The Role of Meditation in Asagas

Legitimation of Mahyna

Alberto Todeschini
University of California Berkeley
170

Abstract
Buddhism is a religion in which references to meditation are
extremely common; they can be found in countless works of art
and iconography, biographies past and present, Dharma-talks, texts
canonical and otherwise, etc. Going by certain strands of Western-
inf luenced popular culture, Buddhism consists of an array of
meditative practices accompanied by some philosophy and ethical
teachings for good measure. Yet, numerically speaking, no more than
a small minority of Buddhists practice meditation.
This paper focuses on appeals to meditation as part of a legitimation
strategy. What needed legitimation were certain innovations in
doctrine and practice that appeared long after the time of the Buddha.
Such legitimation was required because, at least superficially, South
Asian Buddhism was largely conservative. I qualify my claim with
superficially because, much as we have substantial evidence
demonstrating that many authors went to great lengths to show that
what they were doing or saying was not innovative, considerable
change and innovation did undeniably take place. It is in this context
that a number of strategies were employed to justify the introduction
of and give legitimacy to innovative ideas and practices.
My main point of focus is a text titled Summary of the Great Vehicle
(Mahynasagraha), traditionally attributed to Asaga, a monk
who lived perhaps in the 4th century CE. The Summary was a very
influential text in the history of Mahyna and it is relevant here
because of its frequent appeals to meditation in order to show the
validity of Yogcra.

Keywords
meditation; Asaga; Mahyna; legitimation; Mahynasagraha
 The Role of Meditation in Asagas Legitimation of Mahyna 171

.
As just about anyone who has cast more than a superficial glance at
Buddhism knows, this is a religion in which references to meditation
are extremely common; they can be found in countless works of art
and iconography, biographies past and present, Dharma-talks, texts
canonical and otherwise, etc. And if one were to go by certain strands
of Western-influenced popular culture, Buddhism would consist of an
array of meditative practices accompanied by some philosophy and
ethical teachings for good measure. In the eyes of many, meditation
is so central to what Buddhists do as to overshadow or downright
exclude well-nigh everything else. As noted by Carl Bielefeldt, the
question, do you practice? is very often almost synonymous with do
you meditate?1 Looking at it this way, Bielefeldt adds, the great
majority of Buddhists throughout history have never practiced their
religion.2 This religion is not Buddhism, however. It is Trunkism
or Tailism.3 That is to say, this is at best a partial description, just
as partial is the description of an elephant provided by the blind

* I wish to express my gratitude to Venerable Huimin, the faculty, staff and volunteers
at Dharma Drum Buddhist College for their kindness, hospitality and good humor
during my stay. As always, I have been the fortunate beneficiary of assistance
scholarly and otherwise from a number of people, in alphabetical order, Achim
Bayer, Venerable Dhammadinn, Tru Funayama, Eric Greene, Robert Sharf,
Alexander von Rospatt and Stefano Zacchetti.
1 Carl Bielefeldt, Practice, in Critical Terms for the Study of Buddhism, ed. Donald S.
Lopez (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 230.
2 Bielefeldt (ibidem, 230-231): Put this way, the great majority of Buddhists
throughout history have never practiced their religion. They have been the patrons
of, the audience for, at best the auxiliaries to, the relatively small troupe of
professionalsthose who have gone forth (pravrajita) from the homefor whom
the contemplative life is a vocation. And even among the professionals, much of
what they do in the service of their faiththe prayers for their patrons, the ritual
performances for their audiences, the writing of their books, the administration
of their institutions, and the likewill not, properly speaking, count as practice.
Parentheses in the original.
3 These terms have been used by Timothy Barrett while discussing Buddhism and
historical research. I am adapting the imagery and terminology. See Timothy H.
Barrett, History, in Critical Terms for the Study of Buddhism, ed. Donald S. Lopez
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 139.
172

men who touch the elephants trunk, tail or tusk in the well-known
story told in the Pli canon and elsewhere.4 Being partial, it is likely
to be misleading; and at worst, if the part is taken to be the whole,
the description is simply mistaken. Nevertheless, it is true that
numerically speaking, no more than a small minority of Buddhists
practice meditation. In fact, meditation plays no direct, immediate
role in the life of the majority of Buddhists, and this is the case even
including monastics.5
Early European views of meditation and its function in Buddhism
were rather varied.6 Scholarly views are still varied, and it is fair to
say that, for all the high-quality work that has been produced, there
are still important misunderstandings and unanswered questions
including fundamental ones even among specialists. Addressing
these issues is as pressing a task as ever in view of the fact that
millions of people, many of whom do not see themselves as being
Buddhist, have taken up or at least dabbled in meditation, including
in clinical settings.7 I said that only a small minority of Buddhists
practice meditation and I also said that millions of people practice
meditation. These statements are both true. This is because with

4 See for instance the Inspired Utterances (Udna) in Paul Steinthal, Udna (London:
Pali Text Society, 1885), 66. A similar story also appears in Jaina literature.
5 Reference to several sources supporting my last claim can be found in Robert H.
Sharf, Buddhist Modernism and the Rhetoric of Meditative Experience, Numen
42, no. 3 (1995): 228283, especially 241ff. See however also the remarks in Daniel
Boucher, Bodhisattvas of the Forest and the Formation of the Mahyna: A Study
and Translation of the Rraplaparipcch-stra (Honolulu: University of Hawaii
Press, 2008), 195, note 2.
6 For early views, compare for instance that of the Italian Jesuit missionary to Tibet
Ippolito Desideri (20 December 1684 14 April 1733) and that of another Jesuit, the
French Jean Baptiste Du Halde (1 February 1674 18 August 1743). See Michael
J. Sweet (translator), Mission to Tibet: The Extraordinary Eighteenth-Century
Account of Father Ippolito Desideri, S.J., ed. Leonard Zwilling (Boston: Wisdom
Publications, 2010), especially 388-391; Jrgen Offermanns, Debates on Atheism,
Quietism, and Sodomy: The Initial Reception of Buddhism in Europe, Journal of
Global Buddhism 6 (2005).
7 A great deal of relevant information focusing especially on mindfulness can be
found in Fabrizio Didonna, ed., Clinical Handbook of Mindfulness (New York:
Springer, 2009).
 The Role of Meditation in Asagas Legitimation of Mahyna 173

meditation I include both Buddhist and non-Buddhist types of

meditation; further, there are many Buddhists, so even a small
minority can count as several million large; finally, many of the
people who practice Buddhism-inspired or Buddhism-derived
meditation are not themselves Buddhist.8
Whatever the pop-culture and the academic understandings of
Buddhist meditation may be and irrespective of whether meditation is
constitutive of Buddhism, it is certainly true that it has an important
position in this religion; indeed, the very term Buddhism ultimately
owes its existence to a persons transformation engendered by a series
of meditative experiences and it is difficult to imagine Buddhism
existing without Gautamas appeal to realizations that occurred
over two millennia ago while he meditated under what came to be
known as the bodhi tree.9 The events that took place during that
momentous night and the following dawn include one of the most
famous and most commonly depicted legitimation acts in the history
of Buddhism: Gautama, sitting in the lotus posture and under Mras
attack, touches the earth to summon it to witness in his struggle.10

8 Reliable statistics are hard to come by but see ibidem, 10: There are an estimated
10 million practitioners of meditation in the United States and hundreds of
millions worldwide.
9 As demonstrated by Ui, even only taking into consideration early sources, tradition
has transmitted several different explanations of the Buddhas awakening. By
Uis reckoning, there are fifteen different explanations. As a consequence, it is
extraordinarily difficult or perhaps impossible for historians to settle the matter
of what the Buddhas awakening consisted of. See Ui Hakuju ,
, in 3 (Tokyo: Kshisha, 1929), 394ff. Relevant
material can also be found in Anlayos discussion of the Mahsaccaka Sutta
(Majjhima Nikya 36) in A Comparative Study of the Majjhima-nikya (Taipei:
Dharma Drum Publishing, 2011), 232246.
10 This episode, though very well-known and widely depicted, does not appear in the
earliest sources as far as I have been able to ascertain. For more information see
Ananda W. P. Guruge, The Buddhas Encounters with Mara [sic] the Tempter:
Their Representation in Literature and Art, Sri Lanka Journal of Buddhist Studies 2
(1988), http://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/authors/guruge/wheel419.html; Claudine
Bautze-Picron, Lumire et Obscurit: lveil de kyamuni et la Victoire sur
Mra des Dbuts lpoque Gupta, Annali dellUniversit degli Studi di Napoli
LOrientale 58, no. 12 (1998): 149.
174

The situation, thus, is as follows: regardless of however many or

few Buddhists practice meditation, meditation itself has played and
still plays a number of roles in Buddhism. From a claim such as
this several questions can legitimately arise but, while I will touch
on various related topics, I only wish to tackle one in particular.
What I propose to do in the remainder of this article, then, is not to
investigate meditations origin, development, and so on. Nor indeed
will I delve into the nature of the various meditative experiences,
practices and techniques that dot the Buddhist landscape. Rather,
I wish to investigate one of the functions that meditation has had
in Buddhism. In brief, this function can be characterized as being
part of a legitimation strategy. Accordingly, what I am looking at
is not meditation as something a Buddhist does, but as something
a Buddhist may talk about and refer to in trying to justify and
legitimize certain ideas.

.
Henceforth, I will focus on what I call appeals to meditation. This is
not to be confused with appeals to do or practice meditation.11 Simply
put, this does not imply someone asking or exhorting someone else to
meditate. Rather, these appeals to meditation are part of a legitimation
strategy. What needed legitimation were certain innovations in
doctrine and practice that appeared long after the time of the Buddha.
Such legitimation was required because, at least superficially, South
Asian Buddhism was largely conservative. Superficially because,
much as we have substantial evidence demonstrating that many
authors went to great lengths to show that what they were doing or
saying was not innovative, considerable change and innovation did
undeniably take place. It is in this context that a number of strategies
were employed to justify the introduction of and give legitimacy to
innovative ideas and practices. One strategy can be termed appeal to
intention. One version is as follows: an author states that a previous

11 See, e.g., the Mahrhulovda Sutta, Majjhima Nikya 62.

 The Role of Meditation in Asagas Legitimation of Mahyna 175

authoritative source made a claim with a certain surface meaning,

but intended another, deeper meaning, with the latter introducing
the innovative idea. A related case is an authors claiming that an
authority intended something to be understood differently by different
audiences, for example according to an audiences maturity.12 Another
strategy, one which we shall encounter again below, was to dress
new teachings in old garb. Jonathan Silk discusses an instance that is
particularly relevant:
One challenge faced by the authors of the first Mahyna
scriptures is the same as that faced by anyone who seeks to
expand the limits of a canon. With what we might term the
psychological interests of orthodoxy in mind, they had among
other things to convince their audience that their innovations
were fundamentally no innovations at all, and thus that in
fact their presentation of new scriptures, full of new ideas,
in no way really represented any actual expansion of the
established and accepted canon. The new, then, must appear
as the genuinely real old. It is well known that one of the
strategies that the authors of Mahyna scriptures employed
in this effort to persuade their audience of the continuity and
coherence of their compositions with the prevailing corpus
of scripture was to place the newly composed discourses in a
familiar setting. At least in the case of the earlier Mahyna
scriptures now accessible to us, those originating in perhaps
the first couple of centuries of the Common Era, the setting
is always one familiar from the earlier literature, and much

12 For a discussion of several related issues see John Powers, Hermeneutics and
Tradition in the Sadhinirmocana-stra (Leiden; New York: E.J. Brill, 1993).
See also the following two articles by David Seyfort Ruegg, Purport, Implicature
and Presupposition: Sanskrit abhiprya and Tibetan dgos pa/dgos gi as
Hermeneutical Concepts, Journal of Indian Philosophy 13, no. 4 (1985): 309325;
Some Reflections on the Place of Philosophy in the Study of Buddhism, Journal
of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 18, no. 2 (1995): 173174;
and Donald S. Lopez, On the Interpretation of the Mahyna Stras, in Buddhist
Hermeneutics, ed. Donald S. Lopez (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1993), 4767, and
the same authors Authority and Orality in the Mahyna, Numen 42, no. 1 (1995):
2147.
176

of the audience and many of the interlocutors the same. [...]

The placement of a new discourse in familiar surroundings
signals the audience that it should attribute to this material
the same authority and authenticity it attributes to the
previously familiar discourses set in the same environment.
The new discourse, preached by the same Buddha at the same
spots and to, at least in part, the same audience, is therefore
just as true and valid as the teachings already familiar to the
audience.13

While the exact mechanism varies from case to case, this is a

traditional appeal, viz., an appeal to tradition, often reinterpreted
to legitimate innovation. [...] One can also appeal to the authority of
traditional religious figures, attributing new teachings to them that
differ from traditional doctrines.14 A phenomenon closely related
to the one discussed by Silk is seen when authorship of later texts
is given to an earlier figure of authority, such as has happened with
Ngrjuna and Buddhaghosa for example, or with Aristotle, to whom
many medieval works were attributed. An interesting case is that of
some attributions to Dharmamitra, in that, if Yamabe is correct, he
is credited as translator rather than composer.15 Again, Silk makes a
very pertinent observation when he says that an appeal to authority
is perhaps also behind the attribution of authorship of several
fundamental treatises of the Yogcra school to Maitreya.16 Finally,

13 Jonathan A. Silk, Dressed for Success: The Monk Kyapa and Strategies of
Legitimation in Earlier Mahyna Buddhist Scriptures, Journal Asiatique 291, no.
12 (2003): 173174.
14 James R. Lewis, Legitimating New Religions (New Brunswick: Rutgers University
Press, 2003), 14.
15 Nobuyoshi Yamabe, The Stra on the Ocean-like Samdhi of the Visualization of
the Buddha: The Interfusion of the Chinese and Indian Cultures in Central Asia as
Reflected in a Fifth Century Apocryphal Stra. Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University,
1999, 48-49.
16 Silk, Dressed for Success: The Monk Kyapa and Strategies of Legitimation in
Earlier Mahyna Buddhist Scriptures, 176, footnote 6. I agree with Silk that,
literally, this can be described as an appeal to authority. It is however different from
the common understanding of such appeal in argumentation theory and informal
 The Role of Meditation in Asagas Legitimation of Mahyna 177

it is worth noting that the figure of authority to whom texts come

to be attributed need not have existed at all, such as is the case with
attributions to Hermes Trismegistus.17 As remarked by James Lewis
about a modern context but very much propos, the lines dividing
legitimation strategies are often hazy and overlapping.18 At any rate,
common to appeals to intention and to tradition is the fact that they
derive their force from the authority of a Buddha, of a bodhisattva, of
the founder of a school, and so forth.19
Before I proceed, one note on terminology is in order: there is no one-
to-one correspondence between meditation and any of the words
or phrases in the Asian languages that appear in the present article,
nor, I suspect, in those that dont. Meditation, perhaps, is one of
those words that everyone understands but that is difficult to define
clearly. And while the word does not rank exceptionally highly on
the polysemy scale, it does have a number of meanings.20 I know that
I am bordering on being Humpty Dumptyan, but in this article I am

logic, where it is frequently understood as an argumentum ad verecundiam in the

sense derived from John Lockes definition. See Douglas N. Walton, Appeal to
Expert Opinion: Arguments from Authority (University Park: Penn State Press,
1997), 5253.
17 Throughout European religious history, seminal texts were attributed to the sage
Hermes Trismegistus, a pagan theologian living at the time of Moses. Hermes
stature was such that his works served to legitimate magic and other practices that
the church officially frowned upon. Long after the humanist scholar Isaac Casaubon
in the early seventeenth century proved beyond any doubt that the Hermetic texts
were much younger than previously supposed, and it became clear that Hermes was
entirely fictive, esotericists continued to attribute their teachings to the imaginary
philosopher. Quoted from Olav Hammer and James R. Lewis, Introduction,
in The Invention of Sacred Tradition, ed. Olav Hammer and James R. Lewis
(Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 3. The authors offer relevant
remarks on entering the textual corpus in ibidem, 9-12.
18 Lewis, Legitimating New Religions, 14.
19 For more information on legitimation strategies in Mahyna see Joseph Walser,
Ngrjuna in Context: Mahyna Buddhism and Early Indian Culture. New York:
Columbia University Press, 2005, especially 153-187.
20 As often the case, a visit to the Oxford English Dictionary is advisable.
178

using the word meditation not as a constant but as a variable.21 This

variable can take a number of values, including meditative state,
meditative experience and meditative practice. As will become
apparent below, identifying the exact referent of these phrases or
giving precise definitions is not at all necessary in view of this
articles goal.22

.
My main point of focus is a text titled Summary of the Great
Vehicle (Mahynasagraha, henceforth Summary), traditionally
attributed to Asaga, a monk who lived perhaps in the 4th century
CE. I provisionally accept this attribution even though problems of
authorship, including on the very idea of authorship, abound. Asaga
is frequently given the status of founder of a tradition or school
called Yogcra.23 He was steeped in Abhidharma and wrote
competently on epistemology and argumentation in the important
but understudied period before Dignga.24 The exact details of his

21 This is a reference to a famous passage in Lewis Carrolls Through the Looking

Glass, which has been discussed many times by philosophers of language:
When I use a word, Humpty Dumpty said, in rather a scornful tone, it means
just what I choose it to meanneither more nor less.
The question is, said Alice, whether you can make words mean so many
different things.
The question is, said Humpty Dumpty, which is to be the masterthats all.
22 I only wish to restrict the scope of how I use the term as follows, namely, to senses
related to 1.a-d in the meditation entry in the Oxford English Dictionarys third
edition (2001) <http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/115756>.
23 The idea that at the time of Asaga there was a Yogcra school is problematic.
On the very idea of schools in Indian Buddhism see Achim Bayer, The Theory of
Karman in the Abhidharmasamuccaya (Tokyo: International Institute for Buddhist
Studies of the International College for Postgraduate Buddhist Studies, 2010),
3336, who discusses the opinion of a number of scholars.
24 Asagas work on vda, hetuvidy, prama, etc., is far less known and studied
than his most readily recognizable contributions as Yogcra bhidharmika.
See Lambert Schmithausen, The Definition of Pratyakam in the
Abhidharmasamuccaya. Wiener Zeitschrift Fr Die Kunde Sdasiens 16 (1972):
153163; Kajiyama Yichi , , in
 The Role of Meditation in Asagas Legitimation of Mahyna 179

position vis--vis Yogcra are difficult to ascertain; fortunately, it is

not critical that the matter be settled here. More immediately relevant
is the fact that, whatever the nature of Yogcra, its connection with
meditation has long been commented upon. That there was perceived
to be a connection is hinted at by the term yogcra itself, whose
use predates the first undisputed historical persons (Asaga and
Vasubandhu) 25 that are commonly associated with the Yogcra
tradition:
Roughly speaking, a yogcra seems to have been a person
(mostly a monk) in whose cra, i.e. conduct or way of life,
yoga, i.e. ascetic and spiritual effort, especially meditative
and concentrative practice, plays a more or less important
role.26

A nd of cou rse, fou ndational for Yogcra Budd hism is the

Yogcrabhmi-stra, whose title, quoting Schmithausen again,
can be translated as Treatise on the Levels of Those Who Engage

, ed. Hirakawa Akira and others, vol. 9, (Tokyo:

, 1984), 1101 (especially 73ff); Ernst Prets, The Structure of Sdhana
in the Abhidharmasamuccaya, Wiener Zeitschrift fr die Kunde Sdasiens 38
(1994): 337350; and Alberto Todeschini, On the Ideal Debater: Yogcrabhmi,
Abhidharmasamuccaya and Abhidharmasamuccayabhya, Journal of Indian and
Tibetan Studies 15 (2011): 244272.
25 Undisputed in the sense that I am not aware of anyone disputing the fact that they
existed. Many details and even several major points regarding their lives and issues
of authorship of the texts to them attributed, of their relationship with each other
and in the case of Asaga with Maitreya(ntha) are still very much disputed.
26 Lambert Schmithausen, Aspects of Spiritual Practice in Early Yogcra, Journal
of the International College for Postgraduate Buddhist Studies 11 (2007): 213.
Parentheses in the original. For additional details see Jonathan A. Silk, The
Yogcra Bhiku, in Wisdom, Compassion, and the Search for Understanding:
The Buddhist Studies Legacy of Gadjin M. Nagao, ed. Jonathan A. Silk (Honolulu:
University of Hawaii Press, 2000), 265314; the same authors Further Remarks
on the Yogcra Bhiku, in Dharmadta: Mlanges Offerts au Vnrable Thch
Huyn-Vi lOccasion de son Soixante-Dixime Anniversaire, ed. Bhikkhu
Psdika and Bhikkhu Tampalawela (Paris: ditions You Feng, 1997), 233250;
and Hartmut Buescher, The Inception of Yogcra-Vijnavda (Wien: Verlag
der sterreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2008), 815. Specifically on
pre-Yogcra yogcras see Florin Deleanu, rvakayna Yoga Practices and
Mahyna Buddhism, no. 20 (1993): 312.
180

in Spiritual Training. 27 According to traditional biographies /

hagiographies, Asaga himself is closely associated with meditation.
The association is conspicuous in Paramrthas Biography of the
Dharma Master Vasubandhu,28 in which we are told:
Asaga then took ordination in the Sarvstivda [lineage]. He
later practiced concentration, and though he became free of
desire, when pondering the meaning of emptiness he was not
able to fully comprehend it. He then wished to kill himself
[out of despair.] The arhat Piola, residing in East Videha,
saw this situation and came thence to him in order to explain
the Hnayna view on emptiness. Asaga meditated on it as
he was instructed and right away was able to comprehend
it. Although he had attained the Hnayna contemplation
of emptiness, his mind was not at peace yet. He thought
that the truth must not be limited to this. Accordingly he
availed himself of his supernatural powers to travel to Tuita
Heaven, where he questioned the bodhisattva Maitreya, who
explained to him the Mahyna contemplation of emptiness.
Asaga returned to Jambudvpa and meditated as he had
been taught. Right away he attained realization. While he
was meditating, the earth shook in six ways, and it was right
at that moment that he fully attained the Mahyna emptiness
contemplation.29

27 Schmithausen, Aspects of Spiritual Practice in Early Yogcra, 213.

28 Posoupandou fashi zhuan T2049.50.188c01ff. On the nature of
this text see Funayama Tru , , in
, ed. Funayama Tru (Kyoto: ,
2012), 19 and 54-58.
29 T2049.50.188c1-8: .



. For Chinese I have consulted the printed edition
of the Taish Shinsh Daizky (), CBETA and SAT. Passages are
quoted from SAT.
 The Role of Meditation in Asagas Legitimation of Mahyna 181

...
The Dharma master Asaga cultivated the sunlight samdhi.
He trained as he had been taught and immediately attained
this concentration. As a result of obtaining this concentration,
he was able to completely comprehend everything that he had
previously not understood.30

While not as prevalent, Xuanzangs Great Tang Record of the Western

Regions too contains a reference to meditation in connection with
Asaga.31 Meditation figures prominently also in the biographical
/ hagiographical information on Asaga found in Bu stons History
of the Dharma and in Tranthas History of the Dharma in India.32
These four are the main traditional sources on the life of Asaga;33
his well-known, protracted struggles with practice, which include
self-mortification in the form of cutting off his own flesh for the sake
of saving a dog and the worms that were feeding off it, culminate
in the encounter with and discipleship under Maitreya.34 Because
of these tribulations and the ensuing extraordinary achievement
testifying to Asagas religious virtuosity he possessed charisma in

30 T2049.50.188c21-22:
.
31 Da tang xiyu ji , T2087. 51.896c8.
32 For the History of the Dharma (chos byung) see Eugen Obermiller, History of
Buddhism (Chos-byung [sic]) by Bu-ston: II. Part: The History of Buddhism
in India and Tibet, Materialien zur Kunde des Buddhismus, 19 (Heidelberg:
Harrassowitz, 1932), 137ff; for the History of the Dharma in India (rgya gar
chos byung) see Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya, Alaka Chattopadhyaya, and Lama
Chimpa, Tranthas History of Buddhism in India (Motilal Banarsidass Publishers,
1990), 154ff.
33 More bibliographical information on these four texts can be found in Robert
Kritzer, Rebirth and Causation in Yogcra Abhidharma (Vienna: Arbeitskreis fr
tibetische und buddhistische Studien Universitt Wien, 1999), 6. Schmithausen
offers important methodological comments on the value of traditional accounts in
layavijna: On the Origin and the Early Development of a Central Concept of
Yogcra Philosophy (Tokyo: International Institute for Buddhist Studies, 1987),
183193.
34 See the hagiography as presented in the two works referenced in footnote 32.
182

Webers sense and with it authority.35

By Asagas time, several of the doctrinal developments that have
come to epitomize Yogcra had already been introduced. Of the
issues facing Asaga, two are relevant here: one is the issue of
giving legitimacy to a number of innovative Mahyna and Yogcra
doctrines; the other is the issue of giving sufficient systematicity to
Yogcra. Asaga in the Summary deals at length with both issues
and he does so from the very beginning of the text. Specifically, he
is preoccupied with: 1) showing that the teachings of the Mahyna
are buddhavacana;36 2) showing that the Mahyna is superior to
the rvakayna, with the latter not being rejected tout court, but
being shown to be subordinate to the former in an intrasystemic,
inclusivistic hierarchy (even though specific points may indeed
be rejected);37 3) showing the authenticity and validity of certain
specific Yogcra innovations, including a complex and original
theory of mind, the notion of three natures/characteristics, 38 only
representation (vijaptimtra(t)), etc.
As far as the history of Buddhist and South Asian philosophy is
concerned, the fact that Asaga with the Summary attempts to be

35 The term charisma will be applied to a certain quality of an individual personality

by virtue of which he is set apart from ordinary men and treated as endowed with
supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional powers or qualities.
These are such as are not accessible to the ordinary person, but are regarded as of
divine origin or as exemplary, and on the basis of them the individual concerned is
treated as a leader. Quoted from Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic
Organization: With an Introduction by Talcott Parsons, trans. Talcott Parsons and A.
M. Henderson (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947), 358359.
36 A definition of buddhavacana is not given in the Summary as far as I have been able
to ascertain, but it is worth pointing out that the notion is more complex than the
binary distinction of a statements having been directly uttered by the Buddha or
not. For more details on buddhavacana see Graeme MacQueen, Inspired Speech
in Early Mahyna I, Religion 11 (1981): 303319, and Inspired Speech in Early
Mahyna II, Religion 12 (1982): 4965.
37 I am not the first to see Asagas maneuver as inclusivistic. For a specific example,
see Richard King, Early Yogcra and Its Relationship with the Madhyamaka
School, Philosophy East and West 44, no. 4 (1994): 661.
38 What in this context I (and many others) render with nature and character are,
respectively, the Sanskrit svabhva and lakaa.
 The Role of Meditation in Asagas Legitimation of Mahyna 183

systematic is particularly important.39 This systematicity has already

been pointed out: Frauwallner, for whom the most significant
personality of the Yogcra school is Maitreyanthas great student
Asaga, 40 describes the Summary thus: [Asagas] philosophically
most important work, the Mahynasagra (Summary of the
Mahyna), in which he gives a systematic exposition of the
fundamental tenets of his system. 41 Nagao defines the Summary as
a systematic Mahyna outline.42 In order to situate Asaga in the
history of Buddhist thought, the following remark by Florin Deleanu
too is relevant:
No doubt, Asaga and his fellow followers regarded the
Yogcrabhmi teachings as Maitreyas sacred revelation.

39 Hence, the Sanskrit sagraha in the Summarys title could be rendered with the
Latin summa, reflecting the latter words usage by medieval authors for works
that covered or attempted to cover a subject systematically, such as William of
Ockhams (or Occam) Summa Logicae. On the origin of the Sanskrit title of the
Mahynasagraha see Suguro Shinj and Shimokawabe Kiyoshi
, : , (Tokyo: Daiz Shuppan, 2007), 49. On
the summa genre see Eileen Sweeney, Literary Forms of Medieval Philosophy,
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2008, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/
medieval-literary/#Sum. Accessed 8-13-2012.
40 Erich Frauwallner, Die Philosophie des Buddhismus (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag,
1956), 326: Die bedeutendste Persnlichkeit der Yogcra-Schule ist der groe
Schler Maitreyanthas Asaga.
41 Ibidem, 328: Das philosophisch bedeutendste Werk, der Mahynasagra
(Zusammenfassung des Mahyna), in dem er eine systematische Darstellung der
Grundlehren seines System gibt. Parentheses in the original. The emphasis is mine.
On Asagas position in the history of Buddhism, Frauwallner also states: Asaga
hat trotz seiner Schlerschaft bei Maitreyantha und trotz dessen starkem Einflu
auf ihn bedeutendes Eigenes geleistet, und zwar vor allem zweierlei. Er hat durch
bernahme und Einarbeitung der Hnayna-Dogmatik das Yogcra-System so
ausgestaltet, da es sich in jeder Hinsicht ebenbrtig neben die groen Hnayna-
Schulen der damaligen Zeit stellen konnte. Ferner hat her, was Maitreyantha noch
nicht gelungen war, die Massen der alten Erlsungsscholastik mit fester Hand in
sein System eingefgt und so ein einheitliches Lehrgebude errichtet, das in seinen
Grundzgen dauernd in Geltung geblieben ist. Note that according to Frauwallner
(297) it is Maitreyantha who first developed a Yogcra philosophical system.
42 Nagao Gajin , , vol. 1 (Tokyo: Kdansha, 1982),
5. The whole sentence reads:
(Mahyna-sagraha)
. Parentheses in the original.
184

However, in one way or another, it must have been the lack of

sufficient clarification or imperfections (though they would
not have used such words...) in the doctrinal systematisation
of this very text which made them continue their quest for
more precision, elaboration, and creation. Without Asagas
and Vasubandhus philosophical genius and struggle, the
new movement initiated by the Sadhinirmocanastra and
continued by the Bodhisattvabhmivinicaya authors and
editors may have never become firmly crystallised into a new
school of thought and spirituality which would deeply affect
Buddhism not only on Indian soil but also throughout Central
and Eastern Asia.43

Deleanus claims are somewhat stronger than I would make

them, nevertheless, it is undeniable that in general there appeared
increasingly tight treatises with Vasubandhus Pacaskandhaka,
Triik, Viatik and Trisvabhvanirdea as culmination.44 As for
Asaga, his preoccupation with legitimation is immediately apparent
in the Summary. Indeed, it is precisely to this that the introduction,
the first chapter and parts of the second are largely dedicated. These
together constitute almost half of the entire text. One just has to look
at 1.1-1.14, where Asaga is keen to appeal to authority and to show
that the chapters main theme the store consciousness (layavijna)
had already been taught by the Buddha under different names.45
Hereafter, I will focus on Asagas effort at legitimation and consider
particularly the role and function of meditation in such effort.

43 Florin Deleanu, The Chapter on the Mundane Path (Laukikamrga) in the

rvakabhmi: A Trilingual Edition (Sanskrit, Tibetan, Chinese), Annotated
Translation, and Introductory Study, Studia Philologica Buddhica, 20 (Tokyo:
International Institute for Buddhist Studies, 2006), 183. Parentheses and ellipsis in
the original.
44 The fact that I mention these four texts in this particular order should not be taken as
meaning that I believe that they were composed in the order in which I list them.
45 See Katano Michio , ,
8 (1968): 4661. I will return to this below.
 The Role of Meditation in Asagas Legitimation of Mahyna 185

.
The Summary consists of a short introduction followed by ten chapters
of very unequal length. The introduction (henceforth, Introduction)
begins with an appeal to authority. In this case the authority consists
in the bodhisattva Mahynasupravia, who, we are told, spoke
in front of the Bhagavat and whose words are transmitted in the
Abhidharma (mahyna) Stra.46
The legitimization of the Mahyna by means of appealing to
authority continues in Introduction 2,47 where Asaga is keen to
point out that the reference he has just made to the stra indicates that
indeed the Mahyna is buddhavacana.48 In Introduction 2 is also
found the first reference to meditation. Here the Summary introduces
higher mind (adhicitta),49 which is dealt with extensively in chapter

46 Sometimes given as Mahyna-abhidharma Stra. Nagao, , 3: chos

mngon pa theg pa chen poi mdo. T1594.31.132c23: . On the
nature of this alleged stra see Silk, The Yogcra Bhiku, 302 note 132. The
Summary has so far not surfaced in Sanskrit and the source for the Sanskrit I quote
in this article is Gadjin Nagao, An Index to Asagas Mahynasagraha, 2 vols.
(Tokyo: The International Institute for Buddhist Studies, 1994). The Sanskrit given
by Lamotte in his important translation frequently differs from Nagaos. See tienne
Lamotte, La Somme du Grand Vhicule dAsaga (Mahynasagraha), 2 vols.
(Louvain-la-Neuve: Institut Orientaliste Louvain-La-Neuve, 1973). Henceforth, my
translations of the Summary are based on the Tibetan edition of the text contained in
Nagao, . For the sake of comparison I present Xuanzangs translation but
recognize that other translations, especially Paramrthas, are interesting and worthy
of study. I do not systematically point out differences between Tibetan and Chinese.
Information on the Summarys translations and on several relevant secondary source
can be found in Chikafumi Watanabe, A Study of Mahynasagraha III: The
Relation of Practical Theories and Philosophical Theories (PhD Thesis, University
of Calgary, 2000), 1529, and in Suguro and Shimokawabe, , 3349.
There is no need to repeat the same information here.
47 I follow Lamottes division of the text: La Somme du Grand Vhicule dAsaga,
passim. The same division is (largely) followed by Nagao, and by
Suguro and Shimokawabe, .
48 Nagao, , 4: mdoi tshig bstan pa di ni theg pa chen po sangs rgyas kyi
bka nyid du brjod pao. T1594.31.133a3-4:
.
49 Nagao, , 4: lhag pai sems. T1594.31.133a01: .
186

7 and which Vasubandhu equates in his commentary on the Summary

with samdhi.50 This ref lects the traditional organization of the
Eightfold Path into three groups, and the Summarys sixth and eight
chapters, together with the seventh, cover all three groups.
In Int roduction 3 Asaga is preoccupied with showing the
Mahynas distinction from and superiority to the rvakayna, as
well as giving readers/hearers of the Summary some preliminary
acquaintance with the content of its ten chapters. Asaga here
returns to the higher mind, which is mentioned in connection with
the samdhi of the heroic march, of the sky treasury and of
other samdhis that Asaga leaves unspecified here but returns to in
chapter 7.51 We shall see chapter 7 below. In Introduction 4 Asaga
is still engaged in legitimizing the Mahyna as buddhavacana and
with showing its superiority to the rvakayna.
The Summarys chapter 1 is devoted to the store consciousness
(layavijna), which in the opening sentence is identified as being
the support of the knowable ( jeyraya) and indeed this is given as

50 Mahynasagrahabhya (sde dge bstan gyur 4050, 124b): ting nge dzin;
T1597.31.322c18: . Asagas Abhidharmasamuccaya has the following
definition: What is samdhi? It is the focusing of the mind on the object to be
examined. The definition continues by stating that samdhi has the function of
providing a support or basis for knowledge: samdhi katama / upaparikye
vastuni cittasyaikgrat / jnasannirayadnakarmaka. Sanskrit from V. V.
Gokhale, Fragments from the Abhidharmasamuccaya of Asaga. Journal of the
Royal Asiatic Society: Bombay Branch 23 (1947): 16. The first half of the definition
is also given verbatim in Vasubandhus Pacaskandhaka. See Xuezhu Li and Ernst
Steinkellner, Vasubandhus Pacaskandhaka (Beijing; Vienna: China Tibetology
Publishing House; Austrian Academy of Sciences Press, 2008), 6.
51 Heroic march = ragama, on which see tienne Lamotte,
ragamasamdhistra: The Concentration of Heroic Progress: An Early
Mahyna Buddhist Scripture, trans. Sara Boin-Webb (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass,
2003), xiixiv. Sky treasury = gaganagaja. Nagao, , 5: dpa bar gro
ba dang nam mkha mdzod la sogs pai ting nge dzin dag ni der lhag pai sems su
bstan to. T1594.31.133a11-12:
. Here Lamotte, La Somme du Grand Vhicule dAsaga, 8, translates nam
mkha mdzod pa = = gaganagaja with matrice despace (gaganagarbha)
(parentheses in the original). This is unlikely to be correct. On gaganagaja see
Franklin Edgerton, Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar and Dictionary: Volume II
Dictionary (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers, 1977), 207.
 The Role of Meditation in Asagas Legitimation of Mahyna 187

title for the whole chapter.52 William Waldron has characterized the
chapter thus:
The Mahyna-sagraha (MSg) presents the most extended
formal treatment of the laya-vijna of any of the early
Yogcra texts. Indeed, its entire first chapter (MSg I) is
devoted to describing the multiple characteristics of the
laya-vijna and presenting various exegetical and doctrinal
arguments in support of this distinctive genre of mental
process. [] Throughout most of its first chapter, the MSg
is concerned to authenticate and establish the concept of the
laya-vijna in terms of its earlier canonical background
and its contemporaneous Abhidharma context. [ The]
main thrust of MSg I is apologetic seeking to connect
its innovative theories with the authoritative discourses
of the Buddha or to reach out to its contemporaries with
Abhidharmic arguments.53

While I have not hitherto used the ter m apologetic, I take

Waldrons assessment to be accurate. Analysis of the text bears
this characterization out from the outset: at 1.1, Asaga reassures
his audience that the Bhagavat too indeed spoke of the store
consciousness, and he provides a relevant quotation from scriptural
authority (gama). 54 Here I am specifically looking at issues of

52 Nagao, , 9: de la re zhig thog ma kho nar kun gzhi rnam par shes pa ni
shes byai gnas so zhes brjod pa. T1594.31.133b12:
.
53 William Waldron, The Buddhist Unconscious: The laya-vjna in the Context of
Indian Buddhist Thought (London; New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), 128129.
Parentheses in the original.
54 Nagao, , 9; T1594.31.133b12. As is well known, gama is frequently
paired with yukti and this pairing is evident in the Summary too. Richard Nance has
written an article that refers to the Summary and, while focusing on yukti, also sheds
light on gama: On What Do We Rely When We Rely on Reasoning? Journal of
Indian Philosophy 35 (2007): 149167. The fact that I am using scriptural (from
the Latin scriptura = writing) does not imply that the sources understood to be
gama were written compositions.
188

legitimization ex post facto and will not be concerned with why the
introduction of such type of consciousness was deemed necessary
or with proofs given for its existence.55 In any event, the appeal to
scriptural authority continues in 1.2, and the Summary explicitly
mentions the word gama.56 Though the stra is different, scriptural
authority is summoned in 1.4 too. Here Asaga states that the store
consciousness is also called appropriating consciousness, the
former being his preferred terminological choice in the Summary, the
latter being found in the Sadhinirmocana Stra.57 This allows him
to appeal to a second scriptural authority in addition to the already-
mentioned Abhidharma (mahyna) Stra. Asaga describes the
appropriating consciousness by quoting a well-known passage from
the Sadhinirmocana Stra:
The appropriating consciousness, deep, subtle, like a stream,
proceeds with all seeds. I did not reveal it to ignorants, lest
they should imagine that it is the self.58

This passage is interesting: on the one hand, Asaga, by means of

the stra, states that the Buddha did not teach the appropriating
consciousness, which he equates with the store consciousness, to
ignorants, and Asvabhva, commenting on the word subtle in this

55 On issues surrounding the introduction of the store consciousness see Schmithausen,

layavijna, and Waldron, The Buddhist Unconscious.
56 Nagao, , 10: di ni re zhig lung ngo. T1594.31.133b20: .
57 Nagao, , 10: de ni len pai rnam par shes pa zhes kyang bya ste.
T1594.31.133b25: .
58 The Sanskrit is preserved in Sthiramatis Triikvijaptibhya: dnavijna
gabhraskmo ogho yath vartati sarvabjo / blna eo mayi na praki m
haiva tm parikalpayeyur iti. Quoted from Hartmut Buescher, Sthiramatis
Triikvijaptibhya: Critical Editions of the Sanskrit Text and Its Tibetan
Translation (Wien: Verlag der sterreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften,
2 0 0 7 ) , 1 0 4 . T h i s f a m o u s v e r s e a l s o a p p e a r s i n t h e Yo g c r a b h m i,
Asagas own Xianyang shengjiao lun (T1602), Vasubandhus
Karmasiddhiprakaraa, Xuanzangs Cheng weishi lun (T1585), etc.
 The Role of Meditation in Asagas Legitimation of Mahyna 189

passage, states that it was not taught to rvakas.59 On the other hand,
Asaga in 1.11 is keen to point out that indeed the store consciousness
has already been explained by the Buddha to rvakas, and that it
is mentioned in the gama of Mahsghikas, Mahsakas and
Sthaviras, though using other expressions rather than layavijna.60
The case given by Asaga regarding rvakas is different, but in the
latter three cases the strategy can be termed synonymization, namely,
Asaga homogenizes differences between his position and that of
others to the extent of effectively nullifying them by claiming that
various lexical items are synonymous.61
Asaga gives, in 1.5, an explanation as to why the appropriating
consciousness is so called, and then, at 1.6, introduces the defiled
mind (kliamanas). After briefly characterizing it, in 1.7 Asaga
justifies its existence by means of a series of arguments. The fourth is
relevant for my discussion:
[If the defiled mind did not exist,] there would be the fault
of there not being difference between the absorption into
the state of an unconscious being and the absorption of
cessation.62

59 Upanibandhana, sde dge bstan gyur 4050, 196a: phra ba ni nyan thos rnams kyis
kyang shes par dka bai phyir ro / / dei phyir de dag shes bya phra ba thams cad
shes pai skabs ma yin pas nyan thos rnams la ma bshad do. T1598.31.383b18-19:
.
60 Nagao, , 17-18. T1594.31.134a11ff. Xuanzangs and Paramrthas
translations (T1593.31.114b26ff) omit the portion on Sthaviras, which Lamotte does
not translate, but it is found in the Tibetan, and accordingly is translated in Nagao,
ibidem, 122. See also Summary 2.12-14.
61 Lamotte, La Somme du Grand Vhicule, 26-31, translates what most likely is
paryya with synonyme(s). This is a common but problematic translation, as
pointed out by Nagao, , 118-119, note 1. In the present case synonym
does not cover all the uses that Asaga makes of paryya. On paryya see Richard
F. Nance, Speaking for Buddhas: Scriptural Commentary in Indian Buddhism
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), 108. My notion of synonymization
is borrowed and modified from Olav Hammer, Claiming Knowledge: Strategies
of Epistemology from Theosophy to the New Age (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2004),
164165.
62 Nagao, , 13: du shes med pa dang / gog pai snyoms par jug pa bye
brag med pai skyon du yang gyur te. T1594.31.133c15-16:
190

Asagas point is that, as a matter of fact, there is a difference

between the two absorptions, in that the former (asajisampatti)
is characterized by the presence of the defiled mind, while the latter
(nirodhasampatti) is not so characterized. Hence, taking as unstated
premise the fact that there is no other difference between the two
absorptions, there must be a defiled consciousness. I will leave it to
readers to judge the extent to which the argument is successful. For
the present purpose what matters is that Asaga explicitly refers to
meditative absorptions in order to make his point.
Immediately following the passage just seen, Asaga makes another
relevant claim, albeit not a direct reference to meditation. 63 It is
pertinent insofar as there is a close connection certainly at least in
South Asian Buddhism between meditation and how the cosmos
was conceived. Indeed, large parts of the Summarys first chapter are
unintelligible unless such connection is taken into consideration.64
That this is the case is evident in 1.13, where Asaga refers to beings
born from the 4th concentration and above 65 and again in several
instance from 1.38 to the end of the chapter. Specifically, 1.38

. My translation absorption into the state of an unconscious

being for asajisampatti is based on Schmithausens absorption into [the state
of] an unconscious [being]. See layavijna, 35. Brackets in the original.
63 Nagao, , 13: gal te du shes med pa pa de na ngar dzin pa dang / ngao
snyam pai nga rgyal med na du shes med par skye ba thog thag tu nyon mongs pa
can ma yin pai skyon du yang gyur ro. T1594.31.133c18-19:

64 On the nature of this connection see e.g. Tilmann Vetter, The Ideas and Meditative
Practices of Early Buddhism (Leiden; New York: E.J. Brill, 1988), especially
63-73; Rupert Gethin, Cosmology and Meditation: From the Aggaa-Sutta to
the Mahyna, History of Religions 36, no. 3 (1997): 183217. For historical
influence from non-Buddhist sources see Alexander Wynne, The Origin of Buddhist
Meditation (London; New York: Routledge, 2007), 32ff. On Buddhist cosmology
in general, see Padmanabh S. Jaini, Lokka and Lokadhtu: A Comparison of
Jain and Buddhist Cosmology, in Victorious Ones: Jain Images of Perfection, ed.
Phyllis E. Granoff (New York; Ahmedabad; Ocean Township: Rubin Museum of
Art, New York; In association with Mapin Publishing, 2009), 7089.
65 Nagao, , 21: bsam gtan bzhi pa yan chad gong mar skyes pa rnams. The
passage in Xuanzangs translation is longer.
 The Role of Meditation in Asagas Legitimation of Mahyna 191

mentions rebirth in a level at which the mind is concentrated;66 the

argument in 1.41 hinges on the nature of birth in the sphere of neither
consciousness nor non-consciousness;67 at 1.43 and at 1.49 Asaga
brings up once more the concentrated mind as well as the level where
the mind is concentrated; the absorption of cessation makes several
appearances between 1.50 and 1.55. Finally, the first chapters last
relevant passage is at 1.60, where, still in the midst of discussing the
store consciousness, the Summary mentions yogins twice.68
As mentioned above, the Summarys first chapter is dedicated to the
support of the knowable. Chapter 2, instead, treats of the knowables
character. The chapter begins with a question: how should one regard
the character of the knowable ( jeyalakaa)?69 Asaga answers by
introducing the three characteristics.70 In this context there is also a
discussion of the concept of only representation (vijaptimtra),
which Asaga attempts to establish by means of appeals to scriptural
authority and reasoned argumentation (gama and yukti). An
important passage is found in 2.7, a section where Asaga treats of
the issue of how people who have not yet awakened to the fact that
the world is only representation can infer that it is so.71 Regarding
gama, the answer is largely taken up by a short quotation from the

66 Samhitabhmi. Nagao, , 39: mnyam par bzhag pai sa. T1594.31.136a21:

.
67 Naivasajnsajyatana. Nagao, , 40: du shes med du shes med
min skye mched. T1594.31.136a27: .
68 Nagao, , 53-4: rnal byor pa (rnams). T1594.31.137b15: ;
T1594.31.137b18: .
69 Nagao, , 57: shes byai mtshan nyid ji ltar blta bar bya zhe na.
T1594.31.137c27: .
70 Asaga refers to the three as lakaa in 2.1 but from 2.15 until the end of the
chapter he employs the term svabhva. The Sadhinirmocana Stra too uses both
lakaa and svabhva.
71 Nagao, , 61: de kho na shes pas ma sad pas rnam par rig pa tsam nyid
du ji ltar rjes su dpag par bya zhe na. T1594.31.138b2:
. Context for this passage is supplied in 2.6.
192

Daabhmika and a longer one from the Sadhinirmocana Stra,

the details of which have been studied competently already and
need not detain us here.72 What matters is that in this passage there
is a discussion of images perceived in meditative concentration
(samdhigocarapratibimba)73 and that this is used to argue in favor
of vijaptimtra. Having provided traditional authority, in the final
portion of 2.7 Asaga offers reasoned argumentation by referring
back to the same gama: the point is, again, about the status of
images perceived when the mind is in meditative concentration
(samhita). The discussion of the status of certain objects perceived
in concentration in the context of arguing for vijaptimtra continues
in 2.8.
The next relevant passage is found at 2.14. As common, the passage
starts with a question highlighting one of the doctrinal legitimation
goals of the Summary: how is one to know that, even though objects
do appear, they are non-existent?74 As is made clear at the end of the
section, the goal here is to establish the non-existence of objects.75 In
his reply to the opening question, Asaga appeals to the Bhagavats
words again. The pertinent part is as follows: first, there is a reference
to bodhisattvas and meditators who have attained control over their
minds;76 second, Asaga mentions yogins who have attained quietude
(amatha) and have exerted themselves in the analytic meditation

72 See Lambert Schmithausen, On the Vijaptimtra Passage in Sadhinirmocanastra

VIII.7, Acta Indologica 6 (1984): 433455; Schmithausen, Aspects of Spiritual
Practice in Early Yogcra, 235-241; Matsumoto Shir ,
, 61 (2003): 141224.
73 Nagao, , 62: ting nge dzin gyi spyod yul gyi gzugs brnyan.
T1594.31.138b06: .
74 Nagao, , 70: ji ltar na don snang bzhin du yang med pa nyid du blta zhe
na. T1594.31.139a12: .
75 Nagao, , 71: don med par grub pa yin no. T1594.31.139a25:
.
76 Nagao, , 70: byang chub sems dpa dang / bsam gtan pa sems la dbang
thob pa. T1594.31.139a20-21: .
 The Role of Meditation in Asagas Legitimation of Mahyna 193

(vipayan) of the Dharma;77 third and last, 2.14 lists those who have
attained non-conceptual knowledge (nirvikalpajna).78
The Summarys first two chapters are the ones that contain the most
argumentation and the greater emphasis on legitimation, both in
terms of frequency of appearance and in absolute terms. Also, it is
in them that most references to meditation are found and they are
taken with the Introduction roughly as long as all the other chapters
put together. From chapter 3 onwards, Asaga provides something
akin to a map of a bodhisattvas career with the theory of the three
bodies of the Buddha as culmination in the Summarys tenth and last
chapter.79 Some references to meditation do appear, but they are not
as prevalent. Furthermore, the tone is somewhat different, there is less
argumentation, and mentions of rvaka(yna) are rare.
As I have already mentioned, chapter 6, 7 and 8 are dedicated to the
so-called three trainings and it is specifically with their distinguishing
characteristics and superiority that Asaga deals. The second one
higher mind (adhicitta), treated in chapter 7 is relevant here. Higher
mind corresponds to samdhi, as pointed out by Vasubandhu in
his commentary referred to above when I discussed Introduction
2. The chapter does not deal with the definition of samdhi or how
to attain it. Rather, the topic expounded is closer to what I would
term mental development or mental training. The overarching
concern is to show that the mental development in the Mahyna
is superior to that practiced in other vehicles viz., rvakayna
and Pratyekabuddhayna and Asvabhva in his commentary is

77 Nagao, , 70: zhi gnas thob pai rnal byor pa chos la lhag mthong la
brtson pa. T1594.31.139a21-22: .
78 Nagao, , 70-71: rnam par mi rtog pai ye shes thob pa.
T1594.31.139a22-23: . Roughly the second half of 2.14b
reiterates, in verse form and with some differences, several points made in 2.14.
See Nagao, , 72. It is missing in Xuanzangs translation.
79 The trikya theory in the Summarys tenth chapter is dealt with extensively in Paul
J. Griffiths et al., The Realm of Awakening: A Translation and Study of the Tenth
Chapter of Asagas Mahynasagraha (New York: Oxford University Press,
1989), passim.
194

particularly keen to point out the superiority.80 As often, the chapter

begins with a question: How is one to view the superiority of the
higher mind?81 Asaga provides six reasons for such superiority.
We are told, for instance, that there is an innumerable variety of
samdhis, among which Asaga mentions four.82 The nature and goal
of the chapter is somewhat different from that of the Introduction and
of chapters 1 and 2. To the extent that chapter 7 treats meditation,
it does not do so to show the validity, legitimacy or superiority
of something else, as was the case for the appeals we saw above.
Differently put, here Asaga does not appeal to meditation to, say,
show the existence of the defiled mind. Rather, it is the Mahyna
mental training itself that is shown to be superior, by reason of its
samdhis, of the great powers (ddhi) it produces, etc.83 Needles
to say, claiming that Mahyna mental training is superior adds to
Asagas goal of showing the Mahynas preeminence. In connection
with the alleged superiority of the Mahyna mental training, it is
worth looking at some important remarks made by Paul Harrison,
who, while discussing the origins of Mahyna, emphasizes the
significance of and connection between magical powers, purity,
meditation, and the situation early Mahynists found themselves in.
Having mentioned the importance of samdhi in early Mahyna, as
seen for instance from the texts translated by Lokakema,84 Harrison
states:
It is clear from these indications that meditation must

80 Upanibandhana, sde dge bstan gyur 4051, 263aff; T1598.31.427a24ff.

81 Nagao, , vol. 2 (Tokyo: Kdansha, 1987), 87: lhag pai sems
kyi khyad par ji ltar blta ze na. T1594.31.146c11-12: . Most
likely, khyad par and here translate the Sanskrit viea.
82 Mahynloka, Sarvapuyasamuccaya, Samdhirjabhadrapla, ragama. There
exists a Sarvapuyasamuccayasamdhi Stra, on which see Paul M. Harrison,
Mediums and Messages: Reflections on the Production of Mahyna Stras, The
Eastern Buddhist XXXV, no. 1&2 (2003): 125.
83 Nagao, , vol. 2, 88: rdzu phrul chen po. T1594.31.146c22: .
84 Harrison mentions in particular the Pratyutpannabuddhasamukhvasthitasamdhi
and ragamasamdhi stras.
 The Role of Meditation in Asagas Legitimation of Mahyna 195

therefore have occupied a crucial place in the development

of this movement, not merely, we may suppose, because
its followers saw it as a good thing to do, as spiritually
efficacious. It was also important, no doubt, because it
provided a channel for fresh revelation and inspiration,
explaining the extraordinary proliferation of Mahyna
scriptures. But, most of all, it was important because
meditation and the resulting powers gave the Mahynists an
edge in their struggle for resources. This struggle, we may
assume, was a double one: both against the wider religious
community (the normal competitive framework), and also
against other Buddhists, with whom they shared ordination
lineages and institutional structures. Some of these co-
religionists were clearly hostile to the new movement. The
followers of the Mahyna had to lay claim to be in a sense
the true successors of Gautama, the inheritors of his mantle,
and they had to establish that claim both with other Buddhists
and with the population at large. There were, as far as I can
see, two possible ways of doing this: by the possession of
relics, and by the (perceived) possession of ascetic techniques
and magical powers.85

As far as we currently know, the Summary appeared roughly two,

three centuries after the translations of Lokakema. Bearing the
temporal distance in mind, the struggle for resources mentioned by
Harrison can still be glimpsed in the Summary by means of a proxy,
namely, the struggle for acceptance that clearly preoccupied the texts
author(s). There is nothing that I can say about Yogcra and the
possession of relics, but regarding the last point made by Harrison,
the Summarys chapters 5 to 8 do state that the Mahyna is superior
in terms of ethics (which is related to purity), meditative cultivation,

85 Paul M. Harrison, Searching for the Origins of the Mahyna: What Are We
Looking For? The Eastern Buddhist XXVIII, no. 1 (1995): 6566. Parentheses in
the original.
196

meditative attainments, magical powers, wisdom/knowledge, etc.

.
We are now in the position to draw some final considerations. First,
even though limited in scope, the present article does confirm that
meditation plays a central role in Yogcra, at least as far as one of its
most influential texts and authors are concerned. What is interesting
is the nature of the role meditation plays in the Summary. It is not
the subject being explained, as would be the case for a meditation
manual. In fact, in spite of the numerous references contained therein,
one only learns little about meditation itself from the Summary, or
about how to meditate.
Second, it is indeed noteworthy that meditation has such a significant
spot in Asagas endeavor to legitimize a number of fundamental
Yogcra doctrines, including the store consciousness, the defiled
mind, the notion of only representation and the three natures/
characteristics. The appeals to meditation are so numerous and
central in the Summary that without them Asagas effort would
require very substantial adjustments. This can be contrasted with
Vasubandhus Viatik (with the authors own vtti), Triik and
Trisvabhvanirdea, where appeals to meditation do not play such a
significant role. To find interesting similarities one can look at the
Cheng weishi lun, in which Xuanzang does appeal to meditation
frequently as part of his argumentation strategy, with references to
samdhi being particularly numerous, and, to a much lesser extent, to
the Mahynastrlakra.
Third, as to Asagas audience, the fact that he is so heavily reliant on
references to Buddhist meditation, cosmology, gama, and so forth,
strongly suggests that the Summary is a treatise written specifically
for a Buddhist audience. The concerns are clear: to show that the
Mahyna is buddhavacana, that it is superior to the rvakayna,
that gama supports notions such as the store consciousness, etc.
The discussion is clearly intrasystemic as these concerns would
make little sense and Asagas arguments would carry little weight
 The Role of Meditation in Asagas Legitimation of Mahyna 197

if the Summary were directed at non-Buddhists. Differently put,

this treatise was not directed, borrowing Daniel Arnolds phrase,
across party lines.86 In this regard, there is another consideration
to be made. Asaga was first and foremost preoccupied with the
status of Mahyna versus rvakayna. From our historical vantage
point which carries its baggages, disciplinary hang-overs and
disadvantages we employ terms such as Yogcra to designate
Asagas position and we write of a Yogcra tradition or school. (We
are in good company here, as we follow in the footsteps of siddhnta,
panjiao () and grub mtha classifications.) From this perspective,
there is nothing wrong with saying that the Summary attempts to
legitimize Yogcra. However, from the perspective that we can glean
from the Summary itself, the text is best characterized as attempting
to legitimize Mahyna, rather than Yogcra, even if important
parts of what Asaga calls Mahyna we can now more specifically
term Indian Yogcras distinct flavor of Mahyna. We can also
readily see that certain claims made by Yogcras are not consistent
with some of the claims made by Mdhyamikas, that is to say, they
cannot both be true at the same time. Of course, Bhvaviveka and
Candrakrti inter alia already knew this and made sure to let others
know too.87 However, in the Summary it is the rvaka(yna) first
and foremost that is the significant Other, with some passing overt

86 Daniel Arnold, Buddhists, Brahmins, and Belief: Epistemology in South Asian

Philosophy of Religion (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 1.
87 I have no opinion regarding whether Bhvaviveka is the correct name instead of
other possibilities such as Bhviveka and Bhavya. See David Seyfort Ruegg,
The Literature of the Madhyamaka School of Philosophy in India, vol. 7 fascicle 1,
A History of Indian Literature (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1981), 61.
88 I am indebted to Hammer for the following definition, which I have adapted for the
present situation: The term significant Others was coined by George Herbert Mead
in the 1930s and has been used in the theory of personality development. Here,
the concept is metaphorically extended to refer to the process whereby movement
spokespersons construct the identities of their doctrines in relation to abstract or
concrete Others. Quoted from Olav Hammer, Claiming Knowledge: Strategies of
Epistemology from Theosophy to the New Age, 44, note 32. The whole chapter (pp.
27-45) is worth reading.
198

references to the Pratyekabuddha(yna).88 The evidence, then, points

to the fact that Asaga was primarily concerned with justification
and legitimation against the rvakayna rather than different
understandings of the Mahyna, whatever these words might have
meant to him. 89 This, however, does not mean that the intended
audience was composed of rvakas as Asaga might well have
taught to fellow Mahynists.
Returning to the role of meditation, Florin Deleanu makes an
interesting comment that, even though primarily about a period
earlier than Asagas, is very much pertinent:
The stress on mystical and supernatural attainments [in early
Mahyna scriptures], usually connected with meditation
and ascetic practices, was also a guarantee of freedom, at
least doctrinal freedom, from the monastic Establishment
which may have had claim of control of the scholastic and
ordination orthodoxy but had no strong means of suppressing
declarations of direct inspirational creativity Most of
the samdhis in Mahyna Buddhism are declared to be
inaccessible to rvakas and pratyekabuddhas. The adept
who mastered them could claim that he shared a spiritual
experience similar to that of the Buddha and this entitled him
to say that he was speaking with the Buddhas might. This is
clearly illustrated in a large number of Mahyna sutras and
emphasising this aspect appears to have been a major concern
for the earliest authors.90

89 On self-image in early Mahyna, earlier than Asaga but relevant nonetheless,

see Paul M. Harrison, Who Gets to Ride in the Great Vehicle? Self-Image and
Identity Among the Followers of the Early Mahyna, Journal of the International
Association of Buddhist Studies 10, no. 1 (1987): 6789. For a fascinating take on
Asagas position in Buddhist history see Achim Bayer, School Affiliation of the
Abhidharmasamuccaya in the Light of Tibetan Scholasticism. Journal of Bojo
Jinuls Thought 36 (2011): 5578, in which Bayer reports the view of Yongs dzin
ye shes rgyal mtshan (1713-1793) and others.
90 Florin Deleanu, A Preliminary Study on Meditation and the Beginnings of
Mahyna Buddhism, Annual Report of the International Research Institute for
Advanced Buddhology 3 (1999): 8889. The brackets are mine.
 The Role of Meditation in Asagas Legitimation of Mahyna 199

We do not know Asagas exact circumstances and as a consequence

it is difficult to state to which degree his social, cultural and religious
background complies with the situation depicted by Deleanu for the
development of early Mahyna. Even so, the situation proposed
by Deleanu coupled with the remarks by Paul Harrison I quoted
in section IV, to whom Deleanu is indebted offers a possible
explanation for some of the Summarys characteristics.
Unfortunately, limits of space prevent me from exploring the evidence
further on this occasion, but, preliminarily and with the provisos
already made, Harrisons and Deleanus hypotheses substantiate
and are in turn substantiated by my findings. They will be worth
exploring further also as a way to increase our understanding of the
connection between early and middle-period Mahyna.
200

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