IN GENERAL
Political Law Defined
People v. Perfecto, 43 Phil. 887, 897 [1922]
MALCOLM, J.:
About August 20, 1920, the Secretary of the Philippine Senate, Fernando
M. Guerrero, discovered that certain documents which constituted the
records of testimony given by witnesses in the investigation of oil
companies, had disappeared from his office. Shortly thereafter, the
Philippine Senate, having been called into special session by the Governor-
General, the Secretary for the Senate informed that body of the loss of the
documents and of the steps taken by him to discover the guilty party. The
day following the convening of the Senate, September 7, 1920, the
newspaper La Nacion, edited by Mr. Gregorio Perfecto, published an article
reading as follows:
Half a month has elapsed since the discovery, for the first time, of the
scandalous robbery of records which were kept and preserved in the iron
safe of the Senate, yet up to this time there is not the slightest indication
that the author or authors of the crime will ever be discovered.
To find them, it would not, perhaps, be necessary to go out of the Sente
itself, and the persons in charge of the investigation of the case would not
have to display great skill in order to succeed in their undertaking, unless
they should encounter the insuperable obstacle of offical concealment.
The execution of the crime was but the natural effect of the environment of
the place in which it was committed.
How many of the present Senators can say without remorse in their
conscience and with serenity of mind, that they do not owe their victory to
electoral robbery? How may?
The author or authors of the robbery of the records from the said iron safe
of the Senate have, perhaps, but followed the example of certain Senators
who secured their election through fraud and robbery.
During the course of the trial in the Court of First Instance, after the
prosecution had rested, the defense moved for the dismissal of the case.
On the subject of whether or not article 256 of the Penal Code, under which
the information was presented, is in force, the trial judge, the Honorable
George R. Harvey, said:
This antiquated provision was doubtless incorporated into the Penal Code
of Spain for the protection of the Ministers of the Crown and other
representatives of the King against free speech and action by Spanish
subjects. A severe punishment was prescribed because it was doubtless
considered a much more serious offense to insult the King's representative
than to insult an ordinary individual. This provision, with almost all the other
articles of that Code, was extended to the Philippine Islands when under
the dominion of Spain because the King's subject in the Philippines might
defame, abuse or insult the Ministers of the Crown or other representatives
of His Majesty. We now have no Ministers of the Crown or other persons in
authority in the Philippines representing the King of Spain, and said
provision, with other articles of the Penal Code, had apparently passed into
"innocuous desuetude," but the Supreme Corut of the Philippine Islands
has, by a majority decision, held that said article 256 is the law of the land
to-day. . . .
In view of the foregoing considerations, the court finds the defendant guilty
as charged in the information and under article 256 of their Penal Code
sentences him to suffer two months and one day of arresto mayor and the
accessory penalties prescribed by law, and to pay the costs of both
instances.
It will be noted in the first place that the trial judge considered himself
bound to follow the rule announced in the case of United States vs. Helbig
(R. G. No. 14705, 1 not published). In that case, the accused was charged
with having said, "To hell with the President and his proclamations, or
words to that effect," in violation of article 256 of the Penal Code. He was
found guilty in a judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of Manila
and again on appeal to the Supreme Court, with the writer of the instant
decision dissenting on two principal grounds: (1) That the accused was
deprived of the constitutional right of cross-examination, and (2) that article
256 of the Spanish Penal Code is no longer in force. Subsequently, on a
motion of reconsideration, the court, being of the opinion that the Court of
First Instance had committed a prejudicial error in depriving the accused of
his right to cross-examine a principal witness, set aside the judgment
affirming the judgment appealed from and ordered the return of the record
to the court of origin for the celebration of a new trial. Whether such a trial
was actually had, is not known, but at least, the record in the Helbig case
has never again been elevated to this court.
There may perchance exist some doubt as to the authority of the decision
in the Helbig case, in view of the circumstances above described. This
much, however, is certain: The facts of the Helbig case and the case before
us, which we may term the Perfecto case, are different, for in the first case
there was an oral defamation, while in the second there is a written
defamation. Not only this, but a new point which, under the facts, could not
have been considered in the Helbig case, is, in the Perfecto case, urged
upon the court. And, finally, as is apparent to all, the appellate court is not
restrained, as was the trial court, by strict adherence to a former decision.
We much prefer to resolve the question before us unhindered by
references to the Helbig decision.
This is one of those cases on which a variety of opinions all leading to the
same result can be had. A majority of the court are of the opinion that the
Philippine Libel Law, Act No. 277, has had the effect of repealing so much
of article 256 of the Penal Code as relates to written defamation, abuse, or
insult, and that under the information and the facts, the defendant is neither
guilty of a violation of article 256 of the Penal Code, nor of the Libel Law.
The view of the Chief Justice is that the accused should be acquitted for
the reason that the facts alleged in the information do not constitute a
violation of article 156 of the Penal Code. Three members of the court
believe that article 256 was abrogated completely by the change from
Spanish to American sovereignty over the Philippines and is inconsistent
with democratic principles of government.
Without prejudice to the right of any member of the court to explain his
position, we will discuss the two main points just mentioned.
1. Effect of the Philippine Libel Law, Act No. 277, on article 256 of the
Spanish Penal Code. The Libel Law, Act No. 277, was enacted by the
Philippine Commission shortly after organization of this legislative body.
Section 1 defines libel as a "malicious defamation, expressed either in
writing, printing, or by signs or pictures, or the like, or public theatrical
exhibitions, tending to blacken the memory of one who is dead or to
impeach the honesty, virtue, or reputation, or publish the alleged or natural
deffects of one who is alive, and thereby expose him to public hatred,
contempt or ridicule." Section 13 provides that "All laws and parts of laws
now in force, so far as the same may be in conflict herewith, are hereby
repealed. . . ."
That parts of laws in force in 1901 when the Libel Law took effect, were in
conflict therewith, and that the Libel Law abrogated certain portion of the
Spanish Penal Code, cannot be gainsaid. Title X of Book II of the Penal
Code, covering the subjects of calumny and insults, must have been
particularly affected by the Libel Law. Indeed, in the early case of Pardo de
Tavera vs. Garcia Valdez ([1902], 1. Phil., 468), the Supreme Court spoke
of the Libel Law as "reforming the preexisting Spanish law on the subject of
calumnia and injuria." Recently, specific attention was given to the effect of
the Libel Law on the provisions of the Penal Code, dealing with calumny
and insults, and it was found that those provisions of the Penal Code on the
subject of calumny and insults in which the elements of writing an publicity
entered, were abrogated by the Libel Law. (People vs. Castro [1922], p.
842, ante.)
The Libel Law must have had the same result on other provisions of the
Penal Code, as for instance article 256.
The facts here are that the editor of a newspaper published an article,
naturally in writing, which may have had the tendency to impeach the
honesty, virtue, or reputation of members of the Philippine Senate, thereby
possibly exposing them to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule, which is
exactly libel, as defined by the Libel Law. Sir J. F. Stephen is authority for
the statement that a libel is indictable when defaming a "body of persons
definite and small enough for individual members to be recognized as such,
in or by means of anything capable of being a libel." (Digest of Criminal
Law, art. 267.) But in the United States, while it may be proper to prosecute
criminally the author of a libel charging a legislator with corruption,
criticisms, no matter how severe, on a legislature, are within the range of
the liberty of the press, unless the intention and effect be seditious. (3
Wharton's Criminal Law, p. 2131.) With these facts and legal principles in
mind, recall that article 256 begins: Any person who, by . . . writing, shall
defame, abuse, or insult any Minister of the Crown or other person in
authority," etc.
The Libel Law is a complete and comprehensive law on the subject of libel.
The well-known rule of statutory construction is, that where the later statute
clearly covers the old subject-matter of antecedent acts, and it plainly
appears to have been the purpose of the legislature to give expression in it
to the whole law on the subject, previous laws are held to be repealed by
necessary implication. (1 Lewis' Sutherland Statutory Construction, p. 465.)
For identical reasons, it is evident that Act No. 277 had the effect so much
of this article as punishes defamation, abuse, or insults by writing.
Act No. 292 of the Philippine Commission, the Treason and Sedition Law,
may also have affected article 256, but as to this point, it is not necessary
to make a pronouncement.
2. Effect of the change from Spanish to Amercian sevoreignty over the
Philippine son article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code. Appellant's main
proposition in the lower court and again energetically pressed in the
appellate court was that article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code is not now
in force because abrogated by the change from Spanish to American
sovereignty over the Philippines and because inconsistent with democratic
principles of government. This view was indirectly favored by the trial judge,
and, as before stated, is the opinion of three members of this court.
Article 256 is found in Chapter V of title III of Book II of the Spanish Penal
Code. Title I of Book II punishes the crimes of treason, crimes that
endanger the peace or independence of the state, crimes against
international law, and the crime of piracy. Title II of the same book punishes
the crimes of lese majeste, crimes against the Cortes and its members and
against the council of ministers, crimes against the form of government,
and crimes committed on the occasion of the exercise of rights guaranteed
by the fundamental laws of the state, including crime against religion and
worship. Title III of the same Book, in which article 256 is found, punishes
the crimes of rebellion, sedition, assaults upon persons in authority, and
their agents, and contempts, insults, injurias, and threats against persons in
authority, and insults, injurias, and threats against their agents and other
public officers, the last being the title to Chapter V. The first two articles in
Chapter V define and punish the offense of contempt committed by any
one who shall be word or deed defame, abuse, insult, or threathen a
minister of the crown, or any person in authority. The with an article
condemning challenges to fight duels intervening, comes article 256, now
being weighed in the balance. It reads as follows: "Any person who, by
word, deed, or writing, shall defame, abuse, or insult any Minister of the
Crown or other person in authority, while engaged in the performance of
official duties, or by reason of such performance, provided that the
offensive minister or person, or the offensive writing be not addressed to
him, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor," that is, the defamation,
abuse, or insult of any Minister of the Crown of the Monarchy of Spain (for
there could not be a Minister of the Crown in the United States of America),
or other person in authority in the Monarchy of Spain.
It cannot admit of doubt that all those provisions of the Spanish Penal Code
having to do with such subjects as treason, lese majeste, religion and
worship, rebellion, sedition, and contempts of ministers of the crown, are
not longer in force. Our present task, therefore, is a determination of
whether article 256 has met the same fate, or, more specifically stated,
whether it is in the nature of a municipal law or political law, and is
consistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States and the
characteristics and institutions of the American Government.
The nature of the government which has been set up in the Philippines
under American sovereignty was outlined by President McKinley in that
Magna Charta of Philippine liberty, his instructions to the Commission, of
April 7, 1900. In part, the President said:
In all the forms of government and administrative provisions which they are
authorized to prescribe, the Commission should bear in mind that he
government which they are establishing is designed not for our satisfaction
or for the expression of our theoretical views, but for the happiness, peace,
and prosperity of the people of the Philippine Islands, and the measures
adopted should be made to conform to their customs, their habits, and
even their prejudices, to the fullest extent consistent with the
accomplishment of the indispensable requisites of just and effective
government. At the same time the Commission should bear in mind, and
the people of the Islands should be made plainly to understand, that there
are certain great principles of government which have been made the basis
of our governmental system, which we deem essential to the rule of law
and the maintenance of individual freedom, and of which they have,
unfortunately, been denied the experience possessed by us; that there are
also certain practical rules of government which we have found to be
essential to the preservation of these great principles of liberty and law, and
that these principles and these rules of government must be established
and maintained in their islands for the sake of their liberty and happiness,
however much they may conflict with the customs or laws of procedure with
which they are familiar. It is evident that the most enligthened thought of
the Philippine Islands fully appreciates the importance of these principles
and rules, and they will inevitably within a short time command universal
assent.
The courts have naturally taken the same view. Mr. Justice Elliott, speaking
for our Supreme Court, in the case of United States vs. Bull ([1910], 15
Phil., 7), said: "The President and Congress framed the government on the
model with which American are familiar, and which has proven best
adapted for the advancement of the public interests and the protection of
individual rights and privileges."
According to our view, article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code was enacted
by the Government of Spain to protect Spanish officials who were the
representatives of the King. With the change of sovereignty, a new
government, and a new theory of government, as set up in the Philippines.
It was in no sense a continuation of the old, although merely for
convenience certain of the existing institutions and laws were continued.
The demands which the new government made, and makes, on the
individual citizen are likewise different. No longer is there a Minister of the
Crown or a person in authority of such exalted position that the citizen must
speak of him only with bated breath. "In the eye of our Constitution and
laws, every man is a sovereign, a ruler and a freeman, and has equal rights
with every other man. We have no rank or station, except that of
respectability and intelligence as opposed to indecency and ignorance, and
the door to this rank stands open to every man to freely enter and abide
therein, if he is qualified, and whether he is qualified or not depends upon
the life and character and attainments and conduct of each person for
himself. Every man may lawfully do what he will, so long as it is not malum
in se or malum prohibitum or does not infringe upon the qually sacred rights
of others." (State vs. Shepherd [1903], 177 Mo., 205; 99 A. S. R., 624.)
It is true that in England, from which so many of the laws and institutions of
the United States are derived, there were once statutes of scandalum
magnatum, under which words which would not be actionable if spoken of
an ordinary subject were made actionable if spoken of a peer of the realm
or of any of the great officers of the Crown, without proof of any special
damage. The Crown of England, unfortunately, took a view less tolerant
that that of other sovereigns, as for instance, the Emperors Augustus,
Caesar, and Tiberius. These English statutes have, however, long since,
become obsolete, while in the United States, the offense of scandalum
magnatum is not known. In the early days of the American Republic, a
sedition law was enacted, making it an offense to libel the Government, the
Congress, or the President of the United States, but the law met with so
much popular disapproval, that it was soon repealed. "In this country no
distinction as to persons is recognized, and in practice a person holding a
high office is regarded as a target at whom any person may let fly his
poisonous words. High official position, instead of affording immunity from
slanderous and libelous charges, seems rather to be regarded as making
his character free plunder for any one who desires to create a senation by
attacking it." (Newell, Slander and Libel, 3d ed., p. 245; Sillars vs. Collier
[1890], 151 Mass., 50; 6 L.R.A., 680.)
Article 256 of the Penal Code is contrary to the genius and fundamental
principles of the American character and system of government. The gulf
which separates this article from the spirit which inspires all penal
legislation of American origin, is as wide as that which separates a
monarchy from a democratic Republic like that of the United States. This
article was crowded out by implication as soon as the United States
established its authority in the Philippine Islands. Penalties out of all
proportion to the gravity of the offense, grounded in a distorted monarchical
conception of the nature of political authority, as opposed to the American
conception of the protection of the interests of the public, have been
obliterated by the present system of government in the Islands. 1awph!l.net
From an entirely different point of view, it must be noted that this article
punishes contempts against executive officials, although its terms are
broad enough to cover the entire official class. Punishment for contempt of
non-judicial officers has no place in a government based upon American
principles. Our official class is not, as in monarchies, an agent of some
authority greater than the people but it is an agent and servant of the
people themselves. These officials are only entitled to respect and
obedience when they are acting within the scope of their authority and
jurisdiction. The American system of government is calculated to enforce
respect and obedience where such respect and obedience is due, but
never does it place around the individual who happens to occupy an official
position by mandate of the people any official halo, which calls for drastic
punishment for contemptuous remarks.
To summarize, the result is, that all the members of the court are of the
opinion, although for different reasons, that the judgment should be
reversed and the defendant and appellant acquitted, with costs de officio.
So ordered.
Separate Opinions
I concur with the dispositive part of the foregoing decision, that is, with the
acquittal of the accused, for the sole reason that the facts alleged in the
information do not constitute a violation of article 256 of the Penal Code; for
although that article is in force with respect to calumny, injuria, or insult, by
deed or word, against an authority in the performance of his duties or by
reason thereof, outside of his presence, it is repealed by the Libel Law in so
far as it refers to calumny, injuria, or insult committed against an authority
by writing or printing, as was that inserted in the said information.
I concur with the result. I believe that the responsibility of the accused has
not been shown either under article 256 of the Penal Code or under the
Libel Law.
I am of the opinion that article 256 of the Penal Code is still in force, except
as it refers to "Ministers of the Crown," whom we do not have in our
Government, and to calumny, injuria, or insult, by writing or printing,
committed against an authority in the performance of his duties or by
reason thereof, which portion was repealed by the Libel Law.
ISSUE: Whether or not Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code (SPC) is still
in force and can be applied in the case at bar?
HELD: No.
Macariola v. Asuncion 114 SCRA 77, - A.M. No. 133-J, May 31, 1982
MAKASIAR, J:
The factual setting of the case is stated in the report dated May 27, 1971 of
then Associate Justice Cecilia Muoz Palma of the Court of Appeals now
retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, to whom this case was
referred on October 28, 1968 for investigation, thus:
Civil Case No. 3010 of the Court of First Instance of Leyte was a complaint
for partition filed by Sinforosa R. Bales, Luz R. Bakunawa, Anacorita
Reyes, Ruperto Reyes, Adela Reyes, and Priscilla Reyes, plaintiffs, against
Bernardita R. Macariola, defendant, concerning the properties left by the
deceased Francisco Reyes, the common father of the plaintiff and
defendant.
The decision in civil case 3010 became final for lack of an appeal, and on
October 16, 1963, a project of partition was submitted to Judge Asuncion
which is marked Exh. A. Notwithstanding the fact that the project of
partition was not signed by the parties themselves but only by the
respective counsel of plaintiffs and defendant, Judge Asuncion approved it
in his Order dated October 23, 1963, which for convenience is quoted
hereunder in full:
The parties, through their respective counsels, presented to this Court for
approval the following project of partition:
COMES NOW, the plaintiffs and the defendant in the above-entitled case,
to this Honorable Court respectfully submit the following Project of Partition:
l. The whole of Lots Nos. 1154, 2304 and 4506 shall belong exclusively
to Bernardita Reyes Macariola;
2. A portion of Lot No. 3416 consisting of 2,373.49 square meters along the
eastern part of the lot shall be awarded likewise to Bernardita R. Macariola;
3. Lots Nos. 4803, 4892 and 5265 shall be awarded to Sinforosa Reyes
Bales;
4. A portion of Lot No. 3416 consisting of 1,834.55 square meters along the
western part of the lot shall likewise be awarded to Sinforosa Reyes-Bales;
5. Lots Nos. 4474 and 4475 shall be divided equally among Luz Reyes
Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto Reyes, Adela Reyes and Priscilla
Reyes in equal shares;
6. Lot No. 1184 and the remaining portion of Lot No. 3416 after taking the
portions awarded under item (2) and (4) above shall be awarded to Luz
Reyes Bakunawa, Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto Reyes, Adela Reyes and
Priscilla Reyes in equal shares, provided, however that the remaining
portion of Lot No. 3416 shall belong exclusively to Priscilla Reyes.
While the Court thought it more desirable for all the parties to have signed
this Project of Partition, nevertheless, upon assurance of both counsels of
the respective parties to this Court that the Project of Partition, as above-
quoted, had been made after a conference and agreement of the plaintiffs
and the defendant approving the above Project of Partition, and that both
lawyers had represented to the Court that they are given full authority to
sign by themselves the Project of Partition, the Court, therefore, finding the
above-quoted Project of Partition to be in accordance with law, hereby
approves the same. The parties, therefore, are directed to execute such
papers, documents or instrument sufficient in form and substance for the
vesting of the rights, interests and participations which were adjudicated to
the respective parties, as outlined in the Project of Partition and the delivery
of the respective properties adjudicated to each one in view of said Project
of Partition, and to perform such other acts as are legal and necessary to
effectuate the said Project of Partition.
SO ORDERED.
EXH. B.
The above Order of October 23, 1963, was amended on November 11,
1963, only for the purpose of giving authority to the Register of Deeds of
the Province of Leyte to issue the corresponding transfer certificates of title
to the respective adjudicatees in conformity with the project of partition (see
Exh. U).
One of the properties mentioned in the project of partition was Lot 1184 or
rather one-half thereof with an area of 15,162.5 sq. meters. This lot, which
according to the decision was the exclusive property of the deceased
Francisco Reyes, was adjudicated in said project of partition to the plaintiffs
Luz, Anacorita Ruperto, Adela, and Priscilla all surnamed Reyes in equal
shares, and when the project of partition was approved by the trial court the
adjudicatees caused Lot 1184 to be subdivided into five lots denominated
as Lot 1184-A to 1184-E inclusive (Exh. V).
On March 6, 1965, Dr. Arcadio Galapon and his wife Sold a portion of Lot
1184-E with an area of around 1,306 sq. meters to Judge Asuncion and his
wife, Victoria S. Asuncion (Exh. 11), which particular portion was declared
by the latter for taxation purposes (Exh. F).
The records also reveal that on or about November 9 or 11, 1968 (pp. 481,
477, rec.), complainant herein instituted an action before the Court of First
Instance of Leyte, entitled "Bernardita R. Macariola, plaintiff, versus
Sinforosa R. Bales, et al., defendants," which was docketed as Civil Case
No. 4235, seeking the annulment of the project of partition made pursuant
to the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 and the two orders issued by
respondent Judge approving the same, as well as the partition of the estate
and the subsequent conveyances with damages. It appears, however, that
some defendants were dropped from the civil case. For one, the case
against Dr. Arcadio Galapon was dismissed because he was no longer a
real party in interest when Civil Case No. 4234 was filed, having already
conveyed on March 6, 1965 a portion of lot 1184-E to respondent Judge
and on August 31, 1966 the remainder was sold to the Traders
Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc. Similarly, the case against
defendant Victoria Asuncion was dismissed on the ground that she was no
longer a real party in interest at the time the aforesaid Civil Case No. 4234
was filed as the portion of Lot 1184 acquired by her and respondent Judge
from Dr. Arcadio Galapon was already sold on August 31, 1966 to the
Traders Manufacturing and Fishing industries, Inc. Likewise, the cases
against defendants Serafin P. Ramento, Catalina Cabus, Ben Barraza Go,
Jesus Perez, Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc., Alfredo R.
Celestial and Pilar P. Celestial, Leopoldo Petilla and Remedios Petilla,
Salvador Anota and Enriqueta Anota and Atty. Zotico A. Tolete were
dismissed with the conformity of complainant herein, plaintiff therein, and
her counsel.
(1) declaring that only Branch IV of the Court of First Instance of Leyte
has jurisdiction to take cognizance of the issue of the legality and validity of
the Project of Partition [Exhibit "B"] and the two Orders [Exhibits "C" and
"C- 3"] approving the partition;
(2) Directing the plaintiff to pay the defendants Mariquita Villasin and the
heirs of Gerardo Villasin the cost of the suit.
(2) Directing the plaintiff to pay the defendant Bonifacio Ramo the cost of
the suit.
It is further disclosed by the record that the aforesaid decision was elevated
to the Court of Appeals upon perfection of the appeal on February 22,
1971.
Furthermore, respondent Judge did not buy the lot in question on March 6,
1965 directly from the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3010 but from Dr. Arcadio
Galapon who earlier purchased on July 31, 1964 Lot 1184-E from three of
the plaintiffs, namely, Priscilla Reyes, Adela Reyes, and Luz R. Bakunawa
after the finality of the decision in Civil Case No. 3010. It may be recalled
that Lot 1184 or more specifically one-half thereof was adjudicated in equal
shares to Priscilla Reyes, Adela Reyes, Luz Bakunawa, Ruperto Reyes
and Anacorita Reyes in the project of partition, and the same was
subdivided into five lots denominated as Lot 1184-A to 1184-E. As
aforestated, Lot 1184-E was sold on July 31, 1964 to Dr. Galapon for which
he was issued TCT No. 2338 by the Register of Deeds of Tacloban City,
and on March 6, 1965 he sold a portion of said lot to respondent Judge and
his wife who declared the same for taxation purposes only. The subsequent
sale on August 31, 1966 by spouses Asuncion and spouses Galapon of
their respective shares and interest in said Lot 1184-E to the Traders
Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc., in which respondent was the
president and his wife was the secretary, took place long after the finality of
the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 and of the subsequent two aforesaid
orders therein approving the project of partition.
The subsequent filing on November 9, or 11, 1968 of Civil Case No. 4234
can no longer alter, change or affect the aforesaid facts that the
questioned sale to respondent Judge, now Court of Appeals Justice, was
effected and consummated long after the finality of the aforesaid decision
or orders.
It is also argued by complainant herein that the sale on July 31, 1964 of Lot
1184-E to Dr. Arcadio Galapon by Priscilla Reyes, Adela Reyes and Luz R.
Bakunawa was only a mere scheme to conceal the illegal and unethical
transfer of said lot to respondent Judge as a consideration for the approval
of the project of partition. In this connection, We agree with the findings of
the Investigating Justice thus:
1) Exh. 9 Certified true copy of OCT No. 19520 covering Lot 1154 of
the Tacloban Cadastral Survey in which the deceased Francisco Reyes
holds a "1/4 share" (Exh. 9-a). On tills certificate of title the Order dated
November 11, 1963, (Exh. U) approving the project of partition was duly
entered and registered on November 26, 1963 (Exh. 9-D);
Counsel for complainant stresses the view, however, that the latter sold her
one-fourth share in Lot 1154 by virtue of the decision in Civil Case 3010
and not because of the project of partition, Exh. A. Such contention is
absurd because from the decision, Exh. C, it is clear that one-half of one-
fourth of Lot 1154 belonged to the estate of Francisco Reyes Diaz while the
other half of said one-fourth was the share of complainant's mother, Felisa
Espiras; in other words, the decision did not adjudicate the whole of the
one-fourth of Lot 1154 to the herein complainant (see Exhs. C-3 & C-4).
Complainant became the owner of the entire one-fourth of Lot 1154 only by
means of the project of partition, Exh. A. Therefore, if Mrs. Macariola sold
Lot 1154 on October 22, 1963, it was for no other reason than that she was
wen aware of the distribution of the properties of her deceased father as
per Exhs. A and B. It is also significant at this point to state that Mrs.
Macariola admitted during the cross-examination that she went to Tacloban
City in connection with the sale of Lot 1154 to Dr. Decena (tsn p. 92,
November 28, 1968) from which we can deduce that she could not have
been kept ignorant of the proceedings in civil case 3010 relative to the
project of partition.
Finally, while it is. true that respondent Judge did not violate paragraph 5,
Article 1491 of the New Civil Code in acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot
1184-E which was in litigation in his court, it was, however, improper for
him to have acquired the same. He should be reminded of Canon 3 of the
Canons of Judicial Ethics which requires that: "A judge's official conduct
should be free from the appearance of impropriety, and his personal
behavior, not only upon the bench and in the performance of judicial duties,
but also in his everyday life, should be beyond reproach." And as aptly
observed by the Investigating Justice: "... it was unwise and indiscreet on
the part of respondent to have purchased or acquired a portion of a piece
of property that was or had been in litigation in his court and caused it to be
transferred to a corporation of which he and his wife were ranking officers
at the time of such transfer. One who occupies an exalted position in the
judiciary has the duty and responsibility of maintaining the faith and trust of
the citizenry in the courts of justice, so that not only must he be truly honest
and just, but his actuations must be such as not give cause for doubt and
mistrust in the uprightness of his administration of justice. In this particular
case of respondent, he cannot deny that the transactions over Lot 1184-E
are damaging and render his actuations open to suspicion and distrust.
Even if respondent honestly believed that Lot 1184-E was no longer in
litigation in his court and that he was purchasing it from a third person and
not from the parties to the litigation, he should nonetheless have refrained
from buying it for himself and transferring it to a corporation in which he and
his wife were financially involved, to avoid possible suspicion that his
acquisition was related in one way or another to his official actuations in
civil case 3010. The conduct of respondent gave cause for the litigants in
civil case 3010, the lawyers practising in his court, and the public in general
to doubt the honesty and fairness of his actuations and the integrity of our
courts of justice" (pp. 395396, rec.).
II
With respect to the second cause of action, the complainant alleged that
respondent Judge violated paragraphs 1 and 5, Article 14 of the Code of
Commerce when he associated himself with the Traders Manufacturing
and Fishing Industries, Inc. as a stockholder and a ranking officer, said
corporation having been organized to engage in business. Said Article
provides that:
Upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States and later
on from the United States to the Republic of the Philippines, Article 14 of
this Code of Commerce must be deemed to have been abrogated because
where there is change of sovereignty, the political laws of the former
sovereign, whether compatible or not with those of the new sovereign, are
automatically abrogated, unless they are expressly re-enacted by
affirmative act of the new sovereign.
Thus, We held in Roa vs. Collector of Customs (23 Phil. 315, 330, 311
[1912]) that:
While municipal laws of the newly acquired territory not in conflict with the,
laws of the new sovereign continue in force without the express assent or
affirmative act of the conqueror, the political laws do not. (Halleck's Int.
Law, chap. 34, par. 14). However, such political laws of the prior
sovereignty as are not in conflict with the constitution or institutions of the
new sovereign, may be continued in force if the conqueror shall so declare
by affirmative act of the commander-in-chief during the war, or by Congress
in time of peace. (Ely's Administrator vs. United States, 171 U.S. 220, 43 L.
Ed. 142). In the case of American and Ocean Ins. Cos. vs. 356 Bales of
Cotton (1 Pet. [26 U.S.] 511, 542, 7 L. Ed. 242), Chief Justice Marshall
said:
On such transfer (by cession) of territory, it has never been held that the
relations of the inhabitants with each other undergo any change. Their
relations with their former sovereign are dissolved, and new relations are
created between them and the government which has acquired their
territory. The same act which transfers their country, transfers the
allegiance of those who remain in it; and the law which may be
denominated political, is necessarily changed, although that which
regulates the intercourse and general conduct of individuals, remains in
force, until altered by the newly- created power of the State.
Likewise, in People vs. Perfecto (43 Phil. 887, 897 [1922]), this Court
stated that: "It is a general principle of the public law that on acquisition of
territory the previous political relations of the ceded region are totally
abrogated. "
It does not appear also from the records that the aforesaid corporation
gained any undue advantage in its business operations by reason of
respondent's financial involvement in it, or that the corporation benefited in
one way or another in any case filed by or against it in court. It is
undisputed that there was no case filed in the different branches of the
Court of First Instance of Leyte in which the corporation was either party
plaintiff or defendant except Civil Case No. 4234 entitled "Bernardita R.
Macariola, plaintiff, versus Sinforosa O. Bales, et al.," wherein the
complainant herein sought to recover Lot 1184-E from the aforesaid
corporation. It must be noted, however, that Civil Case No. 4234 was filed
only on November 9 or 11, 1968 and decided on November 2, 1970 by CFI
Judge Jose D. Nepomuceno when respondent Judge was no longer
connected with the corporation, having disposed of his interest therein on
January 31, 1967.
It may be pointed out that Republic Act No. 296, as amended, also known
as the Judiciary Act of 1948, does not contain any prohibition to that effect.
As a matter of fact, under Section 77 of said law, municipal judges may
engage in teaching or other vocation not involving the practice of law after
office hours but with the permission of the district judge concerned.
In addition, although Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules made
pursuant to the Civil Service Act of 1959 prohibits an officer or employee in
the civil service from engaging in any private business, vocation, or
profession or be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural or
industrial undertaking without a written permission from the head of
department, the same, however, may not fall within the purview of
paragraph h, Section 3 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act because
the last portion of said paragraph speaks of a prohibition by the
Constitution or law on any public officer from having any interest in any
business and not by a mere administrative rule or regulation. Thus, a
violation of the aforesaid rule by any officer or employee in the civil service,
that is, engaging in private business without a written permission from the
Department Head may not constitute graft and corrupt practice as defined
by law.
Under Section 67 of said law, the power to remove or dismiss judges was
then vested in the President of the Philippines, not in the Commissioner of
Civil Service, and only on two grounds, namely, serious misconduct and
inefficiency, and upon the recommendation of the Supreme Court, which
alone is authorized, upon its own motion, or upon information of the
Secretary (now Minister) of Justice to conduct the corresponding
investigation. Clearly, the aforesaid section defines the grounds and
prescribes the special procedure for the discipline of judges.
And under Sections 5, 6 and 7, Article X of the 1973 Constitution, only the
Supreme Court can discipline judges of inferior courts as well as other
personnel of the Judiciary.
It is true that under Section 33 of the Civil Service Act of 1959: "The
Commissioner may, for ... violation of the existing Civil Service Law and
rules or of reasonable office regulations, or in the interest of the service,
remove any subordinate officer or employee from the service, demote him
in rank, suspend him for not more than one year without pay or fine him in
an amount not exceeding six months' salary." Thus, a violation of Section
12 of Rule XVIII is a ground for disciplinary action against civil service
officers and employees.
Moreover, under Section 16(i) of the Civil Service Act of 1959, it is the
Commissioner of Civil Service who has original and exclusive jurisdiction
"(T)o decide, within one hundred twenty days, after submission to it, all
administrative cases against permanent officers and employees in the
competitive service, and, except as provided by law, to have final authority
to pass upon their removal, separation, and suspension and upon all
matters relating to the conduct, discipline, and efficiency of such officers
and employees; and prescribe standards, guidelines and regulations
governing the administration of discipline" (emphasis supplied). There is no
question that a judge belong to the non-competitive or unclassified service
of the government as a Presidential appointee and is therefore not covered
by the aforesaid provision. WE have already ruled that "... in interpreting
Section 16(i) of Republic Act No. 2260, we emphasized that only
permanent officers and employees who belong to the classified service
come under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Civil Service"
(Villaluz vs. Zaldivar, 15 SCRA 710,713 [1965], Ang-Angco vs. Castillo, 9
SCRA 619 [1963]).
WE are not, however, unmindful of the fact that respondent Judge and his
wife had withdrawn on January 31, 1967 from the aforesaid corporation
and sold their respective shares to third parties, and it appears also that the
aforesaid corporation did not in anyway benefit in any case filed by or
against it in court as there was no case filed in the different branches of the
Court of First Instance of Leyte from the time of the drafting of the Articles
of Incorporation of the corporation on March 12, 1966, up to its
incorporation on January 9, 1967, and the eventual withdrawal of
respondent on January 31, 1967 from said corporation. Such disposal or
sale by respondent and his wife of their shares in the corporation only 22
days after the incorporation of the corporation, indicates that respondent
realized that early that their interest in the corporation contravenes the
aforesaid Canon 25. Respondent Judge and his wife therefore deserve the
commendation for their immediate withdrawal from the firm after its
incorporation and before it became involved in any court litigation
III
With respect to the third and fourth causes of action, complainant alleged
that respondent was guilty of coddling an impostor and acted in disregard
of judicial decorum, and that there was culpable defiance of the law and
utter disregard for ethics. WE agree, however, with the recommendation of
the Investigating Justice that respondent Judge be exonerated because the
aforesaid causes of action are groundless, and WE quote the pertinent
portion of her report which reads as follows:
The basis for complainant's third cause of action is the claim that
respondent associated and closely fraternized with Dominador Arigpa Tan
who openly and publicly advertised himself as a practising attorney (see
Exhs. I, I-1 and J) when in truth and in fact said Dominador Arigpa Tan
does not appear in the Roll of Attorneys and is not a member of the
Philippine Bar as certified to in Exh. K.
SO ORDERED.
Facts:
On June 8, 1963, respondent Judge Elias Asuncion rendered a decision in
Civil Case 3010 final for lack of an appeal.
One of the lots in the project of partition was Lot 1184, which was
subdivided into 5 lots denominated as Lot 1184 A E. Dr. Arcadio Galapon
bought Lot 1184-E on July 31, 1964, who was issued transfer of certificate
of Title No, 2338 of the Register of Deeds of Tacloban City. On March 6,
1965, Galapon sold a portion of the lot to Judge Asuncion and his wife.
Issue:
Whether or Not the respondent Judge violated the mentioned provisions.
Ruling:
No. Judge Asuncion did not violate the mentioned provisions constituting of
"Acts unbecoming a Judge" but was reminded to be more discreet in his
private and business activities.
Respondent Judge did not buy the lot 1184-E directly on the plaintiffs in
Civil Case No. 3010 but from Dr. Galapon who earlier purchased the lot
from 3 of the plaintiffs. When the Asuncion bought the lot on March 6, 1965
from Dr. Galapon after the finality of the decision which he rendered on
June 8, 1963 in Civil Case No 3010 and his two orders dated October and
November, 1963. The said property was no longer the subject of litigation.
Asuncion cannot also be held liable under the par. H, Sec. 3 of RA 3019,
citing that the public officers cannot partake in any business in connection
with this office, or intervened or take part in his official capacity. The Judge
and his wife had withdrawn on January 31, 1967 from the corporation and
sold their respective shares to 3rd parties, and it appears that the
corporation did not benefit in any case filed by or against it in court as there
was no case filed in the different branches of the Court of First Instance
from the time of the drafting of the Articles of Incorporation of the
corporation on March 12, 1966 up to its incorporation on January 9, 1967.
The Judge realized early that their interest in the corporation contravenes
against Canon 25.
TUASON, J.:
The petitioner does not reveal the nature of his interest in the prisoner's
incarceration, or what relation, if any, he has with him. As to the effect on
this case of our decision on the first application, res judicata as an inflexible
doctrine has been held not to apply in habeas corpus proceedings. Still the
court in the exercise of a sound judicial discretion, it has also been held,
may give controlling weight to the prior refusal. Such discretion was used
against the petitioner in Wong Doo vs. United States (68 Law. ed., 241), on
the ground that the petitioner had had full opportunity to offer in the first
case proof on the point he raised in the second. By a similar criterion and
reasonIng, that principle might be brought into play here. No reason
whatever is shown why the petitioner did not question in the first petition
the legality of the recommitment order of the Commissioner of Justice.
Nevertheless, we choose not to dispose of this application on a point of
procedural technicality, but will decide it on the merits.
The authority of the Commissioner of Justice under the then existing
government, laws, and military, executive and administrative orders, to take
over the powers, functions and duties of the Board of Indeterminate
Sentence, is beyond dispute. In an international sense it matters not how
the Commissioner of Justice was vested with that authority. For most
purposes the government of the occupant is likely to exercise the
lawmaking functions through decrees or regulations emanating from a
military source; and these become as effective in operation as though they
were expressed in statutory enactments. As a matter of practical
expediency the occupant may be disposed to utilize certain existing
agencies of that government and to suspend the operation of others. (III
Hyde, International Law, 2 ed., 1883.) This Court has held that the
Philippine Executive Commission was a de facto government, in Co Kim
Cham vs. Valdes Tan Keh and Dizon (75 Phil., 113).
But the petitioner takes the position that the recommitment of which he
complains was not such an act of the belligerent occupant as should be
accorded respect and recognition by the Commonwealth Government, now
Republic of the Philippines, after the cessation of the enemy occupation.
We have only to refer to the Co Kim Cham case for a precedent that
refuses this contention. In that case it was said, "It is legal truism in political
and international law that all acts and proceedings of the legislative,
executive and judicial departments of a de facto government are good and
valid." We held that in consonance with the theory of jus postliminii in
international law, such acts and proceedings remained good and valid after
the liberation or re-occupation of the Philippines by the American and
Filipino forces. The decision cited Hall's work on International Law, 7th ed.,
p. 518, according to which the fact that the territory which has been
occupied by an enemy comes again into the power of its legitimate
government or sovereignty, does not, except in a very few cases, wipe out
the effects of acts done by the invader, which for one reason or another it is
within his competence to do.
Enforcement of the criminal law by the forces of occupation is not only valid
and binding; it is imposed on them as a high obligation by the Hague
Convention, as we have pointed out. The reason underlying requirement is
thus stated in William vs. Bruffy (96 U.S., 176, 192), cited in Co Kim Cham
vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon, supra:
"The existence of a state of insurrection and war did not loosen the bonds
of society, or do away with civil government or the regular administration of
the laws. Order was to be preserved, police regulations maintained, crime
prosecuted, property protected, contracts enforced, marriages celebrated,
estates settled, and the transfer and descent of property regulated,
precisely as in the time of peace. No one, that we are aware of, seriously
questions the validity of judicial or legislative Acts in the insurrectionary
States touching these and kindred subjects, where they were not hostile in
their purpose or mode of enforcement to the authority of the National
Government, and did not impair the rights of citizens under the
Constitution." The same doctrine has been asserted in numerous other
cases.
Separate Opinions
The majority decided to uphold the validity of Administrative Order No. 21,
dated June 21, 1942, and of the order of recommitment issued by the
Commissioner of Justice on June 3, 1943, on the strength of the majority
decision in the case of Co Kim Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon (75
Phil., 113).
For the reasons alleged in our dissenting opinions in said case of Co Kim
Cham vs. Valdez Tan Keh and Dizon, and others where the same
questions had been raised, we are constrained to dissent. We are of
opinion that both Administrative Order No. 21 and the order of the
Commissioner of Justice on June 3, 1943, are null and void under a
proclamation of General MacArthur, and under the provisions of our
Constitution. As we have explained in our concurring opinion in Laurel vs.
Misa (77 Phil., 856), no governmental act shall be recognized as valid
unless made under the authority of our people, on whom, according to our
fundamental law, sovereignty resides exclusively. The acts of the Philippine
Executive Commission and of the Commissioner of Justice during enemy
occupation having been made under the exclusive authority of the
Japanese Imperial Government should not be given any validity.
For all the foregoing, we vote for the immediate release of prisoner Elpidio
S. Cruz.
x----------------------------x
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
The Old Civil Code1 and the Old Code of Civil Procedure,2 repealed laws
that they both are notwithstanding, have not abruptly become mere
quiescent items of legal history since their relevance do not wear off for a
long time. Verily, the old statutes proved to be decisive in the adjudication
of the case at bar.
Before us is a petition for review seeking to annul and set aside the joint
Decision3 dated November 24, 1994, as well as the Resolution4 dated
September 8, 1995, of the former Tenth Division5 of the Court of Appeals
in two consolidated cases involving an action for annulment of title6 and an
action for ejectment.7
The donees took their marriage vows on June 4, 1944 and the fact of their
marriage was inscribed at the back of O.C.T. No. 18383.10
Later on, disagreements among five (5) heirs or groups of heirs, including
petitioner Romana, concerning the distribution of two (2) of the lots covered
by the deed of partition which are Lots No. 2467 and 5567 of the Urdaneta
Cadastral Survey surfaced. As their differences were settled, the heirs
concerned executed a Deed of Compromise Agreement18 on June 12,
1976, which provided for the re-distribution of the two (2) lots. Although not
directly involved in the discord, Benito signed the compromise agreement
together with his feuding siblings, nephews and nieces. Significantly, all the
signatories to the compromise agreement, including petitioner Romana,
confirmed all the other stipulations and provisions of the deed of
partition.19
Sometime in 1983, the apparent calm pervading among the heirs was
disturbed when petitioner Constancia filed an action for annulment of title
against the respondents before the Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan.20
The record shows that the case was dismissed by the trial court but it does
not indicate the reason for the dismissal.21
On December 13, 1983, respondent Benito filed with the Municipal Trial
Court of Urdaneta, Pangasinan a Complaint22 seeking the ejectment of
petitioner Constancia from the subject property.
Meanwhile, the decision in the ejectment case was appealed to the same
RTC where the case for annulment of title was also pending. Finding that
the question of ownership was the central issue in both cases, the court
issued an Order26 suspending the proceedings in the ejectment case until
it shall have decided the ownership issue in the title annulment case.
After trial, the RTC rendered a Decision27 dated January 30, 1989
dismissing the complaint for annulment of title on the grounds of
prescription and laches. It likewise ruled that the Inventario Ti Sagut is a
valid public document which transmitted ownership over the subject land to
the respondents. With the dismissal of the complaint and the confirmation
of the respondents title over the subject property, the RTC affirmed in toto
the decision of the MTC in the ejectment case28.
Concerning the annulment case, the issues to be threshed out are: (1)
whether the donation propter nuptias is authentic; (2) whether acceptance
of the donation by the donees is required; (3) if so, in what form should the
acceptance appear, and; (4) whether the action is barred by prescription
and laches.
The Inventario Ti Sagut which contains the donation propter nuptias was
executed and notarized on May 22, 1944. It was presented to the Register
of Deeds of Pangasinan for registration on May 15, 1970. The photocopy of
the document presented in evidence as Exhibit "8" was reproduced from
the original kept in the Registry of Deeds of Pangasinan.31
To buttress their claim that the document was falsified, the petitioners rely
mainly on the Certification32 dated July 9, 1984 of the Records
Management and Archives Office that there was no notarial record for the
year 1944 of Cipriano V. Abenojar who notarized the document on May 22,
1944 and that therefore a copy of the document was not available.
That the heirs of Lucio Locquiao are not included in this Partition by reason
of the fact that in the same manner as we, BENITO and MARCIANO
LOCQUIAO are concerned, we have already received our shares in the
estate of our parents by virtue of previous donations and conveyances, and
that we hereby confirm said dispositions, waiving our rights to whomsoever
will these properties will now be adjudicated;
That we, the Parties herein, do hereby waive and renounce as against
each other any claim or claims that we may have against one or some of
us, and that we recognize the rights of ownership of our co-heirs with
respect to those parcels already distributed and adjudicated and that in the
event that one of us is cultivating or in possession of any one of the parcels
of land already adjudicated in favor of another heir or has been conveyed,
donated or disposed of previously, in favor of another heir, we do hereby
renounce and waive our right of possession in favor of the heir in whose
favor the donation or conveyance was made previously.36 (Emphasis
supplied)
The exclusion of the subject property in the deed of partition dispels any
doubt as to the authenticity of the earlier Inventario Ti Sagut.
The petitioners fault the RTC for admitting in evidence the deed of partition
and the compromise agreement on the pretext that the documents "were
not properly submitted in evidence", pointing out that "when presented to
respondent Tomasa Mara for identification, she simply stated that she
knew about the documents but she did not actually identify them."37
The petitioners, the appellate court and the trial court all erred in applying
the requirements on ordinary donations to the present case instead of the
rules on donation propter nuptias. Underlying the blunder is their failure to
take into account the fundamental dichotomy between the two kinds of
donations.
Under the Old Civil Code, donations propter nuptias must be made in a
public instrument in which the property donated must be specifically
described.45 However, Article 1330 of the same Code provides that
"acceptance is not necessary to the validity of such gifts". In other words,
the celebration of the marriage between the beneficiary couple, in tandem
with compliance with the prescribed form, was enough to effectuate the
donation propter nuptias under the Old Civil Code.
Under the New Civil Code, the rules are different. Article 127 thereof
provides that the form of donations propter nuptias are regulated by the
Statute of Frauds. Article 1403, paragraph 2, which contains the Statute of
Frauds requires that the contracts mentioned thereunder need be in writing
only to be enforceable. However, as provided in Article 129, express
acceptance "is not necessary for the validity of these donations." Thus,
implied acceptance is sufficient.
It is settled that only laws existing at the time of the execution of a contract
are applicable thereto and not later statutes, unless the latter are
specifically intended to have retroactive effect.46 Consequently, it is the
Old Civil Code which applies in this case since the donation propter nuptias
was executed in 1944 and the New Civil Code took effect only on August
30, 1950.47 The fact that in 1944 the Philippines was still under Japanese
occupation is of no consequence. It is a well-known rule of the Law of
Nations that municipal laws, as contra-distinguished from laws of political
nature, are not abrogated by a change of sovereignty.48 This Court
specifically held that during the Japanese occupation period, the Old Civil
Code was in force.49 As a consequence, applying Article 1330 of the Old
Civil Code in the determination of the validity of the questioned donation, it
does not matter whether or not the donees had accepted the donation. The
validity of the donation is unaffected in either case.
Even the petitioners agree that the Old Civil Code should be applied.
However, they invoked the wrong provisions50 thereof.
Even if the provisions of the New Civil Code were to be applied, the case of
the petitioners would collapse just the same. As earlier shown, even
implied acceptance of a donation propter nuptias suffices under the New
Civil Code.51
With the genuineness of the donation propter nuptias and compliance with
the applicable mandatory form requirements fully established, petitioners
hypothesis that their action is imprescriptible cannot take off.
Viewing petitioners action for reconveyance from whatever feasible legal
angle, it is definitely barred by prescription. Petitioners right to file an action
for the reconveyance of the land accrued in 1944, when the Inventario Ti
Sagut was executed. It must be remembered that before the effectivity of
the New Civil Code in 1950, the Old Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190)
governed prescription.52 Under the Old Code of Civil Procedure, an action
for recovery of the title to, or possession of, real property, or an interest
therein, can only be brought within ten years after the cause of such action
accrues.53 Thus, petitioners action, which was filed on December 23,
1985, or more than forty (40) years from the execution of the deed of
donation on May 22, 1944, was clearly time-barred.
(1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or one under whom he claims,
giving rise to the situation that led to the complaint and for which the
complainant seeks a remedy;
(3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the
complainant would assert the right on which he bases his suit, and
(4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the
complainant, or the suit is not held barred.56
Of the facts which support the finding of laches, stress should be made of
the following: (a) the petitioners Romana unquestionably gained actual
knowledge of the donation propter nuptias when the deed of partition was
executed in 1973 and the information must have surfaced again when the
compromise agreement was forged in 1976, and; (b) as petitioner Romana
was a party-signatory to the two documents, she definitely had the
opportunity to question the donation propter nuptias on both occasions, and
she should have done so if she were of the mindset, given the fact that she
was still in possession of the land in dispute at the time. But she did not
make any move. She tarried for eleven (11) more years from the execution
of the deed of partition until she, together with petitioner Constancia, filed
the annulment case in 1985.
Anent the ejectment case, we find the issues raised by the petitioners to be
factual and, therefore, beyond this Courts power of review. Not being a
trier of facts, the Court is not tasked to go over the proofs presented by the
parties and analyze, assess, and weigh them to ascertain if the trial court
and the appellate court were correct in according them superior credit in
this or that piece of evidence of one party or the other.57 In any event,
implicit in the affirmance of the Court of Appeals is the existence of
substantial evidence supporting the decisions of the courts below.
SO ORDERED.
- versus -
xxxx
xxxx
(f) All persons charged before the prosecutors office with a criminal offense
having an imposable penalty of imprisonment of not less than six (6) years
and one (1) day shall undergo a mandatory drug test;
(g) All candidates for public office whether appointed or elected both in the
national or local government shall undergo a mandatory drug test.
xxxx
(g) All candidates for public office x x x both in the national or local
government shall undergo a mandatory drug test.
WHEREAS, Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides that
public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the
people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and
efficiency;
SEC. 3. x x x
On March 25, 2004, in addition to the drug certificates filed with their
respective offices, the Comelec Offices and employees concerned shall
submit to the Law Department two (2) separate lists of candidates. The first
list shall consist of those candidates who complied with the mandatory drug
test while the second list shall consist of those candidates who failed to
comply x x x.
SEC. 5. Effect of failure to undergo mandatory drug test and file drug test
certificate.No person elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties
of his office until he has undergone mandatory drug test and filed with the
offices enumerated under Section 2 hereof the drug test certificate herein
required. (Emphasis supplied.)
Pimentel invokes as legal basis for his petition Sec. 3, Article VI of the
Constitution, which states:
Petitioner Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr., as citizen and taxpayer, also seeks
in his Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 that Sec. 36(c),
(d), (f), and (g) of RA 9165 be struck down as unconstitutional for infringing
on the constitutional right to privacy, the right against unreasonable search
and seizure, and the right against self-incrimination, and for being contrary
to the due process and equal protection guarantees.
(1) Do Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 impose
an additional qualification for candidates for senator? Corollarily, can
Congress enact a law prescribing qualifications for candidates for senator
in addition to those laid down by the Constitution? and
(2) Are paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36, RA 9165
unconstitutional? Specifically, do these paragraphs violate the right to
privacy, the right against unreasonable searches and seizure, and the
equal protection clause? Or do they constitute undue delegation of
legislative power?
Pimentel Petition
(Constitutionality of Sec. 36[g] of RA 9165 and
COMELEC Resolution No. 6486)
Congress inherent legislative powers, broad as they may be, are subject to
certain limitations. As early as 1927, in Government v. Springer, the Court
has defined, in the abstract, the limits on legislative power in the following
wise:
Someone has said that the powers of the legislative department of the
Government, like the boundaries of the ocean, are unlimited. In
constitutional governments, however, as well as governments acting under
delegated authority, the powers of each of the departments x x x are limited
and confined within the four walls of the constitution or the charter, and
each department can only exercise such powers as are necessarily implied
from the given powers. The Constitution is the shore of legislative authority
against which the waves of legislative enactment may dash, but over which
it cannot leap.[10]
In the same vein, the COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and
administering election laws or promulgating rules and regulations to
implement Sec. 36(g), validly impose qualifications on candidates for
senator in addition to what the Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot
require a candidate for senator to meet such additional qualification, the
COMELEC, to be sure, is also without such power. The right of a citizen in
the democratic process of election should not be defeated by unwarranted
impositions of requirement not otherwise specified in the Constitution.[13]
Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented by the assailed
COMELEC resolution, effectively enlarges the qualification requirements
enumerated in the Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution. As couched, said Sec.
36(g) unmistakably requires a candidate for senator to be certified illegal-
drug clean, obviously as a pre-condition to the validity of a certificate of
candidacy for senator or, with like effect, a condition sine qua non to be
voted upon and, if proper, be proclaimed as senator-elect. The COMELEC
resolution completes the chain with the proviso that [n]o person elected to
any public office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has
undergone mandatory drug test. Viewed, therefore, in its proper context,
Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and the implementing COMELEC Resolution add
another qualification layer to what the 1987 Constitution, at the minimum,
requires for membership in the Senate. Whether or not the drug-free bar
set up under the challenged provision is to be hurdled before or after
election is really of no moment, as getting elected would be of little value if
one cannot assume office for non-compliance with the drug-testing
requirement.
SJS Petition
(Constitutionality of Sec. 36[c], [d], [f], and [g] of RA 9165)
The drug test prescribed under Sec. 36(c), (d), and (f) of RA 9165 for
secondary and tertiary level students and public and private employees,
while mandatory, is a random and suspicionless arrangement. The
objective is to stamp out illegal drug and safeguard in the process the well
being of [the] citizenry, particularly the youth, from the harmful effects of
dangerous drugs. This statutory purpose, per the policy-declaration portion
of the law, can be achieved via the pursuit by the state of an intensive and
unrelenting campaign against the trafficking and use of dangerous drugs x
x x through an integrated system of planning, implementation and
enforcement of anti-drug abuse policies, programs and projects.[14] The
primary legislative intent is not criminal prosecution, as those found positive
for illegal drug use as a result of this random testing are not necessarily
treated as criminals. They may even be exempt from criminal liability
should the illegal drug user consent to undergo rehabilitation. Secs. 54 and
55 of RA 9165 are clear on this point:
Sec. 55. Exemption from the Criminal Liability Under the Voluntary
Submission Program.A drug dependent under the voluntary submission
program, who is finally discharged from confinement, shall be exempt from
the criminal liability under Section 15 of this Act subject to the following
conditions:
xxxx
School children, the US Supreme Court noted, are most vulnerable to the
physical, psychological, and addictive effects of drugs. Maturing nervous
systems of the young are more critically impaired by intoxicants and are
more inclined to drug dependency. Their recovery is also at a depressingly
low rate.[15]
In sum, what can reasonably be deduced from the above two cases and
applied to this jurisdiction are: (1) schools and their administrators stand in
loco parentis with respect to their students; (2) minor students have
contextually fewer rights than an adult, and are subject to the custody and
supervision of their parents, guardians, and schools; (3) schools, acting in
loco parentis, have a duty to safeguard the health and well-being of their
students and may adopt such measures as may reasonably be necessary
to discharge such duty; and (4) schools have the right to impose conditions
on applicants for admission that are fair, just, and non-discriminatory.
Guided by Vernonia and Board of Education, the Court is of the view and
so holds that the provisions of RA 9165 requiring mandatory, random, and
suspicionless drug testing of students are constitutional. Indeed, it is within
the prerogative of educational institutions to require, as a condition for
admission, compliance with reasonable school rules and regulations and
policies. To be sure, the right to enroll is not absolute; it is subject to fair,
reasonable, and equitable requirements.
The Court can take judicial notice of the proliferation of prohibited drugs in
the country that threatens the well-being of the people,[21] particularly the
youth and school children who usually end up as victims. Accordingly, and
until a more effective method is conceptualized and put in motion, a
random drug testing of students in secondary and tertiary schools is not
only acceptable but may even be necessary if the safety and interest of the
student population, doubtless a legitimate concern of the government, are
to be promoted and protected. To borrow from Vernonia, [d]eterring drug
use by our Nations schoolchildren is as important as enhancing efficient
enforcement of the Nations laws against the importation of drugs; the
necessity for the State to act is magnified by the fact that the effects of a
drug-infested school are visited not just upon the users, but upon the entire
student body and faculty.[22] Needless to stress, the random testing
scheme provided under the law argues against the idea that the testing
aims to incriminate unsuspecting individual students.
Just as in the case of secondary and tertiary level students, the mandatory
but random drug test prescribed by Sec. 36 of RA 9165 for officers and
employees of public and private offices is justifiable, albeit not exactly for
the same reason. The Court notes in this regard that petitioner SJS, other
than saying that subjecting almost everybody to drug testing, without
probable cause, is unreasonable, an unwarranted intrusion of the individual
right to privacy,[23] has failed to show how the mandatory, random, and
suspicionless drug testing under Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165 violates the
right to privacy and constitutes unlawful and/or unconsented search under
Art. III, Secs. 1 and 2 of the Constitution.[24] Petitioner Lasernas lament is
just as simplistic, sweeping, and gratuitous and does not merit serious
consideration. Consider what he wrote without elaboration:
The essence of privacy is the right to be left alone.[26] In context, the right
to privacy means the right to be free from unwarranted exploitation of ones
person or from intrusion into ones private activities in such a way as to
cause humiliation to a persons ordinary sensibilities. [27] And while there
has been general agreement as to the basic function of the guarantee
against unwarranted search, translation of the abstract prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures into workable broad guidelines for the
decision of particular cases is a difficult task, to borrow from C. Camara v.
Municipal Court.[28] Authorities are agreed though that the right to privacy
yields to certain paramount rights of the public and defers to the states
exercise of police power.[29]
For another, the random drug testing shall be undertaken under conditions
calculated to protect as much as possible the employees privacy and
dignity. As to the mechanics of the test, the law specifies that the procedure
shall employ two testing methods, i.e., the screening test and the
confirmatory test, doubtless to ensure as much as possible the
trustworthiness of the results. But the more important consideration lies in
the fact that the test shall be conducted by trained professionals in access-
controlled laboratories monitored by the Department of Health (DOH) to
safeguard against results tampering and to ensure an accurate chain of
custody.[33] In addition, the IRR issued by the DOH provides that access to
the drug results shall be on the need to know basis;[34] that the drug test
result and the records shall be [kept] confidential subject to the usual
accepted practices to protect the confidentiality of the test results.[35]
Notably, RA 9165 does not oblige the employer concerned to report to the
prosecuting agencies any information or evidence relating to the violation of
the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act received as a result of the
operation of the drug testing. All told, therefore, the intrusion into the
employees privacy, under RA 9165, is accompanied by proper safeguards,
particularly against embarrassing leakages of test results, and is relatively
minimal.
Taking into account the foregoing factors, i.e., the reduced expectation of
privacy on the part of the employees, the compelling state concern likely to
be met by the search, and the well-defined limits set forth in the law to
properly guide authorities in the conduct of the random testing, we hold that
the challenged drug test requirement is, under the limited context of the
case, reasonable and, ergo, constitutional.
Like their counterparts in the private sector, government officials and
employees also labor under reasonable supervision and restrictions
imposed by the Civil Service law and other laws on public officers, all
enacted to promote a high standard of ethics in the public service.[37] And
if RA 9165 passes the norm of reasonableness for private employees, the
more reason that it should pass the test for civil servants, who, by
constitutional command, are required to be accountable at all times to the
people and to serve them with utmost responsibility and efficiency.[38]
Unlike the situation covered by Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165, the Court
finds no valid justification for mandatory drug testing for persons accused of
crimes. In the case of students, the constitutional viability of the mandatory,
random, and suspicionless drug testing for students emanates primarily
from the waiver by the students of their right to privacy when they seek
entry to the school, and from their voluntarily submitting their persons to the
parental authority of school authorities. In the case of private and public
employees, the constitutional soundness of the mandatory, random, and
suspicionless drug testing proceeds from the reasonableness of the drug
test policy and requirement.
SO ORDERED.
The provision [n]o person elected to any public office shall enter upon the
duties of his office until he has undergone mandatory drug test is not
tenable as it enlarges the qualifications. COMELEC cannot, in the guise of
enforcing and administering election laws or promulgating rules and
regulations to implement Sec. 36, validly impose qualifications on
candidates for senator in addition to what the Constitution prescribes. If
Congress cannot require a candidate for senator to meet such additional
qualification, the COMELEC, to be sure, is also without such power. The
right of a citizen in the democratic process of election should not be
defeated by unwarranted impositions of requirement not otherwise
specified in the Constitution.
Sabio v. Gordon, G.R. No. 174340, 504 SCRA 704, October 17, 2006
x --------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
x --------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
WHEREAS, the Philippine Star, in its 12 February 2002 issue reported that
the executive committee of Philcomsat has precipitately released P265
million and granted P125 million loan to a relative of an executive
committee member; to date there have been no payments given, subjecting
the company to an estimated interest income loss of P11.25 million in
2004;
Adopted.
On the same date, February 20, 2006, Senate Res. No. 455 was submitted
to the Senate and referred to the Committee on Accountability of Public
Officers and Investigations and Committee on Public Services. However,
on March 28, 2006, upon motion of Senator Francis N. Pangilinan, it was
transferred to the Committee on Government Corporations and Public
Enterprises.5
Once more, Chairman Sabio did not comply with the notice. He sent a
letter11 dated September 4, 2006 to Senator Gordon reiterating his reason
for declining to appear in the public hearing.
With all due respect, Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 constitutes a limitation on
the power of legislative inquiry, and a recognition by the State of the need
to provide protection to the PCGG in order to ensure the unhampered
performance of its duties under its charter. E.O. No. 1 is a law, Section 4(b)
of which had not been amended, repealed or revised in any way.
To say the least, it would require both Houses of Congress and Presidential
fiat to amend or repeal the provision in controversy. Until then, it stands to
be respected as part of the legal system in this jurisdiction. (As held in
People v. Veneracion, G.R. Nos. 119987-88, October 12, 1995: Obedience
to the rule of law forms the bedrock of our system of justice. If judges,
under the guise of religious or political beliefs were allowed to roam
unrestricted beyond boundaries within which they are required by law to
exercise the duties of their office, then law becomes meaningless. A
government of laws, not of men excludes the exercise of broad
discretionary powers by those acting under its authority. Under this system,
judges are guided by the Rule of Law, and ought to 'protect and enforce it
without fear or favor,' 4 [Act of Athens (1955)] resist encroachments by
governments, political parties, or even the interference of their own
personal beliefs.)
xxxxxx
Relevantly, Chairman Sabio's letter to Sen. Gordon dated August 19, 2006
pointed out that the anomalous transactions referred to in the P.S.
Resolution No. 455 are subject of pending cases before the regular courts,
the Sandiganbayan and the Supreme Court (Pending cases include: a.
Samuel Divina v. Manuel Nieto, Jr., et al., CA-G.R. No. 89102; b. Philippine
Communications Satellite Corporation v. Manuel Nieto, et al.; c. Philippine
Communications Satellite Corporation v. Manuel D. Andal, Civil Case No.
06-095, RTC, Branch 61, Makati City; d. Philippine Communications
Satellite Corporation v. PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation, et al., Civil
Case No. 04-1049) for which reason they may not be able to testify thereon
under the principle of sub judice. The laudable objectives of the PCGG's
functions, recognized in several cases decided by the Supreme Court, of
the PCGG will be put to naught if its recovery efforts will be unduly impeded
by a legislative investigation of cases that are already pending before the
Sandiganbayan and trial courts.
xxxxxx
Hence, Chairman Sabio filed with this Court a petition for habeas corpus
against the Senate Committee on Government Corporations and Public
Enterprises and Committee on Public Services, their Chairmen, Senators
Richard Gordon and Joker P. Arroyo and Members. The case was
docketed as G.R. No. 174340.
Chairman Sabio, Commissioners Abcede, Conti, Nario, and Javier, and the
PCGG's nominees to Philcomsat Holdings Corporation, Manuel Andal and
Julio Jalandoni, likewise filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition against
the same respondents, and also against Senate President Manuel Villar,
Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, the Sergeant-at-Arms, and the entire Senate.
The case was docketed as G.R. No. 174318.
In G.R. No. 174340 (for habeas corpus) and G.R. No. 174318 (for certiorari
and prohibition) Chairman Sabio, Commissioners Abcede, Conti, Nario,
and Javier; and the PCGG's nominees Andal and Jalandoni alleged: first,
respondent Senate Committees disregarded Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1
without any justifiable reason; second, the inquiries conducted by
respondent Senate Committees are not in aid of legislation; third, the
inquiries were conducted in the absence of duly published Senate Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation; and fourth, respondent
Senate Committees are not vested with the power of contempt.
During the oral arguments held on September 21, 2006, the parties were
directed to submit simultaneously their respective memoranda within a non-
extendible period of fifteen (15) days from date. In the meantime, per
agreement of the parties, petitioner Chairman Sabio was allowed to go
home. Thus, his petition for habeas corpus has become moot. The parties
also agreed that the service of the arrest warrants issued against all
petitioners and the proceedings before the respondent Senate Committees
are suspended during the pendency of the instant cases.14
Perched on one arm of the scale of justice is Article VI, Section 21 of the
1987 Constitution granting respondent Senate Committees the power of
legislative inquiry. It reads:
On the other arm of the scale is Section 4(b) of E.O. No.1 limiting such
power of legislative inquiry by exempting all PCGG members or staff from
testifying in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding, thus:
No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or
produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding
concerning matters within its official cognizance.
It can be said that the Congress' power of inquiry has gained more solid
existence and expansive construal. The Court's high regard to such power
is rendered more evident in Senate v. Ermita,21 where it categorically ruled
that "the power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive
branch." Verily, the Court reinforced the doctrine in Arnault that "the
operation of government, being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a
proper subject for investigation" and that "the power of inquiry is co-
extensive with the power to legislate."
xxxxxx
The clear import of this provision is that all existing laws, executive orders,
proclamations, letters of instructions and other executive issuances
inconsistent or repugnant to the Constitution are repealed.
These Decisions, and many others, highlight that the Constitution is the
highest law of the land. It is "the basic and paramount law to which all other
laws must conform and to which all persons, including the highest officials
of the land, must defer. No act shall be valid, however noble its intentions, if
it conflicts with the Constitution."37 Consequently, this Court has no
recourse but to declare Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 repealed by the 1987
Constitution.
Okay. Now, if the Supreme Court rules that Sec. 4(b) is unconstitutional or
that it does not apply to the Senate, will you answer the questions of the
Senators?
CHAIRMAN SABIO:
Your Honor, my father was a judge, died being a judge. I was here in the
Supreme Court as Chief of Staff of Justice Feria. I would definitely honor
the Supreme Court and the rule of law.
CHAIRMAN SABIO:
With his admission, Chairman Sabio is not fully convinced that he and his
Commissioners are shielded from testifying before respondent Senate
Committees by Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1. In effect, his argument that the
said provision exempts him and his co-respondent Commissioners from
testifying before respondent Senate Committees concerning Senate Res.
No. 455 utterly lacks merit.
At any rate, Article VI, Section 21 grants the power of inquiry not only to the
Senate and the House of Representatives, but also to any of their
respective committees. Clearly, there is a direct conferral of power to the
committees. Father Bernas, in his Commentary on the 1987 Constitution,
correctly pointed out its significance:
It should also be noted that the Constitution explicitly recognizes the power
of investigation not just of Congress but also of "any of its committees."
This is significant because it constitutes a direct conferral of investigatory
power upon the committees and it means that the means which the Houses
can take in order to effectively perform its investigative function are also
available to the Committees.38
But the court in its reasoning goes beyond this, and though the grounds
of the decision are not very clearly stated, we take them to be: that there is
in some cases a power in each House of Congress to punish for contempt;
that this power is analogous to that exercised by courts of justice, and that
it being the well established doctrine that when it appears that a prisoner is
held under the order of a court of general jurisdiction for a contempt of its
authority, no other court will discharge the prisoner or make further inquiry
into the cause of his commitment. That this is the general ruleas regards
the relation of one court to another must be conceded.
In McGrain,40 the U.S. Supreme Court held: "Experience has shown that
mere requests for such information are often unavailing, and also that
information which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so
some means of compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed." The
Court, in Arnault v. Nazareno,41 sustained the Congress' power of
contempt on the basis of this observation.
The principle that Congress or any of its bodies has the power to punish
recalcitrant witnesses is founded upon reason and policy. Said power must
be considered implied or incidental to the exercise of legislative power.
How could a legislative body obtain the knowledge and information on
which to base intended legislation if it cannot require and compel the
disclosure of such knowledge and information if it is impotent to punish a
defiance of its power and authority? When the framers of the Constitution
adopted the principle of separation of powers, making each branch
supreme within the realm of its respective authority, it must have intended
each department's authority to be full and complete, independently of the
other's authority or power. And how could the authority and power become
complete if for every act of refusal, every act of defiance, every act of
contumacy against it, the legislative body must resort to the judicial
department for the appropriate remedy, because it is impotent by itself to
punish or deal therewith, with the affronts committed against its authority or
dignity.43
One important limitation on the Congress' power of inquiry is that "the rights
of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected."
This is just another way of saying that the power of inquiry must be "subject
to the limitations placed by the Constitution on government action." As held
in Barenblatt v. United States,45 "the Congress, in common with all the
other branches of the Government, must exercise its powers subject to the
limitations placed by the Constitution on governmental action, more
particularly in the context of this case, the relevant limitations of the Bill of
Rights."
Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws.46 Within these
zones, any form of intrusion is impermissible unless excused by law and in
accordance with customary legal process. The meticulous regard we
accord to these zones arises not only from our conviction that the right to
privacy is a "constitutional right" and "the right most valued by civilized
men,"47 but also from our adherence to the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights which mandates that, "no one shall be subjected to arbitrary
interference with his privacy" and "everyone has the right to the protection
of the law against such interference or attacks."48
Our Bill of Rights, enshrined in Article III of the Constitution, provides at
least two guarantees that explicitly create zones of privacy. It highlights a
person's "right to be let alone" or the "right to determine what, how much, to
whom and when information about himself shall be disclosed."49 Section 2
guarantees "the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose." Section 3 renders inviolable the
"privacy of communication and correspondence" and further cautions that
"any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding."
The answers are in the negative. Petitioners were invited in the Senate's
public hearing to deliberate on Senate Res. No. 455, particularly "on the
anomalous losses incurred by the Philippine Overseas
Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), Philippine Communications
Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and Philcomsat Holdings
Corporations (PHC) due to the alleged improprieties in the operations by
their respective board of directors." Obviously, the inquiry focus on
petitioners' acts committed in the discharge of their duties as officers and
directors of the said corporations, particularly Philcomsat Holdings
Corporation. Consequently, they have no reasonable expectation of privacy
over matters involving their offices in a corporation where the government
has interest. Certainly, such matters are of public concern and over which
the people have the right to information.
This goes to show that the right to privacy is not absolute where there is an
overriding compelling state interest. In Morfe v. Mutuc,51 the Court, in line
with Whalen v. Roe,52 employed the rational basis relationship test when it
held that there was no infringement of the individual's right to privacy as the
requirement to disclosure information is for a valid purpose, i.e., to curtail
and minimize the opportunities for official corruption, maintain a standard of
honesty in public service, and promote morality in public administration.53
In Valmonte v. Belmonte,54 the Court remarked that as public figures, the
Members of the former Batasang Pambansa enjoy a more limited right to
privacy as compared to ordinary individuals, and their actions are subject to
closer scrutiny. Taking this into consideration, the Court ruled that the right
of the people to access information on matters of public concern prevails
over the right to privacy of financial transactions.
The same directors and officers contend that the Senate is barred from
inquiring into the same issues being litigated before the Court of Appeals
and the Sandiganbayan. Suffice it to state that the Senate Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation provide that the filing or
pendency of any prosecution of criminal or administrative action should not
stop or abate any inquiry to carry out a legislative purpose.
SO ORDERED.
HELD: No. It can be said that the Congress power of inquiry has gained
more solid existence and expansive construal. The Courts high regard to
such power is rendered more evident in Senate v. Ermita, where it
categorically ruled that the power of inquiry is broad enough to cover
officials of the executive branch. Verily, the Court reinforced the doctrine
in Arnault that the operation of government, being a legitimate subject for
legislation, is a proper subject for investigation and that the power of
inquiry is co-extensive with the power to legislate. Subject to reasonable
conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of
full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by Romulo
B. Macalintal, a member of the Philippine Bar, seeking a declaration that
certain provisions of Republic Act No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee
Voting Act of 2003)[1] suffer from constitutional infirmity. Claiming that he
has actual and material legal interest in the subject matter of this case in
seeing to it that public funds are properly and lawfully used and
appropriated, petitioner filed the instant petition as a taxpayer and as a
lawyer.
The Court upholds the right of petitioner to file the present petition.
R.A. No. 9189, entitled, An Act Providing for A System of Overseas
Absentee Voting by Qualified Citizens of the Philippines Abroad,
Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes, appropriates funds
under Section 29 thereof which provides that a supplemental budget on the
General Appropriations Act of the year of its enactment into law shall
provide for the necessary amount to carry out its provisions. Taxpayers,
such as herein petitioner, have the right to restrain officials from wasting
public funds through the enforcement of an unconstitutional statute.[2] The
Court has held that they may assail the validity of a law appropriating public
funds[3] because expenditure of public funds by an officer of the State for
the purpose of executing an unconstitutional act constitutes a
misapplication of such funds.[4]
The challenged provision of law involves a public right that affects a great
number of citizens. The Court has adopted the policy of taking jurisdiction
over cases whenever the petitioner has seriously and convincingly
presented an issue of transcendental significance to the Filipino people.
This has been explicitly pronounced in Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa
Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, Inc. vs. Tan,[5] where the Court held:
Indeed, in this case, the Court may set aside procedural rules as the
constitutional right of suffrage of a considerable number of Filipinos is
involved.
. . . despite the inhibitions pressing upon the Court when confronted with
constitutional issues, it will not hesitate to declare a law or act invalid when
it is convinced that this must be done. In arriving at this conclusion, its only
criterion will be the Constitution and God as its conscience gives it in the
light to probe its meaning and discover its purpose. Personal motives and
political considerations are irrelevancies that cannot influence its decisions.
Blandishment is as ineffectual as intimidation, for all the awesome power of
the Congress and Executive, the Court will not hesitate to make the
hammer fall heavily, where the acts of these departments, or of any official,
betray the peoples will as expressed in the Constitution . . .[9]
The need to consider the constitutional issues raised before the Court is
further buttressed by the fact that it is now more than fifteen years since the
ratification of the 1987 Constitution requiring Congress to provide a system
for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad. Thus, strong reasons of
public policy demand that the Court resolves the instant petition[10] and
determine whether Congress has acted within the limits of the Constitution
or if it had gravely abused the discretion entrusted to it.[11]
A. Does Section 5(d) of Rep. Act No. 9189 allowing the registration of
voters who are immigrants or permanent residents in other countries by
their mere act of executing an affidavit expressing their intention to return to
the Philippines, violate the residency requirement in Section 1 of Article V
of the Constitution?
A. Does Section 5(d) of Rep. Act No. 9189 violate Section 1, Article V of
the 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines?
.........
In compliance with the Resolution of the Court, the Solicitor General filed
his comment for all public respondents. He contraposes that the
constitutional challenge to Section 5(d) must fail because of the absence of
clear and unmistakable showing that said provision of law is repugnant to
the Constitution. He stresses: All laws are presumed to be constitutional; by
the doctrine of separation of powers, a department of government owes a
becoming respect for the acts of the other two departments; all laws are
presumed to have adhered to constitutional limitations; the legislature
intended to enact a valid, sensible, and just law.
In addition, the Solicitor General points out that Section 1, Article V of the
Constitution is a verbatim reproduction of those provided for in the 1935
and the 1973 Constitutions. Thus, he cites Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the
House of Representatives[16] wherein the Court held that the term
residence has been understood to be synonymous with domicile under
both Constitutions. He further argues that a person can have only one
domicile but he can have two residences, one permanent (the domicile)
and the other temporary;[17] and that the definition and meaning given to
the term residence likewise applies to absentee voters. Invoking
Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC[18] which reiterates the Courts ruling in
Faypon vs. Quirino,[19] the Solicitor General maintains that Filipinos who
are immigrants or permanent residents abroad may have in fact never
abandoned their Philippine domicile.[20]
Taking issue with the petitioners contention that green card holders are
considered to have abandoned their Philippine domicile, the Solicitor
General suggests that the Court may have to discard its ruling in Caasi vs.
Court of Appeals[21] in so far as it relates to immigrants and permanent
residents in foreign countries who have executed and submitted their
affidavits conformably with Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189. He maintains that
through the execution of the requisite affidavits, the Congress of the
Philippines with the concurrence of the President of the Republic had in
fact given these immigrants and permanent residents the opportunity,
pursuant to Section 2, Article V of the Constitution, to manifest that they
had in fact never abandoned their Philippine domicile; that indubitably, they
would have formally and categorically expressed the requisite intentions,
i.e., animus manendi and animus revertendi; that Filipino immigrants and
permanent residents abroad possess the unquestionable right to exercise
the right of suffrage under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution upon
approval of their registration, conformably with R.A. No. 9189.[22]
The seed of the present controversy is the interpretation that is given to the
phrase, qualified citizens of the Philippines abroad as it appears in R.A. No.
9189, to wit:
. . . (Emphasis supplied)
SEC. 4. Coverage. All citizens of the Philippines abroad, who are not
otherwise disqualified by law, at least eighteen (18) years of age on the day
of elections, may vote for president, vice-president, senators and party-list
representatives. (Emphasis supplied)
SEC. 2. The Congress shall provide a system for securing the secrecy and
sanctity of the ballot as well as a system for absentee voting by qualified
Filipinos abroad.
. . . . . . . . . (Emphasis supplied)
R.A. No. 9189 was enacted in obeisance to the mandate of the first
paragraph of Section 2, Article V of the Constitution that Congress shall
provide a system for voting by qualified Filipinos abroad. It must be
stressed that Section 2 does not provide for the parameters of the exercise
of legislative authority in enacting said law. Hence, in the absence of
restrictions, Congress is presumed to have duly exercised its function as
defined in Article VI (The Legislative Department) of the Constitution.
Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that [f]or the exercise of civil rights and
the fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of natural persons is their
place of habitual residence. In Ong vs. Republic, this court took the concept
of domicile to mean an individuals permanent home, a place to which,
whenever absent for business or for pleasure, one intends to return, and
depends on facts and circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent.
Based on the foregoing, domicile includes the twin elements of the fact of
residing or physical presence in a fixed place and animus manendi, or the
intention of returning there permanently.
For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are dictated
by the peculiar criteria of political laws. As these concepts have evolved in
our election law, what has clearly and unequivocally emerged is the fact
that residence for election purposes is used synonymously with
domicile.[32] (Emphasis supplied)
Aware of the domiciliary legal tie that links an overseas Filipino to his
residence in this country, the framers of the Constitution considered the
circumstances that impelled them to require Congress to establish a
system for overseas absentee voting, thus:
MR. OPLE. With respect to Section 1, it is not clear whether the right of
suffrage, which here has a residential restriction, is not denied to citizens
temporarily residing or working abroad. Based on the statistics of several
government agencies, there ought to be about two million such Filipinos at
this time. Commissioner Bernas had earlier pointed out that these
provisions are really lifted from the two previous Constitutions of 1935 and
1973, with the exception of the last paragraph. They could not therefore
have foreseen at that time the phenomenon now described as the Filipino
labor force explosion overseas.
I, therefore, ask the Committee whether at the proper time they might
entertain an amendment that will make this exercise of the right to vote
abroad for Filipino citizens an effective, rather than merely a nominal right
under this proposed Constitution.
FR. BERNAS. Certainly, the Committee will consider that. But more than
just saying that, I would like to make a comment on the meaning of
residence in the Constitution because I think it is a concept that has been
discussed in various decisions of the Supreme Court, particularly in the
case of Faypon vs. Quirino, a 1954 case which dealt precisely with the
meaning of residence in the Election Law. Allow me to quote:
A citizen may leave the place of his birth to look for greener pastures, as
the saying goes, to improve his lot and that, of course, includes study in
other places, practice of his avocation, reengaging in business. When an
election is to be held, the citizen who left his birthplace to improve his lot
may decide to return to his native town, to cast his ballot, but for
professional or business reasons, or for any other reason, he may not
absent himself from the place of his professional or business activities.
This may be the explanation why the registration of a voter in a place other
than his residence of origin has not been deemed sufficient to consider
abandonment or loss of such residence of origin.
It gives me scant comfort thinking of about two million Filipinos who should
enjoy the right of suffrage, at least a substantial segment of these overseas
Filipino communities. The Committee, of course, is aware that when this
Article of the Constitution explicitly and unequivocally extends the right of
effective suffrage to Filipinos abroad, this will call for a logistical exercise of
global proportions. In effect, this will require budgetary and administrative
commitments on the part of the Philippine government, mainly through the
COMELEC and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and perhaps, a more
extensive elaboration of this mechanism that will be put in place to make
effective the right to vote. Therefore, seeking shelter in some wise
jurisprudence of the past may not be sufficient to meet the demands of the
right of suffrage for Filipinos abroad that I have mentioned. But I want to
thank the Committee for saying that an amendment to this effect may be
entertained at the proper time. . . . . . . . . .
[33] (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the Constitutional Commission recognized the fact that while millions
of Filipinos reside abroad principally for economic reasons and hence they
contribute in no small measure to the economic uplift of this country, their
voices are marginal insofar as the choice of this countrys leaders is
concerned.
The Constitutional Commission realized that under the laws then existing
and considering the novelty of the system of absentee voting in this
jurisdiction, vesting overseas Filipinos with the right to vote would spawn
constitutional problems especially because the Constitution itself provides
for the residency requirement of voters:
MR. REGALADO. How about those people who cannot go back to the
places where they are registered?
MR. MONSOD. Under the present Election Code, there are provisions for
allowing students and military people who are temporarily in another place
to register and vote. I believe that those situations can be covered by the
Omnibus Election Code. The reason we want absentee voting to be in the
Constitution as a mandate to the legislature is that there could be
inconsistency on the residence rule if it is just a question of legislation by
Congress. So, by allowing it and saying that this is possible, then legislation
can take care of the rest.[34] (Emphasis supplied)
MR. SUAREZ. May I just be recognized for a clarification. There are certain
qualifications for the exercise of the right of suffrage like having resided in
the Philippines for at least one year and in the place where they propose to
vote for at least six months preceding the elections. What is the effect of
these mandatory requirements on the matter of the exercise of the right of
suffrage by the absentee voters like Filipinos abroad?
FR. BERNAS. But I think it should be further clarified with regard to the
residence requirement or the place where they vote in practice; the
understanding is that it is flexible. For instance, one might be a resident of
Naga or domiciled therein, but he satisfies the requirement of residence in
Manila, so he is able to vote in Manila.
MR. MONSOD. Yes, we accepted that. I would like to say that with respect
to registration we will leave it up to the legislative assembly, for example, to
require where the registration is. If it is, say, members of the diplomatic
corps who may be continuously abroad for a long time, perhaps, there can
be a system of registration in the embassies. However, we do not like to
preempt the legislative assembly.
MR. MONSOD. That is right. They must have the qualifications and none of
the disqualifications.
THE PRESIDENT. It is just to devise a system by which they can vote.
MR. SUAREZ. For clarification purposes, we just want to state for the
record that in the case of qualified Filipino citizens residing abroad and
exercising their right of suffrage, they can cast their votes for the
candidates in the place where they were registered to vote in the
Philippines. So as to avoid any complications, for example, if they are
registered in Angeles City, they could not vote for a mayor in Naga City.
MR. MONSOD. Yes, it is possible that the system will enable that child to
comply with the registration requirements in an embassy in the United
States and his name is then entered in the official registration book in
Angeles City, for instance.
MR. MONSOD. That is right. He does not have to come home to the
Philippines to comply with the registration procedure here.
Also, the Floor Leader is happy to announce that there are no more
registered Commissioners to propose amendments. So I move that we
close the period of amendments.
Senator Arroyo. Mr. President, this bill should be looked into in relation to
the constitutional provisions. I think the sponsor and I would agree that the
Constitution is supreme in any statute that we may enact.
Now, Mr. President, the Constitution says, who shall have resided in the
Philippines. They are permanent immigrants. They have changed
residence so they are barred under the Constitution. This is why I asked
whether this committee amendment which in fact does not alter the original
text of the bill will have any effect on this?
Senator Angara. Good question, Mr. President. And this has been asked in
various fora. This is in compliance with the Constitution. One, the
interpretation here of residence is synonymous with domicile.
As the gentleman and I know, Mr. President, domicile is the intent to return
to ones home. And the fact that a Filipino may have been physically absent
from the Philippines and may be physically a resident of the United States,
for example, but has a clear intent to return to the Philippines, will make
him qualified as a resident of the Philippines under this law.
The key to this whole exercise, Mr. President, is qualified. In other words,
anything that we may do or say in granting our compatriots abroad must be
anchored on the proposition that they are qualified. Absent the qualification,
they cannot vote. And residents (sic) is a qualification.
Look at what the Constitution says In the place wherein they propose to
vote for at least six months immediately preceding the election.
Mr. President, all of us here have run (sic) for office.
The second reason, Mr. President, is that under our jurisprudence and I
think this is so well-entrenched that one need not argue about it residency
has been interpreted as synonymous with domicile.
But the third more practical reason, Mr. President, is, if we follow the
interpretation of the gentleman, then it is legally and constitutionally
impossible to give a franchise to vote to overseas Filipinos who do not
physically live in the country, which is quite ridiculous because that is
exactly the whole point of this exercise to enfranchise them and empower
them to vote.
SEC. 4. Coverage. All citizens of the Philippines abroad, who are not
otherwise disqualified by law, at least eighteen (18) years of age on the day
of elections, may vote for president, vice-president, senators and party-list
representatives.
which does not require physical residency in the Philippines; and Section 5
of the assailed law which enumerates those who are disqualified, to wit:
As finally approved into law, Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 specifically
disqualifies an immigrant or permanent resident who is recognized as such
in the host country because immigration or permanent residence in another
country implies renunciation of ones residence in his country of origin.
However, same Section allows an immigrant and permanent resident
abroad to register as voter for as long as he/she executes an affidavit to
show that he/she has not abandoned his domicile in pursuance of the
constitutional intent expressed in Sections 1 and 2 of Article V that all
citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law must be entitled
to exercise the right of suffrage and, that Congress must establish a system
for absentee voting; for otherwise, if actual, physical residence in the
Philippines is required, there is no sense for the framers of the Constitution
to mandate Congress to establish a system for absentee voting.
Contrary to the claim of petitioner, the execution of the affidavit itself is not
the enabling or enfranchising act. The affidavit required in Section 5(d) is
not only proof of the intention of the immigrant or permanent resident to go
back and resume residency in the Philippines, but more significantly, it
serves as an explicit expression that he had not in fact abandoned his
domicile of origin. Thus, it is not correct to say that the execution of the
affidavit under Section 5(d) violates the Constitution that proscribes
provisional registration or a promise by a voter to perform a condition to be
qualified to vote in a political exercise.
It states that: For Filipino immigrants and those who have acquired
permanent resident status abroad, a requirement for the registration is the
submission of a Sworn Declaration of Intent to Return duly sworn before
any Philippine embassy or consulate official authorized to administer oath
Mr. President, may we know the rationale of this provision? Is the purpose
of this Sworn Declaration to include only those who have the intention of
returning to be qualified to exercise the right of suffrage? What if the
Filipino immigrant has no purpose of returning? Is he automatically
disbarred from exercising this right to suffrage?
Senator Angara. The rationale for this, Mr. President, is that we want to be
expansive and all-inclusive in this law. That as long as he is a Filipino, no
matter whether he is a green-card holder in the U.S. or not, he will be
authorized to vote. But if he is already a green-card holder, that means he
has acquired permanent residency in the United States, then he must
indicate an intention to return. This is what makes for the definition of
domicile. And to acquire the vote, we thought that we would require the
immigrants and the green-card holders . . . Mr. President, the three
administration senators are leaving, maybe we may ask for a vote
[Laughter].
Senator Angara. Mr. President, going back to the business at hand. The
rationale for the requirement that an immigrant or a green-card holder
should file an affidavit that he will go back to the Philippines is that, if he is
already an immigrant or a green-card holder, that means he may not return
to the country any more and that contradicts the definition of domicile under
the law.
But what we are trying to do here, Mr. President, is really provide the
choice to the voter. The voter, after consulting his lawyer or after
deliberation within the family, may decide No, I think we are risking our
permanent status in the United States if we file an affidavit that we want to
go back. But we want to give him the opportunity to make that decision. We
do not want to make that decision for him. [39] (Emphasis supplied)
The jurisprudential declaration in Caasi vs. Court of Appeals that green
card holders are disqualified to run for any elective office finds no
application to the present case because the Caasi case did not, for obvious
reasons, consider the absentee voting rights of Filipinos who are
immigrants and permanent residents in their host countries.
In the advent of The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 or R.A. 9189,
they may still be considered as a qualified citizen of the Philippines abroad
upon fulfillment of the requirements of registration under the new law for
the purpose of exercising their right of suffrage.
It must be emphasized that Section 5(d) does not only require an affidavit
or a promise to resume actual physical permanent residence in the
Philippines not later than three years from approval of his/her registration,
the Filipinos abroad must also declare that they have not applied for
citizenship in another country. Thus, they must return to the Philippines;
otherwise, their failure to return shall be cause for the removal of their
names from the National Registry of Absentee Voters and his/her
permanent disqualification to vote in absentia.
11.1. Every qualified citizen of the Philippines abroad whose application for
registration has been approved, including those previously registered under
Republic Act No. 8189, shall, in every national election, file with the officer
of the embassy, consulate or other foreign service establishment
authorized by the Commission, a sworn written application to vote in a form
prescribed by the Commission. The authorized officer of such embassy,
consulate or other foreign service establishment shall transmit to the
Commission the said application to vote within five (5) days from receipt
thereof. The application form shall be accomplished in triplicate and
submitted together with the photocopy of his/her overseas absentee voter
certificate of registration.
Other serious legal questions that may be raised would be: what happens
to the votes cast by the qualified voters abroad who were not able to return
within three years as promised? What is the effect on the votes cast by the
non-returnees in favor of the winning candidates? The votes cast by
qualified Filipinos abroad who failed to return within three years shall not be
invalidated because they were qualified to vote on the date of the elections,
but their failure to return shall be cause for the removal of the names of the
immigrants or permanent residents from the National Registry of Absentee
Voters and their permanent disqualification to vote in absentia.
In fine, considering the underlying intent of the Constitution, the Court does
not find Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 as constitutionally defective.
B. Is Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 in relation to Section 4 of the same Act
in contravention of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution?
Section 4 of R.A. No. 9189 provides that the overseas absentee voter may
vote for president, vice-president, senators and party-list representatives.
.........
18. 5 The canvass of votes shall not cause the delay of the proclamation of
a winning candidate if the outcome of the election will not be affected by
the results thereof. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Commission is
empowered to order the proclamation of winning candidates despite the
fact that the scheduled election has not taken place in a particular country
or countries, if the holding of elections therein has been rendered
impossible by events, factors and circumstances peculiar to such country
or countries, in which events, factors and circumstances are beyond the
control or influence of the Commission. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner claims that the provision of Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189
empowering the COMELEC to order the proclamation of winning
candidates insofar as it affects the canvass of votes and proclamation of
winning candidates for president and vice-president, is unconstitutional
because it violates the following provisions of paragraph 4, Section 4 of
Article VII of the Constitution:
SEC. 4 . . .
The Congress shall promulgate its rules for the canvassing of the
certificates.
...
which gives to Congress the duty to canvass the votes and proclaim the
winning candidates for president and vice-president.
The Solicitor General asserts that this provision must be harmonized with
paragraph 4, Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution and should be taken
to mean that COMELEC can only proclaim the winning Senators and party-
list representatives but not the President and Vice-President.[41]
In addition, the Court notes that Section 18.4 of the law, to wit:
Petitioner avers that Sections 19 and 25 of R.A. No. 9189 violate Article IX-
A (Common Provisions) of the Constitution, to wit:
The COMELEC adds, however, that another provision, vis--vis its rule-
making power, to wit:
17.1. For the May, 2004 elections, the Commission shall authorize voting
by mail in not more than three (3) countries, subject to the approval of the
Congressional Oversight Committee. Voting by mail may be allowed in
countries that satisfy the following conditions:
Thereafter, voting by mail in any country shall be allowed only upon review
and approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee.
. . . . . . . . . (Emphasis supplied)
The Solicitor General takes exception to his prefatory statement that the
constitutional challenge must fail and agrees with the petitioner that
Sections 19 and 25 are invalid and unconstitutional on the ground that
there is nothing in Article VI of the Constitution on Legislative Department
that would as much as imply that Congress has concurrent power to
enforce and administer election laws with the COMELEC; and by the
principles of exclusio unius est exclusio alterius and expressum facit
cessare tacitum, the constitutionally enumerated powers of Congress
circumscribe its authority to the exclusion of all others.
The parties are unanimous in claiming that Sections 19, 25 and portions of
Section 17.1 are unconstitutional. Thus, there is no actual issue forged on
this question raised by petitioner.
. . . . . . . . . (Emphasis supplied)
Composed of Senators and Members of the House of Representatives, the
Joint Congressional Oversight Committee (JCOC) is a purely legislative
body. There is no question that the authority of Congress to monitor and
evaluate the implementation of R.A. No. 9189 is geared towards possible
amendments or revision of the law itself and thus, may be performed in aid
of its legislation.
However, aside from its monitoring and evaluation functions, R.A. No. 9189
gives to the JCOC the following functions: (a) to review, revise, amend and
approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) promulgated by the
COMELEC [Sections 25 and 19]; and (b) subject to the approval of the
JCOC [Section 17.1], the voting by mail in not more than three countries for
the May 2004 elections and in any country determined by COMELEC.
By vesting itself with the powers to approve, review, amend, and revise the
IRR for The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003, Congress went
beyond the scope of its constitutional authority. Congress trampled upon
the constitutional mandate of independence of the COMELEC. Under such
a situation, the Court is left with no option but to withdraw from its usual
reticence in declaring a provision of law unconstitutional.
The second sentence of the first paragraph of Section 19 stating that [t]he
Implementing Rules and Regulations shall be submitted to the Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee created by virtue of this Act for prior
approval, and the second sentence of the second paragraph of Section 25
stating that [i]t shall review, revise, amend and approve the Implementing
Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Commission, whereby
Congress, in both provisions, arrogates unto itself a function not specifically
vested by the Constitution, should be stricken out of the subject statute for
constitutional infirmity. Both provisions brazenly violate the mandate on the
independence of the COMELEC.
During the deliberations, all the members of the Court agreed to adopt the
separate opinion of Justice Reynato S. Puno as part of the ponencia on the
unconstitutionality of Sections 17.1, 19 and 25 of R.A. No. 9189 insofar as
they relate to the creation of and the powers given to the Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee.
a) The phrase in the first sentence of the first paragraph of Section 17.1, to
wit: subject to the approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight
Committee;
b) The portion of the last paragraph of Section 17.1, to wit: only upon
review and approval of the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee;
c) The second sentence of the first paragraph of Section 19, to wit: The
Implementing Rules and Regulations shall be submitted to the Joint
Congressional Oversight Committee created by virtue of this Act for prior
approval; and
Pursuant to Section 30 of R.A. No. 9189, the rest of the provisions of said
law continues to be in full force and effect.
SO ORDERED.
HELD: No.
The Filipino First Policy enshrined in the 1987 Constitution, i.e., in the grant
of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and
patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos,[1] is
invoked by petitioner in its bid to acquire 51% of the shares of the Manila
Hotel Corporation (MHC) which owns the historic Manila Hotel. Opposing,
respondents maintain that the provision is not self-executing but requires
an implementing legislation for its enforcement. Corollarily, they ask
whether the 51% shares form part of the national economy and patrimony
covered by the protective mantle of the Constitution.
1. The Highest Bidder must comply with the conditions set forth below by
October 23, 1995 (reset to November 3, 1995) or the Highest Bidder will
lose the right to purchase the Block of Shares and GSIS will instead offer
the Block of Shares to the other Qualified Bidders:
a. The Highest Bidder must negotiate and execute with the GSIS/MHC the
Management Contract, International Marketing/Reservation System
Contract or other type of contract specified by the Highest Bidder in its
strategic plan for the Manila Hotel x x x x
b. The Highest Bidder must execute the Stock Purchase and Sale
Agreement with GSIS x x x x
In the main, petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987
Constitution and submits that the Manila Hotel has been identified with the
Filipino nation and has practically become a historical monument which
reflects the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture. It is a proud legacy
of an earlier generation of Filipinos who believed in the nobility and
sacredness of independence and its power and capacity to release the full
potential of the Filipino people. To all intents and purposes, it has become
a part of the national patrimony.[6] Petitioner also argues that since 51% of
the shares of the MHC carries with it the ownership of the business of the
hotel which is owned by respondent GSIS, a government-owned and
controlled corporation, the hotel business of respondent GSIS being a part
of the tourism industry is unquestionably a part of the national economy.
Thus, any transaction involving 51% of the shares of stock of the MHC is
clearly covered by the term national economy, to which Sec. 10, second
par., Art. XII, 1987 Constitution, applies.[7]
It is also the thesis of petitioner that since Manila Hotel is part of the
national patrimony and its business also unquestionably part of the national
economy petitioner should be preferred after it has matched the bid offer of
the Malaysian firm. For the bidding rules mandate that if for any reason, the
Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer
this to the other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided
that these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms of
price per share.[8]
Respondents except. They maintain that: First, Sec. 10, second par., Art.
XII, of the 1987 Constitution is merely a statement of principle and policy
since it is not a self-executing provision and requires implementing
legislation(s) x x x x Thus, for the said provision to operate, there must be
existing laws to lay down conditions under which business may be done.[9]
Second, granting that this provision is self-executing, Manila Hotel does not
fall under the term national patrimony which only refers to lands of the
public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and
fauna and all marine wealth in its territorial sea, and exclusive marine zone
as cited in the first and second paragraphs of Sec. 2, Art. XII, 1987
Constitution. According to respondents, while petitioner speaks of the
guests who have slept in the hotel and the events that have transpired
therein which make the hotel historic, these alone do not make the hotel fall
under the patrimony of the nation. What is more, the mandate of the
Constitution is addressed to the State, not to respondent GSIS which
possesses a personality of its own separate and distinct from the
Philippines as a State.
Third, granting that the Manila Hotel forms part of the national patrimony,
the constitutional provision invoked is still inapplicable since what is being
sold is only 51% of the outstanding shares of the corporation, not the hotel
building nor the land upon which the building stands. Certainly, 51% of the
equity of the MHC cannot be considered part of the national patrimony.
Moreover, if the disposition of the shares of the MHC is really contrary to
the Constitution, petitioner should have questioned it right from the
beginning and not after it had lost in the bidding.
Fourth, the reliance by petitioner on par. V., subpar. J. 1., of the bidding
rules which provides that if for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be
awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other Qualified
Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified
Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per share, is
misplaced. Respondents postulate that the privilege of submitting a
matching bid has not yet arisen since it only takes place if for any reason,
the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares. Thus the
submission by petitioner of a matching bid is premature since Renong
Berhad could still very well be awarded the block of shares and the
condition giving rise to the exercise of the privilege to submit a matching
bid had not yet taken place.
Respondents argue that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987
Constitution is clearly not self-executing, as they quote from discussions on
the floor of the 1986 Constitutional Commission -
MR. RODRIGO. Madam President, I am asking this question as the
Chairman of the Committee on Style. If the wording of PREFERENCE is
given to QUALIFIED FILIPINOS, can it be understood as a preference to
qualified Filipinos vis-a-vis Filipinos who are not qualified. So, why do we
not make it clear? To qualified Filipinos as against aliens?
Quite apparently, Sec. 10, second par., of Art XII is couched in such a way
as not to make it appear that it is non-self-executing but simply for
purposes of style. But, certainly, the legislature is not precluded from
enacting further laws to enforce the constitutional provision so long as the
contemplated statute squares with the Constitution. Minor details may be
left to the legislature without impairing the self-executing nature of
constitutional provisions.
On the other hand, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is
a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which
needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its
enforcement. From its very words the provision does not require any
legislation to put it in operation. It is per se judicially enforceable. When our
Constitution mandates that [i]n the grant of rights, privileges, and
concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall give
preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that - qualified Filipinos shall
be preferred. And when our Constitution declares that a right exists in
certain specified circumstances an action may be maintained to enforce
such right notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject;
consequently, if there is no statute especially enacted to enforce such
constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its own inherent potency
and puissance, and from which all legislations must take their bearings.
Where there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
We agree. In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to
heritage.[35] When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers
not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution
could have very well used the term natural resources, but also to the
cultural heritage of the Filipinos.
The history of the hotel has been chronicled in the book The Manila Hotel:
The Heart and Memory of a City.[37] During World War II the hotel was
converted by the Japanese Military Administration into a military
headquarters. When the American forces returned to recapture Manila the
hotel was selected by the Japanese together with Intramuros as the two (2)
places for their final stand. Thereafter, in the 1950s and 1960s, the hotel
became the center of political activities, playing host to almost every
political convention. In 1970 the hotel reopened after a renovation and
reaped numerous international recognitions, an acknowledgment of the
Filipino talent and ingenuity. In 1986 the hotel was the site of a failed coup
d etat where an aspirant for vice-president was proclaimed President of the
Philippine Republic.
For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore mute witness to the
triumphs and failures, loves and frustrations of the Filipinos; its existence is
impressed with public interest; its own historicity associated with our
struggle for sovereignty, independence and nationhood. Verily, Manila
Hotel has become part of our national economy and patrimony. For sure,
51% of the equity of the MHC comes within the purview of the constitutional
shelter for it comprises the majority and controlling stock, so that anyone
who acquires or owns the 51% will have actual control and management of
the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the MHC cannot be disassociated from
the hotel and the land on which the hotel edifice stands. Consequently, we
cannot sustain respondents claim that the Filipino First Policy provision is
not applicable since what is being sold is only 51% of the outstanding
shares of the corporation, not the Hotel building nor the land upon which
the building stands.[38]
The argument is pure sophistry. The term qualified Filipinos as used in our
Constitution also includes corporations at least 60% of which is owned by
Filipinos. This is very clear from the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission -
xxxx
xxxx
MR. FOZ. If the foreigner is more qualified in some aspects than the
Filipino enterprise, will the Filipino still be preferred?
The term qualified Filipinos simply means that preference shall be given to
those citizens who can make a viable contribution to the common good,
because of credible competence and efficiency. It certainly does NOT
mandate the pampering and preferential treatment to Filipino citizens or
organizations that are incompetent or inefficient, since such an
indiscriminate preference would be counterproductive and inimical to the
common good.
When the Constitution addresses the State it refers not only to the people
but also to the government as elements of the State. After all, government
is composed of three (3) divisions of power - legislative, executive and
judicial. Accordingly, a constitutional mandate directed to the State is
correspondingly directed to the three (3) branches of government. It is
undeniable that in this case the subject constitutional injunction is
addressed among others to the Executive Department and respondent
GSIS, a government instrumentality deriving its authority from the State.
It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm offered the higher bid it
is not yet the winning bidder. The bidding rules expressly provide that the
highest bidder shall only be declared the winning bidder after it has
negotiated and executed the necessary contracts, and secured the
requisite approvals. Since the Filipino First Policy provision of the
Constitution bestows preference on qualified Filipinos the mere tending of
the highest bid is not an assurance that the highest bidder will be declared
the winning bidder. Resultantly, respondents are not bound to make the
award yet, nor are they under obligation to enter into one with the highest
bidder. For in choosing the awardee respondents are mandated to abide by
the dictates of the 1987 Constitution the provisions of which are presumed
to be known to all the bidders and other interested parties.
Paragraph V. J. 1 of the bidding rules provides that [i]f for any reason the
Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer
this to other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that
these Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price
per share.[47] Certainly, the constitutional mandate itself is reason enough
not to award the block of shares immediately to the foreign bidder
notwithstanding its submission of a higher, or even the highest, bid. In fact,
we cannot conceive of a stronger reason than the constitutional injunction
itself.
In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public
bidding concerning the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering
the national economy and patrimony, thereby exceeding the bid of a
Filipino, there is no question that the Filipino will have to be allowed to
match the bid of the foreign entity. And if the Filipino matches the bid of a
foreign firm the award should go to the Filipino. It must be so if we are to
give life and meaning to the Filipino First Policy provision of the 1987
Constitution. For, while this may neither be expressly stated nor
contemplated in the bidding rules, the constitutional fiat is omnipresent to
be simply disregarded. To ignore it would be to sanction a perilous skirting
of the basic law.
This Court does not discount the apprehension that this policy may
discourage foreign investors. But the Constitution and laws of the
Philippines are understood to be always open to public scrutiny. These are
given factors which investors must consider when venturing into business
in a foreign jurisdiction. Any person therefore desiring to do business in the
Philippines or with any of its agencies or instrumentalities is presumed to
know his rights and obligations under the Constitution and the laws of the
forum.
Since petitioner has already matched the bid price tendered by Renong
Berhad pursuant to the bidding rules, respondent GSIS is left with no
alternative but to award to petitioner the block of shares of MHC and to
execute the necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale in
accordance not only with the bidding guidelines and procedures but with
the Constitution as well. The refusal of respondent GSIS to execute the
corresponding documents with petitioner as provided in the bidding rules
after the latter has matched the bid of the Malaysian firm clearly constitutes
grave abuse of discretion.
Let it be stated for the record once again that while it is no business of the
Court to intervene in contracts of the kind referred to or set itself up as the
judge of whether they are viable or attainable, it is its bounden duty to
make sure that they do not violate the Constitution or the laws, or are not
adopted or implemented with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction. It will never shirk that duty, no matter how buffeted
by winds of unfair and ill-informed criticism.[48]
The Manila Hotel or, for that matter, 51% of the MHC, is not just any
commodity to be sold to the highest bidder solely for the sake of
privatization. We are not talking about an ordinary piece of property in a
commercial district. We are talking about a historic relic that has hosted
many of the most important events in the short history of the Philippines as
a nation. We are talking about a hotel where heads of states would prefer
to be housed as a strong manifestation of their desire to cloak the dignity of
the highest state function to their official visits to the Philippines. Thus the
Manila Hotel has played and continues to play a significant role as an
authentic repository of twentieth century Philippine history and culture. In
this sense, it has become truly a reflection of the Filipino soul - a place with
a history of grandeur; a most historical setting that has played a part in the
shaping of a country.[51]
This Court cannot extract rhyme nor reason from the determined efforts of
respondents to sell the historical landmark - this Grand Old Dame of hotels
in Asia - to a total stranger. For, indeed, the conveyance of this epic
exponent of the Filipino psyche to alien hands cannot be less than
mephistophelian for it is, in whatever manner viewed, a veritable alienation
of a nations soul for some pieces of foreign silver. And so we ask: What
advantage, which cannot be equally drawn from a qualified Filipino, can be
gained by the Filipinos if Manila Hotel - and all that it stands for - is sold to
a non-Filipino? How much of national pride will vanish if the nations cultural
heritage is entrusted to a foreign entity? On the other hand, how much
dignity will be preserved and realized if the national patrimony is safekept in
the hands of a qualified, zealous and well-meaning Filipino? This is the
plain and simple meaning of the Filipino First Policy provision of the
Philippine Constitution. And this Court, heeding the clarion call of the
Constitution and accepting the duty of being the elderly watchman of the
nation, will continue to respect and protect the sanctity of the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, respondents GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE
SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON
PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE
COUNSEL are directed to CEASE and DESIST from selling 51% of the
shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation to RENONG BERHAD, and to
ACCEPT the matching bid of petitioner MANILA PRINCE HOTEL
CORPORATION to purchase the subject 51% of the shares of the Manila
Hotel Corporation at P44.00 per share and thereafter to execute the
necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale, to issue the
necessary clearances and to do such other acts and deeds as may be
necessary for the purpose.
SO ORDERED.
Facts:
Apprehensive that GSIS has disregarded the tender of the matching bid
and that the sale may be consummated with Renong Berhad, petitioner
filed a petition before the Court.
Issues:
Whether or not Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution is a
self-executing provision.
Whether or not the Manila Hotel forms part of the national patrimony.
Whether or not the submission of matching bid is premature
Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
respondents in refusing the matching bid of the petitioner.
Rulings:
It is a self-executing provision.
Since the Constitution is the fundamental, paramount and supreme law of
the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract. A provision
which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the
1987 Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is
complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary
or enabling legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of
which the right it grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing.
A constitutional provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the
right conferred and the liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself,
so that they can be determined by an examination and construction of its
terms, and there is no language indicating that the subject is referred to the
legislature for action. Unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is
necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that
all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional
provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the
legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the
mandate of the fundamental law.
10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive
command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines
or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its very words the
provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se
judicially enforceable. When our Constitution mandates that in the grant of
rights, privileges, and concessions covering national economy and
patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means
just that qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our Constitution
declares that a right exists in certain specified circumstances an action may
be maintained to enforce such right notwithstanding the absence of any
legislation on the subject; consequently, if there is no statute especially
enacted to enforce such constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its
own inherent potency and puissance, and from which all legislations must
take their bearings. Where there is a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi
remedium.
The Court agree.
In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to heritage.
When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the
natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very
well used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the
Filipinos.
It also refers to Filipinos intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. In the
present case, Manila Hotel has become a landmark, a living testimonial of
Philippine heritage. While it was restrictively an American hotel when it first
opened in 1912, a concourse for the elite, it has since then become the
venue of various significant events which have shaped Philippine history.
Verily, Manila Hotel has become part of our national economy and
patrimony. For sure, 51% of the equity of the MHC comes within the
purview of the constitutional shelter for it comprises the majority and
controlling stock, so that anyone who acquires or owns the 51% will have
actual control and management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of the
MHC cannot be disassociated from the hotel and the land on which the
hotel edifice stands.
It is not premature.
In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public
bidding concerning the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering
the national economy and patrimony, thereby exceeding the bid of a
Filipino, there is no question that the Filipino will have to be allowed to
match the bid of the foreign entity. And if the Filipino matches the bid of a
foreign firm the award should go to the Filipino. It must be so if the Court is
to give life and meaning to the Filipino First Policy provision of the 1987
Constitution. For, while this may neither be expressly stated nor
contemplated in the bidding rules, the constitutional fiat is omnipresent to
be simply disregarded. To ignore it would be to sanction a perilous skirting
of the basic law.
The Court does not discount the apprehension that this policy may
discourage foreign investors. But the Constitution and laws of the
Philippines are understood to be always open to public scrutiny. These are
given factors which investors must consider when venturing into business
in a foreign jurisdiction. Any person therefore desiring to do business in the
Philippines or with any of its agencies or instrumentalities is presumed to
know his rights and obligations under the Constitution and the laws of the
forum.
There was grave abuse of discretion.
To insist on selling the Manila Hotel to foreigners when there is a Filipino
group willing to match the bid of the foreign group is to insist that
government be treated as any other ordinary market player, and bound by
its mistakes or gross errors of judgement, regardless of the consequences
to the Filipino people. The miscomprehension of the Constitution is
regrettable. Thus, the Court would rather remedy the indiscretion while
there is still an opportunity to do so than let the government develop the
habit of forgetting that the Constitution lays down the basic conditions and
parameters for its actions.
Since petitioner has already matched the bid price tendered by Renong
Berhad pursuant to the bidding rules, respondent GSIS is left with no
alternative but to award to petitioner the block of shares of MHC and to
execute the necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale in
accordance not only with the bidding guidelines and procedures but with
the Constitution as well. The refusal of respondent GSIS to execute the
corresponding documents with petitioner as provided in the bidding rules
after the latter has matched the bid of the Malaysian firm clearly constitutes
grave abuse of discretion.
CIR v. San Roque Power Corp., G.R. No. 187485, October 8, 2013
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RESOLUTION
CARPIO, J.:
San Roque prays that the rule established in our 12 February 2013
Decision be given only a prospective effect, arguing that "the manner by
which the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and the Court of Tax
Appeals(CTA) actually treated the 120 + 30 day periods constitutes an
operative fact the effects and consequences of which cannot be erased or
undone."1
The CIR, on the other hand, asserts that Taganito Mining Corporation's
(Taganito) judicial claim for tax credit or refund was prematurely filed before
the CTA and should be disallowed because BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 was
issued by a Deputy Commissioner, not by the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue.
The general rule is that a void law or administrative act cannot be the
source of legal rights or duties. Article 7 of the Civil Code enunciates this
general rule, as well as its exception: "Laws are repealed only by
subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be
excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary. When the courts
declared a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be
void and the latter shall govern. Administrative or executive acts, orders
and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or
the Constitution."
The doctrine of operative fact is an exception to the general rule, such that
a judicial declaration of invalidity may not necessarily obliterate all the
effects and consequences of a void act prior to such declaration.2 In
Serrano de Agbayani v. Philippine National Bank,3 the application of the
doctrine of operative fact was discussed as follows:
Such a view has support in logic and possesses the merit of simplicity. It
may not however be sufficiently realistic. It does not admit of doubt that
prior to the declaration of nullity such challenged legislative or executive act
must have been in force and had to be complied with. This is so as until
after the judiciary, in an appropriate case, declares its invalidity, it is entitled
to obedience and respect. Parties may have acted under it and may have
changed their positions. What could be more fitting than that in a
subsequent litigation regard be had to what has been done while such
legislative or executive act was in operation and presumed to be valid in all
respects. It is now accepted as a doctrine that prior to its being nullified, its
existence as a fact must be reckoned with. This is merely to reflect
awareness that precisely because the judiciary is the governmental organ
which has the final say on whether or not a legislative or executive
measure is valid, a period of time may have elapsed before it can exercise
the power of judicial review that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It would
be to deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice then, if there be no
recognition of what had transpired prior to such adjudication.
The DOF-OSS itself alerted the BIR that LBRDI did not follow the120+30
day periods. In BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03, Deputy Commissioner Jose
Mario C. Buag ruled that "a taxpayer-claimant need not wait for the lapse
of the 120-day period before it could seek judicial relief with the CTA by
way of Petition for Review." Deputy Commissioner Buag, citing the
7February 2002 decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in Commissioner of
Internal Revenue v. Hitachi Computer Products (Asia) Corporation5
(Hitachi), stated that the claim for refund with the Commissioner could be
pending simultaneously with a suit for refund filed before the CTA.
Before the issuance of BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 on 10 December 2003,
there was no administrative practice by the BIR that supported
simultaneous filing of claims. Prior to BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03, the BIR
considered the 120+30 day periods mandatory and jurisdictional.
Thus, prior to BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03, the BIRs actual administrative
practice was to contest simultaneous filing of claims at the administrative
and judicial levels, until the CA declared in Hitachi that the BIRs position
was wrong. The CAs Hitachi decision is the basis of BIR Ruling No. DA-
489-03 dated 10 December 2003 allowing simultaneous filing. From then
on taxpayers could rely in good faith on BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 even
though it was erroneous as this Court subsequently decided in Aichi that
the 120+30 day periods were mandatory and jurisdictional.
At the time San Roque filed its petition for review with the CTA, the 120+30
day mandatory periods were already in the law. Section112(C) expressly
grants the Commissioner 120 days within which to decide the taxpayers
claim. The law is clear, plain, and unequivocal: "x x x the Commissioner
shall grant a refund or issue the tax credit certificate for creditable input
taxes within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of submission of
complete documents." Following the verbalegis doctrine, this law must be
applied exactly as worded since it is clear, plain, and unequivocal. The
taxpayer cannot simply file a petition with the CTA without waiting for the
Commissioners decision within the 120-daymandatory and jurisdictional
period. The CTA will have no jurisdiction because there will be no
"decision" or "deemed a denial" decision of the Commissioner for the CTA
to review. In San Roques case, it filed its petition with the CTA a mere 13
days after it filed its administrative claim with the Commissioner.
Indisputably, San Roque knowingly violated the mandatory 120-day period,
and it cannot blame anyone but itself.
xxxx
To repeat, a claim for tax refund or credit, like a claim for tax exemption, is
construed strictly against the taxpayer.1wphi1 One of the conditions for a
judicial claim of refund or credit under the VAT System is compliance with
the 120+30 day mandatory and jurisdictional periods. Thus, strict
compliance with the 120+30 day periods is necessary for such a claim to
prosper, whether before, during, or after the effectivity of the Atlas doctrine,
except for the period from the issuance of BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 on 10
December 2003 to 6 October 2010 when the Aichi doctrine was adopted,
which again reinstated the 120+30 day periods as mandatory and
jurisdictional.6
San Roques argument must, therefore, fail. The doctrine of operative fact
is an argument for the application of equity and fair play. In the present
case, we applied the doctrine of operative fact when we recognized
simultaneous filing during the period between 10 December 2003, when
BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 was issued, and 6 October 2010, when this
Court promulgated Aichi declaring the 120+30 day periods mandatory and
jurisdictional, thus reversing BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03.
(a) Where the taxpayer deliberately misstates or omits material facts from
his return or any document required of him by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue;
Under Section 246, taxpayers may rely upon a rule or ruling issued by the
Commissioner from the time the rule or ruling is issued up to its reversal by
the Commissioner or this Court. The reversal is not given retroactive effect.
This, in essence, is the doctrine of operative fact. There must, however, be
a rule or ruling issued by the Commissioner that is relied upon by the
taxpayer in good faith. A mere administrative practice, not formalized into a
rule or ruling, will not suffice because such a mere administrative practice
may not be uniformly and consistently applied. An administrative practice, if
not formalized as a rule or ruling, will not be known to the general public
and can be availed of only by those within formal contacts with the
government agency.
Since the law has already prescribed in Section 246 of the Tax Code how
the doctrine of operative fact should be applied, there can be no invocation
of the doctrine of operative fact other than what the law has specifically
provided in Section 246. In the present case, the rule or ruling subject of
the operative fact doctrine is BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 dated 10
December 2003. Prior to this date, there is no such rule or ruling calling for
the application of the operative fact doctrine in Section 246. Section246,
being an exemption to statutory taxation, must be applied strictly against
the taxpayer claiming such exemption.
San Roque insists that this Court should not decide the present case in
violation of the rulings of the CTA; otherwise, there will be adverse effects
on the national economy. In effect, San Roques doomsday scenario is a
protest against this Courts power of appellate review. San Roque cites
cases decided by the CTA to underscore that the CTA did not treat the
120+30 day periods as mandatory and jurisdictional. However, CTA or CA
rulings are not the executive issuances covered by Section 246 of the Tax
Code, which adopts the operative fact doctrine. CTA or CA decisions are
specific rulings applicable only to the parties to the case and not to the
general public. CTA or CA decisions, unlike those of this Court, do not form
part of the law of the land. Decisions of lower courts do not have any value
as precedents. Obviously, decisions of lower courts are not binding on this
Court. To hold that CTA or CA decisions, even if reversed by this Court,
should still prevail is to turn upside down our legal system and hierarchy of
courts, with adverse effects far worse than the dubious doomsday scenario
San Roque has conjured.
In asking this Court to disallow Taganitos claim for tax refund or credit, the
CIR repudiates the validity of the issuance of its own BIR Ruling No. DA-
489-03. "Taganito cannot rely on the pronouncements in BIR Ruling No.
DA-489-03, being a mere issuance of a Deputy Commissioner."9
Although Section 4 of the 1997 Tax Code provides that the "power to
interpret the provisions of this Code and other tax laws shall be under the
exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Commissioner, subject to review by
the Secretary of Finance," Section 7 of the same Code does not prohibit
the delegation of such power. Thus, "the Commissioner may delegate the
powers vested in him under the pertinent provisions of this Code to any or
such subordinate officials with the rank equivalent to a division chief or
higher, subject to such limitations and restrictions as may be imposed
under rules and regulations to be promulgated by the Secretary of Finance,
upon recommendation of the Commissioner."
SO ORDERED.
FACTS:
On October 11, 1997, [San Roque] entered into a Power Purchase
Agreement("PPA") with the National Power Corporation ("NPC") to develop
hydro-potential ofthe Lower Agno River and generate additional power and
energy for the LuzonPower Grid, by building the San Roque Multi-Purpose Project
located in SanManuel, Pangasinan. The PPA provides, among others, that [San
Roque] shall beresponsible for the design, construction, installation, completion,
testing andcommissioning of the Power Station and shall operate and maintain
the same,subject to NPC instructions. During the cooperation period of twenty-
five (25) yearscommencing from the completion date of the Power Station,
NPC will take and payfor all electricity available from the Power Station.[San
Roque] allegedly incurred, excess
input VAT in the amount of 559,709,337.54
for taxable year 2001 which it declared in its Quarterly VAT Returns filed for
thesame year. [San Roque] duly filed with the BIR separate claims for refund, in
the
total amount of 559,709,337.54, representing un
utilized input taxes as declared inits VAT returns for taxable year 2001.On March
28, 2003, [San Roque] filed amended Quarterly VAT Returns for the year
2001 since it increased its unutilized input VAT to the amount of 560,200,283.14.
Consequently, [San Roque] filed with the BIR on even date, separate
amendedclaims for refund.
[CIRs] inaction on the subject claims led to the filing by [San Roque] of the
Petition
for Review with the Court [of Tax Appeals] in Division on April 10, 2003.CTA in
division and CTA En banc gave due course to the claim of San Roque.
ISSUE:
Whether or not San Roques claim for refund was prematurely filed.
(Application of 120+30 days period. Take note: amended claims for refund
filesMarch 28, 2003 while petition for review to the CTA filed on April 10,
2003, barely just 13 days)
HELD:YES. It was premature.
(Relevant provisions in the case at bar)Sec. 112.
Refunds or Tax Credits of Input Tax
.
(A)
Zero-Rated or Effectively Zero-Rated Sales
.
(D)
Period within which Refund or Tax Credit of Input Taxes shall be Made
.
In proper cases, the Commissioner shall grant a refund or issue the taxcredit
certificate for creditable input taxes
within one hundred twenty(120) days from the date of submission of complete
documents
insupport of the application filed in accordance with Subsection (A) and
(B)hereof.In case of full or partial denial of the claim for tax refund or tax credit,
orthe failure on the part of the Commissioner to act on the applicationwithin the
period prescribed above, the taxpayer affected may,
withinthirty (30) days from the receipt of the decision denying the claim orafter
the expiration of the one hundred twenty day-period
, appeal thedecision or the unacted claim with the Court of Tax Appeals.On 10
April 2003, a mere 13 days after it filed its amended administrative claimwith the
Commissioner on 28 March 2003, San Roque filed a Petition for Reviewwith the
CTA docketed as CTA Case No. 6647. From this we gather two crucial facts:
first
, San Roque did not wait for the 120-day period to lapse before filing its
judicialclaim;
second
, San Roque filed its judicial claim more than four (4) years
before
the
Atlas
45
doctrine, which was promulgated by the Court on 8 June 2007.Clearly, San Roque
failed to comply with the 120-day waiting period, the timeexpressly given by law
to the Commissioner to decide whether to grant or deny San
Roques application for tax refund or credit. It is indisputable that compliance
with
the 120-day waiting period is
mandatory and jurisdictional
.
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G.R. No. 160295 November 10, 2003
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESEN-TATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR
ACTING SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE
VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR.,
REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT, SENATE
PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents,
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
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Our nation's history is replete with vivid illustrations of the often frictional, at
times turbulent, dynamics of the relationship among these co-equal
branches. This Court is confronted with one such today involving the
legislature and the judiciary which has drawn legal luminaries to chart
antipodal courses and not a few of our countrymen to vent cacophonous
sentiments thereon.
In passing over the complex issues arising from the controversy, this Court
is ever mindful of the essential truth that the inviolate doctrine of separation
of powers among the legislative, executive or judicial branches of
government by no means prescribes for absolute autonomy in the
discharge by each of that part of the governmental power assigned to it by
the sovereign people.
At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks and balances which has
been carefully calibrated by the Constitution to temper the official acts of
each of these three branches must be given effect without destroying their
indispensable co-equality.
ARTICLE XI
(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be
necessary either to affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of
Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The
vote of each Member shall be recorded.
(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases of
impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall be on oath
or affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is on trial, the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall not vote. No person
shall be convicted without the concurrence of two-thirds of all the Members
of the Senate.
RULE II
INITIATING IMPEACHMENT
RULE V
RULE V
The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first
impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form,"9 but voted to dismiss the
same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance.10 To date,
the Committee Report to this effect has not yet been sent to the House in
plenary in accordance with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the
Constitution.
Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the first
complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day after the House Committee on
Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint11 was filed
with the Secretary General of the House12 by Representatives Gilberto C.
Teodoro, Jr. (First District, Tarlac) and Felix William B. Fuentebella (Third
District, Camarines Sur) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.,
founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by above-
mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment complaint was
accompanied by a "Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at
least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of Representatives.13
Thus arose the instant petitions against the House of Representatives, et.
al., most of which petitions contend that the filing of the second
impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates the provision of
Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that "[n]o impeachment
proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once
within a period of one year."
In G.R. No. 160261, petitioner Atty. Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr., alleging that
he has a duty as a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to use
all available legal remedies to stop an unconstitutional impeachment, that
the issues raised in his petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus
are of transcendental importance, and that he "himself was a victim of the
capricious and arbitrary changes in the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment
Proceedings introduced by the 12th Congress,"14 posits that his right to
bring an impeachment complaint against then Ombudsman Aniano
Desierto had been violated due to the capricious and arbitrary changes in
the House Impeachment Rules adopted and approved on November 28,
2001 by the House of Representatives and prays that (1) Rule V, Sections
16 and 17 and Rule III, Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9 thereof be declared
unconstitutional; (2) this Court issue a writ of mandamus directing
respondents House of Representatives et. al. to comply with Article IX,
Section 3 (2), (3) and (5) of the Constitution, to return the second
impeachment complaint and/or strike it off the records of the House of
Representatives, and to promulgate rules which are consistent with the
Constitution; and (3) this Court permanently enjoin respondent House of
Representatives from proceeding with the second impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160277, petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, alleging that this Court
has recognized that he has locus standi to bring petitions of this nature in
the cases of Chavez v. PCGG15 and Chavez v. PEA-Amari Coastal Bay
Development Corporation,16 prays in his petition for Injunction that the
second impeachment complaint be declared unconstitutional.
In G.R. No. 160292, petitioners Atty. Harry L. Roque, et. al., as taxpayers
and members of the legal profession, pray in their petition for Prohibition for
an order prohibiting respondent House of Representatives from drafting,
adopting, approving and transmitting to the Senate the second
impeachment complaint, and respondents De Venecia and Nazareno from
transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate.
In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso et al., claiming that they
have a right to be protected against all forms of senseless spending of
taxpayers' money and that they have an obligation to protect the Supreme
Court, the Chief Justice, and the integrity of the Judiciary, allege in their
petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that it is instituted as "a class suit" and
pray that (1) the House Resolution endorsing the second impeachment
complaint as well as all issuances emanating therefrom be declared null
and void; and (2) this Court enjoin the Senate and the Senate President
from taking cognizance of, hearing, trying and deciding the second
impeachment complaint, and issue a writ of prohibition commanding the
Senate, its prosecutors and agents to desist from conducting any
proceedings or to act on the impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160318, petitioner Public Interest Center, Inc., whose members
are citizens and taxpayers, and its co-petitioner Crispin T. Reyes, a citizen,
taxpayer and a member of the Philippine Bar, both allege in their petition,
which does not state what its nature is, that the filing of the second
impeachment complaint involves paramount public interest and pray that
Sections 16 and 17 of the House Impeachment Rules and the second
impeachment complaint/Articles of Impeachment be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160365, petitioners U.P. Law Alumni Cebu Foundation Inc., et.
al., in their petition for Prohibition and Injunction which they claim is a class
suit filed in behalf of all citizens, citing Oposa v. Factoran17 which was filed
in behalf of succeeding generations of Filipinos, pray for the issuance of a
writ prohibiting respondents House of Representatives and the Senate from
conducting further proceedings on the second impeachment complaint and
that this Court declare as unconstitutional the second impeachment
complaint and the acts of respondent House of Representatives in
interfering with the fiscal matters of the Judiciary.
In G.R. No. 160370, petitioner-taxpayer Father Ranhilio Callangan Aquino,
alleging that the issues in his petition for Prohibition are of national and
transcendental significance and that as an official of the Philippine Judicial
Academy, he has a direct and substantial interest in the unhampered
operation of the Supreme Court and its officials in discharging their duties
in accordance with the Constitution, prays for the issuance of a writ
prohibiting the House of Representatives from transmitting the Articles of
Impeachment to the Senate and the Senate from receiving the same or
giving the impeachment complaint due course.
In G.R. No. 160397, petitioner Atty. Dioscoro Vallejos, Jr., without alleging
his locus standi, but alleging that the second impeachment complaint is
founded on the issue of whether or not the Judicial Development Fund
(JDF) was spent in accordance with law and that the House of
Representatives does not have exclusive jurisdiction in the examination
and audit thereof, prays in his petition "To Declare Complaint Null and Void
for Lack of Cause of Action and Jurisdiction" that the second impeachment
complaint be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160403, petitioner Philippine Bar Association, alleging that the
issues raised in the filing of the second impeachment complaint involve
matters of transcendental importance, prays in its petition for
Certiorari/Prohibition that (1) the second impeachment complaint and all
proceedings arising therefrom be declared null and void; (2) respondent
House of Representatives be prohibited from transmitting the Articles of
Impeachment to the Senate; and (3) respondent Senate be prohibited from
accepting the Articles of Impeachment and from conducting any
proceedings thereon.
Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262 and 160263,
the first three of the eighteen which were filed before this Court,18 prayed
for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or preliminary
injunction to prevent the House of Representatives from transmitting the
Articles of Impeachment arising from the second impeachment complaint to
the Senate. Petition bearing docket number G.R. No. 160261 likewise
prayed for the declaration of the November 28, 2001 House Impeachment
Rules as null and void for being unconstitutional.
Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160277, 160292 and 160295,
which were filed on October 28, 2003, sought similar relief. In addition,
petition bearing docket number G.R. No. 160292 alleged that House
Resolution No. 260 (calling for a legislative inquiry into the administration
by the Chief Justice of the JDF) infringes on the constitutional doctrine of
separation of powers and is a direct violation of the constitutional principle
of fiscal autonomy of the judiciary.
Before acting on the petitions with prayers for temporary restraining order
and/or writ of preliminary injunction which were filed on or before October
28, 2003, Justices Puno and Vitug offered to recuse themselves, but the
Court rejected their offer. Justice Panganiban inhibited himself, but the
Court directed him to participate.
Without necessarily giving the petitions due course, this Court in its
Resolution of October 28, 2003, resolved to (a) consolidate the petitions;
(b) require respondent House of Representatives and the Senate, as well
as the Solicitor General, to comment on the petitions not later than 4:30
p.m. of November 3, 2003; (c) set the petitions for oral arguments on
November 5, 2003, at 10:00 a.m.; and (d) appointed distinguished legal
experts as amici curiae.20 In addition, this Court called on petitioners and
respondents to maintain the status quo, enjoining all the parties and others
acting for and in their behalf to refrain from committing acts that would
render the petitions moot.
Acting on the other petitions which were subsequently filed, this Court
resolved to (a) consolidate them with the earlier consolidated petitions; (b)
require respondents to file their comment not later than 4:30 p.m. of
November 3, 2003; and (c) include them for oral arguments on November
5, 2003.
On October 30, 2003, Atty. Jaime Soriano filed a "Petition for Leave to
Intervene" in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, and
160295, questioning the status quo Resolution issued by this Court on
October 28, 2003 on the ground that it would unnecessarily put Congress
and this Court in a "constitutional deadlock" and praying for the dismissal of
all the petitions as the matter in question is not yet ripe for judicial
determination.
The motions for intervention were granted and both Senator Pimentel's
Comment and Attorneys Macalintal and Quadra's Petition in Intervention
were admitted.
On November 5-6, 2003, this Court heard the views of the amici curiae and
the arguments of petitioners, intervenors Senator Pimentel and Attorney
Makalintal, and Solicitor General Alfredo Benipayo on the principal issues
outlined in an Advisory issued by this Court on November 3, 2003, to wit:
b) ripeness(prematurity; mootness);
c) political question/justiciability;
Judicial Review
As reflected above, petitioners plead for this Court to exercise the power of
judicial review to determine the validity of the second impeachment
complaint.
SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and
in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the government. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, even in the United States where the power of judicial review is not
explicitly conferred upon the courts by its Constitution, such power has
"been set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of more than one
and a half centuries." To be sure, it was in the 1803 leading case of
Marbury v. Madison27 that the power of judicial review was first articulated
by Chief Justice Marshall, to wit:
In our own jurisdiction, as early as 1902, decades before its express grant
in the 1935 Constitution, the power of judicial review was exercised by our
courts to invalidate constitutionally infirm acts.29 And as pointed out by
noted political law professor and former Supreme Court Justice Vicente V.
Mendoza,30 the executive and legislative branches of our government in
fact effectively acknowledged this power of judicial review in Article 7 of the
Civil Code, to wit:
Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or
non-observance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to
the contrary.
When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the
former shall be void and the latter shall govern.
To ensure the potency of the power of judicial review to curb grave abuse
of discretion by "any branch or instrumentalities of government," the afore-
quoted Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution engraves, for the first time
into its history, into block letter law the so-called "expanded certiorari
jurisdiction" of this Court, the nature of and rationale for which are mirrored
in the following excerpt from the sponsorship speech of its proponent,
former Chief Justice Constitutional Commissioner Roberto Concepcion:
xxx
The first section starts with a sentence copied from former Constitutions. It
says:
The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law.
The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first and
explain.
xxx
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies
and offices of the government as well as those of its officers. In other
words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question whether or not a
branch of government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or
in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of
discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is
not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this
nature.
First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the
Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical
terms are employed. Thus, in J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure
Administration,36 this Court, speaking through Chief Justice Enrique
Fernando, declared:
We look to the language of the document itself in our search for its
meaning. We do not of course stop there, but that is where we begin. It is
to be assumed that the words in which constitutional provisions are
couched express the objective sought to be attained. They are to be given
their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed in which
case the significance thus attached to them prevails. As the Constitution is
not primarily a lawyer's document, it being essential for the rule of law to
obtain that it should ever be present in the people's consciousness, its
language as much as possible should be understood in the sense they
have in common use. What it says according to the text of the provision to
be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to
alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what
they say. Thus these are the cases where the need for construction is
reduced to a minimum.37 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The words of the
Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of its
framers. And so did this Court apply this principle in Civil Liberties Union v.
Executive Secretary38 in this wise:
If, however, the plain meaning of the word is not found to be clear, resort to
other aids is available. In still the same case of Civil Liberties Union v.
Executive Secretary, this Court expounded:
For his part, intervenor Senator Pimentel contends that the Senate's "sole
power to try" impeachment cases48 (1) entirely excludes the application of
judicial review over it; and (2) necessarily includes the Senate's power to
determine constitutional questions relative to impeachment proceedings.49
The major difference between the judicial power of the Philippine Supreme
Court and that of the U.S. Supreme Court is that while the power of judicial
review is only impliedly granted to the U.S. Supreme Court and is
discretionary in nature, that granted to the Philippine Supreme Court and
lower courts, as expressly provided for in the Constitution, is not just a
power but also a duty, and it was given an expanded definition to include
the power to correct any grave abuse of discretion on the part of any
government branch or instrumentality.
There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S. Constitution and the
Philippine Constitution with respect to the power of the House of
Representatives over impeachment proceedings. While the U.S.
Constitution bestows sole power of impeachment to the House of
Representatives without limitation,54 our Constitution, though vesting in the
House of Representatives the exclusive power to initiate impeachment
cases,55 provides for several limitations to the exercise of such power as
embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI thereof. These
limitations include the manner of filing, required vote to impeach, and the
one year bar on the impeachment of one and the same official.
But did not the people also express their will when they instituted the
above-mentioned safeguards in the Constitution? This shows that the
Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole
discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for certain well-defined limits, or
in the language of Baker v. Carr,57 "judicially discoverable standards" for
determining the validity of the exercise of such discretion, through the
power of judicial review.
There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court exercised the power
of judicial review over congressional action. Thus, in Santiago v. Guingona,
Jr.,60 this Court ruled that it is well within the power and jurisdiction of the
Court to inquire whether the Senate or its officials committed a violation of
the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion in the exercise of their
functions and prerogatives. In Tanada v. Angara,61 in seeking to nullify an
act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravened the
Constitution, it held that the petition raises a justiciable controversy and that
when an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have
infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty
of the judiciary to settle the dispute. In Bondoc v. Pineda,62 this Court
declared null and void a resolution of the House of Representatives
withdrawing the nomination, and rescinding the election, of a congressman
as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal for being violative of Section
17, Article VI of the Constitution. In Coseteng v. Mitra,63 it held that the
resolution of whether the House representation in the Commission on
Appointments was based on proportional representation of the political
parties as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution is subject to
judicial review. In Daza v. Singson,64 it held that the act of the House of
Representatives in removing the petitioner from the Commission on
Appointments is subject to judicial review. In Tanada v. Cuenco,65 it held
that although under the Constitution, the legislative power is vested
exclusively in Congress, this does not detract from the power of the courts
to pass upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress. In Angara v.
Electoral Commission,66 it ruled that confirmation by the National
Assembly of the election of any member, irrespective of whether his
election is contested, is not essential before such member-elect may
discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges of a member of the National
Assembly.
Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the
exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset the
system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted
as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat another."67 Both
are integral components of the calibrated system of independence and
interdependence that insures that no branch of government act beyond the
powers assigned to it by the Constitution.
x x x Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and
controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the
parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very
lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics
and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to
actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not
pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More
than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative
enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the
Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual
cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people
as expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative
departments of the government.68 (Italics in the original)
Standing
Upon the other hand, the Solicitor General asserts that petitioners have
standing since this Court had, in the past, accorded standing to taxpayers,
voters, concerned citizens, legislators in cases involving paramount public
interest70 and transcendental importance,71 and that procedural matters
are subordinate to the need to determine whether or not the other branches
of the government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution
and the laws and that they have not abused the discretion given to them.72
Amicus curiae Dean Raul Pangalangan of the U.P. College of Law is of the
same opinion, citing transcendental importance and the well-entrenched
rule exception that, when the real party in interest is unable to vindicate his
rights by seeking the same remedies, as in the case of the Chief Justice
who, for ethical reasons, cannot himself invoke the jurisdiction of this Court,
the courts will grant petitioners standing.
The difference between the rule on standing and real party in interest has
been noted by authorities thus: "It is important to note . . . that standing
because of its constitutional and public policy underpinnings, is very
different from questions relating to whether a particular plaintiff is the real
party in interest or has capacity to sue. Although all three requirements are
directed towards ensuring that only certain parties can maintain an action,
standing restrictions require a partial consideration of the merits, as well as
broader policy concerns relating to the proper role of the judiciary in certain
areas.
xxx
On the other hand, the question as to "real party in interest" is whether he
is "the party who would be benefited or injured by the judgment, or the
'party entitled to the avails of the suit.'"76 (Citations omitted)
While rights personal to the Chief Justice may have been injured by the
alleged unconstitutional acts of the House of Representatives, none of the
petitioners before us asserts a violation of the personal rights of the Chief
Justice. On the contrary, they invariably invoke the vindication of their own
rights as taxpayers; members of Congress; citizens, individually or in a
class suit; and members of the bar and of the legal profession which were
supposedly violated by the alleged unconstitutional acts of the House of
Representatives.
In the same vein, when dealing with class suits filed in behalf of all citizens,
persons intervening must be sufficiently numerous to fully protect the
interests of all concerned87 to enable the court to deal properly with all
interests involved in the suit,88 for a judgment in a class suit, whether
favorable or unfavorable to the class, is, under the res judicata principle,
binding on all members of the class whether or not they were before the
court.89 Where it clearly appears that not all interests can be sufficiently
represented as shown by the divergent issues raised in the numerous
petitions before this Court, G.R. No. 160365 as a class suit ought to fail.
Since petitioners additionally allege standing as citizens and taxpayers,
however, their petition will stand.
The Philippine Bar Association, in G.R. No. 160403, invokes the sole
ground of transcendental importance, while Atty. Dioscoro U. Vallejos, in
G.R. No. 160397, is mum on his standing.
There being no doctrinal definition of transcendental importance, the
following instructive determinants formulated by former Supreme Court
Justice Florentino P. Feliciano are instructive: (1) the character of the funds
or other assets involved in the case; (2) the presence of a clear case of
disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public
respondent agency or instrumentality of the government; and (3) the lack of
any other party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the
questions being raised.90 Applying these determinants, this Court is
satisfied that the issues raised herein are indeed of transcendental
importance.
In not a few cases, this Court has in fact adopted a liberal attitude on the
locus standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of
transcendental significance to the people, as when the issues raised are of
paramount importance to the public.91 Such liberality does not, however,
mean that the requirement that a party should have an interest in the
matter is totally eliminated. A party must, at the very least, still plead the
existence of such interest, it not being one of which courts can take judicial
notice. In petitioner Vallejos' case, he failed to allege any interest in the
case. He does not thus have standing.
With respect to the motions for intervention, Rule 19, Section 2 of the Rules
of Court requires an intervenor to possess a legal interest in the matter in
litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against
both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other
disposition of property in the custody of the court or of an officer thereof.
While intervention is not a matter of right, it may be permitted by the courts
when the applicant shows facts which satisfy the requirements of the law
authorizing intervention.92
Alleging that the issues raised in the petitions in G.R. Nos. 160261,
160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, 160295, and 160310 were of
transcendental importance, World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the
Philippines, Inc. filed a "Petition-in-Intervention with Leave to Intervene" to
raise the additional issue of whether or not the second impeachment
complaint against the Chief Justice is valid and based on any of the
grounds prescribed by the Constitution.
Senator Aquilino Pimentel, on the other hand, sought to intervene for the
limited purpose of making of record and arguing a point of view that differs
with Senate President Drilon's. He alleges that submitting to this Court's
jurisdiction as the Senate President does will undermine the independence
of the Senate which will sit as an impeachment court once the Articles of
Impeachment are transmitted to it from the House of Representatives.
Clearly, Senator Pimentel possesses a legal interest in the matter in
litigation, he being a member of Congress against which the herein
petitions are directed. For this reason, and to fully ventilate all substantial
issues relating to the matter at hand, his Motion to Intervene was granted
and he was, as earlier stated, allowed to argue.
In praying for the dismissal of the petitions, Soriano failed even to allege
that the act of petitioners will result in illegal disbursement of public funds or
in public money being deflected to any improper purpose. Additionally, his
mere interest as a member of the Bar does not suffice to clothe him with
standing.
The instant petitions raise in the main the issue of the validity of the filing of
the second impeachment complaint against the Chief Justice in accordance
with the House Impeachment Rules adopted by the 12th Congress, the
constitutionality of which is questioned. The questioned acts having been
carried out, i.e., the second impeachment complaint had been filed with the
House of Representatives and the 2001 Rules have already been already
promulgated and enforced, the prerequisite that the alleged
unconstitutional act should be accomplished and performed before suit, as
Tan v. Macapagal holds, has been complied with.
The dean's position does not persuade. First, the withdrawal by the
Representatives of their signatures would not, by itself, cure the House
Impeachment Rules of their constitutional infirmity. Neither would such a
withdrawal, by itself, obliterate the questioned second impeachment
complaint since it would only place it under the ambit of Sections 3(2) and
(3) of Article XI of the Constitution97 and, therefore, petitioners would
continue to suffer their injuries.
Second and most importantly, the futility of seeking remedies from either or
both Houses of Congress before coming to this Court is shown by the fact
that, as previously discussed, neither the House of Representatives nor the
Senate is clothed with the power to rule with definitiveness on the issue of
constitutionality, whether concerning impeachment proceedings or
otherwise, as said power is exclusively vested in the judiciary by the earlier
quoted Section I, Article VIII of the Constitution. Remedy cannot be sought
from a body which is bereft of power to grant it.
Justiciability
The frequency with which this Court invoked the political question doctrine
to refuse to take jurisdiction over certain cases during the Marcos regime
motivated Chief Justice Concepcion, when he became a Constitutional
Commissioner, to clarify this Court's power of judicial review and its
application on issues involving political questions, viz:
The first section starts with a sentence copied from former Constitutions. It
says:
The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law.
The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first and
explain.
Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part or
instrumentality of the government.
xxx
The government said that in a referendum held from January 10 to January
15, the vast majority ratified the draft of the Constitution. Note that all
members of the Supreme Court were residents of Manila, but none of them
had been notified of any referendum in their respective places of residence,
much less did they participate in the alleged referendum. None of them saw
any referendum proceeding.
In the Philippines, even local gossips spread like wild fire. So, a majority of
the members of the Court felt that there had been no referendum.
x x x The defense of the political question was rejected because the issue
was clearly justiciable.
xxx
The Supreme Court, like all other courts, has one main function: to settle
actual controversies involving conflicts of rights which are demandable and
enforceable. There are rights which are guaranteed by law but cannot be
enforced by a judiciary party. In a decided case, a husband complained
that his wife was unwilling to perform her duties as a wife. The Court said:
"We can tell your wife what her duties as such are and that she is bound to
comply with them, but we cannot force her physically to discharge her main
marital duty to her husband. There are some rights guaranteed by law, but
they are so personal that to enforce them by actual compulsion would be
highly derogatory to human dignity."
This is why the first part of the second paragraph of Section I provides that:
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies
and offices of the government as well as those of its officers. In other
words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question whether or not a
branch of government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or
in excess of jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of
discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of jurisdiction. This is
not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this
nature.
I have made these extended remarks to the end that the Commissioners
may have an initial food for thought on the subject of the judiciary.103
(Italics in the original; emphasis supplied)
MR. NOLLEDO. The Gentleman used the term "judicial power" but judicial
power is not vested in the Supreme Court alone but also in other lower
courts as may be created by law.
xxx
FR. BERNAS. So, I am satisfied with the answer that it is not intended to
do away with the political question doctrine.
FR. BERNAS. So, this is not an attempt to solve the problems arising from
the political question doctrine.
MR. CONCEPCION. It definitely does not eliminate the fact that truly
political questions are beyond the pale of judicial power.104 (Emphasis
supplied)
Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason for
respect of the doctrine of separation of powers to be maintained. On the
other hand, by virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, courts can
review questions which are not truly political in nature.
The present Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine and
broadens the scope of judicial inquiry into areas which the Court, under
previous constitutions, would have normally left to the political departments
to decide.106 x x x
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less
tenable and decisive. The reason is that, even if we were to assume that
the issue presented before us was political in nature, we would still not be
precluded from resolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon
us that now covers, in proper cases, even the political question.110 x x x
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
Section 1, Article VIII, of the Court does not define what are justiciable
political questions and non-justiciable political questions, however.
Identification of these two species of political questions may be
problematic. There has been no clear standard. The American case of
Baker v. Carr111 attempts to provide some:
Of these standards, the more reliable have been the first three: (1) a
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department; (2) the lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it; and (3) the impossibility of deciding
without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial
discretion. These standards are not separate and distinct concepts but are
interrelated to each in that the presence of one strengthens the conclusion
that the others are also present.
III. Whether the legislative inquiry by the House Committee on Justice into
the Judicial Development Fund is an unconstitutional infringement of the
constitutionally mandated fiscal autonomy of the judiciary.
The first issue goes into the merits of the second impeachment complaint
over which this Court has no jurisdiction. More importantly, any discussion
of this issue would require this Court to make a determination of what
constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a determination is a purely
political question which the Constitution has left to the sound discretion of
the legislation. Such an intent is clear from the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission.113
Lis Mota
It has been established that this Court will assume jurisdiction over a
constitutional question only if it is shown that the essential requisites of a
judicial inquiry into such a question are first satisfied. Thus, there must be
an actual case or controversy involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible
of judicial determination, the constitutional question must have been
opportunely raised by the proper party, and the resolution of the question is
unavoidably necessary to the decision of the case itself.118 [Emphasis
supplied]
Succinctly put, courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality unless it is
truly unavoidable and is the very lis mota or crux of the controversy.
As noted earlier, the instant consolidated petitions, while all seeking the
invalidity of the second impeachment complaint, collectively raise several
constitutional issues upon which the outcome of this controversy could
possibly be made to rest. In determining whether one, some or all of the
remaining substantial issues should be passed upon, this Court is guided
by the related cannon of adjudication that "the court should not form a rule
of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it
is applied."119
In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso, et al. argue that, among
other reasons, the second impeachment complaint is invalid since it directly
resulted from a Resolution120 calling for a legislative inquiry into the JDF,
which Resolution and legislative inquiry petitioners claim to likewise be
unconstitutional for being: (a) a violation of the rules and jurisprudence on
investigations in aid of legislation; (b) an open breach of the doctrine of
separation of powers; (c) a violation of the constitutionally mandated fiscal
autonomy of the judiciary; and (d) an assault on the independence of the
judiciary.121
Without going into the merits of petitioners Alfonso, et. al.'s claims, it is the
studied opinion of this Court that the issue of the constitutionality of the said
Resolution and resulting legislative inquiry is too far removed from the
issue of the validity of the second impeachment complaint. Moreover, the
resolution of said issue would, in the Court's opinion, require it to form a
rule of constitutional law touching on the separate and distinct matter of
legislative inquiries in general, which would thus be broader than is
required by the facts of these consolidated cases. This opinion is further
strengthened by the fact that said petitioners have raised other grounds in
support of their petition which would not be adversely affected by the
Court's ruling.
En passant, this Court notes that a standard for the conduct of legislative
inquiries has already been enunciated by this Court in Bengzon, Jr. v.
Senate Blue Ribbon Commttee,122 viz:
In sum, this Court holds that the two remaining issues, inextricably linked
as they are, constitute the very lis mota of the instant controversy: (1)
whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules
adopted by the 12th Congress are unconstitutional for violating the
provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution; and (2) whether, as a
result thereof, the second impeachment complaint is barred under Section
3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.
Judicial Restraint
On the other hand, respondents Speaker De Venecia et. al. argue that
"[t]here is a moral compulsion for the Court to not assume jurisdiction over
the impeachment because all the Members thereof are subject to
impeachment."125 But this argument is very much like saying the
Legislature has a moral compulsion not to pass laws with penalty clauses
because Members of the House of Representatives are subject to them.
Even in cases where it is an interested party, the Court under our system of
government cannot inhibit itself and must rule upon the challenge because
no other office has the authority to do so.128 On the occasion that this
Court had been an interested party to the controversy before it, it has acted
upon the matter "not with officiousness but in the discharge of an
unavoidable duty and, as always, with detachment and fairness."129 After
all, "by [his] appointment to the office, the public has laid on [a member of
the judiciary] their confidence that [he] is mentally and morally fit to pass
upon the merits of their varied contentions. For this reason, they expect
[him] to be fearless in [his] pursuit to render justice, to be unafraid to
displease any person, interest or power and to be equipped with a moral
fiber strong enough to resist the temptations lurking in [his] office."130
To our mind, this is the overriding consideration that the Tribunal be not
prevented from discharging a duty which it alone has the power to perform,
the performance of which is in the highest public interest as evidenced by
its being expressly imposed by no less than the fundamental law.
It is aptly noted in the first of the questioned Resolutions that the framers of
the Constitution could not have been unaware of the possibility of an
election contest that would involve all Senatorselect, six of whom would
inevitably have to sit in judgment thereon. Indeed, such possibility might
surface again in the wake of the 1992 elections when once more, but for
the last time, all 24 seats in the Senate will be at stake. Yet the Constitution
provides no scheme or mode for settling such unusual situations or for the
substitution of Senators designated to the Tribunal whose disqualification
may be sought. Litigants in such situations must simply place their trust and
hopes of vindication in the fairness and sense of justice of the Members of
the Tribunal. Justices and Senators, singly and collectively.
Besides, there are specific safeguards already laid down by the Court when
it exercises its power of judicial review.
3. The Court will not 'formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is
required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied.'
4. The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly
presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon
which the case may be disposed of. This rule has found most varied
application. Thus, if a case can be decided on either of two grounds, one
involving a constitutional question, the other a question of statutory
construction or general law, the Court will decide only the latter. Appeals
from the highest court of a state challenging its decision of a question
under the Federal Constitution are frequently dismissed because the
judgment can be sustained on an independent state ground.
5. The Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon complaint of
one who fails to show that he is injured by its operation. Among the many
applications of this rule, none is more striking than the denial of the right of
challenge to one who lacks a personal or property right. Thus, the
challenge by a public official interested only in the performance of his
official duty will not be entertained . . . In Fairchild v. Hughes, the Court
affirmed the dismissal of a suit brought by a citizen who sought to have the
Nineteenth Amendment declared unconstitutional. In Massachusetts v.
Mellon, the challenge of the federal Maternity Act was not entertained
although made by the Commonwealth on behalf of all its citizens.
6. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute at the
instance of one who has availed himself of its benefits.
4. the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.136
Justice Feliciano warned against the dangers when this Court refuses to
act.
Substituting the word public officers for judges, this Court is well guided by
the doctrine in People v. Veneracion, to wit:141
Obedience to the rule of law forms the bedrock of our system of justice. If
[public officers], under the guise of religious or political beliefs were allowed
to roam unrestricted beyond boundaries within which they are required by
law to exercise the duties of their office, then law becomes meaningless. A
government of laws, not of men excludes the exercise of broad
discretionary powers by those acting under its authority. Under this system,
[public officers] are guided by the Rule of Law, and ought "to protect and
enforce it without fear or favor," resist encroachments by governments,
political parties, or even the interference of their own personal beliefs.142
The resolution of this issue thus hinges on the interpretation of the term
"initiate." Resort to statutory construction is, therefore, in order.
xxx
xxx
I already mentioned earlier yesterday that the initiation, as far as the House
of Representatives of the United States is concerned, really starts from the
filing of the verified complaint and every resolution to impeach always
carries with it the Articles of Impeachment. As a matter of fact, the words
"Articles of Impeachment" are mentioned on line 25 in the case of the direct
filing of a verified compliant of one-third of all the Members of the House. I
will mention again, Madam President, that my amendment will not vary the
substance in any way. It is only in keeping with the uniform procedure of
the House of Representatives of the United States Congress. Thank you,
Madam President.143 (Italics in the original; emphasis and udnerscoring
supplied)
This amendment proposed by Commissioner Maambong was clarified and
accepted by the Committee on the Accountability of Public Officers.144
It is thus clear that the framers intended "initiation" to start with the filing of
the complaint. In his amicus curiae brief, Commissioner Maambong
explained that "the obvious reason in deleting the phrase "to initiate
impeachment proceedings" as contained in the text of the provision of
Section 3 (3) was to settle and make it understood once and for all that the
initiation of impeachment proceedings starts with the filing of the complaint,
and the vote of one-third of the House in a resolution of impeachment does
not initiate the impeachment proceedings which was already initiated by the
filing of a verified complaint under Section 3, paragraph (2), Article XI of the
Constitution."145
During the oral arguments before this Court, Father Bernas clarified that
the word "initiate," appearing in the constitutional provision on
impeachment, viz:
Section 3 (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power
to initiate all cases of impeachment.
xxx
Father Bernas explains that in these two provisions, the common verb is "to
initiate." The object in the first sentence is "impeachment case." The object
in the second sentence is "impeachment proceeding." Following the
principle of reddendo singuala sinuilis, the term "cases" must be
distinguished from the term "proceedings." An impeachment case is the
legal controversy that must be decided by the Senate. Above-quoted first
provision provides that the House, by a vote of one-third of all its members,
can bring a case to the Senate. It is in that sense that the House has
"exclusive power" to initiate all cases of impeachment. No other body can
do it. However, before a decision is made to initiate a case in the Senate, a
"proceeding" must be followed to arrive at a conclusion. A proceeding must
be "initiated." To initiate, which comes from the Latin word initium, means
to begin. On the other hand, proceeding is a progressive noun. It has a
beginning, a middle, and an end. It takes place not in the Senate but in the
House and consists of several steps: (1) there is the filing of a verified
complaint either by a Member of the House of Representatives or by a
private citizen endorsed by a Member of the House of the Representatives;
(2) there is the processing of this complaint by the proper Committee which
may either reject the complaint or uphold it; (3) whether the resolution of
the Committee rejects or upholds the complaint, the resolution must be
forwarded to the House for further processing; and (4) there is the
processing of the same complaint by the House of Representatives which
either affirms a favorable resolution of the Committee or overrides a
contrary resolution by a vote of one-third of all the members. If at least one
third of all the Members upholds the complaint, Articles of Impeachment
are prepared and transmitted to the Senate. It is at this point that the House
"initiates an impeachment case." It is at this point that an impeachable
public official is successfully impeached. That is, he or she is successfully
charged with an impeachment "case" before the Senate as impeachment
court.
Father Bernas concludes that when Section 3 (5) says, "No impeachment
proceeding shall be initiated against the same official more than once
within a period of one year," it means that no second verified complaint
may be accepted and referred to the Committee on Justice for action. By
his explanation, this interpretation is founded on the common
understanding of the meaning of "to initiate" which means to begin. He
reminds that the Constitution is ratified by the people, both ordinary and
sophisticated, as they understand it; and that ordinary people read ordinary
meaning into ordinary words and not abstruse meaning, they ratify words
as they understand it and not as sophisticated lawyers confuse it.
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and
referral or endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the House
Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third of the members
of the House of Representatives with the Secretary General of the House,
the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an
impeachment complaint has been initiated, another impeachment
complaint may not be filed against the same official within a one year
period.
In his amicus curiae brief, Justice Hugo Gutierrez posits that this Court
could not use contemporaneous construction as an aid in the interpretation
of Sec.3 (5) of Article XI, citing Vera v. Avelino147 wherein this Court
stated that "their personal opinions (referring to Justices who were
delegates to the Constitution Convention) on the matter at issue expressed
during this Court's our deliberations stand on a different footing from the
properly recorded utterances of debates and proceedings." Further citing
said case, he states that this Court likened the former members of the
Constitutional Convention to actors who are so absorbed in their emotional
roles that intelligent spectators may know more about the real meaning
because of the latter's balanced perspectives and disinterestedness.148
Section 3 (8) of Article XI provides that "The Congress shall promulgate its
rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section."
Clearly, its power to promulgate its rules on impeachment is limited by the
phrase "to effectively carry out the purpose of this section." Hence, these
rules cannot contravene the very purpose of the Constitution which said
rules were intended to effectively carry out. Moreover, Section 3 of Article
XI clearly provides for other specific limitations on its power to make rules,
viz:
Section 3. (1) x x x
(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be
necessary to either affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of
Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary resolution. The
vote of each Member shall be recorded.
It is basic that all rules must not contravene the Constitution which is the
fundamental law. If as alleged Congress had absolute rule making power,
then it would by necessary implication have the power to alter or amend the
meaning of the Constitution without need of referendum.
With due respect, I do not agree that the issues posed by the petitioner are
non-justiciable. Nor do I agree that we will trivialize the principle of
separation of power if we assume jurisdiction over he case at bar. Even in
the United States, the principle of separation of power is no longer an
impregnable impediment against the interposition of judicial power on
cases involving breach of rules of procedure by legislators.
"x x x
"The Constitution, in the same section, provides, that each house may
determine the rules of its proceedings." It appears that in pursuance of this
authority the House had, prior to that day, passed this as one of its rules:
Rule XV
The action taken was in direct compliance with this rule. The question,
therefore, is as to the validity of this rule, and not what methods the
Speaker may of his own motion resort to for determining the presence of a
quorum, nor what matters the Speaker or clerk may of their own volition
place upon the journal. Neither do the advantages or disadvantages, the
wisdom or folly, of such a rule present any matters for judicial
consideration. With the courts the question is only one of power. The
Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of proceedings. It
may not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental
rights, and there should be a reasonable relation between the mode or
method of proceedings established by the rule and the result which is
sought to be attained. But within these limitations all matters of method are
open to the determination of the House, and it is no impeachment of the
rule to say that some other way would be better, more accurate, or even
more just. It is no objection to the validity of a rule that a different one has
been prescribed and in force for a length of time. The power to make rules
is not one which once exercised is exhausted. It is a continuous power,
always subject to be exercised by the House, and within the limitations
suggested, absolute and beyond the challenge of any other body or
tribunal."
Ballin, clearly confirmed the jurisdiction of courts to pass upon the validity
of congressional rules, i.e, whether they are constitutional. Rule XV was
examined by the Court and it was found to satisfy the test: (1) that it did not
ignore any constitutional restraint; (2) it did not violate any fundamental
right; and (3) its method had a reasonable relationship with the result
sought to be attained. By examining Rule XV, the Court did not allow its
jurisdiction to be defeated by the mere invocation of the principle of
separation of powers.154
xxx
xxx
The Constitution cannot be any clearer. What it granted to this Court is not
a mere power which it can decline to exercise. Precisely to deter this
disinclination, the Constitution imposed it as a duty of this Court to strike
down any act of a branch or instrumentality of government or any of its
officials done with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. Rightly or wrongly, the Constitution has elongated the checking
powers of this Court against the other branches of government despite their
more democratic character, the President and the legislators being elected
by the people.156
xxx
The provision defining judicial power as including the 'duty of the courts of
justice. . . to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government' constitutes the capstone of
the efforts of the Constitutional Commission to upgrade the powers of this
court vis--vis the other branches of government. This provision was
dictated by our experience under martial law which taught us that a
stronger and more independent judiciary is needed to abort abuses in
government. x x x
xxx
In sum, I submit that in imposing to this Court the duty to annul acts of
government committed with grave abuse of discretion, the new Constitution
transformed this Court from passivity to activism. This transformation,
dictated by our distinct experience as nation, is not merely evolutionary but
revolutionary. Under the 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions, this Court
approached constitutional violations by initially determining what it cannot
do; under the 1987 Constitution, there is a shift in stress this Court is
mandated to approach constitutional violations not by finding out what it
should not do but what it must do. The Court must discharge this solemn
duty by not resuscitating a past that petrifies the present.
I urge my brethren in the Court to give due and serious consideration to this
new constitutional provision as the case at bar once more calls us to define
the parameters of our power to review violations of the rules of the House.
We will not be true to our trust as the last bulwark against government
abuses if we refuse to exercise this new power or if we wield it with timidity.
To be sure, it is this exceeding timidity to unsheathe the judicial sword that
has increasingly emboldened other branches of government to denigrate, if
not defy, orders of our courts. In Tolentino, I endorsed the view of former
Senator Salonga that this novel provision stretching the latitude of judicial
power is distinctly Filipino and its interpretation should not be depreciated
by undue reliance on inapplicable foreign jurisprudence. In resolving the
case at bar, the lessons of our own history should provide us the light and
not the experience of foreigners.157 (Italics in the original emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the
impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on Justice,
the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI
becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the
foregoing manner, another may not be filed against the same official within
a one year period following Article XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution.
Conclusion
Through all these and as early as the time when the Articles of
Impeachment had been constituted, this Court was specifically asked, told,
urged and argued to take no action of any kind and form with respect to the
prosecution by the House of Representatives of the impeachment
complaint against the subject respondent public official. When the present
petitions were knocking so to speak at the doorsteps of this Court, the
same clamor for non-interference was made through what are now the
arguments of "lack of jurisdiction," "non-justiciability," and "judicial self-
restraint" aimed at halting the Court from any move that may have a
bearing on the impeachment proceedings.
This Court did not heed the call to adopt a hands-off stance as far as the
question of the constitutionality of initiating the impeachment complaint
against Chief Justice Davide is concerned. To reiterate what has been
already explained, the Court found the existence in full of all the requisite
conditions for its exercise of its constitutionally vested power and duty of
judicial review over an issue whose resolution precisely called for the
construction or interpretation of a provision of the fundamental law of the
land. What lies in here is an issue of a genuine constitutional material
which only this Court can properly and competently address and adjudicate
in accordance with the clear-cut allocation of powers under our system of
government. Face-to-face thus with a matter or problem that squarely falls
under the Court's jurisdiction, no other course of action can be had but for it
to pass upon that problem head on.
The claim, therefore, that this Court by judicially entangling itself with the
process of impeachment has effectively set up a regime of judicial
supremacy, is patently without basis in fact and in law.
This Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and
resolved on the merits only the main issue of whether the impeachment
proceedings initiated against the Chief Justice transgressed the
constitutionally imposed one-year time bar rule. Beyond this, it did not go
about assuming jurisdiction where it had none, nor indiscriminately turn
justiciable issues out of decidedly political questions. Because it is not at all
the business of this Court to assert judicial dominance over the other two
great branches of the government. Rather, the raison d'etre of the judiciary
is to complement the discharge by the executive and legislative of their own
powers to bring about ultimately the beneficent effects of having founded
and ordered our society upon the rule of law.
The institution that is the Supreme Court together with all other courts has
long held and been entrusted with the judicial power to resolve conflicting
legal rights regardless of the personalities involved in the suits or actions.
This Court has dispensed justice over the course of time, unaffected by
whomsoever stood to benefit or suffer therefrom, unfraid by whatever
imputations or speculations could be made to it, so long as it rendered
judgment according to the law and the facts. Why can it not now be trusted
to wield judicial power in these petitions just because it is the highest
ranking magistrate who is involved when it is an incontrovertible fact that
the fundamental issue is not him but the validity of a government branch's
official act as tested by the limits set by the Constitution? Of course, there
are rules on the inhibition of any member of the judiciary from taking part in
a case in specified instances. But to disqualify this entire institution now
from the suit at bar is to regard the Supreme Court as likely incapable of
impartiality when one of its members is a party to a case, which is simply a
non sequitur.
No one is above the law or the Constitution. This is a basic precept in any
legal system which recognizes equality of all men before the law as
essential to the law's moral authority and that of its agents to secure
respect for and obedience to its commands. Perhaps, there is no other
government branch or instrumentality that is most zealous in protecting that
principle of legal equality other than the Supreme Court which has
discerned its real meaning and ramifications through its application to
numerous cases especially of the high-profile kind in the annals of
jurisprudence. The Chief Justice is not above the law and neither is any
other member of this Court. But just because he is the Chief Justice does
not imply that he gets to have less in law than anybody else. The law is
solicitous of every individual's rights irrespective of his station in life.
The Filipino nation and its democratic institutions have no doubt been put
to test once again by this impeachment case against Chief Justice Hilario
Davide. Accordingly, this Court has resorted to no other than the
Constitution in search for a solution to what many feared would ripen to a
crisis in government. But though it is indeed immensely a blessing for this
Court to have found answers in our bedrock of legal principles, it is equally
important that it went through this crucible of a democratic process, if only
to discover that it can resolve differences without the use of force and
aggression upon each other.
SO ORDERED.
Facts:
Rulings:
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
For decades, the toil of solitary migrants has helped lift entire families and
communities out of poverty. Their earnings have built houses, provided
health care, equipped schools and planted the seeds of businesses. They
have woven together the world by transmitting ideas and knowledge from
country to country. They have provided the dynamic human link between
cultures, societies and economies. Yet, only recently have we begun to
understand not only how much international migration impacts
development, but how smart public policies can magnify this effect.
For Antonio Serrano (petitioner), a Filipino seafarer, the last clause in the
5th paragraph of Section 10, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042,2 to wit:
The LA rendered a Decision dated July 15, 1999, declaring the dismissal of
petitioner illegal and awarding him monetary benefits, to wit:
The claims of the complainant for moral and exemplary damages are
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Petitioner also appealed16 to the NLRC on the sole issue that the LA erred
in not applying the ruling of the Court in Triple Integrated Services, Inc. v.
National Labor Relations Commission17 that in case of illegal dismissal,
OFWs are entitled to their salaries for the unexpired portion of their
contracts.18
In a Decision dated June 15, 2000, the NLRC modified the LA Decision, to
wit:
SO ORDERED.19
The NLRC corrected the LA's computation of the lump-sum salary awarded
to petitioner by reducing the applicable salary rate from US$2,590.00 to
US$1,400.00 because R.A. No. 8042 "does not provide for the award of
overtime pay, which should be proven to have been actually performed,
and for vacation leave pay."20
Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari23 with the CA, reiterating the
constitutional challenge against the subject clause.24 After initially
dismissing the petition on a technicality, the CA eventually gave due course
to it, as directed by this Court in its Resolution dated August 7, 2003 which
granted the petition for certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 151833, filed by
petitioner.
The Court of Appeals and the labor tribunals have decided the case in a
way not in accord with applicable decision of the Supreme Court involving
similar issue of granting unto the migrant worker back wages equal to the
unexpired portion of his contract of employment instead of limiting it to
three (3) months
II
In the alternative that the Court of Appeals and the Labor Tribunals were
merely applying their interpretation of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042,
it is submitted that the Court of Appeals gravely erred in law when it failed
to discharge its judicial duty to decide questions of substance not
theretofore determined by the Honorable Supreme Court, particularly, the
constitutional issues raised by the petitioner on the constitutionality of said
law, which unreasonably, unfairly and arbitrarily limits payment of the
award for back wages of overseas workers to three (3) months.
III
On February 26, 2008, petitioner wrote the Court to withdraw his petition as
he is already old and sickly, and he intends to make use of the monetary
award for his medical treatment and medication.29 Required to comment,
counsel for petitioner filed a motion, urging the court to allow partial
execution of the undisputed monetary award and, at the same time, praying
that the constitutional question be resolved.30
Considering that the parties have filed their respective memoranda, the
Court now takes up the full merit of the petition mindful of the extreme
importance of the constitutional question raised therein.
On the first and second issues
The unanimous finding of the LA, NLRC and CA that the dismissal of
petitioner was illegal is not disputed. Likewise not disputed is the salary
differential of US$45.00 awarded to petitioner in all three fora. What
remains disputed is only the computation of the lump-sum salary to be
awarded to petitioner by reason of his illegal dismissal.
Applying the subject clause, the NLRC and the CA computed the lump-sum
salary of petitioner at the monthly rate of US$1,400.00 covering the period
of three months out of the unexpired portion of nine months and 23 days of
his employment contract or a total of US$4,200.00.
Moreover, petitioner argues that the decisions of the CA and the labor
tribunals are not in line with existing jurisprudence on the issue of money
claims of illegally dismissed OFWs. Though there are conflicting rulings on
this, petitioner urges the Court to sort them out for the guidance of affected
OFWs.36
Petitioner further underscores that the insertion of the subject clause into
R.A. No. 8042 serves no other purpose but to benefit local placement
agencies. He marks the statement made by the Solicitor General in his
Memorandum, viz.:
In terms of practical application, the local employers are not limited to the
amount of backwages they have to give their employees they have illegally
dismissed, following well-entrenched and unequivocal jurisprudence on the
matter. On the other hand, foreign employers will only be limited to giving
the illegally dismissed migrant workers the maximum of three (3) months
unpaid salaries notwithstanding the unexpired term of the contract that can
be more than three (3) months.38
Lastly, petitioner claims that the subject clause violates the due process
clause, for it deprives him of the salaries and other emoluments he is
entitled to under his fixed-period employment contract.39
The Solicitor General (OSG)41 points out that as R.A. No. 8042 took effect
on July 15, 1995, its provisions could not have impaired petitioner's 1998
employment contract. Rather, R.A. No. 8042 having preceded petitioner's
contract, the provisions thereof are deemed part of the minimum terms of
petitioner's employment, especially on the matter of money claims, as this
was not stipulated upon by the parties.42
Moreover, the OSG emphasizes that OFWs and local workers differ in
terms of the nature of their employment, such that their rights to monetary
benefits must necessarily be treated differently. The OSG enumerates the
essential elements that distinguish OFWs from local workers: first, while
local workers perform their jobs within Philippine territory, OFWs perform
their jobs for foreign employers, over whom it is difficult for our courts to
acquire jurisdiction, or against whom it is almost impossible to enforce
judgment; and second, as held in Coyoca v. National Labor Relations
Commission43 and Millares v. National Labor Relations Commission,44
OFWs are contractual employees who can never acquire regular
employment status, unlike local workers who are or can become regular
employees. Hence, the OSG posits that there are rights and privileges
exclusive to local workers, but not available to OFWs; that these
peculiarities make for a reasonable and valid basis for the differentiated
treatment under the subject clause of the money claims of OFWs who are
illegally dismissed. Thus, the provision does not violate the equal protection
clause nor Section 18, Article II of the Constitution.45
Lastly, the OSG defends the rationale behind the subject clause as a police
power measure adopted to mitigate the solidary liability of placement
agencies for this "redounds to the benefit of the migrant workers whose
welfare the government seeks to promote. The survival of legitimate
placement agencies helps [assure] the government that migrant workers
are properly deployed and are employed under decent and humane
conditions."46
The third condition that the constitutional issue be critical to the resolution
of the case likewise obtains because the monetary claim of petitioner to his
lump-sum salary for the entire unexpired portion of his 12-month
employment contract, and not just for a period of three months, strikes at
the very core of the subject clause.
Thus, the stage is all set for the determination of the constitutionality of the
subject clause.
Petitioner's claim that the subject clause unduly interferes with the
stipulations in his contract on the term of his employment and the fixed
salary package he will receive57 is not tenable.
The prohibition is aligned with the general principle that laws newly enacted
have only a prospective operation,58 and cannot affect acts or contracts
already perfected;59 however, as to laws already in existence, their
provisions are read into contracts and deemed a part thereof.60 Thus, the
non-impairment clause under Section 10, Article II is limited in application
to laws about to be enacted that would in any way derogate from existing
acts or contracts by enlarging, abridging or in any manner changing the
intention of the parties thereto.
As aptly observed by the OSG, the enactment of R.A. No. 8042 in 1995
preceded the execution of the employment contract between petitioner and
respondents in 1998. Hence, it cannot be argued that R.A. No. 8042,
particularly the subject clause, impaired the employment contract of the
parties. Rather, when the parties executed their 1998 employment contract,
they were deemed to have incorporated into it all the provisions of R.A. No.
8042.
But even if the Court were to disregard the timeline, the subject clause may
not be declared unconstitutional on the ground that it impinges on the
impairment clause, for the law was enacted in the exercise of the police
power of the State to regulate a business, profession or calling, particularly
the recruitment and deployment of OFWs, with the noble end in view of
ensuring respect for the dignity and well-being of OFWs wherever they may
be employed.61 Police power legislations adopted by the State to promote
the health, morals, peace, education, good order, safety, and general
welfare of the people are generally applicable not only to future contracts
but even to those already in existence, for all private contracts must yield to
the superior and legitimate measures taken by the State to promote public
welfare.62
Section 18,63 Article II and Section 3,64 Article XIII accord all members of
the labor sector, without distinction as to place of deployment, full
protection of their rights and welfare.
Such rights are not absolute but subject to the inherent power of Congress
to incorporate, when it sees fit, a system of classification into its legislation;
however, to be valid, the classification must comply with these
requirements: 1) it is based on substantial distinctions; 2) it is germane to
the purposes of the law; 3) it is not limited to existing conditions only; and
4) it applies equally to all members of the class.66
There are three levels of scrutiny at which the Court reviews the
constitutionality of a classification embodied in a law: a) the deferential or
rational basis scrutiny in which the challenged classification needs only be
shown to be rationally related to serving a legitimate state interest;67 b) the
middle-tier or intermediate scrutiny in which the government must show
that the challenged classification serves an important state interest and that
the classification is at least substantially related to serving that interest;68
and c) strict judicial scrutiny69 in which a legislative classification which
impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right70 or
operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class71 is presumed
unconstitutional, and the burden is upon the government to prove that the
classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest and that it
is the least restrictive means to protect such interest.72
xxxx
Further, the quest for a better and more "equal" world calls for the use of
equal protection as a tool of effective judicial intervention.
Equality is one ideal which cries out for bold attention and action in the
Constitution. The Preamble proclaims "equality" as an ideal precisely in
protest against crushing inequities in Philippine society. The command to
promote social justice in Article II, Section 10, in "all phases of national
development," further explicitated in Article XIII, are clear commands to the
State to take affirmative action in the direction of greater equality. x x x
[T]here is thus in the Philippine Constitution no lack of doctrinal support for
a more vigorous state effort towards achieving a reasonable measure of
equality.
Our present Constitution has gone further in guaranteeing vital social and
economic rights to marginalized groups of society, including labor. Under
the policy of social justice, the law bends over backward to accommodate
the interests of the working class on the humane justification that those with
less privilege in life should have more in law. And the obligation to afford
protection to labor is incumbent not only on the legislative and executive
branches but also on the judiciary to translate this pledge into a living
reality. Social justice calls for the humanization of laws and the equalization
of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and
objectively secular conception may at least be approximated.
xxxx
xxxx
In the case at bar, the challenged proviso operates on the basis of the
salary grade or officer-employee status. It is akin to a distinction based on
economic class and status, with the higher grades as recipients of a benefit
specifically withheld from the lower grades. Officers of the BSP now receive
higher compensation packages that are competitive with the industry, while
the poorer, low-salaried employees are limited to the rates prescribed by
the SSL. The implications are quite disturbing: BSP rank-and-file
employees are paid the strictly regimented rates of the SSL while
employees higher in rank - possessing higher and better education and
opportunities for career advancement - are given higher compensation
packages to entice them to stay. Considering that majority, if not all, the
rank-and-file employees consist of people whose status and rank in life are
less and limited, especially in terms of job marketability, it is they - and not
the officers - who have the real economic and financial need for the
adjustment . This is in accord with the policy of the Constitution "to free the
people from poverty, provide adequate social services, extend to them a
decent standard of living, and improve the quality of life for all." Any act of
Congress that runs counter to this constitutional desideratum deserves
strict scrutiny by this Court before it can pass muster. (Emphasis supplied)
Imbued with the same sense of "obligation to afford protection to labor," the
Court in the present case also employs the standard of strict judicial
scrutiny, for it perceives in the subject clause a suspect classification
prejudicial to OFWs.
Upon cursory reading, the subject clause appears facially neutral, for it
applies to all OFWs. However, a closer examination reveals that the
subject clause has a discriminatory intent against, and an invidious impact
on, OFWs at two levels:
First, OFWs with employment contracts of less than one year vis--vis
OFWs with employment contracts of one year or more;
Second, among OFWs with employment contracts of more than one year;
and
OFWs with employment contracts of less than one year vis--vis OFWs
with employment contracts of one year or more
A plain reading of Sec. 10 clearly reveals that the choice of which amount
to award an illegally dismissed overseas contract worker, i.e., whether his
salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or three (3)
months salary for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less,
comes into play only when the employment contract concerned has a term
of at least one (1) year or more. This is evident from the words "for every
year of the unexpired term" which follows the words "salaries x x x for three
months." To follow petitioners thinking that private respondent is entitled to
three (3) months salary only simply because it is the lesser amount is to
completely disregard and overlook some words used in the statute while
giving effect to some. This is contrary to the well-established rule in legal
hermeneutics that in interpreting a statute, care should be taken that every
part or word thereof be given effect since the law-making body is presumed
to know the meaning of the words employed in the statue and to have used
them advisedly. Ut res magis valeat quam pereat.80 (Emphasis supplied)
In Marsaman, the OFW involved was illegally dismissed two months into
his 10-month contract, but was awarded his salaries for the remaining 8
months and 6 days of his contract.
Prior to Marsaman, however, there were two cases in which the Court
made conflicting rulings on Section 10(5). One was Asian Center for Career
and Employment System and Services v. National Labor Relations
Commission (Second Division, October 1998),81 which involved an OFW
who was awarded a two-year employment contract, but was dismissed
after working for one year and two months. The LA declared his dismissal
illegal and awarded him SR13,600.00 as lump-sum salary covering eight
months, the unexpired portion of his contract. On appeal, the Court
reduced the award to SR3,600.00 equivalent to his three months salary,
this being the lesser value, to wit:
The disparity becomes more aggravating when the Court takes into
account jurisprudence that, prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 8042 on July
14, 1995,97 illegally dismissed OFWs, no matter how long the period of
their employment contracts, were entitled to their salaries for the entire
unexpired portions of their contracts. The matrix below speaks for itself:
The Court notes that the subject clause "or for three (3) months for every
year of the unexpired term, whichever is less" contains the qualifying
phrases "every year" and "unexpired term." By its ordinary meaning, the
word "term" means a limited or definite extent of time.105 Corollarily, that
"every year" is but part of an "unexpired term" is significant in many ways:
first, the unexpired term must be at least one year, for if it were any shorter,
there would be no occasion for such unexpired term to be measured by
every year; and second, the original term must be more than one year, for
otherwise, whatever would be the unexpired term thereof will not reach
even a year. Consequently, the more decisive factor in the determination of
when the subject clause "for three (3) months for every year of the
unexpired term, whichever is less" shall apply is not the length of the
original contract period as held in Marsaman,106 but the length of the
unexpired portion of the contract period -- the subject clause applies in
cases when the unexpired portion of the contract period is at least one
year, which arithmetically requires that the original contract period be more
than one year.
Article 299. If the contracts between the merchants and their shop clerks
and employees should have been made of a fixed period, none of the
contracting parties, without the consent of the other, may withdraw from the
fulfillment of said contract until the termination of the period agreed upon.
Persons violating this clause shall be subject to indemnify the loss and
damage suffered, with the exception of the provisions contained in the
following articles.
There is a more specific rule as far as seafarers are concerned: Article 605
of the Code of Commerce which provides:
Article 605. If the contracts of the captain and members of the crew with the
agent should be for a definite period or voyage, they cannot be discharged
until the fulfillment of their contracts, except for reasons of insubordination
in serious matters, robbery, theft, habitual drunkenness, and damage
caused to the vessel or to its cargo by malice or manifest or proven
negligence.
which the Court held the shipping company liable for the salaries and
subsistence allowance of its illegally dismissed employees for the entire
unexpired portion of their employment contracts.
While Article 605 has remained good law up to the present,111 Article 299
of the Code of Commerce was replaced by Art. 1586 of the Civil Code of
1889, to wit:
Article 1586. Field hands, mechanics, artisans, and other laborers hired for
a certain time and for a certain work cannot leave or be dismissed without
sufficient cause, before the fulfillment of the contract. (Emphasis supplied.)
Citing Manresa, the Court in Lemoine v. Alkan112 read the disjunctive "or"
in Article 1586 as a conjunctive "and" so as to apply the provision to local
workers who are employed for a time certain although for no particular skill.
This interpretation of Article 1586 was reiterated in Garcia Palomar v. Hotel
de France Company.113 And in both Lemoine and Palomar, the Court
adopted the general principle that in actions for wrongful discharge founded
on Article 1586, local workers are entitled to recover damages to the extent
of the amount stipulated to be paid to them by the terms of their contract.
On the computation of the amount of such damages, the Court in Aldaz v.
Gay114 held:
The doctrine is well-established in American jurisprudence, and nothing
has been brought to our attention to the contrary under Spanish
jurisprudence, that when an employee is wrongfully discharged it is his duty
to seek other employment of the same kind in the same community, for the
purpose of reducing the damages resulting from such wrongful discharge.
However, while this is the general rule, the burden of showing that he failed
to make an effort to secure other employment of a like nature, and that
other employment of a like nature was obtainable, is upon the defendant.
When an employee is wrongfully discharged under a contract of
employment his prima facie damage is the amount which he would be
entitled to had he continued in such employment until the termination of the
period. (Howard vs. Daly, 61 N. Y., 362; Allen vs. Whitlark, 99 Mich., 492;
Farrell vs. School District No. 2, 98 Mich., 43.)115 (Emphasis supplied)
On August 30, 1950, the New Civil Code took effect with new provisions on
fixed-term employment: Section 2 (Obligations with a Period), Chapter 3,
Title I, and Sections 2 (Contract of Labor) and 3 (Contract for a Piece of
Work), Chapter 3, Title VIII, Book IV.116 Much like Article 1586 of the Civil
Code of 1889, the new provisions of the Civil Code do not expressly
provide for the remedies available to a fixed-term worker who is illegally
discharged. However, it is noted that in Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co.,
Inc. v. Rich,117 the Court carried over the principles on the payment of
damages underlying Article 1586 of the Civil Code of 1889 and applied the
same to a case involving the illegal discharge of a local worker whose
fixed-period employment contract was entered into in 1952, when the new
Civil Code was already in effect.118
In sum, prior to R.A. No. 8042, OFWs and local workers with fixed-term
employment who were illegally discharged were treated alike in terms of
the computation of their money claims: they were uniformly entitled to their
salaries for the entire unexpired portions of their contracts. But with the
enactment of R.A. No. 8042, specifically the adoption of the subject clause,
illegally dismissed OFWs with an unexpired portion of one year or more in
their employment contract have since been differently treated in that their
money claims are subject to a 3-month cap, whereas no such limitation is
imposed on local workers with fixed-term employment.
In the present case, the Court dug deep into the records but found no
compelling state interest that the subject clause may possibly serve.
The OSG defends the subject clause as a police power measure "designed
to protect the employment of Filipino seafarers overseas x x x. By limiting
the liability to three months [sic], Filipino seafarers have better chance of
getting hired by foreign employers." The limitation also protects the interest
of local placement agencies, which otherwise may be made to shoulder
millions of pesos in "termination pay."128
This measure redounds to the benefit of the migrant workers whose welfare
the government seeks to promote. The survival of legitimate placement
agencies helps [assure] the government that migrant workers are properly
deployed and are employed under decent and humane conditions.129
(Emphasis supplied)
However, nowhere in the Comment or Memorandum does the OSG cite the
source of its perception of the state interest sought to be served by the
subject clause.
The OSG locates the purpose of R.A. No. 8042 in the speech of Rep.
Bonifacio Gallego in sponsorship of House Bill No. 14314 (HB 14314), from
which the law originated;130 but the speech makes no reference to the
underlying reason for the adoption of the subject clause. That is only
natural for none of the 29 provisions in HB 14314 resembles the subject
clause.
On the other hand, Senate Bill No. 2077 (SB 2077) contains a provision on
money claims, to wit:
Sec. 10. Money Claims. - Notwithstanding any provision of law to the
contrary, the Labor Arbiters of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and
decide, within ninety (90) calendar days after the filing of the complaint, the
claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of the
complaint, the claim arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by
virtue of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas
employment including claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms
of damages.
(1) The salary of any such official who fails to render his decision or
resolution within the prescribed period shall be, or caused to be, withheld
until the said official complies therewith;
(3) Dismissal from the service with disqualification to hold any appointive
public office for five (5) years.
But significantly, Section 10 of SB 2077 does not provide for any rule on
the computation of money claims.
In fine, the Government has failed to discharge its burden of proving the
existence of a compelling state interest that would justify the perpetuation
of the discrimination against OFWs under the subject clause.
Assuming that, as advanced by the OSG, the purpose of the subject clause
is to protect the employment of OFWs by mitigating the solidary liability of
placement agencies, such callous and cavalier rationale will have to be
rejected. There can never be a justification for any form of government
action that alleviates the burden of one sector, but imposes the same
burden on another sector, especially when the favored sector is composed
of private businesses such as placement agencies, while the
disadvantaged sector is composed of OFWs whose protection no less than
the Constitution commands. The idea that private business interest can be
elevated to the level of a compelling state interest is odious.
Moreover, even if the purpose of the subject clause is to lessen the solidary
liability of placement agencies vis-a-vis their foreign principals, there are
mechanisms already in place that can be employed to achieve that purpose
without infringing on the constitutional rights of OFWs.
Thus, the subject clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of R.A. No.
8042 is violative of the right of petitioner and other OFWs to equal
protection.1avvphi1
While all the provisions of the 1987 Constitution are presumed self-
executing,132 there are some which this Court has declared not judicially
enforceable, Article XIII being one,133 particularly Section 3 thereof, the
nature of which, this Court, in Agabon v. National Labor Relations
Commission,134 has described to be not self-actuating:
It must be stressed that Section 3, Article XIII does not directly bestow on
the working class any actual enforceable right, but merely clothes it with the
status of a sector for whom the Constitution urges protection through
executive or legislative action and judicial recognition. Its utility is best
limited to being an impetus not just for the executive and legislative
departments, but for the judiciary as well, to protect the welfare of the
working class. And it was in fact consistent with that constitutional agenda
that the Court in Central Bank (now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas) Employee
Association, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, penned by then Associate
Justice now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, formulated the judicial precept
that when the challenge to a statute is premised on the perpetuation of
prejudice against persons favored by the Constitution with special
protection -- such as the working class or a section thereof -- the Court may
recognize the existence of a suspect classification and subject the same to
strict judicial scrutiny.
The view that the concepts of suspect classification and strict judicial
scrutiny formulated in Central Bank Employee Association exaggerate the
significance of Section 3, Article XIII is a groundless apprehension. Central
Bank applied Article XIII in conjunction with the equal protection clause.
Article XIII, by itself, without the application of the equal protection clause,
has no life or force of its own as elucidated in Agabon.
Along the same line of reasoning, the Court further holds that the subject
clause violates petitioner's right to substantive due process, for it deprives
him of property, consisting of monetary benefits, without any existing valid
governmental purpose.136
The argument of the Solicitor General, that the actual purpose of the
subject clause of limiting the entitlement of OFWs to their three-month
salary in case of illegal dismissal, is to give them a better chance of getting
hired by foreign employers. This is plain speculation. As earlier discussed,
there is nothing in the text of the law or the records of the deliberations
leading to its enactment or the pleadings of respondent that would indicate
that there is an existing governmental purpose for the subject clause, or
even just a pretext of one.
The subject clause does not state or imply any definitive governmental
purpose; and it is for that precise reason that the clause violates not just
petitioner's right to equal protection, but also her right to substantive due
process under Section 1,137 Article III of the Constitution.
Petitioner contends that his overtime and leave pay should form part of the
salary basis in the computation of his monetary award, because these are
fixed benefits that have been stipulated into his contract.
Petitioner is mistaken.
The word salaries in Section 10(5) does not include overtime and leave
pay. For seafarers like petitioner, DOLE Department Order No. 33, series
1996, provides a Standard Employment Contract of Seafarers, in which
salary is understood as the basic wage, exclusive of overtime, leave pay
and other bonuses; whereas overtime pay is compensation for all work
"performed" in excess of the regular eight hours, and holiday pay is
compensation for any work "performed" on designated rest days and
holidays.
However, the payment of overtime pay and leave pay should be disallowed
in light of our ruling in Cagampan v. National Labor Relations Commission,
to wit:
The rendition of overtime work and the submission of sufficient proof that
said was actually performed are conditions to be satisfied before a seaman
could be entitled to overtime pay which should be computed on the basis of
30% of the basic monthly salary. In short, the contract provision guarantees
the right to overtime pay but the entitlement to such benefit must first be
established.
In the same vein, the claim for the day's leave pay for the unexpired portion
of the contract is unwarranted since the same is given during the actual
service of the seamen.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Petition. The subject clause "or for
three months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less" in the
5th paragraph of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is DECLARED
UNCONSTITUTIONAL; and the December 8, 2004 Decision and April 1,
2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals are MODIFIED to the effect that
petitioner is AWARDED his salaries for the entire unexpired portion of his
employment contract consisting of nine months and 23 days computed at
the rate of US$1,400.00 per month.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
FACTS:
On March 19, 1998, the date of his departure, petitioner was constrained to
accept a downgraded employment contract for the position of Second
Officer with a monthly salary of US$1,000.00, upon the assurance and
representation of respondents that he would be made Chief Officer by the
end of April 1998.
Petitioner filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA) a Complaint against respondents
for constructive dismissal and for payment of his money claims in the total
amount of US$26,442.73.
The LA rendered a Decision dated July 15, 1999, declaring the dismissal of
petitioner illegal and awarding him monetary benefits, to wit:
The claims of the complainant for moral and exemplary damages are
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
The NLRC modified the LA Decision and corrected the LAs computation of
the lump-sum salary awarded to petitioner by reducing the applicable
salary rate from US$2,590.00 to US$1,400.00 because R.A. No. 8042
does not provide for the award of overtime pay, which should be proven to
have been actually performed, and for vacation leave pay.
Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA, reiterating the
constitutional challenge against the subject clause. After initially dismissing
the petition on a technicality, the CA eventually gave due course to it, as
directed by this Court in its Resolution which granted the petition for
certiorari,filed by petitioner.
The CA affirmed the NLRC ruling on the reduction of the applicable salary
rate; however, the CA skirted the constitutional issue raised by petitioner.
His Motion for Reconsideration having been denied by the CA, petitioner
brings his cause to this Court on the following grounds:
The Court of Appeals and the labor tribunals have decided the case in a
way not in accord with applicable decision of the Supreme Court involving
similar issue of granting unto the migrant worker back wages equal to the
unexpired portion of his contract of employment instead of limiting it to
three (3) months.
The Court now takes up the full merit of the petition mindful of the extreme
importance of the constitutional question raised therein.
ISSUES:
The unanimous finding of the LA, NLRC and CA that the dismissal of
petitioner was illegal is not disputed. Likewise not disputed is the salary
differential of US$45.00 awarded to petitioner in all three fora.
Applying the subject clause, the NLRC and the CA computed the lump-sum
salary of petitioner at the monthly rate of US$1,400.00 covering the period
of three months out of the unexpired portion of nine months and 23 days of
his employment contract or a total of US$4,200.00.
Impugning the constitutionality of the subject clause, petitioner contends
that, in addition to the US$4,200.00 awarded by the NLRC and the CA, he
is entitled to US$21,182.23 more or a total of US$25,382.23, equivalent to
his salaries for the entire nine months and 23 days left of his employment
contract, computed at the monthly rate of US$2,590.00.31
For Antonio Serrano (petitioner), a Filipino seafarer, the last clause in the
5th paragraph of Section 10, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042, violates the
OFWs constitutional rights in that it impairs the terms of their contract,
deprives them of equal protection and denies them due process.
The Solicitor General (OSG)41 points out that as R.A. No. 8042 took effect
on July 15, 1995, its provisions could not have impaired petitioners 1998
employment contract. Rather, R.A. No. 8042 having preceded petitioners
contract, the provisions thereof are deemed part of the minimum terms of
petitioners employment, especially on the matter of money claims, as this
was not stipulated upon by the parties.
First Issue
Does the subject clause violate Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, and
Section 18, Article II and Section 3, Article XIII on Labor as protected
sector?
Section 18, Article II and Section 3, Article XIII accord all members of the
labor sector, without distinction as to place of deployment, full protection of
their rights and welfare.
Imbued with the same sense of obligation to afford protection to labor, the
Court in the present case also employs the standard of strict judicial
scrutiny, for it perceives in the subject clause a suspect classification
prejudicial to OFWs.
Upon cursory reading, the subject clause appears facially neutral, for it
applies to all OFWs. However, a closer examination reveals that the
subject clause has a discriminatory intent against, and an invidious impact
on OFWs
The subject clause does not state or imply any definitive governmental
purpose; and it is for that precise reason that the clause violates not just
petitioners right to equal protection, but also her right to substantive due
process under Section 1, Article III of the Constitution.
Second Issue
It is plain that prior to R.A. No. 8042, all OFWs, regardless of contract
periods or the unexpired portions thereof, were treated alike in terms of the
computation of their monetary benefits in case of illegal dismissal. Their
claims were subjected to a uniform rule of computation: their basic salaries
multiplied by the entire unexpired portion of their employment contracts.
The subject clause does not state or imply any definitive governmental
purpose; and it is for that precise reason that the clause violates not just
petitioners right to equal protection, but also her right to substantive due
process under Section 1, Article III of the Constitution.
Third Issue
Petitioner contends that his overtime and leave pay should form part of the
salary basis in the computation of his monetary award, because these are
fixed benefits that have been stipulated into his contract.
Petitioner is mistaken.
The word salaries in Section 10(5) does not include overtime and leave
pay. For seafarers like petitioner, DOLE Department Order No. 33, series
1996, provides a Standard Employment Contract of Seafarers, in which
salary is understood as the basic wage, exclusive of overtime, leave pay
and other bonuses; whereas overtime pay is compensation for all work
performed in excess of the regular eight hours, and holiday pay is
compensation for any work performed on designated rest days and
holidays.
In the same vein, the claim for the days leave pay for the unexpired portion
of the contract is unwarranted since the same is given during the actual
service of the seamen.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the Petition. The subject clause or for
three months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less in the
5th paragraph of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is DECLARED
UNCONSTITUTIONAL; and the December 8, 2004 Decision and April 1,
2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals are MODIFIED to the effect that
petitioner is AWARDED his salaries for the entire unexpired portion of his
employment contract consisting of nine months and 23 days computed at
the rate of US$1,400.00 per month.
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BRION, J.:
These motions assail our Decision dated October 18, 2011, where we
upheld the constitutionality of Republic Act (RA) No. 10153. Pursuant to the
constitutional mandate of synchronization, RA No. 10153 postponed the
regional elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)
(which were scheduled to be held on the second Monday of August 2011)
to the second Monday of May 2013 and recognized the Presidents power
to appoint officers-in-charge (OICs) to temporarily assume these positions
upon the expiration of the terms of the elected officials.
The petitioners in G.R. No. 196271 raise the following grounds in support of
their motion:
II. R.A. 10153 AND R.A. 9333 AMEND THE ORGANIC ACT.
The petitioner in G.R. No. 197221 raises similar grounds, arguing that:
xxxx
xxxx
xxxx
xxxx
V. THE HONORABLE COURT COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR IN
DECLARING THE HOLD-OVER OF ARMM ELECTIVE OFFICIALS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
xxxx
A.
B.
C.
D.
c) RA No. 10153 amends the Organic Act (RA No. 9054) and, thus, has to
comply with the 2/3 vote from the House of Representatives and the
Senate, voting separately, and be ratified in a plebiscite;
(d) Does the COMELEC have the power to call for special elections in
ARMM?
(e) Does granting the President the power to appoint OICs violate the
elective and representative nature of ARMM regional legislative and
executive offices?
(f) Does the appointment power granted to the President exceed the
Presidents supervisory powers over autonomous regions?
The Court was unanimous in holding that the Constitution mandates the
synchronization of national and local elections. While the Constitution does
not expressly instruct Congress to synchronize the national and local
elections, the intention can be inferred from the following provisions of the
Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the Constitution, which state:
Of the Senators elected in the elections in 1992, the first twelve obtaining
the highest number of votes shall serve for six years and the remaining
twelve for three years.
xxxx
The first regular elections for the President and Vice-President under this
Constitution shall be held on the second Monday of May, 1992.
MR. DAVIDE. Before going to the proposed amendment, I would only state
that in view of the action taken by the Commission on Section 2 earlier, I
am formulating a new proposal. It will read as follows: "THE SENATORS,
MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND THE LOCAL
OFFICIALS FIRST ELECTED UNDER THIS CONSTITUTION SHALL
SERVE UNTIL NOON OF JUNE 30, 1992."
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Rodrigo). What does the committee say?
xxxx
MR. GUINGONA. Not the reverse. Will the committee not synchronize the
election of the Senators and local officials with the election of the
President?
MR. DAVIDE. It works both ways, Mr. Presiding Officer. The attempt here
is on the assumption that the provision of the Transitory Provisions on the
term of the incumbent President and Vice-President would really end in
1992.
MR. DAVIDE. In other words, there will be a single election in 1992 for all,
from the President up to the municipal officials.5 (emphases and
underscoring ours)
The framers of the Constitution could not have expressed their objective
more clearly there was to be a single election in 1992 for all elective
officials from the President down to the municipal officials. Significantly,
the framers were even willing to temporarily lengthen or shorten the terms
of elective officials in order to meet this objective, highlighting the
importance of this constitutional mandate.
Neither do we find any merit in the petitioners contention that the ARMM
elections are not covered by the constitutional mandate of synchronization
because the ARMM elections were not specifically mentioned in the above-
quoted Transitory Provisions of the Constitution.
That the ARMM elections were not expressly mentioned in the Transitory
Provisions of the Constitution on synchronization cannot be interpreted to
mean that the ARMM elections are not covered by the constitutional
mandate of synchronization. We have to consider that the ARMM, as we
now know it, had not yet been officially organized at the time the
Constitution was enacted and ratified by the people. Keeping in mind that a
constitution is not intended to provide merely for the exigencies of a few
years but is to endure through generations for as long as it remains
unaltered by the people as ultimate sovereign, a constitution should be
construed in the light of what actually is a continuing instrument to govern
not only the present but also the unfolding events of the indefinite future.
Although the principles embodied in a constitution remain fixed and
unchanged from the time of its adoption, a constitution must be construed
as a dynamic process intended to stand for a great length of time, to be
progressive and not static.8
The petitioners further argue that even assuming that the Constitution
mandates the synchronization of elections, the ARMM elections are not
covered by this mandate since they are regional elections and not local
elections.
In construing provisions of the Constitution, the first rule is verba legis, "that
is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given
their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed."9
Applying this principle to determine the scope of "local elections," we refer
to the meaning of the word "local," as understood in its ordinary sense. As
defined in Websters Third New International Dictionary Unabridged, "local"
refers to something "that primarily serves the needs of a particular limited
district, often a community or minor political subdivision." Obviously, the
ARMM elections, which are held within the confines of the autonomous
region of Muslim Mindanao, fall within this definition.
To be sure, the fact that the ARMM possesses more powers than other
provinces, cities, or municipalities is not enough reason to treat the ARMM
regional elections differently from the other local elections. Ubi lex non
distinguit nec nos distinguire debemus. When the law does not distinguish,
we must not distinguish.10
This view that Congress thought it best to leave the determination of the
date of succeeding ARMM elections to legislative discretion finds support
in ARMMs recent history.
To recall, RA No. 10153 is not the first law passed that rescheduled the
ARMM elections. The First Organic Act RA No. 6734 not only did not fix
the date of the subsequent elections; it did not even fix the specific date of
the first ARMM elections, leaving the date to be fixed in another legislative
enactment. Consequently, RA No. 7647, RA No. 8176, RA No. 8746, RA
No. 8753, and RA No. 9012 were all enacted by Congress to fix the dates
of the ARMM elections. Since these laws did not change or modify any part
or provision of RA No. 6734, they were not amendments to this latter law.
Consequently, there was no need to submit them to any plebiscite for
ratification.
The Second Organic Act RA No. 9054 which lapsed into law on March
31, 2001, provided that the first elections would be held on the second
Monday of September 2001. Thereafter, Congress passed RA No. 9140 to
reset the date of the ARMM elections. Significantly, while RA No. 9140 also
scheduled the plebiscite for the ratification of the Second Organic Act (RA
No. 9054), the new date of the ARMM regional elections fixed in RA No.
9140 was not among the provisions ratified in the plebiscite held to approve
RA No. 9054. Thereafter, Congress passed RA No. 9333, which further
reset the date of the ARMM regional elections. Again, this law was not
ratified through a plebiscite.
We find this an erroneous assertion. Well-settled is the rule that the court
may not, in the guise of interpretation, enlarge the scope of a statute and
include therein situations not provided nor intended by the lawmakers. An
omission at the time of enactment, whether careless or calculated, cannot
be judicially supplied however later wisdom may recommend the
inclusion.13 Courts are not authorized to insert into the law what they think
should be in it or to supply what they think the legislature would have
supplied if its attention had been called to the omission.14 Providing for
lapses within the law falls within the exclusive domain of the legislature,
and courts, no matter how well-meaning, have no authority to intrude into
this clearly delineated space.
Since RA No. 10153 does not amend, but merely fills in the gap in RA No.
9054, there is no need for RA No. 10153 to comply with the amendment
requirements set forth in Article XVII of RA No. 9054.
The power of the legislature to make laws includes the power to amend
and repeal these laws. Where the legislature, by its own act, attempts to
limit its power to amend or repeal laws, the Court has the duty to strike
down such act for interfering with the plenary powers of Congress. As we
explained in Duarte v. Dade:16
A state legislature has a plenary law-making power over all subjects,
whether pertaining to persons or things, within its territorial jurisdiction,
either to introduce new laws or repeal the old, unless prohibited expressly
or by implication by the federal constitution or limited or restrained by its
own. It cannot bind itself or its successors by enacting irrepealable laws
except when so restrained. Every legislative body may modify or abolish
the acts passed by itself or its predecessors. This power of repeal may be
exercised at the same session at which the original act was passed; and
even while a bill is in its progress and before it becomes a law. This
legislature cannot bind a future legislature to a particular mode of repeal. It
cannot declare in advance the intent of subsequent legislatures or the
effect of subsequent legislation upon existing statutes. [emphasis ours]
Under our Constitution, each House of Congress has the power to approve
bills by a mere majority vote, provided there is quorum.17 In requiring all
laws which amend RA No. 9054 to comply with a higher voting requirement
than the Constitution provides (2/3 vote), Congress, which enacted RA No.
9054, clearly violated the very principle which we sought to establish in
Duarte. To reiterate, the act of one legislature is not binding upon, and
cannot tie the hands of, future legislatures.18
Section 18, Article X of the Constitution provides that "[t]he creation of the
autonomous region shall be effective when approved by majority of the
votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose[.]"
We interpreted this to mean that only amendments to, or revisions of, the
Organic Act constitutionally-essential to the creation of autonomous regions
i.e., those aspects specifically mentioned in the Constitution which
Congress must provide for in the Organic Act21 require ratification
through a plebiscite. We stand by this interpretation.
Interestingly, the petitioner in G.R. No. 197282 posits that RA No. 10153, in
giving the President the power to appoint OICs to take the place of the
elective officials of the ARMM, creates a fundamental change in the basic
structure of the government, and thus requires compliance with the
plebiscite requirement embodied in RA No. 9054.
Again, we disagree.
We cannot see how the above-quoted provision has changed the basic
structure of the ARMM regional government. On the contrary, this provision
clearly preserves the basic structure of the ARMM regional government
when it recognizes the offices of the ARMM regional government and
directs the OICs who shall temporarily assume these offices to "perform the
functions pertaining to the said offices."
On the other hand, Section 7(1), Article VII of RA No. 9054 provides:
Congress, in passing RA No. 10153 and removing the holdover option, has
made it clear that it wants to suppress the holdover rule expressed in RA
No. 9054. Congress, in the exercise of its plenary legislative powers, has
clearly acted within its discretion when it deleted the holdover option, and
this Court has no authority to question the wisdom of this decision, absent
any evidence of unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion. It is for the
legislature and the executive, and not this Court, to decide how to fill the
vacancies in the ARMM regional government which arise from the
legislature complying with the constitutional mandate of synchronization.
More importantly, RA No. 10153 has already fixed the date for the next
ARMM elections and the COMELEC has no authority to set a different
election date.
Even assuming that the COMELEC has the authority to hold special
elections, and this Court can compel the COMELEC to do so, there is still
the problem of having to shorten the terms of the newly elected officials in
order to synchronize the ARMM elections with the May 2013 national and
local elections. Obviously, neither the Court nor the COMELEC has the
authority to do this, amounting as it does to an amendment of Section 8,
Article X of the Constitution, which limits the term of local officials to three
years.
The petitioner in G.R. No. 197221 argues that the Presidents power to
appoint pertains only to appointive positions and cannot extend to positions
held by elective officials.
Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive
departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or officers
of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other
officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall
also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are
not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized
by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other
officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of
departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. [emphasis ours]
(3) The President shall nominate and with the consent of the Commission
on Appointments, shall appoint the heads of the executive departments and
bureaus, officers of the Army from the rank of colonel, of the Navy and Air
Forces from the rank of captain or commander, and all other officers of the
Government whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for,
and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint; but the Congress
may by law vest the appointment of inferior officers, in the President alone,
in the courts, or in the heads of departments. [emphasis ours]
The main distinction between the provision in the 1987 Constitution and its
counterpart in the 1935 Constitution is the sentence construction; while in
the 1935 Constitution, the various appointments the President can make
are enumerated in a single sentence, the 1987 Constitution enumerates the
various appointments the President is empowered to make and divides the
enumeration in two sentences. The change in style is significant; in
providing for this change, the framers of the 1987 Constitution clearly
sought to make a distinction between the first group of presidential
appointments and the second group of presidential appointments, as made
evident in the following exchange:
The petitioners also jointly assert that RA No. 10153, in granting the
President the power to appoint OICs in elective positions, violates Section
16, Article X of the Constitution,30 which merely grants the President the
power of supervision over autonomous regions.
The wording of the law is clear. Once the President has appointed the OICs
for the offices of the Governor, Vice Governor and members of the
Regional Legislative Assembly, these same officials will remain in office
until they are replaced by the duly elected officials in the May 2013
elections. Nothing in this provision even hints that the President has the
power to recall the appointments he already made. Clearly, the petitioners
fears in this regard are more apparent than real.
The grant to the President of the power to appoint OICs in place of the
elective members of the Regional Legislative Assembly is neither novel nor
innovative. The power granted to the President, via RA No. 10153, to
appoint members of the Regional Legislative Assembly is comparable to
the power granted by BP 881 (the Omnibus Election Code) to the President
to fill any vacancy for any cause in the Regional Legislative Assembly (then
called the Sangguniang Pampook).34
Secondly, the fact that our previous decision was based on a slim vote of 8-
7 does not, and cannot, have the effect of making our ruling any less
effective or binding. Regardless of how close the voting is, so long as there
is concurrence of the majority of the members of the en banc who actually
took part in the deliberations of the case,37 a decision garnering only 8
votes out of 15 members is still a decision of the Supreme Court en banc
and must be respected as such. The petitioners are, therefore, not in any
position to speculate that, based on the voting, "the probability exists that
their motion for reconsideration may be granted."38
Similarly, the petitioner in G.R. No. 197282, in his Very Urgent Motion to
Issue Clarificatory Resolution, argues that since motions for
reconsideration were filed by the aggrieved parties challenging our October
18, 2011 decision in the present case, the TRO we initially issued on
September 13, 2011 should remain subsisting and effective. He further
argues that any attempt by the Executive to implement our October 18,
2011 decision pending resolution of the motions for reconsideration
"borders on disrespect if not outright insolence"39 to this Court.
We agree with the petitioner that the lifting of a TRO can be included as a
subject of a motion for reconsideration filed to assail our decision. It does
not follow, however, that the TRO remains effective until after we have
issued a final and executory decision, especially considering the clear
wording of the dispositive portion of our October 18, 2011 decision, which
states:
Conclusion
As a final point, we wish to address the bleak picture that the petitioner in
G.R. No. 197282 presents in his motion, that our Decision has virtually
given the President the power and authority to appoint 672,416 OICs in the
event that the elections of barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan officials
are postponed or cancelled.
This argument fails to take into consideration the unique factual and legal
circumstances which led to the enactment of RA No. 10153. RA No. 10153
was passed in order to synchronize the ARMM elections with the national
and local elections. In the course of synchronizing the ARMM elections with
the national and local elections, Congress had to grant the President the
power to appoint OICs in the ARMM, in light of the fact that: (a) holdover by
the incumbent ARMM elective officials is legally impermissible; and (b)
Congress cannot call for special elections and shorten the terms of elective
local officials for less than three years.
Unlike local officials, as the Constitution does not prescribe a term limit for
barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan officials, there is no legal
proscription which prevents these specific government officials from
continuing in a holdover capacity should some exigency require the
postponement of barangay or Sangguniang Kabataan elections. Clearly,
these fears have neither legal nor factual basis to stand on.
SO ORDERED.
I. THE FACTS
Pursuant to RA No. 9333, the next ARMM regional elections should have
been held on August 8, 2011. COMELEC had begun preparations for these
elections and had accepted certificates of candidacies for the various
regional offices to be elected. But on June 30, 2011, RA No. 10153 was
enacted, resetting the next ARMM regular elections to May 2013 to
coincide with the regular national and local elections of the country.
In these consolidated petitions filed directly with the Supreme Court, the
petitioners assailed the constitutionality of RA No. 10153.
While the Constitution does not expressly state that Congress has to
synchronize national and local elections, the clear intent towards this
objective can be gleaned from the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of
the Constitution, which show the extent to which the Constitutional
Commission, by deliberately making adjustments to the terms of the
incumbent officials, sought to attain synchronization of elections. The
Constitutional Commission exchanges, read with the provisions of the
Transitory Provisions of the Constitution, all serve as patent indicators of
the constitutional mandate to hold synchronized national and local
elections, starting the second Monday of May 1992 and for all the following
elections.
Thus, it is clear from the foregoing that the 1987 Constitution mandates the
synchronization of elections, including the ARMM elections.
2. NO, the passage of RA No. 10153 DOES NOT violate the three-
readings-on-separate-days requirement in Section 26(2), Article VI of the
1987 Constitution.
The general rule that before bills passed by either the House or the Senate
can become laws they must pass through three readings on separate days,
is subject to the EXCEPTION when the President certifies to the necessity
of the bills immediate enactment. The Court, in Tolentino v. Secretary of
Finance, explained the effect of the Presidents certification of necessity in
the following manner:
In the present case, the records show that the President wrote to the
Speaker of the House of Representatives to certify the necessity of the
immediate enactment of a law synchronizing the ARMM elections with the
national and local elections. Following our Tolentino ruling, the Presidents
certification exempted both the House and the Senate from having to
comply with the three separate readings requirement.
3. YES, the grant [to the President] of the power to appoint OICs in the
ARMM is constitutional
[During the oral arguments, the Court identified the three options open to
Congress in order to resolve the problem on who should sit as ARMM
officials in the interim [in order to achieve synchronization in the 2013
elections]: (1) allow the [incumbent] elective officials in the ARMM to
remain in office in a hold over capacity until those elected in the
synchronized elections assume office; (2) hold special elections in the
ARMM, with the terms of those elected to expire when those elected in the
[2013] synchronized elections assume office; or (3) authorize the President
to appoint OICs, [their respective terms to last also until those elected in
the 2013 synchronized elections assume office.]
We rule out the [hold over] option since it violates Section 8, Article X of the
Constitution. This provision states:
Since elective ARMM officials are local officials, they are covered and
bound by the three-year term limit prescribed by the Constitution; they
cannot extend their term through a holdover. xxx.
Congress, in passing RA No. 10153, made it explicitly clear that it had the
intention of suppressing the holdover rule that prevailed under RA No. 9054
by completely removing this provision. The deletion is a policy decision that
is wholly within the discretion of Congress to make in the exercise of its
plenary legislative powers; this Court cannot pass upon questions of
wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation, except where an attendant
unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion results.
After Congress has so acted, neither the Executive nor the Judiciary can
act to the contrary by ordering special elections instead at the call of the
COMELEC. This Court, particularly, cannot make this call without thereby
supplanting the legislative decision and effectively legislating. To be sure,
the Court is not without the power to declare an act of Congress null and
void for being unconstitutional or for having been exercised in grave abuse
of discretion. But our power rests on very narrow ground and is merely to
annul a contravening act of Congress; it is not to supplant the decision of
Congress nor to mandate what Congress itself should have done in the
exercise of its legislative powers.
Thus, in the same way that the term of elective ARMM officials cannot be
extended through a holdover, the term cannot be shortened by putting an
expiration date earlier than the three (3) years that the Constitution itself
commands. This is what will happen a term of less than two years if a
call for special elections shall prevail. In sum, while synchronization is
achieved, the result is at the cost of a violation of an express provision of
the Constitution.
3.3. 3rd option: Grant to the President of the power to appoint ARMM
OICs in the interim is valid.
Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive
departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls or officers
of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other
officers whose appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall
also appoint all other officers of the Government whose appointments are
not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized
by law to appoint. The Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other
officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of
departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. [emphasis ours]
This provision classifies into four groups the officers that the President can
appoint. These are:
After fully examining the issue, we hold that this alleged constitutional
problem is more apparent than real and becomes very real only if RA No.
10153 were to be mistakenly read as a law that changes the elective and
representative character of ARMM positions. RA No. 10153, however,
does not in any way amend what the organic law of the ARMM (RA No.
9054) sets outs in terms of structure of governance. What RA No. 10153 in
fact only does is to appoint officers-in-charge for the Office of the Regional
Governor, Regional Vice Governor and Members of the Regional
Legislative Assembly who shall perform the functions pertaining to the said
offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall have
qualified and assumed office. This power is far different from appointing
elective ARMM officials for the abbreviated term ending on the assumption
to office of the officials elected in the May 2013 elections.
[T]he legal reality is that RA No. 10153 did not amend RA No. 9054. RA
No. 10153, in fact, provides only for synchronization of elections and for the
interim measures that must in the meanwhile prevail. And this is how RA
No. 10153 should be read in the manner it was written and based on its
unambiguous facial terms. Aside from its order for synchronization, it is
purely and simply an interim measure responding to the adjustments that
the synchronization requires.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Arguing mainly (1) that the WTO requires the Philippines "to place nationals
and products of member-countries on the same footing as Filipinos and
local products" and (2) that the WTO "intrudes, limits and/or impairs" the
constitutional powers of both Congress and the Supreme Court, the instant
petition before this Court assails the WTO Agreement for violating the
mandate of the 1987 Constitution to "develop a self-reliant and
independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos . . . (to)
give preference to qualified Filipinos (and to) promote the preferential use
of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced goods."
The Facts
ANNEX 1
ANNEX 2
ANNEX 3
On the other hand, the Final Act signed by Secretary Navarro embodies not
only the WTO Agreement (and its integral annexes aforementioned) but
also (1) the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions and (2) the
Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services. In his Memorandum
dated May 13, 1996, 8 the Solicitor General describes these two latter
documents as follows:
On December 29, 1994, the present petition was filed. After careful
deliberation on respondents' comment and petitioners' reply thereto, the
Court resolved on December 12, 1995, to give due course to the petition,
and the parties thereafter filed their respective memoranda. The court also
requested the Honorable Lilia R. Bautista, the Philippine Ambassador to
the United Nations stationed in Geneva, Switzerland, to submit a paper,
hereafter referred to as "Bautista Paper," 9 for brevity, (1) providing a
historical background of and (2) summarizing the said agreements.
During the Oral Argument held on August 27, 1996, the Court directed:
(a) the petitioners to submit the (1) Senate Committee Report on the
matter in controversy and (2) the transcript of proceedings/hearings in the
Senate; and
(b) the Solicitor General, as counsel for respondents, to file (1) a list of
Philippine treaties signed prior to the Philippine adherence to the WTO
Agreement, which derogate from Philippine sovereignty and (2) copies of
the multi-volume WTO Agreement and other documents mentioned in the
Final Act, as soon as possible.
After receipt of the foregoing documents, the Court said it would consider
the case submitted for resolution. In a Compliance dated September 16,
1996, the Solicitor General submitted a printed copy of the 36-volume
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, and in another
Compliance dated October 24, 1996, he listed the various "bilateral or
multilateral treaties or international instruments involving derogation of
Philippine sovereignty." Petitioners, on the other hand, submitted their
Compliance dated January 28, 1997, on January 30, 1997.
The Issues
By raising and arguing only four issues against the seven presented by
petitioners, the Solicitor General has effectively ignored three, namely: (1)
whether the petition presents a political question or is otherwise not
justiciable; (2) whether petitioner-members of the Senate (Wigberto E.
Taada and Anna Dominique Coseteng) are estopped from joining this suit;
and (3) whether the respondent-members of the Senate acted in grave
abuse of discretion when they voted for concurrence in the ratification of
the WTO Agreement. The foregoing notwithstanding, this Court resolved to
deal with these three issues thus:
(1) The "political question" issue being very fundamental and vital,
and being a matter that probes into the very jurisdiction of this Court to hear
and decide this case was deliberated upon by the Court and will thus be
ruled upon as the first issue;
(2) The matter of estoppel will not be taken up because this defense is
waivable and the respondents have effectively waived it by not pursuing it
in any of their pleadings; in any event, this issue, even if ruled in
respondents' favor, will not cause the petition's dismissal as there are
petitioners other than the two senators, who are not vulnerable to the
defense of estoppel; and
(3) The issue of alleged grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
respondent senators will be taken up as an integral part of the disposition
of the four issues raised by the Solicitor General.
During its deliberations on the case, the Court noted that the respondents
did not question the locus standi of petitioners. Hence, they are also
deemed to have waived the benefit of such issue. They probably realized
that grave constitutional issues, expenditures of public funds and serious
international commitments of the nation are involved here, and that
transcendental public interest requires that the substantive issues be met
head on and decided on the merits, rather than skirted or deflected by
procedural matters. 11
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the government.
The foregoing text emphasizes the judicial department's duty and power to
strike down grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of government including Congress. It is an innovation in our
political law. 16 As explained by former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion,
17 "the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question of whether or not a
branch of government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or
in excess of jurisdiction or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of
discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial
power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature."
We should stress that, in deciding to take jurisdiction over this petition, this
Court will not review the wisdom of the decision of the President and the
Senate in enlisting the country into the WTO, or pass upon the merits of
trade liberalization as a policy espoused by said international body. Neither
will it rule on the propriety of the government's economic policy of
reducing/removing tariffs, taxes, subsidies, quantitative restrictions, and
other import/trade barriers. Rather, it will only exercise its constitutional
duty "to determine whether or not there had been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the part of the
Senate in ratifying the WTO Agreement and its three annexes.
This is the lis mota, the main issue, raised by the petition.
Petitioners vigorously argue that the "letter, spirit and intent" of the
Constitution mandating "economic nationalism" are violated by the so-
called "parity provisions" and "national treatment" clauses scattered in
various parts not only of the WTO Agreement and its annexes but also in
the Ministerial Decisions and Declarations and in the Understanding on
Commitments in Financial Services.
Article II
DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES
AND STATE POLICIES
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 19. The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national
economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.
Article XII
Sec. 10. . . . The Congress shall enact measures that will encourage the
formation and operation of enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by
Filipinos.
Sec. 12. The State shall promote the preferential use of Filipino labor,
domestic materials and locally produced goods, and adopt measures that
help make them competitive.
Article 2
ANNEX
Illustrative List
The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the
territory of any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less
favorable than that accorded to like products of national origin in respect of
laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for
sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use, the provisions of this
paragraph shall not prevent the application of differential internal
transportation charges which are based exclusively on the economic
operation of the means of transport and not on the nationality of the
product." (Article III, GATT 1947, as amended by the Protocol Modifying
Part II, and Article XXVI of GATT, 14 September 1948, 62 UMTS 82-84 in
relation to paragraph 1(a) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
1994, Vol. 1, Uruguay Round, Legal Instruments p. 177, emphasis
supplied).
National Treatment
On the other hand, respondents through the Solicitor General counter (1)
that such Charter provisions are not self-executing and merely set out
general policies; (2) that these nationalistic portions of the Constitution
invoked by petitioners should not be read in isolation but should be related
to other relevant provisions of Art. XII, particularly Secs. 1 and 13 thereof;
(3) that read properly, the cited WTO clauses do not conflict with
Constitution; and (4) that the WTO Agreement contains sufficient provisions
to protect developing countries like the Philippines from the harshness of
sudden trade liberalization.
In the same light, we held in Basco vs. Pagcor 25 that broad constitutional
principles need legislative enactments to implement the, thus:
My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the trial court, show a
more specific legal right a right cast in language of a significantly lower
order of generality than Article II (15) of the Constitution that is or may
be violated by the actions, or failures to act, imputed to the public
respondent by petitioners so that the trial court can validly render judgment
grating all or part of the relief prayed for. To my mind, the court should be
understood as simply saying that such a more specific legal right or rights
may well exist in our corpus of law, considering the general policy
principles found in the Constitution and the existence of the Philippine
Environment Code, and that the trial court should have given petitioners an
effective opportunity so to demonstrate, instead of aborting the proceedings
on a motion to dismiss.
Sec. 1. ...
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government. (Emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, Secs. 10 and 12 of Article XII, apart from merely laying
down general principles relating to the national economy and patrimony,
should be read and understood in relation to the other sections in said
article, especially Secs. 1 and 13 thereof which read:
In the pursuit of these goals, all sectors of the economy and all regions of
the country shall be given optimum opportunity to develop. . . .
Sec. 13. The State shall pursue a trade policy that serves the general
welfare and utilizes all forms and arrangements of exchange on the basis
of equality and reciprocity.
As pointed out by the Solicitor General, Sec. 1 lays down the basic goals of
national economic development, as follows:
3. An expanding productivity as the key to raising the quality of life for all
especially the underprivileged.
With these goals in context, the Constitution then ordains the ideals of
economic nationalism (1) by expressing preference in favor of qualified
Filipinos "in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the
national economy and patrimony" 27 and in the use of "Filipino labor,
domestic materials and locally-produced goods"; (2) by mandating the
State to "adopt measures that help make them competitive; 28 and (3) by
requiring the State to "develop a self-reliant and independent national
economy effectively controlled by Filipinos." 29 In similar language, the
Constitution takes into account the realities of the outside world as it
requires the pursuit of "a trade policy that serves the general welfare and
utilizes all forms and arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality ad
reciprocity"; 30 and speaks of industries "which are competitive in both
domestic and foreign markets" as well as of the protection of "Filipino
enterprises against unfair foreign competition and trade practices."
It is true that in the recent case of Manila Prince Hotel vs. Government
Service Insurance System, et al., 31 this Court held that "Sec. 10, second
par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a mandatory, positive command
which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or
implementing laws or rule for its enforcement. From its very words the
provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per se
judicially enforceable." However, as the constitutional provision itself states,
it is enforceable only in regard to "the grants of rights, privileges and
concessions covering national economy and patrimony" and not to every
aspect of trade and commerce. It refers to exceptions rather than the rule.
The issue here is not whether this paragraph of Sec. 10 of Art. XII is self-
executing or not. Rather, the issue is whether, as a rule, there are enough
balancing provisions in the Constitution to allow the Senate to ratify the
Philippine concurrence in the WTO Agreement. And we hold that there are.
All told, while the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino
goods, services, labor and enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the
need for business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of
equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only
against foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair. 32 In other
words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist policy. It did
not shut out foreign investments, goods and services in the development of
the Philippine economy. While the Constitution does not encourage the
unlimited entry of foreign goods, services and investments into the country,
it does not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an exchange on the basis
of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition that is
unfair.
Upon the other hand, respondents maintain that the WTO itself has some
built-in advantages to protect weak and developing economies, which
comprise the vast majority of its members. Unlike in the UN where major
states have permanent seats and veto powers in the Security Council, in
the WTO, decisions are made on the basis of sovereign equality, with each
member's vote equal in weight to that of any other. There is no WTO
equivalent of the UN Security Council.
Hence, poor countries can protect their common interests more effectively
through the WTO than through one-on-one negotiations with developed
countries. Within the WTO, developing countries can form powerful blocs to
push their economic agenda more decisively than outside the Organization.
This is not merely a matter of practical alliances but a negotiating strategy
rooted in law. Thus, the basic principles underlying the WTO Agreement
recognize the need of developing countries like the Philippines to "share in
the growth in international trade commensurate with the needs of their
economic development." These basic principles are found in the preamble
34 of the WTO Agreement as follows:
Moreover, GATT itself has provided built-in protection from unfair foreign
competition and trade practices including anti-dumping measures,
countervailing measures and safeguards against import surges. Where
local businesses are jeopardized by unfair foreign competition, the
Philippines can avail of these measures. There is hardly therefore any
basis for the statement that under the WTO, local industries and
enterprises will all be wiped out and that Filipinos will be deprived of control
of the economy. Quite the contrary, the weaker situations of developing
nations like the Philippines have been taken into account; thus, there would
be no basis to say that in joining the WTO, the respondents have gravely
abused their discretion. True, they have made a bold decision to steer the
ship of state into the yet uncharted sea of economic liberalization. But such
decision cannot be set aside on the ground of grave abuse of discretion,
simply because we disagree with it or simply because we believe only in
other economic policies. As earlier stated, the Court in taking jurisdiction of
this case will not pass upon the advantages and disadvantages of trade
liberalization as an economic policy. It will only perform its constitutional
duty of determining whether the Senate committed grave abuse of
discretion.
The Constitution has not really shown any unbalanced bias in favor of any
business or enterprise, nor does it contain any specific pronouncement that
Filipino companies should be pampered with a total proscription of foreign
competition. On the other hand, respondents claim that WTO/GATT aims to
make available to the Filipino consumer the best goods and services
obtainable anywhere in the world at the most reasonable prices.
Consequently, the question boils down to whether WTO/GATT will favor
the general welfare of the public at large.
Will adherence to the WTO treaty bring this ideal (of favoring the general
welfare) to reality?
No doubt, the WTO Agreement was not yet in existence when the
Constitution was drafted and ratified in 1987. That does not mean however
that the Charter is necessarily flawed in the sense that its framers might not
have anticipated the advent of a borderless world of business. By the same
token, the United Nations was not yet in existence when the 1935
Constitution became effective. Did that necessarily mean that the then
Constitution might not have contemplated a diminution of the absoluteness
of sovereignty when the Philippines signed the UN Charter, thereby
effectively surrendering part of its control over its foreign relations to the
decisions of various UN organs like the Security Council?
The Constitution must be quintessential rather than superficial, the root and
not the blossom, the base and frame-work only of the edifice that is yet to
rise. It is but the core of the dream that must take shape, not in a twinkling
by mandate of our delegates, but slowly "in the crucible of Filipino minds
and hearts," where it will in time develop its sinews and gradually gather its
strength and finally achieve its substance. In fine, the Constitution cannot,
like the goddess Athena, rise full-grown from the brow of the Constitutional
Convention, nor can it conjure by mere fiat an instant Utopia. It must grow
with the society it seeks to re-structure and march apace with the progress
of the race, drawing from the vicissitudes of history the dynamism and
vitality that will keep it, far from becoming a petrified rule, a pulsing, living
law attuned to the heartbeat of the nation.
The WTO Agreement provides that "(e)ach Member shall ensure the
conformity of its laws, regulations and administrative procedures with its
obligations as provided in the annexed Agreements." 39 Petitioners
maintain that this undertaking "unduly limits, restricts and impairs Philippine
sovereignty, specifically the legislative power which under Sec. 2, Article VI
of the 1987 Philippine Constitution is vested in the Congress of the
Philippines. It is an assault on the sovereign powers of the Philippines
because this means that Congress could not pass legislation that will be
good for our national interest and general welfare if such legislation will not
conform with the WTO Agreement, which not only relates to the trade in
goods . . . but also to the flow of investments and money . . . as well as to a
whole slew of agreements on socio-cultural matters . . . 40
More specifically, petitioners claim that said WTO proviso derogates from
the power to tax, which is lodged in the Congress. 41 And while the
Constitution allows Congress to authorize the President to fix tariff rates,
import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or
imposts, such authority is subject to "specified limits and . . . such
limitations and restrictions" as Congress may provide, 42 as in fact it did
under Sec. 401 of the Tariff and Customs Code.
Sovereignty Limited by
International Law and Treaties
This Court notes and appreciates the ferocity and passion by which
petitioners stressed their arguments on this issue. However, while
sovereignty has traditionally been deemed absolute and all-encompassing
on the domestic level, it is however subject to restrictions and limitations
voluntarily agreed to by the Philippines, expressly or impliedly, as a
member of the family of nations. Unquestionably, the Constitution did not
envision a hermit-type isolation of the country from the rest of the world. In
its Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the Constitution "adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the
land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom,
cooperation and amity, with all nations." 43 By the doctrine of incorporation,
the country is bound by generally accepted principles of international law,
which are considered to be automatically part of our own laws. 44 One of
the oldest and most fundamental rules in international law is pacta sunt
servanda international agreements must be performed in good faith. "A
treaty engagement is not a mere moral obligation but creates a legally
binding obligation on the parties . . . A state which has contracted valid
international obligations is bound to make in its legislations such
modifications as may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the
obligations undertaken." 45
Thus, when the Philippines joined the United Nations as one of its 51
charter members, it consented to restrict its sovereign rights under the
"concept of sovereignty as auto-limitation." 47-A Under Article 2 of the UN
Charter, "(a)ll members shall give the United Nations every assistance in
any action it takes in accordance with the present Charter, and shall refrain
from giving assistance to any state against which the United Nations is
taking preventive or enforcement action." Such assistance includes
payment of its corresponding share not merely in administrative expenses
but also in expenditures for the peace-keeping operations of the
organization. In its advisory opinion of July 20, 1961, the International Court
of Justice held that money used by the United Nations Emergency Force in
the Middle East and in the Congo were "expenses of the United Nations"
under Article 17, paragraph 2, of the UN Charter. Hence, all its members
must bear their corresponding share in such expenses. In this sense, the
Philippine Congress is restricted in its power to appropriate. It is compelled
to appropriate funds whether it agrees with such peace-keeping expenses
or not. So too, under Article 105 of the said Charter, the UN and its
representatives enjoy diplomatic privileges and immunities, thereby limiting
again the exercise of sovereignty of members within their own territory.
Another example: although "sovereign equality" and "domestic jurisdiction"
of all members are set forth as underlying principles in the UN Charter,
such provisos are however subject to enforcement measures decided by
the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and
security under Chapter VII of the Charter. A final example: under Article
103, "(i)n the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of
the United Nations under the present Charter and their obligations under
any other international agreement, their obligation under the present
charter shall prevail," thus unquestionably denying the Philippines as a
member the sovereign power to make a choice as to which of conflicting
obligations, if any, to honor.
Apart from the UN Treaty, the Philippines has entered into many other
international pacts both bilateral and multilateral that involve
limitations on Philippine sovereignty. These are enumerated by the Solicitor
General in his Compliance dated October 24, 1996, as follows:
(b) Bilateral agreement with Belgium, providing, among others, for the
avoidance of double taxation with respect to taxes on income.
(c) Bilateral convention with the Kingdom of Sweden for the avoidance of
double taxation.
(d) Bilateral convention with the French Republic for the avoidance of
double taxation.
(e) Bilateral air transport agreement with Korea where the Philippines
agreed to exempt from all customs duties, inspection fees and other duties
or taxes aircrafts of South Korea and the regular equipment, spare parts
and supplies arriving with said aircrafts.
(f) Bilateral air service agreement with Japan, where the Philippines
agreed to exempt from customs duties, excise taxes, inspection fees and
other similar duties, taxes or charges fuel, lubricating oils, spare parts,
regular equipment, stores on board Japanese aircrafts while on Philippine
soil.
(g) Bilateral air service agreement with Belgium where the Philippines
granted Belgian air carriers the same privileges as those granted to
Japanese and Korean air carriers under separate air service agreements.
(h) Bilateral notes with Israel for the abolition of transit and visitor visas
where the Philippines exempted Israeli nationals from the requirement of
obtaining transit or visitor visas for a sojourn in the Philippines not
exceeding 59 days.
(i) Bilateral agreement with France exempting French nationals from the
requirement of obtaining transit and visitor visa for a sojourn not exceeding
59 days.
In the foregoing treaties, the Philippines has effectively agreed to limit the
exercise of its sovereign powers of taxation, eminent domain and police
power. The underlying consideration in this partial surrender of sovereignty
is the reciprocal commitment of the other contracting states in granting the
same privilege and immunities to the Philippines, its officials and its
citizens. The same reciprocity characterizes the Philippine commitments
under WTO-GATT.
Article 34
(b) if there is a substantial likelihood that the identical product was made
by the process and the owner of the patent has been unable through
reasonable efforts to determine the process actually used.
The foregoing notwithstanding, the patent owner still has the "burden of
proof" since, regardless of the presumption provided under paragraph 1 of
Article 34, such owner still has to introduce evidence of the existence of the
alleged identical product, the fact that it is "identical" to the genuine one
produced by the patented process and the fact of "newness" of the genuine
product or the fact of "substantial likelihood" that the identical product was
made by the patented process.
Petitioners allege that the Senate concurrence in the WTO Agreement and
its annexes but not in the other documents referred to in the Final Act,
namely the Ministerial Declaration and Decisions and the Understanding on
Commitments in Financial Services is defective and insufficient and thus
constitutes abuse of discretion. They submit that such concurrence in the
WTO Agreement alone is flawed because it is in effect a rejection of the
Final Act, which in turn was the document signed by Secretary Navarro, in
representation of the Republic upon authority of the President. They
contend that the second letter of the President to the Senate 53 which
enumerated what constitutes the Final Act should have been the subject of
concurrence of the Senate.
On the other hand, the WTO Agreement itself expresses what multilateral
agreements are deemed included as its integral parts, 58 as follows:
Article II
1. The WTO shall provide the common institutional frame-work for the
conduct of trade relations among its Members in matters to the agreements
and associated legal instruments included in the Annexes to this
Agreement.
MR. ROMULO: Mr. Chairman, to make sure that it is clear cut and there
should be no misunderstanding, it was his intention to clarify all matters by
giving this letter.
Can this Committee hear from Senator Taada and later on Senator
Tolentino since they were the ones that raised this question yesterday?
Based on what Secretary Romulo has read, it would now clearly appear
that what is being submitted to the Senate for ratification is not the Final Act
of the Uruguay Round, but rather the Agreement on the World Trade
Organization as well as the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions, and the
Understanding and Commitments in Financial Services.
THE CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Taada. Can we hear from Senator
Tolentino? And after him Senator Neptali Gonzales and Senator Lina.
SEN. TOLENTINO, Mr. Chairman, I have not seen the new submission
actually transmitted to us but I saw the draft of his earlier, and I think it now
complies with the provisions of the Constitution, and with the Final Act itself
. The Constitution does not require us to ratify the Final Act. It requires us
to ratify the Agreement which is now being submitted. The Final Act itself
specifies what is going to be submitted to with the governments of the
participants.
By signing the present Final Act, the representatives agree: (a) to submit as
appropriate the WTO Agreement for the consideration of the respective
competent authorities with a view to seeking approval of the Agreement in
accordance with their procedures.
In other words, it is not the Final Act that was agreed to be submitted to the
governments for ratification or acceptance as whatever their constitutional
procedures may provide but it is the World Trade Organization Agreement.
And if that is the one that is being submitted now, I think it satisfies both the
Constitution and the Final Act itself .
Epilogue
In rendering this Decision, this Court never forgets that the Senate, whose
act is under review, is one of two sovereign houses of Congress and is thus
entitled to great respect in its actions. It is itself a constitutional body
independent and coordinate, and thus its actions are presumed regular and
done in good faith. Unless convincing proof and persuasive arguments are
presented to overthrow such presumptions, this Court will resolve every
doubt in its favor. Using the foregoing well-accepted definition of grave
abuse of discretion and the presumption of regularity in the Senate's
processes, this Court cannot find any cogent reason to impute grave abuse
of discretion to the Senate's exercise of its power of concurrence in the
WTO Agreement granted it by Sec. 21 of Article VII of the Constitution. 64
The eminent futurist John Naisbitt, author of the best seller Megatrends,
predicts an Asian Renaissance 65 where "the East will become the
dominant region of the world economically, politically and culturally in the
next century." He refers to the "free market" espoused by WTO as the
"catalyst" in this coming Asian ascendancy. There are at present about 31
countries including China, Russia and Saudi Arabia negotiating for
membership in the WTO. Notwithstanding objections against possible
limitations on national sovereignty, the WTO remains as the only viable
structure for multilateral trading and the veritable forum for the development
of international trade law. The alternative to WTO is isolation, stagnation, if
not economic self-destruction. Duly enriched with original membership,
keenly aware of the advantages and disadvantages of globalization with its
on-line experience, and endowed with a vision of the future, the Philippines
now straddles the crossroads of an international strategy for economic
prosperity and stability in the new millennium. Let the people, through their
duly authorized elected officers, make their free choice.
SO ORDERED.
Facts:
Petitioners believe that this will be detrimental to the growth of our National
Economy and against to the Filipino First policy. The WTO opens access
to foreign markets, especially its major trading partners, through the
reduction of tariffs on its exports, particularly agricultural and industrial
products. Thus, provides new opportunities for the service sector cost and
uncertainty associated with exporting and more investment in the country.
These are the predicted benefits as reflected in the agreement and as
viewed by the signatory Senators, a free market espoused by WTO.
Discussions:
1987 Constitution states that Judicial power includes the duty of the
courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the government.
Although the Constitution mandates to develop a self-reliant and
independent national economy controlled by Filipinos, does not
necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and
services. It contemplates neither economic seclusion nor
mendicancy in the international community. The WTO itself has
some built-in advantages to protect weak and developing economies,
which comprise the vast majority of its members. Unlike in the UN
where major states have permanent seats and veto powers in the
Security Council, in the WTO, decisions are made on the basis of
sovereign equality, with each members vote equal in weight to that of
any other. Hence, poor countries can protect their common interests
more effectively through the WTO than through one-on-one
negotiations with developed countries. Within the WTO, developing
countries can form powerful blocs to push their economic agenda
more decisively than outside the Organization. Which is not merely a
matter of practical alliances but a negotiating strategy rooted in law.
Thus, the basic principles underlying the WTO Agreement recognize
the need of developing countries like the Philippines to share in the
growth in international trade commensurate with the needs of their
economic development.
In its Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the Constitution
adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part
of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality,
justice, freedom, cooperation and amity, with all nations. By the
doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted
principles of international law, which are considered to be
automatically part of our own laws. A state which has contracted valid
international obligations is bound to make in its legislations such
modifications as may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the
obligations undertaken. Paragraph 1, Article 34 of the General
Provisions and Basic Principles of the Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) may intrudes on the
power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedures. With regard to Infringement of a
design patent, WTO members shall be free to determine the
appropriate method of implementing the provisions of TRIPS within
their own internal systems and processes.
The alleged impairment of sovereignty in the exercise of legislative
and judicial powers is balanced by the adoption of the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land
and the adherence of the Constitution to the policy of cooperation and
amity with all nations. The Senate, after deliberation and voting,
voluntarily and overwhelmingly gave its consent to the WTO
Agreement thereby making it a part of the law of the land is a
legitimate exercise of its sovereign duty and power.
Rulings:
CORTES, J.:
But the armed threats to the Government were not only found in misguided
elements and among rabid followers of Mr. Marcos. There are also the
communist insurgency and the seccessionist movement in Mindanao which
gained ground during the rule of Mr. Marcos, to the extent that the
communists have set up a parallel government of their own on the areas
they effectively control while the separatist are virtually free to move about
in armed bands. There has been no let up on this groups' determination to
wrest power from the govermnent. Not only through resort to arms but also
to through the use of propaganda have they been successful in dreating
chaos and destabilizing the country.
Nor are the woes of the Republic purely political. The accumulated foreign
debt and the plunder of the nation attributed to Mr. Marcos and his cronies
left the economy devastated. The efforts at economic recovery, three years
after Mrs. Aquino assumed office, have yet to show concrete results in
alleviating the poverty of the masses, while the recovery of the ill-gotten
wealth of the Marcoses has remained elusive.
Now, Mr. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the
Philipppines to die. But Mrs. Aquino, considering the dire consequences to
the nation of his return at a time when the stability of government is
threatened from various directions and the economy is just beginning to
rise and move forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of
Mr. Marcos and his family.
The Petition
This case is unique. It should not create a precedent, for the case of a
dictator forced out of office and into exile after causing twenty years of
political, economic and social havoc in the country and who within the short
space of three years seeks to return, is in a class by itself.
This petition for mandamus and prohibition asks the Courts to order the
respondents to issue travel documents to Mr. Marcos and the immediate
members of his family and to enjoin the implementation of the President's
decision to bar their return to the Philippines.
The Issue
According to the petitioners, the resolution of the case would depend on the
resolution of the following issues:
1. Does the President have the power to bar the return of former
President Marcos and family to the Philippines?
2. Assuming that the President has the power to bar former President
Marcos and his family from returning to the Philippines, in the interest of
"national security, public safety or public health
a. Has the President made a finding that the return of former President
Marcos and his family to the Philippines is a clear and present danger to
national security, public safety or public health?
(4) Assuming that notice and hearing may be dispensed with, has the
President's decision, including the grounds upon which it was based, been
made known to petitioners so that they may controvert the same?
The case for petitioners is founded on the assertion that the right of the
Marcoses to return to the Philippines is guaranteed under the following
provisions of the Bill of Rights, to wit:
Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits
prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the
court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of
national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.
The petitioners contend that the President is without power to impair the
liberty of abode of the Marcoses because only a court may do so "within
the limits prescribed by law." Nor may the President impair their right to
travel because no law has authorized her to do so. They advance the view
that before the right to travel may be impaired by any authority or agency of
the government, there must be legislation to that effect.
The petitioners further assert that under international law, the right of Mr.
Marcos and his family to return to the Philippines is guaranteed.
Article 13. (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and
residence within the borders of each state.
(2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to
return to his country.
Article 12
Respondents argue for the primacy of the right of the State to national
security over individual rights. In support thereof, they cite Article II of the
Constitution, to wit:
Section 4. The prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the
people. The Government may call upon the people to defend the State and,
in the fulfillment thereof, all citizens may be required, under conditions
provided by law, to render personal, military, or civil service.
Respondents also point out that the decision to ban Mr. Marcos and family
from returning to the Philippines for reasons of national security and public
safety has international precedents. Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican
Republic, Anastacio Somoza Jr. of Nicaragua, Jorge Ubico of Guatemala,
Fulgencio batista of Cuba, King Farouk of Egypt, Maximiliano Hernandez
Martinez of El Salvador, and Marcos Perez Jimenez of Venezuela were
among the deposed dictators whose return to their homelands was
prevented by their governments. [See Statement of Foreign Affairs
Secretary Raul S. Manglapus, quoted in Memorandum for Respondents,
pp. 26-32; Rollo, pp. 314-319.]
The parties are in agreement that the underlying issue is one of the scope
of presidential power and its limits. We, however, view this issue in a
different light. Although we give due weight to the parties' formulation of the
issues, we are not bound by its narrow confines in arriving at a solution to
the controversy.
At the outset, we must state that it would not do to view the case within the
confines of the right to travel and the import of the decisions of the U.S.
Supreme Court in the leading cases of Kent v. Dulles [357 U.S. 116, 78
SCt 1113, 2 L Ed. 2d 1204] and Haig v. Agee [453 U.S. 280, 101 SCt 2766,
69 L Ed. 2d 640) which affirmed the right to travel and recognized
exceptions to the exercise thereof, respectively.
It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to
travel from the Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines.
These are what the right to travel would normally connote. Essentially, the
right involved is the right to return to one's country, a totally distinct right
under international law, independent from although related to the right to
travel. Thus, the Universal Declaration of Humans Rights and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treat the right to
freedom of movement and abode within the territory of a state, the right to
leave a country, and the right to enter one's country as separate and
distinct rights. The Declaration speaks of the "right to freedom of movement
and residence within the borders of each state" [Art. 13(l)] separately from
the "right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his
country." [Art. 13(2).] On the other hand, the Covenant guarantees the
"right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence" [Art.
12(l)] and the right to "be free to leave any country, including his own." [Art.
12(2)] which rights may be restricted by such laws as "are necessary to
protect national security, public order, public health or morals or enter qqqs
own country" of which one cannot be "arbitrarily deprived." [Art. 12(4).] It
would therefore be inappropriate to construe the limitations to the right to
return to one's country in the same context as those pertaining to the liberty
of abode and the right to travel.
The right to return to one's country is not among the rights specifically
guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which treats only of the liberty of abode
and the right to travel, but it is our well-considered view that the right to
return may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of international
law and, under our Constitution, is part of the law of the land [Art. II, Sec. 2
of the Constitution.] However, it is distinct and separate from the right to
travel and enjoys a different protection under the International Covenant of
Civil and Political Rights, i.e., against being "arbitrarily deprived" thereof
[Art. 12 (4).]
Thus, the rulings in the cases Kent and Haig which refer to the issuance of
passports for the purpose of effectively exercising the right to travel are not
determinative of this case and are only tangentially material insofar as they
relate to a conflict between executive action and the exercise of a protected
right. The issue before the Court is novel and without precedent in
Philippine, and even in American jurisprudence.
Consequently, resolution by the Court of the well-debated issue of whether
or not there can be limitations on the right to travel in the absence of
legislation to that effect is rendered unnecessary. An appropriate case for
its resolution will have to be awaited.
Having clarified the substance of the legal issue, we find now a need to
explain the methodology for its resolution. Our resolution of the issue will
involve a two-tiered approach. We shall first resolve whether or not the
President has the power under the Constitution, to bar the Marcoses from
returning to the Philippines. Then, we shall determine, pursuant to the
express power of the Court under the Constitution in Article VIII, Section 1,
whether or not the President acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when she determined
that the return of the Marcose's to the Philippines poses a serious threat to
national interest and welfare and decided to bar their return.
Executive Power
The 1987 Constitution has fully restored the separation of powers of the
three great branches of government. To recall the words of Justice Laurel
in Angara v. Electoral Commission [63 Phil. 139 (1936)], "the Constitution
has blocked but with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to
the executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the
government." [At 157.1 Thus, the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that
"[the legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines"
Art VI, Sec. 11, "[t]he executive power shall bevested in the President of
the Philippines" [Art. VII, Sec. 11, and "[te judicial power shall be vested in
one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by
law" [Art. VIII, Sec. 1.] These provisions not only establish a separation of
powers by actual division [Angara v. Electoral Commission, supra] but also
confer plenary legislative, executive and judicial powers subject only to
limitations provided in the Constitution. For as the Supreme Court in
Ocampo v. Cabangis [15 Phil. 626 (1910)] pointed out "a grant of the
legislative power means a grant of all legislative power; and a grant of the
judicial power means a grant of all the judicial power which may be
exercised under the government." [At 631-632.1 If this can be said of the
legislative power which is exercised by two chambers with a combined
membership of more than two hundred members and of the judicial power
which is vested in a hierarchy of courts, it can equally be said of the
executive power which is vested in one official the President.
As stated above, the Constitution provides that "[t]he executive power shall
be vested in the President of the Philippines." [Art. VII, Sec. 1]. However, it
does not define what is meant by executive power" although in the same
article it touches on the exercise of certain powers by the President, i.e.,
the power of control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices,
the power to execute the laws, the appointing power, the powers under the
commander-in-chief clause, the power to grant reprieves, commutations
and pardons, the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of
Congress, the power to contract or guarantee foreign loans, the power to
enter into treaties or international agreements, the power to submit the
budget to Congress, and the power to address Congress [Art. VII, Sec. 14-
23].
Reviewing how the powers of the U.S. President were exercised by the
different persons who held the office from Washington to the early 1900's,
and the swing from the presidency by commission to Lincoln's dictatorship,
he concluded that "what the presidency is at any particular moment
depends in important measure on who is President." [At 30.]
We do not say that the presidency is what Mrs. Aquino says it is or what
she does but, rather, that the consideration of tradition and the
development of presidential power under the different constitutions are
essential for a complete understanding of the extent of and limitations to
the President's powers under the 1987 Constitution. The 1935 Constitution
created a strong President with explicitly broader powers than the U.S.
President. The 1973 Constitution attempted to modify the system of
government into the parliamentary type, with the President as a mere
figurehead, but through numerous amendments, the President became
even more powerful, to the point that he was also the de facto Legislature.
The 1987 Constitution, however, brought back the presidential system of
government and restored the separation of legislative, executive and
judicial powers by their actual distribution among three distinct branches of
government with provision for checks and balances.
On these premises, we hold the view that although the 1987 Constitution
imposes limitations on the exercise of specific powers of the President, it
maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope of
"executive power." Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said
to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. In
other words, executive power is more than the sum of specific powers so
enumerated,
It has been advanced that whatever power inherent in the government that
is neither legislative nor judicial has to be executive. Thus, in the landmark
decision of Springer v. Government of the Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189
(1928), on the issue of who between the Governor-General of the
Philippines and the Legislature may vote the shares of stock held by the
Government to elect directors in the National Coal Company and the
Philippine National Bank, the U.S. Supreme Court, in upholding the power
of the Governor-General to do so, said:
We are not unmindful of Justice Holmes' strong dissent. But in his enduring
words of dissent we find reinforcement for the view that it would indeed be
a folly to construe the powers of a branch of government to embrace only
what are specifically mentioned in the Constitution:
The great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and divide fields
of black and white. Even the more specific of them are found to terminate in
a penumbra shading gradually from one extreme to the other. ....
It does not seem to need argument to show that however we may disguise
it by veiling words we do not and cannot carry out the distinction between
legislative and executive action with mathematical precision and divide the
branches into watertight compartments, were it ever so desirable to do so,
which I am far from believing that it is, or that the Constitution requires. [At
210- 211.]
The Constitution declares among the guiding principles that "[t]he prime
duty of theGovernment is to serve and protect the people" and that "[t]he
maintenance of peace and order,the protection of life, liberty, and property,
and the promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by
all the people of the blessings of democracy." [Art. II, Secs. 4 and 5.]
Faced with the problem of whether or not the time is right to allow the
Marcoses to return to the Philippines, the President is, under the
Constitution, constrained to consider these basic principles in arriving at a
decision. More than that, having sworn to defend and uphold the
Constitution, the President has the obligation under the Constitution to
protect the people, promote their welfare and advance the national interest.
It must be borne in mind that the Constitution, aside from being an
allocation of power is also a social contract whereby the people have
surrendered their sovereign powers to the State for the common good.
Hence, lest the officers of the Government exercising the powers delegated
by the people forget and the servants of the people become rulers, the
Constitution reminds everyone that "[s]overeignty resides in the people and
all government authority emanates from them." [Art. II, Sec. 1.]
The resolution of the problem is made difficult because the persons who
seek to return to the country are the deposed dictator and his family at
whose door the travails of the country are laid and from whom billions of
dollars believed to be ill-gotten wealth are sought to be recovered. The
constitutional guarantees they invoke are neither absolute nor inflexible.
For the exercise of even the preferred freedoms of speech and
ofexpression, although couched in absolute terms, admits of limits and
must be adjusted to the requirements of equally important public interests
[Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 79690-707, October 7, 1981.]
To the President, the problem is one of balancing the general welfare and
the common good against the exercise of rights of certain individuals. The
power involved is the President's residual power to protect the general
welfare of the people. It is founded on the duty of the President, as steward
of the people. To paraphrase Theodore Roosevelt, it is not only the power
of the President but also his duty to do anything not forbidden by the
Constitution or the laws that the needs of the nation demand [See Corwin,
supra, at 153]. It is a power borne by the President's duty to preserve and
defend the Constitution. It also may be viewed as a power implicit in the
President's duty to take care that the laws are faithfully executed [see
Hyman, The American President, where the author advances the view that
an allowance of discretionary power is unavoidable in any government and
is best lodged in the President].
More particularly, this case calls for the exercise of the President's powers
as protector of the peace. Rossiter The American Presidency].The power of
the President to keep the peace is not limited merely to exercising the
commander-in-chief powers in times of emergency or to leading the State
against external and internal threats to its existence. The President is not
only clothed with extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but is also
tasked with attending to the day-to-day problems of maintaining peace and
order and ensuring domestic tranquility in times when no foreign foe
appears on the horizon. Wide discretion, within the bounds of law, in
fulfilling presidential duties in times of peace is not in any way diminished
by the relative want of an emergency specified in the commander-in-chief
provision. For in making the President commander-in-chief the enumeration
of powers that follow cannot be said to exclude the President's exercising
as Commander-in- Chief powers short of the calling of the armed forces, or
suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or declaring martial
law, in order to keep the peace, and maintain public order and security.
That the President has the power under the Constitution to bar the
Marcose's from returning has been recognized by memembers of the
Legislature, and is manifested by the Resolution proposed in the House of
Representatives and signed by 103 of its members urging the President to
allow Mr. Marcos to return to the Philippines "as a genuine unselfish
gesture for true national reconciliation and as irrevocable proof of our
collective adherence to uncompromising respect for human rights under the
Constitution and our laws." [House Resolution No. 1342, Rollo, p. 321.1
The Resolution does not question the President's power to bar the
Marcoses from returning to the Philippines, rather, it appeals to the
President's sense of compassion to allow a man to come home to die in his
country.
What we are saying in effect is that the request or demand of the Marcoses
to be allowed to return to the Philippines cannot be considered in the light
solely of the constitutional provisions guaranteeing liberty of abode and the
right to travel, subject to certain exceptions, or of case law which clearly
never contemplated situations even remotely similar to the present one. It
must be treated as a matter that is appropriately addressed to those
residual unstated powers of the President which are implicit in and
correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office to safeguard and
protect general welfare. In that context, such request or demand should
submit to the exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the President to
determine whether it must be granted or denied.
The present Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine and
broadens the scope of judicial inquiry into areas which the Court, under
previous constitutions, would have normally left to the political departments
to decide. But nonetheless there remain issues beyond the Court's
jurisdiction the determination of which is exclusively for the President, for
Congress or for the people themselves through a plebiscite or referendum.
We cannot, for example, question the President's recognition of a foreign
government, no matter how premature or improvident such action may
appear. We cannot set aside a presidential pardon though it may appear to
us that the beneficiary is totally undeserving of the grant. Nor can we
amend the Constitution under the guise of resolving a dispute brought
before us because the power is reserved to the people.
Article VII of the [1935] Constitution vests in the Executive the power to
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under specified
conditions. Pursuant to the principle of separation of powers underlying our
system of government, the Executive is supreme within his own sphere.
However, the separation of powers, under the Constitution, is not absolute.
What is more, it goes hand in hand with the system of checks and
balances, under which the Executive is supreme, as regards the
suspension of the privilege, but only if and when he acts within the sphere
alloted to him by the Basic Law, and the authority to determine whether or
not he has so acted is vested in the Judicial Department, which, in this
respect, is, in turn, constitutionally supreme. In the exercise of such
authority, the function of the Court is merely to check not to supplant the
Executive, or to ascertain merely whether he has gone beyond the
constitutional limits of his jurisdiction, not to exercise the power vested in
him or to determine the wisdom of his act [At 479-480.]
Accordingly, the question for the Court to determine is whether or not there
exist factual bases for the President to conclude that it was in the national
interest to bar the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines. If such
postulates do exist, it cannot be said that she has acted, or acts, arbitrarily
or that she has gravely abused her discretion in deciding to bar their return.
We find that from the pleadings filed by the parties, from their oral
arguments, and the facts revealed during the briefing in chambers by the
Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the National
Security Adviser, wherein petitioners and respondents were represented,
there exist factual bases for the President's decision..
The Court cannot close its eyes to present realities and pretend that the
country is not besieged from within by a well-organized communist
insurgency, a separatist movement in Mindanao, rightist conspiracies to
grab power, urban terrorism, the murder with impunity of military men,
police officers and civilian officials, to mention only a few. The documented
history of the efforts of the Marcose's and their followers to destabilize the
country, as earlier narrated in this ponencia bolsters the conclusion that the
return of the Marcoses at this time would only exacerbate and intensify the
violence directed against the State and instigate more chaos.
It will not do to argue that if the return of the Marcoses to the Philippines
will cause the escalation of violence against the State, that would be the
time for the President to step in and exercise the commander-in-chief
powers granted her by the Constitution to suppress or stamp out such
violence. The State, acting through the Government, is not precluded from
taking pre- emptive action against threats to its existence if, though still
nascent they are perceived as apt to become serious and direct. Protection
of the people is the essence of the duty of government. The preservation of
the State the fruition of the people's sovereignty is an obligation in the
highest order. The President, sworn to preserve and defend the
Constitution and to see the faithful execution the laws, cannot shirk from
that responsibility.
We cannot also lose sight of the fact that the country is only now beginning
to recover from the hardships brought about by the plunder of the economy
attributed to the Marcoses and their close associates and relatives, many of
whom are still here in the Philippines in a position to destabilize the
country, while the Government has barely scratched the surface, so to
speak, in its efforts to recover the enormous wealth stashed away by the
Marcoses in foreign jurisdictions. Then, We cannot ignore the continually
increasing burden imposed on the economy by the excessive foreign
borrowing during the Marcos regime, which stifles and stagnates
development and is one of the root causes of widespread poverty and all its
attendant ills. The resulting precarious state of our economy is of common
knowledge and is easily within the ambit of judicial notice.
The President has determined that the destabilization caused by the return
of the Marcoses would wipe away the gains achieved during the past few
years and lead to total economic collapse. Given what is within our
individual and common knowledge of the state of the economy, we cannot
argue with that determination.
SO ORDERED.
FACTS:
After President Marcos was deposed from presidency via the People
Power Revolution, he and his family was forced into exile. Now in his
deathbed, the former President has signified his wish to return to the
Philippines to die. But President Aquino, considering the dire
consequences on the nation on the return at a time when the stability of the
government is threatened from various directions, stood firmly on the
decision to bar the return of Mr. Marcos and his family.
ISSUE:
RULING:
FACTS:
1.On February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation
No. 1 announcingthat she and Vice President Laurel were taking
power.2.On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the
basis of the Aquinogovernment assumption of power by stating that the
"new government was installed througha direct exercise of the power of the
Filipino people assisted by units of the New ArmedForces of the
Philippines."
ISSUE:
Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate.
HELD:
Yes.The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but
belongs to the realmof politics where only the people are the judge.The
Court further held that:1.The people have accepted the Aquino government
which is in effective control of the entirecountry;
2.
It is not merely a
de facto
government but in fact and law a
de jure
government; and
3.
The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the new
government.
R E S O L U T IO N
PER CURIAM:
The first regular elections for the President and Vice-President under this
Constitution shall be held on the second Monday of May, 1992.
Claiming that the said provision "is not clear" as to whom it refers, he then
asks the Court "to declare and answer the question of the construction and
definiteness as to who, among the present incumbent President Corazon
Aquino and Vice-President Salvador Laurel and the elected President
Ferdinand E. Marcos and Vice-President Arturo M. Tolentino being referred
to under the said Section 7 (sic) of ARTICLE XVIII of the TRANSITORY
PROVISIONS of the proposed 1986 Constitution refers to, . ...
The petition is dismissed outright for lack of jurisdiction and for lack for
cause of action.
For the above-quoted reason, which are fully applicable to the petition at
bar, mutatis mutandis, there can be no question that President Corazon C.
Aquino and Vice-President Salvador H. Laurel are the incumbent and
legitimate President and Vice-President of the Republic of the
Philippines.or the above-quoted reasons, which are fully applicable to the
petition at bar,
The first regular elections for the President and Vice-President under this
Constitution shall be held on the second Monday of May, 1992.
Bermudez claims that the said provision is not clear as to whom it refers,
he then asks the Court to declare and answer the question of the
construction and definiteness as to who, among the present incumbent
President Corazon Aquino and Vice President Salvador Laurel and the
elected President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Vice President Arturo M.
Tolentino being referred to as the incumbent president.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
That the above cited memorandum dated December 1, 1986 was signed by
me personally on February 8,1987;
That said memorandum was further deciminated (sic) to all concerned the
following day, February 9. 1987.
But while February 8, 1987 is ostensibly still within the one-year deadline,
the aforequoted provision in the Provisional Constitution must be deemed
to have been overtaken by Section 27, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution
reading.
SECTION 27. This Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its
ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite held for the
purpose and shall supersede all previous Constitutions.
Until the term of office of barangay officials has been determined by law,
therefore, the term of office of six (6) years provided for in the Barangay
Election Act of 1982 5 should still govern.
SO ORDERED.
Taada v. Tuvera, G.R. No. L-6315, December 29, 1986
ESCOLIN, J.:
a] Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37, 38, 59, 64, 103, 171, 179, 184,
197, 200, 234, 265, 286, 298, 303, 312, 324, 325, 326, 337, 355, 358, 359,
360, 361, 368, 404, 406, 415, 427, 429, 445, 447, 473, 486, 491, 503, 504,
521, 528, 551, 566, 573, 574, 594, 599, 644, 658, 661, 718, 731, 733, 793,
800, 802, 835, 836, 923, 935, 961, 1017-1030, 1050, 1060-1061, 1085,
1143, 1165, 1166, 1242, 1246, 1250, 1278, 1279, 1300, 1644, 1772, 1808,
1810, 1813-1817, 1819-1826, 1829-1840, 1842-1847.
b] Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39, 49, 72, 107, 108, 116, 130, 136,
141, 150, 153, 155, 161, 173, 180, 187, 188, 192, 193, 199, 202, 204, 205,
209, 211-213, 215-224, 226-228, 231-239, 241-245, 248, 251, 253-261,
263-269, 271-273, 275-283, 285-289, 291, 293, 297-299, 301-303, 309,
312-315, 325, 327, 343, 346, 349, 357, 358, 362, 367, 370, 382, 385, 386,
396-397, 405, 438-440, 444- 445, 473, 486, 488, 498, 501, 399, 527, 561,
576, 587, 594, 599, 600, 602, 609, 610, 611, 612, 615, 641, 642, 665, 702,
712-713, 726, 837-839, 878-879, 881, 882, 939-940, 964,997,1149-
1178,1180-1278.
c] General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64 & 65.
d] Proclamation Nos.: 1126, 1144, 1147, 1151, 1196, 1270, 1281, 1319-
1526, 1529, 1532, 1535, 1538, 1540-1547, 1550-1558, 1561-1588, 1590-
1595, 1594-1600, 1606-1609, 1612-1628, 1630-1649, 1694-1695, 1697-
1701, 1705-1723, 1731-1734, 1737-1742, 1744, 1746-1751, 1752, 1754,
1762, 1764-1787, 1789-1795, 1797, 1800, 1802-1804, 1806-1807, 1812-
1814, 1816, 1825-1826, 1829, 1831-1832, 1835-1836, 1839-1840, 1843-
1844, 1846-1847, 1849, 1853-1858, 1860, 1866, 1868, 1870, 1876-1889,
1892, 1900, 1918, 1923, 1933, 1952, 1963, 1965-1966, 1968-1984, 1986-
2028, 2030-2044, 2046-2145, 2147-2161, 2163-2244.
e] Executive Orders Nos.: 411, 413, 414, 427, 429-454, 457- 471, 474-
492, 494-507, 509-510, 522, 524-528, 531-532, 536, 538, 543-544, 549,
551-553, 560, 563, 567-568, 570, 574, 593, 594, 598-604, 609, 611- 647,
649-677, 679-703, 705-707, 712-786, 788-852, 854-857.
The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case
dismissed outright on the ground that petitioners have no legal personality
or standing to bring the instant petition. The view is submitted that in the
absence of any showing that petitioners are personally and directly affected
or prejudiced by the alleged non-publication of the presidential issuances in
question 2 said petitioners are without the requisite legal personality to
institute this mandamus proceeding, they are not being "aggrieved parties"
within the meaning of Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which we
quote:
SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.When any tribunal, corporation, board
or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or
unlawfully excludes another from the use a rd enjoyment of a right or office
to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved
thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the
defendant, immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act
required to be done to Protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the
damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the
defendant.
Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of the
petition concerns a public right and its object is to compel the performance
of a public duty, they need not show any specific interest for their petition to
be given due course.
The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as the 1910 case of
Severino vs. Governor General, 3 this Court held that while the general rule
is that "a writ of mandamus would be granted to a private individual only in
those cases where he has some private or particular interest to be
subserved, or some particular right to be protected, independent of that
which he holds with the public at large," and "it is for the public officers
exclusively to apply for the writ when public rights are to be subserved
[Mithchell vs. Boardmen, 79 M.e., 469]," nevertheless, "when the question
is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the
enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in
interest and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted
need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being
sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the
execution of the laws [High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 3rd ed., sec.
431].
Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator Lope Severino, a
private individual, as a proper party to the mandamus proceedings brought
to compel the Governor General to call a special election for the position of
municipal president in the town of Silay, Negros Occidental. Speaking for
this Court, Mr. Justice Grant T. Trent said:
We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of authority supports the
proposition that the relator is a proper party to proceedings of this character
when a public right is sought to be enforced. If the general rule in America
were otherwise, we think that it would not be applicable to the case at bar
for the reason 'that it is always dangerous to apply a general rule to a
particular case without keeping in mind the reason for the rule, because, if
under the particular circumstances the reason for the rule does not exist,
the rule itself is not applicable and reliance upon the rule may well lead to
error'
No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the general rule insisted
upon by counsel for the respondent. The circumstances which surround
this case are different from those in the United States, inasmuch as if the
relator is not a proper party to these proceedings no other person could be,
as we have seen that it is not the duty of the law officer of the Government
to appear and represent the people in cases of this character.
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion
of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, ...
Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all important
legisiative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the, Congress of the
Philippines; [2] all executive and administrative orders and proclamations,
except such as have no general applicability; [3] decisions or abstracts of
decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals as may be
deemed by said courts of sufficient importance to be so published; [4] such
documents or classes of documents as may be required so to be published
by law; and [5] such documents or classes of documents as the President
of the Philippines shall determine from time to time to have general
applicability and legal effect, or which he may authorize so to be published.
...
The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public
adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and
conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no
basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It
would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for
the transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even
a constructive one.
The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There
shall be published in the Official Gazette ... ." The word "shall" used therein
imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be
enforced if the Constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters
of public concern is to be given substance and reality. The law itself makes
a list of what should be published in the Official Gazette. Such listing, to our
mind, leaves respondents with no discretion whatsoever as to what must
be included or excluded from such publication.
The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress,
having been found to be unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was
inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no duties, and hence
affording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton v. Shelby County, 118
U.S. 425, 442; Chicago, 1. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566. It is
quite clear, however, that such broad statements as to the effect of a
determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. The
actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination, is an operative
fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past
cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the
subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various
aspects-with respect to particular conduct, private and official. Questions of
rights claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior determinations
deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the
light of the nature both of the statute and of its previous application,
demand examination. These questions are among the most difficult of
those which have engaged the attention of courts, state and federal and it
is manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a
principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.
Consistently with the above principle, this Court in Rutter vs. Esteban 9
sustained the right of a party under the Moratorium Law, albeit said right
had accrued in his favor before said law was declared unconstitutional by
this Court.
From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears that
of the presidential decrees sought by petitioners to be published in the
Official Gazette, only Presidential Decrees Nos. 1019 to 1030, inclusive,
1278, and 1937 to 1939, inclusive, have not been so published. 10 Neither
the subject matters nor the texts of these PDs can be ascertained since no
copies thereof are available. But whatever their subject matter may be, it is
undisputed that none of these unpublished PDs has ever been
implemented or enforced by the government. In Pesigan vs. Angeles, 11
the Court, through Justice Ramon Aquino, ruled that "publication is
necessary to apprise the public of the contents of [penal] regulations and
make the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby. " The
cogency of this holding is apparently recognized by respondent officials
considering the manifestation in their comment that "the government, as a
matter of policy, refrains from prosecuting violations of criminal laws until
the same shall have been published in the Official Gazette or in some other
publication, even though some criminal laws provide that they shall take
effect immediately.
SO ORDERED.
Issue: WON to provide publications of the law elsewhere, aside from the
Official Gazette, as itwould be essential to the effectivity of the said
legislative or executive act that regulatesthe acts and conduct of people as
citizens.
Law: Executive Order 200 Amending Article 2 of the Civil Code, June
18, 1987
WHEREAS, Article 2 of the Civil Code partly provides that "laws shall take
effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the
Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided . . .;"
Sec. 1. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion
of their publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of
general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided.
Sec. 2. Article 2 of Republic Act No. 386, otherwise known as the "Civil
Code of the Philippines," and all other laws inconsistent with this Executive
Order are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
Sec. 3. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately after its
publication in the Official Gazette.
Done in the City of Manila, this 18th day of June, in the year of Our Lord,
nineteen hundred and eighty-seven.