People v. Pagalasan GR No.

131926 & 138991 (June 18, 2003)

FACTS:

Spouses George and Desiree Lim have 3 children; one of them is 10 year old Christopher. On September 4, 1994,
their maid was in their kitchen when someone knocked. She opened the door thinking that it was Fernando Cortez,
their security guard. Instead, 4 masked men armed with handguns and grenades barged in. Fernando was with
them with his arms tied behind his back. The men asked the maid to knock at the bedroom where the family was.
One of the men was left in the sala while the 3 others went into the bedroom and informed the Lims that nobody
will get hurt if they are given what they want. They took money and valuables. They gave Desiree a note and took
with them George and Christopher. One of the men asked George for the key to his Nissan car and they asked
George and his son to occupy the backseat of the car. 2 of the men sat on either side of the Lims and one occupied
the passenger seat beside the driver. After about 15 minutes at Sitio Tupi, the 3 men alighted with Christopher and
George was transferred to the front seat beside the driver. He was told that he will be brought to Maasim.

The police were informed of what happened. They established a mobile checkpoint. When the driver of the Nissan
saw the checkpoint 30 meters ahead, he stopped removed his mask and told George not make any false move. The
police questioned them. George told them that his name is Albert Lim for fear of the driver, Michael Pagalasan.
The police noticed that George is trembling. They got Pagalasan out of the car and George identified himself. They
saw a handgun and grenade when they searched the car. They were taken to the police station where the security
guard was being investigated.

On Sept 5, 1994, in his extrajudicial confession, Michael said that he with 3 others, Aladin, Ferdinand (a muslim)
and Bong (resident of Purok Islam) kidnapped the Lims upon the order of Aladins brother, Ronnie Cabalo. (Note:
He withdrew this confession saying he was forced and intimidated into making it and he was not provided with
counsel of his own choice during custodial investigation). Because of this confession, farmer Hadji Aladin Malang
Cabalo, Ronie Puntuan and Fernando Quizon were arrested and detained at Camp Fermin Lira Barracks, General
Santos City.

The following day, the Lims received a letter, supposedly from the kidnappers, ordering the release of Michael and
Ronnie Puntuan, for they are said to be innocent, and asking for 3M pesos for the release of Christopher. Three
days after, the Lims received another letter signed by Mubarak II or 2 (same sign as the note given by the masked
men). It says that they dont want the military to be involved neither to prejudice innocent people. They
demanded the release of Ronnie Putuan in 3 days or their son would not be released alive. Then, the morning of
the following day, Christopher was rescued by police without any ransom being paid. (How and where? It didnt
say)

DEFENSE

1. Fernando Cortez, the security guard, said he was washing the car when the incident took place. The gate was
surrounded by 10 foot wall and the gate was locked. He was shocked when 4 masked men, armed with handguns,
suddenly arrived. They poked their guns at him,

maltreated him, and tied his hands behind his back. The masked men knocked at the door of the house and when
the housemaid Julita Sarno opened it, the men dragged Ferdinand towards the entrance, to make it appear that he
was the one knocking. The masked men then barged into the sala and tied Julitas hands. Ferdinand claimed he
never met any of the kidnappers before September 4, 1994. He was puzzled why he was being implicated in the
case.
2. Michael Pagalasan, he is simply a conductor of his uncles jeepney and made his living out of it. On the evening
of September 4, 1994, at about 9:00 p.m., he was in their house. His friend Bong arrived, and invited him for a
stroll and to accompany the latter to get his motorcycle. Michael agreed. They took a tricycle and arrived at the
Villa Consuelo Subdivision. Michael was surprised when the tricycle stopped near the gate of the Lim residence and
masked men suddenly appeared, poking their guns at him. Bong fled, leaving Michael alone to fend for himself.
The masked men ordered Michael to drive a car, and warned him that if he refused, he would be killed.
Momentarily, one of the men emerged from the house, with George Lim in tow. George gave the key to his Nissan
car to one of the kidnappers, who in turn handed it over to Michael. The men forced George and his son
Christopher to board the car. Father and son were seated between two masked men. Afraid for his life, Michael
was forced to drive the car with one of the kidnappers pointing a gun at him, seated to his right at the passengers
side. The kidnappers ordered Michael to drive the car towards the direction of Barangay Ligaya.

Three of the men alighted, bringing Christopher with them. Michael then pleaded to George to bring him first to
Tambler, where the jeepney of his uncle was parked. Michael wanted to sleep there instead of going home.
George agreed, and drove the car himself through Barangay Makar. George told Michael that they had to travel
along Espina road instead of the regular road because they might encounter policemen, and Christopher might be
killed by the kidnappers. However, the car had to stop at the intersection of the national highway when George
saw the policemen and their mobile police car parked at the intersection. Michael was then arrested by the police,
blindfolded, and brought to the mobile car where he was also beaten. His head was banged against the sides of the
mobile car. And then he made his extrajudicial confession.

INITIAL RULING OF THE RTC

On October 17, 1994, with Case No. 11062

Information is filed in RTC for violation of PD 1866 (kidnapping with ransom) against Michael (judgment: Sept.
24, 2007- for failure of the prosecution to prove the accusation against the accused Michael Pagalasan beyond
reasonable doubt, he is hereby acquitted of the crime charged.)

On November 3, 1994, with Case No. 11098

Michael, Ronnie Cabalo, Aladin Cabalo, Ferdinand Cortez, a certain John Doe identified as Fernando, and Peter
Doe were charged with kidnapping for ransom in an Information in RTC (judgment: the accused Michael Pagalasan
is hereby found guilty of the crime of kidnapping for ransom as defined and penalized under Article 267 as
amended by Section 8 of Republic Act 7659, and there being no modifying circumstance to consider, he is
sentenced to suffer the EXTREME PENALTY OF DEATH insofar as the case of George Lim is concerned. The same
penalty of death shall also be imposed against Michael Pagalasan in the case of Christopher Neal Lim who was
kidnapped on the same occasion and was released only on the sixth day after his captivity.)

Issue:

1. WON Pagalasan is guilty of kidnapping George and Christopher Lim under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code
(main issue)

2. WON there is a conspiracy committed between Pagalasan and his cohorts (Article 8 of the RPC)
HELD:

Yes. He is guilty of kidnapping (with no ransom) under Article 267 and guilty of slight illegal detention of George
under Article 268 of the Revised Penal Code.

Yes, conspiracy between the accused and his cohorts exists

RATIO:

Guilty of Kidnapping:

1. For Christopher (Article 267 Paragraph 4, kidnapping): Pagalasan and others conspired to kidnap George and
Christopher and detained them illegally but prosecution failed to prove that they intended to extort ransom. (see
the 3 letters below). Of the 3 letters only the second letter is asking for ransom and it is not signed by MUBARAK II
or. It is possible that it did not come from the kidnappers or others are acting independently to benefit from the
situation. Even if the letter asking for ransom came from the kidnappers, Pagalasans conspiracy with them already
ended at the time of his arrest. There is no proof that what is contained in the second and third letters is with the
knowledge and concurrence of Pagalasan.

2. For George (Article 268, slight illegal detention): George had been kidnapped and detained illegally by the
appellant and his allies, but only for less than a day. George regained his freedom after the appellant had been
arrested at the intersection of the national highway and Espina Road. There is no evidence that the appellant and
his allies kidnapped George for the purpose of extorting ransom for his release. There is likewise no evidence that
they inflicted any serious physical injuries on George, or simulated public authority, or threatened to kill him.
Furthermore, there is no evidence that the appellant and his allies intended to detain the victim for more than
three days. The appellant is not entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance under the second paragraph of
Article 268 of the Revised Penal Code because he did not voluntarily release George within three days from the
kidnapping.

On conspiracy:

There is conspiracy when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy as a
mode of incurring criminal liability must be proven separately from and with the same quantum of proof as the
crime itself. Conspiracy need not be proven by direct evidence. After all, secrecy and concealment are essential
features of a successful conspiracy. Settled as a rule of law is that the conspiracy continues until the object is
attained, unless in the meantime the conspirator abandons the conspiracy or is arrested. The loner a conspiracy is
deemed to continue, the greater the chances that additional persons will be found to have joined it.

Each conspirator is liable for everything that is done by his confederates which follows incidentally in the execution
of a common design as one of its probable and natural consequence even though it was not intended as part of
the original design.

In this case, the collective, concerted and synchronized sets of Pagalasan with his three cohorts before, during and
after the kidnapping constitute concrete proof that he and his companions conspired with each other to attain a
common objective; to kidnap George and Christopher and detain them illegally. Pagalasan was a principal by his
direct participation in the kidnapping of the two victims.
THE LETTERS
1. The handwritten letter received by Desiree on September 4, 1994, first letter, reads:
Para Sa Inyo Mr. & Mrs. Lim,

Una wag na wag kayong gumawa ng hakbang na hindi namin alam o gusto, lalong-lalo na sa pakikipag-usap sa militar o
magkoordinate sa militar ay hindi namin gustong mangyari ang ganon mga sistem. Ang pangalawa, wag na wag kayong
tumanggap ng negotiator na walang palatandaan na galing sa amin, pakiusap lang yon na dapat ninyong sundin, madidisgrasya
ang aming dala kung kayoy magkakamali ng hakbang.

Maliwanag sana sa inyo ang aming mga salaysay.

Note Palatandaan na galing sa aming hakbang ay ito

MR. MUBARAK II or 2 Sulat man o telephone

2. The letter received by George on September 6, 1994, second letter, reads:

Ronie Puntuan
Michael Pagalasan

Mr. G. Lim palayain ninyo ang suspek ninyo. Wala silang kasalanan bago natin tapusin ang usapan tatlong milyong piso
(3,000,000) katumbas ng kalayaan ng mahal ninyong anak. Paalisin ang mga sundalo. Kailangan ang Black Out News. Huwag
kang magkakamali Mr. Lim. Kunting sipyot mo patay ang anak mo. Isang araw lamang ang tagal namin sa inyo.

3. The handwritten letter received by George on September 9, 1994, third letter, reads:

Para sayo Mr. & Mrs. Lim,

Mr. Lim, gusto ko lang ipaabot sayo ang maikli kong kataga. Unang-una, ayaw namin na mga asong militar na makialam.
Pangalawa, ayaw namin sa grupo na idamay ang tao na walang-alam. Alalahanin mo mabuti lahat ng mga kataga na iniwan ko
sayo, Mr. Lim. Ang taong dinampot ng militar sa purok islam na si Ronie, ang taong yan walang conection (sic) sa grupo, sa
madaling usapan, Mr. Lim, alalahanin mo ang anak mo sa oras na tatlong araw na taong yan hindi makalabas. Ang isipin mo ang
anak mo hindi rin makalabas hanggat sa mabulok sa lupa (maliwanag).

Palatandaan MUBARAK II 2

Elements of Kidnapping (Article 267 of the RPC)

1. That the offender is a private individual;

2. That he detains another or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty;

3. That the act of detention must be illegal; and

4. That in the commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances is present:

a. That the detention lasts for more than 3 days;

b. That it is committed simulating public authority;

c. That any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person detained or threats to kill him are made; or

d. That the person detained is a minor, female, or a public officer.

People vs. Larraaga

Appellee: People of the Philippines

Appellants: Francisco Juan Larraaga, Josman Aznar, Rowen Adlawan, Alberto Cao, Ariel Balansag, Davidson
Rusia, James Anthony Uy, James Andrew Uy Per curiam decision

FACTS:
On the night of July 16, 1997, victims Marijoy and Jacqueline Chiong failed to come home on the expected time.
Two days after, a young woman was found dead at the foot of a cliff. Her pants were torn, her t-shirt was raised up
to her breast and her bra was pulled down. Her face and neck were covered with masking tape and attached to her
left wrist was a handcuff. The woman was identified as Marijoy. After almost ten months, accused Davidson Rusia
surfaced and admitted before the police having participated in the abduction of the sisters. He identified
appellants Francisco Juan Larraaga, Josman Aznar, Rowen Adlawan, Alberto Cao, Ariel Balansag, James Anthony
Uy, and James Andrew Uy as co-perpetrators in the crime.

Rusia provided the following before the trial court:

1) That at 10:30 in the evening of July 16, 1997, he met Rowen and Josman and told him to ride with them in a
white car. Following them were Larraaga, James Anthony and James Andrew who were in a red car. Josman
stopped the white car in front of the waiting shed where the sisters Marijoy and Jacqueline were standing and
forced them to ride the car. Rusia taped their mouths while Rowen handcuffed them jointly.
2) That after stopping by a safehouse, the group thereafter headed to the South Bus Terminal where they met
Alberto and Ariel, and hired the white van driven by the former. They traveled towards south of Cebu City, leaving
the red car at the South Bus Terminal.
3) That after parking their vehicles near a precipice, they drank and had a pot session. Later, they started to rape
Marijoy inside the vehicle, and thereafter raped Jaqueline.
4) That Josman intructed Rowen and Ariel to bring Marijoy to the cliff and push her into the ravine.
The claims of Rusia were supported by other witnesses. He was discharged as an accused and became a state
witness. Still, the body of Jacqueline was never found. The trial court found the other appellants guilty of two
crimes of kidnapping and serious illegal detention and sentenced each of them to suffer the penalties of two (2)
reclusiones perpetua. The appellants assailed the said decision, arguing inter alia, that court erred in finding that
there was consipiracy. James Anthony was also claimed to be only 16 years old when the crimes were committed.

ISSUES:
1) Whether or not there was conspiracy.
2) Whether or not the trial court erred in characterizing the crime.
3) Whether or not the trial court erred imposing the correct penalty.

HELD:
1) Yes. Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and manner by which the offense was perpetrated, or may be
inferred from the acts of the accused themselves, when such point to a joint design and community of interest.
The appellants actions showed that they had the same objective to kidnap and detain the Chiong sisters. The
Court affirmed the trial courts finding that the appellants indeed conspired in the commission of the crimes
charged.

2) Yes. The rule is that when the law provides a single penalty for two or more component offenses, the resulting
crime is called a special complex crime. Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 8 of R.A.
7659, provides that in the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention, when the victim is killed or dies as a
consequence of the detention, or is raped or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty
shall be imposed. Thus, the resulting crime will change from complex crime to special complex crime. In the
present case, the victims were raped and subjected to dehumanizing acts. Thus, the Court held that all the
appellants were guilty of the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with homicide and
rape in the case where Marijoy is the victim; and simple kidnapping and serious illegal detention in the case of
Jacqueline.

3) Yes. Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code provides that by reason of minority, the imposable penalty to the
offender is one degree lower than the statutory penalty. James Anthony was only 16 years old when the crimes
were committed. As penalty for the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with
homicide and rape is death, the correct penalty to be imposed should be reclusion perpetua. On the other hand,
the penalty for simple kidnapping and serious illegal detention is reclusion perpetua to death. One degree lower
from the said penalty is reclusion temporal. There being no aggravating and mitigating circumstance, the penalty
to be imposed on him should be reclusion temporal in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, he should be sentenced to suffer the penalty of twelve (12) years of prision mayor in its maximum period, as
minimum, to seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum. With regard to the
rest of the appellants, the statutory penalty as provided above should be imposed. Therefore, trial court erred in
merely imposing two (2) reclusiones perpetua.

Due process in a criminal prosecution

No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy
the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him,
to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to
secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf.
People vs Garchitorena August 28, 2009

FACTS:

September 22, 1995 at around 9:00 in the evening. Dulce Borero along with his brother Mauro Biay y Almarinez
was selling balut as Sta. Inez Almeda Subdivision, Brgy. Dela paz, Binan, Laguna. Dulce Borero was about seven (7)
arms length away from her brother Mauro Biay. Accused Jessie Garcia called Mauro Biay and as Mauro Biay
approached Jessie, the latter twisted the hand of Mauro and Jessies companions (co-accused) Arnold Gachitorena
and Joey Pamplona began stabbing Mauro repeatedly with a shiny blade instrument. Witness saw her brother
Mauro struggling to free himself while being stabbed by the (3) accused, until her brother slumped face down on
the ground. Arnold instructed his two co-accused to run away. Borero claims she wanted to shout but nothing
came out from her mouth. Witness went home to call for her elder brother Teodoro Biay but when they return to
the scene the victim was no longer there as he had been brought to the Perpetual Help Hospital.

Joey Pamplona denied that he participated in the stabbing, Arnold Garchitorena claims for insanity.

The trial court convicted the accused and the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court. The
Supreme Court affirmed the decision with modifications.

ISSUES:

WON there is a conspiracy on the case?

HELD:

Yes, accuse appelants were together in performing the concerted acts in pursuit of their common objective. Jessie
Garcia grabbed the victims hands and twisted his arms; in turn, Joey Pamplona, together with Arnold Garchitorena
strangled Mauro Biay and straddled Mauro Biay on the ground, then stabbed him.
PEOPLE V. CARANDANG

FACTS:

According to the victims, on April 5, 2001, the drug enforcement unit of La Loma Police Station received a request
for assistance from the sister of accused Milan regarding a drug deal about to take place in their house.
The station commander delegated tasks to interrogate the sister of Milan and to proceed to the house in Calavite
Street.

At around 4:00pm, the police went to the house and declared their presence. In the house were the accused Henry
Milan, Jackman Chua and Restituto Carandang. Upon hearing the police arrival, Milan shut the door. PO2 Alonzo
and SPO2 Red pushed the door open. Suddenly gunshots were fired by Carandang which hit Alonzo and Red. SPO1
Monteclavo was likewise hit but was only injured. Chua uttered to Milan, sugurin mo na! Reinforcements came
at 4:30 pm. Negotiations ensued. Milan was sent to the hospital together with Monteclavo. Chua and Carandang
remained in the house and demanded certain persons to meet with. A paraffin test was conducted which yielded
negative on Chua while positive for Carandang.

According to the accused, he (Carandang) claims that he had no firearm. He was only in the house of Milan to talk
about his cellphones SIM card. And that successive gunshots erupted while they remained hidden under the bed.

ISSUE: Whether or not Carandang, Milan, and Chua are guilty of two counts of murder and one count of frustrated
murder with conspiracy as a qualifying circumstance.

RULING: On April 22, 2003, the trial court rendered its Decision finding Carandang, Milan and Chua guilty of two
counts of murder and one count of frustrated murder. They were found guilty for the killing of SPO2 Wilfredo Pilar
Red and PO2 Dionisio Alonzo qualified by treachery and acting in conspiracy with each other. Also the trial court
found the accused Restituto Carandang, Henry Milan and Jackman Chua guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of frustrated murder, described and penalized under Article 249 in relation to Article 6, paragraph 2, having
acted in conspiracy with each other.

The Court of Appeals modified the decision of the trial court as to their costs and their sentence.

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals with modification.

The appellants alleged that there is lack of direct evidence showing that they conspired with Carandang during the
latters act of shooting the policemen. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Evidence need not establish the actual agreement
among the conspirators showing a preconceived plan or motive for the commission of the crime, which
demonstrates their unity of design and objective, is sufficient. When conspiracy is established, the act of one is the
act of all regardless of the degree of participation of each.

The act of closing the door by Milan gave Carandang ample time to move into a more strategic position for gunfire.
Chua likewise urged Milan to attack Monteclavo. The circumstantial evidence supports the unity of purpose of the
minds of the three. Appellants further alleged that the incident occurred so rapidly that conspiracy is impossible to
commit. However, the Supreme Court ruled that there is no requirement for conspiracy to exist that there be
sufficient period of time to elapse. Conspiracy arises from the very moment the plotters agree to commit a felony.
G.R. No. 201860 January 22, 2014 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff -Appellee, vs. MARCELINO DADAO,
ANTONIO SULINDAO, EDDIE MALOGSI (deceased) and ALFEMIO MALOGSI,* Accused-Appellants.

FACTS : Prosecutions first witness, Ronie Dacion, a 14-year old stepson of the victim, Pionio Yacapin, testified that
on July 11, 1993 at about 7:30 in the evening he saw accused Marcelino Dadao, Antonio Sulindao, Eddie Malogsi
and [A]lfemio Malogsi helping each other and with the use of firearms and bolos, shot to death the victim, Pionio
Yacapin in their house at Barangay Salucot, Talakag, Bukidnon. The testimony of the second witness for the
prosecution, Edgar Dacion, a 12-year old stepson of the victim, corroborates the testimony of his older brother
Ronie Dacion. Prosecutions third witness, Nenita Yacapin, the widow of the victim, also corroborates the
testimony of the prosecutions first and second witness. The said witness further testified that she suffered civil
and moral damages [due to] the death of her husband. After trial was concluded, a guilty verdict was handed down
by the trial court finding appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murdering Pionio Yacapin.

ISSUE: WHETHER THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING APPELLANTS OF THE CRIME CHARGED
DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE THEIR GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

HELD: NO [T]he issue raised by accused-appellant involves the credibility of [the] witness, which is best addressed
by the trial court, it being in a better position to decide such question, having heard the witness and observed his
demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grueling examination. These are the most significant factors in evaluating
the sincerity of witnesses and in unearthing the truth, especially in the face of conflicting testimonies. Given the
natural frailties of the human mind and its capacity to assimilate all material details of a given incident, slight
inconsistencies and variances in the declarations of a witness hardly weaken their probative value. It is well-settled
that immaterial and insignificant details do not discredit a testimony on the very material and significant point
bearing on the very act of accused-appellants. As long as the testimonies of the witnesses corroborate one another
on material points, minor inconsistencies therein cannot destroy their credibility. Inconsistencies on minor details
do not undermine the integrity of a prosecution witness.

Alibi It is a time honored principle in jurisprudence that positive identification prevails over alibi since the latter
can easily be fabricated and is inherently unreliable.
Conspiracy: act of one is the act of all.
Flight is indicative of guilt, but its converse is not necessarily true.
Treachery Time and again, the Supreme Court has declared that treachery is present when the offender commits
any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution, which tend directly and
specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party
might make.
Death of the Accused The death of the accused during the pendency of the case extinguishes the criminal liability
and civil liability ex delicto following Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated May 16, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CR.H. C. No.
00364 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS
People v. Estanly Octa

Facts: 4 armed men stopped and boarded a Honda Civic car being driven by Johnny Corpuz who was with his
brother Mike Adrian Batuigas. Johnny was then forced to the backseat and was blindfolded and handcuffed. The
armed men first contacted Johnny's mother-in-law and informed her that they were just on a trip. The victims
were later brought to a safe house where one of the kidnappers contacted Johnny's wife, Ana Marie Corpuz. Upon
confirmation that his husband was kidnapped, Ana Marie sought the assistance of the PACER where several
communications were had. The kidnappers demanded for a ransom of P20M but was reduced to P538K. She was
then instructed to meet a man with a red cap who would ask her "saan yung padala ni boss". She saw the man but
first asked for confirmation from one of the kidnappers by talking to the man. The man with the red cap turned out
to be the accused and was described by Ana Marie as good looking, lightly built, in his early 20s around 5'4" in
height and with dimples. After the ransom was given, the victims were released. The accused invoked the defense
of denial and alibi and that he was a victim of the kidnapping as well. On appeal, he argued that he was not a co-
conspirator since he cannot be considered as a conspirator to the kidnapping in the absence of concrete proof that
he actually participated in the execution of the essential elements of the crime by overt acts indispensable to its
accomplishment. His receipt of the ransom money transpired only after the kidnapping had been consummated
and was not an essential element of the crime. Crime charged: Kidnapping for ransom

RTC: Guilty as charged

CA: Affirmed the RTC

Issue: Is the accused liable for the felony charged as a co-conspiratorz.

Held: Yes. As held in People v. Bautista: Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Where all the accused acted in concert at the time
of the commission of the offense, and it is shown by such acts that they had the same purpose or common design
and were united in its execution, conspiracy is sufficiently established. It must be shown that all participants
performed specific acts with such closeness and coordination as to indicate a common purpose or design to
commit the felony. Evidently, to hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown
to have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. There must be intentional
participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose. Taking these
facts in conjunction with the testimony of Dexter, who testified that accused-appellant was the one who received
the ransom money then the commonality of purpose of the acts of accused-appellant together with the other
accused can no longer be denied. Such acts have the common design or purpose to commit the felony of
kidnapping for ransom.

Moreover, the CA is correct in its observation that at the time accused-appellant received the ransom money, the
crime of kidnapping was still continuing, since both victims were still being illegally detained by the kidnappers.
While his receipt of the ransom money was not a material element of the crime, it was nevertheless part of the
grand plan and was in fact the main reason for kidnapping the victims. Ransom is money, price or consideration
paid or demanded for the redemption of a captured person or persons; or payment that releases from captivity.
Without ransom money, the freedom of the detained victims cannot be achieved.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A.G.R. CRH.C. No.
03490 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and ordered to pay P538,000 as actual damages, P100,000 as moral damages, and P100,000 as
exemplary damages.
PEOPLE vs. FELICIANO, JR.
G.R. No. 196735
May 5, 2014

FACTS:
Accused-appellants: Feliciano, Jr., Medalla, Soliva, Zingapan, and Alvir

In the afternoon of December 8, 1994, seven (7) members of the Sigma Rho fraternity were eating
lunch at the Beach House Canteen, near the Main Library of the UP Diliman when suddenly, the
deceased Dennis Venturina shouted, "Brads, brods!"

Lachica, Grand Archon of Sigma Rho Fraternity, looked around when Venturina shouted, and he
saw about ten men charging toward them. The men were armed with baseball bats and lead pipes,
and their heads were covered with either handkerchiefs or shirts. Within a few seconds, five (5) of
the men started attacking him, hitting him with their lead pipes. During the attack, he recognized
one of the attackers as Alvir because his mask fell off. Lachica suffered injuries but was able to run
to the nearby College of Education. Just before reaching it, he looked back and saw Warren
Zingapan and Julius Victor L. Medalla holding lead pipes and standing where the commotion was.
Natalicio, the Vice Grand Archon of Sigma Rho, looked to his left when Venturina shouted. He saw
about fifteen (15) to twenty (20) men, most of who were wearing masks, running toward them. He
was stunned at first and then he started running. The attackers came after him and beat him up
with lead pipes and baseball bats until he fell down. He was lying on his back and when he looked
up, he saw another group of four (4) to five (5) men coming toward him, led by Benedict Guerrero.
This group also beat him up. He did not move until another group of masked men beat him up for
about five (5) to eight (8) seconds.

Mangrobang, Jr., member of Sigma Rho, also looked back when Venturina shouted and saw a group
of men with baseball bats and lead pipes. He ran when they attacked, but two (2) men, whose faces
were covered with pieces of cloth, blocked his way and hit him with lead pipes. While running and
parrying the blows, he recognized them as Gilbert Merle Magpantay and Carlo Jolette Fajardo
because their masks fell off. He successfully evaded his attackers and ran to the Main Library. He
then decided that he needed to help his fraternity brothers and turned back toward Beach House.
There, he saw Venturina lying on the ground. Danilo Feliciano, Jr. was beating Venturina up with a
lead pipe while Raymund E. Narag was aiming to hit Venturina. When they saw him, they went
toward his direction. They were about to hit him when somebody shouted that policemen were
coming. Feliciano and Narag then ran away.

Gaston, Jr., member of Sigma Rho, immediately stood up when he heard someone shout,
"Brods!" He saw a group of men charging toward them carrying lead pipes and baseball
bats. Most of them had pieces of cloth covering their faces. He was about to run when two
(2) of the attackers approached him. One struck him with a heavy pipe while the other
stabbed him with a bladed instrument. He was able to parry most of the blows from the
lead pipe, but he sustained stab wounds on the chest and on his left forearm. He was able to
run away. When he sensed that no one was chasing him, he looked back to Beach House
Canteen and saw Danilo Feliciano, Jr., Warren Zingapan, and George Morano. He decided to go
back to the canteen to help his fraternity brothers. When he arrived, he did not see any of his
fraternity brothers but only saw the ones who attacked them.
Fortes, member of Sigma Rho, also ran when he saw the group of attackers coming toward them.
When he looked back, he saw Danilo Feliciano, Jr. hitting Venturina. He was also able to see Warren
Zingapan and George Morano at the scene.

Venturina was transferred from the U.P. Infirmary to St. Luke's Hospital where he died two days
later because of traumatic head injuries.

Lachica, Natalicio, Mangrobang, Fortes, and Gaston suffered injuries which required medical
attendance for a period of ten (10) days to thirty (30) days from the date of infliction.

RTC: all of the accused-appellants were found guilty of the murder of Dennis Venturina and the
attempted murder of Mervin Natalicio, Cesar Mangrobang, Jr., Leandro Lachica, Arnel Fortes, and
Cristobal Gaston, Jr.

CA: modified their liabilities and found that the accused-appellants were guilty of attempted
murder only against Natalicio and Fortes, and not against Mangrobang, Lachica, and Gaston. It is
the appellate court's reasoning that because Lachica and Mangrobang "were no longer chased by the
attackers," it concluded that accused-appellants "voluntary desisted from pursuing them and from
inflicting harm to them, which shows that they did not have the intent to do more than to make them
suffer pain by slightly injuring them." It also pointed out that the wound inflicted on Gaston "was too
shallow to have been done with an intent to kill." Thus, it concluded that the accused-appellants
would have been guilty only of slight physical injuries.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellate court was correct in finding that the accused were only guilty for
slight physical injuries of Mangrobang, Lachica, and Gaston (NO)

HELD:
The conclusion of appellate court is erroneous.
It should be remembered that the trial court found that there was conspiracy among the accused-
appellants and the appellate court sustained this finding.

Conspiracy, once proven, has the effect of attaching liability to all of the accused, regardless
of their degree of participation, thus: once an express or implied conspiracy is proved, all of the
conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the extent and character of their respective
active participation in the commission of the crime or crimes perpetrated in furtherance of the
conspiracy because in contemplation of law, the act of one is the act of all.

The foregoing rule is anchored on the sound principle that "when two or more persons unite to
accomplish a criminal object, whether through the physical volition of one, or all, proceeding severally
or collectively, each individual whose evil will actively contributes to the wrong-doing is in law
responsible for the whole, the same as though performed by himself alone."

Although it is axiomatic that no one is liable for acts other than his own, "when two or more
persons agree or conspire to commit a crime, each is responsible for all the acts of the others,
done in furtherance of the agreement or conspiracy." The imposition of collective liability upon
the conspirators is clearly explained in one case where this Court held that:
... it is impossible to graduate the separate liability of each (conspirator) without taking into
consideration the close and inseparable relation of each of them with the criminal act, for the
commission of which they all acted by common agreement ... The crime must therefore in view of the
solidarity of the act and intent which existed between the ... accused, be regarded as the act of the band
or party created by them, and they are all equally responsible.
Verily, the moment it is established that the malefactors conspired and confederated in the
commission of the felony proved, collective liability of the accused conspirators attaches by
reason of the conspiracy, and the court shall not speculate nor even investigate as to the actual
degree of participation of each of the perpetrators present at the scene of the crime. x x x.

The liabilities of the accused-appellants in this case arose from a single incident wherein the
accused-appellants were armed with baseball bats and lead pipes, all in agreement to do the
highest amount of damage possible to the victims. Some were able to run away and take cover,
but the others would fall prey at the hands of their attackers. The intent to kill was already
present at the moment of attack and that intent was shared by all of the accused-appellants
alike when the presence of conspiracy was proven. It is, therefore, immaterial to distinguish
between the seriousness of the injuries suffered by the victims to determine the respective
liabilities of their attackers. What is relevant is only as to whether the death occurs as a result of
that intent to kill and whether there are qualifying, aggravating or mitigating circumstances that
can be appreciated.

The appellate court, therefore, erred in finding the accused-appellants guilty only of slight physical
injuries. It would be illogical to presume that despite the swiftness and suddenness of the attack,
the attackers intended to kill only Venturina, Natalicio, and Fortes, and only intended to injure
Lachica, Mangrobang, and Gaston. Since the intent to kill was evident from the moment the
accused-appellants took their first swing, all of them were liable for that intent to kill.

For this reason, the accused-appellants should be liable for the murder of Dennis Venturina and the
attempted murder of Mervin Natalicio, Cesar Mangrobang, Jr., Leandro Lachica, Arnel Fortes, and
Cristobal Gaston, Jr.

=============================================================================================
PEOPLE vs. MORILLA
G.R. No. 189833
February 5, 2014
FACTS:
(as found by the trial court)

On October 13, 2001, two vehicles, the Starex van driven by Mayor Mitra and the ambulance van
driven by Morilla, left Infanta, Quezon en route to Manila. The Starex van which was ahead of the
ambulance was able to pass the checkpoint set up by the police officers. However, the ambulance
driven by Morilla was stopped by police officers. Through the untinted window, one of the police
officers noticed several sacks inside the van. Upon inquiry of the contents, Morilla replied that the
sacks contained narra wooden tiles.

Unconvinced, the police officers requested Morilla to open the rear door of the car for further
inspection. When it was opened, the operatives noticed that white crystalline granules were
scattered on the floor, prompting them to request Morilla to open the sacks. At this moment, Morilla
told the police officers that he was with Mayor Mitra in an attempt to persuade them to let him pass.
His request was rejected by the police officers and upon inspection, the contents of the sacks turned
out to be sacks of methamphetamine hydrochloride. This discovery prompted the operatives to
chase the Starex van of Mayor Mitra. The police officers were able to overtake the van and Mayor
Mitra was asked to stop. They then inquired if the mayor knew Morilla. On plain view, the
operatives noticed that his van was also loaded with sacks like the ones found in the ambulance.
Thus, Mayor Mitra was also requested to open the door of the vehicle for inspection. At this
instance, Mayor Mitra offered to settle the matter but the same was rejected. Upon examination, the
contents of the sacks were likewise found to contain sacks of methamphetamine hydrochloride.

RTC: convicted Morilla and Mayor Mitra of illegal transport of methamphetamine hydrochloride
(shabu) beyond reasonable doubt, in conspiracy with each other

CA: affirmed RTC; it upheld the finding of conspiracy between Mayor Mitra and Morilla in their
common intent to transport several sacks containing methamphetamine hydrochloride on board
their respective vehicles. The singularity of their intent to illegally transport methamphetamine
hydrochloride was readily shown when Morilla agreed to drive the ambulance van from Infanta,
Quezon to Manila together with Mayor Mitra, who drove the lead vehicle, the Starex van.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is conspiracy between Morilla and Mayor Mitra (YES)

Defense
Morilla primarily cites the provision on Sec. 1(b), Rule 115 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure to
substantiate his argument that he should have been informed first of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him. He pointed out that the Information itself failed to state the word
conspiracy but instead, the statement "the above-named accused, one of them an incumbent mayor
of the Municipality of Panukulan, Quezon Province, who all belong to an organized/syndicated
crime group as they all help one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
transport x x x." He argued that conspiracy was only inferred from the words used in the
Information.
HELD:
YES, the Court affirmed the finding of conspiracy by the RTC and CA, but modified the penalty
imposed.

Even assuming that his assertion is correct, the issue of defect in the Information, at this point, is
deemed to have been waived due to Morillas failure to assert it as a ground in a motion to quash
before entering his plea.
Further, it must be noted that accused Morilla participated and presented his defenses to contradict
the allegation of conspiracy before the trial and appellate courts. His failure or neglect to assert a
right within a reasonable time warrants a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned it or declined to assert it.

In conspiracy, it need not be shown that the parties actually came together and agreed in
express terms to enter into and pursue a common design. The assent of the minds may be and,
from the secrecy of the crime, usually inferred from proof of facts and circumstances which, taken
together, indicate that they are parts of some complete whole.

In this case, the totality of the factual circumstances leads to a conclusion that Morilla conspired
with Mayor Mitra in a common desire to transport the dangerous drugs. Both vehicles loaded
with several sacks of dangerous drugs, were on convoy from Quezon to Manila. Mayor Mitra was
able to drive through the checkpoint set up by the police operatives. When it was Morillas turn to
pass through the checkpoint, he was requested to open the rear door for a routinary check. Noticing
white granules scattered on the floor, the police officers requested Morilla to open the sacks. If
indeed he was not involved in conspiracy with Mayor Mitra, he would not have told the police
officers that he was with the mayor.

The very act of transporting methamphetamine hydrochloride is malum prohibitum since it is

punished as an offense under a special law. The fact of transportation of the sacks containing
dangerous drugs need not be accompanied by proof of criminal intent, motive or knowledge.
People v Bokingco
Evident Premeditation
(a) the time when the offender was determined to commit the crime
(b) an act manifestly indicating that the offender clung to his determination and
(c) a sufficient interval of time between the determination and the execution of the crime to allow him to reflect
upon the consequences of his act.

Issues:

Whether or not the crime perpetuated by Appellants was done with conspiracy.

Whether or not, Renante Col is guilty beyond reasonable doubt as a co-conspirator.

Held:

The crime, according to the SC, was not performed with conspiracy. Though Bokingco admitted thru uncounselled
admission that they conspired to kill Passion, absence of quantum of proof to prove the same on the part of the
prosecution will not make the case prosper. Moreover, the uncounselled admission is inadmissible as proof or
evidence against the appellants.

In order for the accused to be convicted as conspirators beyond reasonable doubt of Murder, according to SC, it is
necessary that conspiracy between Col and Bokingco must be proven. Conspiracy exists when two or more
persons come to an agreement to commit an unlawful act. It may be inferred from the conduct of the accused
before, during, and after the commission of the crime. Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and manner in
which the offense was perpetuated or inferred from the acts of the accused evincing a joint or common purpose
and design, concerted action, and community of interest

In the case under consideration, the testimony of Elsa is not sufficient to prove that the accused conspired to kill
Pasion. At most, Cols actuation can be equated to attempted robbery. Furthermore, the testimony of Elsa that
she heard Bokingco called out for Col that Pasion had been killed and that they had to leave the place does not
prove that they acted in concert towards the consummation of the crime. It only proves, at best, that there were
two crimes committed simultaneously and they were united in their efforts to escape from the crime they
simultaneously committed. Also there was no unity in their acts since Bokingco had already killed Pasion while Col
was attempting to rob the pawnshop.

With these, Renante Col was acquitted of the co-conspirator in the crime of murder on the ground of reasonable
doubt.

Nota Bene:

RTC- Appellants guilty of Murder, Death Penalty (December 16, 2004)

CA- Affirmed the decision of the RTC but reduced the penalty to reclusion perpetua (July 24, 2008) See amount of
damages

SC- Bokingco guilty of Homicide, Col Acquitted, See penalty and damages
PEOPLE VS. CASTILLO, G.R. NO. 132895, March 10, 2004

FACTS:

Who:

Appellant - Elizabeth Castillo (principal), Evangeline Padayhag (co-principal) and Imelda Castillo Wenceslao (accessory)
Appellee - Solicitor General
o Kidnapped- "Rocky" or Horacio Cebrero IV (6 years old)
o Parents - Luis Cabrero and Sandra Cabrero

Where: Paranaque, Manila

Appellant Elizabeth Castillo

Castillo asserts that the victims parents did not pay her wages when she worked as a maid of the victims family.
She claims that it was this injustice, her educational level and her ignorance of the law, which impelled her to take
Rocky. Castillo insists that she took Rocky simply because she missed him, and wanted to spend time with him.
Castillo also points out that Rocky came along freely with them, was not harmed, and was even cared for during his
detention.

Appellant Evangeline Padayhag

Padayhag asserts that she doesnt have knowlege of Castillos plans. She met Castillo only because Castillo told her
that her boyfriend is sick. When Castillo asked her to fetch Rocky, she did so believing that Castillo misses the boy,
as the former told her.

Appellee
March 1, 1995, Rosanna Baria (victim's yaya) and Femie(another housemaid), bathed and prepared Rocky (victim).
The parents advised Baria that someone would fetch Rocky. At 8:00 am, a tricycle arrived and on-board was
Evangeline Padayhag (accused co-principal). They went to a nearby Mcdonald's and joined by Elizabeth Castillo
(principal). At 5:30 PM, Luis Cabrero arrived home from work. DJ (other son) informed him that Rocky did not
attend school. Baria said that Rocky was fetched by a woman to attend a birthday party. Mr. Cabrero went to
police station and report his missing son.At 7:30 PM, a woman called asking for the ATM in exchange of his son.
March 2, 1995 - A woman called asking for 1 million pesos. Mr. Cabrero said he doesn't have that money. On
March 3, 1995 - No call. Mr. Cabrero as his wife to raise money and was able to withdrew P800,000. The bank
provided the serial nos. of the money.

March 4, 1995 - 9:30 PM - The woman called again and asked for the ransom. Mr. Cabrero said he only has half.
The woman agreed and instructed them to be in Paco, Obando, Bulacan at 2AM. A stakeout operations by Major
Ronnie Eleazar was organized. At 11PM, in front of the Sabadista chapel, a car arrived. A man alighted, left the bag
in front of the chapel and immediately left. About 40 mins after, two woman collected the bag and disappeared.
The policie lost the suspects but have identified Castillo and Padayhag.

March 5, 1995 at 9PM, tricycle stopped in front of Mr. Cabreros house and found that is was his son who
knocked. On March 12, 1995 Police found Padayhag, who surrendered herself to clear her name. On March 18,
1995 Police captured Castillo in Mitimos, Rizal, Zamboanga City and found the ransom money, matching the
serial numbers provided by the bank.
ISSUE: WON Padayahags actions is considered conspiracy for the kidnapping and illegal detention of the victim?

HELD:

RTC: Qualified Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention, sentencing them with death penalty

Supreme Court:

On Castillo - Affirmed with Modification. Appellant Elizabeth Castillo is sentenced to suffer the penalty of DEATH
and to pay the victim P100,000 as moral damages. The award for exemplary damages is deleted for lack of legal
basis.

On Padayhag Reversed and Acquitted.

Padayhags sole involvement in this entire episode is her act of fetching Rocky and bringing him to where Castillo
was waiting for them. Padayhag then went strolling with the two, went to the house of Castillos sister together
with Castillo and Rocky, and then later left the house. From this fact alone, the prosecution would have us rule that
Padayhag acted in conspiracy with Castillo. The prosecution contends that without Padayhags help, Castillo could
not have abducted Rocky. Padayhags acts before, during and after the crime all point to the conclusion that she
was no more than an unwitting tool of Castillo. Castillo misled her into a meeting. Castillo again misled her into
fetching Rocky. Castillo never met or contacted her after the day of Rockys abduction. Castillo also testified that
she did not bring Padayhag along with her when she went to Obando on the day that coincided with the pay-off.
The only circumstance linking Padayhag to that event is the shaky account of two police officers who admitted that
their quarry inexplicably disappeared before their very eyes. Even the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty, by itself, cannot prevail over the constitutional presumption of innocence.Nothing
links Padayhag to the demand for ransom. She never received any part of the ransom, precisely because she did
not even know it existed.

There must be positive and conclusive evidence that Padayhag acted in concert with Castillo to commit the same
criminal act. To hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by conspiracy, there must be a sufficient and unbroken
chain of events that directly and definitely links the accused to the commission of the crime without any space for
baseless suppositions or frenzied theories to filter through.

Conspiracy is established by the presence of two factors: (1) singularity of intent; and (2) unity in execution of an
unlawful objective. The two must concur. Performance of an act that contributes to the goal of another is not
enough. The act must be motivated by the same unlawful intent. Neither joint nor simultaneous action is per se
sufficient indicium of conspiracy, unless proved to have been motivated by a common design

In the absence of conspiracy, if the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations,
one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the
evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a conviction.

A criminal conviction must stand on the strength of the evidence presented by the prosecution, and not on the
weakness of the defense of the accused. The prosecution should have done more to establish Padayhags guilt.
Instead, the prosecution left a lot of room for other possible scenarios besides her guilt.

The presumption of innocence can be overborne only by proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt, which means
proof, to the satisfaction of the court and keeping in mind the presumption of innocence, as precludes every
reasonable hypothesis except that which it is given to support. It is not sufficient for the proof to establish a
probability, even though strong, that the fact charged is more likely true than the contrary. It must establish the
truth of the fact to a reasonable and moral certainty- a certainty that convinces and satisfies the reason and
conscience of those who are to act upon it.

===========================================================================================

FERNAN vs. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 145927
August 24, 2007

FACTS:
Petitioners and 36 former officials and employees of the then Ministry of Public Highways (MPH)
and several suppliers of construction materials were involved in the misappropriation of public
funds arising from numerous transactions in the Cebu First Highway Engineering District in 1977.

Sometime in February, 1977, accused Rolando Mangubat (Chief Accountant), Delia Preagido
(Accountant III), Jose Sayson (Budget Examiner), and Edgardo Cruz (Clerk II), all of MPH Region VII,
met at the Town and Country Restaurant in Cebu City and hatched an ingenious plan to siphon off
large sums of money from government coffers.

Mangubat had found a way to withdraw government money through the use of fake Letters of
Advice of Allotments (LAA), vouchers and other documents and to conceal traces thereof with the
connivance of other government officials and employees.

A total of 132 General Vouchers, emanating from fake LAAs, were traced back to Rolando Mangubat,
Regional Accountant of Region VII and Adventor Fernandez, Regional Highway Engineer, also of
Region VII. Those LAAs became the vehicles in the disbursement of funds amounting to
P3,839,810.74, through the vouchers purportedly issued for the purchase and delivery of the
aforementioned materials allegedly used for the maintenance and repair of the national highways
within the Cebu First HED.

Despite the enormous additional expenditure of P3,839,810.74, the roads and bridges in the
district, as found out by the NBI, did not show any improvement. As testified to by several barangay
captains, the road maintenance consisted merely of spreading anapog or limestone on potholes of
the national highway. Because of the sheer magnitude of the illegal transactions, the number of
people involved, and the ingenious scheme employed in defrauding the government, this infamous
86 million highway scam has few parallels in the annals of crime in the country.

The petitioners and all other accused were charged and convicted in the Sandiganbayan all in
conspiracy with each other committing estafa thru falsification of public documents as defined
and penalized in Articles 318 and 171, in relation to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred in convicting petitioners as co-conspirators despite the
prosecutions failure to specifically prove beyond reasonable doubt the facts and circumstances
that would implicate them as co-conspirators and justify their conviction (Sandiganbayan was
correct)

HELD:
Petitioners acted in conspiracy with one another.
Petitioners vigorously claim error on the part of the lower court when it made the finding that they
were co-conspirators with the other parties accused despite the dearth of evidence to amply
demonstrate complicity.

The Court is not convinced by petitioners postulation. Indeed, the burden of proving the allegation
of conspiracy falls to the shoulders of the prosecution. Considering, however, the difficulty in
establishing the existence of conspiracy, settled jurisprudence finds no need to prove it by
direct evidence. In People vs. Pagalasan, the Court explicated why direct proof of prior agreement
is not necessary:
After all, secrecy and concealment are essential features of a successful conspiracy.
Conspiracies are clandestine in nature. It may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before,
during and after the commission of the crime, showing that they had acted with a common purpose
and design. Conspiracy may be implied if it is proved that two or more persons aimed their acts
towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their
combined acts, though apparently independent of each other, were in fact, connected and
cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment. To
hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed
an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. There must be intentional participation in
the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose.

In Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan, the Court categorized two (2) structures of multiple conspiracies,
namely: (1) the so-called "wheel" or "circle" conspiracy, in which there is a single person or group
(the "hub") dealing individually with two or more other persons or groups (the "spokes"); and (2) the
"chain" conspiracy, usually involving the distribution of narcotics or other contraband, in which
there is successive communication and cooperation in much the same way as with legitimate
business operations between manufacturer and wholesaler, then wholesaler and retailer, and then
retailer and consumer.

The Court finds that the conspiracy in the instant cases resembles the "wheel" conspiracy. The 36
disparate persons who constituted the massive conspiracy to defraud the government were
controlled by a single hub, namely: Rolando Mangubat (Chief Accountant), Delia Preagido
(Accountant III), Jose Sayson (Budget Examiner), and Edgardo Cruz (Clerk II), who controlled the
separate "spokes" of the conspiracy. Petitioners were among the many spokes of the wheel.

Mangubat enticed Preagido, Cruz and Sayson to join him. All three agreed to help him carry out his
plan. They typed fake LAAs during Saturdays. Cruz and Sayson also took charge of negotiating or
selling fake LAAs to contractors at 26% of the gross amount. Preagido manipulated the general
ledger, journal vouchers and general journal through negative entries to conceal the illegal
disbursements. The four formed the nucleus of the nefarious conspiracy. Other government
employees, tempted by the prospect of earning big money, allowed their names to be used
and signed spurious documents.

The feeble defense of petitioners that they were not aware of the ingenuous plan of the group of
accused Mangubat and the indispensable acts to defraud the government does not merit any
consideration. The State is not tasked to adduce direct proof of the agreement by petitioners with
the other accused, for such requirement, in many cases, would border on near impossibility. The
State needs to adduce proof only when the accused committed acts that constitute a vital
connection to the chain of conspiracy or in furtherance of the objective of the conspiracy. In the
case at bench, the signing of the fake tally sheets and/or delivery receipts, reports of
inspection, and requests for supplies and materials by petitioners on separate occasions is
vital to the success of the Mangubat Group in siphoning off government funds. Without such
fabricated documents, the general vouchers covering the supply of materials cannot be properly
accomplished and submitted to the disbursing officer for the preparation of checks.

Where the acts of each of the accused constitute an essential link in a chain and the desistance of even
one of them would prevent the chain from being completed, then no conspiracy could result as its
consummation would then be impossible or aborted. But when each and everyone of the accused
in the instant cases performed their assigned tasks and roles with martinet-like precision
and accuracy, by individually performing essential overt acts, so much so that the common
objective is attained, which is to secure the illegal release of public funds under the guise of fake
or simulated public documents, then each and everyone of said accused are equally liable as
co-principals under the well-established and universally-accepted principle that, once a
conspiracy is directly or impliedly proven, the act of one is the act of all and such liability exists
notwithstanding no-participation in every detail in the execution of the offense.

In sum, the required quantum of proof has been adduced by the State on the conspiracy among the
accused including petitioners. The conviction of petitioners must perforce be sustained.
GO-TAN vs. TAN
G.R. No. 168852
September 30, 2008

FACTS:
Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan (petitioner) and Steven L. Tan were married. Barely six years into the
marriage, petitioner filed a Petition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Protective Order
(TPO) against Steven and her parents-in-law, Spouses Perfecto C. Tan and Juanita L. Tan
(respondents) before the RTC. She alleged that Steven, in conspiracy with respondents, were
causing verbal, psychological and economic abuses upon her in violation of Section 5, paragraphs
(e)(2)(3)(4), (h)(5), and (i) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, otherwise known as the Anti-Violence
Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004.
The RTC granted petitioner's prayer for a TPO.

Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss with Opposition to the Issuance of Permanent Protection
Order Ad Cautelam and Comment on the Petition, contending that the RTC lacked jurisdiction over
their persons since, as parents-in-law of the petitioner, they were not covered by R.A. No. 9262.
Petitioner argued that respondents were covered by R.A. No. 9262 under a liberal interpretation
thereof aimed at promoting the protection and safety of victims of violence.

The RTC dismissed the case as to respondents on the ground that, being the parents-in-law of
the petitioner, they were not included/covered as respondents under R.A. No. 9262 under the
well-known rule of law expressio unius est exclusio alterius.

Petitioner filed her Verified Motion for Reconsideration contending that the doctrine of necessary
implication should be applied in the broader interests of substantial justice and due process.
Respondents filed their Comment arguing that petitioner's liberal construction unduly broadened
the provisions of R.A. No. 9262 since the relationship between the offender and the alleged victim
was an essential condition for the application of R.A. No. 9262.

The RTC denied petitioners Verified Motion for Reconsideration and reasoned that to include
respondents under the coverage of R.A. No. 9262 would be a strained interpretation of the
provisions of the law. Hence, the present petition on a pure question of law.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondents-spouses Perfecto & Juanita, parents-in-law of Sharica, may be included
in the petition for the issuance of a protective order, in accordance with R.A. No. 9262 (YES)

Petitioner contends that R.A. No. 9262 must be understood in the light of the provisions of
Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262 which explicitly provides for the suppletory application of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC) and, accordingly, the provision on conspiracy under Article 8 of
the RPC can be suppletorily applied to R.A. No. 9262; that Steven and respondents had
community of design and purpose in tormenting her by giving her insufficient financial
support; harassing and pressuring her to be ejected from the family home; and in
repeatedly abusing her verbally, emotionally, mentally and physically; that respondents should be
included as indispensable or necessary parties for complete resolution of the case.
Defenses
Respondents submit that they are not covered by R.A. No. 9262 since Section 3 thereof
explicitly provides that the offender should be related to the victim only by marriage, a former
marriage, or a dating or sexual relationship; that allegations on the conspiracy of respondents
require a factual determination which cannot be done by this Court in a petition for review; that
respondents cannot be characterized as indispensable or necessary parties, since their presence in
the case is not only unnecessary but altogether illegal, considering the non-inclusion of in-laws as
offenders under Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262.

HELD:
While the Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262 provides that the offender be related or connected to the
victim by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude the
application of the principle of conspiracy under the RPC. Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly
provides for the suppletory application of the RPC.

Article 10 of the RPC provides that offenses which are or in the future may be punishable under
special laws are not subject to the provisions of this Code. This Code shall be supplementary to
such laws, unless the latter should specially provide the contrary. Hence, legal principles
developed from the Penal Code may be applied in a supplementary capacity to crimes punished
under special laws, such as R.A. No. 9262, in which the special law is silent on a particular matter.

The principle of conspiracy may be applied to R.A. No. 9262 because of the express provision of
Section 47 that the RPC shall be supplementary to said law. Thus, general provisions of the RPC,
which by their nature, are necessarily applicable, may be applied suppletorily. Once conspiracy or
action in concert to achieve a criminal design is shown, the act of one is the act of all the
conspirators, and the precise extent or modality of participation of each of them becomes
secondary, since all the conspirators are principals.

Also, Section 5 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly recognizes that the acts of violence against women and
their children may be committed by an offender through another. The protection order that
may be issued for the purpose of preventing further acts of violence against the woman or her child
may include individuals other than the offending husband.

Finally, Section 4 of R.A. No. 9262 calls for a liberal construction of the law. Contrary to the RTC's
pronouncement, the maxim "expressio unios est exclusio alterius finds no application here. It
must be remembered that this maxim is only an ancillary rule of statutory construction. It is not of
universal application. Neither is it conclusive. It should be applied only as a means of discovering
legislative intent which is not otherwise manifest and should not be permitted to defeat the plainly
indicated purpose of the legislature.

Conspiracy is an evidentiary matter which should be threshed out in a full-blown trial on the
merits and cannot be determined in the present petition since this Court is not a trier of facts. It is
thus premature for petitioner to argue evidentiary matters since this controversy is centered only
on the determination of whether respondents may be included in a petition under R.A. No. 9262.
The presence or absence of conspiracy can be best passed upon after a trial on the merits.