1

Kidde Aerospace & Defense

Technical Paper

Aircraft Fire Detection and Suppression

Kidde plc

Thomas C. Hillman
Kidde Aerospace & Defense; USA
Steven W. Hill
Kidde Aerospace; USA
Martin J. Sturla
Kidde Aerospace; USA

ABSTRACT
A review of past and state-of-the-art
aircraft fire/explosion detection and
extinguishing components is presented. The
lessons learned from previously fielded
systems are discussed so that they can be
applied to the modern protection systems as
they are implemented.
Discussions of various types of fire detection
systems, fire extinguishing systems, integrated
total protection systems, and other fire
protection and prevention are discussed. A
brief overview of some of the operational
features and characteristics of these protection
components and systems are presented so that
trade studies and comparisons can be
conducted. By understanding the technological
feature sets and the differences between the
various approaches, an optimized protection
approach can be defined for any given aircraft
platform.
INTRODUCTION
Active protection systems and
components have always been the last resort
for dealing with anomalous faults and other
hazards which may lead to fires and explosions
onboard aircraft. Historically, these
components, which are made up of detection
sensors and frequently fire extinguishing
vessels, have been employed only after design
measures could not adequately assure the
elimination of a potentially catastrophic fire
incident.
Over the last 70 years or so, aircraft
power plants have received the most attention,
with regard to protection. Aircraft cargo bay
protection, primarily for commercial aviation,
was addressed several years later when
commercial transport became a more popular
means of travel to the general public. Only in
the last 45 years has the protection of the fuel
system (especially in the case of military
aircraft applications) received attention,
primarily driven by benefits in reducing aircraft
vulnerability to hostile fire. More recently, the
protection of select aircraft dry bays has been
recognized as a major contributor toward
further enhancing aircraft survivability to hostile
2
threats. These vulnerability reduction systems
also offered the added benefit of increased
aircraft safety to fault induced fires.
Fire detection and extinguishing and
suppression technologies used to protect these
areas have evolved over this period of time. To
fully appreciate where we stand today, with
respect to aircraft fire and explosion protection
components and systems, one must appreciate
the technological evolutions that have taken
place. A brief historical synopsis of aircraft
detection and extinguishing systems is offered
for this reason.
This paper is divided into three basic
sections:
Aircraft Fire Detection: Discusses thermal
based fire and overheat detection systems,
optical fire detection systems, and smoke
detection systems. Trade studies for these
types of detection systems are offered as
they apply to engine power plant
applications and cargo compartment
applications.
Aircraft Fire Extinguishing: Discusses
extinguishing systems for engine power
plants, and suppression and inerting
systems for cargo compartment
applications. The status of alternate
extinguishing agents to the halon
extinguishing agents is also presented in
this section.
Fire Prevention Approaches & Integrated
Explosion Protection Systems:Discusses
protection of fuel tanks and dry bay
compartments. Integrated detection and
suppression systems are presented in this
section, as well as other approaches and
technologies for protection fuel tanks and
dry bays.
DETECTION SYSTEMS
Thermal Fire Detection Systems
Fire detection has long been recognized
as the single most important aspect of fire
protection. If one is made aware of a
hazardous condition early enough in its
development, corrective action of some kind
can be initiated, in an attempt to negate a
catastrophic condition. Recognizing this fact,
fire detection systems were first deployed in
aircraft engine nacelle compartments some 70
years ago.
In the 1930s and 40s, a continuous
type fire detector using a fusible alloy that,

when melted, completed an electrical circuit
between the outer sheath and the isolated
center conductor, was first used. One of the
early aircraft to use this system was the B-25;
others included the B-26, C-47, and the C-54.
After initiating an alarm, the detector could not
eliminate the warning signal. Thus, no fire out
message was issued. The melted element had
to be replaced before the next flight.
In the 1940s thermocouple type point
detectors were used to provide fire and
overheat detection coverage in the engine
nacelle. This technique represented a
significant advancement in aircraft engine early
fire warning in that these systems also provided
fire out indications and were resetable.
Systems of this type were deployed on many
military aircraft of that day, including the B-29,
B-36, C-119, and the F-86 to name just a few.
In about this same time period, unit type
bimetallic thermoswitch sensors were
developed and widely used on select jet engine
installations. Detectors set at 450oF (230oC)
were used to detect overheat conditions in the
forward compartment and detectors set at
700oF (370oC) for fire detection in the aft
section of the nacelle. Aircraft using these
bimetallic thermoswitch sensors include the B-
45C, B-47, B-52, C-135, F-80, F-84, F-104 and
the F-105.
Although the thermocouple and
thermoswitch type detection systems were
credited with saving numerous aircraft
installations and crews, it was recognized that
point detectors were very limited with regard to
area of coverage. In that thermal monitoring
devices rely on convective heat, transferred
from a fire to the detector, and ambient airflow
affects the heat transfer process, the placement
of the point detector became the most critical
factor of how successful the detection system
would be for providing early warnings of
anomalous fire events.
When continuous element thermal
detection systems were introduced to the
aircraft industry in the early and mid 1950s, a
major shortcoming of point detectors was
overcome; i.e., greater detection coverage was
achieved. Sensing elements, resembling long
continuous wires, were routed throughout the
length of the engine nacelle, and like the earlier
fusible alloy elements, provided greater volume
coverage. Unlike the fusible alloy elements,
however, these continuous elements were
resettable. The continuous element thermal
3
detection technology became the most popular
detection approach for aircraft engines and has
remained so to this day.
Various versions of continuous element
detection systems have been developed and
fielded. Some versions are dependent on the
amount of element heated to reach their alarm
threshold level and have been termed
averaging types of detectors. In other words,
their alarm threshold averages the temperature
over its entire length. If only a small length of
element is heated (for example, six inches; 15
centimeters), a higher temperature is required
to reach its alarm threshold. If a greater length
of sensing element is heated, a lower alarm
threshold results. This feature enables
averaging type thermal element systems to be
routed near recognized localized hot spots,
such as the area around combustor cans,
without causing the system to output an alarm
condition. Conversely, when this feature is
deemed non-desirable, a second alarm
threshold can be added to the system
architecture (one that corresponds to the
unique higher temperature characteristics
associated with the localized hot spot event)
and a corresponding second output can be
monitored. This multiple threshold property,
unique to averaging type detection systems
(including point detector systems), is commonly
used to indicate an overheat warning, indicative
of an engine bleed air duct failure or
combustor-can burn-through event.
Averaging type continuous elements
monitor either changing electrical resistance
alone, or resistance and capacitance in
conjunction with each other, or changing
internal gas pressure as function of
temperature. The electrical based continuous
sensing elements (ones that monitor changing
electrical capacitance and/or resistance) have
one or two internal wire conductors embedded
in a ceramic-like material that are contained in
a metallic outer sheath. As the surrounding
temperature increases, the resistance between
the inner conductor and the outer sheath
conductor decreases, while the capacitance
increases. When two internal wire conductors
are embedded in the sensing element, the
resistance change between these two wires is
typically measured. When the resistance
between the internal conductor and the external
sensing element sheath drops to some pre-
determined level (and/or the capacitance
increases), which corresponds to the desired
 4

alarm temperature, a monitoring control unit

issues a hazard signal. When the hazard
condition is eliminated and the temperature
returns to normal, the resistance increases and The time to alarm for both of these
the capacitance decreases, thereby canceling types of continuous element systems is, by
the alarm. Multiple trip resistance / capacitance design, five (5) seconds when inserted directly
settings are used when multiple thresholds are into a 2000oF (1100oC) flame. The time to
pursued (to indicate fire versus overheat). reset when removed from the flame is less than
thirty (30) seconds.
Shortly after the first continuous element
averaging type detection systems was
6 IN
introduced, a discrete type detection system
HEATED was also introduced. Unlike the averaging
detection systems, the discrete systems utilized
RESISTANCE-OHMS

1 FT
HEATED sensing elements that were essentially
Wires independent of the length of element heated to
10 FT achieve its alarm threshold. There have been
HEATED (and continue to be) only electrical based
versions of discrete continuous element
Thermistor detection systems. These systems employ a
Sheath sensing element which, like the electrical based
TEMPERATURE-DEGREES FAHRENHEIT averaging systems, have either one or two
The pneumatic based continuous internal wire conductors embedded in a
element system relies on increasing gas ceramic-like core material, surrounded by a
pressure to achieve its alarm threshold. These metallic outer sheath. The ceramic core is
sensing elements have a hydrogen charged impregnated with eutectic salt. The salt melts
core surrounded by helium gas, contained in a at its eutectic melt temperature, even when
metallic outer sheath. As the surrounding only a very short length of element is heated.
temperature increases, the helium gas' When this occurs, the electrical resistance
pressure increases, closing a pressure switch, between the inner conductor and the outer
thereby issuing an alarm. As the temperature sheath very rapidly breaks down (also the
returns to normal, the pressure decreases and capacitance increases), and a monitoring
the alarm is canceled. If a localized, high control unit signals a fire or overheat,
temperature event is present, the hydrogen whichever is appropriate for the intended
core also out-gasses it hydrogen gas, application.
incongruently increasing the internal pressure
and closing the pressure switch (or a second
6 IN HEATED 10 FT HEATED
switch if multiple thresholds are used, such as
a fire or overheat output). As the sensing
RESISTANCE-OHMS

element cools, the hydrogen absorbs back into

the core so that the internal pressure
decreases, removing the alarm output.

EUTECTIC SALT
ALARM PRESSURE

TEMPERATURE-DEGREES FAHRENHEIT
HELIUM GAS
D
TE
EA
H
PRESSURE

TH
NG

While this type of sensing element is

LE

H
GT
essentially independent of the length heated
LE

N
LE
HO

T
OR D
(which is a critical feature for reliable, early
W

SH ATE
SHEATH HE
HYDRIDE CORE warning or small, discrete overheat events,
(HYDROGEN)
TEMPERATURE
such as bleed air duct failures), it cannot in its

present form provide multiple alarm thresholds
or any kind of analog temperature trend
information as the averaging detection systems
can.
Several design improvements have
been incorporated and deployed. Some of the
more significant improvements were:
short circuit discrimination (electrical
based systems),
fail safe: circuit design,
use of dual sensing elements which
utilize AND logic,
on-command self test features (option
for automatic test),
self interrogation which automatically
switches dual ANDed elements to
single element operation if one element
fails, ambient temperature trend
monitoring,
improved support/mounting hardware
designs,
use of terminal lug connectors to
circumvent the most recognized cause
of false alarms, connector
contamination.
improved support/mounting hardware
designs,
use of terminal lug connectors to
circumvent the most recognized cause
of false alarms, connector
contamination.
The terminal lug fitting feature is one of the
more recent improvements to be implemented.
Although hermetic connectors which were
utilized in engine compartments were
successful in minimizing contamination from
entering the connector cavity, there were
scenarios in which the connectors hermetic
seal led to operational faults (specifically, false
alarms). Certain aircraft maintenance
procedures permit the use of chlorinated
solvents to clean connectors. When the
continuous elements hermetic connectors were
cleaned with these solvents and subsequently
mated together and exposed to heat (such as
the high temperatures associated with the
engine compartment), electrolytic
decomposition of the solvent occurred. The
decomposition forms a conductive acid that in
turn allows electrical short circuits to occur
between connector pins. Unfortunately, this
electrical shorting is many times introduced in
such a manner that it mimics a resistance
change from a high temperature event. In the
5
case of the pneumatic system, the electrical
short occurs at the pressure switch/aircraft
wiring interface.
Optical Fire Detection Systems
In a similar time frame to the
introduction of continuous element detection
systems (early 1950s), optical based fire
detection systems were also introduced.
A photoelectric lead sulfide cell used to
monitor infrared radiation, which flickered
(around five to ten hertz, the flicker rate of fire),
was deployed on the C-130 and later on the C-
133s APU compartment (then called a GPU).
While this detection approach, later trade
named FIREYER, served as a quantum leap in
early warning detection, it, like many of its
optical detection successors, was false alarm
prone. In fact it appeared that its primary
shortcoming was that its alarm threshold was
set too low (i.e. the sensitivity was set too high).
One of its primary false alarm scenarios
occurred when an aircraft fitted with this
detection system flew over a city at night.
Since the detector had a truncated view of the
lights which appear to be chopped, as viewed
through narrow apertures (interface seams) of
the nacelle structure, the flickering light was
reported as a fire.
A cadmium-sulfide detector cell was
later introduced and subsequently replaced the
FIREYER sensor on the C-130. This optical
sensor monitored two narrow wavebands in the
visible spectrum, red and green wavebands.
The cad-sulfide detection sensor market grew
in the 1960s and into the 1970s, but its market
was primarily limited to helicopter applications
and some general aviation engine bays. While
this concept was recognized to have
operational limitations, such as alarming to
non-fire sources (such as rising and setting
sunlight conditions, light reflected off bright
colored clothing, flashlights, etc.), its market
share increased; primarily so that logistical
compatibility could be maintained with similar
aircraft utilizing this technology.
The U.S. Air Force conducted a detection
system performance survey for their aircraft in
the early 1970s. They found a very high
percentage of the fire incidents that were not
detected by the thermal detection systems.
Plus, according to the performance statistics
generated by this study, most of the time the
detection system did issue a fire warning, it was
false (1). Although the greatest percentage of

the negative statistics toward detection systems
was associated with archaic point detectors, it
was still conclusive that continuous element
detection systems were far from providing
optimal performance. While the continuous
element detection system design
improvements, mentioned earlier, significantly
improved the performance statistics, it took
time for these improvements to be measured.
It was at that time, the U.S. Air Force moved to
develop a new detection system for the engine
compartment. The result of this effort
culminated in the development of the high
temperature Ultraviolet Aircraft Fire Detection
System (UVAFDS) (2).
USAF sponsored this activity in the late
1970s, with the objective of developing an
improved method of fire detection for aircraft
engine nacelles. This UV detection system
utilized a cold cathode gas discharge tube
responsive to radiation below 280 nanometers
(nm). The figure below illustrates the detector
tubes relative responsively as a function of
wavelength in conjunction with the radiant
emission of a fire and sunlight. The sensor is
highly responsive to radiation in the 200 to 250
nm range and relatively insensitive to radiation
of longer wavelengths. This very large
difference in sensitivity is essential because the
amount of short wavelength power radiated by
a flame is only a small portion of the total
radiant power emitted and is small compared to
other radiation emitting sources which might
serve as false alarm sources.
No
The sensor is made up of a special UV
transmitting envelope that contains two metal
electrodes and a special gas mixture. The
electrodes are connected to an established
high voltage source (generally above 300
volts D.C.). When a photon emitted from the
UV spectrum of a fire, possessing sufficient
energy, strikes the cathode, an electron is
emitted and is accelerated towards the anode
6
by the electric field existing between the
electrodes. The inert gas filling of the photocell
contains gas molecules that are electrically
neutral and present in sufficient quantity to
ensure that a collision takes place between a
gas molecule and the accelerating electron.
After collision, the gas molecule loses electrons
and the gas molecule becomes a positively
charged ion. The displaced electrons collide
with other gas molecules, which can cause an
avalanche of electron flow, and conduction
occurs between the two electrodes. Upon
removal of the voltage supply to the electrodes
of the photocell (accomplished by electronic
switching within the associated control unit), the
positively charged ions and the free electrons
recombine and the gas becomes non-
conducting. This process is repeated in a pre-
set gating fashion until the pre-determined
sequence of tube conductions (which have
been termed counts) are achieved.
In addition to the development of UVAFDS
for engine detection, several other development
efforts were conducted to improve fire/overheat
detection technology; however little enthusiasm
to implement these new detection technologies
were expressed by the aircraft user community.
It is believed that the reasons for this were:
Although there were numerous false fire
warnings on certain aircraft designs (while
the detection system vendors were
developing an appreciation of the
maintenance practices and application
constraints associated with the end item
environment and while the aircraft
designers and users were learning the
limitations associated with the detection
systems which they were implementing),
the number of false fire warnings and
undetected fires continued to decrease.
The trend was improvement.
Different detection techniques implemented
in the past, specifically optical detection, did
not improve the perceived performance
problems associated with continuous
element detection systems.
After witnessing past performance and
operational problems of various detection
systems when they were initially deployed,
no one wanted to be the first to trouble-
shoot new technology. The technical risk
was deemed too high.
Unless a specific aircraft user had several
experiences with undetected combustor-

can and/or afterburner nozzle burn-through
events, the general consensus was that the
level of detection coverage in aircraft
engine compartments was adequate.
Therefore, unless there is a recognized fault
mechanism which leads (or can lead, if allowed
to continue) to a fire or other hazardous
conditions and a continuous element of
detection system cannot provide timely warning
of that event, continuous thermal based
detection systems would continue to be the
preferred method of engine fire and overheat
detection. If the recognized fault mechanism
becomes a safety-of-flight issue, which
conventional detection technology cannot
reliably accommodate, then different
techniques for providing detection coverage
might be more seriously entertained. An
example of this is undetected combustor can
burn-through events. Heat transfer from a
small, discrete burn-through event is many
times not sufficient to allow a thermal element
detection system to reach its alarm threshold,
especially if the detection coverage is provided
with an averaging continuous element
detection system. When this is the case, either
sonic detection of the acoustics associated with
the event or UV detection of the burn-through
flame are two techniques that have been
demonstrated to be effective (3-8). Of these
two, only the UV detection systems technology
appears aircraft-ready.
With newer military aircraft designs placing
a greater emphasis on stealth technologies,
additional hazards are being created. Aircraft
designers are using the fuel cells to surround
the engines to minimize their spectral heat
signature. While this is effective for minimizing
observability of an aircraft, it raises concerns
that faults, such as combustor can burn
through's and failed seals, can allow fuel to
enter the hot engine compartment. These
types of events must be detected as early as
possible. For many of these reasons, USAFs
latest generation of fighters are now using UV
fire detection.
Smoke Detection Systems
Smoke detection, the primary means of
fire detection used in cargo compartments, has
not changed much over the last 50 years.
While solid state electronics and new optics
and new processing algorithms have been
introduced, the basic mechanism that these
detectors operate under has remained the
7
same. There are two basic designs of smoke
detectors: ionization and photoelectric.
Ionization type detectors monitor ionized
combustion by-products as they pass through a
charged electrical field. Photoelectric detectors
measure light attenuation and/or reflection
and/or .refraction and/or absorption of certain
wavebands, and as such, these types of
detectors are in the optical detector family.
Ionization smoke detectors were used in
early years, but this approach, for the most
part, has been abandoned. The typical
approach was to use a radioactive isotope as
the source to charge the combustion products;
however, this source also charges everything
else, including dust and fine water droplets.
These detectors sensitivities change with
pressure (i.e. altitude changes). Plus as they
age, they typically become more sensitive,
leading to increased false alarms. There are
still a fair number of these detectors, though
still flying today, found primarily on Airbus
aircraft, and some commercially available
ionization type smoke detectors have been
used, primarily by the commercial aviation
community, in lavatories and some cargo bays,
but these are almost always accessible areas
where a fire alarm indication can be verified.
Photoelectric based detectors have
became the industry standard for smoke
detectors, primarily because ionization type
detectors were found to be so unreliable. This
is not to imply that photoelectric based
detectors were overly impressive with respect
to freedom from false alarms, because these
types of detectors, too, have been quite
troublesome over the years.
Most cargo bay applications use
aerospace quality photoelectric type smoke
detectors that rely on scattered or reflected light
radiation caused by a particulate matter
between a radiation emitting source and a
detector device. The figure below illustrates the
operating principle of one particular
photoelectric smoke detector design.
The smoke detector industry, like the
thermal detection industry, has modified their
design approach based on negative
experiences on previously fielded systems;
specifically, false alarms, missed or slow
alarms, and low mean-time-between-failures
(MTBFs). As the smoke detector industry
transitioned their design to include solid state
circuitry, the smoke detectors sensitivity as a
function of time and temperature is less prone

to threshold drift. This, in turn, has made solid-
state-smoke detectors less prone to false
alarming in that their sensitivity setting remains
within calibration threshold alarm limits for a
longer period of time, and these threshold limits
should have been specifically catered to the
individual cargo bay environment. Another
advantage of solid state smoke detectors is the
use of longer life components. A good example
of this is the light source used in photoelectric
smoke detectors. Early models used a low
voltage light bulb that had an extremely short
life. The solid state photoelectric smoke
detectors use a long-life light emitting diode
(LED) as its source of light.
many lessons learned have been implemented
over the last several years, Including:
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One of the key reasons that cargo bay
fire detection technology has not evolved to a
level of performance equivalent to other fire
detection systems on the aircraft is multi-fold.
Cargo compartment environments vary so
greatly:
Sometimes cargo is packed loosely,
Sometimes it is packed in enclosed
containers (LD3 container),
Sometimes livestock, birds, even fish and
frogs are transported,
Some airlines periodically clean their
compartments, while others do not, making
for a very dusty environment,
Sometimes cargo compartments have very
hot and humid air in them and then the
airplane takes off, up to altitude where the
temperature is below the ambient airs dew
point,
Sometimes cargo compartments are in very
cold environments, and so on.
Because the variabilities of cargo
compartments are so much greater than the
8
variabilities of engine or fuel tank or dry bays,
designing a detection system which is smart
enough to correct for all these variabilities is
very difficult to achieve, especially when most
detection designers cannot even quantify what
the environment is, let alone the variability
associated with it.
Nevertheless, incremental
improvements have been introduced and have
improved the performance of smoke detection
systems. While other detection technologies
have been considered for cargo protection,
either in place of or in addition to smoke
detectors, none have really been able to
replace smoke detectors in-situ. One must
remember that cargo can be densely packed
or even placed inside containers. This can
permit deep seated fires to exist that emit very
little heat or visible flames. Smoke seems be
the most consistent parameter that exists when
cargo bay fires occur (although there are
exceptions to that, like when aerosol spray
cans are involved in a fire event) versus
monitoring optical radiation from a fire or using
closed circuit TVs to look for a fire and/or
adding thermal detection systems.
In the case of smoke detection systems,
Almost all aircraft OEMs have stopped
using ionization smoke detectors for cargo
applications;
Almost all aircraft OEMs have stopped
designing ducted smoke detection systems,
unless absolutely necessary. Instead, open
area designs are being used, designs that
rely on convective forces to carry the smoke
up to the smoke detector. Ducted based
systems used a vacuum system that
interfaced with the smoke detector and a
series of ducts that were routed throughout
the cargo compartment. It allowed fewer
smoke detectors to be used since the ducts
would pick up air samples from around the
cargo bay and transport these samples
back to the detector. However, because
these metallic ducts had a relatively higher
thermal mass, they created even a greater
water condensation issue for the smoke
detectors. Plus, they tended be worse for
picking up dust and other particulate matter,
almost like a vacuum cleaner.
Heaters and insulation were added to many
ducted systems. Heaters were also added

to many open area smoke detectors. The
heaters minimized the problem of water
condensing inside the smoke detectors.
Smarter detection logic, many times
embedded in software algorithms, has been
developed. This has allowed improved
processing and discrimination of smoke
particulates from all other non-smoke
matter.
While the response time for smoke
detectors, as installed in an aircraft system,
was reduced from five minutes to one
minute in the late 1980s, there is little
benefit in maximizing the speed of response
beyond this one minute requirement. It is
better to take the majority of the entire
minute to process air samples for smoke
by-products than to increase the risk of
false alarming because too little time was
spent on analyzing air samples.
Dual loop detection configurations (i.e. a combustible is still present, hot surfaces
redundant outputs) are more and more
being used. Like the engine detection
systems, at least two detectors must detect
smoke and their respective outputs are
ANDed together before a FIRE signal is
issued.
Improved dust screens and smoke
sampling chambers have been developed.
Thermal devices have been utilized in some
smoke detector devices. While the thermal
detectors output is NOT ANDed with the
smoke detector, the thermal monitoring can
accommodate those cases where flaming
combustion occurs, such as pressurized
aerosols as those found in some hair
sprays and deodorants, are involved in a
fire.
Fire Detection Comparison and Application
Recommendations
If the flight crew can be made aware of the
hazardous condition early enough in its
development, corrective action can be
implemented immediately, thereby,
mitigating/eliminating catastrophic conditions.
The response time associated with the
detection systems therefore becomes the most
critical factor as to whether the aircraft can be
successfully protected. Wright Patterson Air
Force Base, through the Boeing Military
Airplane Company, conducted a study that
supports this bold statement (14). Their
programs initial objective was to evaluate the
9
effectiveness of various extinguishing agents in
a dynamic engine environment. While this
objective was clearly met, another interesting
act was observed. When Halon 1301 was used
to extinguish fires in a simulated engine
application and it was introduced in a timely
fashion (specifically, within 12 seconds for their
particular application), its performance, based
on established extinguishing agent sizing
criteria, was acceptable and included a large
margin of safety. However, if a fire was
allowed to exist in the engine compartment for
as little as 15 seconds, the amount of agent, as
determined by accepted sizing requirements in
MIL-E-22285, did not appear to be adequate.
This finding, upon initial inspection, is
somewhat deceptive. In actuality, there is
enough agent to knock down the fire. But, if
there is air flow sufficient to dilute the
concentration of the extinguishing agent and if
created from the initial fire allow it to re-ignite.
This study found that if agent was introduced
within a 12 second period of time, hot surface
formation was minimized. Thus, the rapid
recognition of fire formation through detection,
in conjunction with rapid reaction to implement
corrective procedures, is of key importance to
the success of any protection system (whether
it be for a fire fighting system, such as those
used in aircraft engine nacelles and cargo
bays, or for an explosion protection system,
such as those used for dry by applications).
Table 1 illustrates some generalized
properties associated with various aircraft
detection concepts. Table 1 is dedicated
toward detection technologies used in fire
fighting type protection systems, such as
aircraft engine protection systems and cargo
protection systems. As can be seen upon
inspection of this table, certain concepts have
limitations with regard to certain features.
Therefore, the end-item environment and the
characteristics associated with the hazardous
even must be known and a detection system
trade study performed before a given detection
concept is pursued.
One technology that is not addressed in
Table 1 is fiber optic based systems. Great
strides have been made using fiber optics as a
wave guide to direct radiometric energy from an
area where a fire is occurring to a remote area
where an optical based sensor resides. This
approach can reduce the weight and cost of
detection systems in that fewer sensors are

needed (they are replaced by fiber bundles
which direct the energy back to a central
sensing unit). Fibers have also been used in
place of thermal sensors in the same fashion
as the continuous element systems, where
refracted and reflected light is measured as the
fiber is heated. These concepts look
encouraging, but are a few years away from
being ready for aircraft consideration. ENGINE
RECOMMEDATION-With regard to detection,
as can be observed upon inspection of Table 1,
two to three detection concepts could be (or
have been) deployed for aircraft engine
compartment protection, specifically including,
continuous element thermal detection (either
electrical based, pneumatic based), ultraviolet
(UV) optical detection, and even infrared (IR)
for lower temperature engine applications.
Of these concepts, conventional
continuous element detection probably
represents the most versatile and lowest
technical risk approach: primarily because so
many lesson-learned have resulted through so
many years of service. It can be used in the
largest variety of engine applications because
of its durable design and ability to live in very
high temperature environments.
UV detection can accommodate a
temperature environment of at least 400oF to
500oF (200o to 260oC) which is adequate for
most engine applications, but IR detection can
only operate in a less than 300oF (150oC)
environment. Since aircraft and engine OEMs
have a better understanding of the operational
characteristics and limitations associated with
continuous thermal detection systems, more so
than optical based systems, and the thermal
detection vendors have developed an
increased understanding of the operational and
maintenance characteristics associated with
aircraft engine applications, most of the
operational inadequacies associated with
thermal detection systems from past years
have been minimized.
New features are also now offered in
continuous element detection systems that
further enhance their reliability and
maintainability aspects. They include:
Automatic, periodic self-test and system
reconfiguration,
Fault location/isolation to the line
replaceable unit level
Self-health monitoring which automatically
notifies the maintenance crew that a
10
component is deteriorating, before a fault
occurs.
These features can lead to increased
detection confidence and improved aircraft
dispatchability (mission readiness).
When improved coverage is a necessity
and/or weight and maintainability are major
considerations, UV detection system deserves
consideration.
While an experience base has been
acquired over the last 30 years with IR based
detection systems in powerplant environments,
it probably cannot be considered too favorable.
It did serve as a reminder that either the OEM
or the optical detection vendor had better be
familiar with all the radiation emitting sources
which may be present in the engine nacelle
environment, or false alarm problems could
result. For the most part, IR detection systems
today are far superior with respect to
discriminating a non-fire radiation source from a
true fire event.
IR based detection system designs offer
less attenuation from contaminants which may
be present in the engine compartment, but it is
theoretical fact that IR detection systems
cannot achieve the same level of detection
coverage (i.e., sensitivity) as UV detection
systems without significantly impacting its false
alarm susceptibility. There is a smaller
radiometric signal to noise ratio associated with
hot engine nacelles for most portions of the IR
spectrum compared to other regions of the
spectrum, such as the UV. Furthermore, IR
radiation from a hydrocarbon fire attenuates
with decreasing air pressure, so its sensitivity
threshold must be extrapolated to
accommodate high altitude engine fires (16).
Nevertheless, state of the art IR detection
systems have been designed and
demonstrated to provide adequate performance
characteristics for lower temperature, lower
altitude aircraft installations. A form, fit, but
functionally superior replacement of the early
cad-sulfide IR detector is now available.
Aircraft systems with this early design could
improve their performance and reduce their
maintenance and spares costs without having
to retrofit. The new IR sensor is identified as
preferred spare.
The form, fit, but functionally superior
replacement of the cad-sulfide detector
monitors the 4.3 micrometer CO2 spectral
emission band, unique to hydrocarbon fires.
An estimate of 24% of the total infrared radiant
 11

energy is emitted in this narrow band (17). This makes thermal based systems alone
dominant emission band, coupled with the impractical, also. While other combustion
measured presence of flicker, gives a high gases, such as CO or CO2, could be monitored,
degree of confidence that, when an alarm is these gases can be introduced from sources
issued, the source being detected is a fire. other than fires (exhalation from live animals,
CARGO BAY DETECTION: Despite the plants, etc.). Plus, most commercially-available
incremental improvement incorporated into detectors for monitoring these gases are easily
modern day smoke detectors there are still contaminated and have short lives. The
many limitations associated with smoke presence of smoke seems to be the most
detector applications. Since these devices rely consistent parameter associated with a cargo
on mass transfer of particulate matter as their bay fire. However, combinations of these other
means of determining whether a fire event is technologies, in conjunction with smoke
occurring, their operational success depends detection, will be included in the next-
highly on the placement of these devices with generation of cargo bay detection system
respect to where a fire event is
expected/suspected to occur. Air flow rate and
its dynamic characteristics are the most
important factors associated with whether the
smoke detection installation is able to detect
the early stages of combustion. The relative
placement of the detector with respect to the
fire must permit the air flow to carry the
combustion by-products to the detection
device. If adequate coverage is not obtained,
either air samples must mechanically be
obtained and transported to the smoke detector
or the smoke detector must be brought closer
to or in the airflow path of the hazard area.
APPLICATION RECOMMENDATION:
As outlined above the IR based smoke detector
remains the recommended technology for
cargo bay applications and when installed in
dual loop configuration more acceptable levels
of performance and false alarm immunity can
be achieved. However some other potential
technologies are discussed below
Designs for a laser-based smoke
detection system have been investigated. This
particular device would offer increased
sensitivity with better resolution and
discrimination from particulate matter that was
not generated by a fire. Up to 0.1%
obscuration levels are achievable. Plus, this
smoke detector offers an analog output if
trend information is of interest. However,
these devises do not operate too well in high
vibration environments, such as aircraft. For
this reason, this approach never has
perpetuated into aircraft cargo compartments.
Since one cannot count on a visual line-
of-sight of a cargo bay fire, future cargo
detection technologies cannot rely on the use
of video camera or thermal imaging devices.
Deep seated fires and/or fires inside LD3
containers will still be hidden. This reality
 13

TABLE 1. FIRE DETECTION SENSOR PROPERTIES

(NEAR-READY FOR EXISTING AIRCRAFT TECHNOLOGIES)

IR based
THERMAL CONTINUOUS
SENSOR UV (Single Band, 2 band IR, SMOKE
ELEMENT
UV/IR, etc.)
5 SEC MAX. WHEN
1-2 SEC POSSIBLE, BUT 0.1-2 SEC, BUT IMMERSED IN FIRE, BUT <60 SEC TO STANDARD
SPEED OF RESPONSE (NOM)
5 SEC RECOMMENDED 5 SEC RECOMMENDED ACTUAL TIME DEPENDS ON SMOKE GENERATOR
CONVECTIVE FORCES
RELATIVE RESPONSIVITY to
VERY HIGH HIGH LOW LOW
FIRE HAZARD
o o
APPROXIMATE FIELD OF APPROACHES 180 SOLID APPROACHES 120 SOLID RELIES ON CONVECTIVE RELIES ON CONVECTIVE
VIEW CONE (+ REFLECTIONS) CONE ANGLE HEAT TRANSFER MASS TRANSFER
GOOD, PRONE TO ARC
WELDING, SUSTAINED SUSCEPTIBLE TO DUST
RELATIVE FALSE ALARM BETTER THAN UV EXCELLENT, IF UNDAMAGED
ELEC. ARCS & SUNTAN & HUMIDITY
LAMPS
o o o
400 F W/ TRANSIENTS 260 F W/ TRANSIENTS UP 1200 F DEPENDING ON o
OPERATING TEMPERATURE o o 160 F
UP TO 500 F TO 300 F or HIGHER DESIGN
0.01 LBS. / FT. + 0.25 lbs. FOR
SENSOR WEIGHT (NOM) 0.25-0.4 LBS 0.3 0.5 LBS 0.75-1.25 LBS.
END CONNECTORS
SMART; OUTPUTS ITS SMART; OUTPUTS ITS
NON-SMART SENSOR* NON SMART SENSOR*
OWN FIRE SIGNAL OWN FIRE SIGNAL
SENSOR: LOW COST SENSOR: HIGHEST COST SENSOR: LOWEST COST SENSOR: MED. COST
SYSTEM: LOWEST COST SYSTEM: MED.COST SYSTEM: HIGH COST SYSTEM: HIGH COST

OTHER CHARACTERISTICS HIGH MTBF AVG. MTBF HIGHEST MTBF AVG. MTBF

REMOTE MOUNTING REMOTE MOUNTING LOCALIZED ROUTING FREMOTE MOUTING

FIELDED CONCEPT FIELDED CONCEPT FIELDED CONCEPT FIELDED CONCEPT

*CONTROL ELECTRONICS / CIRCUIT CARD INTERFACE REQUIRED TO PROCESS DATA COLLECTED BY SENSOR (Not Applicable to pneumatic based
thermal detection sensors)

designs. Smarter processing, using fuzzy
logic principals, trending information, etc.
should make this next generation of cargo
detection systems far superior, with respect to
performance, to the current generation of cargo
detection systems.
EXTINGUISHING AND SUPPRESSION
SYSTEMS
Engine Extinguishing Applications
With the exception of cargo bay
environments, which utilized portable hand-held
CO2 extinguishers, the engine compartment
was the first area to receive fire extinguishing
coverage. It was found that in order for the
engine extinguisher to be effective, the source
of combustible fluid entry (jet fuel, hydraulic
fluid, and engine oil) into the engine
compartment must be eliminated. If it were not,
after the extinguishing agent dissipated, if the
ignition source was still present (which it often
was), the fire would just reoccur. This is the
reason that an engine is shut down and the fuel
supply shut off before an aircraft fire
extinguisher is activated. Because of this
practice, which still applies today, only multi-
engine aircraft typically utilize extinguishing
systems.
Some of the first aircraft to deploy fixed
fire extinguishing systems for engine protection
included the C-46, C-47, B-17, and the B-26
aircraft, back in the 1930s and 1940s. While
the system was effective when activated early
in the fire development, it had a significant
weight penalty associated with it. Nominally
speaking, one pound by weight of CO2 can only
protect approximately a 15 cubic foot (0.425
cubic meters) volume for hydrocarbon based
aircraft fuels. Plus, the pressure associated
with the CO2 fire extinguisher is relatively high
at the maximum design temperature (3000 psi
at 160oF; 207 bar at 71oC).
In the late 1940s time frame,
halogenated hydrocarbon (later termed, halons)
fire extinguishing agents were introduced. The
primary agents used for fixed fire extinguishing
systems were methylbromide (Halon 1001) and
bromochloromethane (CB, Halon 1011).
Carbon tetrachloride (Halon 104) was also
introduced but it was only used in hand-held
portable extinguishers.
Halon 1011 agent eventually displaced
Halon 1001 for engine extinguishing systems
primarily because of toxicity and corrosion
14
concerns. It became the extinguishing agent of
choice until the modern halons were
introduced. In fact some aircraft operators
even used Halon 1011 in their hand-held
portable extinguishers. It was much lighter that
a CO2 system. One pound of Halon 1011 was
required to cover around 25 to 30 cubic feet
(0.71 to 0.85 cubic meters) for jet fuel fire
fighting. However, greater attention with
respect to the distribution manifold and nozzle
outlet designs was required because the agent
typically discharged as a liquid as opposed to a
vapor. Because of this particular property, the
use of spray nozzles and piccolo spray tubes
were introduced and subsequently used.
Even though Halon 1011 was less toxic
than 1001, it was still higher than the halons
which were introduced in the early 1950s.
They included Dibromodifluoromethane (Halon
1202), Dibromoflouromethane (Halon 1211),
Bromotrifluoromethane (Halon 1301), and a
lesser extent 1,2-Dibromotetrafluorethane
(Halon 2402). As the number of halogenated
hydrocarbons or halon increased, the selection
of which agent to utilize for a given engine
application became a matter of organizational
preference and specific needs. The U.S. Navy
opted to pursue and utilize the higher vapor
pressure Halon 1301; the primary reason being
lower toxicity (which was a legitimate safety
concern of carrier-based aircraft). This system
was configured as a high rate discharge
system. The U.S. Air Force, on the other hand,
remained with a relatively low vapor agent,
specifically Halon 1202. While 1202 was less
toxic than Halon 1011, it was not as low as
1301. Since 1202 was demonstrated to be
slightly more effective on a weight basis and
the Air Force felt that these extinguisher
devices would only be used to protect
unmanned areas, such as engine
compartments, the toxicity of 1202, was not felt
to be a deterrent. The Europeans preferred
Halon 1211 and the Russians, Australians, and
many Eastern countries, opted for Halon 2402.
Because of its lower density, it
appeared that the Halon 1301 systems would
require more agent than 1202 and 1211 based
systems and would require containers which
could safely contain higher pressures, and thus
result in a heavier system. This was not
necessarily the case. Because of the high
vapor pressure of 1301, the use of elaborate
spray nozzles and spray bars was no longer
required. Plus, since these new Halon 1301

extinguisher systems were designed to
discharge at a very high rate, it was more
important to get the agent into the protected
area as quickly as possible, than to distribute it
through nozzles which were designed to
increase the dispersion volume, but in turn
would slow down agent discharge times. The
pressure of the 1301 as it transitioned from a
liquid to a vapor was typically sufficient to
ensure thorough volumetric distribution. This
high rate discharge concept was also later
deployed with Halon 1202 agent (on the F-111)
and was deemed to be successful. However,
more recent studies have questioned this
design approach with the Halon 1202.
Over the next 30 years, Halon 1301 has
essentially displaced most of the Halon 1011,
1202, and 1211 systems, but there are still
some older aircraft flying today with these other
agents.
In recent years, due to international
agreement to ban the production and use of
ozone depleting substances, including all the
halons, the need for alternate extinguishing
agents to the halons has arisen. This subject is
discussed in greater detail in the later portions
of this paper.
The design of the vessel to contain the
extinguishing agent has also evolved through
the years. When the CO2 systems were
employed, heavy steels were used to form the
bottle. With the introduction of the low vapor
pressure halons which were only super-
pressurized to a nominal 360 psig (25 bar) with
nitrogen and with the use of new stainless
steels, very light-weight extinguisher vessel
designs resulted. However, with the advent of
high rate discharge systems which utilized
high vapor pressure halon agents
(specifically, Halon 1301) and were super-
pressurized to 600 psig (40 bar), the pressures
that a vessel had to withstand again increased,
like the old CO2 systems. Fortunately, new
stainless steel alloys, including 304 and 21-6-9
(Nitronic 40), were also introduced. This
minimized the impact of greater wall thickness
needed to withstand these higher pressures.
Because a spherical shaped pressure vessel
design represents the most weight and volume
efficient geometrical configuration for
containing the most agent, and this shape is
the strongest with respect to tensile and yield
stresses, it was and continues to be the most
popular extinguisher vessel design. However,
because of occasional installation constraints,
15
some applications have been forced to utilize
cylindrical shaped extinguisher designs, even
for the high vapor pressure 1301 systems.
Figure below illustrates various versions of
these two basic designs. Although non-
standard sizes ranging from less than 40 to
2500 cubic inches (656 to 40,975 cubic
centimeters, cm3), have been developed, and
fielded, standardized sizes, as specified in the
U.S. Military Specification MIL-E-22284, offer
cost efficiencies.
kkkk
The standardized sizes of MIL-E-22284
include: 86 cubic inches (1,410 cubic
centimeters, cm3), 224 cubic inches (3,671
cm3), 378 cubic inches (6,195 cm3), 536 cubic
inches (8,785 cm3), 630 (10,326 cm3), 945
cubic inches (15,489 cm3), and 1050 cubic
inches (17,210 cm3).
Although not included in the MIL SPEC,
several other sizes have become readily
available and commercially competitive with
these standard size extinguishers. These are
the basic designs for the extinguisher vessels
used today for engine protection systems.
These extinguisher designs almost all use
pyrotechnic cartridges that rupture a burst disc.
The more modern designs utilize cartridges that
are certified to meet one amp at one watt
without detonating and meet the
electromagnetic requirements of MIL-I-23659
(HERO).
Cargo Extinguishing and Inerting
Applications
Cargo compartments have traditionally
been protected with hand-held fire

extinguishers (water or Halon 1211 or both) if
the compartment was accessible and with a
fixed Halon 1301 fire extinguishing/inerting
system if the compartment was not accessible.
Fixed cargo bay fire suppression
systems are more akin to industrial type
suppression systems than to aircraft engine
extinguishing systems. The dynamic airflow is
lower in the cargo bay, and its flow
characteristics are far more predictable and
characterize-able.
Like engine extinguishing systems, a
Cargo bay suppression system is required to
provide an initial peak volumetric agent
concentration of at least 5% and this
concentration should be achieved as quickly as
possible to knock-down the fire (engine
systems are actually required to achieve a 6%
concentration). Unlike the engine extinguishing
system, however, a cargo suppression system
is also required to maintain a concentration of
at least 3% for some extended period of time.
The typical time period for keeping the
compartment inert against flaming combustion
is 60 minutes, however this can vary depending
on the route the aircraft is commissioned to fly,
and in extended operations (ETOPS/EROPS)
inerting periods can be considerably longer.
For example, wide body aircraft that fly over
water can require inerting coverage from a
suppression system ranging from two to four
hours (the longer the inerting coverage, the
greater the distance the aircraft can fly from
potential emergency landing sites).
For example, wide body aircraft that fly
over water can require inerting coverage from a
suppression system ranging from two to four
hours (the longer the inerting coverage, the
greater the distance the aircraft can fly from
potential emergency landing sites.
Inerting cargo compartments, after fire
knock-down, is necessary because some
carriers use enclosed containers, such as LD3
containers, to store the passenger luggage and
other cargo inside, and for those that do not
use containers, their cargo can be densely
packed. In either case, the extinguishing agent
may not be able to reach the source of the
combustion to completely extinguish deep-
seated fires. Since complete fire extinction
cannot be assured, the compartment is inerted
to prevent the fire from re-igniting or growing.
When the aircraft lands, the ground fire fighters
ensure that complete fire extinction is achieved.
16
A typical cargo fire suppression system
will consist of two fire extinguishers (or two fire
extinguisher banks) connected to single or
multiple cargo compartments by distribution
plumbing. The knock-down or High Rate
Discharge (HRD) extinguisher provides the
required 5% volumetric concentration and the
second Low Rate Discharge (LRD) extinguisher
provides the metered inerting concentration of
3%. A schematic diagram of a typical
HRD/LRD system is shown.
Typical HRD/LRD Cargo Fire Suppression
System - Dual Compartment
Since halon is a refrigerant, when it is
metered into the cargo compartment during the
extended inerting operation, its expansion
through restricting orifice creates cooling. If
there are any residual moisture particles in the
halon (which can be the case quite frequently),
the restricting orifice and/or plumbing lines tend
to freeze up. To negate this effect, methanol
can be added to the halon to act as an
antifreeze. While this is an effective approach
to minimize freezing lines, it also creates a
maintenance/quality requirement to make sure
that when these extinguishers are refilled, they
are filled with the specified amount of
methanol-doped halon. This can create a
logistical burden. Plus, methanol-doped halon
is far more difficult to recycle creating a risk that
stored banks of halon could progressively
become contaminated.
The recommended approach for
removing water from the extinguishing agent to
prevent freezing is to use a moisture filter or
drying device, upstream of any metering
orifices. This approach ensures that the
metered flow of halon will have any residual
water filtered out of it. There are several
designs on the market today that offer
integrated filter/dryer assemblies, a typical unit
is shown below.

Typical Dryer Metering Unit
Passenger Compartment
With regard to the extinguishing
protection, hand held Halon 1211 and/or water
extinguishers have been the approved
approach for accessible fire fighting
applications for over 50 years.
There are no unique aviation
standards that portable fire extinguishers must
meet, in that the FAA (nor any other
airworthiness authority) does not specifically
approve hand-held fire extinguishers. The FAA
accepts hand-held fire extinguishers in
accordance with guidance stated in Advisory
Circular (AC) 20-42C, Hand Fire Extinguishers
for use in Aircraft. This AC states that hand-
held portable extinguishers must be approved
by Underwriters Laboratories, Inc. (UL). In
addition to the ULs approval, the FAA accepts
Factory Mutual Research Corp. and US Coast
Guards hand held fire extinguishers under 46
CFR for use in aircraft.
Generally the kinds of fires that are likely to
occur in an aircraft are Class A, B and C since
the material used in the aircraft interior
construction and articles carried in the aircraft
passenger compartment usually fall into these
categories. These classifications for fires, as
defined by the National Fire Protection
Association, are defined as follows:
Class A: Fires involving ordinary
combustible solid materials, such as wood,
paper, rubber and many plastics
Class B: Fire involving flammable liquids,
oils, greases, paints, lacquers and
flammable gases
Class C: Fires involving energized
electrical equipment
The number of hand-held fire
extinguishers to be carried in an aircraft is
generally determined by the number of seats
and the FAA, JAA, etc. stipulate the location
and the fact that at least two of the
extinguishers should contain Halon 1211.
Typically, the extinguishers contain 2.5 to 3.3
lbs (1.1 to 1.5 kg) of halon and have a 5-B:C
rating. In order to meet the requirement for
fighting a Class A fire, a water extinguisher or
17
alternatively a 9 lbs. (4kg) Halon 1211
extinguisher is also required. The mix and
configuration of halon and water extinguishers
is usually determine by available space and
economic constraints.
The FAA has recently established a
Minimum Performance Standard (MPS) for the
certification of Halon alternative agents in hand-
held extinguishers. The MPS certification
criterion is based on performance including a
hidden fire challenge, as might occur in the
cheek area (the volume between the interior
lining and the aircraft structure), and
toxicological requirements. As yet no hand-held
extinguisher has been approved to meet all of
these requirements. It is expected that it will be
2002 or beyond before an approved hand-held
portable that uses an alternate extinguishing
agent to halon is on the market.
Alternate Extinguishing Agents
For environmental reasons, production
of halon, as well as other ozone depleting
chemicals, has been banned by international
agreement (15).
However, the use of halons is still
permitted for essential applications, such as
aircraft, until a suitable replacement agent can
be developed, approved, and certified for
aircraft use. Until that time comes, existing
stocks of halon, recovered from
decommissioned industrial and consumer fire
protection systems, are sufficient to support
many years of aircraft production and use. It is
necessary, however, to restore the halon to its
original purity before reuse in aircraft fire
extinguishers. Halon recycling machines have
been developed to accommodate this function.
Used halon is acquired, it is recycled and
reconditioned, and then stored in a halon bank
for future use by aircraft (and some other
essential use) applications.
While recycling and banking may
support the existing world aircraft fleet,
increased production and the introduction of
new aircraft and new applications requiring
extinguishing and/or suppression (e.g. narrow
body Class D cargo compartment
extinguishing/inerting and military aircraft dry
bay protection) pose the need to develop a
replacement agent for halon.
Most of leading candidates to replace
halon are included in Table 2, as is Halon 1211
and 1301. A few replacement candidates have
been eliminated because of their high Ozone

Depletion Potential (ODP) or long atmospheric
lifetimes and high Global Warming Potential
(GWP). Other technologies, such as water mist
and inert gas systems are available and could
potentially replace Halon 1301 in certain
applications, like cargo compartment
suppression. These technologies would require
different systems than currently used and are
discussed at the end of this section.
Table 2 identifies the various nomenclatures
associated with each agent as well as physical
and chemical properties. An agent with an ODP
> 0 is not acceptable for use. ODP is reported
relative to the ODP of CFC-11 (which is
assigned an ODP of 1). There is no formal
international policy regarding GWP, but current
sentiment is that if an agent has a significant
GWP value, its use could be
limited/affected/regulated in the future. To
some extent this has already occurred with the
limitation on use of Perflourocarbon candidates
(not shown in Table 2). Thus, low GWPs are
highly desirable. GWP is reported relative to
carbon dioxide (which has a GWP of 1). With
respect to atmospheric lifetime, this number
identifies the stability of a particular chemical
when released to the atmosphere. The longer
its atmospheric life, the more damaging it could
be with respect to global warming.
It should be noted that agents with low
boiling points and high vapor pressures are
commonly called "gaseous agents" and higher
boiling, lower vapor pressure agents are
commonly called "streaming agents". For total
flooding systems, lower boiling/higher vapor
pressure agents are preferred, but their use is
not exclusive; higher boiling agents have been
successfully employed in aviation applications.
Table 2 also shows acute inhalation toxicity
information. The LOAEL (the lowest
concentration of agent causing an adverse
effect), and the NOEAL, (the highest
concentration of agent without showing an
adverse effect) for the various agents. The
acute inhalation toxicity is where 50% of rats
are killed after a four-hour exposure to the
agent. It should be noted that a 15-minute
exposure requirement has been used for some
agents.
The table also includes a standard test,
which offers insight with respect to each
agents extinguishing efficiency: the cup burner
test. This test indicates the amount of agent in
volume percent required to extinguish a
heptane flame contained in a burner cup.
18
Heptane fuel is the "standard" fuel for
measuring extinguishing performance;
however, methanol data is also shown. The
relative performance, based on the heptane
burner cup test, is also shown in the table. The
volumetric concentration is converted, based
on the agent's density and molecular weight, to
the amount required on a mass basis, and then
this value is normalized to the amount of Halon
1301 required to extinguish a flame.
Similarly, the amount of agent on a
liquid volume basis is also presented. This
gives one an idea how much bigger an
alternate agent vessel would have to be to
contain the agent.
The amount of agent that is required to
inert a compartment is shown for reference.
Typically this requires more agent to keep a
flame from igniting than to extinguish a flame.
Lastly, the chemical companies that are
supplying these agents are shown for
reference. All the chemicals shown are
commercially available.
Upon review, it is evident that there is
no clear winner with respect to a replacement
for Halon 1301 in fire suppression systems that
will use similar hardware and architecture.
Each candidate has at least one characteristic
that makes it inferior to Halon 1301. Thus when
considering these agents for future
applications, the trade-off of the least important
property to the customer will have to made.
Only CF3I, FM-200 and FE-25TM have
acceptable ODPs and GWPs. FE-13TM and FE-
36TM have GWPs that are considered far too
high; thus these agents will, most likely, never
be used for aircraft applications (except
possibly for portables or lavatory automatic
extinguishers). FE-25TM has a desirable vapor
pressure for Halon-like distribution at low
temperatures, however, agents with similar
volatilities to CF3I and FM-200 have been
used in low temperature applications before
and these agent have been demonstrated to
work at low temperatures.
For engine nacelle applications, CF3I,
TM
FE-25 and FM-200 have been deemed
acceptable for use in terms of their toxicological
properties (these agents are all EPA approved
for use in non-occupied spaces). FM-200 may
be the only agent considered for use in cargo
applications, as it is EPA approved for use in
occupied spaces.
With respect to extinguishing efficiency,
CF3I is by far the most efficient but it can only

be used in unoccupied spaces. FM-200 is
more efficient than FE-25TM on a system weight
and volume basis.
CF3I, FM-200 and FE-25TM are
currently available and approved by the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and
National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) for
production use.
FE-25TM has been fielded in production
military engine nacelle and APU applications.
FM-200 has been employed in over 40,000
industrial fire protection systems worldwide.
Concerns regarding exposure
constraints, handling, and long term storage of
CF3I appear to be mostly resolved, clearing the
way for CF3I use for non-occupied spaces on
aircraft.
Other technologies such as water mist
and inert gas systems are also receiving the
attention of the aviation fire protection
community. These systems use radically
different hardware and system architectures to
Halon 1301 systems.
Conventional inert gas systems are
large and heavy and therefore unattractive to
the aviation community. However, some new
and novel inert gas systems have been
demonstrated to work on some military
applications. Inert gases can be generated
pyrotechnically (for dry bay suppression
systems) or by on board inert gas generator
systems (for fuel tank inerting systems). It
should be noted that technical barriers do exist
before these types of systems can find more
widespread employment but the environmental
benefits will ensure that research will continue
in this area.
Water mist and water mist combined
with inert gas systems have been
demonstrated to work on the cargo fire threat.
System weights are comparable with Halon
1301 if a zonal method of water mist application
is employed. Water mist systems are more
complex that those of Halon 1301 but, again,
the environmental benefits will ensure research
in this area continues.
Both the technologies mentioned above
are extremely promising but their use will
probably be limited to cargo bays only and
cannot be utilized without more detailed test
work.
19
AIRCRAFT FIRE PREVENTION
TECHNOLOGIES & EXPLOSION
PROTECTION SYSTEMS
Fuel Tank Protection
In the 1950s, attention to protecting the
fuel tanks of aircraft began receiving greater
attention. The C-5 was one of the first aircraft
to use stored nitrogen systems that was
metered into the aircraft fuel tank ullage. The
inert gas lowered the oxygen content in the
ullage, preventing any ignition source from
igniting the flammable vapor. This system was
very effective, but it was also very heavy and
expensive to maintain.
The Europeans started fitting fuel tanks
with active ullage protection systems. These
systems utilized a cold cathode detection
sensor, which monitored for optical radiation in
the near infrared (IR) region. These optical
based protection systems ended up being used
on a number of aircraft including the Vulcun,
Victor, Valient, and the Hunter aircraft. While
there may be a few of these systems still flying
today, for the most part, this approach was
discontinued in the early 1960s, primarily
because of false alarms with the detection
system.
Other versions of detection sensors
were tried for active fuel tank protection
systems, the significant ones included pressure
sensors and gravity inertia or g sensors. Like
the early optical sensors, pressure sensors
were used to activate high speed suppressor
devices that quenched flame fronts that could
result from ballistic penetration. The g sensor
approach, however, was used to activate fuel
tank suppressors in crash related scenarios.
Since that time, these fuel tank protection
concepts have found limited application
onboard aircraft for fire and explosion
applications, but few are still flying today.
These re-active fuel tank ullage
protection system must be extremely rapid in
response to successfully protect a fuel tank. In
fact, since this type of protection system must
be configured to protect a fuel system under
the worst-case scenario, which includes a
premix/stoichiometric (or slightly richer than
stoichiometric) fuel-air vapor environment, an
ullage protection system must be even faster
than a dry bay protection system (discussed
later in this paper) to deploy suppression agent
if combustion overpressures are to be
 20

TABLE 2. FIRE EXTINGUISHING AGENT PROPERTIES

RELATIVE TO JET FUEL FIRES

FM-200
FE-13 FE-25 FE-36
Name (HFC- ITM BTM BCF
(HFC-23) (HFC-125) (HFC236fa)
227ea)
Chemical Formula CF3H CF3CF2H CF3CFHCF3 CF3CH2CF3 CF3I CF3Br CF2ClBr
Halon No. 13 25 37 36 (13001) 1301 1211
Refrigerant No. 23 125 227ea 236fa 13I1 13B1 12B1
ODP (CFC11 = 1) 0 0 0 0 0.0001 12-13 5.1
100 Year GWP (CO2 = 1) 11,700 2,800 2,900 6,300 <1 5,400
Atmospheric Lifetime (years) 264 32.6 36.5 209 <0.005 65 20
Molecular Weight 70.01 120.02 170.03 152.04 195.91 148.90 165.36
Boiling Point (C) -82.0 -48.3 -16.36 -1.4 -22.5 -57.8 -4
Freezing Point (C) -155 -103 -131 -103 -78 -168.0 -160.5
Vapor Pressure (bar(a) at 25C) 45.2 13.1 4.5 2.724 5.4 16.0 2.8
-3
Liquid Density (g.cm at 25C) 0.67 1.190 1.43 1.360 2.096 1.54 1.8
Critical Temperature (C) 25.9 66.3 101.7 124.9 100 67 153.8
Critical Pressure (bar(a)) 48.4 35.9 28.7 32 4.04 39.6 41.0
-3
Critical Density (g.cm ) 0.53 0.571 0.621 0.5553 0.745 0.713
-1
Heat of Vaporization (J.g @ Boil pt) 240 164.4 132.6 160.0 112.3 121 137
-1 -1 1.377 @-
Specific Heat Liquid (J.g .K @ 25C) 1.26 1.102 1.1085 0.883 0.783
40C
-1 -1 0.888 @-
Specific Heat Vapor (J.g .K @ 25C) 0.800 0.777 0.8444 0.361 0.473 0.460
40C
*
Inhalation Toxicity (volume %) >65 >70 >79 >18.9 27.4 80 13
Lowest Concentration Causing an Adverse 0.4
>50 10.0 10.5 15 7.5 1.0
Cardiotoxic Effect (LOAEL, volume %)
Highest Concentration Causing No Adverse
30 7.5 9.0 10 0.2 5.0 0.5
Cardiotoxic Effect (NOAEL, volume %)
Safety Ratio (NOAEL/Design Concentration) 2.0 0.69 1.2 1.6 0.06 1.3 0.12

EPA SNAP List Approval Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes N/A N/A
Heptane Cup Burner (volume %) 12.4 9.0 6.4 6.3 3.0 3.3 3.6
Methanol Cup Burner (volume %) 16.3 12.4 10.0 7.4 3.8 5.9 8.2
Inerting Conc. (volume %) Propane 19.8 15.7 11.5 6.5 7.7 5.9
Mass Equivalence Relative to Halon 1301 1.8 2.2 2.2 1.8 1.2 1.0 1.2
Liquid Volume Equivalence Rel. to 1301 4.1 2.7 2.4 2.0 0.9 1.0 1.0
Company DuPont DuPont Great Lakes DuPont AJAY - -

* 15 minute exposure Unoccupied applications only

 21

suppressed to acceptable levels.

Because a suppressor may be activated
when the fuel tank is nearly full (small ullage)
and there is limited venting, it is critical that the
suppressor, when discharging its contents,
does not create excessive overpressures. This
can be the case with a pressurized suppressor.
Therefore, suppressors that had low vapor
pressure suppression agent had to be used for
fuel tank environments. While these devices
still introduce turbulence that can accelerate
the flame front and its related pressure wave, it
minimized this effect.
The first fuel tank protection suppressor
designs used low vapor pressure agents and
were not pressurized. They used a pyrotechnic
charge that detonates in the liquid agent,
creating a shock wave that ruptured the vessel
along pre-scored lines.
Cylindrical shaped canister suppression
vessels, as well as hemispherical and tubular
vessels, which contained low vapor pressure
suppression agent were designed to meet the vv
extremely high agent release times, in the
range of less than a couple of milliseconds. Of these devices, only the cylindrical
Conversely, High Rate Discharge engine and canister type suppressor was eventually
cargo fire extinguishers have agent out times pursued and deployed for fuel tank protection
on the order of one second. Figure below applications.
illustrates these three designs. Each was The canister type suppressor offered
designed to petal open from the hydraulic ram the unique feature of being able to be stacked
forces created when a pyrotechnic device was on top of each other, so that this suppression
initiated in the liquid agent. The hydraulic system could be catered to each fuel tank
forces were sufficient to rupture the containing system. A version of this design was used in a
vessel along pre-scored etches and a very fine fuel tank ullage protection system for the F-105,
atomized liquid was dispersed. High speed the Buccaneer, the Canberra and some U.S.
motion pictures of the dispersion of liquid agent Navy aircraft (which all used Halon 1011), plus
show that the agent droplets were dispersed the Vulcun, Victor, Valient, and Hunter aircraft
around four feet (1.2 meters) radially for the (which used pentane). While these suppression
cylindrical canister suppressors and around 15 systems did not perpetuate into future fuel tank
feet (4.6 meters) linearly for the hemispherical protection systems, the reasons were not
and tubular suppressors (9). The figure because of their ineffectiveness; it was
opposite illustrates the linear dispersion rate of because the detection portion of the system
the low vapor pressure Halon 1011 in a was susceptible to false alarms.
hemispherical suppressor as function of time.
Similarly dispersion times were measured with
the other suppressor designs (10).

nn
One of the more interesting suppression
agents that was used in these suppression
devices was pentane fuel. The theory behind
this form of suppression is to drive the fuel tank
ullage into an overly fuel rich condition so that
combustion cannot occur (not enough oxygen
to support combustion). Obviously, this type of
suppression system must be applied with care,
but it has been shown to be quite effective. It
also offers the advantages of low weight and no
fuel contamination when deployed.
With the new emphasis on aircraft
survivability, many of these active protection
component designs are being considered
again, but for dry bay applications more so than
wet bays. The advancements in optics and
electronics have made these systems more
reliable and even faster responding.
From the 1950s and into the 1960s,
other forms of fuel tank protection arose in
addition to fuel tank inerting with nitrogen and
reactive protection systems:
Aircraft fuel system designers placed
greater emphasis in ensuring that isolated
conductors which could serve as an
electrical charge collector were eliminated.
In those cases, where the fuel system
designer could not eliminate the isolated
conductor inside the fuel cell, the
capacitance of the conductor was
measured to ensure that it could not collect
sufficient charge to ignite flammable fuel
vapors.
Less volatile fuels were pursued. Typically,
naval aircraft used the least volatile fuels
since aircraft fires onboard naval aircraft
carriers could be devastating.
Stored nitrogen inerting systems were
displaced on newer military aircraft with
stored Halon 1301 inerting systems. These
systems would only be activated when the
aircraft was in a potential hostile threat
22
area.
Many military aircraft users started using
flexible polyurethane foam materials inside
their fuel tanks. This sponge like material
served as a heat sink that thermally cooled
a flame front, thereby reducing the
combustion overpressures inside the fuel
cell, whether the flame front was generated
from a fault induced ignition source or from
a hostile ballistic round.
Inerting using the combustion by-products
from the engine was investigated, but could
not be made practical (too much water and
particulate matter clogging filters).
In the 1970s, On Board Inert Gas
Generation Systems (OBIGGS) were
introduced. These systems passed bleed air
thought a semi-permeable membrane which
separated the oxygen in air from the nitrogen,
resulting in nitrogen enriched air that was used
for inerting fuel tanks. Early models used
molecular sieves to achieve this separation;
however this process was not very efficient so
only air vehicles which did not change altitudes
frequently or quickly (i.e. helicopters) were
practical for application of this technology.
In the 1980s, advances in membrane
technology made selective diffusion fiber
membranes practical. This breakthrough
allowed OBIGGStype systems to be used for
fixed wing aircraft. While further improvements
with respect to air separation efficiency and
weight of these systems were desired,
protection of fuel tanks with OBIGGS has
become the popular method for todays aircraft
systems.
Stored halon, similar to the stored nitrogen
systems of the 1950/60s was also introduced
in the 1970s, about the same time as OBIGGS
for helicopters. The benefit of using halon
(most were Halon 1301) was that much less
agent was required versus nitrogen, allowing
smaller, lighter systems. These systems were
deployed on several military aviation platforms
and typically were only activated when an
aircraft fly into a hostile environment. These
systems might still be considered as option to
employing an OBIGGS system today, if it were
not for the ozone depleting properties of halon
and its discontinued production.
Other concepts that have been investigated
include collapsible fuel bladders. The theory
behind these bladders is that they their size
varies as the fuel level varies, allowing no
ullage to ever form. While a few aircraft may

have tested this approach, it is unclear whether
this technology ever was adopted by the
military or commercial aircraft industry.
Still other concepts that were investigated
included anti-misting fuel. This fuel was
encapsulated, making its volatility literally nil.
The fuel was pumped through a degrader that
would remove the encapsulation before it
entered the engine combustor to burn. The
concern regarding this approach was that it
might create more of a hazard than it is
eliminating.
What is on the horizon for future fuel
tank protection depends on who is asked the
question:
Many military organizations are still
investing on increasing the operational
efficiency of OBIGGS-type systems.
Emphasis on improved membrane
separation materials, lower pressure
systems, and even use of cryogenics are
being investigated and pursued.
Use of ground based nitrogen filling stations
at commercial airports are being
considered.
Use of alternate extinguishing agents to
replace stored halon based systems for
military applications.
Reactive fuel tank protection techology
configured as a zoned protection
approach
Dry Bay Protection
Dry bay compartments are generally
defined as any internal volume of the aircraft
that normally does not contain fluids, but could
under a fault or a hostile damage scenario.
While this definition generally could include
every compartment of an aircraft system except
the fuel tanks, this is not what is meant when
dry bay vulnerability and protection is
discussed. The connotation associated with
the dry bays in aircraft survivability circles has
now come to mean vulnerable compartments
that surround fuel tanks and or have a number
of combustible fluid-carrying lines in it.
Therefore, when one refers to dry bay
compartments, it is generally inferred that the
volume is deemed vulnerable and requires
vulnerability reduction of some kind.
The purpose of protecting dry bay
compartments is to negate the effects of hostile
threat penetration. When a ballistic round
penetrates a fuel cell or some combustible
fluid-carrying line via a dry bay, combustion can
23
occur. If the round penetrates a fuel cell above
the fuel level, the ignition of fuel vapors inside
the fuel tank is likely to occur. This fire could
easily transfer to the adjacent dry bay. If the
round penetrates below the fuel surface, the
hydraulic ram created from this event is likely to
create a fuel mist that can enter the dry bay. If
the round carries in own incendiary or, in itself,
is an ignition source (whether it be an impact
flash created by penetration or the severing of
electrical lines or some other similar scenario),
flash fire with combustion overpressures are
likely to occur. Note, overpressures may not be
observed if the round created sufficient venting
when it impacted.
When historical combat data was
reviewed by the military, trends in how to make
aircraft more survivable to enemy fire became
evident. If one protected the most vulnerable
areas of the aircraft, lower losses and higher
mission success would result. Effective
technologies were readily available for
protecting the vulnerable aircraft engine
compartments and the fuel cells. Combat data
suggested that the next logical place where a
significant benefit could result is protecting
select dry bays in the aircraft. If the dry bays
that surround fuel tanks and/or bays that have
combustible fluid-carrying lines in them were
protected in a similar manner to the fuel
system, significant reductions in overall aircraft
vulnerability could be achieved. It is readily
accepted that aircraft fuel systems, followed by
aircraft dry bays, are the two most susceptible
areas for combat threat penetration for both
fighter and transport aircraft (11,12,13).
While the Europeans were quite active
in the area of dry bay vulnerability studies in the
early and mid 1970s, the U.S. military
perpetuated these analyses and studies in the
1980s. While dry chemical powder
extinguishant contained in packs or panels and
attached to dry bay surface walls, as well as
explosion suppression foam materials, were
demonstrated to be effective in reducing dry
bay vulnerability (and they were even
subsequently deployed on close air support
helicopters and aircraft), they were heavy and
sometimes not practical for large dry bays. The
figure below illustrates a weight comparison of
various explosion suppression foam materials
compared to an active detection/suppression
protection system (11). It should be noted,
however, that the weights presented in the
figure below are dependent on not only the

volume of the bay to be protected, but also its
geometry (i.e., surface area). In certain dry bay
configurations, active protection systems were
also found to be lighter than powder packs, but
generally this was only true in the larger bays.
mmm
Active protection systems, like those
used for dry bay protection systems, consist of
fast response detection sensors that
automatically activate suppressors with
extinguishing agent it.
DRY BAY DETECTION-To suppress any
combustion overpressures by quenching the
fuel mist flash fire and to ensure that no pool
fires develop, a detection systems senses the
presence of this event and initiates a signal to
discharge one or more suppressors. To
maximize the probability of quenching the
event, the active protection system must
respond rapidly. Measurements support that
the detection system should be no longer than
twenty five to thirty milliseconds to initiate a
signal for the suppressor to discharge their
agent. The suppressor must achieve rapid
agent-out times, also. It is estimated that the
suppressors should not take any longer than
100 milliseconds to discharge all of its agent
(11 and 18). These response times are based
on actual measurements but should not be
construed as applicable to all dry bay protection
scenarios, since overpressure is a direct
function of volume size, geometry, and several
other governing parameters. Regardless of this
response time criteria, the more rapid the
suppression agent is initiated, the higher the
probability of suppressing the event.
Recognizing this fact, the use of
sensors that discriminate between a ballistic
impact and/or incendiary flash and a true
24
hydrocarbon based fire requires comment. The
U.S. Army has defined a sensor that can
distinguish an incendiary detonation from all
other combustion events as discriminating. If
a sensor that initiates as alarm signal
regardless of whether an event was a fire or a
ballistic flash has been termed non
discriminating.
The advantage of utilizing a
discriminating sensor is that if the first ballistic
round did not initiate a fire, the sensor would
not issue a suppressor discharge signal,
thereby saving the suppressant for a potential
second round penetration. The benefit,
obviously, is that no suppressant is released.
Suppression agent is saved until it is needed.
The penalty is that it takes a discriminating
sensor some additional period of time for it to
process the optical radiation input to determine
whether the event was a fire or a ballistic flash
(either incendiary or impact). The longer the
time to initiate suppression, the higher the risk
is of non-successful suppression. Therefore,
before a discriminating sensor is specified for a
given dry application, a
susceptibility/vulnerability analysis should be
conducted and carefully analyzed to assess
whether the risks of saving agent for
subsequent ballistic hits outweigh the risk or
rapid corrective action, the release of
suppression agent. In the case of low flying,
close air support aircraft or helicopters and if
the dry bays are relatively large in surface area,
use of a discriminating sensor could very well
be warranted.
In addressing what type of sensor is
most suitable for a dry bay protection system,
Table 3 indicates that either UV or IR have
rapid enough response times, but the IR
detection system is undoubtedly faster (when
both are designed to an acceptable level of
false alarm immunity). The UV detection
sensor could offer improved protection
coverage from fault related pool-type fires, but
both sensor types are capably of detecting this
type of event (as well as the higher energy
ballistic flash fire event). Because of the rapid
response time requirement for this type of
application, IR is the lower risk approach. There
could be more transient non-fire sources which
emit UV radiation in a given dry bay (e.g.,
lighting reflections in a wheel well) and this
could affect the operation which
analyzes/processes the UV radiation for one to
several seconds to maximize its false alarm

immunity, a dry bay sensor cannot afford this
amount of time to decide what is a false alarm
source and what is a fire. But with proper
application engineering, it is believed that the
UV based approach could be made to operate
at low risk. IR based sensors offer the
necessary speed of response, adequate
sensitivity and field of view, and greater
tolerance to contaminates which may coat the
optics. Also, an IR detection sensor package
can be made to be more survivable than a UV
detector with its glass envelope (assuming a
high temperature UV design is pursued). The
IR detection sensor can have less vulnerable
area exposed. Its sensing detector element is
small in diameter (around 0.5 inches in
diameter, 1.3 cm) much smaller than the UV
tube. This area is the most vulnerable part of
an optical sensor and the most apt to be
damaged.
DRY BAY CONTROL UNITS-Some dry bay
protection systems employ sensors which
interface to suppressors via a control unit or
circuit card. Others have the mechanisms to
initiate suppression vessels directly from the
sensor, with the use of a control unit (this
function is contained in the sensor design). A
direct sensor to suppressor interface approach
requires that the sensor design have all of its
processing and signal conditioning electronics
inherent to its housing. The sensor must
decide on whether radiation being detected by
it is from a fire or explosion event or some other
radiation emitting source, based solely on its
input. This type of sensor has been termed a
smart sensor. In addition to processing the
radiation input signals it receives, it also must
have the hardware required to initiate an
explosive cartridge device on the suppressor
(or have access to power to send a high current
signal to the suppressor). A system that
utilizes smart sensors with a direct interface is
many times advantageous to pursue, especially
in bays that require just one or two sensors and
only one suppressor.
However, if multiple sensors are
deemed necessary, reliability with regard to
mean-time-between-failures (MTBF) and
operational confidence can, many times, be
enhanced if a control unit assembly is pursued.
A control unit allows a single processing
subsystem to analyze the output of several
sensors, and after appropriately weighting each
of these outputs, the control unit initiates the
high energy suppressor initiate signal (if
25
appropriate). This approach offers much
flexibility, in that the number of suppressors can
be increased without having to increase the
number of sensors (to access their suppressor
drivers). The parts count is minimized in that
the processing electronics and suppressor
driver circuitry can be shared. This increases
the MTBF. Also, since the unit price of a
sensor goes down the simpler its design and its
MTBF goes up, the sensor can many times be
classified as a non-repairable item, thus
reducing maintenance costs. Lastly, since the
decision on whether there is a fire or explosion
event can now be made based on the output of
multiple sensors, the confidence of the
protection system operating as designed is
greater. Some signal conditioning/processing
electronics may still be necessary in the
detection sensor, especially in case of the IR
based sensors, but the price of these types of
sensor will be lower than a smart sensor with
suppression drivers.
The down side of a control unit based
protection system is that all the components
(sensors, suppressors, and the controller) are
interfaced via electrical cables. These cables
could be susceptible to damage from a ballistic
impact. Thus, an integrated
detection/suppression unit (where the sensor is
physically and funcitionally mated to the
suppressor) is a more survivable design
approach than a segregated system that
interfaces the protection components though
the use of electrical cables.
DRY BAY SUPPRESSION- Suppressor
designs, similar to those used for active fuel
tank protection systems, were used in early dry
bay proof-of-concept designs. However,
because dry bays were typically cluttered, low
vapor pressure agents did not distribute well
around this clutter. Therefore, to achieve the
rapid agent-out times necessary to suppress an
explosive event and to ensure that after the
agent is out of the suppressor, it dispersed
quickly, even in a cluttered compartment, high
vapor pressure extinguishing agents were
required. As a result, pressurized vessels,
more similar to those used in the engine and
cargo compartment as opposed to the fuel tank
suppressors, are employed.
High vapor pressure, Halon 1301, has
been the preferred agent for dry bay
suppressors. However, FE-25TM is being
introduced as an non-ozone depleting
alternative to halon, and many military aircraft

users, excluding the U.S. Navy, believe that
CF3I should also be considered.
Because dry bays are often narrow and
many cluttered, there often was little room for
spherical or even cylindrical shaped pressure
vessel designs. Further, suppression vessels
mounting orientation could not be ensure,
making the need for an attitude-insensitive
design. Tubular shaped suppressors were
designed to meet this need. These vessels
had their electro-explosive cartridge device
mounted at one end of the suppressor and its
rupture disc and radial outlet located at the
other end. Thus, regardless of the orientation
of the suppressor, when the cartridge was
activated, it pushed the high pressure
extinguishing agent out. Typical agent-out
times were measured to be in the 20-50 msec
range, depending on the size of the
suppressor.
More recently, gas generators that when
activated expel inert gas by-products have
received a great deal of attention in the 1990s,
particularly by the U.S. Navy. While the
generation of these inert gases is considerably
slower than some of the pressurized vessel
approaches or the non-pressurized vessels that
rely on hydraulic ram, they can be designed
depending on the dry bay, to be quick
enough.
These devices are very much like
automobile air bag initiators, where a great deal
of gas is generated in a very short period of
time. However, in the case of dry bay
protection, one needs significantly more inert
gas than ever would be needed to inflate an
automobile air bag.
The advantages and disadvantages of
this approach are provided below.
Advantages
Based on current air bag technology high
and low temperature storage/cycling from -
40 up to 107oC
Releases environmentally safe gases (CO2,
N2, H2O) in addition to some solid by-
products
Excellent environmental properties:
a) insignificant atmospheric life
b) Zero OPD and minimal GWP
c) Non-toxic
Low system maintenance costs
Stored as a non-pressurized material
Can inhibit re-ignition if the solid by-
26
products are allowed to coat surfaces
Disadvantages
Very high exhaust temperatures
Higher operating pressures inside the
generator, as opposed to a pressurized
vessel
Has the potential to over-pressurize the
protected volume if sufficient venting is not
provided
Use in uninhabited spaces only
Possible corrosion potential of the
incomplete combustion by-products
The gas generator is extremely effective
and has been shown to exceed the efficiency of
competing systems, including both Halon 1301
and FE-25TM, but care must be taken in the
application engineering of this suppression
approach into a given dry bay.
Driven by some of the disadvantages of
the gas generators, hybrid versions of this
concept have arisen. One such concept is the
Pyrotechnically Augmented Liquid Agent
System (PALAS). The PALAS system uses a
proportionately smaller amount of a clean-
burning gas generator propellant, minimizing
the problem of hot, corrosive exhaust. With the
PALAS, the propellant merely heats and expels
vaporizable fire suppressant agents as a
rapidly vaporizing aerosol.
The PALAS is amenable to occupied
spaces since the exhaust temperatures are
much cooler and the primary suppressant is the
heated liquid agent. To date, the selected
PALAS liquid agent has been 1,1,1,2,3,4,4-
heptafluoropropane or HFC-227 ea. (FM-200).
FM200 was selected in part because it is
acceptable for use in occupied areas. FM-200
has been shown in fire suppression testing to
be an excellent Halon replacement at ambient
and higher temperatures when dispersed by
some artificial means (e.g., pressurized
nitrogen). The problem is that, at cooler
temperatures, FM-200 does not sufficiently
vaporize and thus dispersion is significantly
diminished. The use of a small amount of
propellant provides both dispersion and
vaporization of the liquid agent, even at cold
temperatures. Extensive testing of this liquid-
agent/propellant combination in the PALAS
device verified the combustion acid and other
by-product gases (HF, CO, NO) were
acceptably low for occupied spaces.
 27

TABLE 3. EXPLOSION DETECTION SENSOR PROPERTIES

(NEAR-READY AIRCRAFT TECHNOLOGIES)

SENSOR UV IR

SPEED OF RESPONSE (NOM) 5 mSEC 1-3 mSEC

RELATIVE RESPONSIVITY (S/N) HIGH MEDIUM

FIELD OF VIEW
RELATIVE FALSE ALARM IMMUNITY
OPERATING TEMPERATURE
o
APPROACHES 180 SOLID CONE + o
APPROACHES 120 SOLID CONE ANGLE
(REFLECTIONS)
GOOD, PRONE TO ARC WELDING, ELECT.
BETTER
ARCS, SUNTAN LAMPS, LIGHTING
o o o o
400 F W/ TRANSIENTS UP TO 500 F 260 W/ TRANSIENTS UP TO 300 F

0.25-0.4 LBS 0.3-0.5 LBS

SENSOR WEIGHT

NON SMART SENSOR* SMART SENSOR

SENSOR: LOWER COST THAN IR SENSOR: HIGHER COST

SYSTEM: LOWER COST THAN IR SYSTEM: SLIGHTLY HIGHER THAN UV
SENSOR: HIGHER MTBF SENSOR: LOWER MTBF
OTHER CHARACTERISTICS SYSTEM: COMPARABLE TO IR SYSTEM: COMPARABLE TO UV

REMOTE MOUNTING REMOTE MOUNTING

FIELDED CONCEPT FOR ENGINE A/B
MONITOR & F-22 FIRE DETECTION; ONLY FIELDED ON V-22, F-18, EH-101
DEMO. FOR EXPLOSION APPLICATIONS

*CONTROL ELECTRONICS OR CIRCUIT CARD INTERFACE REQUIRED


Testing with this concept was
successfully demonstrated in simulated dry
bays by the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Army.
DRY BAY SUPRESSION SUMMARY-The dry
bay fire/explosion protection application is
unique and places stringent demands on
system designers. The following
recommendations and observations are based
on well proven explosion protection technology.
To adequately protect the dry bay the
suppression system should provide:
Rapid response in terms of detection,
suppressor initiation and the onset of agent
flow.
The required agent concentration as rapidly
as possible.
Suppression systems will be improperly
designed if they provide too little, too slow, too
late.
If the above is considered, stored gas
systems are demonstrated to be the most
reliable options for use in dry bay fire
suppression systems. The rationale can be
summarized as follows:
The stored gas systems employ a simple
discharge system firing architecture: The
extinguishing concentrations and
refrigeration properties of the agents used
prevent any over-pressure concerns during
discharge. The high extinguishing
concentrations for inert gases requires large
volumes of hot inert gas to be discharged
by solid propellant gas generator systems.
The large volume of inert gas requires the
solid propellant gas generator system
discharge to be sequenced to prevent over-
pressurization. The sequenced firing could
also increase power consumption for gas
generator initiation.
Stored gas systems require fewer
suppressors: The actuation times,
discharge times and discharge architecture
ensure good agent distribution and rapid
suppression with the minimum number of
suppressors. The utilization of
aerodynamically assisted suppression and
slow discharge times of solid propellant gas
generators means more suppressors are
required to be distributed around a bay to
minimize the effects of obstructions and
flame holders and suppress the fire threat.
Certification is faster/more cost effective
with stored gas systems: The stored gas
29
systems employ agents that have well
understood and characterized extinguishing
mechanisms that can be demonstrated by
test and then extrapolated to other dry bay
volumes and configurations by the use of
high speed gas analyzers. The reliance of
solid propellant gas generator systems on
aerodynamic extinguishing mechanisms
means these systems can only be certified
by test.
Stored gas systems utilize equivalent or
better agent weights compared to solid
propellant gas generator systems.
Stored gas systems have lower qualification
costs: Stored gas systems require smaller
numbers of qualification units.
Lower maintenance costs: Stored gas
systems have been fielded for many years
and have demonstrated reliability and
maintainability records. New propellant
systems often require extensive life testing
and fleet sampling to derive maintenance
plans.
CONCLUSION
The aircraft type, the type of protection
required, the area of the aircraft which requires
protection, and the level of protection one can
afford (with regard to cost, weight,
supportability requirements, etc.) are all factors
which affect the definition of the optimal
protection systems or component. The
characteristics of various aircraft environments
and of various protection system components
were briefly discussed so that these factors
could be considered during future design
studies.
Concepts and technologies from the
past were discussed at some length. The
purpose of this to establish the fact that many
of the existing and new protection concepts
performance can be maximized if some lessons
learned from the past are applied.

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