RENATO CAYETANO vs.

CHRISTIAN MONSOD
G.R. No. 100113. September 3, 1991.

FACTS:

Monsod was nominated by President Aquino as Chairman of the Comelec. The Commission on
Appointments confirmed the appointment despite Cayetano's objection, based on Monsod's alleged
lack of the required qualification of 10 year law practice. Cayetano filed this certiorari and
prohibition. The 1987 constitution provides in Section 1, Article IX-C: There shall be a Commission on
Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of the
Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college
degree, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding
elections.However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar
who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not Monsod has been engaged in the practice of law for 10 years.

2. Whether or not the Commission on Appointments committed grave abuse of discretion in confirming
Monsods appointment.

HELD:

1. YES. The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court. It embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management
of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients, and other works where the work done involves the
determination of the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions (PLA vs. Agrava.) The
records of the 1986 constitutional commission show that the interpretation of the term practice of law
was liberal as to consider lawyers employed in the Commission of Audit as engaged in the practice of
law provided that they use their legal knowledge or talent in their respective work. The court also cited
an article in the January 11, 1989 issue of the Business Star, that lawyers nowadays have their own
specialized fields such as tax lawyers, prosecutors, etc., that because of the demands of their
specialization, lawyers engage in other works or functions to meet them. These days, for example, most
corporation lawyers are involved in management policy formulation. Therefore, Monsod, who passed
the bar in 1960, worked with the World Bank Group from 1963-1970, then worked for an investment
bank till 1986, became member of the CONCOM in 1986, and also became a member of the Davide
Commission in 1990, can be considered to have been engaged in the practice of law as lawyer-
economist, lawyer-manager, lawyer-entrepreneur, etc.

2. NO. The power of the COA to give consent to the nomination of the Comelec Chairman by the
president is mandated by the constitution. The power of appointment is essentially within the discretion
of whom it is so vested subject to the only condition that the appointee should possess the qualification
required by law. From the evidence, there is no occasion for the SC to exercise its corrective power since
there is no such grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA.
Ulep vs The Legal Clinic

In 1984, The Legal Clinic was formed by Atty. Rogelio Nogales. Its aim, according to Nogales was to move
toward specialization and to cater to clients who cannot afford the services of big law firms. Now, Atty.
Mauricio Ulep filed a complaint against The Legal Clinic because of the latters advertisements which
contain the following:

SECRET MARRIAGE?

P560.00 for a valid marriage.

Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE. ANNULMENT. VISA.

THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC.

Please call: 521-0767; 521-7232; 522-2041

8:30am 6:00pm

7th Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Manila

GUAM DIVORCE

DON PARKINSON

An attorney in Guam is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The Legal Clinic beginning Monday
to Friday during office hours.

Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext. Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special
Retirees Visa. Declaration of Absence. Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil.
US/Foreign Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children.

Call Marivic.

THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC.

7th Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Manila nr. US Embassy

Tel. 521-7232, 521-7251, 522-2041, 521-0767

It is also alleged that The Legal Clinic published an article entitled Rx for Legal Problems in Star Week
of Philippine Star wherein Nogales stated that they The Legal Clinic is composed of specialists that can
take care of a clients problem no matter how complicated it is even if it is as complicated as the Sharon
Cuneta-Gabby Concepcion situation. He said that he and his staff of lawyers, who, like doctors, are
specialists in various fields, can take care of it. The Legal Clinic, Inc. has specialists in taxation and
criminal law, medico-legal problems, labor, litigation and family law. These specialists are backed up by a
battery of paralegals, counselors and attorneys.
As for its advertisement, Nogales said it should be allowed in view of the jurisprudence in the US which
now allows it (John Bates vs The State Bar of Arizona). And that besides, the advertisement is merely
making known to the public the services that The Legal Clinic offers.

ISSUE: Whether or not The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law; whether such is allowed;
whether or not its advertisement may be allowed.

HELD: Yes, The Legal Clinic is engaged in the practice of law however, such practice is not allowed. The
Legal Clinic is composed mainly of paralegals. The services it offered include various legal problems
wherein a client may avail of legal services from simple documentation to complex litigation and
corporate undertakings. Most of these services are undoubtedly beyond the domain of paralegals, but
rather, are exclusive functions of lawyers engaged in the practice of law. Under Philippine jurisdiction
however, the services being offered by Legal Clinic which constitute practice of law cannot be
performed by paralegals. Only a person duly admitted as a member of the bar and who is in good and
regular standing, is entitled to practice law.

Anent the issue on the validity of the questioned advertisements, the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair,
dignified and objective information or statement of facts. The standards of the legal profession
condemn the lawyers advertisement of his talents. A lawyer cannot, without violating the ethics of his
profession, advertise his talents or skills as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising his goods.
Further, the advertisements of Legal Clinic seem to promote divorce, secret marriage, bigamous
marriage, and other circumventions of law which their experts can facilitate. Such is highly
reprehensible.

The Supreme Court also noted which forms of advertisement are allowed. The best advertising possible
for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust, which must be
earned as the outcome of character and conduct. Good and efficient service to a client as well as to the
community has a way of publicizing itself and catching public attention. That publicity is a normal by-
product of effective service which is right and proper. A good and reputable lawyer needs no artificial
stimulus to generate it and to magnify his success. He easily sees the difference between a normal by-
product of able service and the unwholesome result of propaganda. The Supreme Court also
enumerated the following as allowed forms of advertisement:

1. Advertisement in a reputable law list

2. Use of ordinary simple professional card

3. Listing in a phone directory but without designation as to his specialization

Bautista vs Gonzales [A.M. No. 1625. February 12, 1990]

16OCT

[Per Curiam]

FACTS:

In a verified complaint filed by Angel L. Bautista, respondent Ramon A. Gonzales was charged with
malpractice, deceit, gross misconduct and violation of lawyers oath. Required by this Court to answer
the charges against him, respondent filed a motion for a bill of particulars asking this Court to order
complainant to amend his complaint by making his charges more definite. In a resolution the Court
granted respondents motion and required complainant to file an amended complaint. Complainant
submitted an amended complaint for disbarment, alleging that respondent committed the following
acts:

1. Accepting a case wherein he agreed with his clients, namely, Alfaro Fortunado, Nestor Fortunado and
Editha Fortunado [hereinafter referred to as the Fortunados] to pay all expenses, including court fees,
for a contingent fee of fifty percent (50%) of the value of the property in litigation.

xxx

4. Inducing complainant, who was his former client, to enter into a contract with him on August 30, 1971
for the development into a residential subdivision of the land involved in Civil Case No. Q-15143,
covered by TCT No. T-1929, claiming that he acquired fifty percent (50%) interest thereof as attorneys
fees from the Fortunados, while knowing fully well that the said property was already sold at a public
auction on June 30, 1971, by the Provincial Sheriff of Lanao del Norte and registered with the Register of
Deeds of Iligan City;

xxx

Pertinent to No. 4 above, the contract, in No. 1 above, reads:

We the [Fortunados] agree on the 50% contingent fee, provided, you [respondent Ramon Gonzales]
defray all expenses, for the suit, including court fees.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent committed serious misconduct involving a champertous contract.

HELD:

YES. Respondent was suspended from practice of law for six (6) months.

RATIO:

The Court finds that the agreement between the respondent and the Fortunados contrary to Canon 42
of the Canons of Professional Ethics which provides that a lawyer may not properly agree with a client to
pay or bear the expenses of litigation. [See also Rule 16.04, Code of Professional Responsibility].
Although a lawyer may in good faith, advance the expenses of litigation, the same should be subject to
reimbursement. The agreement between respondent and the Fortunados, however, does not provide
for reimbursement to respondent of litigation expenses paid by him. An agreement whereby an
attorney agrees to pay expenses of proceedings to enforce the clients rights is champertous [citation
omitted]. Such agreements are against public policy especially where, as in this case, the attorney has
agreed to carry on the action at his own expense in consideration of some bargain to have part of the
thing in dispute [citation omitted]. The execution of these contracts violates the fiduciary relationship
between the lawyer and his client, for which the former must incur administrative sanctions.
DOMINADOR P. BURBE

vs.

ATTY. ALBERTO C. MAGULTAAC No. 99-634. June 10, 2002FACTS:

On September 1998, respondent agreed to legally represent petitioner Dominador Burbe in a

moneyclaim and possible civil case against certain parties for breach of contract. In consequence to
suchagreement, Atty. Alberto C. Magulta prepared the demand letter and some other legal papers, for
whichservices he was accordingly paid and an amount of P25,000.00 for the required filing fee. A week
later,petitioner was informed by the respondent that the complaint had already been filed in court, and
that heshould receive notice of its progress. The petitioner waited for several months for the notice
from the court but there was no progress in the case, he was also inquired repeatedly in the
respondents Law Office, however he was told to just wait.The petitioner decided to go to the Office of
the Clerk of Court with the draft of Atty. Magultas complaint to personally verify the progress of the
case, and there told that there was no record at all of a case filedby Atty. Alberto C. Magulta on his
behalf, copy of the Certification dated May 27, 1999. As such, thepetitioner confronted the latter. The
respondent admitted that he has not at all filed the complaint becausehe had spent the money for the
filing fee for his own purpose he offered to reimburse him by issuing two(2) checks, postdated June 1
and June 5, 1999, in the amounts of P12,000.00 and P8,000.00.The petitioner filed a case against Atty.
Magulta for misrepresentation, dishonesty and oppressiveconduct. The respondent denied the
allegations and alleged that he was never been paid by complainantfor his acceptance and legal fees and
that the amount he had paid was a deposit for the acceptance fee

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent Atty. Magulta is liable for misrepresentation of funds given to him for
thefiling fee.

HELD:

YES. Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that lawyers shall hold in trust
allmoneys of their clients and properties that may come into their possession.Lawyers who convert the
funds entrusted to them are in gross violation of professional ethics and areguilty of betrayal of public
confidence in the legal profession. It may be true that they have a lien upon the clients funds,
documents and other papers that have lawfully come into their possession; that they may retain them
until their lawful fees and disbursements have been paid; and that they may apply such funds to the
satisfaction of such fees and disbursements. However, these considerations do not relieve them of their
duty to promptly account for the moneys they received. Their failure to do so constitutes professional
misconduct. In any event, they must still exert all effort to protect their clients interest within the
bounds of law.

Respondent fell short of this standard when he converted into his legal fees the filing fee entrusted to
him by his client and thus failed to file the complaint promptly. The fact that the former returned the
amount does not exculpate him from his breach of duty.
RADIOWEALTH FINANCE V. INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE BANK

182 SCRA 862

FACTS:

The petitioner entered into a Credit Facilities agreement with Interbank. This is secured by a
promissory note, trust receipts, security arrangements, which included provisions on payment of
attorneys fees and costs of collection in case of default. The petitioner failed to pay. A
compromise agreement was entered into by the parties but this agreement failed to include the
attorneys fees and costs of collection. The trial court reduced the percentage of attorneys fees in its
decision.

HELD:

The courts may modify the attorneys fees previously agreed upon where the amount appears to be
unconscionable and unreasonable. For the law recognizes the validity of stipulations included in
documents such as negotiable instruments and mortgages with respect. The fees in this case are
reasonable and fair.
JOSE TOLOSA vs. ALFREDO CARGO

Adm. Case No. 2385. March 8, 1989.

Facts:

Complainant Jose Tolosa filed with the Court an Affidavit-Complaint seeking the disbarment of
respondent District Citizens Attorney Alfredo Cargo for immorality. Complainant claimed that
respondent had been seeing his wife Priscilla M. Tolosa in his house and elsewhere.
Complainant further alleged that his wife left his conjugal home and went to live with
respondent and that since then has been living with respondent.

Complying with an order of this Court, respondent filed a Comment and/or Answer denying
the allegations of complainant. Respondent acknowledged that complainants wife had been
seeing him but that had done so in the course of seeking advice from respondent (in view of the
continuous cruelty and unwarranted marital accusations of affiant [complainant] against her),
much as complainants mother-in-law had also frequently sought the advice of respondent and
of his wife and mother as to what to do about the continuous quarrels between affiant and his
wife and the beatings and physical injuries (sometimes less serious) that the latter sustained
from the former.

By a Resolution, the Court referred this case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report and
recommendation.

In effect, the Solicitor General found that complainants charges of immorality had not been
sustained by sufficient evidence. But the respondent was not able to explain why he
continuously see Priscilla when there was already friction with the petitioner as well as being
involved in numerous incidents involving complainant and Priscillas brothers.

Issue: Whether there is sufficient evidence to suspend Atty. Cargo for immorality.

Ratio:

NO. The Supreme Court agrees with the Solicitor General that the record does not contain sufficient
evidence to show that respondent had indeed been cohabiting with complainants wife or was
otherwise guilty of acts of immorality. For this very reason, we do not believe that the penalty of
suspension from the practice of law may be properly imposed upon respondent. At the same time, the
Court agrees that respondent should be reprimanded for failure to comply with the rigorous standards
of conduct appropriately required from the members of the Bar and officers of the court. As officers of
the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good
moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community.
More specifically, a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to refrain from
adulterous relationships or the keeping of mistresses but must also so behave himself as to avoid
scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards.
Fernandez vs Bello

107 Phil 1140 Legal Ethics Strong Language by a Lawyer against a Judge

Atty. Manuel Fernandez won a civil case for Florentino Perreyras however, Florentino died without
paying Fernandez. Fernandez then assisted the eldest child of Perreyras in a guardianship proceeding so
that the eldest may properly dispose of their property in order to pay their fathers indebtedness.
Eventually, Florentinos nipa land was sold for P1,000.00. Thereafter, P200.00 was paid to Atty.
Fernandez for his legal services both for Florentino and his heirs. Judge Bello found out about said
payment and so directed Fernandez to explain (because under the guardianship, proceeds of any sale
must first be accounted for and no payment to creditors shall be made without prior authorization from
the court).

In the course of the proceeding however, Judge Bello stated that Fernandez does not deserve the
P200.00 attorneys fees because Fernandez is a below average standard of a lawyer. Fernandez then
responded with strong language (which were not specified).

ISSUE: Whether or not the strong language used by Fernandez against the judge is proper.

HELD: The Supreme Court seem to say yes. The Supreme Court stated that the strong language used by
Fernandez must have been impelled by the same language used by Bello in characterizing the act of
Fernandez as anomalous and unbecoming and in charging him of obtaining his fee through
maneuvers of documents from the guardian-petitioner. If anyone is to blame for the language used by
Fernandez, it is Bello himself who has made insulting remarks in his orders, which must have provoked
Fernandez.. If a judge desires not to be insulted he should start using temperate language himself; he
who sows the wind will reap a storm.

On the issue of attorneys fees, the opinion of a judge as to the capacity of a lawyer is not the basis of
the right to a lawyers fee. It is the contract between the lawyer and client and the nature of the services
rendered.
Laput v Atty. Remotigue

6 SCRA 45 Legal Ethics Client Grabbing

In 1952, Atty. Laput was retained by Nieves Barrera as counsel in a testate proceeding. He remained as
counsel for three years. But in January 1955, Atty. Fortunato Patalinghug filed his written appearance as
new counsel for Barrera. When Laput found out about Patalinghugs appearance, he voluntarily asked
the court to be relieved as counsel for Barrera on February 5, 1955. On February 7, 1955, Atty.
Remotigue also filed his appearance as additional counsel for Barrera.

Laput is now charging the two lawyers of unethical and improper appearances for Barrera; that they
influenced her to replace Laput as her counsel; that they caused her to disauthorize him as counsel for
her; that the purpose of said lawyers is to embarrass Laput to the officials and employees of the
corporations owned by the estate subject of the testate proceedings.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is encroachment of client in the case at bar.

HELD: No. It was found out that Barrera herself caused the filing of a pleading to discharge Laput as her
counsel. Barrera did this because she lost trust and confidence in Laput. She lost trust in Laput because
she found out that there were some dividend checks that were supposed to be sent to her but Laput
took said checks as his own hence she felt cheated.

Thereafter, she went to the law office of Remotigue and Patalinghug where she arranged a contract. The
fact that Laput voluntarily asked the court to discharge him as counsel for Barrera after Patalinghug filed
his entry of appearance showed Laputs acquiescence to Patalinghugs appearance as counsel for
Barrera. This should estop petitioner from now complaining that the appearance of Atty. Patalinghug
was unprofessional. On the part of Remotigue, there can be no irregularity for he filed his entry of
appearance only after Laput was discharged as counsel for Barrera.
ZALDIVAR VS. SANDIGANBAYAN (166 SCRA 316 10/071988)

FACTS: Zaldivar was the governor of Antique and was charged before the Sandiganbayan for violations of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Gonzales was the then Tanodbayan who was investigating the case. Zaldivar then
filed with the Supreme Court a petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus assailing the authority of the
Tanodbayan to investigate graft cases under the 1987 Constitution. The Supreme Court, acting on the petition
issued a Cease and Desist Order against Gonzalez directing him to temporarily restrain from investigating and
filing informations against Zaldivar. Gonzales however proceeded with the investigation and he filed
criminal informations against Zaldivar. Respondent Gonzalez has also asserted that the Court was preventing him
from prosecuting "rich and powerful persons," that the Court was in effect discrimination between the rich and
powerful on the one hand and the poor and defenseless upon the other, and allowing "rich and powerful" accused
persons to go "scot-free" while presumably allowing or affirming the conviction of poor and small offenders.

Zaldivar then filed a Motion for Contempt against Gonzalez. The Supreme Court then ordered Gonzalez to explain
his side. Gonzalez stated that the statements in the newspapers were true; that he was only exercising his freedom
of speech; that he is entitled to criticize the rulings of the Court, to point out where he feels the Court may have
lapsed into error.

ISSUE: Whether or not Gonzalez is guilty of contempt.

HELD: YES. The statements made by respondent Gonzalez clearly constitute contempt and call for the exercise of
the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court. According to Canon 11: A lawyer shall observe and maintain the
respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others. It is one of the
bounded duties of an attorney to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officer
(Section 20 [b], Rule 138 of the Rules of Court). His statements necessarily imply that the justices of the
Supreme Court betrayed their oath of office. Such statements very clearly debase and degrade the Supreme Court
and, through the Court, the entire system of administration of justice in the country. Gonzalez is entitled to the
constitutional guarantee of free speech. What Gonzalez seems unaware of is that freedom of speech and
of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom of expression needs on occasion to
be adjusted to and accommodated with the requirements of equally important public interests. One of these
fundamental public interests is the maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of the administration of
justice. There is no antinomy between free expression and the integrity of the system of administering justice.

Gonzalez, apart from being a lawyer and an officer of the court, is also a Special Prosecutor who owes duties of
fidelity and respect to the Republic and to the Supreme Court as the embodiment and the repository of the judicial
power in the government of the Republic. The responsibility of Gonzalez to uphold the dignity and authority of the
Supreme Court and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice is heavier than that of a private
practicing lawyer.

Gonzalez is also entitled to criticize the rulings of the court but his criticisms must be bona fide. In the case at bar,
his statements, particularly the one where he alleged that members of the Supreme Court approached him, are of
no relation to the Zaldivar case.

The Court concludes that respondent Gonzalez is guilty both of contempt of court in facie curiae and of gross
misconduct as an officer of the court and member of the Bar.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND Atty. Raul M. Gonzalez from the practice of law indefinitely and
until further orders from this Court, the suspension to take effect immediately.
PEOPLE VS. TUANDA (A.M. NO. 3360 01/30/1990)

FACTS: Respondent Fe T. Tuanda, a member of the Philippine Bar, asks this Court to lift the suspension
from the practice of law imposed upon her by a decision of the Court of Appeals. In 1983, Atty. Fe
Tuanda received from one Herminia A. Marquez several pieces of jewelry with a total value of P36,000
for sale on commission basis. In 1984, instead of returning the unsold pieces of jewelry worth P26,250,
she issued 3 checks. These checks were dishonored by the drawee bank, Traders Royal Bank, for
insufficiency of funds. Notwithstanding receipt of the notice of dishonor, Tuanda made no effort to
settle her obligation. Criminal cases were filed, wherein she was acquitted of estafa but was found guilty
of violation of BP 22 (The Anti-Bouncing Check Law). The appellate court affirmed the decision of the
trial court and imposed further suspension against Tuanda in the practice of law, on the ground that the
offense involves moral turpitude. Tuanda is now appealing to the Supreme Court for her suspension to
be lifted arguing that her suspension was a penalty so harsh on top of the fines imposed to her in
violation of the aforementioned law. Arguing further that she intends no damage to the plaintiff-
appellee (Herminia A. Marquez)and she is not guilty of the offense charged.

ISSUE: Whether or not the suspension of Atty. Tuanda be lifted.

HELD: NO. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that "the offense [of] which she is found guilty involved
moral turpitude. Sections 27 and 28 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court provide as follows:

Sec. 27. Attorneys renewed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. A member of the
bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court of any
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath
which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any
lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party
to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of
gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Italics
supplied)

Sec. 28. Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance. The Court
of Appeals or a Court of First Instance may suspend an attorney from practice for any of the
causes named in the last preceding section, and after such suspension such attorney shall not
practice his profession until further action of the Supreme Court in the premises.

Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude relates to and affects the good moral character of a person
convicted of such offense. Herein, BP 22 violation is a serious criminal offense which deleteriously affects public
interest and public order. The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interest of parties
directly involved in the transaction and touches the interest of the community at large. Putting valueless
commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousand fold, can very well pollute the channels of trade and
commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest. The crimes
of which respondent was convicted also import deceit and violation of her attorney's oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility under both of which she was bound to "obey the laws of the land."

ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DENY the Motion to Lift Order of Suspension. Respondent shall remain
suspended from the practice of law until further orders from this Court.
SUMAOANG vs. JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH XXXI, GUIMBA,NUEVA ECIJA and ATTY.
JORGE A. PASCUA

FACTS:

Private respondent Atty. Jorge Pascua filed a complaint for collection of attorneys fees for not having
received compensation for his professional services as a counsel against hisformer clients, Petitioner
Andres Sumaoang and his brothers. The Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija rendered judgment in
favor of herein private respondent and awarded to him the sum of P110, 000.00 as attorneys fees.

Petitioner filed a petition asking for the nullification of the aforesaid decision of thelower court on the
contention that the award of P110, 000.00 as attorneys fees was unconscionable.

ISSUE:Whether or not

HELD:

A lawyer it not merely the defender of his client's cause and a trustee of his client inrespect of the
client's cause of action and assets; he is also, and first and foremost, an officer of the court and
participates in the fundamental function of administering justice in society. Itfollows that a lawyer's
compensation for professional services rendered are subject to thesupervision of the court, not just to
guarantee that the fees he charges and receives remainreasonable and commensurate with the services
rendered, but also to maintain the dignity andintegrity of the legal profession to which he belongs. Upon
taking his attorney's oath as anofficer of the court, a lawyer submits himself to the authority of the
courts to regulate his rightto charge professional fees.

In the instant case, the Court considers that the fees which private respondent Atty.Pascua received
from petitioner and his brothers became unreasonable and unconscionable incharacter, not because the
original agreement between Atty. Pascua and his clients was itself unreasonable and unconscionable but
rather as a result of the subsequent dispositions of thetrial court.
People vs Ricardo Rio

GR No. 90294, 24 September 1991

FACTS

Accussed-appellant Ricardo Rio was charged and convicted of the crime of rape before the RTC
of Makati City and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He filed an appeal and as a
consequence, the branch clerk of court forwarded the records to the CA. the appellate court, however,
forwarded the records to the SC in view of the penalty imposed upon the accused.

However, accused-appellant, in his two letters addressed to the clerk of court, manifested his
intention to withdraw the appeal due to his poverty. Upon inquiry of the clerk of court of the trial
court, through the recommendation of the SolGen, the accused-appellant submits that he was no longer
interested in pursuing his appeal and had, in fact, withdrawn his appeal. The Court denied his motion to
withdraw and appointed a counsel de oficio for him. All the letters reveal that the only reason he
offered for the withdrawal of his appeal is his inability to retain the services of a counsel de oficio on
account of his poverty.

ISSUE

Whether or not the right to counsel of accused-appellant ceased upon his conviction by the trial
court.

HELD

The Supreme Court held in the negative. This right to counsel de oficio does not cease upon the
conviction of an accused by the trial court. It continues, even during appeal, such duty of the court to
assign a counsel de oficio persists where an accused interposes intent to appeal. Even in a case, where
the accused has signified his intent to withdraw his appeal, the court is required to inquire into the
reason for the withdrawal. Where it finds the sole reason for the withdrawal to be poverty, the court
must assign a counsel de oficio, for despite such withdrawal, the duty to protect the rights of the
accused subsists and perhaps, with greater reason. After all, those who have less in life must have more
in law.

The Court admonishes members of the Bar to be more conscious of their duties as advocates of
their clients causes whether acting de parte or de oficio for public interest requires that an attorney
exert his best efforts and ability in the prosecution or defense of his clients cause.

Lawyers are an indispensable part of the whole system of administering justice in this
jurisdiction. And a lawyer who performs that duty with diligence and candor not only protects the
interests if his client; he also serve the ends of justice, does honor to th Bar and helds maintain the
respect of the community to the legal profession. This is because the entrusted privilege to practice law
carries with it the correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar and to the
public.
LEGARDA VS CA

FACTS: Petitioner Victoria Legarda was theowner of a parcel of land and the improvementslocated at
123 West Avenue, Quezon City. On January 11, 1985 respondent New Cathay House,Inc. filed a
complaint against the petitioner forspecific performance with preliminary injunctionand damages in
RTC alleging that petitionerentered into a lease agreement with the privaterespondent through
its representative, Roberto V.Cabrera, Jr., of the aforestated property of petitioner. Respondent drew
up the writtencontract and sent it to petitioner, that petitionerfailed and refused to execute and sign
the samedespite demands of respondent.

Petitioner engaged the services of counsel tohandle her case. Said counsel filed hisappearance with
an urgent motion for extensionof time to file the answer within ten (10) daysfrom February 26,
1985. However, said counselfailed to file the answer within the extendedperiod prayed for. Counsel
for private respondentfiled an ex-parte motion to declare petitioner indefault. This was granted by the
trial court onMarch 25, 1985 and private respondent wasallowed to present evidence ex-parte.
Thereafter,on March 25, 1985, the trial court rendered itsdecision.

Said counsel for petitioner received a copy of the judgment but took no steps to have the same setaside
or to appeal therefrom. Thus, the judgmentbecame final and executory. The property of petitioner was
sold at public auction to satisfy the judgment in favor of private respondent. Theproperty was sold
to Roberto V. Cabrera, Jr.,representative of private respondent, and acertificate of sale was issued in his
favor. Theredemption period expired after one year so afinal deed of sale was issued by the sheriff
infavor of Cabrera, who in turn appears to havetransferred the same to private respondent.

During all the time, the petitioner was abroad.When, upon her return, she learned, to her greatshock,
what happened to her case and property,she nevertheless did not lose faith in her counsel.She still
asked Atty. Coronel to take suchappropriate action possible under thecircumstances.

As above related, said counsel filed a petition forannulment of judgment and its amendment in theCourt
of Appeals. But that was all he did. After anadverse judgment was rendered againstpetitioner, of which
counsel was duly notified,said counsel did not inform the petitioner aboutit. He did not even ask for a
reconsiderationthereof, or file a petition for review before thisCourt. Thus, the judgment became final.
It wasonly upon repeated telephone inquiries of petitioner that she learned from the secretary of her
counsel of the judgment that hadunfortunately become final.

HELD

: A lawyer owes entire devotion to theinterest of his client, warmth and zeal in themaintenance and
defense of his rights and theexertion of his utmost learning and ability, to theend that nothing can be
taken or withheld fromhis client except in accordance with the law. Heshould present every remedy
or defenseauthorized by the law in support of his client'scause, regardless of his own personal views.
Inthe full discharge of his duties to his client, thelawyer should not be afraid of the possibility thathe
may displease the judge or the general public.

Judged by the actuations of said counsel in thiscase, he has miserably failed in his duty toexercise his
utmost learning and ability inmaintaining his client's cause.

It is not only acase of simple negligence as found by theappellate court, but of reckless and
grossnegligence, so much so that his client wasdeprived of her property without due process of law. The
Court finds that the negligence of counsel inthis case appears to be so gross and inexcusable. This was
compounded by the fact, that afterpetitioner gave said counsel another chance tomake up for his
omissions by asking him to file apetition for annulment of the judgment in theappellate court, again
counsel abandoned thecase of petitioner in that after he received a copyof the adverse judgment of
the appellate court,he did not do anything to save the situation orinform his client of the judgment.
He allowed the judgment to lapse and become final. Suchreckless and gross negligence should
not beallowed to bind the petitioner. Petitioner wasthereby effectively deprived of her day in
court. Thus, We have before Us a case where to enforcean alleged lease agreement of the property
of petitioner, private respondent went to court, andthat because of the gross negligence of thecounsel
for the petitioner, she lost the case aswell as the title and ownership of the property,which is worth
millions. The mere lessee thennow became the owner of the property. Its trueowner then, the
petitioner, now is consigned topenury all because her lawyer appear to haveabandoned her case not
once but repeatedly.
FRANCISCO JR. VS. BOSA
205 SCRA 722

FACTS:
1. Brothers Juan Jr. and Joram Francisco initiated before the Supreme Court an administrative case for
the disbarment of Attys. Antonio Bosa and Jesus Bandong.
2. Atty. Bosa was the counsel for the complainants in a civil case appealed to the Court of Appeals.
3. Atty. Bosa was charged for his failure to notify his clients of the unfavorable decision of said appellate
court.
4. Complainants alleged that his negligence resulted in the loss of their right to appeal which eventually
led to the loss of 28 hectares of land which should have been adjudicated to them.
5. Joram testified that in a telegram he was requested by his brother Juan to verify the status of their
case pending before the Court of Appeals.
6. At the CA, he discovered to his consternation that a decision in their case was promulgated and that a
copy thereof was received by their counsel Atty. Bosa.
7. Joram wired Atty. Bosa to appeal the case before the SC.
8. Atty. Bosa wired back suggesting they engage the services of another lawyer. By this time, two
months had passed from the time Atty. Bosa received a copy of the decision.
9. Joram again requested Atty. Bosa to file the petition for review before the SC but the request was
ignored.
10. Juan thus engaged the service of Atty. Moralde to take care of the case.
11. Petition filed by the second lawyer was however denied due course by the SC for being filed out of
time.
12. Juan narrated that when he met Atty. Bosa, respondent told him he sent a telegram through
Teodoro Balarete and since he received no reply, he presumed that the Franciscos were no longer
interested in appealing the case.
13. Atty. Jesus Bandong on the other hand is being charged for his failure to forward to the Court of
Appeals with his letter of transmittal, the transcript of stenographic notes of the pre-trial proceedings
and hearing on July 1, 1977 and June 25, 1981 in the civil Case, which transcripts, according to
complainants, were vital to their case.
14. The Francisco brothers testified that Atty. Bandong as Clerk of Court of the RTC of Cataingan,
Masbate falsified the minutes of the pre-trail proceedings because the signatures of Attys. Pecson and
Almario were forged.
15. For his defense, Atty. Bandong said that since he did not prepare the minutes of the July 1, 1977 pre-
trail in the Civil Case, it would be impossible for him to falsify said documents alleging that it is usually
the court interpreter who prepares the minutes.
16. Atty. Bandong denied any knowledge of the missing transcript of stenographic notes taken during
the June 25, 1981 hearing when he prepared the letter of transmittal to the CA.

ISSUE:
Were the lawyers remiss in their duties.

HELD:
No matter how much Atty. Antonio Bosa tries to disclaim negligence on his part in failing to appeal the
case, the evidence indicates otherwise. It is true that the respondent counsel sent to his client by
telegram the information on the adverse decision in the case, yet he never checked whether the
telegram reached its intended addressee. In this regard, he failed to exercise due diligence required of a
counsel. A lawyer handling the case must give his entire devotion to the interest of his client. He must
not do acts detrimental to the cause of his client. Neither shall he neglect a legal matter entrusted to
him for his negligence therewith shall render him liable.

Public interest requires that an attorney must exert his best efforts and ability in the prosecution or
defense of his clients cause. A lawyer who performs that duty with diligence and candor not only
protects the interest of his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar and helps
maintain AND respect of the community to the legal profession. This is so because the entrusted
privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court,
to the bar and to the public.

An examination of the records shows that while not listed in the letter of transmittal, transcripts of
stenographic notes of July 1, 1977 were actually part of the transcripts transmitted to the appellate
court. Thus, complainants cause could not have been affected by this slight error. However, the non-
inclusion of the transcripts of stenographic notes of June 25, 1891 is an entirely different matter.

Had Atty. JB given the records a thorough examination, he would have come across the order of Judge
Alfin S. Vicencio wherein the court-noted testimony of Juan Francisco taken on June 25, 1981. From such
fact, he could have noted the absence of and he should have searched for the transcript of June 25,
1981. Not having done this, he failed to exercise the due care required of him.
ORDONIO VS EDUARTE

FACTS:

Antonia Ulibari filed with RTC for annulment of a document against her children. The case was handled
by Atty. Henerido Eduarte. However, Atty. Henerido Eduarte was appointed as RTC judge. The case of
Ulibari was then transferred to Atty, Josephine Eduarte, wife of Atty. Henerido Eduarte. The RTC
rendered a decision in favor of Antonia Ulibari. Only one of the children, Dominga Ordonio, appealed to
CA. While the appeal was pending in the CA, Antonia conveyed some parcels of her land to her children
in the form of deeds of absolute sale, prepared and notarized by Atty. Josephine Eduarte. Antonia also
conveyed 20 hectares of land to Atty. Josephine and Atty. Henerido as their attorneys fees. All the titles
and lands subject to the deeds of absolute sale and deeds of conveyance were in the name of Antonia.
Subsequently, Dominga filed a disbarment complaint against Atty. Josephine on the basis of an affidavit
executed by her mother, Antonia, stating that she never conveyed parcel of land to Atty. Josephine as
attorneys fees and she had no knowledge of the deeds of absolute sale executed in favor of her
children. The IBPCBD recommended one-year suspension from the practice of law.

ISSUE/S: 1. WON Antonia was defrauded into signing the Deed of Conveyance 2. WON Atty. Josephine
violated any law in preparing and notarizing the deeds of absolute sale in making it appear that there
were considerations therefore, when in truth there were none so received by the seller

HELD:

1. Yes. It is clear from Antonias affidavit and deposition that she never conveyed the said land to her
lawyer as attorneys fees. Granting for the sake of argument that Antonio did convey the land as
attorneys fee, Atty. Josephine should have not caused the execution of the deed since a case was still
pending before CA covering the same land. She violated Art 1491 of the Civil Code which prohibits
lawyers from acquiring assignment property and rights which may be subject of any litigation in which
they may take part by virtue of their profession. The prohibition applies when a lawyer has not paid
money for it and the property was merely assigned to him in consideration of legal services rendered at
a time when the property is still subject of a pending case. 2. Yes. Atty. Josephine admitted that Antonia
did not actually sell parcels of land to her children and that she utilized the form of deed of sale because
it was the most convenient and appropriate document to effect transfer of parcels of land. She violated
part of her oath as a lawyer that she shall not do any falsehood. She violated Rule 10.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Overall holding: Suspension of 6 months for having violated Art 1491 of the
Civil Code another 6 months for violation of lawyers oath and Rule 10.01. Total of one year suspension.
TIANA v. OCAMPO

Facts:

First case:

Maria Tiania claims in her verified complaint that respondent Amado Ocampo who has

been her "retaining counsel" in all her legal problems and court cases as early as 1966,

has always had her unqualified faith and confidence.

One Mrs. Concepcion Blaylock sued Tiania for ejectment from a parcel of land.

Ocampo appeared for Tiania and also for Blaylock.

Tiania confronted Ocampo about this but the latter reassured Tiania that he will take care

of everything and that there was no need for Tiania to hire a new lawyer since he is still

Tiania's lawyer. Ocampo prepared the answer in the said ejectment case, which Tiania

signed. Then Ocampo made Tiania sign a Compromise Agreement which the latter

signed without reading.

Tiania was shocked when she received an order to vacate the property in question. To

hold off her ejectment for another two years, Ocampo advised Tiania to pay him a certain

amount for the sheriff

Ocampo denied the charges in detail. Although he handled some legal problems and

executed some notarial deeds for Tiania from 1966-1971, Tiania had also engaged the

services of various counsel to represent her in several criminal and civil cases, involving

violations of municipal ordinances and estafa. Thus, he could not be the complainant's

"retaining counsel" in all her legal problems and court cases.

Ocampo then insisted that he appeared on behalf of Mrs. Blaylock, and not as counsel of

Tiania. He never saw or talked to Tiania from the time the said civil case was filed up to

the pre-trial and as such could not have discussed with her the complaint, the hiring of
another lawyer, and more so the preparation of the answer in the said case.

He admitted that during the pre-trial of the said case, Tiania showed to him a document

which supported her claim, over the property in question. Ocampo, after going over the

document, expressed his doubts about it authenticity.

This convinced Tiania to sign a Compromise Agreement and to pay the acquisition cost

to Blaylock over a period of six (6) months. But Tiania never fulfilled any of her

obligations. She moreover made the situation worse by selling the contested property to a

third party even after an alias writ of execution had ordered the transfer of the possession

of the disputed property to Blaylock.

Citing Arboleda v. Gatchalian, Ocampo said that the overdue filing of a complaint

against a lawyer should already create a suspicion about the motives of the complainant

or the merit of the complaint.

Second Case:

The Angel spouses, complainants in this case, allege that sometime in 1972, they sold

their house in favor of Blaylock for the amount of seventy thousand pesos, (P70,000.00).

Ocampo (the same respondent Atty. Amado Ocampo), acted as their counsel and

prepared the Deed of Sale of a Residential House and Waiver of Rights Over a Lot.

With the money paid by Blaylock, the Angel spouses bought another parcel of land.

Again, Ocampo prepared the Deed of Sale which was signed by the vendor, a certain

Laura Dalanan, and the Angel spouses, as the vendees. In addition, Ocampo allegedly

made the Angel spouses sign two (2) more documents which, accordingly, were made

parts of the sale transaction.

Those two (2) documents later turned out to be a Real Estate Mortgage of the same

property purchased from Laura Dalanan and a Promissory Note, both in favor of

Blaylock.
 The Angel spouses never realized the nature of the said documents until they received a

complaint naming them as defendants in a collection suit

The Angel spouses added that Ocampo reassured them that there was no need for them to

engage the services of a new lawyer since he will take care of everything.

These acts, the complainants charge, violate the ethics of the legal profession. They lost

their property as a result of the respondent's fraudulent manipulation, taking advantage of

his expertise in law against his own unsuspecting and trusting clients.

As in the first case, Ocampo presented an elaborate explanation.

Ocampo alleged that it was his client, Mrs. Concepcion Blaylock, who introduced to him

the Angel spouses in 1972. Blaylock wanted Ocampo to check the background of the

Angel spouses in connection with the loan they were seeking from Blaylock.

The Solicitor General charged the respondent Atty. Amado Ocampo with malpractice and

gross misconduct punishable under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court of the

Philippines and violation of his oath of office as an attorney

Issue: WON respondent Atty. Ocampo is guilty of representing conflicting interests?

Held:

Yes

The specific law applicable in both administrative cases is Rule 15.03 of the Code of

Professional Responsibility which provides:

A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interest except by written consent of all

concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.

The Court prohibits the representation of conflicting interests not only because the
relation of attorney and client is one of trust and confidence of the highest degree, but

also because of the principles of public policy and good taste. An attorney has the duty to

deserve the fullest confidence of his client and represent him with undivided loyalty.

Once this confidence is abused, the entire profession suffers.

The aforementioned acts of the respondent in representing Blaylock, and at the same time

advising Tiania, the opposing party, as in the first administrative case, and once again

representing Blaylock and her interest while handling the legal documents of another

opposing party as in the second case, whether the said actions were related or totally

unrelated, constitute serious misconduct.

However, taking into consideration the advanced age of the respondent, who would have

reached seventy three (73) years, as of this date, the Court, while uncompromisingly firm

in its stand against erring lawyers, nonetheless appreciates the advance years of the

respondent in his favor.

Wherefore, respondent is suspended for a period of one year.

Terre vs terre

SUMMARY:

Disbarment case against Jordan Terre who convinced a married woman to marry without
judicial declaration of nullityof void marriage (incestuous) AND THEN marrying someone else after a few
years without getting a judicial declaration of nullity forhis first marriage (bigamous).

FACTS:

12/24/1981: Disbarment case filed by Dorothy B. Terre against Jordan Terre for "grossly immoral
conduct,"

Jordan Terre alleged to have contracted a second marriage and living with another woman other than
complainant, whilehis prior marriage with complainant remained subsists

4/24/85: Three years, respondent still has not answered. SC decided to suspend respondent for evading
notice from court.

9/28/85: Respondent finally answered via Answer with Motion to Set Aside/Lift Suspension. Stated the
ff:

Petitioner Dorothy Terre was married to Merito Bercenilla 1968

Petitioner mockingly told him of her private meetings with Bercenilla and that child she was
carrying then was theson of Bercenilla

That believing in good faith, Jordan Terre married Helina Malicdem believing that his first marriage is
void ab initio.

SC denied petition

Petitioner testified. Petitioner and Respondent met highschool where petitioner was already married.
Both moved toManila where eventually, respondent studied Law in Lyceum. Respondent continued
courting her even with the knowledgethat she was married. Respondent said that her prior marriage
was void ab initio since Bercenilla is her first cousin.

Despite her objections, respondent wrote single under her status in the marriage license stating
that her first marriage was void ab initio and requires no judicial declaration. Couple was thereby
married.

Respondent suddenly left petitioner 1981. Eventually, respondent found out that respondent married.

ISSUE/S:

WON a judicial declaration of nullity is needed to enter into a subsequent marriage

RULING:

Respondent disbarred.
RATIO:

The Court considers this claim on the part of respondent Jordan Terre as a spurious defense. In the
first place, respondent has notrebutted complainant's evidence as to the basic facts which underscores
the bad faith of respondent Terre. In the second place, thatpretended defense is the same argument by
which he had inveigled complainant into believing that her prior marriage to Merlito A.Bercenilla being
incestuous and void ab initio (Dorothy and Merlito being allegedly first cousins to each other), she
was free tocontract a second marriage with the respondent.Respondent Jordan Terre, being a lawyer,
knew or should have known that such an argument ran counter to the prevailing case lawof this Court
which holds that

for purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to contract a second marriage, a
judicialdeclaration that the first marriage was null and void ab initio is essential

.Even if we were to assume, arguendo merely, that Jordan Terre held that mistaken belief in good faith,
the same result will follow.For if we are to hold Jordan Terre to his own argument, his first marriage to
complainant Dorothy Terre must be deemed valid, withthe result that his second marriage to Helina
Malicdem must be regarded as bigamous and criminal in character.
Licuanan vs Melo

170 SCRA 100 Legal Ethics Duty to Hold in Trust Clients Money

In 1979, Licuanan won a case against her tenant Aida Pineda whereby Pineda was ordered to pay the
rents due to Licuanan. Pineda complied and she started paying the rents to Licuanans lawyer, Atty.
Manuel Melo. So for 12 months, Melo received the rental payments but he did not turn over the said
payments to Licuanan. Licuanan did inquire about said payment but Melo withheld information about
the fact that Pineda was actually paying. As a consequence, Licuanan filed a case against Pineda. Pineda
in turn filed a damage suit against Licuanan as she claims that the case filed by Licuanan against her is
groundless as she was in fact paying her rents.

Eventually, Licuanan find out that Melo failed to deliver to her the rents. Licuanan then filed an affidavit
complaint against Melo. Melo in his defense said that he withheld information about the rent payments
for a year because he merely wanted to surprise Licuanan about the success of the collections. The
Solicitor General subsequently recommended the suspension of Melo for not less than one year.

ISSUE: Whether or not Melo should be suspended.

HELD: No. As ruled by the Supreme Court, he should be disbarred. Melos retaining of Licuanans money
for more than a year breached his oath and transgressed the Code of Professional Responsibility. Such
action did not merely deprive Licuanan of the use of her money but also caused her to file a groundless
suit against Pineda and on top of that, Licuanan had to defend herself in a damage suit filed against her
in turn by Pineda. In all, Melos actuations make him guilty of deceit, malpractice and gross misconduct
in office. He has displayed lack of honesty and good moral character. He has violated his oath not to
delay any man for money or malice, besmirched the name of an honorable profession and has proven
himself unworthy of the trust reposed in him by law as an officer of the Court. He deserves the severest
punishment of disbarment.
QUILBAN V ROBINOL

PER CURIAM; April 10, 1989

NATURE

ADMINISTRATIVE CASES in the Supreme Court. Disbarment.

FACTS

- The Colegio de San Jose, through its administrator, Father Federico Escaler, sold a land to the Quezon
City Government as thesite for the Quezon City General Hospital but reserved an area of 2,743 square
meters as a possible development site. Squatters,however, settled in the area since 1965 or 1966. In
1970, the Colegio, through Father Escaler gave permission to CongressmanLuis R. Taruc to build on the
reserved site a house for his residence and a training center for the Christian Social Movement.Seeing
the crowded shanties of squatters, Congressman Taruc suggested to Father Escaler the idea of donating
or selling the landcheap to the squatters. Congressman Taruc then advised the squatters to form an
organization and choose a leader authorized tonegotiate with Father Escaler. Following that advice, the
squatters formed the "Samahang Pagkakaisa ng Barrio Bathala", withBernabe Martin as President.- But
instead of working for the welfare of the Samahan, Martin went to one Maximo Rivera, a realtor, with
whom he connived toobtain the sale to the exclusion of the other Samaban members. The land was
ultimately sold to Rivera at a cheap price of PI5 persquare meter or a total consideration of P41,961.65.
The prevailing price of the land in the vicinity then was P1 00 to P1 20 persquare meter. Father Escaler
had been made to believe that Rivera represented the squatters on the property.- In 1972, thirty-two
heads of families of the Samahan filed the case against Rivera, et. al. The CFI, however, dismissed the
case.- To prosecute the appea in the CAl, the Samahan members hired as their counsel Atty. Santiago R.
Robinol for which the latterwas paid P2,000.00 as attorney's fees on. Atty. Robinol was also to be given
by the members a part of the land, subject matter of the case, equal to the portion that would pertain to
each of them. What was initially a verbal commitment on the land sharing wasconfirmed in writing.- On
14 November 1978, the Court of Appeals reversed the CFI Decision and ruled in favor of the plaintiffs.-
To raise the amount of P41,961.65 ordered paid by the Court of Appeals, plus expenses for ejectment of
the non-plaintiffsoccupying the property, conveyance, documentation, transfer of title etc., the five
officers of the Samahan collected, little by little,P2,500.00 from each head of family. The Treasurer, Luis
Agawan, issued the proper receipts prepared by Atty. Robinol.- On 18 May 1979, the sum of P68,970.00
was turned over to Atty. Robinol by the officers; on 31 May 1979 the amounts of P1,030.00 and
P2,500.00 respectively; and on 2 June 1979, the sum of P2,500.00, or a total of P75,000.00.- After almost
a year, the five officers discovered that no payment had been made to Rivers. When queried, Atty.
Robinol repliedthat there was an intervention filed in the civil case and that a Writ of Execution bad not
yet been issued by the CFI of Quezon City.However, it turned out that the motion for intervention had
already been dismissed. After confronting Atty. Robinol with that fact, thelatter gave other excuses,
which the officers discovered to have no basis at all.- On 6 March 1980, 21 out of 32 plaintiffs arrived at
a "first consensus" to change their counsel, Atty. Robinol. The officers of theSamahan thereafter
approached Atty. AnacIeto R. Montemayor, who agreed to be their counsel, after he was shown the
documentcontaining the consensus of the Samahan members to change Atty. Robinol as their lawyer.
Upon Atty. Montemayor's advice, theofficers sent Atty. Robinol a letter informing the latter of their
decision to terminate his services and demanding the return of the P75,000.00 deposited with him. Atty.
Robinol turned deaf ears to the demand. A subsequent letter of the same tenor as similarlydisregarded
by Atty. Robinol.- On 20 March 1980, Atty. Montemayor formally entered his appearance in a civil case
as counsel for the plaintiffs, vice Atty.Robinol, on the strength of the authority given him by plaintiffs in
said civil case through the five officers. Atty. Montemayor thenfiled on 20 March 1980 a Motion for
Execution praying that the defendants and/or the Clerk of Court be directed to execute adeed of
conveyance in favor of the plaintiffs. At the hearing of the Motion for Execution, Atty. Robinol
manifested that he had noobjection to the appearance of and his substitution by Atty. Montemayor.-
Because Atty. Robinol, however, still questioned the first consensus, another document labelled the a
second consensus" wassigned by 21 plaintiffs during a meeting held for the purpose on 24 November
1980 to the effect that they had decided to changeAtty. Robinol as their counsel because he had
delayed paying for their land notwithstanding the Decision of the Court of Appeals intheir favor.-
Administrative Case No. 2144:

On 15 April 1980 the Samahan officers filed this Administrative Complaint before this Courtrequesting
the investigation of Atty. Robinolfor refusal to return the P75,000.00 and praying that the Court exercise
its power of discipline over members of the Bar unworthy to practice law.-

Administrative Case No. 2180:

Atty. Robinol filed a complaint for Disbarment against Atty. Anacleto R. Montemayor for alleged gross
unethical conduct unbecoming of a lawyer in that Atty. Montemayor readily accepted the case without
his (Robinol's) formal withdrawal and conformity and knowing fully well that there was no consensus of
all the plaintiffs to discharge him as their counsel.- Court referred administrative cases to the Sol. Gen.
who recommended: 1. That Atty. Santiago R. Robinol be suspended for threemonths for refusing to
deliver the funds of the plaintiffs in his possession, with the warning that a more severe penalty will
beimposed for a repetition of the same or similar act, and that he be ordered to return to the plaintiffs,
the sum of P75,000.00. 2.That the case against Atty. Anacleto R. Montemayor, be dismissed, since he
has not committed any misconduct imputed to him byAtty. Robinol.

ISSUES

1. WON Atty. Robinol should be suspended

2. WON Atty. Montemayor should be disbarred

HELD

1. YES

Reasoning

Atty. Robinol has, in fact, been guilty of ethical infractions and grave misconduct that make him
unworthy to continue inthe practice of the profession. After the CA had rendered a Decision favorable
to his clients and he had received the latter's funds,suddenly, he had a change of mind and decided to
convert the payment of his fees from a portion of land equivalent to that of eachof the plaintiffs to
P50,000.00, which he alleges to be the monetary value of that area. Certainly, Atty. Robinol had no right
tounilaterally appropriate his clients' money not only because he is bound by a written agreement but
also because, under thecircumstances, it was highly unjust for him to have done so. His clients were
mere squatters who could barely eke out an existence.They had painstakingly raised their respective
quotas of P2,500.00 per family with which to pay for the land only to be deprived of the same by one
who, after having seen the color of money, heartlessly took advantage of them.
- Atty. Robinol has no basis to claim that since he was unjustly dismissed by his clients he had the legal
right to retain the money inhis possession. Firstly, there was justifiable ground for his discharge as
counsel. His clients had lost confidence in him for he hadobviously engaged in dilatory tactics to the
detriment of their interests, which he was duty-bound to pro. tect. Secondly, even if there were no valid
ground, he is bereft of any legal right to retain his clients' funds intended for a specific purpose-the
purchase of land. He stands obliged to return the money immediately to their rightful owners.- The
Court agrees with the Solicitor General that complainants' evidence on this is the more credible. And
that he had, in fact,received the total sum of P75,000-00. Inevitable, therefore, is the conclusion that
Atty. Robinol has rendered himself unfit tocontinue in the practice of law. He has not only

violated his oath not to delay any man for money and to conduct himself with all good fidelity to his
clients

He has also brought the profession into disrepute

with people who had reposed in it full faith andreliance for the fulfillment of a life-time ambition to
acquire a homelot they could call their own.2. NO

Reasoning

In so far as Atty. Montemayor is concerned, we agree with the findings of the Solicitor General that he
has notexposed himself to any plausible charge of unethical conduct in the exercise of his profession
when he agreed to serve as counselfor the plaintiffs.There is no doubt that clients are free to change
their counsel in a pending case at any time (Section 26, Rule138, Rules of Court) and thereafter employ
another lawyer who may then enter his appearance. In this case, the plaintiffs in thecivil suit below
decided to change their lawyer, Atty. Robinol, for loss of trust and confidence. That act was well within
theirprerogative. In so far as the complaint for disbarment filed by Atty. Robinol against Atty.
Montemayor is concerned, therefore, thesame is absolutely without merit.

Disposition

- Atty. Santiago R. Robinol is hereby DISBARRED for having violated his lawyer's oath to delay no man for
money, broken thefiduciary relation between lawyer and client, and proven himself unworthy to
continue in the practice of law. By reason of hisunethical actuations, he is hereby declared to have
forfeited his rights to attorney's fees and is ordered to return the amount of P75,000.00 to the
plaintiffs.- Administrative Case No. 2180 against Atty. Anacleto R. Montemayor for disbarment is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Alberto Fernandez vs Atty. Benjamin Grecia

42 SCAD 438 Legal Ethics Gross Misconduct

In 1990, Linda Aves was admitted to St. Lukes Hospital. Among the doctors who treated her was Dr.
Alberto Fernandez. She was treated well hence she was sent home but then the next day she died
together with her unborn child. Damaso Aves, husband, then filed a damage suit against the hospital
and he impleaded the attending doctors which included Fernandez. Aves hired Atty. Benjamin Grecia to
represent him.

Grecia requested St. Luke to surrender before the court the medical records of Linda Aves. St. Luke
complied and the medical records were delivered to the Clerk of Court. In the morning of July 16, 1991,
Grecia went to the office of the clerk of court to borrow the said medical records. While Grecia was
examining the said medical records, he tore in front of the Clerk and one office staff two pages from the
medical records and then handed it back to the Clerk. The Clerk was stunned as she watched Grecia walk
away. She then reported the incident to the judge. The judge immediately took action and the torn
pages were eventually recovered as it turned out that Grecia handed the torn pages to someone else.

Grecia was then administratively charged by Dr. Fernandez. Apparently, Grecia has been disbarred
before. However, he was able to get to the good side of the Supreme Court hence he was reinstated to
the profession.

ISSUE: Whether or not Grecia should be disbarred again.

HELD: Yes. Grecia violated the Code of Professional Responsibility. As a lawyer, he should not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful conduct. A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and
dignity of the legal profession and support the activities of the Integrated Bar. A lawyer is an officer of
the courts; he is like the court itself, an instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice.
Considering that this is his second offense, an incorrigible practitioner of dirty tricks, like Grecia would
be ill-suited to discharge the role of an instrument to advance the ends of justice. By descending to
the level of a common thief, respondent Grecia has demeaned and disgraced the legal profession. He
has demonstrated his moral unfitness to continue as a member of the honorable fraternity of lawyers.
He has forfeited his membership in the BAR.
Reontoy vs. Ibadlit

DUTY OF A LAWYER; A lawyer is without authority to waive his client's right to appeal and that his failure
to appeal within the prescribed period constitutes negligence and malpractice.

FACTS: On January 28, 1998, the Supreme Court issued a resolution holding respondent Atty. Liberato
Ibadlit administratively liable. The latter was suspended from the practice of law for one year for failing
to appeal within the reglementary period the decision rendered against his client, complainant Corazon
Reontoy, in Civil Case No. 2805. In his motion for reconsideration, respondent argued that he believed in
good faith that his client's case was weak and that the complainant wholeheartedly accepted his
explanation that the adverse decision was not worth appealing anymore. Respondent further claimed
that complainant had reasonable opportunity to hire another counsel for a second opinion whether to
appeal from the judgement or file a petition for relief.

HELD: The Supreme Court declared that it was highly improper for the respondent to have adopted his
opinion that to appeal the decision would be futile. A lawyer is without authority to waive his client's
right to appeal and that his failure to appeal within the prescribed period constituted negligence and
malpractice, proscribed by Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
provides "(a) lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable. In the case at bar, finding the arguments of respondent Atty. Liberato
Ibadlit to be without merit, the Supreme Court resolved to imposed a penalty of two months suspension
from the practice of law with warning that he should be more attentive to and solicitous of the welfare
of his clients. [Reontoy vs. Ibadlit, Adm. Case CBD No. 190; February 04, 1999; Second Division---
Bellosillo, J.]
Basilio Palang vs. Judge Mariano Zosa

G.R. No. L-38229 August 30, 1974

FACTS:

After respondent Judge had acquitted Julieto P. Herrera of the crime of estafa, with the statement in his
opinion that the charge was nothing but a "clear concocted story" with the testimonies being"
rehearsed and rehashed therefore, maliciously presented by the offended party, now petitioner, causing
great damage and prejudice to Herrera's moral and social standing and a destruction of his image as well
as his character, the aforesaid Herrera, thus acquitted, now private respondent here, filed an action for
damages against the complainant, now petitioner. It is his submission here that considering the
language used by respondent Judge, he would not be able to decide such civil case justly and impartially.
The respondent Judge respectfully manifests that he voluntarily inhibits himself from conducting the
trial of the said case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent judge is allowed to inhibit

RULING:

This voluntary inhibition by respondent Judge is to be commended. He has lived up to what is expected
of occupants of the bench. The public faith in the impartial administration of justice is thus reinforced. It
is not enough that they decide cases without bias and favoritism. It does not suffice that they in fact rid
themselves of prepossessions. Their actuation must inspire that belief. This is an instance where
appearance is just as important as the reality. Like Caesar's wife, a judge must not only be pure but
beyond suspicion. At least, that is an ideal worth striving for. What is more, there is deference to the
due process mandate.
Marquez vs Llamas

Charges:

immorality and gross misconduct.

FACTS:

The complainants are court employees. They allegedthat the respondent judge, although married,
maintains anillicit relationship with a married woman, Lourdes Munoz-Garcia (who fondly calls him
Daddyor Masiken[Pangasinense for old man]and the relationship istrumpeted in open view) and
both are living together ashusband and wife under one roof. The Judge also used theoffice of his
personnel as dancing halls and drinking winerooms during office hours. And the Judge was even
drunkalmost everyday (his court interpreter alleged that heholds a glass of wine while roaming the
Justice Hall duringoffice hours and would force his staff to drink with himand some lawyers and litigants.
He loves Carlsber winesbecause they make him feel young). They were alsosubjected to intimidated and
harassed by the respondentJudge.

Associate Justice Romeo A. Brawner of the Court ofAppeals findings and recommendation:

Respondent Judge has failed to live up to these exactingmagnitude of how a judge should behave. His
disregard forcommon decency and morality has made him unfit todischarge his present position and
thus his dismissal is in order. His retirement benefits should likewise be forfeitedbut his wife who has
never appeared on the scene shouldnow be his saving grace against such forfeiture.

Indeed it is the wife of Judge Llamas who is the aggrievedparty in the infidelity of her husband but she
was not theone who initiated this complaint nor did she participate inits prosecution. This factor should
be considered inrespondent Judges favor and therefore he should bespared the forfeiture of his earned
benefits.

Justice Brawner thus recommended that respondent Judgebe dismissed from service but without
forfeiture of hisearned benefits.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent judge is guilty ofimmorality.

RULING:

YES.In administrative proceedings, only substantialevidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence that
areasonable mind might accept as adequate to support aconclusion, is required. We find no room to
accommodate doubts on Justice Brawners findings of facts, which we find to be a result of a meticulous
and dispassionateanalysis of the testimonies of the complainants and therespondent as well as their
respective witnesses. Thus, we adopt Justice Brawners recommendation of dismissal.

The Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a judgeshould be the embodiment of competence,
integrity, andindependence. He should so behave at all times as topromote public confidence in the
integrity and impartialityof the judiciary, and avoid impropriety and the appearanceof impropriety in all
activities. His personal behavior, notonly while in the performance of official duties but alsooutside the
court, must be beyond reproach, for he is, as heso aptly is perceived to be, the visible personification
oflaw and of justice.

Regrettably, respondent Judge failed to live up tothese standards. He brazenly flouted judicial ethics
and betrayed judicial standards by using his court to indulge his drinking, singing and dancing habits to
the detriment ofthe other courts within the building who were disturbedby all the noise coming from his
courtroom; and, especially, by maintaining an illicit relationship withLourdes Muoz Garcia, a married
woman. A judge suffersfrom moral obtuseness or has a weird notion of morality inpublic office when he
labors under the delusion that he canbe a judge and at the same time have a mistress in defianceof the
mores and sense of morality of the community.

A judge traces a line around his official as well aspersonal conduct, a price one has to pay for occupying
anexalted position in the judiciary, beyond which he may notfreely venture. No position is more
demanding as regards moral righteousness and uprightness of any individual than a seat on the Bench.
Thus, a judge ought to live up tothe strictest standard of honesty, integrity anduprightness. Certainly,
keeping a mistress is not an act onewould expect of a judge who is expected to posses thehighest
standard of morality and decency.

Respondent Judge shamelessly mocked the dignity ofhis office and tainted the image of the entire
judiciary towhich he owes fealty and the obligation to keep it at alltime unsullied and worthy of the
peoples trust. Respondent Judge has shown himself unworthy of thejudicial robe and the place of
honor reserved for theguardian of justice in a civilized community. On thisoccasion, therefore, the Court
metes upon respondentJudge the severest of administrative penalties. He is herebystripped of his
judicial robe.

However, we are unable to agree with the reservation of Justice Brawner on the forfeiture of earned
benefits due respondent Judge based on the fact that respondent Judges wife was not the one who
initiated this complaint nor did she participate in its prosecution. The non-participation or non-
appearance of the wife in the administrative proceedings for immorality is not a factor in the imposition
of penalty. Neither should it be beneficial to respondent Judge.

DISPOSITION: GUILTY OF THE CHARGE OFIMMORALITY. HEREBY DISMISSED WITH FORFEITURE OF50%
OF HIS RETIREMENT BENEFITS.
Maceda vs. Vasquez (G.R. No. 102781)

Facts: Respondent Napoleon Abiera of PAO filed a complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman
against petitioner RTC Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda. Respondent Abiera alleged that petitioner Maceda
has falsified his certificate of service by certifying that all civil and criminal cases which have been
submitted for decision for a period of 90 days have been determined and decided on or before January
31, 1989, when in truth and in fact, petitioner Maceda knew that no decision had been rendered in 5
civil and 10 criminal cases that have been submitted for decision. Respondent Abiera alleged that
petitioner Maceda falsified his certificates of service for 17 months.

Issue: Whether or not the investigation made by the Ombudsman constitutes an encroachment into the
SCs constitutional duty of supervision over all inferior courts

Held: A judge who falsifies his certificate of service is administratively liable to the SC for serious
misconduct and under Sec. 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and criminally liable to the State under the
Revised Penal Code for his felonious act.

In the absence of any administrative action taken against him by the Court with regard to his certificates
of service, the investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the Courts power of
administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of
powers.

Art. VIII, Sec. 6 of the Constitution exclusively vests in the SC administrative supervision over all courts
and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the CA down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk.
By virtue of this power, it is only the SC that can oversee the judges and court personnels compliance
with all laws, and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation
thereof. No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the
doctrine of separation of powers.

Where a criminal complaint against a judge or other court employee arises from their administrative
duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the same to the SC for
determination whether said judge or court employee had acted within the scope of their administrative
duties.
Case: Sangalang vs. Gaston, Aug. 30, 1989
G. R. No. 71169

Facts:

The issue of the case started when Ayala Corporation removed the fence or wall on the
commercial block along the Jupiter Street inside the Bel-Air Subd. in Makati City. Said wall was erected
originally in between of the residential lots and commercial lots. Petitioners maintained that Ayala corp
possessed that contractual obligation to maintain the privacy and security of the homeowners free from
the access of animals and strangers. Hence, according to the petitioners, Ayala Corp is obligated under
the said reasons and pursuant to the restrictive easements present in the stipulations embodied in the
deed restrictions containing the restrictions to be imposed in 50 years. On its defense, Ayala Corp.
argued that it cannot be held liable in tearing down the perimeter wall because of Ordinance no. 81
enacted by the Municipality of Makati as well as the Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance No. 8101 which
allowed the use of Jupiter St. both for residential and commercial purposes.

The lower court rendered judgments in favor of the petitioners and ordered to
reconstruct the wall on its original perimeter with the allowance of damages. On appeal, the CA
reversed the decisions for lack of cause of action.

Issue: Whether or not Ayala Corp. can be held liable for tearing down the perimeter wall despite of the
enactment of the aforementioned statutes?

Ruling: No. The wall was not originally constructed for the exclusive use of either block, least of
all the residents of Bel-Air village. Therefore, it cannot be said to have been for the exclusive
benefit of the latter. Neither petitioners cannot rely on the alleged promise through
announcement made to the homeowners to build and/or maintain perpetually a fence or a
wall as evidence of Ayalas alleged continuing obligation to maintain the peace and privacy of
the Bel-Air residents. The Court does not agree that Ayala had categorically assumed as an
obligation to maintain the wall perpetually until the date of the expiration of the deed
restrictions.
Case: IN RE: SUSPENSION OF VICENTE PELAEZ

March 3, 1923

Facts: Vicente Pelaez is a lawyer and was appointed as guardian of the minor Gracia Cabrera.
As such guardian, he came into possession of certain property including the 20 shares of E.
Michael Co. and 10 shares of the Phil. Engineering Co. While was still a guardian, he borrowed
2,800 from Phil. Natl Bank (PNB). To guarantee the loan, he deposited the shares of stock
corresponding to the guardianship without the knowledge and consent of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu. Said facts caused the judge of First Instance to suspend him from the legal
profession.

Issue: Whether or not:

1. The Courts in the Philippines authorized to suspend or disbar a lawyer for causes other than
those enumerated in the statute?
2. May a lawyer may be disbarred or be suspended for non-professional misconduct?

Ruling: Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that a member of the bar may be
removed or suspended from this office as lawyer by the Supreme Court for any of the causes therein
enumerated. It will be noticed that our statute merely provides that certain cause shall be deemed
sufficient for the revocation or suspension of an attorney's license. It does not provide that these
shall constitute the only causes for disbarment, or that an attorney may not be disbarred or
suspended for other reasons. The prior tendency of the decisions of this court has been toward the
conclusion that a member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as lawyer for
other than statutory grounds. Indeed, the statute is so phrased as to be broad enough to cover
practically any misconduct of a lawyer.

Anent the second issue, as a general rule, a court will not assume jurisdiction to discipline
one of its officers for misconduct alleged to have been committed in his private capacity. But this is a
general rule with many exceptions. The courts sometimes stress the point that the attorney has
shown, through misconduct outside of his professional dealings, a want of such professional honesty
as render him unworthy of public confidence, and an unfit and unsafe person to manage the legal
business of others.
Case: BAUTISTA vs GUEVARRA

G. R. No. L-2278-MJ

July 11, 1986

Facts: Judge Guevarra was arrested by the NBI while in the act of receiving the marked money of
P600.00 being asked for from the complainant Bautista. The complainant further alleged that the
respondent Judge previous to the arrest incident that he received from the complainant the amount
of P600.00 to dismiss the criminal complaint against Bautista and his nephew for violation of Art. 195
in RPC.

The respondent Judge was convicted by the Sandiganbayan for the crime charged which was
eventually brought to the SC. Thereafter, on Jan. 17, 1983 Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 was
implemented. Respondent Judge in his motion averred that the charge against him be dismissed for
being moot and academic. Judge Navarro, executive Judge upon said motion filed by the respondent
rendered an order of dismissal of the case on account of the implementation of BP 129.

Issue: Whether or not judges have the authority in law to dismiss a disbarment case for being moot and
academic on account of the implementation of BP 129 even if there was already a final judgment?

Ruling: No. It is the Court alone that should be left to decide the appropriate action to be taken.
Judge Navarro was ordered by the Court to conduct further investigation of facts supported by
evidence. The ultimate action should have been left to this Court. Respondent Judge was ordered to
refrain from performing his duty and eventually was convicted by the Sandiganbayan for violation of
Anit-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

Therefore, the dismissal of the administrative case would be highly improper because
respondent judge was convicted of the said crime. The Court resolved to consider the aforesaid
judgment against the respondent judge as sufficient ground for his disbarment.
Case: DINOY vs ROSAL

Adm. Case No. 3721

August 17, 1994

Facts: Complainant Dinoy charged Atty. Rosal with having notarized a SPA in favor of Estela
Gentacutan at a time when some of the principals mentioned in the document were already dead.
Dinoy submitted his evidence to support his charge against the respondent such as Xerox copy of
death certificate and certification issued by the Parish Church indicating that the skeletal remains
have been interred in the Calamba Roman Catholic Cemetery. The respondent averred that
notwithstanding the heavy workload, he was satisfied that the persons who signed the documents
were the ones who represented themselves to be such.

Atty. Legaspi set a hearing and received the evidences of the parties. After hearing Atty.
Legaspi rendered a resolution finding the respondents negligence in having careful interview of the
individuals who executed the questioned documents. Attys. report or recommendation was
adopted by the Board of the Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Phils.

Issue: Whether or not respondent Rosal failed to exercise the required standard of care in complying with
the formalities in the performance of his duties as a notarial officer?

Ruling: Yes. The Court finds that the conclusions of the IBP in its report are supported by substantial
evidence. Notarization of a private document converts into a public one and renders it admissible in
courts without further proof of its authenticity. It is the duty of a notarial officer to demand that a
document be signed in his presence by the real parties thereto; the notarial officer must observe
utmost care to comply with the elementary formalities in the performance of his duties. However,
the administrative sanction of 6 months of suspension is reduced to 3 months for being too harsh
considering that it only relates to one document only.
Case: GO vs CA

G. R. No. 101837

Feb. 11, 1992

Facts: An information was filed against petitioner Go for murder. Petitioner voluntary presented
himself accompanied by his 2 lawyers upon obtaining knowledge of being hunted by the police. He
was immediately detained and denied his right to preliminary investigation unless he executes a
waiver of the provisions of Art. 125 of the RPC. Upon omnibus motion for immediate release on
recognizance or on bail and proper preliminary investigation on the ground that his warrantless
arrest was unlawful and no preliminary investigation was conducted before the information was
filed, the same was granted but later on reversed by the lower court and affirmed by the CA on the
ground that the warrantless arrest was valid in view of the fact that the offense was committed and
the petitioner was clearly identified and there exists valid information for murder filed against
petitioner. Hence, this petition

Issue: Whether or not:

1. The warrantless arrest was lawful?

2. Petitioner waived his right to preliminary investigation?

Ruling: The general rule is that the arrest is valid if effected with valid warrant. However, there are
instances specifically enumerated when a warrantless arrest may be considered lawful. In the case at
bar, the warrantless arrest of herein petitioner Go does not fall of said rule. The police were not
present at the time of the commission of the crime, neither do they have personal knowledge on the
crime to be committed or has been committed not to mention the fact the petitioner was not a
prisoner who has escaped from the penal institution. Nevertheless, petitioner has all the right to ask
for a preliminary investigation to determine whether there is a probable cause that a crime has been
committed and that petitioner is probably guilty thereof.

Anent the second issue, petitioner did not waive his right to preliminary investigation. The
right thereto is deemed waived when the accused fails to invoke it before or at the time of entering a
plea at arraignment. For the above reasons, the SC granted the petition. However, failure to accord
preliminary investigation did not impair the validity of the information charging the latter of the
crime of murder.
Case: GEESLIN vs NAVARRO

A. C. No. 2033
May 9, 1990

Facts: Atty. Navarro, respondent herein this case, was charged for malpractice and gross
misconduct by herein complaints, who seek the disbarment of the respondent on the ground that he
openly sell titled lots and thereby misrepresented himself as the owner of those land in question. On
that premises, one of the complainants sent a letter to the SC informing the latter the modus
operandi of the respondent. While on investigation conducted by the Solicitor General, the SC
ordered the suspension of respondent Navarro while the administrative case is pending. However,
despite the suspension the respondent continued to do the acts being complained of.

Navarro testified that he became the owner of the lands not occupied by his clients by virtue
of his contract of legal services allegedly signed by them. More so, he persisted that his clients title
over the land in question was rendered null and void by virtue of the expiration of the Parity
Amendment and the decision of the SC in the Quasha Case.

Issue: Whether or not:

1. Navarro sold properties titled in the names of other persons without the consent of the latter?
2. If in the affirmative, whether or not such acts constitute sufficient grounds for suspension or
disbarment?

Ruling: No. pursuant to the provisions of the contract of legal services, the defendants-clients
agreed to convey to respondent whatever properties may be adjudicated in their favor in the event
of their to pay the attorneys fees agreed upon. As hereinbefore stated, there was nothing awarded
to the said defendants except the right to possess for the nonce the lots they were occupying,
nothing more. It follows that his acts of selling the properties in question is patently and indisputably
illegal.

Anent the second issue, it further bears mention that despite the suspension of respondent
from the practice of law, he continues to do so in clear violation and open defiance of the original
resolution of suspension issued by the SC. Such acts of the respondent are evidential of flouting
resistance to lawful orders of constituted authority and illustrate his incorrigible despiciency for an
attorneys duty for the society.