Journal of Theological Interpretation 3.

2 (2009) 227-239

Speech Act Theory, Dual Authorship,

and Canonical Hermeneutics:
Making Sense of Sensus Plenior

K I T BARKER
WESLEY INSTITUTE

Abstract The divine authorship of Scripture has been a much-debated

topic throughout history, particularly in the modern and postmodern
eras. Those who continue to hold to such a conviction have often wres-
tled with its hermeneutical implications. Hermeneutic realists who em-
ploy forms of authorial discourse interpretation have realized that their
presuppositions regarding the divine authorship of Scripture pose signif-
icant hermeneutical challenges. In particular, it is often believed that the
divine author may intend to communicate something different from
what the human author of the text intended. This belief has led many to
employ what became known as a. sensus plenior hermeneutic, a hermeneu-
tic that has generated criticism from both hermeneutic realists and non-
realists alike.
Recent years have witnessed renewed interest in understanding
Scripture as divine communication. Those involved in theological herme-
neutics have drawn upon advances in a wide range of disciplines in order
to develop and defend their methodologies. From the fields of communi-
cation theory and pragmatics, speech act theory has been proffered by
some as providing an insightful analysis of the anatomy of communica-
tion and, in particular, authorial intention.
The aim of this paper is to demonstrate how speech act theory high-
lights the problems related to a dual-authorship hermeneutic and with
sensus plenior approaches in particular. At the same time, speech act the-
ory is shown to be a valuable tool that can clarify interpretive goals and
enable a greater appreciation of the divine authorship of Scripture at both
canonical and intracanonical levels.
Key Words canonical, dual authorship, hermeneutics, intention, illocution,
meaning, sensus plenior, speech act theory, Vanhoozer, Wolterstorff

T h e problem of sensus plenior is peculiar. It stems from the basic con-

viction that G o d has communicative intentions and that these intentions
228 Journal of Theological Interpretation 3.2 (2009)

are realized in Scripture. 1 The notion of sensus plenior arises when it is

believed that God is communicating something other than what the hu-
man author intended. 2
The thesis of this article is that, although sensus plenior approaches
have responded to a real hermeneutical challenge in light of the attending
convictions, they have largely failed to solve the problem. There are two
main reasons for this failure. First, the scope of the problem has not been
accurately identified, with most sensus plenior approaches being reduction-
istic in their application. Second, there is a lack of precision involved
when discussing exactly how Scripture functions as God's communicative
act. I believe that both of these problems can be ameliorated with the uti-
lization of speech act theory.
The aim of this article, therefore, is to demonstrate how speech act
theory highlights the problems inherent in dual-authorship hermeneutics
and sensus plenior approaches in particular. At the same time, speech act
theory will be shown to be a valuable tool that can clarify interpretive goals
and enable a greater appreciation of the divine authorship of Scripture.

A BRIEF REVIEW OF SENSUS PLENIOR

Raymond E. Brown

In the last half century, a renewed interest in dual authorship has been
sparked by the discussion of a sensus plenior by Catholic scholar Raymond
Brown. He defines this term in the following manner: "The sensus plenior is
that additional, deeper meaning, intended by God but not clearly in-
tended by the human author, which is seen to exist in the words of a Bib-
lical text (or group of texts, or even a whole book) when they are studied in

1. This conviction is not novel. The communities of faith in both Testaments held this
basic belief, out of which the respective canons were formed. Internal canonical evidence
also demonstrates this conviction. In Matt 19:4-5, Jesus refers to a narrator's comment in
Genesis as being the speech of "the Creator." The N T writers not only considered the O T
Scriptures to be God's communicative action (cf. 2 Tim 3:16) but also understood some of
their own writings and the writings of their fellow apostles in the same manner (cf. 2 Pet 3:16).
2. The church has continuously grappled with the hermeneutical implications of dual
authorship. Various methods of interpretation have been applied to the Scriptures, particu-
larly to the OT, in order to understand how they pointed to Christ and how they might speak
authoritatively to the contemporary community. For a brief history of interpretation, see
Anthony C. Thiselton, "Hermeneutics," in Dictionary for Theological Interpretation of the Bible
(ed. Kevin J. Vanhoozer; Grand Rapids: Baker, 2005), 283-87; Gordon. R. Lewis, "The Hu-
man Authorship of Inspired Scripture," in Inerrancy (ed. Norman Geisler; Grand Rapids:
Zondervan, 1980).
 BARKER: Making Sense of Sensus Plenior 229

the light of further revelation or development in the understanding of

revelation. "3
Brown proposes elsewhere that the meaning of the text is always em-
bedded within it even though the total (that is, "full") meaning is not under-
stood until the context of the completed canon is available. 4 This further
revelation assists the interpreter in understanding all that the author (that
is, God) was intending in the communicative act.*
Although the concept of sensus plenior has enjoyed support within
various Christian traditions, little work has been done in developing
hermeneutics that account for it. This is despite a number of calls for such
a project. 6

3. Raymond E. Brown, The "Sensus Plenior" of Sacred Scripture (Baltimore, MD: St. Mary's
University Press, 1955), 92. For a discussion of the origin of the term, see William Lasor,
"The 'Sensus Plenior' and Biblical Interpretation," in Scripture Tradition and Interpretation (ed.
W. Ward Gasque and William Sanford Lasor; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1978), 273-75.
4. Brown comments, "We would rather phrase it this way: the literal sense answers the
question of what this text meant according to its author's intention as that author was in-
spired to compose it in his particular stage in the history of God's plan of salvation. The SP
[that is, sensus plenior] answers the question of what the text means in the whole context of
God's plan, a meaning which God, who knew the whole plan from the start, intended from
the moment He inspired the composition of the text" ("The Sensus Plenior in the Last Ten
Years," CB$j.$ [1963}: 278).
5. In another clarification of his definition, Brown suggests that the sensus plenior ap-
plies to both the OT and NT. He notes that the key to understanding the O T is the revela-
tion of Jesus Christ, who is "the key that unlocked the treasures of the Jewish Scriptures"
(idem, The "Sensus Plenior" of Sacred Scripture, 92). In regard to the NT, he writes, "Develop-
ment in Christian doctrine has enabled us to penetrate more to the core of N.T. texts and un-
derstand their sensus plenior" (ibid.). It is interesting to note at this point that Brown sees an
appropriate application of the sensus plenior in N T texts. His last comment, that Christian
doctrine enables us to see the fuller meaning, reveals the dual-source theology that underpins
Catholicism. Although dual-source theology is not a presupposition of this paper, two points
of agreement can be identified. First, in contrast to the prevailing discussion within evangel-
icalism, which sees the issue of sensus plenior largely with respect to O T prophecy, this paper
defends its application across the entire canon. Second, although this paper denies the au-
thority of a particular church to determine the correct interpretation of Scripture, it sup-
ports Brown's suggestion that Christian theology may be of assistance in understanding the
sensus plenior.
6. In his 1963 article, Brown quotes R. Murphy as saying, "The primary task that re-
mains to be done is the working out of the SP in actual exegesis." Brown concurs: "This is
quite true for if, as we insist, all NT, Patristic, or Liturgical exegesis cannot be classified as SP
or as typical sense, then we should get busy classifying such exegesis. Especially with regard
to the NT, we should distinguish what is typology, what is SP, and what is some form of ac-
commodation. There remains also the problem of the relation of our hermeneutical theory
to the new theories of inspiration. We suspect that in the next ten years, as the whole ques-
tion of inspiration is discussed and clarified, we shall hear more of the problem of the SP"
(idem, "The Sensus Plenior in the Last Ten Ifears," 281-82).
230 Journal of Theological Interpretation 3.2 (2009)

Challenges to Sensus Plenior

In recent times, authors from broadly evangelical persuasions have

adopted sensus plenior approaches and it is their work that has dominated
the discussion. 7 This is expected in light of their presuppositions regard
ing God and Scripture. However, there are those who share their presup
positions yet reject any kind of sensus plenior for two main reasons. They
contest that sensus plenior approaches marginalize the intent of the human
author 8 and, subsequently, fail to offer a clear hermeneutic. Jeannine
Brown explains her objection to a sensus plenior approach in terms of this
latter point: "Problematic for the sensus plenior view as applied to contem
porary 'fuller meaning' is the lack of any adequate controls for what might
be part of this new, fuller sense. For 'it is difficult to tell the difference be
tween {the sensus plenior] and the projection onto the text of a theological
idea or belief acquired by some other means.'"9
These are valid criticisms of the sensus plenior discussion and will be
addressed in due course. However, those like Jeannine Brown who reject
any form of sensus plenior are alternatively faced with the following chal
lenges: (1) the manner in which Jesus and the N T authors interpret the
OT, (2) how the O T can function as God's current word to the new cove
nant community, (3) how there could be any communicative intent at the
canonical level, and (4) whether God can be understood to share the com
municative intent of the human author in every case.
To date, sensus plenior proponents have not adequately responded to
their detractors, yet these detractors have not sufficiently explained how
the entire canon continues to function as God's ongoing communicative
act. I O Applying the resources of speech act theory not only clarifies the
problem but expands it and additionally offers a pathway to a solution.

7. Darrel Bock, "Evangelicals and the Use of the Old Testament in the New: Part 2,"
BSac 14 (1985): 306-19; John Goldingay, Models for Interpretation of Scripture (Grand Rapids:
Eerdmans, 1995); William S. LaSor, "Prophecy, Inspiration, and Sensus Plenior," TynBul 29
(1978): 49-60; Douglas J. Moo, "The Problem of Sensus Plenior," in Hermeneutics, Authority,
and Canon (ed. Donald A. Carson and John Woodbridge; Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 1986),
179-211; Vern S. Poythress, "Divine Meaning of Scripture," WTJ 48 (1986): 241-79; Kevin Van-
hoozer, Is There a Meaning in This Text? The Bible, the Reader, and the Morality of Literary Knowl
edge (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1998); Nicholas Wolterstorff, Divine Discourse: Philosophical
Reflections on the Claim That God Speaks (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995).
8. See Walter C. Kaiser, "Legitimate Hermeneutics," in Inerrancy (ed. Norman Geisler;
Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1979), 122-23.
9. Jeanine . Brown, Scripture as Communication: Introducing Biblical Hermeneutics
(Grand Rapids: Baker, 2007), 115; quoting . T. Wright, The New Testament and the People of
God (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1992), 58-59.
10. Elliot Johnson, "Author's Intention and Biblical Interpretation," Hermeneutics, Iner
rancy, and the Bible (ed. Earl Radmacher and Robert Preus; Grand Rapids: Acadmie, 1984),
 BARKER: Making Sense of Sensus Plenior 231

SPEECH A C T THEORY AND DUAL AUTHORSHIP:

TOWARD A SOLUTION

An Introduction to Speech Act Theory

Speech act theory is a subdiscipline of the philosophy of language and

was founded by J. L. Austin and his student John Searle.11 Austin's central
idea is that in making a statement one is performing an action. He isolated
three types of linguistic actions that can occur when we communicate ver-
bally: the locutionary act the uttering of the words; the illocutionary act
what we do in uttering the words (understood as the meaning of the sen-
tence); and the perlocutionary actwhat we bring about by uttering the
words.12
The following example may be helpful. The locution "It's after 9
o'clock" can be used to perform a number of actions and, consequently, can
take on an equal number of meanings. It may be an assertion (in response to
a question regarding the time). It may be a question (e.g., "Where are you?").
It may be a request (e.g., "I would prefer decaf over regular coffee"). It may
be a command (e.g., "Your talk needed to finish by now, so sit down").
The locution "It's after 9 o'clock" is used to perform the illocution
that gives the sentence meaning. The context or background provides the
normative conditions that make this illocution intelligible. The perlocu-
tion is the effect of one's illocution upon the person to whom one was
speaking. This effect may or may not be the one wanted, but the meaning
of the sentence is based on which illocution is performed. *3
In the last couple of decades, Christian scholars have drawn upon
speech act theory as either a tool for exegesis or more systemically as a
tool to reconceptualize theological hermeneutics. Kevin Vanhoozer and

427-28; Kaiser, "Legitimate Hermeneutics"; Brown, Scripture as Communication-, Moo, "The

Problem of Sensus Plenior."
11. John L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words (2nd ed.; Cambridge, MA: Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 1975); John Searle, Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969); idem, Expression and Meaning: Studies in the Theory
of Speech Acts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979). Their contributions to the the-
ory have been characterized in the following way: "If Austin is the Luther of speech act phi-
losophy, John Searle may be considered its Melanchthonits systematic theologian"
(Vanhoozer, Is There a Meaning in This Text? 209).
12. Austin, How to Do Things with Words, chs. 8-10. Though these distinctions are some-
times contested, most scholars are willing to speak in terms of these three components: lo-
cution, illocution, and perlocution.
13. Kit Barker, "Divine Illocutions in Psalm 137: A Critique of Nicholas Wolterstorff's
Second Hermeneutic," TynBul 60 (2009): 1-14.
232 Journal of Theological Interpretation 3.2 (2009)

Nicholas Wolterstorff are representative of this latter group. *4 The appli-

cation of speech act theory to hermeneutics is, in my opinion, invaluable.
Speech act theory defines the nature and goals of interpretation by stating
that the meaning of a text is the illocutionary act, or the sum of illocution-
ary acts, that an author performs.

Divine Speech Acts: Points of Clarification

When considering the dual authorship of Scripture and sensus plenior

hermeneutics, speech act theory enables a level of precision previously
lacking in the discussion and consequently raises a number of questions
for further clarification.
The first point of clarification regards the scope of the problem. Sen-
sus plenior proponents have largely considered their approach necessary for
explaining various OT texts that the N T writers explain in terms of Chris-
tological fulfilment. In these cases, it is unlikely that the human author of
the O T text understood this "fuller meaning," and a sensus plenior herme-
neutic is applied to account for the divine intention. This seems justified.
However, if it is assumed that God continues to speak through the entire
canon, then in speech act terminology this means that God continues to
perform illocutionary acts across the entire OT. More pointedly, without a
sensusplenior approach, God must then be understood to perform the same
(or at least some of the same) illocutionary acts as the human authors of
these texts. This would make sense of many of the texts in their original
context. However, there are many other texts and genres where this does
not fit. For example, unless one accepts the theonomist position, many
commands within the Mosaic Law are clearly not functioning in the same
way today as they did in their original context. Consequently, the sensusple-
nior hermeneutic should also apply here. In speech act terminology, if the
original illocutionary acts are no longer being performed, and yet God is
still communicating through the text, then new illocutionary acts are now
being performed solely by God. Even if it is merely the case that an atten-
dant illocution becomes primary, this results in a different meaning, and a
sensus plenior approach is justified. *5

14. Kevin J. Vanhoozer, "The Semantics of Biblical Literature: Truth and Scripture's Di-
verse Literary Forms," in Hermeneutics, Authority and Canon (ed. Donald A. Carson and John
D. Woodbridge; Leicester: Inter-Varsity, 1986), 53-104; idem, Is There a Meaning in This Text?;
idem, First Theology: God, Scripture and Hermeneutics (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 2002);
Wolterstorff, Divine Discourse; Francis Watson, Text and Truth: Redefining Biblical Theology
(Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1997).
15. Assuming once again, that the entire canon remains relevant as a continual divine
communicative act.
 BARKER: Making Sense of Sensus Plenior 233

If a sensusplenior approach is rejected, and the illocutionary acts of the

original author are taken as coterminous with the illocutionary acts of
God, then much of the OT is relegated to mere history, and it is unclear
how God communicates through it today. Speech act theory demonstrates
that the application of a sensus plenior-type hermeneutic is necessary in
many more instances than are traditionally recognized.
A second point of clarification that is highlighted by the use of speech
act theory is whether God appropriates all of the illocutionary acts of the
original authors and whether it is necessary for him to do so in order for
Scripture properly to be his communicative act. A consideration of the
psalms in this regard may be helpful. Although it seems likely that many of
the illocutionary acts within the psalms could be echoed by God (e.g.,
"Happy are those who" [Ps 1:1, NRSV}; "Kiss the Son" {Ps 2:12, NIV]), there
are many examples of illocutionary acts that are nonsensical if attributed
to him (e.g., David's request for a clean heart in Ps 51, any of the requests
made to God for salvation from one's enemies, or any time a psalmist ques-
tions God's presence or purposes). As the psalms are directed to God, it
makes sense that some of the illocutionary acts of the psalmist are not be-
ing performed by God at the same time. If one holds the prior conviction
that all Scripture is God's communicative act, then how in speech act
terms can these psalms be considered God's illocutionary acts? The appli-
cation of speech act theory demonstrates the need for greater precision in
defining how Scripture functions as God's word.
There seem to be three lines of inquiry that may prove helpful in ad-
vancing the discussion. The first is to consider the various levels at which
illocutionary acts occur in a text. The second is whether some illocution-
ary acts supervene upon other locutions to produce different illocutionary
acts from those initially performed, and the third is a recognition that nu-
merous illocutionary acts often occur simultaneously in one text.

Literary Levels of Illocutionary Acts

Most of the discussion of dual authorship and sensus plenior has been
undertaken without using the resources of communication theory. The no-
table exceptions are again Kevin Vanhoozer and Nicholas Wolterstorff.16

16. Other writers have made limited contributions to the discussion. See Michael S.
Horton, Covenant and Eschatology (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 2002); Gordon Mc-
Conville, "Divine Speech and the Book of Jeremiah," in The Trustworthiness of God: Perspec-
tives on the Nature of Scripture (ed. Paul Helm and Carl R. Trueman; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans,
2002), 18-38; Daniel J. Treier, Virtue and the Voice of God: Toward Theology as Wisdom (Grand
Rapids: Eerdmans, 2006); Timothy Ward, Word and Supplement: Speech Acts, Biblical Texts, and
the Sufficiency of Scripture (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).
234 Journal of Theological Interpretation 3.2 (2009)

Wolterstorff's work has been influential in demonstrating how speech act

theory clarifies the communicative act and explains the possibility of God's
speech in Scripture. His application of the theory to exegesis, however, suf-
fers from his attempt to explain God's illocutionary acts at the sentential
level in every case. A recognition that illocutionary acts occur at a range
of literary levels and that God's illocutionary acts might occur in differ-
ent ways at different levels might have avoided the problems his solution
encounters.1? An example from his explanation of Paul's declaration in
Romans highlights the point. Paul here states, "God, whom I serve" (1:9),
and Wolterstorff notes that it is incoherent to suggest that God makes
the same statement. Wolterstorff's solution is to change the rhetorico-
conceptual structure of the text. He proposes the following, "So whatever
we take God to be saying by way of this passage, its noematic content will
have a different rhetorico structure from the noematic content of what
Paul said. The point holds for a great deal of the Bible, and is obvious and
non-controversial."18 Wolterstorff's use of speech act theory has demon-
strated that the issue of God speaking through the text is far more compli-
cated than usually suggested. However, his solution that reshapes the
rhetorico-conceptual structure is overly reductionistic.1^
Perhaps a better solution would be to consider that God may be ap-
propriating the text at a different level. That is, God may be performing il-
locutionary acts at higher literary levels than that of a particular phrase or
sentence. In the case of the Psalms, it could be suggested that God is au-
thorizing them as proper responses to commensurate situations. In speech
act terms, God would be performing a generic illocutionary act at the level
of the Psalter that states, "%u should pray like this in these kinds of situ-
ations." He may also appropriate some of the lower level, attendant illocu-
tionary acts, but this is not always the case. Similarly, with respect to
Romans, God's speech through Paul might be at the level of paragraph or

17. For a discussion of the need to describe sufficiently the full range of textual speech
acts, see Vern S Poythress, "Canon and Speech Act. Limitations in Speech-Act Theory, with
Implications for a Putative Theory of Canonical Speech Acts," WTJ 70 (2008) 337-54
Poythress is concerned that the application of speech act theory to biblical studies may re-
sult m a reductiomstic hermeneutic that understands texts as a groups of sentences, each of
which performs a single speech act This problem is not, however, inherent to speech act the-
ory but exemplifies a misappropriation of the theory, as Poythress himself noted His discus-
sion rightly acknowledges the need to understand the complexity of human communication
In particular, he argues that multiple speech acts can occur not only in a single sentence but
most obviously when that sentence is located within a broader textual context This is un-
doubtedly correct and is addressed briefly in this article here and in the discussion of "central
lllocutions" and "thick descriptions" below
18 Wolterstorff, Divine Discourse, 209
19 Barker, "Divine lllocutions in Psalm 137 "
 BARKER: Making Sense of Sensus Plenior 235

larger literary unit where God would appropriate Paul's illocutionary acts
directly, yet at the lower sentential levels God might be performing the
illocutionary act of affirming Paul's stance (e.g., "I accept/agree with Paul's
declaration of faith").
It needs to be recognized that across genres and within genres God's
illocutionary acts might be identical with the human author's, yet they
might be necessarily different. It is not a simple divine appropriation of ev-
ery human speech act and it is not a simple appropriation of only higher-
level speech acts. Each genre and text requires individual analysis to deter-
mine exactly how God is speaking through it. Again, a sensus plenior ap-
proach that utilizes speech act theory recognizes the complexity of God's
speech in Scripture and allows for greater precision in discussing how and,
in particular, at what level, God is communicating.

Central Illocutionary Acts

The second line of inquiry where speech act theory helps to clarify
sensus plenior hermeneutics recognizes that certain illocutionary acts might
supervene or affect other illocutionary acts within the canon. Sensus ple-
nior approaches have often appealed to the N T to demonstrate that a text
has taken on a new meaning or that this new meaning has been finally re-
vealed. Speech act theory would suggest that the mechanics of this pro-
cess involves higher-level illocutionary acts functioning as what I will call
central illocutionary acts. These illocutionary acts often create or reveal
realities in which the conditions necessary for the performance of previ-
ous illocutionary acts no longer exist. The original locutions are now being
used to perform new illocutionary acts.
Kevin Vanhoozer speaks of these central illocutionary acts as canoni-
cal illocutionary acts, which he says supervene upon Scripture. His thesis
is that divine illocutionary acts are present at this canonical level, yet this
is not the only way in which Scripture can be affirmed as God's word:
There are two complementary senses in which I wish to affirm the
canon as God's illocutionary act. First, there is the divine appropria-
tion of the lllocutions of the human authors, particularly at the ge-
neric level but not exclusively there. For example, God still uses the
book of Jonah to satirize religious ethnocentrism Yet God may be
doing new things with Jonah and other biblical text too by virtue of
their being gathered together in the canon. Could it be that certain ll-
locutions come to light only when we describe what God is doing at
the canonical level? More work needs to be done in this area, but for
the moment let me offer the following as possible candidates for the
236 Journal of Theological Interpretation 3.2 (200p)

divine canonical lllocutions: instructing the believing community,

testifying to Christ, and perhaps most obviously, covenanting.20
Elsewhere, he specifically affirms the concept ofsensus plenior in explaining
his hermeneutic: "My thesis is that the "fuller meaning" of Scripturethe
meaning associated with divine authorshipemerges only at the level of
the whole canon The divine intention does not contravene the intention of
the human author but rather supervenes on it"11
Vanhoozer suggests that God first performs illocutionary acts by ap
propriating the illocutionary acts of the human author. Additionally, God
performs illocutionary acts at the canonical level, which is impossible for
the human author. 2 2 These divine illocutionary acts at the canonical level
"supervene" rather than "contravene" lower-level illocutionary acts. It is
the sum of these canonical illocutionary acts that Vanhoozer would label
sensus plenior.2^ In the previous quotation, he provided examples of what
these canonical illocutionary acts may be: instructing the believing com
munity, testifying to Christ, and covenanting.
Vanhoozer's work has been the most helpful contribution to under
standing sensusplenior in terms of speech act theory He recognizes all texts
are communicative acts, that meaning is a function of the sum of illocu
tionary acts that an author performs by the text, that God appropriates
human illocutionary acts, and that God performs different illocutionary
acts as the author of the canon. Yet, his explanation is not comprehensive
and at various points merely highlights the inherent difficulties with sensus
plenior approaches.
For example, illocutionary acts must be based upon locutions; like
wise, canonical illocutionary acts must be based upon canonical locutions.
This raises the question of which locutions form the basis of the canonical
lllocutions. The connection between the locutions/illocutions of books

20. Vanhoozer, First Theology, 194.

21. Idem, Is There a Meaning in this Text? 264-65.
22. He states, "Perhaps the most important question we can ask of the canon is: whose
act is it? If interpretation is a matter of ascribing and inferring communicative intentions, to
whom do we ascribe the lllocutions?" (idem, First Theology, 196).
23. In relation to these canonical illocutionary acts being "new," Vanhoozer responds
that they were always present in that God had always intended that these texts would func
tion canonically: "ifet it is precisely the function of canon to serve as a guide for future gen
erations and to provide the descriptive framework within which to understand new events
(e.g., the event of Jesus Christ). The latent potential of a text is really there, buried in the cu
mulative wisdom carried by a literary form. What this means is that the literal sensethe
sense of the literary actmay, at times, be indeterminate or open-ended. Howeverand this
is crucialthe indeterminacy we are considering is intended; moreover, it is a definite feature
of the meaning of the text. If there is a. sensus plenior, then, it is on the level of God's gathering
together the various partial and progressive communicative acts and purposes of the human
authors into one 'great canonical Design"' (idem, Is There Meaning in This Text?, 313-14).
 BARKER: Making Sense of Sensus Plenior 237

within the canon and the locutions/illocutions at the canonical level is left
unclear. 24
Furthermore, Vanhoozer has not addressed the cases where it is non-
sensical for God to be appropriating the illocutionary acts of the human
author at the sentential level, a point that Wolterstorff's work has high-
lighted. Although Vanhoozer has utilized speech act theory in unique ways
that advance and clarify the discussion, particularly with regard to levels of
illocutionary acts and canonical illocutionary acts, he has not provided an
explanation with enough detail.
Perhaps the concept of central illocutionary acts based on intracanon-
ical locutions might clarify the problem and provide a supplementary
explanation. To explain, certain illocutionary acts based on generic or sub-
generic locutions actually function as higher-level or central illocutionary
acts even though they are not performed at this level. These central illocu-
tionary acts would, in Vanhoozer's terminology, supervene upon the rest of
Scripture so that all other illocutionary acts would need to be consistent
with these central illocutionary acts. Thus, they are central or canonical in
their supervenience but do not occur at that literary level. 2$ This explana-
tion provides greater clarity regarding the connection between locution
and illocution. Admittedly, generic illocutionary acts are also based, in cer-
tain cases, on conventionally generated locutions. In these cases, illocu-
tionary acts are performed on the basis of literary conventions (e.g.,
whether someone is reporting history, speaking poetically or apocalypti-
cally, or in the case of some Psalms, providing paradigms for future prayer).
The problem with suggesting canonical illocutionary acts based on generic
convention is that the canon is not one kind of literature that follows spe-
cific conventions in order to make these extratextual judgments. Van-
hoozer is correct that the canon performs generic illocutions; however, its
genre is not one that is standard or previously recognized. The generic il-
locutionary acts of the canon are discoverable only upon a sustained inves-
tigation of the genres within it. Locating the central illocutionary act at a
lower level, where either generic convention or subgeneric locution pro-
vide the basis for the illocutionary act, enables much greater precision in
the earlier stages of the hermeneutical task.

24. A related issue is whether there are any levels of locution/illocution that occur be-
tween the levels of book and canon (e.g., at the level of Testament or a partially complete
Testament).
25. Examples of "central lllocutions" would include covenantal promises and declara-
tions such as "You will be my people and I will be your God" (Jer 30:22; Ezek 36:28) and "Jesus
is Lord" (Rom 10:9; 1 Cor 12:3). Of course, the hermeneutic offered here will not identify
which lllocutions are central. This would require an exegetical and theological defense that
demonstrates that lllocutions of this sort are canonical in their supervenience.
238 Journal of Theological Interpretation 3.2 (2009)

Thick Descriptions

Two lines of inquiry have now been addressed: levels at which illocu-
tionary acts occur and the possibility of central and supervening illocu-
tionary acts. The final area of inquiry is related to what Vanhoozer
describes as a "thick description" of a text (borrowing Gilbert Ryles's ter-
minology). A description is "thick" when it accounts for all of the illocu-
tionary acts being performed in a text. Thus, thick descriptions are the
goal of interpretation.
This observation has significant implications for sensus plenior herme-
neutics. If we examine any paragraph of text there are a number of illocu-
tionary acts that the author is performing. Take Ps 1 as an example. It makes
assertions about the righteous person and assertions about the wicked and
assertions about how God relates to both. However, it could be argued that
the primary illocutionary act is not an assertion but a call to be the righ-
teous one and simultaneously a warning against following the wicked or
surrounding oneself with wicked people. Furthermore, the Psalm is also in-
fluenced by its function in the Psalter, its connection with Ps 2, and its in-
clusion in the canon. Through these relationships, the Psalm is used to
perform additional illocutionary acts. For the sake of discussion, the main
point of the text will be referred to as the primary illocutionary act and the
subpoints as attendant illocutionary acts. The attendant illocutionary acts
are no less important; however, they are not the primary function of the
text but rather support that function.
Applying this insight to dual authorship and sensusplenior, it maybe that
God appropriates all the illocutionary acts of the human author. However,
as already mentioned, it may be that central illocutionary acts have changed
the conditions necessary for the primary illocutionary acts of the OT text
to remain in play (e.g., many of the cultic commands of the mosaic law con-
cerning the sacrificial system, the commands regarding Din). God is not
currently performing those illocutionary acts. Yet, believing that God still
speaks through this text requires that he is understood to be performing at
least one, if not many, illocutionary acts. This can be explained by suggest-
ing that later, central illocutionary acts have changed the conditions and
context within which those previous locutions now exist. Although God is
not performing the primary illocutionary act of the original OT text (e.g.,
the command to enact Din), it may be the case that one of the attendant il-
locutionary acts now becomes primary. In the examples just mentioned,
this could be any number of assertions concerning God's character, the sin-
fulness of humanity, or the need for justice and atonement, just to name a
few. In this case, the sensusplenior is simply that the primary illocutionary act
of the OT text ceases to be performed and an attendant illocutionary act
becomes primary for the new covenant community. Alternatively, the cen-
tral illocutionary act may supervene in such a way that it creates an entirely
 BARKER: Making Sense of Sensus Plenior 239

"new" illocutionary act that the human author could never have understood
or intended. This would be a more traditional understanding of the sensus
plenior.

CONCLUSION

Utilizing speech act theory to clarify the nature of theological herme-

neutics is highly productive. It magnifies the problem of sensus plenior by
recognizing that for God to continue to communicate through the text he
must currently perform illocutionary acts. It also highlights the fact that
God's contemporary illocutionary acts must often diverge from those of
the original author. This divergence is explained by recognizing two facts.
First, illocutionary acts occur at a variety of levels. Therefore, God may not
appropriate all of the human author's illocutionary acts, and God may per-
form illocutionary acts at levels impossible for any human author. Second,
God may also perform central illocutionary acts that alter the conditions
within which previous locutions existed. This enables new illocutionary
acts to be performed on the basis of earlier locutions. To repeat an earlier
point, God does not simply appropriate all the illocutionary acts of the hu-
man author. Each genre and text requires individual analysis to determine
exactly how God is speaking through it. A sensus plenior approach that uti-
lizes speech act theory recognizes the complexity of God's speech in Scrip-
ture and allows for greater precision in discussing how and, in particular, at
what level, God is communicating.
This paper began by noting two related objections to sensus plenior ap-
proaches, (1) that sensusplenior approaches generally marginalize the human
author's original intentions and (2) that they offer no clear hermeneutic.
This speech-act-theory-based approach addresses the first challenge by
paying close attention to how the locutions functioned in their original
context and by examining whether the normative conditions still exist that
enables them to function identically in the canonical context. Even if it is
deemed that different primary illocutionary acts or new illocutionary acts
are now being performed on the basis of supervening central illocutionary
acts, a speech-act-theory-based hermeneutic anchors these new illocution-
ary acts to the original locutions.
The second and related problem regarding the lack of hermeneutical
clarity is largely ameliorated in this regard. The point of discussion now
shifts from the more nebulous question of how we know the fuller sense
that God intended to more specific questions: What illocutionary acts are
being performed across and within the canon? Which illocutionary acts
are central and what is the nature of their supervention? And finally, which
illocutionary acts can be attributed to God? In the end, speech act theory
will not solve the question of what God is saying, but if allowed, it will
clarify the nature of the problem and define the terms of the discussion.
 ^ s
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