, Atty. Peralta examined Exhibit "C" and explained to Lucero its Legal
implications. He asked Lucero whether he gave the statements voluntarily. Lucero replied in the affirmative. Atty.
Peralta then signed Exhibit "C". 10

The three (3) accused denied complicity in the in the crime charged.

Appellant Lucero's defense is alibi. He testified that on May 7, 1988, he was at his house in Caloocan City. He
woke up at 6:30 a.m., stayed at his house the whole day repairing the upholstery of a customer's chair. He was
then with his cousin Marcelino Seneta and his wife Mylen Lucero. He worked until 5 p.m. that day.

Lucero was apprehended on July 25, 1988, more than two (2) months after the commission of the crime. He said
he was surprised when several unidentified men accosted him while he was walking towards his house. They
chased him, handcuffed and blindfolded him and pushed him into a jeep. He was He was blindfolded the whole
night and did not know where he was taken. The men turned out to be police officers. Later, he identified one of
the men to be Capt. Boak, head of the CIS Special Operations Group.

The next day, he learned he was in Camp Crame. He claimed that he was tortured. He was not informed of the
offense for which he was being investigated. Neither did they reveal the identity of the complainant. A couple of
days lapsed and a CIS agent brought him to a clinic inside Camp Crame. The doctor saw the contusions on his
body. He advised that he be treated. The CIS agent refused and they left the clinic.

Lucero denied knowing Dr. Madrid, the Echavez brothers and the other accused in this case. He said he only
met Dr. Madrid at the CIS Office during the police line-up. He was made to line-up four (4) times before Dr.
Madrid finally identified him on the fourth time.
Lucero also claimed he signed the extrajudicial confession (Exhibit "C") 11 under duress. He denied engaging the
services of Atty. Peralta. He likewise confirmed that Atty. Peralta was not present during his actual custodial
interrogation. 12

After trial, the court a quo acquitted the Echavez brothers for insufficient evidence. The trial court, however,
convicted accused Lucero. The dispositive portion of the Decision 13 reads:

ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. The accused brothers BIENVENIDO ECHAVEZ y VALIDA and BALBINO ECHAVEZ y VALIDA
are hereby ACQUITTED for insufficiency of evidence; and

2. Accused ALEJANDRO LUCERO y CORTEL is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable

doubt as principal by direct participation of Robbery with Homicide. Alejandro Lucero is hereby
sentenced to suffer an imprisonment term of RECLUSION PERPETUA.

On the civil aspect, Alejandro Lucero is hereby ordered a) to pay the heirs of the deceased
victim Lorenzo Bernales y Aleria the sum of P30,000.00 as actual damages and P50,000.00 as
moral damages for the mental anguish suffered by his family; and b) to pay Dr. Demetrio Z.
Madrid the sum of P363,600.00 representing the cash money, and money value of the jewelries
and wristwatch he lost due to the robbery at bar.

SO ORDERED. 14

Hence this appeal by Lucero, raising the following assignments of error:

1. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING MORE WEIGHT TO THE EVIDENCES (SIC) OF
THE PROSECUTION WHICH WERE INCONSISTENT, NOT CREDIBLE, UNRELIABLE,
DOUBTFUL AND INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT ACCUSED-APPELLANT'S CONVICTION
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

2. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE

ALLEGED CRIME OF ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE INSPITE OF THE FACT THAT
CONSPIRACY WAS NOT PROVEN IN THIS CASE.

3. THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE

CRIME CHARGED ON THE BASIS OF HIS ALLEGED EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION (MADE
IN CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION) WHICH WAS OBTAINED THRU FORCE, VIOLENCE AND
WITHOUT THE PRESENCE OF COUNSEL OF HIS OWN CHOICE OR ENGAGED BY ANY
PERSON ON HIS BEHALF OR APPOINTED BY THE LOWER COURT AND THEREFORE
SUFFERED CONSTITUTIONAL INFIRMITIES.

4 THAT THE LOWER ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME

CHARGED INSPITE OF THE FACT THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS NOT
POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED WITH CERTITUDE BY THE PROSECUTION.

5. THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE

CRIME CHARGED PRIMARILY ON THE BASIS OF THE WEAKNESS OF HIS DEFENSE OF
ALIBI AND NOT ON THE STRENGTH OF THE PROSECUTION EVIDENCE; AND INSPITE OF
THE LACK OF POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

6. THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT AND NOT

ACQUITTING HIM LIKE HIS CO-ACCUSED AND ALLEGED CO-CONSPIRATORS [THE
ECHAVEZ BROTHERS] OF THE CRIME CHARGED.
We find the appeal meritorious.

The conviction of appellant rests on two (2) facts: (a) his positive identification by the complainant, and (b) his
extra-judicial confession admitting his participation in the crime. We find that the evidence proving these facts
cannot stand scrutiny.

Firstly, the credibility of the main prosecution eyewitness, Dr. Demetrio Madrid who identified appellant, is
seriously open to doubt. It stands unrebutted on the record that appellant had to participate at the police line-up
four (4) times before he was finally identified by Dr. Madrid. There is no reason for the ambivalence. The robbery
took place in broad daylight and the three malefactors wore no mask. They drove them around for three (3)
hours. Considering these circumstances, there is no reason for Dr. Madrid's failure to immediately identify
appellant.

We are also disconcerted by the vacillating testimony of Dr. Madrid during the trial. Initially, Dr. Madrid claimed
that he could identify only one of the robbers who staged the hold-up. 15 At another point, Dr. Madrid said he
could identify two of the malefactors. 16 In his affidavit, Dr. Madrid presented he could identify all three. 17
Appellant's conviction cannot be made to rest on this nebulous identification by Dr. Madrid.

Secondly, appellant's conviction cannot be based on his extra-judicial confession.

The 1987 Constitution 18 requires that a person under investigation for the commission of a crime should be
provided with counsel. We have constitutionalized the right to counsel because of our hostility against the use of
duress and other undue influence in extracting confessions from a suspect. Force and fraud tarnish confessions
and render them inadmissible. 19 We take pride in constitutionalizing this right to counsel even while other
countries have desisted from elevating this right to a higher pedestal. We have sustained the inviolability of this
precious right with vigor and without any apology.

The trial court did not display the required sensitivity to appellant's right to counsel. Indeed, it did not impose a
rigorous respect for the right. It was satisfied that there was "substantial" compliance with the requirements of
right to counsel. This is far from the intent of the Constitution. The records show that Atty. Peralta's, who was not
the counsel of choice of appellant, arrived at the CIS Office an the second night of appellant's detention. More
exactly, he arrived at the CIS Office at around 9:00 p.m. and talked with appellant about his rights. Atty. Peralta
himself admitted he received no reaction from appellant although his impression was that appellant understood
him. 20 Worse, Atty. Peralta left appellant in the custody of the CIS agents when his real interrogation started. He
said he had to attend the wake of a friend. His attitude did not speak well of the importance he gave to his role
as counsel to a person under custodial interrogation for the commission of a very serious offense. It was during
his absence that appellant gave an uncounselled confession. They tried to cure his uncounselled confession for
the next day, appellant was brought by two (2) CIS agents to Atty. Peralta's house. In the presence of these
agents, Atty. Peralta asked appellant if he understood the statements he gave and if he signed it voluntarily.
Appellant, of course, affirmed the voluntariness of the execution of the confession. Atty. Peralta was satisfied and
the trial court ruled that appellant's right to counsel was not infringed. We disagree.

We hold that when the Constitution requires the right to counsel, it did not mean any kind of counsel but effective
and vigilant counsel. The circumstances in the case at bench clearly demonstrate that appellant received no
effective counseling from Atty. Peralta. In People v. De Guzman, 21 we held that in custodial investigation, the
right to counsel attaches from the moment the investigation starts, i.e., when the investigating officer starts to
ask questions to elicit information and confessions or admissions from the accused. In this case, at the crucial
point when the interrogation was just starting, Atty. Peralta left appellant to attend the wake of a friend . At that
critical stage, appellant gave his uncounselled extra-judicial a confession. Surely, such a confession where
appellant was unprotected from mischief cannot convict.

Neither can the trial court convict appellant on the ground that alibi is inherently a weak defense. Chiseled in our
jurisprudence is the rule that the onus is on the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt. Given the uncertainty of appellant's identification and the inadmissibility of his uncounselled confession,
there is no thread of evidence to criminally inculpate appellant.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision in Criminal Case No. Q-88-201 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City ,
Branch CIII, convicting appellant Alejandro Lucero y Cortel of robbery with homicide is hereby REVERSED AND
SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

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