SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 125356. November 21, 2001]

SUPREME TRANSLINER INC., FELIPE SIA and NOVENCIO FLORES, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, GLORIA
BRAZAL and minor LOTIS BRAZAL, represented by her father, NOEL BRAZAL, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition seeks to annul the decision[1] dated September 21, 1995, of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. No. 39784,
and its resolution[2] dated June 18, 1996 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Petitioners Supreme Transliner Inc. and Felipe Sia are the registered owners of a bus driven by co-petitioner
Novencio Flores. On September 24, 1990, the bus collided with a passenger jeepney carrying private respondents Gloria
and Lotis Brazal. At the time of the incident, the jeepney was owned and registered in the name of Marcelino Villones
and driven by Reynaldo Decena.
As a result of the collision, private respondents suffered injuries. They instituted Civil Case No. SP-3312 for damages
against petitioners based on quasi-delict and against Villones and Decena for breach of contract. Petitioners, in turn,
filed a third-party complaint against Country Bankers Insurance Company, insurer of the Supreme Transliner bus.
During the trial, Gloria Brazal testified that on September 24, 1990, she and her daughter Lotis were on board the
passenger jeepney when the Supreme Transliner bus hit it, causing them injuries that required medical treatment.
Decena and Villones testified on their own behalf and presented Luzviminda Malabanan and Sgt. Nicolas M. Roxas
as witnesses. Decena recounted that on September 24, 1990, at about 2:00 P.M., he was driving a passenger jeepney
bound for Candelaria, Quezon. On board, the jeepney was about fifteen passengers, including private respondents
Gloria and Lotis Brazal. Upon reaching Sampaloc, Sariaya, Quezon, a Supreme Transliner bus coming from the opposite
direction, suddenly appeared on a curved portion of the road and overtook another jeepney, which it was then
following. Thereafter, the bus collided with Decenas jeepney.
Petitioners presented Novencio Flores and Moises Alvarez, the Manager of Supreme Transliner. Both testified that
the passenger jeepney was running very fast when the accident occurred. On the third-party complaint, petitioners
showed that they already submitted the required documents for insurance claim and that Country Bankers Insurance
Company promised to settle the claim, but did not.
On October 28, 1992, the trial court rendered its judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding that the plaintiffs [have] established by preponderance of evidence the allegations of the
complaint, judgment is hereby rendered:
ON THE COMPLAINT:
1. Ordering the defendants Felipe Sia, as registered owner of the Supreme Bus, and Novencio Flores primarily liable for
the damages of the plaintiffs and directing them to jointly and severally pay plaintiffs the following:
a. The amount of TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P25,000.00) by way of actual damages;
b. The amount of P10,000.00 by way of moral damages;
c. The amount of P5,000.00 as attorneys fees.
On the third-party complaint, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the third-party defendant to pay the third-party
plaintiffs any and all amounts that they have paid to the plaintiffs by reason of this decision provided it does not exceed
P50,000.00.
Third-party defendant is also ordered to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.[3]
The trial court declared that Flores was negligent in operating the bus, while Sia failed to exercise the diligence of a
good father of a family in the choice, supervision and direction of his employees.
On the third-party complaint, the trial court found that Supreme Transliner had insured the bus with Country
Bankers, paid the premiums for the period covering the accident, and made an insurance claim by notifying the insurer
and submitting the required documents. However, until the filing of the complaint, Country Bankers had not acted upon
Supreme Transliners claim. The trial court ordered Country Bankers to pay third-party plaintiffs an amount not
exceeding P50,000.
Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals where they maintained that the trial court erred in: (a) pronouncing
them liable to private respondents; (b) awarding the amount of P25,000 as actual damages; and (c) finding Sia solidarily
liable with driver Flores. Country Bankers Insurance Company filed on July 5, 1994, a manifestation and motion wherein
it stated that it had already settled its maximum liability under the policy, and therefore prayed for its exclusion from
the case.
On September 21, 1995, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision, decreeing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is AFFIRMED subject to the Manifestation and Motion filed by third-party
defendant as discussed in the text of herein decision.
Costs against defendant-third party appellant Felipe Sia and defendant-appellant Novencio C. Flores.
SO ORDERED.[4]
The Court of Appeals found that there was competent and preponderant evidence which showed that driver
Novencio Flores negligence was the proximate cause of the mishap and that Felipe Sia failed to perform the required
degree of care in the selection and supervision of the bus driver. It also found that the actual damages representing the
medical expenses incurred by private respondents were properly supported by receipts.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but this was denied. Hence, this petition, where petitioners raise the
following issues:
I
ARE EVIDENCES (SIC) IN THE RECORDS OF THE CASE BUT NOT OFFERED BY A PARTY LITIGANT BE CONSIDERED IN
THE LATTERS FAVOR?
II
 ARE EVIDENCES (SIC) ADDUCED BY A CO-DEFENDANT BE CONSIDERED AS EVIDENCES (SIC) OF THE PLAINTIFF AS
AGAINST THE OTHER DEFENDANT?[5]
Petitioners aver that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial courts decision which was mainly based on the
evidence proffered by their co-defendants Decena and Villones. Petitioners contend that this evidence, which proved
their liability for quasi-delict, could not be appreciated against them because the same was not adopted, much less
offered in evidence by private respondents. Neither did Decena and Villones file a cross-claim against
them. Consequently, in accordance with Section 1,[6] Rule 131 and Sections 34[7] and 35[8], Rule 132 of the Rules of Court,
said evidence was placed beyond the courts consideration, hence they could not be held liable on the basis thereof.
Private respondents contend that Philippine courts are not only courts of law but of equity and justice as well. The
Court of Appeals, being a court of record, has to appreciate all the facts and evidence before it in determining the
parties rights and liabilities regardless of who among the litigants actually presented the same. Further, they point out
that the issue is being raised for the first time, thus it is highly improper to nullify or reverse the Court of Appeals
decision based solely on a completely new and foreign ground.
For our resolution are the following issues: (a) Who has the burden of proving herein petitioners liability? (b) May
the evidence presented by Decena and Villones be considered in determining preponderance of evidence against herein
petitioners?
Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence to establish his claim or defense by the amount of
evidence required by law, which is preponderance of evidence in civil cases.[9] The party, whether plaintiff or defendant,
who asserts the affirmative of the issue has the burden of proof to obtain a favorable judgment. For the defendant, an
affirmative defense is one which is not a denial of an essential ingredient in the plaintiffs cause of action, but one which,
if established, will be a good defense i.e. an avoidance of the claim.[10]
In this case, both private respondents as well as the jeepney driver Reynaldo Decena and its owner Marcelino
Villones claim that the bus driver, Novencio Flores, was liable for negligently operating the bus. For private respondents,
the claim constitutes their cause of action against petitioners which said private respondents must prove by
preponderance of evidence. At the same time, the same claim is a matter of affirmative defense on the part of Decena
and Villones who are impleaded as co-defendants of petitioners. Therefore, both private respondents as well as the said
co-defendants had the burden of proving petitioners negligence by the quantum of proof required to establish the
latters liability, i.e. by preponderance of evidence.
On the second issue, we rule in the affirmative. The evidence presented by the jeepney owner and its driver,
Villones and Decena, forms part of the totality of the evidence concerning the negligence committed by petitioners as
defendants in quasi-delict case. Preponderance of evidence is determined by considering all the facts and circumstances
of the case, culled from the evidence, regardless of who actually presented it.[11] Petitioners liability were proved by the
evidence presented by Decena and Villones at the trial, taken together with the evidence presented by the victims of the
collision, namely herein private respondents Gloria and Lotis Brazal.
We find petitioners reliance on Sections 34 and 35 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court misplaced. Petitioners cited
these rules to support their allegation that evidence by Decena and Villones should not be considered in private
respondents favor since the latter did not adopt much less offer them in evidence. Nothing in Section 34 requires that
the evidence be offered or adopted by a specific party before it could be considered in his favor. It is enough that the
evidence is offered for the courts consideration. We find, moreover, no pertinence in petitioners invocation of Rule 35,
on when to make an offer, except to indicate to us petitioners reliance on inapplicable technicalities that betray the lack
of merit of their petition.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The decision and resolution dated September 21, 1995 and June 18,
1996, respectively, of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

[1]
Rollo, pp. 24-39.
[2]
Id. at 41
[3]
Records, pp. 128-129.
[4]
Rollo, p. 38.
[5]
Id. at 13.
[6]
Section 1. Burden of proof. Burden of proof is the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to
establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required by law.
[7]
Section 34. Offer to evidence. the court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose
for which the evidence is offered must be specified.
[8]
Section 35. When to make offer. As regards the testimony of a witness, the offer must be made at the time the
witness is called to testify.
Documentary and object evidence shall be offered after the presentation of a partys testimonial evidence. Such offer
shall be done orally unless allowed by the court to be done in writing.
[9]
See note 6.
[10]
Paras, Rules of Court 448 ( 3rd ed. 1996).
[11]
Sec. 1, Rule 133, Revised Rules on Evidence. Preponderance of evidence, how determined. - In civil cases, the party
having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. In determining where the
preponderance or superior weight of evidence on the issues involved lies, the court may consider all the facts and
circumstances of the case, the witnesses manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of
knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify, the probability or
improbability of their testimony, their interest or want of interest, and also their personal credibility so far as the same
may legitimately appear upon the trial. The court may also consider the number of witnesses, though the
preponderance is not necessarily with the greater number.
 THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 104629. November 13, 2001]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JULIUS KINOK alias "YOS BLA-AN" and TAPANTE SALIGAN alias
"TAPANTE BLA-AN", accused-appellants.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Davao del Sur,[1] in Criminal Case No. 3(90), People
vs. Julius Kinok alias Yos Bla-an and Tapante Saligan alias Tapante Bla-an,convicting both accused of murder and
sentencing them to reclusion perpetua with accessory penalties.
The Amended Information dated February 26, 1990 filed against the accused reads:
That on or about the 24th day of September, 1989 in the Municipality of Kiblawan, Province of Davao del Sur, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said accused, conspiring, confederating together, and mutually
helping one another, and armed with a firearm, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, attack, assault
and wound therewith William Aguipo, in the vital part of his body, inflicting upon him gunshot wound, with treachery
and evident premeditation, said accused having inflicted said wound while William Aguipo is asleep, and as a result
thereof, said William Aguipo died instantly.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
Upon arraignment, the two accused pleaded NOT GUILTY. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
The theory of the prosecution, as aptly stated by the Solicitor General in the appellees brief, is reproduced
hereunder:
After taking supper at around 8:00 oclock in the evening of September 23, 1989, Luz Aguipo, together with four of her
five children, went upstairs in her house at Kimlawis, Kiblawan, Davao del Sur, while her husband, William Aguipo
proceeded inside the store in the first floor and slept therein (pp. 4-6, tsn, May 30, 1990). At around 8:30 oclock of the
same evening, Luz heard two persons calling out to buy rise (p. 6, id). When William later called out to Luz whether she
had change for P100.00, she answered that she had none (id.). She went down the house and saw accused Julius Kinok
and Tapante Saligan.The duo were thus unable to buy the rice as the couple had no change (id.). The two accused then
asked if the couple had corn grits (p.7, id.). They replied that there was none available. Thereafter, the two accused
requested William to accompany them to the store owned by Roger Mioza (id.). William acceded (id.).
Between 8:30 and 9:00 oclock in the same evening, William returned to their store and proceeded to sleep (p. 8,
id.). Thereupon, Luz went back upstairs, listened to a radio program until sign-off, and thereafter slept at around
midnight (id.).
At around 12:30 oclock past midnight, Luz was awakened by a muffled gunburst. She immediately got up, looked over
the window and saw the two accused both holding guns which were pointed at where her husband, William, was later
found dead (pp. 8-9, id.). She was able to identify the two as the moon and stars were shinning brightly and besides
there was a pile of woods and bamboos (bagacay) which were burning around eight (8) meters away from where the
two accused were (p. 9, id.). Not long after, the two accused ran away (id.). Thereafter, Luz went back to lie down on her
bed (p.10, id.). She could not go back to sleep because she was scared that the two would come back to strafe their
house and kill them all (pp. 10, 16-17, id.).
While all these were going on, Ronel Mande, the 13-year old nephew of the couple, who was sleeping in the first floor
with the other child, Rommel Aguipo (on the other side of the wall of split bamboos from where William was sleeping),
was himself awakened by the noise coming from the horse and pigs (pp. 2-5, tsn, May 11, 1990). When he tried to look
at the place where the horse and pigs were, he saw the two accused both holding firearms which were directed and
poked at the walling of the store where William was sleeping (pp. 4-6, id.). He saw both accused clearly since the moon
was shining brightly and the pile of woods he had previously set fire earlier in the evening was burning just around eight
(8) meters away from where the accused were (id.). Upon noticing that both accused had pointed their guns toward the
store where his uncle William was sleeping, he tried to look at the wooden railings (id.). As he was looking, he heard a
muffled gunburst (id.). Thereupon, he ducked and lay down on the floor (id.).Feeling very much scared, he covered
himself with a blanket (p. 7, id.).
About one and a half hours later, still being unable to sleep, Ronel noticed that his clothes were wet (pp. 8-12,
id.). Thinking that the children upstairs had urinated, he went upstairs and woke his Aunt Luz complaining that he was
wet with urine (id.). Luz check who of the children urinated, and finding no one, she lighted the lump to check why he
was wet and, then discovered that it was blood (pp. 8, 13, id.; p. 10, tsn, May 30, 1990). She found out that the blood
came from William whose wounds were oozing with blood (pp. 8-9, 13, tsn, May 11, 1990; pp. 10-11, tsn, May 30,
1990). She noticed that William had two wounds, one on the right side of the body and another on the left wrist (p. 11,
tsn, May 30, 1990). She started crying, joined by Ronel (p. 9, tsn, May 11, 1990; p. 11, tsn, May 30, 1990). While Luz was
crying , Ronel told her, Auntie, I saw the persons who shot him (pp. 11-12, tsn, May 30, 1990). She warned him not to
tell any one because the accused might come back and retaliate against them (p. 16, tsn, May 11, 1990).
Luz, then, brought the dead body of her husband outside of the store and wrapped it with a mat (p. 12, tsn, May 30,
1990). Thereupon, she informed her parents-in-law (id.). At about 4:30 oclock in the afternoon, they proceeded to the
municipal hall of Kiblawan and subsequently to the Gregoria Matas District Hospital for an autopsy of the cadaver
(id.). The examining physician, Dr. Reynaldo Villanueva, found, as revealed in his Outside Patients Record Card, that:
'PRE: (1) entrance wound, L post lateral wrist 0.5 cm. diameter
(2) exit wound L ant-medial wrist 1 cm. diam. everted
(3) entrance wound R ant-level of 8th rib abdomen R upper quadrant just below the R cortal margin
1.5 cm. inverted c no exit
Cause of Death: CPA 2 to gunshot wound'
(Outside Patients Record Card, Exhibit A', Records, p. 71; tsn, March 14, 1990, pp. 3, 5-6)
Luz had four policemen friends in Kiblawan who told her to reveal the identities of the culprits (pp. 27-28, tsn, May 30,
1990). She told them that she would do so at the proper time (p. 28, id.).
After the burial of her husband on October 9, 1989, she went to the Kiblawan Police Station and executed a sworn
statement to support her complaint against the two accused (pp. 27-28, id.; p. 7, Sworn Statement, Exhibit 1, Records).[3]
Neither of the two accused took the witness stand. In their defense, only Alfredo Canacan and Flaviana Solo
testified.
Alfredo Canacan, a resident and barangay councilman of Kimlawis, testified that at about 5:00 oclock in the
morning of September 24, 1989, he fetched water from a well. While passing by the Aguipos place, he heard some cries
and being curious, he entered their house and there he saw the body of William Aguipo lying on the floor wrapped by a
blanket wet with blood. He noticed that when Luz saw the forearm of her husband, she shouted, giwak-giwak, gikitkit si
William, which means, William was eaten by the witch. When he told her that William might have been shot to death,
she disagreed, saying she did not see any person nor hear any gunshot the night before.[4]
Flaviana Solo, barangay captain of Kimlawis, corroborated Alfredo Canacans testimony [5] and further declared that
she interrogated Ronel Mande. When she asked him about his uncles condition, he answered that his uncle was
trembling and he (Ronel) believed the incident was just a nightmare.[6]
After hearing, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered and in view of the foregoing, this court find the accused Julius Kinok alias Yos Bla-an
and Tapante Saligan alias Tapante Bla-an guilty of the crime of murder as charged.They are hereby ordered to suffer
imprisonment with a penalty of reclusion perpetua (Life sentence) each with the accessory penalties of the law. It
appearing that there is no payment of the filing and docket fees, this Court cannot pronounce any civil liability, for
jurisdiction over the same is acquired only from the moment of its payment.
SO ORDERED.[7]
In this appeal, appellants ascribe to the trial court ten interrelated errors which may be summed up as follows: (1)
in finding that the evidence for the prosecution has established the identity of the killers; (2) in concluding that delay on
the part of Luz Aguipo in naming the assailants did not weaken her testimony; (3) in holding that Ronel Mande, although
the victims nephew, is a credible witness; and (4) in convicting the appellants despite the fact that no ill motive on their
part has been established by the prosecution.
Incidentally, during the pendency of this appeal, or on July 24, 1994, appellant Tapante Saligan died due to cardio
respiratory arrest while confined at the National Bilibid Prison in Muntinlupa.[8] Hence, in a Resolution dated March 8,
1995, this Court dismissed the appeal with respect to him for being moot and academic.[9]
After a meticulous review of the entire records of this case, we find the appeal bereft of merit.
Ronel Mande, prosecution witness, positively identified appellants. His testimony in point is quoted as follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION
ATTY. CARPENTERO:
Q Now, while you were sleeping that evening, what unusual incident have you noticed if any?
A When I heard the sound coming from the horse and I noticed that the pigs were noisy, I was awakened and tried to
look at the place where the horse and pigs were, I saw the two accused Yos Bla-an and Tapante Bla-an bringing
firearms to the place where my uncle William Aguipo was sleeping.
xxx
Q How where you able to see this when it was in the evening?
A Because the moon was shining very bright and besides I was burning file of wood in front of the road.
COURT:
Q Why where you burning those woods?
A I burned in that place because there were so many garbage, your honor, so I have to burn them.
ATTY. CARPENTERO:
Q How far was that burning fire to the place where the accused where?
A About 8 meters.
xxx
Q Seeing the two holding firearms pointed to the place where your uncle William was sleeping, according to you,
what did you do next?
A When I noticed that they were poking their firearms towards the store where my uncle was sleeping, I tried to look
at the wooden railings and as I looked, I heard gun burst.
Q What kind of burst was that?
A A muffled burst.
Q Hearing the muffled burst at that time, what did you do?
A I ducked and laid down towards the floor?
Q Why did you drop towards the floor?
A Because I was afraid.
xxx
Q Now, after wrapping yourself with the blanket and knowing that Luz Aguipo was upstairs, what did you do next?
A I did nothing but to lie down covering myself with a blanket because I was very much afraid.[10]
Likewise, Luz Aguipo positively identified the appellants as the perpetrators of the crime, thus:
DIRECT EXAMINATION
ATTY. CARPENTERO:
Q While you were sleeping, what unusual incident happened?
A After I went to sleep that was about 12:30 oclock past midnight, I was surprised when I heard a gunshot, so I
immediately rose up from the bed.
Q What kind of burst did you hear?
A A gun burst with a dull sound or in the local dialect bungol nga boto.
Q Where did that gun burst emanate?
A From the downstairs of our house.
 Q As you heard a gun burst, what did you do, if any?
A. When I heard a gun burst, I immediately opened the window of our house.
Q What did you notice as you opened the window of your house?
A When I opened the window of our house, I saw two person, the two accused, holding a gun.
xxx
Q What was their respective positions when you saw the accused for the first time after opening the window?
A When I opened the window of our house and looked over the window, I saw the two accused pointing their guns at
the place where my husband was killed.
Q How were you able to recognize the two since it was past 12:30 oclock midnight going to dawn?
A I recognized the two accused through the illumination coming from the moon and stars because they were shining
very brightly, and besides there was a pile of wood and bagacay burned by my son that early evening and
because of the continuos blowing of the wind, these pile of woods and bamboos were lighting.
Q How far was the burning woods and bamboos from the place where the two accused were?
A More or less 8 meters.[11]
Instead of controverting the above testimonies and defending themselves, appellants merely chose to remain
silent. They relied solely on the testimonies of their barriomates who claimed that Luz Aguipo and Ronel Mande did not
inform them of the names of the perpetrators.
In criminal cases, the prosecution bears the onus to prove beyond reasonable doubt not only the commission of the
crime but likewise to establish, with the same quantum of proof, the identity of the person or persons responsible
therefor.[12] This burden of proof does not shift to the defense but remains in the prosecution throughout the
trial.[13] However, when the prosecution has succeeded in discharging the burden of proof by presenting evidence
sufficient to convince the court of the truth of the allegations in the information or has established a prima facie case
against the accused, the burden of evidence shiftsto the accused making it incumbent upon him to adduce evidence in
order to meet and nullify, if not to overthrow, that prima facie case.[14]
As we held in People v. Resano:[15]
x x x [The witness], of course, has a right not to do so and his failure and/or refusal to testify shall not in any manner
prejudice or be taken against him. But when the prosecution has already established a prima facie case, more so when
the offense charged is grave and sufficient enough to send the accused behind bars for life or may even warrant the
imposition of the supreme penalty of death, then in order to meet and destroy the effects of said prima facie case and
so as to shift the burden of producing further evidence to the prosecution, the party making the denial must produce
evidence tending to negate the blame asserted to such a point that, if no more evidence is given, his adversary cannot
win the case beyond reasonable doubt. In such a situation, it may be necessary for the accused to have a complete
destruction of the prosecutions prima facie case, that he take the stand since no hardship will in any way be imposed
upon him nor advantage be taken of him.
Appellants unexplainable silence, in the midst of the overwhelming evidence established by the prosecution against
them, leads to no other conclusion than that they are guilty as charged.
Anent Luz Aguipos delay in reporting the incident to the proper authorities, we agree with the Solicitor General that
such delay, which covered only sixteen (16) days, was satisfactorily explained by her.
Luz testified that she feared for her life as well as her family. She was also convinced that appellants would flee to
the mountains and might no longer be apprehended. Likewise, in her barangay, many residents have been killed in the
past. Although the culprits were identified, the barangay officials would usually fix the cases because they themselves
are afraid of the people in the mountains. Similarly, she did not immediately bring the matter to the police authorities
because she was then busy attending to the burial arrangements of her husband.[16] With these things in her mind,
compounded by the traumatic shock of finding herself suddenly a widow with five children to support, Luz could not be
expected to immediately take the proper action.
Next, appellants assail Ronels credibility on the ground that he is a nephew of Luz Aguipo and her husband who
were then sending him to school. Mere relationship by itself does not give rise to the presumption of bias or ulterior
motive, nor does it ipso facto impair the credibility or tarnish the testimony of a witness. Antithetically, a witness
relationship to a victim of the crime would even make his or her testimony more credible as it would be unnatural for a
relative who is interested in vindicating the crime to accuse somebody other than the real culprit.[17] Indeed, at 14,
Ronels act of accusing his barriomates of such a serious crime even strengthens the veracity of his testimony.
Appellants also vigorously contend that since there was no ill motive on their part against the victim, then they
should be acquitted. Suffice it to state that the prosecution witnesses positively identified them as the malefactors. It is
a settled principle requiring minimal discussion that motive is not essential for conviction when there is no doubt as to
the identity of the accused.[18]
The aggravating circumstance of treachery, which qualified the killing to murder, was properly appreciated by the
trial court. The two conditions of treachery concurred, namely, (a) that the means, methods, and forms of execution
employed gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate, and (b) that such means, methods,
and forms of execution were deliberately and consciously adopted by the accused without danger to his
person. Appellants, then fully armed, shot the victim to death while he was asleep and therefore, could not have put up
any kind of defense.[19] The Information also alleges the presence of evident premeditation in the commission of the
crime. For evident premeditation to be appreciated, the evidence for the prosecution must establish with equal
certainty and clearness as the criminal act itself[20] all its elements, to wit: (1) the time the offender determined to
commit the crime; (2) an act indicating that the offender had clung to his determination; and (3) sufficient lapse of time
between the determination to commit the crime and the execution thereof to allow the offender to reflect upon the
consequences of his act.[21] A perusal of the records of this case reveals that not one of these elements was sufficiently
established by the prosecution. The trial court, therefore, correctly disregarded the same.
Under Article 248[22] of the Revised Penal Code, then the applicable provision when the crime was committed,
murder is punishable by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. It appearing that no other modifying
circumstances attended the commission of the crime, the trial court correctly imposed on the appellants the penalty
of reclusion perpetua.[23]
However, the trial court erred in not holding that appellants are civilly liable. Luz Aguipo is claiming actual
damages. She testified that she spent no less than P10,000.00 during the burial of her husband; and P10,000.00 as
attorneys fees and other expenses. However, this Court can only award such damages if supported by receipts.[24] We
scoured the records for any receipt in support of her claim but found none.
The heirs, however, are entitled to a fixed sum representing civil indemnity for the death of William Aguipo. Per
prevailing jurisprudence, death indemnity is fixed in the sum of P50,000.00.[25] This kind of civil indemnity is separate
and distinct from other forms of indemnity for damages[26] and is automatically awarded without need of further proof
other than the fact of death and that the accused is responsible therefor.[27]
Luz Aguipo is likewise praying for moral damages. Such damages recoverable in criminal offenses resulting in
physical injuries or the victims death must be supported by factual basis [28] or sufficient proof of physical suffering,
mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock and similar injury.[29] Luz
Aguipo testified that she was in grief because of the death of her husband and encountered so many difficulties
thereafter.[30] She thus asks for the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages. Obviously, she is entitled to moral
damages and the amount she prays for is deemed proper and justified.
Furthermore, because of the presence of the qualifying aggravating circumstance of treachery, exemplary damages,
now fixed at P25,000.00, is also recoverable pursuant to Article 2230 of the Civil Code.It is now well-settled that with
respect to the civil aspect of a criminal case, an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying, should entitle
the offended party to an award of exemplary damages.[31]
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is AFFIRMED, subject to the MODIFICATION that appellant Julius Kinok
alias Yos Bla-an is ORDERED to pay the heirs of the victim P50,000 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and
P25,000.00 as exemplary damages. Cost against appellant Julius Kinok alyas "Yos Bla-an".
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman),Vitug, Panganiban, and Carpio, JJ., concur.

[1]
Presided by Judge Dominador F. Carillo.
[2]
Rollo, p. 6.
[3]
Id., pp. 176-181.
[4]
TSN, August 15, 1990, pp. 4-8.
[5]
TSN, September 3, 1990, pp. 5-10.
[6]
Ibid., p. 8
[7]
Rollo, p. 24.
[8]
Ibid., pp. 125-127.
[9]
Ibid., p. 128 a.
[10]
TSN, May 11, 1990, pp. 4-7.
[11]
TSN, May 30, 1990, pp 8-9.
[12]
People v. Nio, 290 SCRA 155; People of the Philippines v. Bernie Faustino, G.R. No. 129220, September 6, 2000.
[13]
Bautista v. Sarmiento, G.R. No. L-45137, September 23, 1985; 138 SCRA 587, p. 593.
[14]
[15]
[16]
TSN, May 30, 1990, pp. 28-30.
[17]
People v. Macuha, 310 SCRA 14 (1999).
[18]
People v. Cabrera, 241 SCRA 28.
[19]
People v. Caisip, 290 SCRA 451.
[20]
People v. Sison, 312 SCRA 792 (1999)
[21]
People v. Altabano, 317 SCRA 708 (1999).
[22]
Article 248 of the Revised Penal code was later amended by R.A. No. 7659, which took effect on 31 December 1993
(see People v. Simon, 234 SCRA 555 [1994]. The penalty for murder is now reclusion perpetua to death.
[23]
See People v. Muoz, 170 SCRA 107 (1989); People v. De Mesa, 188 SCRA 48 (1990).
[24]
Macalino v. People, G.R. No. 121802, September 7, 2000; People v. Salcedo, 273 SCRA 473 [1997].
[25]
People v. Espanola, 271 SCRA 689, April 18, 1997 (citing People v. Teehankee, 249 SCRA 54).
[26]
Brias v. People, 125 SCRA 687, November 25, 1983.
[27]
People v. Ortega, Jr., 276 SCRA 166; People v. Salcedo, 273 SCRA 473.
[28]
People v. Balano, 272 SCRA 782.
[29]
People v. Zamora, 278 SCRA 60.
[30]
TSN, May 30, 1990, p. 13.
[31]
People v. Catubig, G.R. No. 137842, August 23, 2001, cited in People v. Dionisio, G.R. No. 137676, September 27,
2001.