Republic of the Philippines proceeded with the development of the subject property which included the portions
SUPREME COURT occupied and cultivated by private respondents.
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 76217 September 14, 1989
GERMAN MANAGEMENT & SERVICES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ERNESTO VILLEZA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-76216 September 14, 1989
GERMAN MANAGEMENT & SERVICES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ORLANDO GERNALE, respondents.
Alam, Verano & Associates for petitioner.
Francisco D. Lozano for private respondents.
FERNAN, C.J.:
Spouses Cynthia Cuyegkeng Jose and Manuel Rene Jose, residents of Pennsylvania,
Philadelphia, USA are the owners of a parcel of land situated in Sitio Inarawan, San
Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal, with an area of 232,942 square meters and covered by TCT No.
50023 of the Register of Deeds of the province of Rizal issued on September 11, 1980
which canceled TCT No. 56762/ T-560. The land was originally registered on August 5,
1948 in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Rizal as OCT No. 19, pursuant to a
Homestead Patent granted by the President of the Philippines on July 27, 1948, under
Act No. 141.
On February 26, 1982, the spouses Jose executed a special power of attorney
authorizing petitioner German Management Services to develop their property covered
by TCT No. 50023 into a residential subdivision. Consequently, petitioner on February
9,1983 obtained Development Permit No. 00424 from the Human Settlements
Regulatory Commission for said development. Finding that part of the property was
occupied by private respondents and twenty other persons, petitioner advised the
occupants to vacate the premises but the latter refused. Nevertheless, petitioner
Private respondents filed an action for forcible entry against petitioner before the
Municipal Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, alleging that they are mountainside farmers of
Sitio Inarawan, San Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal and members of the Concerned Citizens of
Farmer's Association; that they have occupied and tilled their farmholdings some twelve
to fifteen years prior to the promulgation of P.D. No. 27; that during the first week of
August 1983, petitioner, under a permit from the Office of the Provincial Governor of
Rizal, was allowed to improve the Barangay Road at Sitio Inarawan, San Isidro, Antipolo,
Rizal at its expense, subject to the condition that it shag secure the needed right of way
from the owners of the lot to be affected; that on August 15, 1983 and thereafter,
petitioner deprived private respondents of their property without due process of law by:
(1) forcibly removing and destroying the barbed wire fence enclosing their farmholdings
without notice; (2) bulldozing the rice, corn fruit bearing trees and other crops of private
respondents by means of force, violence and intimidation, in violation of P.D. 1038 and
(3) trespassing, coercing and threatening to harass, remove and eject private
respondents from their respective farmholdings in violation of P.D. Nos. 316, 583, 815,
and 1028. 1
On January 7,1985, the Municipal Trial Court dismissed private respondents' complaint
for forcible entry. 2 On appeal, the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch LXXI
sustained the dismissal by the Municipal Trial Court. 3
Private respondents then filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals. On July
24,1986, said court gave due course to their petition and reversed the decisions of the
Municipal Trial Court and the Regional Trial Court. 4
The Appellate Court held that since private respondents were in actual possession of the
property at the time they were forcibly ejected by petitioner, private respondents have a
right to commence an action for forcible entry regardless of the legality or illegality of
possession. 5 Petitioner moved to reconsider but the same was denied by the Appellate
Court in its resolution dated September 26, 1986. 6
Hence, this recourse.
The issue in this case is whether or not the Court of Appeals denied due process to
petitioner when it reversed the decision of the court a quo without giving petitioner the
opportunity to file its answer and whether or not private respondents are entitled to file a
forcible entry case against petitioner. 7
We affirm. The Court of Appeals need not require petitioner to file an answer for due
process to exist. The comment filed by petitioner on February 26, 1986 has sufficiently
addressed the issues presented in the petition for review filed by private respondents
before the Court of Appeals. Having heard both parties, the Appellate Court need not
await or require any other additional pleading. Moreover, the fact that petitioner was
heard by the Court of Appeals on its motion for reconsideration negates any violation of
due process.
Notwithstanding petitioner's claim that it was duly authorized by the owners to develop
the subject property, private respondents, as actual possessors, can commence a
forcible entry case against petitioner because ownership is not in issue. Forcible entry is
merely a quieting process and never determines the actual title to an estate. Title is not
involved. 8
In the case at bar, it is undisputed that at the time petitioner entered the property, private
respondents were already in possession thereof . There is no evidence that the spouses
Jose were ever in possession of the subject property. On the contrary, private
respondents' peaceable possession was manifested by the fact that they even planted
rice, corn and fruit bearing trees twelve to fifteen years prior to petitioner's act of
destroying their crops.
Although admittedly petitioner may validly claim ownership based on the muniments of
title it presented, such evidence does not responsively address the issue of prior actual
possession raised in a forcible entry case. It must be stated that regardless of the actual
condition of the title to the property, the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be
turned out by a strong hand, violence or terror. 9 Thus, a party who can prove prior
possession can recover such possession even against the owner himself. Whatever may be
the character of his prior possession, if he has in his favor priority in time, he has the security
that entitles him to remain on the property until he is lawfully ejected by a person having a
better right by accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. 10
Both the Municipal Trial Court and the Regional Trial Court have rationalized petitioner's
drastic action of bulldozing and destroying the crops of private respondents on the basis
of the doctrine of self-help enunciated in Article 429 of the New Civil Code. 11 Such
justification is unavailing because the doctrine of self-help can only be exercised at the time
of actual or threatened dispossession which is absent in the case at bar. When possession
has already been lost, the owner must resort to judicial process for the recovery of property.
This is clear from Article 536 of the Civil Code which states, "(I)n no case may possession be
acquired through force or intimidation as long as there is a possessor who objects thereto. He
who believes that he has an action or right to deprive another of the holding of a thing, must
invoke the aid of the competent court, if the holder should refuse to deliver the thing."
WHEREFORE, the Court resolved to DENY the instant petition. The decision of the
Court of Appeals dated July 24,1986 is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 142668 August 31, 2004
UNITED COCONUT PLANTERS BANK and LUIS MA. ONGSIAPCO, petitioners,
vs.
RUBEN E. BASCO, respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals
dated March 30, 2000, affirming, with modifications, the Decision2 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Makati City, Branch 146, which found the petitioner bank liable for payment
of damages and attorney's fees.
The Case for the Respondent
Respondent Ruben E. Basco had been employed with the petitioner United Coconut
Planters Bank (UCPB) for seventeen (17) years.3 He was also a stockholder thereof and
owned 804 common shares of stock at the par value of P1.00.4 He likewise maintained a
checking account with the bank at its Las Pias Branch under Account No. 117-001520-
6.5 Aside from his employment with the bank, the respondent also worked as an
underwriter at the United Coconut Planters Life Association (Coco Life), a subsidiary of
UCPB since December, 1992.6 The respondent also solicited insurance policies from
UCPB employees.
On June 19, 1995, the respondent received a letter from the UCPB informing him of the
termination of his employment with the bank for grave abuse of discretion and authority,
and breach of trust in the conduct of his job as Bank Operations Manager of its Olongapo
Branch. The respondent thereafter filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, non-payment of
salaries, and damages against the bank in the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC), docketed as NLRC Cases Nos. 00-09-05354-92 and 00-09-05354-93. However,
the respondent still frequented the UCPB main office in Makati City to solicit insurance
policies from the employees thereat. He also discussed the complaint he filed against the
bank with the said employees.7
The respondent was also employed by All-Asia Life Insurance Company as an
underwriter. At one time, the lawyers of the UCPB had an informal conference with him
at the head office of the bank, during which the respondent was offered money so that
the case could be amicably settled. The respondent revealed the incident to some of the
bank employees.8
On November 15, 1995, Luis Ma. Ongsiapco, UCPB First Vice-President, Human
Resource Division, issued a Memorandum to Jesus Belanio, the Vice-President of the
Security Department, informing him that the respondent's employment had been
terminated as of June 19, 1995, that the latter filed charges against the bank and that the
case was still on-going. Ongsiapco instructed Belanio not to allow the respondent access
to all bank premises.9Attached to the Memorandum was a passport-size picture of the
respondent. The next day, the security guards on duty were directed to strictly impose
the security procedure in conformity with Ongsiapco's Memorandum.10
On December 7, 1995, the respondent, through counsel, wrote Ongsiapco, requesting
that such Memorandum be reconsidered, and that he be allowed entry into the bank
premises.11 His counsel emphasized that
In the meantime, we are more concerned with your denying Mr. Basco "access to
all bank premises." As you may know, he is currently connected with Cocolife as
insurance agent. Given his 17-year tenure with your bank, he has established
good relationships with many UCPB employees, who comprise the main source
of his solicitations. In thecourse of his work as insurance agent, he needs free
access to your bank premises, within reason, to add the unnecessary. Your
memorandum has effectively curtailed his livelihood and he is once again
becoming a victim of another "illegal termination," so to speak. And Shakespeare
said: "You take his life when you do take the means whereby he lives."
Mr. Basco's work as an insurance agent directly benefits UCPB, Cocolife's
mother company. He performs his work in your premises peacefully without
causing any disruption of bank operations. To deny him access to your premises
for no reason except the pendency of the labor case, the outcome of which is still
in doubt his liability, if any, certainly has not been proven is a clear abuse of
right in violation of our client's rights. Denying him access to the bank, which is of
a quasi-public nature, is an undue restriction on his freedom of movement and
right to make a livelihood, comprising gross violations of his basic human rights.
(This is Human Rights Week, ironically).
We understand that Mr. Basco has been a stockholder of record of 804 common
shares of the capital stock of UCPB since July 1983. As such, he certainly
deserves better treatment than the one he has been receiving from your office
regarding property he partly owns. He is a particle of corporate sovereignty. We
doubt that you can impose the functional equivalent of the penalty of destierro on
our client who really wishes only to keep his small place in the sun, to survive
and breathe. No activity can be more legitimate than to toil for a living. Let us live
and let live.12
In his reply dated December 12, 1995, Ongsiapco informed the respondent that his
request could not be granted:
As you understand, we are a banking institution; and as such, we deal with
matters involving confidences of clients. This is among the many reasons why
we, as a matter of policy, do not allow non-employees to have free access to
areas where our employees work. Of course, there are places where visitors may
meet our officers and employees to discuss business matters; unfortunately, we
have limited areas where our officers and employees can entertain non-official
matters.
Furthermore, in keeping with good business practices, the Bank prohibits
solicitation, peddling and selling of goods, service and other commodities within
its premises as it disrupts the efficient performance and function of the
employees.
Please be assured that it is farthest from our intention to discriminate against
your client. In the same vein, it is highly improper for us to carve exceptions to
our policies simply to accommodate your client's business ventures.13
The respondent was undaunted. At 5:30 p.m. of December 21, 1995, he went to the
office of Junne Cacay, the Assistant Manager of the Makati Branch. Cacay was then
having a conference with Bong Braganza, an officer of the UCPB Sucat Branch. Cacay
entertained the respondent although the latter did have an appointment. Cacay even
informed him that he had a friend who wanted to procure an insurance
policy.14 Momentarily, a security guard of the bank approached the respondent and told
him that it was already past office hours. He was also reminded not to stay longer than
he should in the bank premises.15 Cacay told the guard that the respondent would be
leaving shortly.16 The respondent was embarrassed and told Cacay that he was already
leaving.17
At 1:30 p.m. of January 31, 1996, the respondent went to the UCPB Makati Branch to
receive a check from Rene Jolo, a bank employee, and to deposit money with the bank
for a friend.18 He seated himself on a sofa fronting the teller's booth19 where other people
were also seated.20 Meanwhile, two security guards approached the respondent. The
guards showed him the Ongsiapco's Memorandum and told him to leave the bank
premises. The respondent pleaded that he be allowed to finish his transaction before
leaving. One of the security guards contacted the management and was told to allow the
respondent to finish his transaction with the bank.
Momentarily, Jose Regino Casil, an employee of the bank who was in the 7th floor of the
building, was asked by Rene Jolo to bring a check to the respondent, who was waiting in
the lobby in front of the teller's booth.21 Casil agreed and went down to the ground floor of
the building, through the elevator. He was standing in the working area near the
Automated Teller Machine (ATM) Section22 in the ground floor when he saw the
respondent standing near the sofa23 near the two security guards.24 He motioned the
respondent to come and get the check, but the security guard tapped the respondent on
the shoulder and prevented the latter from approaching Casil. The latter then walked
towards the respondent and handed him the check from Jolo.
Before leaving, the respondent requested the security guard to log his presence in the
logbook. The guard did as requested and the respondent's presence was recorded in the
logbook.25
On March 11, 1996, the respondent filed a complaint for damages against the petitioners
UCPB and Ongsiapco in the RTC of Manila, alleging inter alia, that
12. It is readily apparent from this exchange of correspondence that defendant
bank'' acknowledged reason for barring plaintiff from its premises - the pending
labor case is a mere pretense for its real vindictive and invidious intent: to
prevent plaintiff, and plaintiff alone, from carrying out his trade as an insurance
agent among defendant bank's employees, a practice openly and commonly
allowed and tolerated (encouraged even, for some favored proverbial sacred
cows) in the bank premises, now being unjustly denied to plaintiff on spurious
grounds.
13. Defendants, to this day, have refused to act on plaintiff's claim to be allowed
even in only the "limited areas where [the bank's] officers and employees can
entertain non-official matters" and have maintained the policy banning plaintiff
from all bank premises. As he had dared exercised his legal right to question his
dismissal, he is being penalized with a variation of destierro, available in criminal
cases where the standard however, after proper hearing, is much more stringent
and based on more noble grounds than mere pique or vindictiveness.
14. This appallingly discriminatory policy resulted in an incident on January 31,
1996 at 1:30 p.m. at defendant bank's branch located at its head office, which
caused plaintiff tremendous undeserved humiliation, embarrassment, and loss of
face.26
15. Defendants' memorandum and the consequent acts of defendants' security
guards, together with defendant Ongsiapco's disingenuous letter of December
12, 1995, are suggestive of malice and bad faith in derogation of plaintiff's right
and dignity as a human being and citizen of this country, which acts have caused
him considerable undeserved embarrassment. Even if defendants, for the sake of
argument, may be acting within their rights, they cannot exercise same abusively,
as they must, always, act with justice and in good faith, and give plaintiff his
due.27
The respondent prayed that, after trial, judgment be rendered in his favor, as follows:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that judgment issue ordering defendants:
1. To rescind the directive to its agents barring plaintiff from all bank premises as
embodied in the memorandum of November 15, 1995, and allow plaintiff access
to the premises of defendant bank, including all its branches, which are open to
members of the general public, during reasonable hours, to be able to conduct
lawful business without being subject to invidious discrimination; and
2. To pay plaintiff P100,000.00 as moral damages, P100,000.00 as exemplary
damages, and P50,000.00 by way of attorney's fees.
Plaintiff likewise prays for costs, interest, the disbursements of this action, and
such other further relief as may be deemed just and equitable in the premises.28
In their Answer to the complaint, the petitioners interposed the following affirmative
defenses:
9. Plaintiff had been employed as Branch Operations Officer, Olongapo Branch,
of defendant United Coconut Planters Bank.
In or about the period May to June 1992, he was, together with other fellow
officers and employees, investigated by the bank in connection with various
anomalies. As a result of the investigation, plaintiff was recommended terminated
on findings of fraud and abuse of discretion in the performance of his work. He
 was found by the bank's Committee on Employee Discipline to have been guilty
of committing or taking part in the commission of the following:
a. Abuse of discretion in connection with actions taken beyond or outside
the limits of his authority.
b. Borrowing money from a bank client.
c. Gross negligence or dereliction of duty in the implementation of bank
policies or valid orders from management.
d. Direct refusal or willful failure to perform, or delay in performing, an
assigned task.
e. Fraud or willful breach of trust in the conduct of his work.
f. Falsification or forgery of bank records/documents.
10. Plaintiff thereafter decided to contest his termination by filing an action for
illegal dismissal against the bank.
Despite the pendency of this litigation, plaintiff was reported visiting employees of
the bank in their place of work during work hours, and circulating false
information concerning the status of his case against the bank, including alleged
offers by management of a monetary settlement for his "illegal dismissal."
11. Defendants acted to protect the bank's interest by preventing plaintiff's
access to the bank's offices, and at the same time informing him of that decision.
Plaintiff purported to insist on seeing and talking to the bank's employees despite
this decision, claiming he needed to do this in connection with his insurance
solicitation activities, but the bank has not reconsidered.
12. The complaint states, and plaintiff has, no cause of action against
defendants.29
The petitioners likewise interposed compulsory counterclaims for damages.
The Case for the Petitioners
The petitioners adduced evidence that a day or so before November 15, 1995, petitioner
Ongsiapco was at the 10thfloor of the main office of the bank where the training room of
the Management Development Training Office was located. Some of the bank's
management employees were then undergoing training. The bank also kept important
records in the said floor. When Ongsiapco passed by, he saw the respondent talking to
some of the trainees. Ongsiapco was surprised because non-participants in the training
were not supposed to be in the premises.30Besides, the respondent had been dismissed
and had filed complaints against the bank with the NLRC. Ongsiapco was worried that
bank records could be purloined and employees could be hurt.
The next day, Ongsiapco contacted the training supervisor and inquired why the
respondent was in the training room the day before. The supervisor replied that he did
not know why.31 Thus, on November 15, 1995, Ongsiapco issued a Memorandum to
Belanio, the Vice-President for Security Services, directing the latter not to allow the
respondent access to the bank premises near the working area.32 The said Memorandum
was circulated by the Chief of Security to the security guards and bank employees.
At about 12:30 p.m. on January 31, 1996, Security Guard Raul Caspe, a substitute for
the regular guard who was on leave, noticed the respondent seated on the sofa in front
of the teller's booth.33 Caspe notified his superior of the respondent's presence, and was
instructed not to confront the respondent if the latter was going to make a deposit or
withdrawal.34 Caspe was also instructed not to allow the respondent to go to the upper
floors of the building.35The respondent went to the teller's booth and, after a while, seated
himself anew on the sofa. Momentarily, Caspe noticed Casil, another employee of the
bank who was at the working section of the Deposit Service Department (DSD),
motioning to the respondent to get the check. The latter stood up and proceeded in the
direction of Casil's workstation. After the respondent had taken about six to seven paces
from the sofa, Caspe and the company guard approached him. The guards politely
showed Ongsiapco's Memorandum to the respondent and told the latter that he was not
allowed to enter the DSD working area; it was lunch break and no outsider was allowed
in that area.36The respondent looked at the Memorandum and complied.
On May 29, 1998, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of the respondent. The fallo
of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, defendants are hereby adjudged liable to
plaintiff and orders them to rescind and set-aside the Memorandum of November
15, 1995 and orders them to pay plaintiff the following:
1) the amount of P100,000.00 as moral damages;
2) the amount of P50,000.00 as exemplary damages;
3) P50,000.00 for and as attorney's fees;
 4) Cost of suit.
Defendants' counterclaim is dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED. 37
The trial court held that the petitioners abused their right; hence, were liable to the
respondent for damages under Article 19 of the New Civil Code.
The petitioners appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals and raised the following
issues:
4.1 Did the appellants abuse their right when they issued the Memorandum?
4.2 Did the appellants abuse their right when Basco was asked to leave the bank
premises, in implementation of the Memorandum, on 21 December 1995?
4.3. Did the appellants abuse their right when Basco was asked to leave the bank
premises, in implementation of the Memorandum, on 31 January 1995?
4.4. Is Basco entitled to moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees?
4.5. Are the appellants entitled to their counterclaim?38
The CA rendered a Decision on March 30, 2000, affirming the decision of the RTC with
modifications. The CA deleted the awards for moral and exemplary damages, but
ordered the petitioner bank to pay nominal damages on its finding that latter abused its
right when its security guards stopped the respondent from proceeding to the working
area near the ATM section to get the check from Casil. The decretal portion of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court dated May 29, 1998 is
hereby MODIFIED as follows:
1. The awards for moral and exemplary damages are deleted;
2. The award for attorney's fees is deleted;
3. The order rescinding Memorandum dated November 15, 1995 is set aside;
and
4. UCPB is ordered to pay nominal damages in the amount of P25,000.00 to
plaintiff-appellee.
Costs de oficio.39
The Present Petition
The petitioners now raise the following issues before this Court:
I. Whether or not the appellate court erred when it found that UCPB excessively
exercised its right to self-help to the detriment of Basco as a depositor, when on
January 31, 1996, its security personnel stopped respondent from proceeding to
the area restricted to UCPB's employees.
II. Whether or not the appellate court erred when it ruled that respondent is
entitled to nominal damages.
III. Whether or not the appellate court erred when it did not award the petitioners'
valid and lawful counterclaim.40
The core issues are the following: (a) whether or not the petitioner bank abused its right
when it issued, through petitioner Ongsiapco, the Memorandum barring the respondent
access to all bank premises; (b) whether or not petitioner bank is liable for nominal
damages in view of the incident involving its security guard Caspe, who stopped the
respondent from proceeding to the working area of the ATM section to get the check
from Casil; and (c) whether or not the petitioner bank is entitled to damages on its
counterclaim.
The Ruling of the Court
On the first issue, the petitioners aver that the petitioner bank has the right to prohibit the
respondent from access to all bank premises under Article 429 of the New Civil Code,
which provides that:
Art. 429. The owner or lawful possessor of a thing has the right to exclude any
person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof. For this purpose, he may use
such force as may be reasonably necessary to repel or prevent an actual or
threatened unlawful physical invasion or usurpation of his property.
The petitioners contend that the provision which enunciates the principle of self-help
applies when there is a legitimate necessity to personally or through another, prevent not
only an unlawful, actual, but also a threatened unlawful aggression or usurpation of its
properties and records, and its personnel and customers/clients who are in its premises.
The petitioners assert that petitioner Ongsiapco issued his Memorandum dated
November 15, 1995 because the respondent had been dismissed from his employment
for varied grave offenses; hence, his presence in the premises of the bank posed a
threat to the integrity of its records and to the persons of its personnel. Besides, the
petitioners contend, the respondent, while in the bank premises, conversed with bank
employees about his complaint for illegal dismissal against the petitioner bank then
pending before the Labor Arbiter, including negotiations with the petitioner bank's
counsels for an amicable settlement of the said case.
The respondent, for his part, avers that Article 429 of the New Civil Code does not give
to the petitioner bank the absolute right to exclude him, a stockholder and a depositor,
from having access to the bank premises, absent any clear and convincing evidence that
his presence therein posed an imminent threat or peril to its property and records, and
the persons of its customers/clients.
We agree with the respondent bank that it has the right to exclude certain individuals
from its premises or to limit their access thereto as to time, to protect, not only its
premises and records, but also the persons of its personnel and its customers/clients
while in the premises. After all, by its very nature, the business of the petitioner bank is
so impressed with public trust; banks are mandated to exercise a higher degree of
diligence in the handling of its affairs than that expected of an ordinary business
enterprise.41 Banks handle transactions involving millions of pesos and properties worth
considerable sums of money. The banking business will thrive only as long as it
maintains the trust and confidence of its customers/clients. Indeed, the very nature of
their work, the degree of responsibility, care and trustworthiness expected of officials and
employees of the bank is far greater than those of ordinary officers and employees in the
other business firms.42 Hence, no effort must be spared by banks and their officers and
employees to ensure and preserve the trust and confidence of the general public and its
customers/clients, as well as the integrity of its records and the safety and well being of
its customers/clients while in its premises. For the said purpose, banks may impose
reasonable conditions or limitations to access by non-employees to its premises and
records, such as the exclusion of non-employees from the working areas for employees,
even absent any imminent or actual unlawful aggression on or an invasion of its
properties or usurpation thereof, provided that such limitations are not contrary to the
law.43
It bears stressing that property rights must be considered, for many purposes, not as
absolute, unrestricted dominions but as an aggregation of qualified privileges, the limits
of which are prescribed by the equality of rights, and the correlation of rights and
obligations necessary for the highest enjoyment of property by the entire community of
proprietors.44 Indeed, in Rellosa vs. Pellosis,45 we held that:
Petitioner might verily be the owner of the land, with the right to enjoy and to
exclude any person from the enjoyment and disposal thereof, but the exercise of
these rights is not without limitations. The abuse of rights rule established in
Article 19 of the Civil Code requires every person to act with justice, to give
everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good faith. When right is
exercised in a manner which discards these norms resulting in damage to
another, a legal wrong is committed for which the actor can be held accountable.
Rights of property, like all other social and conventional rights, are subject to such
reasonable limitations in their enjoyment and to such reasonable restraints established
by law.46
In this case, the Memorandum of the petitioner Ongsiapco dated November 15, 1995,
reads as follows:
MEMO TO : MR. JESUS M. BELANIO
Vice President
Security Department
D A T E : 15 November 1995
R E : MR. RUBEN E. BASCO
Please be advised that Mr. Ruben E. Basco was terminated for a cause by the
Bank on 19 June 1992. He filed charges against the bank and the case is still on-
going.
In view of this, he should not be allowed access to all bank premises.
(Sgd.) LUIS MA. ONGSIAPCO
First Vice President
Human Resource Division
16 November 1995
TO: ALL GUARDS
ON DUTY
Strictly adhere/impose Security Procedure RE: Admission to Bank premises.
 For your compliance.
(Signature) 11/16/95
JOSE G. TORIAGA47
On its face, the Memorandum barred the respondent, a stockholder of the petitioner bank
and one of its depositors, from gaining access to all bank premises under all
circumstances. The said Memorandum is all-embracing and admits of no exceptions
whatsoever. Moreover, the security guards were enjoined to strictly implement the same.
We agree that the petitioner may prohibit non-employees from entering the working area
of the ATM section. However, under the said Memorandum, even if the respondent
wished to go to the bank to encash a check drawn and issued to him by a depositor of
the petitioner bank in payment of an obligation, or to withdraw from his account therein,
or to transact business with the said bank and exercise his right as a depositor, he could
not do so as he was barred from entry into the bank. Even if the respondent wanted to go
to the petitioner bank to confer with the corporate secretary in connection with his shares
of stock therein, he could not do so, since as stated in the Memorandum of petitioner
Ongsiapco, he would not be allowed access to all the bank premises. The said
Memorandum, as worded, violates the right of the respondent as a stockholder or a
depositor of the petitioner bank, for being capricious and arbitrary.
The Memorandum even contravenes Article XII, paragraph 4 (4.1 and 4.2) of the Code of
Ethics issued by the petitioner bank itself, which provides that one whose employment
had been terminated by the petitioner bank may, nevertheless, be allowed access to
bank premises, thus:
4.1 As a client of the Bank in the transaction of a regular bank-client activity.
4.2 When the offending party is on official business concerning his employment
with the Bank with the prior approval and supervision of the Head of HRD or of
the Division Head, or of the Branch Head in case of branches.48
For another, the Memorandum, as worded, is contrary to the intention of the petitioners.
Evidently, the petitioners did not intend to bar the respondent from access to all bank
premises under all circumstances. When he testified, petitioner Ongsiapco admitted that
a bank employee whose services had been terminated may be allowed to see an
employee of the bank and may be allowed access to the bank premises under certain
conditions, viz:
ATTY. R. ALIKPALA
Q So the permission you are referring to is merely a permission to be granted
by the security guard?
A No, sir, not the security guard. The security will call the office where they
are going. Because this is the same procedure they do for visitors. Anybody who
wants to see anybody in the bank before they are allowed access or entry, they
call up the department or the division.
Q So I want to clarify, Mr. Witness. Former bank employees are not allowed
within the bank premises until after the security guard call, which ever
department they are headed for, and that they give the permission and they tell
the security guard to allow the person?
A Yes, Sir, that is the usual procedure.
Q If an employee resigned from the bank, same treatment?
A Yes, Sir.
Q If an employee was terminated by the bank for cause, same treatment?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Outsiders who are not employees or who were never employees of the
bank also must ask permission?
A Yes, Sir. Because there is a security control at the lobby.
Q You mentioned that this is a general rule?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Is this rule written down in black and white anywhere?
A I think this is more of a security procedure.
Q But being a huge financial institution, we expect Cocobank has its
procedure written down in black and white?
ATTY. A. BATUHAN
Your Honor, objection. Argumentative, Your Honor.
There is no question posed at all, Your Honor.
COURT
Answer. Is there any guideline?
A There must be a guideline of the security.
Q But you are not very familiar about the security procedures?
A Yes, Sir.
ATTY. R. ALIKPALA
Q Mr. Ongsiapco, the agency that you hired follows certain procedures?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Which of course are under the direct control and supervision of the bank?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And did the security agency have any of this procedure written down?
A It will be given to them by the Security Department, because they are under
the Security Department.
Q But if an employee is only entering the ground floor bank area, where
customers of the bank are normally allowed, whether depositors or not, they don't
need to ask for express permission, is that correct?
A Yes, if they are client.
Q Even if they are not client, but let us say they have to encash a check paid
to them by someone?
A He is a client then.
Q But he is not yet a client when he enters the bank premises. He only
becomes you know because you do not all these people, you do not know
every client of the bank so you just allow them inside the bank?
A Yes, the premises.49
Petitioner Ongsiapco also testified that a former employee who is a customer/client of the
petitioner bank also has access to the bank premises, except those areas reserved for
its officers and employees, such as the working areas:
ATTY. R. ALIKPALA
Q So Mr. Witness, just for the sake of clarity. The ground floor area is where
the regular consumer banking services are held? What do you call this portion?
A That is the Deposit Servicing Department.
Q Where the .
A Where the people transact business.
ATTY. R. ALIKAPALA
Q They are freely allowed in this area?
A Yes, Sir.
Q This is the area where there are counters, Teller, where a person would
normally go to let us say open a bank account or to request for manager's check,
is that correct?
A Yes, Sir.
Q So, in this portion, no, I mean beyond this portion, meaning the working
areas and second floor up, outsiders will have to ask express permission from
the security guard?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And you say that the security guards are instructed to verify the purpose of
every person who goes into this area?
A As far as I know, sir.50
It behooved the petitioners to revise such Memorandum to conform to its Code of Ethics
and their intentions when it was issued, absent facts and circumstances that
occurred pendente lite which warrant the retention of the Memorandum as presently
worded.
On the second issue, the Court of Appeals ruled that the petitioner bank is liable for
nominal damages to the respondent despite its finding that the petitioners had the right to
issue the Memorandum. The CA ratiocinated that the petitioner bank should have
allowed the respondent to walk towards the restricted area of the ATM section until they
were sure that he had entered such area, and only then could the guards enforce the
Memorandum of petitioner Ongsiapco. The Court of Appeals ruled that for such failure of
the security guards, the petitioner bank thereby abused its right of self-help and violated
the respondent's right as one of its depositors:
With respect, however, to the second incident on January 31, 1996, it appears
that although according to UCPB security personnel they tried to stop plaintiff-
appellee from proceeding to the stairs leading to the upper floors, which were
limited to bank personnel only (TSN, pp. 6-9, June 4, 1997), the said act exposed
plaintiff-appellee to humiliation considering that it was done in full view of other
bank customers. UCPB security personnel should have waited until they were
sure that plaintiff-appellee had entered the restricted areas and then
implemented the memorandum order by asking him to leave the premises.
Technically, plaintiff-appellee was still in the depositing area when UCPB security
personnel approached him. In this case, UCPB's exercise of its right to self-help
was in excess and abusive to the detriment of the right of plaintiff-appellee as
depositor of said Bank, hence, warranting the award of nominal damages in favor
of plaintiff-appellee. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of a
plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated
or recognized and not for the purpose of indemnifying any loss suffered by him
(Japan Airlines vs. Court of Appeals, 294 SCRA 19).51
The petitioners contend that the respondent is not entitled to nominal damages and that
the appellate court erred in so ruling for the following reasons: (a) the respondent failed
to prove that the petitioner bank violated any of his rights; (b) the respondent did not
suffer any humiliation because of the overt acts of the security guards; (c) even if the
respondent did suffer humiliation, there was no breach of duty committed by the
petitioner bank since its security guards politely asked the respondent not to proceed to
the working area of the ATM section because they merely acted pursuant to the
Memorandum of petitioner Ongsiapco, and accordingly, under Article 429 of the New
Civil Code, this is a case of damnum absque injuria;52 and (d) the respondent staged the
whole incident so that he could create evidence to file suit against the petitioners.
We rule in favor of the petitioners.
The evidence on record shows that Casil was in the working area of the ATM section on
the ground floor when he motioned the respondent to approach him and receive the
check. The respondent then stood up and walked towards the direction of Casil.
Indubitably, the respondent was set to enter the working area, where non-employees
were prohibited entry; from there, the respondent could go up to the upper floors of the
bank's premises through the elevator or the stairway. Caspe and the company guard had
no other recourse but prevent the respondent from going to and entering such working
area. The security guards need not have waited for the respondent to actually
commence entering the working area before stopping the latter. Indeed, it would have
been more embarrassing for the respondent to have started walking to the working area
only to be halted by two uniformed security guards and disallowed entry, in full view of
bank customers. It bears stressing that the security guards were polite to the respondent
and even apologized for any inconvenience caused him. The respondent could have just
motioned to Casil to give him the check at the lobby near the teller's booth, instead of
proceeding to and entering the working area himself, which the respondent knew to be
an area off-limits to non-employees. He did not.
The respondent failed to adduce evidence other than his testimony that people in the
ground floor of the petitioner bank saw him being stopped from proceeding to the
working area of the bank. Evidently, the respondent did not suffer embarrassment,
inconvenience or discomfort which, however, partakes of the nature of damnum absque
injuria, i.e. damage without injury or damage inflicted without injustice, or loss or damage
without violation of legal rights, or a wrong due to a pain for which the law provides no
remedy.53 Hence, the award of nominal damages by the Court of Appeals should be
deleted.
On the third issue, we now hold that the petitioner bank is not entitled to damages and
attorney's fees as its counterclaim. There is no evidence on record that the respondent
acted in bad faith or with malice in filing his complaint against the petitioners. Well-settled
is the rule that the commencement of an action does not per se make the action wrongful
and subject the action to damages, for the law could not have meant to impose a penalty
on the right to litigate.
We reiterate case law that if damages result from a party's exercise of a right, it
is damnum absque injuria.54
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision
of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint of the respondent
in the trial court and the counterclaims of the petitioners are DISMISSED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines The spouses Velasco failed to pay the loan, resulting in petitioner foreclosing the
SUPREME COURT mortgaged property. During the auction sale held on 6 July 1979, petitioner was the
Manila highest bidder. The spouses Velasco failed to redeem the property during the one-year
redemption period; hence, petitioners ownership was consolidated, and a Definite Deed
THIRD DIVISION of Sale was issued in its favor. TCT No. 675 was cancelled, and on 14 October 1982, a
new title, TCT No. P-1619, was issued in the name of petitioner.
G.R. No. 168061 October 12, 2009
Meanwhile, Teofilo Icot (respondent) and the late Genaro and Felimon Icot
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Petitioner, (predecessors-in-interest of the other respondents) claimed to have been in quiet, open
vs. and continuous possession of the subject real property which they allegedly acquired
TEOFILO P. ICOT, ANOLITA ICOT PILAPIL, LENNIE P. ICOT, VILMA ICOT CUYOS, from their father, Roberto Icot, through an extrajudicial settlement of estate in 1964.
RESTITUTO C. ICOT, FLORIDO A. CUYOS, CAYETANO GARBO, TEODULA P. Upon learning of the mortgage of the subject real property, respondents filed separate
ICOT, YOLA P. ICOT, and HEIRS OF GENARO ICOT, namely: AMANCIO P. ICOT, cases for quieting of title against Velasco. These cases were docketed as Civil Case
HERMELINA ICOT, EVELYN ICOT GARBO, CARLOS P. ICOT, RENATO P. ICOT, Nos. CEB-14935 and CEB-14946 in RTC Branch XXI of Cebu City, and were later
JOSEPHINE A. ICOT, AMELIA I. GARBO, and ROMMEL ICOT, Respondents. consolidated.

DECISION On 22 November 1985, RTC Branch XXI of Cebu City issued an Order stating thus:

CARPIO, J.: The defendant Vicente Velasco was given 60 days from September 23, 1985 within
which to expedite the repurchase of the properties which plaintiffs herein seek to recover.
xxx
The Case
However, defendant Vicente Velasco informed the Court that the Bank of Philippine
This is a petition for review1 of the Court of Appeals Decision2 dated 7 January 2005 and
Islands, Cebu Branch, to whom he made the offer to repurchase the properties
Resolution dated 3 May 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 81495. The Court of Appeals reversed
mortgaged by him for the sum of P50,000.00 has reportedly indorsed his offer to Manila
the Decision3 dated 21 December 2001 and Order dated 29 July 2003 of the Regional
Office of said bank but up to the present no action has been received whether to accept
Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaue City, Branch 56.
or reject his offer.
The Antecedent Facts
x x x the defendant Vicente Velasco is hereby directed to expedite the negotiation and to
inform the Court of the result thereof within 30 days from today.
On 6 July 1976, spouses Vicente and Trinidad Velasco (spouses Velasco) obtained from
petitioner Bank of the Philippine Islands (petitioner) a loan amounting to P50,000,
The Bank of Philippine Islands, Cebu Branch, thru its manager is hereby requested for
secured by a real estate mortgage over a parcel of land located in Liloan, Cebu. The
(sic) comment on the aforementioned negotiation for confirmation of said negotiation to
parcel of land was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 675, issued in the
the satisfaction of the plaintiffs and the Court. Furnish copy of this order to parties thru
name of Vicente Velasco, and was particularly described as follows:
their respective counsel and the manager of the bank of Philippine Islands, Cebu Branch.
Lot No. 958, Pls-823; x x x containing an area of SEVEN THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED
SO ORDERED.7 (Emphasis supplied)
EIGHTY-NINE (7,189) SQUARE METERS x x x Bounded on the SE., along line 1-2-3 by
Lot 980; Pls-823; along lines 3-4-5-6-7 by Lot 992; Pls-823; on the SW., along line 7-8 by
Lot 957, Pls 823; on the NW., along line 8-9 by Road; and on the NE., along line 9-1 by In compliance with the above RTC Order, petitioner BPI filed a Manifestation8 stating that
Lot 993, Pls 823. x x x4 it has favorably endorsed Velascos proposal to repurchase the real property to its Head
Office, but the latter had yet to act on the recommendation.
On 14 August 1986, RTC Branch XXI of Cebu City rendered Judgment based on a
Compromise Agreement entered into by the parties, stating thus:
The parties assisted by their respective counsel (sic) submitted the above-entitled two
civil cases for judgment based on the following compromise agreement, viz:
1. That the defendant recognizes the ownership and title of the plaintiffs in Civil
Case No. CEB-1493 Teofilo Icot and Genaro Icot and the plaintiff Filemon
Icot in Civil Case No. CEB-1494 over the lands described in their respective
complaints;
2. That these lands are among real properties purchased by the defendant from
plaintiffs predecessor-in-interest, unknowing that it had already been partitioned,
hence, the defendant mortgaged the real properties purchased to the Bank of the
Philippine Islands for P50,000.00;
3. That the whole property mortgaged was foreclosed and remains foreclosed to
the present time, but with the awareness brought about by these cases that the
properties claimed in the complaints had been included in the mortgage, the
defendant had to negotiate with the bank to repurchase the foreclosed collateral
to the end that the lands of the plaintiffs, as described in their complaints, would
be freed from the encumbrance and plaintiffs title thereto quieted and restored;
4. That the Bank has agreed at last to have the mortgaged property repurchased
in five (5) installments at P10,000.00 an installment, the first installment for the
month of July, 1986, having been paid on July 14, 1986, as evidenced by Bank of
P.I. Miscellaneous receipt No. 273616 and by the month of November, 1986, the
whole repurchase price shall have been paid and the mortgaged-foreclosed
property will be freed from any and all encumbrance, including the parcels
claimed by the plaintiffs in their complaints;
5. That the defendant had never been in possession of the parcels claimed by
the plaintiffs and he executed the mortgage in good faith, without in the least
intending to prejudice anyone by said mortgage;
6. That the plaintiffs acknowledge the good faith of the defendant and the fact
that the latter had never bothered them in their possession of the lands subject-
matter of these cases and factually had not prejudiced their possession thereof,
except the doubt created by the mortgage to the bank;
7. That with the repurchase of the subject land in these cases by the defendant
and the latters acknowledgment of the ownership and title over the same in (sic)
the individual plaintiffs in these cases, the Parties hereto would pray for a
judgment based on the foregoing facts, with the plaintiffs waiving any and all
damages alleged and claimed in their complaint.
WHEREFORE, finding the compromise agreement to be not contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order and public policy, the same is hereby approved and
judgment is hereby rendered on the basis thereof, with the terms of the compromise
agreement constituting as dispositive part thereof and the parties are hereby enjoined to
comply therewith in good faith.
SO ORDERED.9
On 17 October 1988, petitioner and Velasco entered into a Contract to Sell wherein the
former agreed to sell to the latter the subject real property for P60,387, payable within a
year on installment basis. Velasco failed to pay the amount due, prompting petitioner to
cancel the Contract to Sell. In a letter dated 10 June 1993, petitioner reiterated its
cancellation of the contract and requested Velasco to peacefully surrender possession of
the subject property.10
On 23 February 1994, respondents Amancio P. Icot and Florido A. Cuyos wrote
petitioner a letter offering to purchase the subject property for the amount of P150,000.
The amount was later increased to P250,000, but the same was rejected by petitioner for
being too low.11
On 26 October 1999, petitioner filed with the RTC of Mandaue City a Petition for the
Issuance of a Writ of Possession, docketed as LRC Case No. 3.
The Trial Courts Ruling
On 21 December 2001, the RTC rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, and finding the Petition meritorious, the same is
hereby granted. Accordingly, let a Writ of Possession be issued to petitioner.
SO ORDERED.12
Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but this was denied by the RTC in its
Order dated 29 July 2003.
The Court of Appeals Ruling
Respondents filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the
1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. On 7 January 2005, the Court of Appeals
rendered judgment granting the petition and reversing the RTC decision. We quote the
dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals decision below.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, finding the petition meritorious, the same is hereby
granted and the assailed Decision of the trial court dated December 21, 2001 as well as
its Order dated July 29, 2003 are hereby reversed and set aside.
SO ORDERED.13
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in its
Resolution of 3 May 2005.14
Hence, this appeal.
The Issue
The sole issue for resolution in this case is whether petitioner is entitled to the issuance
of a writ of possession of the subject property.
The Courts Ruling
We find the appeal without merit.
A writ of possession is generally understood to be an order whereby the sheriff is
commanded to place a person in possession of a real or personal property.15 A writ of
possession may be issued under the following instances: (1) land registration
proceedings under Section 17 of Act 496; (2) judicial foreclosure, provided the debtor is
in possession of the mortgaged realty and no third person, not a party to the foreclosure
suit, had intervened; and (3) extrajudicial foreclosure of a real estate mortgage under
Section 7 of Act 3135, as amended by Act 4118 (Act 3135).16 This case involves the third
instance. Under Section 7 of Act 3135, a writ of possession may be issued either (1)
within the one year redemption period, upon the filing of a bond, or (2) after the lapse of
the redemption period, without need of a bond17 or of a separate and independent
action.18 This is founded on the purchasers right of ownership over the property which he
bought at the auction sale and his consequent right to be placed in possession
thereof.19 However, this rule admits of an exception, that is, Section 33 (former Section
35) of Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides that the possession of the
mortgaged property shall be given to the purchaser "unless a third party is actually
holding the property adversely to the judgment obligor."20 We quote section 33, to wit:
Sec. 33. Deed and possession to be given at expiration of redemption period; by whom
executed or given. If no redemption be made within one (1) year from the date of the
registration of the certificate of sale, the purchaser is entitled to a conveyance and
possession of the property; or, if so redeemed whenever sixty (60) days have elapsed
and no other redemption has been made, and notice thereof given, and the time for
redemption has expired, the last redemptioner is entitled to the conveyance and
possession; but in all cases the judgment obligor shall have the entire period of one (1)
year from the date of the registration of the sale to redeem the property. The deed shall
be executed by the officer making the sale or by his successor in office, and in the latter
case shall have the same validity as though the officer making the sale had continued in
office and executed it.
Upon the expiration of the right of redemption, the purchaser or redemptioner shall be
substituted to and acquire all the rights, title, interest and claim of the judgment obligor to
the property as of the time of the levy. The possession of the property shall be given to
the purchaser or last redemptioner by the same officer unless a third party is actually
holding the property adversely to the judgment obligor. (Emphasis supplied)
In the recent case of Development Bank of the Philippines v. Prime Neighborhood
Association,21 we reiterated our previous ruling in Philippine National Bank v. Court of
Appeals22 that "the obligation of a court to issue an ex parte writ of possession in favor of
the purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale ceases to be ministerial once it appears
that there is a third party in possession of the property who is claiming a right adverse to
that of the debtor/mortgagor." We further held, thus:
Under [Article 433 of the Civil Code],23 one who claims to be the owner of a property
possessed by another must bring the appropriate judicial action for its physical recovery.
The term "judicial process" could mean no less than an ejectment suit or reivindicatory
action in which ownership claims of the contending parties may be properly heard and
adjudicated.
An ex parte petition for issuance of a possessory writ under Section 7 of Act 3135[, as
amended,] is not, strictly speaking, a "judicial process" as contemplated above. Even if
the same may be considered a judicial proceeding for the enforcement of one's right of
possession as purchaser in a foreclosure sale, it is not an ordinary suit filed in court by
which one party "sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the
prevention or redress of a wrong."
It should be emphasized that an ex parte petition for issuance of a writ of possession is a
non-litigious proceeding authorized in an extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage pursuant
to Act 3135, as amended. Unlike a judicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage under
Rule 68 of the Rules of Court, any property brought within the ambit of the act is
foreclosed by the filing of a petition, not with any court of justice, but with the office of the
sheriff of the province where the sale is to be made.
As such, a third person in possession of an extrajudicially foreclosed realty, who claims a
right superior to that of the original mortgagor, will have no opportunity to be heard on his
claim in a proceeding of this nature. It stands to reason, therefore, that such third person
may not be dispossessed on the strength of a mere ex parte possessory writ, since to do
so would be tantamount to his summary ejectment, in violation of the basic tenets of due
process.
Besides, as earlier stressed, Article 433 of the Civil Code, cited above, requires nothing
less that an action for ejectment to be brought even by the true owner. After all, the
actual possessor of a property enjoys a legal presumption of just title in his favor, which
must be overcome by the party claiming otherwise.24
We also held in Tan Soo Huat v. Ongwico,25 that:
There is no law in this jurisdiction whereby the purchaser at a sheriffs sale of real
property is obliged to bring a separate and independent suit for possession after the one-
year period for redemption has expired and after he has obtained the sheriffs final
certificate of sale. There is neither legal ground nor reason of public policy precluding the
court from ordering the sheriff in this case to yield possession of the property purchased
at public auction where it appears that the judgment debtor is the one in possession
thereof and no rights of third persons are involved. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the right of possession by a purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure of real
property is recognized only as against the judgment debtor and his successor-in-interest,
but not as against persons whose right of possession is adverse to the latter.26 In this
case, respondents are third parties in possession of the subject real property, holding the
same under a title adverse to that of the mortgagor/judgment obligor, Velasco.
Respondents are claiming title by virtue of an extrajudicial settlement of their fathers
estate executed in 1964. Upon learning of the mortgage of the real property by Velasco
to petitioner, respondents filed a case for quieting of title against Velasco. The latter later
acknowledged or "recognized" respondents ownership of the real property in the
Compromise Agreement executed by the parties in the quieting of title case. Velasco
even agreed to undertake restitution of the subject property by contracting anew with and
repurchasing the foreclosed property from petitioner. 1avv phi 1
Moreover, respondents are not parties to the mortgage contract between the spouses
Velasco and petitioner. As correctly ruled by the appellate court, the mere mention of the
mortgage of the real property in the Compromise Agreement did not make respondents
privies to the mortgage contract between the spouses Velasco and petitioner. Moreover,
respondents offer to repurchase the foreclosed property from petitioner is not
tantamount to stepping into the shoes of Velasco, nor would such offer qualify
respondents as Velascos successors-in-interest. Rather, the offer may be considered as
respondents last ditch effort to avoid being deprived of the property they claim to have
possessed since time immemorial.
Petitioners right to issuance of a writ of possession cannot be invoked against
respondents. Respondents possession of the subject real property is legally presumed
to be pursuant to a just title which petitioner may endeavor to overcome in a judicial
proceeding for recovery of property.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Court of Appeals Decision dated
7 January 2005 and Resolution dated 3 May 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 81495.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 165952 July 28, 2008
ANECO REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs.
LANDEX DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent.
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
THIS is a simple case of a neighbor seeking to restrain the landowner from fencing his
own property. The right to fence flows from the right of ownership. Absent a clear legal
and enforceable right, We will not unduly restrain the landowner from exercising an
inherent proprietary right.
Before Us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) affirming the Order2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) dismissing the complaint for
injunction filed by petitioner Aneco Realty and Development Corporation (Aneco) against
respondent Landex Development Corporation (Landex).
Facts
Fernandez Hermanos Development, Inc. (FHDI) is the original owner of a tract of land in
San Francisco Del Monte, Quezon City. FHDI subdivided the land into thirty-nine (39)
lots.3 It later sold twenty-two (22) lots to petitioner Aneco and the remaining seventeen
(17) lots to respondent Landex.4
The dispute arose when Landex started the construction of a concrete wall on one of its
lots. To restrain construction of the wall, Aneco filed a complaint for injunction5 with the
RTC in Quezon City. Aneco later filed two (2) supplemental complaints seeking to
demolish the newly-built wall and to hold Landex liable for two million pesos in damages.6
Landex filed its Answer7 alleging, among others, that Aneco was not deprived access to
its lots due to the construction of the concrete wall. Landex claimed that Aneco has its
own entrance to its property along Miller Street, Resthaven Street, and San Francisco
del Monte Street. The Resthaven access, however, was rendered inaccessible when
Aneco constructed a building on said street. Landex also claimed that FHDI sold ordinary
lots, not subdivision lots, to Aneco based on the express stipulation in the deed of sale
that FHDI was not interested in pursuing its own subdivision project.
RTC Disposition
On June 19, 1996, the RTC rendered a Decision8 granting the complaint for injunction,
disposing as follows:
Wherefore, premises considered, and in the light aforecited decision of the Supreme
Court judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and the defendant is hereby
ordered:
1. To stop the completion of the concrete wall and excavation of the road lot in
question and if the same is already completed, to remove the same and to return
the lot to its original situation;
2. To pay actual and compensatory damage to the plaintiff in the total amount
of P50,000.00;
3. To pay attorneys fees in the amount of P20,000.00;
4. To pay the cost.
SO ORDERED.9
Landex moved for reconsideration.10 Records reveal that Landex failed to include a
notice of hearing in its motion for reconsideration as required under Section 5, Rule 15 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Realizing the defect, Landex later filed a
motion11 setting a hearing for its motion for reconsideration. Aneco countered with a
motion for execution12 claiming that the RTC decision is already final and executory.
Acting on the motion of Landex, the RTC set a hearing on the motion for reconsideration
on August 28, 1996. Aneco failed to attend the slated hearing. The RTC gave Aneco
additional time to file a comment on the motion for reconsideration.13
On March 13, 1997, the RTC issued an order14 denying the motion for execution of
Aneco.
On March 31, 1997, the RTC issued an order granting the motion for reconsideration of
Landex and dismissing the complaint of Aneco. In granting reconsideration, the RTC
stated:
In previously ruling for the plaintiff, this Court anchored its decision on the ruling of the
Supreme Court in the case of "White Plains Association vs. Legaspi, 193 SCRA 765,"
wherein the issue involved was the ownership of a road lot, in an existing, fully
developed and authorized subdivision, which after a second look, is apparently
inapplicable to the instant case at bar, simply because the property in question never did
exist as a subdivision. Since, the property in question never did exist as a subdivision,
the limitations imposed by Section 1 of Republic Act No. 440, that no portion of a
subdivision road lot shall be closed without the approval of the Court is clearly in
appropriate to the case at bar.
The records show that the plaintiffs property has access to a public road as it has its
own ingress and egress along Miller St.; That plaintiffs property is not isolated as it is
bounded by Miller St. and Resthaven St. in San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City; that
plaintiff could easily make an access to a public road within the bounds and limits of its
own property; and that the defendant has not yet been indemnified whatsoever for the
use of his property, as mandated by the Bill of rights. The foregoing circumstances,
negates the alleged plaintiffs right of way.15
Aneco appealed to the CA.16
CA Disposition
On March 31, 2003, the CA rendered a Decision17 affirming the RTC order, disposing as
follows:
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing, the instant appeal is perforce
dismissed. Accordingly, the order dated 31 March 1996 is hereby affirmed.
SO ORDERED.18
In affirming the RTC dismissal of the complaint for injunction, the CA held that Aneco
knew at the time of the sale that the lots sold by FHDI were not subdivision units based
on the express stipulation in the deed of sale that FHDI, the seller, was no longer
interested in pursuing its subdivision project, thus:
The subject property ceased to be a road lot when its former owner (Fernandez
Hermanos, Inc.) sold it to appellant Aneco not as subdivision lots and without the
intention of pursuing the subdivision project. The law in point is Article 624 of the New
Civil Code, which provides:
Art. 624. The existence of an apparent sign of easement between two estates,
established or maintained by the owner of both, shall be considered, should either of
them be alienated, as a title in order that the easement may continue actively and
passively, unless, at the time the ownership of the two estates is divided, the contrary
should be provided in the title of conveyance of either of them, or the sign aforesaid
should be removed before the execution of the deed. This provision shall also apply in
case of the division of a thing owned in common by two or more persons.
Viewed from the aforesaid law, there is no question that the law allows the continued use
of an apparent easement should the owner alienate the property to different persons. It is
noteworthy to emphasize that the lot in question was provided by the previous owner
(Fernandez Hermanos, Inc.) as a road lot because of its intention to convert it into a
subdivision project. The previous owner even applied for a development permit over the
subject property. However, when the twenty-two (22) lots were sold to appellant Aneco, it
was very clear from the sellers deed of sale that the lots sold ceased to be subdivision
lots. The seller even warranted that it shall undertake to extend all the necessary
assistance for the consolidation of the subdivided lots, including the execution of the
requisite manifestation before the appropriate government agencies that the seller is no
longer interested in pursuing the subdivision project. In fine, appellant Aneco knew from
the very start that at the time of the sale, the 22 lots sold to it were not intended as
subdivision units, although the titles to the different lots have yet to be consolidated.
Consequently, the easement that used to exist on the subject lot ceased when appellant
Aneco and the former owner agreed that the lots would be consolidated and would no
longer be intended as a subdivision project.
Appellant Aneco insists that it has the intention of continuing the subdivision project
earlier commenced by the former owner. It also holds on to the previous development
permit granted to Fernandez Hermanos, Inc. The insistence is futile. Appellant Aneco did
not acquire any right from the said previous owner since the latter itself expressly stated
in their agreement that it has no more intention of continuing the subdivision project. If
appellant desires to convert its property into a subdivision project, it has to apply in its
own name, and must have its own provisions for a road lot.19
Anent the issue of compulsory easement of right of way, the CA held that Aneco failed to
prove the essential requisites to avail of such right, thus:
An easement involves an abnormal restriction on the property of the servient owner and
is regarded as a charge or encumbrance on the servient owner and is regarded as a
charge or encumbrance on the servient estate (Cristobal v. CA, 291 SCRA 122). The
essential requisites to be entitled to a compulsory easement of way are: 1) that the
dominant estate is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a
public highway; 2) that proper indemnity has been paid; 3) that the isolation was not due
to acts of the proprietor of the dominant estate; 4) that the right of way claimed is at a
point least prejudicial to the servient estate and in so far as consistent with this rule,
where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest
(Cristobal v. Court of Appeals, 291 SCRA 122).
An in depth examination of the evidence adduced and offered by appellant Aneco,
showed that it had failed to prove the existence of the aforementioned requisites, as the
burden thereof lies upon the appellant Aneco.20
Aneco moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied.21 Hence, the present petition
or appeal by certiorari under Rule 45.
Issues
Petitioner Aneco assigns quadruple errors to the CA in the following tenor:
A.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DISMISSING PETITIONERS
APPEAL AND SUSTAINING THE TRIAL COURTS ORDER DATED 31 MARCH
1997 GRANTING RESPONDENTS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
WHICH IS FATALLY DEFECTIVE FOR LACK OF NOTICE OF HEARING.
B.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL
COURTS ORDER WHICH GAVE FULL WEIGHT AND CREDIT TO THE
MISLEADING AND ERRONEOUS CERTIFICATION ISSUED BY GILDA E.
ESTILO WHICH SHE LATER EXPRESSLY AND CATEGORICALLY
RECANTED BY WAY OF HER AFFIDAVIT.
 C.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN APPLYING THE LIBERAL
CONSTRUCTION OF THE RULES IN ORDER TO SUSTAIN THE TRIAL
COURTS ORDER DATED 31 MARCH 1997.
D.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL
COURTS ORDER THAT MADE NO PRONOUNCEMENTS AS TO COSTS,
AND IN DISREGARDING THE MERIT OF THE PETITIONERS CAUSE OF
ACTION.22
Our Ruling
The petition is without merit.
Essentially, two (2) issues are raised in this petition. The first is the procedural issue of
whether or not the RTC and the CA erred in liberally applying the rule on notice of
hearing under Section 5, Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The second is the
substantive issue of whether or not Aneco may enjoin Landex from constructing a
concrete wall on its own property.
We shall discuss the twin issues sequentially.
Strict vs. Liberal Construction of Procedural Rules; Defective motion was cured when
Aneco was given an opportunity to comment on the motion for reconsideration.
Section 5, Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure23 requires a notice of hearing for
a contested motion filed in court. Records disclose that the motion for reconsideration
filed by Landex of the RTC decision did not contain a notice of hearing. There is no
dispute that the motion for reconsideration is defective. The RTC and the CA ignored the
procedural defect and ruled on the substantive issues raised by Landex in its motion for
reconsideration. The issue before Us is whether or not the RTC and the CA correctly
exercised its discretion in ignoring the procedural defect. Simply put, the issue is whether
or not the requirement of notice of hearing should be strictly or liberally applied under the
circumstances.
Aneco bats for strict construction. It cites a litany of cases which held that notice of
hearing is mandatory. A motion without the required notice of hearing is a mere scrap of
paper. It does not toll the running of the period to file an appeal or a motion for
reconsideration. It is argued that the original RTC decision is already final and executory
because of the defective motion.24
Landex counters for liberal construction. It similarly cites a catena of cases which held
that procedural rules may be relaxed in the interest of substantial justice. Landex asserts
that the procedural defect was cured when it filed a motion setting a hearing for its
motion for reconsideration. It is claimed that Aneco was properly informed of the pending
motion for reconsideration and it was not deprived of an opportunity to be heard.25
It is true that appeals are mere statutory privileges which should be exercised only in the
manner required by law. Procedural rules serve a vital function in our judicial system.
They promote the orderly resolution of cases. Without procedure, there will be chaos. It
thus behooves upon a litigant to follow basic procedural rules. Dire consequences may
flow from procedural lapses.
Nonetheless, it is also true that procedural rules are mere tools designed to facilitate the
attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application should be relaxed when they hinder
rather than promote substantial justice. Public policy dictates that court cases should, as
much as possible, be resolved on the merits not on mere technicalities. Substantive
justice trumps procedural rules. In Barnes v. Padilla,26 this Court held:
Let it be emphasized that the rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools
designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which
would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice,
must always be eschewed. Even the Rules of Court reflect this principle. The power to
suspend or even disregard rules can be so pervasive and compelling as to alter even
that which this Court itself has already declared to be final x x x.lawph!l
The emerging trend in the rulings of this Court is to afford every party litigant the amplest
opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of
technicalities. Time and again, this Court has consistently held that rules must not be
applied rigidly so as not to override substantial justice.27
Here, We find that the RTC and the CA soundly exercised their discretion in opting for a
liberal rather than a strict application of the rules on notice of hearing. It must be stressed
that there are no vested right to technicalities. It is within the courts sound discretion to
relax procedural rules in order to fully adjudicate the merits of a case. This Court will not
interfere with the exercise of that discretion absent grave abuse or palpable error.
Section 6, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure even mandates a liberal
construction of the rules to promote their objectives of securing a just, speedy, and
inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.
To be sure, the requirement of a notice of hearing in every contested motion is part of
due process of law. The notice alerts the opposing party of a pending motion in court and
gives him an opportunity to oppose it. What the rule forbids is not the mere absence of a
notice of hearing in a contested motion but the unfair surprise caused by the lack of
notice. It is the dire consequences which flow from the procedural error which is
proscribed. If the opposing party is given a sufficient opportunity to oppose a defective
motion, the procedural lapse is deemed cured and the intent of the rule is substantially
complied. In E & L Mercantile, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court,28 this Court held:
Procedural due process is not based solely on a mechanistic and literal application of a
rule such that any deviation is inexorably fatal. Rules of procedure, and this includes the
three (3) days notice requirement, are liberally construed in order to promote their object
and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
every action and proceeding (Section 2, Rule 1, Rules of Court). In Case and Nantz v.
Jugo (77 Phil. 517), this Court made it clear that lapses in the literal observance of a rule
of procedure may be overlooked when they have not prejudiced the adverse party and
have not deprived the court of its authority.
A party cannot ignore a more than sufficient opportunity to exercise its right to be heard
and once the court performs its duty and the outcome happens to be against that
negligent party, suddenly interpose a procedural violation already cured, insisting that
everybody should again go back to square one. Dilatory tactics cannot be the guiding
principle.
The rule in De Borja v. Tan (93 Phil. 167), that "what the law prohibits is not the absence
of previous notice, but the absolute absence thereof and lack of opportunity to be heard,"
is the applicable doctrine. (See also Aguilar v. Tan, 31 SCRA 205; Omico v. Vallejos, 63
SCRA 285; Sumadchat v. Court of Appeals, 111 SCRA 488.) x x x29
We also find that the procedural lapse committed by Landex was sufficiently cured when
it filed another motion setting a hearing for its defective motion for reconsideration.
Records reveal that the RTC set a hearing for the motion for reconsideration but Anecos
counsel failed to appear. The RTC then gave Aneco additional time to file comment on
the motion for reconsideration.30
Aneco was afforded procedural due process when it was given an opportunity to oppose
the motion for reconsideration. It cannot argue unfair surprise because it was afforded
ample time to file a comment, as it did comment, on the motion for reconsideration.
There being no substantial injury or unfair prejudice, the RTC and the CA correctly
ignored the procedural defect. Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 116100 February 9, 1996
SPOUSES CRISTINO and BRIGIDA CUSTODIO and SPOUSES LITO and MARIA
CRISTINA SANTOS,petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF PACIFICO C. MABASA and REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF PASIG, METRO MANILA, BRANCH 181, respondents.
DECISION
REGALADO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari assails the decision of respondent Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 29115, promulgated on November 10, 1993, which affirmed with
modification the decision of the trial court, as well as its resolution dated July 8, 1994
denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.1
On August 26, 1982, Civil Case No. 47466 for the grant of an easement of right of way
was filed by Pacifico Mabasa against Cristino Custodio, Brigida R. Custodio, Rosalina R.
Morato, Lito Santos and Maria Cristina C. Santos before the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig and assigned to Branch 22 thereof.2
The generative facts of the case, as synthesized by the trial court and adopted by the
Court of Appeals, are as follows:
Perusing the record, this Court finds that the original plaintiff Pacifico Mabasa
died during the pendency of this case and was substituted by Ofelia Mabasa, his
surviving spouse [and children].
The plaintiff owns a parcel of land with a two-door apartment erected thereon
situated at Interior P. Burgos St., Palingon, Tipas, Tagig, Metro Manila. The
plaintiff was able to acquire said property through a contract of sale with spouses
Mamerto Rayos and Teodora Quintero as vendors last September 1981. Said
property may be described to be surrounded by other immovables pertaining to
defendants herein. Taking P. Burgos Street as the point of reference, on the left
side, going to plaintiff's property, the row of houses will be as follows: That of
defendants Cristino and Brigido Custodio, then that of Lito and Maria Cristina
Santos and then that of Ofelia Mabasa. On the right side (is) that of defendant
Rosalina Morato and then a Septic Tank (Exhibit "D"). As an access to P. Burgos
Street from plaintiff's property, there are two possible passageways. The first
passageway is approximately one meter wide and is about 20 meters distan(t)
from Mabasa's residence to P. Burgos Street. Such path is passing in between
the previously mentioned row of houses. The second passageway is about 3
meters in width and length from plaintiff Mabasa's residence to P. Burgos Street;
 it is about 26 meters. In passing thru said passageway, a less than a meter wide
path through the septic tank and with 5-6 meters in length, has to be traversed.
When said property was purchased by Mabasa, there were tenants occupying
the remises and who were acknowledged by plaintiff Mabasa as
tenants. However, sometime in February, 1982, one of said tenants vacated the
apartment and when plaintiff Mabasa went to see the premises, he saw that there
had been built an adobe fence in the first passageway making it narrower in
width. Said adobe fence was first constructed by defendants Santoses along their
property which is also along the first passageway. Defendant Morato constructed
her adobe fence and even extended said fence in such a way that the entire
passageway was enclosed. (Exhibit "1-Santoses and Custodios, Exh. "D" for
plaintiff, Exhs. "1-C", "1-D" and "1-E") And it was then that the remaining tenants
of said apartment vacated the area. Defendant Ma. Cristina Santos testified that
she constructed said fence because there was an incident when her daughter
was dragged by a bicycle pedalled by a son of one of the tenants in said
apartment along the first passageway. She also mentioned some other
inconveniences of having (at) the front of her house a pathway such as when
some of the tenants were drunk and would bang their doors and windows. Some
of their footwear were even lost. . . .3 (Emphasis in original text; corrections in
parentheses supplied)
On February 27, 1990, a decision was rendered by the trial court, with this dispositive
part:
Accordingly, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1) Ordering defendants Custodios and Santoses to give plaintiff permanent
access ingress and egress, to the public street;
2) Ordering the plaintiff to pay defendants Custodios and Santoses the sum of
Eight Thousand Pesos (P8,000) as indemnity for the permanent use of the
passageway.
The parties to shoulder their respective litigation expenses.4
Not satisfied therewith, therein plaintiff represented by his heirs, herein private
respondents, went to the Court of Appeals raising the sole issue of whether or not the
lower court erred in not awarding damages in their favor. On November 10, 1993, as
earlier stated, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision affirming the judgment of the
trial court with modification, the decretal portion of which disposes as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the lower court is hereby AFFIRMED
WITH MODIFICATION only insofar as the herein grant of damages to plaintiffs-
appellants. The Court hereby orders defendants-appellees to pay plaintiffs-
appellants the sum of Sixty Five Thousand (P65,000) Pesos as Actual Damages,
Thirty Thousand (P30,000) Pesos as Moral Damages, and Ten Thousand
(P10,000) Pesos as Exemplary Damages. The rest of the appealed decision is
affirmed to all respects.5
On July 8, 1994, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.6 Petitioners then took the present recourse to us, raising two issues,
namely, whether or not the grant of right of way to herein private respondents is proper,
and whether or not the award of damages is in order.
With respect to the first issue, herein petitioners are already barred from raising the
same. Petitioners did not appeal from the decision of the court a quo granting private
respondents the right of way, hence they are presumed to be satisfied with the
adjudication therein. With the finality of the judgment of the trial court as to petitioners,
the issue of propriety of the grant of right of way has already been laid to rest.
For failure to appeal the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals, petitioners
cannot obtain any affirmative relief other than those granted in the decision of the trial
court. That decision of the court below has become final as against them and can no
longer be reviewed, much less reversed, by this Court. The rule in this jurisdiction is that
whenever an appeal is taken in a civil case, an appellee who has not himself appealed
may not obtain from the appellate court any affirmative relief other than what was
granted in the decision of the lower court. The appellee can only advance any argument
that he may deem necessary to defeat the appellant's claim or to uphold the decision that
is being disputed, and he can assign errors in his brief if such is required to strengthen
the views expressed by the court a quo. These assigned errors, in turn, may be
considered by the appellate court solely to maintain the appealed decision on other
grounds, but not for the purpose of reversing or modifying the judgment in the appellee's
favor and giving him other affirmative reliefs.7
However, with respect to the second issue, we agree with petitioners that the Court of
Appeals erred in awarding damages in favor of private respondents. The award of
damages has no substantial legal basis. A reading of the decision of the Court of
Appeals will show that the award of damages was based solely on the fact that the
original plaintiff, Pacifico Mabasa, incurred losses in the form of unrealized rentals when
the tenants vacated the leased premises by reason of the closure of the passageway.
However, the mere fact that the plaintiff suffered losses does not give rise to a right to
recover damages. To warrant the recovery of damages, there must be both a right of
action for a legal wrong inflicted by the defendant, and damage resulting to the plaintiff
therefrom. Wrong without damage, or damage without wrong, does not constitute a
cause of action, since damages are merely part of the remedy allowed for the injury
caused by a breach or wrong.8
There is a material distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the illegal invasion
of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt, or harm which results from the injury; and
damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus,
there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not
the result of a violation of a legal duty. These situations are often called damnum absque
injuria.9
In order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the injuries of which he complains, he
must establish that such injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant
owed to the plaintiff a concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility by the
person causing it.10 The underlying basis for the award of tort damages is the premise
that an individual was injured in contemplation of law. Thus, there must first be the
breach of some duty and the imposition of liability for that breach before damages may
be awarded; it is not sufficient to state that there should be tort liability merely because
the plaintiff suffered some pain and suffering.11
Many accidents occur and many injuries are inflicted by acts or omissions which cause
damage or loss to another but which violate no legal duty to such other person, and
consequently create no cause of action in his favor. In such cases, the consequences
must be borne by the injured person alone. The law affords no remedy for damages
resulting from an act which does not amount to a legal injury or wrong.12
In other words, in order that the law will give redress for an act causing damage, that act
must be not only hurtful, but wrongful. There must be damnum et injuria.13 If, as may
happen in many cases, a person sustains actual damage, that is, harm or loss to his
person or property, without sustaining any legal injury, that is, an act or omission which
the law does not deem an injury, the damage is regarded as damnum absque injuria.14
In the case at bar, although there was damage, there was no legal injury. Contrary to the
claim of private respondents, petitioners could not be said to have violated the principle
of abuse of right. In order that the principle of abuse of right provided in Article 21 of the
Civil Code can be applied, it is essential that the following requisites concur: (1) The
defendant should have acted in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy; (2) The acts should be willful; and (3) There was damage or injury to the
plaintiff.15
The act of petitioners in constructing a fence within their lot is a valid exercise of their
right as owners, hence not contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. The law
recognizes in the owner the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations
than those established by law.16 It is within the right of petitioners, as owners, to enclose
and fence their property. Article 430 of the Civil Code provides that "(e)very owner may
enclose or fence his land or tenements by means of walls, ditches, live or dead hedges,
or by any other means without detriment to servitudes constituted thereon."
At the time of the construction of the fence, the lot was not subject to any servitudes.
There was no easement of way existing in favor of private respondents, either by law or
by contract. The fact that private respondents had no existing right over the said
passageway is confirmed by the very decision of the trial court granting a compulsory
right of way in their favor after payment of just compensation. It was only that decision
which gave private respondents the right to use the said passageway after payment of
the compensation and imposed a corresponding duty on petitioners not to interfere in the
exercise of said right.
Hence, prior to said decision, petitioners had an absolute right over their property and
their act of fencing and enclosing the same was an act which they may lawfully perform
in the employment and exercise of said right. To repeat, whatever injury or damage may
have been sustained by private respondents by reason of the rightful use of the said land
by petitioners is damnum absque injuria.17
A person has a right to the natural use and enjoyment of his own property, according to
his pleasure, for all the purposes to which such property is usually applied. As a general
rule, therefore, there is no cause of action for acts done by one person upon his own
property in a lawful and proper manner, although such acts incidentally cause damage or
an unavoidable loss to another, as such damage or loss is damnum absque
injuria. 18 When the owner of property makes use thereof in the general and ordinary
manner in which the property is used, such as fencing or enclosing the same as in this
case, nobody can complain of having been injured, because the incovenience arising
from said use can be considered as a mere consequence of community life. 19
The proper exercise of a lawful right cannot constitute a legal wrong for which an action
will lie, 20 although the act may result in damage to another, for no legal right has been
invaded. 21 One may use any lawful means to accomplish a lawful purpose and though
the means adopted may cause damage to another, no cause of action arises in the
latter's favor. An injury or damage occasioned thereby is damnum absque injuria. The
courts can give no redress for hardship to an individual resulting from action reasonably
calculated to achieve a lawful means. 22
WHEREFORE, under the compulsion of the foregoing premises, the appealed decision
of respondent Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the judgment
of the trial court is correspondingly REINSTATED.
Romero and Puno, JJ., concur.
Mendoza, J., took no part.
The RTC and the CA did not err in dismissing the complaint for injunction; factual
findings and conclusions of law of the RTC and the CA are afforded great weight and
respect.
Anent the substantive issue, We agree with the RTC and the CA that the complaint for
injunction against Landex should be dismissed for lack of merit. What is involved here is
an undue interference on the property rights of a landowner to build a concrete wall on
his own property. It is a simple case of a neighbor, petitioner Aneco, seeking to restrain a
landowner, respondent Landex, from fencing his own land.
Article 430 of the Civil Code gives every owner the right to enclose or fence his land or
tenement by means of walls, ditches, hedges or any other means. The right to fence
flows from the right of ownership. As owner of the land, Landex may fence his property
subject only to the limitations and restrictions provided by law. Absent a clear legal and
enforceable right, as here, We will not interfere with the exercise of an essential attribute
of ownership.
Well-settled is the rule that factual findings and conclusions of law of the trial court when
affirmed by the CA are accorded great weight and respect. Here, We find no cogent
reason to deviate from the factual findings and conclusion of law of the trial court and the
appellate court. We have meticulously reviewed the records and agree that Aneco failed
to prove any clear legal right to prevent, much less restrain, Landex from fencing its own
property.
Aneco cannot rely on the road lot under the old subdivision project of FHDI because it
knew at the time of the sale that it was buying ordinary lots, not subdivision lots, from
FHDI. This is clear from the deed of sale between FHDI and Aneco where FHDI
manifested that it was no longer interested in pursuing its own subdivision project. If
Aneco wants to transform its own lots into a subdivision project, it must make its own
provision for road lots. It certainly cannot piggy back on the road lot of the defunct
subdivision project of FHDI to the detriment of the new owner Landex. The RTC and the
CA correctly dismissed the complaint for injunction of Aneco for lack of merit.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the appealed Decision AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 4223 August 19, 1908
NICOLAS LUNOD, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
HIGINO MENESES, defendant-appellant.
T. Icasiano, for appellant.
R. Salinas, for appellee.
TORRES, J.:
On the 14th of March, 1904, Nicolas Lunod, Juan de la Vega, Evaristo Rodriguez,
Fernando Marcelo, Esteban Villena, Benito Litao, Ventura Hernandez, and Casimiro
Pantanilla, residents of the town of Bulacan, province of the same name, filed a written
complaint against Higino Meneses, alleging that they each owned and possessed farm
lands, situated in the places known as Maytunas and Balot, near a small lake named
Calalaran; that the defendant is the owner of a fish-pond and a strip of land situated in
Paraanan, adjoining the said lake on one side, and the River Taliptip on the other; that
from time immemorial, and consequently for more than twenty years before 1901, there
existed and still exists in favor of the rice fields of the plaintiffs a statutory easement
permitting the flow of water over the said land in Paraanan, which easement the said
plaintiffs enjoyed until the year 1901 and consisted in that the water collected upon their
lands and in the Calalaran Lake flow through Paraanan into the Taliptip River. From that
year however, the defendant, without any right or reason, converted the land in
Paraanan into a fishpond and by means of a dam and a bamboo net, prevented the free
passage of the water through said place into the Taliptip River, that in consequence the
lands of the plaintiff became flooded and damaged by the stagnant waters, there being
no outlet except through the land in Paraanan; that their plantation were destroyed,
causing the loss and damages to the extent of about P1,000, which loss and damage will
continue if the obstructions to the flow of the water are allowed to remain, preventing its
passage through said land and injuring the rice plantations of the plaintiffs. They
therefore asked that judgment be entered against the defendant, declaring that the said
tract of land in Paraanan is subject to a statutory easement permitting the flow of water
from the property of the plaintiffs, and that, without prejudice to the issuing of a
preliminary injunction, the defendant be ordered to remove and destroy the obstructions
that impede the passage of the waters through Paraanan, and that in future, and forever,
he abstain from closing in any manner the aforesaid tract of land; that, upon judgment
being entered, the said injunction be declared to be final and that the defendant be
sentenced to pay to the plaintiffs an indemnity of P1,000, and the costs in the
proceedings; that they be granted any other and further equitable or proper remedy in
accordance with the facts alleged and proven.
In view of the demurrer interposed by the plaintiffs to the answer of the defendant, the
latter, on the 29th of August, 1904, filed an amended answer, denying each and
everyone of the allegations of the complaint, and alleged that no statutory easement
existed nor could exist in favor of the lands described in the complaint, permitting the
waters to flow over the fish pond that he, together with his brothers, owned in the sitio of
Bambang, the area and boundaries of which were stated by him, and which he and his
brothers had inherited from their deceased mother.
Apolinara de Leon; that the same had been surveyed by a land surveyor in September,
1881, he also denied that he had occupied or converted any land in the barrio of
Bambang into a fishpond; therefore, and to sentence the plaintiffs to pay the costs and
corresponding damages.
Upon the evidence adduced by both parties to the suit, the court, on the 13th of March,
1907, entered judgment declaring that the plaintiffs were entitled to a decision in their
favor, and sentenced the defendant to remove the dam placed on the east of the
Paraanan passage on the side of the Taliptip River opposite the old dam in the barrio of
Bambang, as well as to remove and destroy the obstacles to the free passage of the
waters through the strip of land in Paraanan; to abstain in future, and forever, from
obstructing or closing in any manner the course of the waters through the said strip of
land. The request that the defendant be sentenced to pay an indemnity was denied, and
no ruling was made as to costs.
The defendant excepted to the above judgment and furthermore asked for a new trial
which was denied and also excepted to, and, upon approval of the bill of exceptions, the
question was submitted to this court.
Notwithstanding the defendant's denial in his amended answer, it appears to have been
clearly proven in this case that the lands owned by the plaintiffs in the aforesaid barrio,
as well as the small adjoining lake, named Calalaran, are located in places relatively
higher than the sitio called Paraanan where the land and fish pond of the defendant are
situated, and which border on the Taliptip River; that during the rainy season the rain
water which falls on he land of the plaintiffs, and which flows toward the small Calalaran
Lake at flood time, has no outlet to the Taliptip River other than through the low land of
Paraanan: that the border line between Calalaran and Paraanan there has existed from
time immemorial a dam, constructed by the community for the purpose of preventing the
salt waters from the Taliptip River, at high tide, from flooding the land in Calalaran,
passing through the lowlands of Paraanan; but when rainfall was abundant, one of the
residents was designated in his turn by the lieutenant or justice of the barrio to open the
sluice gate in order to let out the water that flooded the rice fields, through the land of
Paraanan to the above-mentioned river, that since 1901, the defendant constructed
another dam along the boundary of this fishpond in Paraanan, thereby impeding the
outlet of the waters that flood the fields of Calalaran, to the serious detriment of the
growing crops.
According to article 530 of the Civil Code, an easement is charge imposed upon one
estate for the benefit of another estate belonging to a different owner, and the realty in
favor of which the easement is established is called the dominant estate, and the one
charged with it the servient estate.
The lands of Paraanan being the lower are subject to the easement of receiving and
giving passage to the waters proceeding from the higher lands and the lake of Calalaran;
this easement was not constituted by agreement between the interested parties; it is of a
statutory nature, and the law had imposed it for the common public utility in view of the
difference in the altitude of the lands in the barrio Bambang.
Article 552 of the Civil code provides:
Lower estates must receive the waters which naturally and without the
intervention of man descend from the higher estates, as well as the stone or
earth which they carry with them.
Neither may the owner of the lower estates construct works preventing this
easement, nor the one of the higher estate works increasing the burden.
Article 563 of the said code reads also:
The establishment, extent, form, and conditions of the easements of waters to
which this section refers shall be governed by the special law relating thereto in
everything not provided for in this code.
The special law cited in the Law of Waters of August 3, 1866, article 111 of which,
treating of natural easements relating to waters, provides:
Lands situated at a lower level are subject to receive the waters that flow
naturally, without the work of man, from the higher lands together with the stone
or earth which they carry with them.
Hence, the owner of the lower lands can not erect works that will impede or prevent such
an easement or charge, constituted and imposed by the law upon his estate for the
benefit of the higher lands belonging to different owners; neither can the latter do
anything to increase or extend the easement.
According to the provisions of law above referred to, the defendant, Meneses, had no
right to construct the works, nor the dam which blocks the passage, through his lands
and the outlet to the Taliptip River, of the waters which flood the higher lands of the
plaintiffs; and having done so, to the detriment of the easement charged on his estate, he
has violated the law which protects and guarantees the respective rights and regulates
the duties of the owners of the fields in Calalaran and Paraanan.
It is true that article 388 of said code authorizes every owner to enclose his estate by
means of walls, ditches fences or any other device, but his right is limited by the
easement imposed upon his estate.
The defendant Meneses might have constructed the works necessary to make and
maintain a fish pond within his own land, but he was always under the strict and
necessary obligation to respect the statutory easement of waters charged upon his
property, and had no right to close the passage and outlet of the waters flowing from the
lands of the plaintiffs and the lake of Calalaran into the Taliptip River. He could not
lawfully injure the owners of the dominant estates by obstructing the outlet to the Taliptip
River of the waters flooding the upper lands belonging to the plaintiffs.
It is perhaps useful and advantageous to the plaintiffs and other owners of high lands in
Calalaran, in addition to the old dike between the lake of said place and the low lands in
Paraanan, to have another made by the defendant at the border of Paraanan adjoining
the said river, for the purpose of preventing the salt waters of the Taliptip River flooding,
at high tide, not only the lowlands in Paraanan but also the higher ones of Calalaran and
its lake, since the plaintiffs can not prevent the defendant from protecting his lands
against the influx of salt water; but the defendant could never be permitted to obstruct the
flow of the waters through his lands to the Taliptip River during the heavy rains, when the
high lands in Calalaran and the lake in said place are flooded, thereby impairing the right
of the owners of the dominant estates.
For the above reasons, and accepting the findings of the court below in the judgment
appealed from in so far as they agree with the terms of this decision, we must and do
hereby declare that the defendant, Higino Meneses, as the owner of the servient estate,
is obliged to give passage to and allow the flow of the waters descending from the
Calalaran Lake and from the land of the plaintiffs through his lands in Paraanan for their
discharge into the Taliptip River; and he is hereby ordered to remove any obstacle that
may obstruct the free passage of the waters whenever there may be either a small or
large volume of running water through his lands in the sitio of Paraanan for their
discharge into the Taliptip River; and in future to abstain from impeding, in any manner,
the flow of the waters coming from the higher lands. The judgment appealed from is
affirmed, in so far as it agrees with decision, and reversed in other respects, with the
costs of this instance against the appellants. So ordered.
Carson, Willard and Tracey, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 183719 February 2, 2011
MARGARITA F. CASTRO, Petitioner,
vs.
NAPOLEON A. MONSOD, Respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
assailing the Decision1dated May 25, 2007 and the Resolution2 dated July 14, 2008 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 83973.
The antecedents of the case are as follows:
Petitioner is the registered owner of a parcel of land located on Garnet Street, Manuela
Homes, Pamplona, Las Pias City, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
T-36071, with an area of one hundred thirty (130) square meters (sq.m.). Respondent,
on the other hand, is the owner of the property adjoining the lot of petitioner, located on
Lyra Street, Moonwalk Village, Phase 2, Las Pias City. There is a concrete fence, more
or less two (2) meters high, dividing Manuela Homes from Moonwalk Village.3
On February 29, 2000, respondent caused the annotation of an adverse claim against
sixty-five (65) sq.m. of the property of petitioner covered by TCT No. T-36071. The
adverse claim was filed without any claim of ownership over the property. Respondent
was merely asserting the existing legal easement of lateral and subjacent support at the
rear portion of his estate to prevent the property from collapsing, since his property is
located at an elevated plateau of fifteen (15) feet, more or less, above the level of
petitioners property.4 Respondent also filed a complaint for malicious mischief and
malicious destruction before the office of the barangay chairman.5
In defiance, petitioner filed a complaint for damages with temporary restraining order/writ
of preliminary injunction before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Pias City.
Petitioner also prayed that the Register of Deeds of Las Pias City be ordered to cancel
the annotation of the adverse claim on TCT No. T-36071.6
Prior to the filing of the case before the RTC, there were deposits of soil and rocks about
two (2) meters away from the front door of the house of
petitioner. As such, petitioner was not able to park her vehicle at the dead-end portion of
Garnet Street. When petitioner noticed a leak that caused the front portion of her house
to be slippery, she hired construction workers to see where the leak was coming from.
The workers had already started digging when police officers sent by respondent came
and stopped the workers from finishing their job.7
Petitioner averred that when she bought the property from Manuela Homes in 1994,
there was no annotation or existence of any easement over the property. Respondent
neither asked permission nor talked to her with regard to the use of 65 sq.m. of her
property as easement. Upon learning of the adverse claim, she felt disturbed and
experienced sleepless nights for fear that she would not be able to sell her property.
Petitioner admitted that TCT No. 36071 does not cover the open space at the dead-end
portion of Garnet Street.8
For his part, respondent claimed that he and his family had been residing in Moonwalk
Village since June 1984. Adjacent to his property is the land of petitioner in Manuela
Homes. When he bought the property in 1983, the land elevation of Moonwalk Village
was almost on the same level as Manuela Homes. However, sometime in 1985 and
1986, Pilar Development Corporation, the developer of Manuela Homes, bulldozed,
excavated, and transferred portions of the elevated land to the lower portions of Manuela
Homes. Thus, Manuela Homes became lower than Moonwalk Village.9
Before the said excavation, respondent personally complained to Pilar
Development Corporation and was assured that, as provided by the National Building
Code, an embankment will be retained at the boundary of Manuela Homes and
Moonwalk Village, which is more or less fifteen (15) feet higher than Manuela Homes.10
Manuela Homes retained the embankment consisting of soil and rocks. Respondent had
the open space riprapped with stones as reinforcement against any potential soil erosion,
earthquake, and possible digging by any person.
Respondent asserted that the affidavit of adverse claim was for the annotation of the
lateral and subjacent easement of his property over the property of petitioner, in view of
the latters manifest determination to remove the embankment left by the developer of
Manuela Homes.
On October 11, 2004, the RTC rendered a decision,11 the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this court hereby renders judgment: (1) ordering
the cancellation of [respondents] adverse claim at the back of Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-36071 at the expense of [respondent] Napoleon Monsod; (2) ordering the said
[respondent] to pay the herein [petitioner] the amount of Php50,000.00 as moral
damages; and (3) dismissing [petitioners] claim for actual damages, attorneys fees,
litigation costs and costs of suit and [respondents] compulsory counterclaim for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.12
The trial court ratiocinated that the adverse claim of respondent was non-registrable
considering that the basis of his claim was an easement and not an interest adverse to
the registered owner, and neither did he contest the title of petitioner. Furthermore, the
adverse claim of respondent failed to comply with the requisites provided under Section
70 of Presidential Decree No. 1529.13
On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the trial court in a Decision14 dated May 25,
2007, the fallo of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The Decision of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 198, Las Pias City dated October 11, 2004 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Court hereby orders the retention of the annotation at
the back of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-36071, not as an adverse claim, but a
recognition of the existence of a legal easement of subjacent and lateral support
constituted on the lengthwise or horizontal land support/embankment area of sixty-five
(65) square meters, more or less, of the property of [petitioner] Margarita Castro. The writ
of preliminary injunction issued by this Court on April 18, 2006 is hereby made
permanent. [Petitioners] claim for damages is likewise DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.15
The CA ruled that while respondents adverse claim could not be sanctioned because it
did not fall under the requisites for registering an adverse claim, the same might be duly
annotated in the title as recognition of the existence of a legal easement of subjacent and
lateral support. The purpose of the annotation was to prevent petitioner from making
injurious excavations on the subject embankment as to deprive the residential house and
lot of respondent of its natural support and cause it to collapse. Respondent only asked
that petitioner respect the legal easement already existing thereon.16
On June 15, 2007, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. However, the CA denied
the same in a Resolution17dated July 14, 2008.
Hence, this petition.
The issue in this case is whether the easement of lateral and subjacent support exists on
the subject adjacent properties and, if it does, whether the same may be annotated at the
back of the title of the servient estate.
Article 437 of the Civil Code provides that the owner of a parcel of land is the owner of its
surface and of everything under it, and he can construct thereon any works, or make any
plantations and excavations which he may deem proper. However, such right of the
owner is not absolute and is subject to the following limitations: (1) servitudes or
easements,18 (2) special laws,19 (3) ordinances,20 (4) reasonable requirements of aerial
navigation,21 and (5) rights of third persons.22
Respondent filed before the RTC an affidavit of adverse claim, the pertinent portions of
which read:
5. That our adverse claim consists of rights of legal or compulsory easement of
lateral and subjacent support (under the Civil Code) over a portion of the above-
described property of owner Margarita F. Castro, that is, covering the lengthwise
or horizontal land support/embankment area of sixty-five (65) square meters,
more or less.
6. That said registered owner has attempted to destroy and/or remove portions of
the existing lateral/subjacent land and cement supports adjoining the said two
properties. In fact, a portion of the easement was already destroyed/removed, to
the continuing prejudice of herein adverse claimant, and that a formal complaint
against said registered owner was filed by the herein adverse claimant before the
Office of the Barangay Chairman of Talon V, Las Pias City and the same proved
futile.23
Respondents assertion that he has an adverse claim over the 65 sq.m. property of
petitioner is misplaced since he does not have a claim over the ownership of the land.
The annotation of an adverse claim over registered land under Section 70 of Presidential
Decree 152924 requires a claim on the title of the disputed land. Annotation is done to
apprise third persons that there is a controversy over the ownership of the land and to
preserve and protect the right of the adverse claimant during the pendency of the
controversy. It is a notice to third persons that any transaction regarding the disputed
land is subject to the outcome of the dispute.25
In reality, what respondent is claiming is a judicial recognition of the existence of the
easement of subjacent and lateral support over the 65 sq. m. portion of petitioners
property covering the land support/embankment area. His reason for the annotation is
only to prevent petitioner from removing the embankment or from digging on the property
for fear of soil erosion that might weaken the foundation of the rear portion of his property
which is adjacent to the property of petitioner.
An easement or servitude is an encumbrance imposed upon an immovable for the
benefit of another immovable belonging to a different owner.26 There are two kinds of
easements according to source. An easement is established either by law or by will of
the owners.27 The courts cannot impose or constitute any servitude where none existed.
They can only declare its existence if in reality it exists by law or by the will of the
owners. There are therefore no judicial easements.28
Article 684 of the Civil Code provides that no proprietor shall make such excavations
upon his land as to deprive any adjacent land or building of sufficient lateral or subjacent
support. An owner, by virtue of his surface right, may make excavations on his land, but
his right is subject to the limitation that he shall not deprive any adjacent land or building
of sufficient lateral or subjacent support. Between two adjacent landowners, each has an
absolute property right to have his land laterally supported by the soil of his neighbor,
and if either, in excavating on his own premises, he so disturbs the lateral support of his
neighbors land as to cause it, or, in its natural state, by the pressure of its own weight, to
fall away or slide from its position, the one so excavating is liable.29
In the instant case, an easement of subjacent and lateral support exists in favor of
respondent. It was established that the properties of petitioner and respondent adjoin
1avvphi 1
each other. The residential house and lot of respondent is located on an elevated plateau
of fifteen (15) feet above the level of petitioners property. The embankment and the
riprapped stones have been in existence even before petitioner became the owner of the
property. It was proven that petitioner has been making excavations and diggings on the
subject embankment and, unless restrained, the continued excavation of the
embankment could cause the foundation of the rear portion of the house of respondent
to collapse, resulting in the destruction of a huge part of the family dwelling.30
We sustain the CA in declaring that a permanent injunction on the part of petitioner from
making injurious excavations is necessary in order to protect the interest of respondent.
However, an annotation of the existence of the subjacent and lateral support is no longer
necessary. It exists whether or not it is annotated or registered in the registry of property.
A judicial recognition of the same already binds the property and the owner of the same,
including her successors-in-interest. Otherwise, every adjoining landowner would come
to court or have the easement of subjacent and lateral support registered in order for it to
be recognized and respected.
CRUZ, J.:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision dated May 25, 2007 and the
Resolution dated July 14, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 83973 are The Regalian doctrine reserves to the State all natural wealth that may be found in the
hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION that the annotation at the back of Transfer bowels of the earth even if the land where the discovery is made be private. 1 In the cases
Certificate of Title No. T-36071, recognizing the existence of the legal easement of at bar, which have been consolidated because they pose a common issue, this doctrine was
subjacent and lateral support constituted on the lengthwise or horizontal land not correctly applied.
support/embankment area of sixty-five (65) square meters, more or less, of the property
of petitioner Margarita F. Castro, is hereby ordered removed. These cases arose from the application for registration of a parcel of land filed on
February 11, 1965, by Jose de la Rosa on his own behalf and on behalf of his three
SO ORDERED. children, Victoria, Benjamin and Eduardo. The land, situated in Tuding, Itogon, Benguet
Province, was divided into 9 lots and covered by plan Psu-225009. According to the
Republic of the Philippines application, Lots 1-5 were sold to Jose de la Rosa and Lots 6-9 to his children by
SUPREME COURT Mamaya Balbalio and Jaime Alberto, respectively, in 1964. 2
Manila
The application was separately opposed by Benguet Consolidated, Inc. as to Lots 1-5,
FIRST DIVISION Atok Big Wedge Corporation, as to Portions of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9, and by the
Republic of the Philippines, through the Bureau of Forestry Development, as to lots 1-9. 3
G.R. No. L-43938 April 15, 1988
In support of the application, both Balbalio and Alberto testified that they had acquired
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (DIRECTOR OF FOREST the subject land by virtue of prescription Balbalio claimed to have received Lots 1-5 from
DEVELOPMENT), petitioner, her father shortly after the Liberation. She testified she was born in the land, which was
vs. possessed by her parents under claim of ownership. 4 Alberto said he received Lots 6-9 in
HON. COURT OF APPEALS (THIRD DIVISION) and JOSE Y. DE LA 1961 from his mother, Bella Alberto, who declared that the land was planted by Jaime and his
ROSA, respondents. predecessors-in-interest to bananas, avocado, nangka and camote, and was enclosed with a
barbed-wire fence. She was corroborated by Felix Marcos, 67 years old at the time, who
recalled the earlier possession of the land by Alberto's father. 5 Balbalio presented her tax
G.R. No. L-44081 April 15, 1988 declaration in 1956 and the realty tax receipts from that year to 1964, 6 Alberto his tax
declaration in 1961 and the realty tax receipts from that year to 1964. 7
BENGUET CONSOLIDATED, INC., petitioner,
vs. Benguet opposed on the ground that the June Bug mineral claim covering Lots 1-5 was
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, VICTORIA, BENJAMIN and sold to it on September 22, 1934, by the successors-in-interest of James Kelly, who
EDUARDO, all surnamed DE LA ROSA, represented by their father JOSE Y. DE LA located the claim in September 1909 and recorded it on October 14, 1909. From the date
ROSA, respondents. of its purchase, Benguet had been in actual, continuous and exclusive possession of the
land in concept of owner, as evidenced by its construction of adits, its affidavits of annual
G.R. No. L-44092 April 15, 1988 assessment, its geological mappings, geological samplings and trench side cuts, and its
payment of taxes on the land. 8
ATOK-BIG WEDGE MINING COMPANY, petitioner,
vs. For its part, Atok alleged that a portion of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9 were covered by
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, VICTORlA, BENJAMIN and the Emma and Fredia mineral claims located by Harrison and Reynolds on December
EDUARDO, all surnamed DE LA ROSA, represented by their father, JOSE Y. DE LA 25, 1930, and recorded on January 2, 1931, in the office of the mining recorder of
ROSA, respondents. Baguio. These claims were purchased from these locators on November 2, 1931, by
Atok, which has since then been in open, continuous and exclusive possession of the Benguet introduced improvements on mineral claim June Bug, and also
said lots as evidenced by its annual assessment work on the claims, such as the boring conducted geological mappings, geological sampling and trench side
of tunnels, and its payment of annual taxes thereon. 9 cuts. In 1948, Benguet redeclared the "June Bug" for taxation and had
religiously paid the taxes.
The location of the mineral claims was made in accordance with Section 21 of the
Philippine Bill of 1902 which provided that: The Emma and Fredia claims were two of the several claims of Harrison
registered in 1931, and which Atok representatives acquired. Portions of
SEC. 21. All valuable mineral deposits in public lands in the philippine Lots 1 to 5 and all of Lots 6 to 9 are within the Emma and Fredia mineral
Islands both surveyed and unsurveyed are hereby declared to be free claims of Atok Big Wedge Mining Company.
and open to exploration, occupation and purchase and the land in which
they are found to occupation and purchase by the citizens of the United The June Bug mineral claim of Benguet and the Fredia and Emma
States, or of said islands. mineral claims of Atok having been perfected prior to the approval of the
Constitution of the Philippines of 1935, they were removed from the
The Bureau of Forestry Development also interposed its objection, arguing that the land public domain and had become private properties of Benguet and Atok.
sought to be registered was covered by the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve under
Proclamation No. 217 dated February 16, 1929. Moreover, by reason of its nature, it was It is not disputed that the location of the mining claim
not subject to alienation under the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973. 10 under consideration was perfected prior to November 15,
1935, when the Government of the Commonwealth was
The trial court * denied the application, holding that the applicants had failed to prove their claim of possession and inaugurated; and according to the laws existing at that
ownership of the land sought to be registered. 11 The applicants appealed to the respondent court, * which time, as construed and applied by this court in McDaniel
reversed the trial court and recognized the claims of the applicant, but subject to the rights of Benguet and Atok respecting v. Apacible and Cuisia (42 Phil. 749), a valid location of a
their mining claims. 12 In other words, the Court of Appeals affirmed the surface rights of the de la mining claim segregated the area from the public domain.
Rosas over the land while at the same time reserving the sub-surface rights of Benguet and Said the court in that case: The moment the locator
Atok by virtue of their mining claims. discovered a valuable mineral deposit on the lands
located, and perfected his location in accordance with
Both Benguet and Atok have appealed to this Court, invoking their superior right of law, the power of the United States Government to
ownership. The Republic has filed its own petition for review and reiterates its argument deprive him of the exclusive right to the possession and
that neither the private respondents nor the two mining companies have any valid claim enjoyment of the located claim was gone, the lands had
to the land because it is not alienable and registerable. become mineral lands and they were exempted from
lands that could be granted to any other person. The
It is true that the subject property was considered forest land and included in the Central reservations of public lands cannot be made so as to
Cordillera Forest Reserve, but this did not impair the rights already vested in Benguet include prior mineral perfected locations; and, of course, if
and Atok at that time. The Court of Appeals correctly declared that: a valid mining location is made upon public lands
afterwards included in a reservation, such inclusion or
There is no question that the 9 lots applied for are within the June Bug reservation does not affect the validity of the former
mineral claims of Benguet and the "Fredia and Emma" mineral claims of location. By such location and perfection, the land located
Atok. The June Bug mineral claim of plaintiff Benguet was one of the 16 is segregated from the public domain even as against the
mining claims of James E. Kelly, American and mining locator. He filed Government. (Union Oil Co. v. Smith, 249 U.S. 337; Van
his declaration of the location of the June Bug mineral and the same was Mess v. Roonet, 160 Cal. 131; 27 Cyc. 546).
recorded in the Mining Recorder's Office on October 14, 1909. All of the
Kelly claims ha subsequently been acquired by Benguet Consolidated, "The legal effect of a valid location of a mining claim is not
Inc. Benguet's evidence is that it had made improvements on the June only to segregate the area from the public domain, but to
Bug mineral claim consisting of mine tunnels prior to 1935. It had grant to the locator the beneficial ownership of the claim
submitted the required affidavit of annual assessment. After World War II, and the right to a patent therefor upon compliance with
 the terms and conditions prescribed by law. Where there
is a valid location of a mining claim, the area becomes
segregated from the public domain and the property of the
locator." (St. Louis Mining & Milling Co. v. Montana Mining
Co., 171 U.S. 650; 655; 43 Law ed., 320, 322.) "When a
location of a mining claim is perfected it has the effect of a
grant by the United States of the right of present and
exclusive possession, with the right to the exclusive
enjoyment of all the surface ground as well as of all the
minerals within the lines of the claim, except as limited by
the extralateral right of adjoining locators; and this is the
locator's right before as well as after the issuance of the
patent. While a lode locator acquires a vested property
right by virtue of his location made in compliance with the
mining laws, the fee remains in the government until
patent issues."(18 R.C.L. 1152) (Gold Creek Mining
Corporation v. Hon. Eulogio Rodriguez, Sec. of
Agriculture and Commerce, and Quirico Abadilla, Director
of the Bureau of Mines, 66 Phil. 259, 265-266)
It is of no importance whether Benguet and Atok had secured a patent for
as held in the Gold Creek Mining Corp. Case, for all physical purposes of
ownership, the owner is not required to secure a patent as long as he
complies with the provisions of the mining laws; his possessory right, for
all practical purposes of ownership, is as good as though secured by
patent.
We agree likewise with the oppositors that having complied with all the
requirements of the mining laws, the claims were removed from the
public domain, and not even the government of the Philippines can take
away this right from them. The reason is obvious. Having become the
private properties of the oppositors, they cannot be deprived thereof
without due process of law. 13
Such rights were not affected either by the stricture in the Commonwealth Constitution
against the alienation of all lands of the public domain except those agricultural in nature
for this was made subject to existing rights. Thus, in its Article XIII, Section 1, it was
categorically provided that:
SEC. 1. All agricultural, timber and mineral lands of the public domain,
waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of
potential energy and other natural resources of the Philipppines belong to
the State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization
shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or
associations at least 60% of the capital of which is owned by such
citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease or concession at the
time of the inauguration of the government established under this
Constitution. Natural resources with the exception of public agricultural
lands, shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the
exploitation, development or utilization of any of the natural resources
shall be granted for a period exceeding 25 years, except as to water
rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than
the development of water power, in which case beneficial use may be the
measure and the limit of the grant.
Implementing this provision, Act No. 4268, approved on November 8, 1935, declared:
Any provision of existing laws, executive order, proclamation to the
contrary notwithstanding, all locations of mining claim made prior to
February 8, 1935 within lands set apart as forest reserve under Sec.
1826 of the Revised Administrative Code which would be valid and
subsisting location except to the existence of said reserve are hereby
declared to be valid and subsisting locations as of the date of their
respective locations.
The perfection of the mining claim converted the property to mineral land and under the
laws then in force removed it from the public domain. 14 By such act, the locators acquired
exclusive rights over the land, against even the government, without need of any further act
such as the purchase of the land or the obtention of a patent over it. 15 As the land had
become the private property of the locators, they had the right to transfer the same, as they
did, to Benguet and Atok.
It is true, as the Court of Appeals observed, that such private property was subject to the
"vicissitudes of ownership," or even to forfeiture by non-user or abandonment or, as the
private respondents aver, by acquisitive prescription. However, the method invoked by
the de la Rosas is not available in the case at bar, for two reasons.
First, the trial court found that the evidence of open, continuous, adverse and exclusive
possession submitted by the applicants was insufficient to support their claim of
ownership. They themselves had acquired the land only in 1964 and applied for its
registration in 1965, relying on the earlier alleged possession of their predecessors-in-
interest. 16The trial judge, who had the opportunity to consider the evidence first-hand and
observe the demeanor of the witnesses and test their credibility was not convinced. We defer
to his judgment in the absence of a showing that it was reached with grave abuse of
discretion or without sufficient basis. 17
Second, even if it be assumed that the predecessors-in-interest of the de la Rosas had
really been in possession of the subject property, their possession was not in the concept
of owner of the mining claim but of the property as agricultural land, which it was not. The
property was mineral land, and they were claiming it as agricultural land. They were not
disputing the lights of the mining locators nor were they seeking to oust them as such
and to replace them in the mining of the land. In fact, Balbalio testified that she was
aware of the diggings being undertaken "down below" 18 but she did not mind, much less
protest, the same although she claimed to be the owner of the said land.
The Court of Appeals justified this by saying there is "no conflict of interest" between the
owners of the surface rights and the owners of the sub-surface rights. This is rather
doctrine, for it is a well-known principle that the owner of piece of land has rights not only
to its surface but also to everything underneath and the airspace above it up to a
reasonable height. 19 Under the aforesaid ruling, the land is classified as mineral underneath
and agricultural on the surface, subject to separate claims of title. This is also difficult to
understand, especially in its practical application.
Under the theory of the respondent court, the surface owner will be planting on the land
while the mining locator will be boring tunnels underneath. The farmer cannot dig a well
because he may interfere with the operations below and the miner cannot blast a tunnel
lest he destroy the crops above. How deep can the farmer, and how high can the miner,
go without encroaching on each other's rights? Where is the dividing line between the
surface and the sub-surface rights?
The Court feels that the rights over the land are indivisible and that the land itself cannot
be half agricultural and half mineral. The classification must be categorical; the land must
be either completely mineral or completely agricultural. In the instant case, as already
observed, the land which was originally classified as forest land ceased to be so and
became mineral and completely mineral once the mining claims were
perfected. 20 As long as mining operations were being undertaken thereon, or underneath, it
did not cease to be so and become agricultural, even if only partly so, because it was
enclosed with a fence and was cultivated by those who were unlawfully occupying the
surface.
What must have misled the respondent court is Commonwealth Act No. 137, providing
as follows:
Sec. 3. All mineral lands of the public domain and minerals belong to the
State, and their disposition, exploitation, development or utilization, shall
be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations, or
associations, at least 60% of the capital of which is owned by such
citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease or concession at the
time of the inauguration of government established under the
Constitution.
SEC. 4. The ownership of, and the right to the use of land for agricultural,
industrial, commercial, residential, or for any purpose other than mining
does not include the ownership of, nor the right to extract or utilize, the
minerals which may be found on or under the surface.
SEC. 5. The ownership of, and the right to extract and utilize, the
minerals included within all areas for which public agricultural land
patents are granted are excluded and excepted from all such patents.
SEC. 6. The ownership of, and the right to extract and utilize, the
minerals included within all areas for which Torrens titles are granted are
excluded and excepted from all such titles.
This is an application of the Regalian doctrine which, as its name implies, is intended for
the benefit of the State, not of private persons. The rule simply reserves to the State all
minerals that may be found in public and even private land devoted to "agricultural,
industrial, commercial, residential or (for) any purpose other than mining." Thus, if a
person is the owner of agricultural land in which minerals are discovered, his ownership
of such land does not give him the right to extract or utilize the said minerals without the
permission of the State to which such minerals belong.
The flaw in the reasoning of the respondent court is in supposing that the rights over the
land could be used for both mining and non-mining purposes simultaneously. The correct
interpretation is that once minerals are discovered in the land, whatever the use to which
it is being devoted at the time, such use may be discontinued by the State to enable it to
extract the minerals therein in the exercise of its sovereign prerogative. The land is thus
converted to mineral land and may not be used by any private party, including the
registered owner thereof, for any other purpose that will impede the mining operations to
be undertaken therein, For the loss sustained by such owner, he is of course entitled to
just compensation under the Mining Laws or in appropriate expropriation proceedings. 21
Our holding is that Benguet and Atok have exclusive rights to the property in question by
virtue of their respective mining claims which they validly acquired before the
Constitution of 1935 prohibited the alienation of all lands of the public domain except
agricultural lands, subject to vested rights existing at the time of its adoption. The land
was not and could not have been transferred to the private respondents by virtue of
acquisitive prescription, nor could its use be shared simultaneously by them and the
mining companies for agricultural and mineral purposes.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent court dated April 30, 1976, is SET ASIDE
and that of the trial court dated March 11, 1969, is REINSTATED, without any
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. RESOLUTION

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila SARMIENTO, J.:

EN BANC The incident before the Court refers to charges for contempt against Atty. J. Cezar
Sangco, counsel for the petitioners Spouses Jose and Lutgarda Sangalang. (G.R. No.
G.R. No. 71169 August 30, 1989 71169.)

JOSE D. SANGALANG and LUTGARDA D. SANGALANG, petitioners, FELIX C.
GASTON and DOLORES R. GASTON, JOSE V. BRIONES and ALICIA R. BRIONES,
and BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., intervenors-petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and AYALA CORPORATION, respondents.
G.R. No. 74376 August 30, 1989
On February 2, 1989, the Court issued a Resolution, requiring, among other things, Atty.
Sangco to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt "for using
intemperate and accusatory language." 1 On March 2, 1989, Atty. Sangco filed an
explanation.
The Court finds Atty. Sangco's remarks in his motion for reconsideration, reproduced as
follows:

BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner, ...

vs.
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ROSARIO DE JESUS TENORIO, and This Decision of this Court in the above-entitled case reads more like a
CECILIA GONZALEZ, respondents. Brief for Ayala ... 2

G.R. No. 76394 August 30, 1989 ... [t]he Court not only put to serious question its own integrity and
competence but also jeopardized its own campaign against graft and
BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner, corruption undeniably pervading the judiciary ... 3
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEAL and EDUARDO and BUENA ROMUALDEZ respondents. ...

G.R. No. 78182 August 30, 1989 The blatant disregard of controlling, documented and admitted facts not
put in issue, such as those summarily ignored in this case; the
BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner, extraordinary efforts exerted to justify such arbitrariness and the very
vs. strained and unwarranted conclusions drawn therefrom, are unparalleled
COURT OF APPEALS, DOLORES FILLEY and J. ROMERO & in the history of this Court ... 4
ASSOCIATES, respondents.
...
G.R. No. 82281 August 30, 1989
... [T]o ignore the fact that Jupiter Street was originally constructed for the
BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner, exclusive benefit of the residents of Bel- Air Village, or rule that
vs. respondent Court's admission of said fact is "inaccurate," as Ayala's
COURT OF APPEALS, VIOLETA MONCAL, and MAJAL DEVELOPMENT Counsel himself would like to do but did not even contend, is a
CORPORATION, respondents.
 manifestation of this Court's unusual partiality to Ayala and puts to
serious question its integrity on that account. 5
...
[i]t is submitted that this ruling is the most serious reflection on the Court's
competence and integrity and exemplifies its manifest partiality towards
Ayala. It is a blatant disregard of documented and incontrovertible and
uncontroverted factual findings of the trial court fully supported by the
records and the true significance of those facts which both the
respondent court and this Court did not bother to read and consequently
did not consider and discuss, least of all in the manner it did with respect
to those in which it arrived at conclusions favorable to Ayala. 6
To totally disregard Ayala's written letter of application for special
membership in BAVA which clearly state that such membership is
necessary because it is a new development in their relationship with
respect to its intention to give its commercial lot buyers an equal right to
the use of Jupiter Street without giving any reason therefor, smacks of
judicial arrogance ... 7
...
... [A]re all these unusual exercise of such arbitrariness above suspicion?
Will the current campaign of this Court against graft and corruption in the
judiciary be enhanced by such broad discretionary power of courts? 8
disparaging, intemperate, and uncalled for. His suggestions that the Court might have
been guilty of graft and corruption in acting on these cases are not only unbecoming, but
comes, as well, as an open assault upon the Court's honor and integrity. In rendering its
judgment, the Court yielded to the records before it, and to the records alone, and not to
outside influences, much less, the influence of any of the parties. Atty. Sangco, as a
former judge of an inferior court, should know better that in any litigation, one party
prevails, but his success will not justify indictments of bribery by the other party. He
should be aware that because of his accusations, he has done an enormous disservice
to the integrity of the highest tribunal and to the stability of the administration of justice in
general.
As a former judge, Atty. Sangco also has to be aware that we are not bound by the
findings of the trial court (in which his clients prevailed). But if we did not agree with the
lwph1.t
findings of the court a quo, it does not follow that we had acted arbitrarily because,
precisely, it is the office of an appeal to review the findings of the inferior court.
To be sure, Atty. Sangco is entitled to his opinion, but not to a license to insult the Court
with derogatory statements and recourses to argumenta ad hominem. In that event, it is
the Court's duty "to act to preserve the honor and dignity ... and to safeguard the morals
and ethics of the legal profession." 9
We are not satisfied with his explanation that he was merely defending the interests of
his clients. As we held in Laureta, a lawyer's "first duty is not to his client but to the
administration of justice; to that end, his client's success is wholly subordinate; and his
conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of law and ethics." 10 And
while a lawyer must advocate his client's cause in utmost earnest and with the maximum skill
he can marshal, he is not at liberty to resort to arrogance, intimidation, and innuendo.
That "[t]he questions propounded were not meant or intended to accuse but to ...
challenge the thinking in the Decision, 11 comes as an eleventh-hour effort to cleanse what
is in fact and plainly, an unfounded accusation. Certainly, it is the prerogative of an
unsuccessful party to ask for reconsideration, but as we held in Laureta, litigants should not
"'think that they will win a hearing by the sheer multiplication of words' ". 12 As we indicated
(see Decision denying the motions for reconsideration in G.R. Nos. 71169, 74376, 76394,
78182, and 82281, and deciding G.R. No. 60727, dated August 25, 1989), the movants have
raised no new arguments to warrant reconsideration and they can not veil that fact with
inflammatory language.
Atty. Sangco himself admits that "[a]s a judge I have learned to live with and accept with
grace criticisms of my decisions". 13 Apparently, he does not practice what he preaches. Of
course, the Court is not unreceptive to comment and critique of its decisions, but provided
they are fair and dignified. Atty. Sangco has transcended the limits of fair comment for which
he deserves this Court's rebuke.
In our "show-cause" Resolution, we sought to hold Atty. Sangco in contempt, specifically,
for resort to insulting language amounting to disrespect toward the Court within the
meaning of Section 1, of Rule 71, of the Rules of Court. Clearly, however, his act also
constitutes malpractice as the term is defined by Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, as follows:
CANON 11-A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO
THE COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR
CONDUCT BY OTHERS.
Rule 11.01...
Rule 11.02...
Rule 11.03-A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or
menacing language or behavior before the Courts.
 Rule 11.04-A lawyer should not attribute to a Judge motives not
supported by the record or have no materiality to the case.

Rule 11.05...

Thus, aside from contempt, Atty. Sangco faces punishment for professional misconduct
or malpractice.

WHEREFORE Atty. J. Cezar Sangco is (1) SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
three (3) months effective from receipt hereof, and (2) ORDERED to pay a fine of P
500.00 payable from receipt hereof. Let a copy of this Resolution be entered in his
record.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Cortes,
Gri;o-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Narvasa, and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., took no part.