EN BANC
ESCOLIN, J.:
a] Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37, 38, 59, 64, 103,
171, 179, 184, 197, 200, 234, 265, 286, 298, 303, 312,
324, 325, 326, 337, 355, 358, 359, 360, 361, 368, 404,
406, 415, 427, 429, 445, 447, 473, 486, 491, 503, 504,
521, 528, 551, 566, 573, 574, 594, 599, 644, 658, 661,
718, 731, 733, 793, 800, 802, 835, 836, 923, 935, 961,
1017-1030, 1050, 1060-1061, 1085, 1143, 1165, 1166,
1242, 1246, 1250, 1278, 1279, 1300, 1644, 1772, 1808,
1810, 1813-1817, 1819-1826, 1829-1840, 1842-1847.
c] General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64 &
65.
The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case
dismissed outright on the ground that petitioners have no legal
personality or standing to bring the instant petition. The view is
submitted that in the absence of any showing that petitioners are
personally and directly affected or prejudiced by the alleged non-
publication of the presidential issuances in question 2 said petitioners
are without the requisite legal personality to institute this mandamus
proceeding, they are not being "aggrieved parties" within the meaning
of Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which we quote:
Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of the
petition concerns a public right and its object is to compel the
performance of a public duty, they need not show any specific interest
for their petition to be given due course.
The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as the 1910
case of Severino vs. Governor General, 3 this Court held that while the
general rule is that "a writ of mandamus would be granted to a private
individual only in those cases where he has some private or particular
interest to be subserved, or some particular right to be protected,
independent of that which he holds with the public at large," and "it is
for the public officers exclusively to apply for the writ when public
rights are to be subserved [Mithchell vs. Boardmen, 79 M.e., 469],"
nevertheless, "when the question is one of public right and the object
of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the
people are regarded as the real party in interest and the relator at
whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he
has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to
show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the
laws [High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 3rd ed., sec. 431].
Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator Lope Severino, a
private individual, as a proper party to the mandamus proceedings
brought to compel the Governor General to call a special election for
the position of municipal president in the town of Silay, Negros
Occidental. Speaking for this Court, Mr. Justice Grant T. Trent said:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless
it is otherwise provided, ...
The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act
of Congress, having been found to be unconstitutional, was
not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and
imposing no duties, and hence affording no basis for the
challenged decree. Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425,
442; Chicago, 1. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559,
566. It is quite clear, however, that such broad statements
as to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality
must be taken with qualifications. The actual existence of a
statute, prior to such a determination, is an operative fact
and may have consequences which cannot justly be
ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial
declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to
invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects-
with respect to particular conduct, private and official.
Questions of rights claimed to have become vested, of
status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality and
acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the light of the
nature both of the statute and of its previous application,
demand examination. These questions are among the most
difficult of those which have engaged the attention of
courts, state and federal and it is manifest from numerous
decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of
absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.
SO ORDERED.
Separate Opinions
5. Nor can I agree with the rather sweeping conclusion in the opinion
of Justice Escolin that presidential decrees and executive acts not thus
previously published in the Official Gazette would be devoid of any
legal character. That would be, in my opinion, to go too far. It may be
fraught, as earlier noted, with undesirable consequences. I find myself
therefore unable to yield assent to such a pronouncement.
I concur with the main opinion of Mr. Justice Escolin and the
concurring opinion of Mme. Justice Herrera. The Rule of Law connotes
a body of norms and laws published and ascertainable and of equal
application to all similarly circumstances and not subject to arbitrary
change but only under certain set procedures. The Court has
consistently stressed that "it is an elementary rule of fair play and
justice that a reasonable opportunity to be informed must be afforded
to the people who are commanded to obey before they can be
punished for its violation, 1 citing the settled principle based on due
process enunciated in earlier cases that "before the public is bound by
its contents, especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or
circular must first be published and the people officially and specially
informed of said contents and its penalties.
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that "laws shall take effect after
fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official
Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided " Two things may be said of
this provision: Firstly, it obviously does not apply to a law with a built-
in provision as to when it will take effect. Secondly, it clearly
recognizes that each law may provide not only a different period for
reckoning its effectivity date but also a different mode of notice. Thus,
a law may prescribe that it shall be published elsewhere than in the
Official Gazette.
Separate Opinions
5. Nor can I agree with the rather sweeping conclusion in the opinion
of Justice Escolin that presidential decrees and executive acts not thus
previously published in the Official Gazette would be devoid of any
legal character. That would be, in my opinion, to go too far. It may be
fraught, as earlier noted, with undesirable consequences. I find myself
therefore unable to yield assent to such a pronouncement.
I concur with the main opinion of Mr. Justice Escolin and the
concurring opinion of Mme. Justice Herrera. The Rule of Law connotes
a body of norms and laws published and ascertainable and of equal
application to all similarly circumstances and not subject to arbitrary
change but only under certain set procedures. The Court has
consistently stressed that "it is an elementary rule of fair play and
justice that a reasonable opportunity to be informed must be afforded
to the people who are commanded to obey before they can be
punished for its violation, 1 citing the settled principle based on due
process enunciated in earlier cases that "before the public is bound by
its contents, especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or
circular must first be published and the people officially and specially
informed of said contents and its penalties.
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that "laws shall take effect after
fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official
Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided " Two things may be said of
this provision: Firstly, it obviously does not apply to a law with a built-
in provision as to when it will take effect. Secondly, it clearly
recognizes that each law may provide not only a different period for
reckoning its effectivity date but also a different mode of notice. Thus,
a law may prescribe that it shall be published elsewhere than in the
Official Gazette.
EN BANC
CONCEPCION, J.:
The issue in this case is whether the above quoted provision of the
contract between plaintiff and the defendant, whereby the former
waived his right to transfer to another school without refunding to the
latter the equivalent of his scholarships in cash, is valid or not. The
lower court resolved this question in the affirmative, upon the ground
that the aforementioned memorandum of the Director of Private
Schools is not a law; that the provisions thereof are advisory, not
mandatory in nature; and that, although the contractual provision
"may be unethical, yet it was more unethical for plaintiff to quit
studying with the defendant without good reasons and simply because
he wanted to follow the example of his uncle." Moreover, defendant
maintains in its brief that the aforementioned memorandum of the
Director of Private Schools is null and void because said officer had no
authority to issue it, and because it had been neither approved by the
corresponding department head nor published in the official gazette.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-28040 August 18, 1972
L-28040
L-28568
The relationship between the children of the first marriage and Tasiana
Ongsingco has been plagued with several court suits and counter-
suits; including the three cases at bar, some eighteen (18) cases
remain pending determination in the courts. The testate estate of
Josefa Tangco alone has been unsettled for more than a quarter of a
century. In order to put an end to all these litigations, a compromise
agreement was entered into on 12 October 1963, 2 by and between
"[T]he heir and son of Francisco de Borja by his first marriage,
namely, Jose de Borja personally and as administrator of the Testate
Estate of Josefa Tangco," and "[T]he heir and surviving spouse of
Francisco de Borja by his second marriage, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de
Borja, assisted by her lawyer, Atty. Luis Panaguiton Jr." The terms and
conditions of the compromise agreement are as follows:
AGREEMENT
AND
WITNESSETH
THAT with this end in view, the parties herein have agreed
voluntarily and without any reservations to enter into and
execute this agreement under the following terms and
conditions:
This provision evidences beyond doubt that the ruling in the Guevara
case is not applicable to the cases at bar. There was here no attempt
to settle or distribute the estate of Francisco de Borja among the heirs
thereto before the probate of his will. The clear object of the contract
was merely the conveyance by Tasiana Ongsingco of any and all her
individual share and interest, actual or eventual in the estate of
Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco. There is no stipulation as to any
other claimant, creditor or legatee. And as a hereditary share in a
decedent's estate is transmitted or vested immediately from the
moment of the death of such causante or predecessor in interest (Civil
Code of the Philippines, Art. 777) 3 there is no legal bar to a successor
(with requisite contracting capacity) disposing of her or his hereditary
share immediately after such death, even if the actual extent of such
share is not determined until the subsequent liquidation of the
estate. 4 Of course, the effect of such alienation is to be deemed
limited to what is ultimately adjudicated to the vendor heir. However,
the aleatory character of the contract does not affect the validity of the
transaction; neither does the coetaneous agreement that the
numerous litigations between the parties (the approving order of the
Rizal Court enumerates fourteen of them, Rec. App. pp. 79-82) are to
be considered settled and should be dismissed, although such
stipulation, as noted by the Rizal Court, gives the contract the
character of a compromise that the law favors, for obvious reasons, if
only because it serves to avoid a multiplicity of suits.
III. That this agreement shall take effect only upon the
consummation of the sale of the property mentioned herein
and upon receipt of the total and full payment of the
proceeds of the sale by the herein owner heirs-children of
Francisco de Borja, namely, Crisanto, Cayetano and
Matilde, all surnamed de Borja; Provided that if no sale of
the said property mentioned herein is consummated, or the
non-receipt of the purchase price thereof by the said
owners within the period of sixty (60) days from the date
hereof, this agreement will become null and void and of no
further effect.
This brings us to the plea that the Court of First Instance of Rizal had
no jurisdiction to approve the compromise with Jose de Borja (Annex
A) because Tasiana Ongsingco was not an heir in the estate of Josefa
Tangco pending settlement in the Rizal Court, but she was an heir of
Francisco de Borja, whose estate was the object of Special Proceeding
No. 832 of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija. This
circumstance is irrelevant, since what was sold by Tasiana Ongsingco
was only her eventual share in the estate of her late husband, not the
estate itself; and as already shown, that eventual share she owned
from the time of Francisco's death and the Court of Nueva Ecija could
not bar her selling it. As owner of her undivided hereditary share,
Tasiana could dispose of it in favor of whomsoever she chose. Such
alienation is expressly recognized and provided for by article 1088 of
the present Civil Code:
Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights
to a stranger before the partition, any or all of the co-heirs
may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by
reimbursing him for the price of the sale, provided they do
so within the period of one month from the time they were
notified in writing of the sale of the vendor.
Tasiana Ongsingco further argues that her contract with Jose de Borja
(Annex "A") is void because it amounts to a compromise as to her
status and marriage with the late Francisco de Borja. The point is
without merit, for the very opening paragraph of the agreement with
Jose de Borja (Annex "A") describes her as "the heir and surviving
spouse of Francisco de Borja by his second marriage, Tasiana
Ongsingco Vda. de de Borja", which is in itself definite admission of
her civil status. There is nothing in the text of the agreement that
would show that this recognition of Ongsingco's status as the surviving
spouse of Francisco de Borja was only made in consideration of the
cession of her hereditary rights.
In her brief, Tasiana Ongsingco also pleads that the time elapsed in
the appeal has affected her unfavorably, in that while the purchasing
power of the agreed price of P800,000 has diminished, the value of the
Jalajala property has increased. But the fact is that her delay in
receiving the payment of the agreed price for her hereditary interest
was primarily due to her attempts to nullify the agreement (Annex
"A") she had formally entered into with the advice of her counsel,
Attorney Panaguiton. And as to the devaluation de facto of our
currency, what We said in Dizon Rivera vs. Dizon, L-24561, 30 June
1970, 33 SCRA 554, that "estates would never be settled if there were
to be a revaluation with every subsequent fluctuation in the values of
currency and properties of the estate", is particularly opposite in the
present case.
Coming now to Case G.R. No. L-28611, the issue is whether the
Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion), concededly acquired by Francisco de
Borja during his marriage to his first wife, Josefa Tangco, is the
husband's private property (as contended by his second spouse,
Tasiana Ongsingco), or whether it forms part of the conjugal
(ganancial) partnership with Josefa Tangco. The Court of First Instance
of Rizal (Judge Herminio Mariano, presiding) declared that there was
adequate evidence to overcome the presumption in favor of its
conjugal character established by Article 160 of the Civil Code.
After trial, the Court of First Instance of Rizal, per Judge Herminio
Mariano, held that the plaintiff had adduced sufficient evidence to
rebut the presumption, and declared the Hacienda de Jalajala
(Poblacion) to be the exclusive private property of the late Francisco
de Borja, and his Administratrix, Tasiana Ongsingco Vda. de Borja, to
be entitled to its possession. Defendant Jose de Borja then appealed to
this Court.
The evidence reveals, and the appealed order admits, that the
character of the Hacienda in question as owned by the conjugal
partnership De Borja-Tangco was solemnly admitted by the late
Francisco de Borja no less than two times: first, in the Reamended
Inventory that, as executor of the estate of his deceased wife Josefa
Tangco, he filed in the Special Proceedings No. 7866 of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal on 23 July 1953 (Exhibit "2"); and again, in the
Reamended Accounting of the same date, also filed in the proceedings
aforesaid (Exhibit "7"). Similarly, the plaintiff Tasiana O. Vda. de
Borja, herself, as oppositor in the Estate of Josefa Tangco, submitted
therein an inventory dated 7 September 1954 (Exhibit "3") listing the
Jalajala property among the "Conjugal Properties of the Spouses
Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco". And once more, Tasiana
Ongsingco, as administratrix of the Estate of Francisco de Borja, in
Special Proceedings No. 832 of the Court of First Instance of Nueva
Ecija, submitted therein in December, 1955, an inventory wherein she
listed the Jalajala Hacienda under the heading "Conjugal Property of
the Deceased Spouses Francisco de Borja and Josefa Tangco, which
are in the possession of the Administrator of the Testate Estate of the
Deceased Josefa Tangco in Special Proceedings No. 7866 of the Court
of First Instance of Rizal" (Exhibit "4").
Notwithstanding the four statements aforesaid, and the fact that they
are plain admissions against interest made by both Francisco de Borja
and the Administratrix of his estate, in the course of judicial
proceedings in the Rizal and Nueva Ecija Courts, supporting the legal
presumption in favor of the conjugal community, the Court below
declared that the Hacienda de Jalajala (Poblacion) was not conjugal
property, but the private exclusive property of the late Francisco de
Borja. It did so on the strength of the following evidences: (a) the
sworn statement by Francis de Borja on 6 August 1951 (Exhibit "F")
that
The Court below, reasoning that not only Francisco's sworn statement
overweighed the admissions in the inventories relied upon by
defendant-appellant Jose de Borja since probate courts can not finally
determine questions of ownership of inventoried property, but that the
testimony of Gregorio de Borja showed that Francisco de Borja
acquired his share of the original Hacienda with his private funds, for
which reason that share can not be regarded as conjugal partnership
property, but as exclusive property of the buyer, pursuant to Article
1396(4) of Civil Code of 1889 and Article 148(4) of the Civil Code of
the Philippines.
No error having been assigned against the ruling of the lower court
that claims for damages should be ventilated in the corresponding
special proceedings for the settlement of the estates of the deceased,
the same requires no pro announcement from this Court.
10. That out of the 48 mine workers who were then working
at defendant PHILEX's mine on the said date, five (5) were
able to escape from the terrifying holocaust; 22 were
rescued within the next 7 days; and the rest, 21 in number,
including those referred to in paragraph 7 hereinabove,
were left mercilessly to their fate, notwithstanding the fact
that up to then, a great many of them were still alive,
entombed in the tunnels of the mine, but were not rescued
due to defendant PHILEX's decision to abandon rescue
operations, in utter disregard of its bounden legal and
moral duties in the premises;
13. That defendant PHILEX not only violated the law and
the rules and regulations duly promulgated by the duly
constituted authorities as set out by the Special Committee
above referred to, in their Report of investigation, pages 7-
13, Annex 'B' hereof, but also failed completely to provide
its men working underground the necessary security for the
protection of their lives notwithstanding the fact that it had
vast financial resources, it having made, during the year
1966 alone, a total operating income of P 38,220,254.00, or
net earnings, after taxes of P19,117,394.00, as per its llth
Annual Report for the year ended December 31, 1966, and
with aggregate assets totalling P 45,794,103.00 as of
December 31, 1966;
A motion to dismiss dated May 14, 1968 was filed by Philex alleging
that the causes of action of petitioners based on an industrial accident
are covered by the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act
(Act 3428, as amended by RA 772) and that the former Court of First
Instance has no jurisdiction over the case. Petitioners filed an
opposition dated May 27, 1968 to the said motion to dismiss claiming
that the causes of action are not based on the provisions of the
Workmen's Compensation Act but on the provisions of the Civil Code
allowing the award of actual, moral and exemplary damages,
particularly:
Art. 2201. x x x x x x x x x
II
In the first assignment of error, petitioners argue that the lower court
has jurisdiction over the cause of action since the complaint is based
on the provisions of the Civil Code on damages, particularly Articles
2176, 2178, 1173, 2201 and 2231, and not on the provisions of the
Workmen's Compensation Act. They point out that the complaint
alleges gross and brazen negligence on the part of Philex in failing to
take the necessary security for the protection of the lives of its
employees working underground. They also assert that since Philex
opted to file a motion to dismiss in the court a quo, the allegations in
their complaint including those contained in the annexes are deemed
admitted.
In the second assignment of error, petitioners asseverate that
respondent Judge failed to see the distinction between the claims for
compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act and the claims
for damages based on gross negligence of Philex under the Civil Code.
They point out that workmen's compensation refers to liability for
compensation for loss resulting from injury, disability or death of the
working man through industrial accident or disease, without regard to
the fault or negligence of the employer, while the claim for damages
under the Civil Code which petitioners pursued in the regular court,
refers to the employer's liability for reckless and wanton negligence
resulting in the death of the employees and for which the regular court
has jurisdiction to adjudicate the same.
Philex cites the case of Manalo vs. Foster Wheeler (98 Phil. 855
[1956]) where it was held that "all claims of workmen against their
employer for damages due to accident suffered in the course of
employment shall be investigated and adjudicated by the Workmen's
Compensation Commission," subject to appeal to the Supreme Court.
Philex maintains that the fact that an employer was negligent, does
not remove the case from the exclusive character of recoveries under
the Workmen's Compensation Act; because Section 4-A of the Act
provides an additional compensation in case the employer fails to
comply with the requirements of safety as imposed by law to prevent
accidents. In fact, it points out that Philex voluntarily paid the
compensation due the petitioners and all the payments have been
accepted in behalf of the deceased miners, except the heirs of Nazarito
Floresca who insisted that they are entitled to a greater amount of
damages under the Civil Code.
WE hold that the former Court of First Instance has jurisdiction to try
the case,
In the present case, there exists between Philex and the deceased
employees a contractual relationship. The alleged gross and reckless
negligence and deliberate failure that amount to bad faith on the part
of Philex, constitute a breach of contract for which it may be held liable
for damages. The provisions of the Civil Code on cases of breach of
contract when there is fraud or bad faith, read:
Furthermore, Articles 2216 et seq., Civil Code, allow the payment of all
kinds of damages, as assessed by the court.
The claimant for damages under the Civil Code has the burden of
proving the causal relation between the defendant's negligence and
the resulting injury as well as the damages suffered. While under the
Workmen's Compensation Act, there is a presumption in favor of the
deceased or injured employee that the death or injury is work-
connected or work-aggravated; and the employer has the burden to
prove otherwise (De los Angeles vs. GSIS, 94 SCRA 308; Carino vs.
WCC, 93 SCRA 551; Maria Cristina Fertilizer Corp. vs. WCC, 60 SCRA
228).
In Pacaa WE said:
Although the doctrine in the case of Esguerra vs. Munoz Palma (104
Phil. 582), applies to third-party tortfeasor, said rule should likewise
apply to the employer-tortfeasor.
WE hold that although the other petitioners had received the benefits
under the Workmen's Compensation Act, such may not preclude them
from bringing an action before the regular court because they became
cognizant of the fact that Philex has been remiss in its contractual
obligations with the deceased miners only after receiving
compensation under the Act. Had petitioners been aware of said
violation of government rules and regulations by Philex, and of its
negligence, they would not have sought redress under the Workmen's
Compensation Commission which awarded a lesser amount for
compensation. The choice of the first remedy was based on ignorance
or a mistake of fact, which nullifies the choice as it was not an
intelligent choice. The case should therefore be remanded to the lower
court for further proceedings. However, should the petitioners be
successful in their bid before the lower court, the payments made
under the Workmen's Compensation Act should be deducted from the
damages that may be decreed in their favor.
Article 10 of the New Civil Code states: "In case of doubt in the
interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the law-
making body intended right and justice to prevail. "
More specifically, Article 1702 of the New Civil Code likewise directs
that. "In case of doubt, all labor legislation and all labor contracts shall
be construed in favor of the safety and decent living of the laborer."
Before it was amended by Commonwealth Act No. 772 on June 20,
1952, Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act provided:
Article 173 of the New Labor Code does not repeal expressly nor
impliedly the applicable provisions of the New Civil Code, because said
Article 173 provides:
It is patent, therefore, that recovery under the New Civil Code for
damages arising from negligence, is not barred by Article 173 of the
New Labor Code. And the damages recoverable under the New Civil
Code are not administered by the System provided for by the New
Labor Code, which defines the "System" as referring to the
Government Service Insurance System or the Social Security System
(Art. 167 [c], [d] and [e] of the New Labor Code).
The Court, through the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, in People
vs. Licera ruled:
Since the first sentence of Article 173 of the New Labor Code is merely
a re-statement of the first paragraph of Section 5 of the Workmen's
Compensation Act, as amended, and does not even refer, neither
expressly nor impliedly, to the Civil Code as Section 5 of the
Workmen's Compensation Act did, with greater reason said Article 173
must be subject to the same interpretation adopted in the cases of
Pacana, Valencia and Esguerra aforementioned as the doctrine in the
aforesaid three (3) cases is faithful to and advances the social justice
guarantees enshrined in both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions.
The dissent seems to subordinate the life of the laborer to the property
rights of the employer. The right to life is guaranteed specifically by
the due process clause of the Constitution. To relieve the employer
from liability for the death of his workers arising from his gross or
wanton fault or failure to provide safety devices for the protection of
his employees or workers against the dangers which are inherent in
underground mining, is to deprive the deceased worker and his heirs
of the right to recover indemnity for the loss of the life of the worker
and the consequent loss to his family without due process of law. The
dissent in effect condones and therefore encourages such gross or
wanton neglect on the part of the employer to comply with his legal
obligation to provide safety measures for the protection of the life,
limb and health of his worker. Even from the moral viewpoint alone,
such attitude is un-Christian.
"Idolatrous reverence" for the letter of the law sacrifices the human
being. The spirit of the law insures man's survival and ennobles him.
In the words of Shakespeare, "the letter of the law killeth; its spirit
giveth life."
It is curious that the dissenting opinion clings to the myth that the
courts cannot legislate.
That myth had been exploded by Article 9 of the New Civil Code, which
provides that "No judge or court shall decline to render judgment by
reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the laws. "
Hence, even the legislator himself, through Article 9 of the New Civil
Code, recognizes that in certain instances, the court, in the language
of Justice Holmes, "do and must legislate" to fill in the gaps in the law;
because the mind of the legislator, like all human beings, is finite and
therefore cannot envisage all possible cases to which the law may
apply Nor has the human mind the infinite capacity to anticipate all
situations.
But about two centuries before Article 9 of the New Civil Code, the
founding fathers of the American Constitution foresaw and recognized
the eventuality that the courts may have to legislate to supply the
omissions or to clarify the ambiguities in the American Constitution
and the statutes.
True, there are jurists and legal writers who affirm that judges should
not legislate, but grudgingly concede that in certain cases judges do
legislate. They criticize the assumption by the courts of such law-
making power as dangerous for it may degenerate into Judicial
tyranny. They include Blackstone, Jeremy Bentham, Justice Black,
Justice Harlan, Justice Roberts, Justice David Brewer, Ronald Dworkin,
Rolf Sartorious, Macklin Fleming and Beryl Harold Levy. But said
Justices, jurists or legal commentators, who either deny the power of
the courts to legislate in-between gaps of the law, or decry the
exercise of such power, have not pointed to examples of the exercise
by the courts of such law-making authority in the interpretation and
application of the laws in specific cases that gave rise to judicial
tyranny or oppression or that such judicial legislation has not protected
public interest or individual welfare, particularly the lowly workers or
the underprivileged.
On the other hand, there are numerous decisions interpreting the Bill
of Rights and statutory enactments expanding the scope of such
provisions to protect human rights. Foremost among them is the
doctrine in the cases of Miranda vs. Arizona (384 US 436 1964),
Gideon vs. Wainright (372 US 335), Escubedo vs. Illinois (378 US
478), which guaranteed the accused under custodial investigation his
rights to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed of such rights
as even as it protects him against the use of force or intimidation to
extort confession from him. These rights are not found in the American
Bill of Rights. These rights are now institutionalized in Section 20,
Article IV of the 1973 Constitution. Only the peace-and-order
adherents were critical of the activism of the American Supreme Court
led by Chief Justice Earl Warren.
The requisites of double jeopardy are not spelled out in the Bill of
Rights. They were also developed by judicial decisions in the United
States and in the Philippines even before people vs. Ylagan (58 Phil.
851-853).
Again, the equal protection clause was interpreted in the case of Plessy
vs. Ferguson (163 US 537) as securing to the Negroes equal but
separate facilities, which doctrine was revoked in the case of Brown vs.
Maryland Board of Education (349 US 294), holding that the equal
protection clause means that the Negroes are entitled to attend the
same schools attended by the whites-equal facilities in the same
school-which was extended to public parks and public buses.
Among other examples, the due process clause was interpreted in the
case of People vs. Pomar (46 Phil. 440) by a conservative, capitalistic
court to invalidate a law granting maternity leave to working women-
according primacy to property rights over human rights. The case of
People vs. Pomar is no longer the rule.
As early as 1904, in the case of Lochner vs. New York (198 US 45, 76,
49 L. ed. 937, 949), Justice Holmes had been railing against the
conservatism of Judges perverting the guarantee of due process to
protect property rights as against human rights or social justice for the
working man. The law fixing maximum hours of labor was invalidated.
Justice Holmes was vindicated finally in 1936 in the case of West Coast
Hotel vs. Parish (300 US 377-79; 81 L. ed. 703) where the American
Supreme Court upheld the rights of workers to social justice in the
form of guaranteed minimum wage for women and minors, working
hours not exceeding eight (8) daily, and maternity leave for women
employees.
Unlike the American Constitution, both the 1935 and 1973 Philippine
Constitutions expressly vest in the Supreme Court the power to review
the validity or constitutionality of any legislative enactment or
executive act.
SO ORDERED.
Separate Opinions
This case involves a complaint for damages for the death of five
employees of PHILEX Mining Corporation under the general provisions
of the Civil Code. The Civil Code itself, however, provides for its non-
applicability to the complaint. It is specifically provided in Article 2196
of the Code, found in Title XVIII-Damages that:
COMPENSATION FOR WORKMEN AND OTHER EMPLOYEES
IN CASE OF DEATH, INJURY OR ILLNESS IS REGULATED BY
SPECIAL LAWS.
By the very provisions of the Civil Code, it is a "special law", not the
Code itself, which has to apply to the complaint involved in the instant
case. That "special law", in reference to the complaint, can be no other
than the Workmen's Compensation
B.
under the Civil Code and other laws, because of said injury
(Paragraphing and emphasis supplied)
It will be seen that, within the Act itself, the exclusory character of the
Act was amended. At that time, if he had so desired, the legislator
could have amended the first paragraph of Section 5 so that the
employee would have the option to sue the employer under the Act, or
under the Civil Code, should the latter be more favorable to him.
In time, it must have been thought that it was inequitable to have the
amount of compensation, caused by negligence on the part of the
employer, to be the same amount payable when the employer was not
negligent. Based on that thinking, Section 4-A 1 was included into the
Act, on June 20, 1952, through RA 772. Said Section 4-A increased the
compensation payable by 50% in case there was negligence on the
part of the employer. That additional section evidenced the intent of
the legislator not to give an option to an employee, injured with
negligence on the part of the employer, to sue the latter under the
provisions of the Civil Code.
To grant the petition and allow the victims of industrial accidents to file
damages suits based on torts would be a radical innovation not only
contrary to the express provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act
but a departure from the principles evolved in the long history of
workmen's compensation. At the very least, it should be the legislature
and not this Court which should remove the exclusory provision of the
Workmen's Compensation Act, a provision reiterated in the present
Labor Code on employees' compensation.
The problems associated with the application of the fellow servant rule,
the assumption of risk doctrine, the principle of contributory
negligence, and the many other defenses so easily raised in protracted
damage suits illustrated the need for a system whereby workers had
only to prove the fact of covered employment and the fact of injury
arising from employment in order to be compensated.
Separate Opinions
This case involves a complaint for damages for the death of five
employees of PHILEX Mining Corporation under the general provisions
of the Civil Code. The Civil Code itself, however, provides for its non-
applicability to the complaint. It is specifically provided in Article 2196
of the Code, found in Title XVIII-Damages that:
By the very provisions of the Civil Code, it is a "special law", not the
Code itself, which has to apply to the complaint involved in the instant
case. That "special law", in reference to the complaint, can be no other
than the Workmen's Compensation
B.
'There is full concurrence on my part with the dissenting opinion of Mr.
Justice Gutierrez upholding "the exclusory provision of the Workmen's
Compensation Act." I may further add:
under the Civil Code and other laws, because of said injury
(Paragraphing and emphasis supplied)
It will be seen that, within the Act itself, the exclusory character of the
Act was amended. At that time, if he had so desired, the legislator
could have amended the first paragraph of Section 5 so that the
employee would have the option to sue the employer under the Act, or
under the Civil Code, should the latter be more favorable to him.
In time, it must have been thought that it was inequitable to have the
amount of compensation, caused by negligence on the part of the
employer, to be the same amount payable when the employer was not
negligent. Based on that thinking, Section 4-A 1 was included into the
Act, on June 20, 1952, through RA 772. Said Section 4-A increased the
compensation payable by 50% in case there was negligence on the
part of the employer. That additional section evidenced the intent of
the legislator not to give an option to an employee, injured with
negligence on the part of the employer, to sue the latter under the
provisions of the Civil Code.
To grant the petition and allow the victims of industrial accidents to file
damages suits based on torts would be a radical innovation not only
contrary to the express provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act
but a departure from the principles evolved in the long history of
workmen's compensation. At the very least, it should be the legislature
and not this Court which should remove the exclusory provision of the
Workmen's Compensation Act, a provision reiterated in the present
Labor Code on employees' compensation.
The problems associated with the application of the fellow servant rule,
the assumption of risk doctrine, the principle of contributory
negligence, and the many other defenses so easily raised in protracted
damage suits illustrated the need for a system whereby workers had
only to prove the fact of covered employment and the fact of injury
arising from employment in order to be compensated.
EN BANC
SANCHEZ, J.:
On June 18, 1966, the Chief Executive signed into law House Bill 1247,
known as Republic Act 4790, now in dispute. The body of the statute,
reproduced in haec verba, reads:
It came to light later that barrios Togaig and Madalum just mentioned
are within the municipality of Buldon, Province of Cotabato, and that
Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao,
Tiongko, Colodan and Kabamakawan are parts and parcel of another
municipality, the municipality of Parang, also in the Province of
Cotabato and not of Lanao del Sur.
This triggered the present original action for certiorari and prohibition
by Bara Lidasan, a resident and taxpayer of the detached portion of
Parang, Cotabato, and a qualified voter for the 1967 elections. He
prays that Republic Act 4790 be declared unconstitutional; and that
Comelec's resolutions of August 15, 1967 and September 20, 1967
implementing the same for electoral purposes, be nullified.
2. Suggestion was made that Republic Act 4790 may still be salvaged
with reference to the nine barrios in the municipalities of Butig and
Balabagan in Lanao del Sur, with the mere nullification of the portion
thereof which took away the twelve barrios in the municipalities of
Buldon and Parang in the other province of Cotabato. The reasoning
advocated is that the limited title of the Act still covers those barrios
actually in the province of Lanao del Sur.
Republic Act 4790 is thus indivisible, and it is accordingly null and void
in its totality.14
For the reasons given, we vote to declare Republic Act 4790 null and
void, and to prohibit respondent Commission from implementing the
same for electoral purposes.
With regret and with due recognition of the merit of the opinion of the
Court, I find myself unable to give my assent. Hence these few words
to express my stand.
Republic Act No. 4790 deals with one subject matter, the creation of
the municipality of Dianaton in the province of Lanao del Sur. The title
makes evident what is the subject matter of such an enactment. The
mere fact that in the body of such statute barrios found in two other
municipalities of another province were included does not of itself
suffice for a finding of nullity by virtue of the constitutional provision
invoked. At the most, the statute to be free from the insubstantial
doubts about its validity must be construed as not including the
barrios, located not in the municipalities of Butig and Balabagan,
Lanao del Sur, but in Parang and Baldon, Cotabato.
Wherein does the weakness of the statute lie then? To repeat, several
barrios of two municipalities outside Lanao del Sur were included in
the municipality of Dianaton of that province. That itself would not
have given rise to a constitutional question considering the broad,
well-high plenary powers possessed by Congress to alter provincial
and municipal boundaries. What justified resort to this Court was the
congressional failure to make explicit that such barrios in two
municipalities located in Cotabato would thereafter form part of the
newly created municipality of Dianaton, Lanao del Sur.
This mode of interpreting Republic Act No. 4790 finds support in basic
principles underlying precedents, which if not precisely controlling,
have a persuasive ring. In Radiowealth v. Agregado,8 certain
provisions of the Administrative Code were interpreted and given a
"construction which would be more in harmony with the tenets of the
fundamental law." In Sanchez v. Lyon Construction,9 this Court had a
similar ruling: "Article 302 of the Code of Commerce must be applied
in consonance with [the relevant] provisions of our Constitution." The
above principle gained acceptance at a much earlier period in our
constitutional history. Thus in a 1913 decision, In re Guaria:10"In
construing a statute enacted by the Philippine Commission we deem it
our duty not to give it a construction which would be repugnant to an
Act of Congress, if the language of the statute is fairly susceptible of
another construction not in conflict with the higher law. In doing so,
we think we should not hesitate to disregard contentions touching the
apparent intention of the legislator which would lead to the conclusion
that the Commission intended to enact a law in violation of the Act of
Congress. However specious the argument may be in favor of one of
two possible constructions, it must be disregarded if on examination it
is found to rest on the contention that the legislator designed an
attempt to transcend the rightful limits of his authority, and that his
apparent intention was to enact an invalid law."
It would follow then that both Philippine and American decisions unite
in the view that a legislative measure, in the language of Van Devanter
"should not be given a construction which will imperil its validity where
it is reasonably open to construction free from such peril."15 Republic
Act No. 4790 as above construed incurs no such risk and is free from
the peril of nullity.
Footnotes
1
Hereinafter referred to as Comelec.
2
Article VI, Sec. 21(1), Philippine Constitution.
3
Stiglitz vs. Schiardien, 40 SW 2d 315, 317, 320.
4
Congressional Record, Vol. I, No. 40, p. 8; Vol. I, No. 50, pp.
40-41.
5
Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution, provides:
State vs. Burr, 238 P 585, the statute entitled "An act to
amend Secs. 4318 and 4327 of the Codes of Montana
relating to changing the boundaries of Fergus and Judith
Basin countries" was rendered void because the body of the
act included the boundaries of Petroleum county.
State vs. Nelson, 98 So. 715, the title of the act purporting
to alter or rearrange the boundaries of Decatur city and the
body of the act which actually diminished the boundary
lines of the city were considered by the court as dealing
with incongruous matters. The reading of the former would
give no clear suggestion that the latter would follow and be
made the subject of the act. Jackson, Clerk vs. Sherrod, 92
So. 481; City of Ensley vs. Simpson, 52 So. 61, cited.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-19650 September 29, 1966
CASTRO, J.:
Foreseeing the extensive use of the mails not only as amongst the
media for publicizing the contest but also for the transmission of
communications relative thereto, representations were made by Caltex
with the postal authorities for the contest to be cleared in advance for
mailing, having in view sections 1954(a), 1982 and 1983 of the
Revised Administrative Code, the pertinent provisions of which read as
follows:
The parties are now before us, arrayed against each other upon two
basic issues: first, whether the petition states a sufficient cause of
action for declaratory relief; and second, whether the proposed "Caltex
Hooded Pump Contest" violates the Postal Law. We shall take these
up in seriatim.
Against this backdrop, the stage was indeed set for the remedy prayed
for. The appellee's insistent assertion of its claim to the use of the
mails for its proposed contest, and the challenge thereto and
consequent denial by the appellant of the privilege demanded,
undoubtedly spawned a live controversy. The justiciability of the
dispute cannot be gainsaid. There is an active antagonistic assertion of
a legal right on one side and a denial thereof on the other, concerning
a real not a mere theoretical question or issue. The contenders
are as real as their interests are substantial. To the appellee, the
uncertainty occasioned by the divergence of views on the issue of
construction hampers or disturbs its freedom to enhance its business.
To the appellant, the suppression of the appellee's proposed contest
believed to transgress a law he has sworn to uphold and enforce is an
unavoidable duty. With the appellee's bent to hold the contest and the
appellant's threat to issue a fraud order therefor if carried out, the
contenders are confronted by the ominous shadow of an imminent and
inevitable litigation unless their differences are settled and stabilized
by a tranquilizing declaration (Pablo y Sen, et al. vs. Republic of the
Philippines, G.R. No. L-6868, April 30, 1955). And, contrary to the
insinuation of the appellant, the time is long past when it can rightly
be said that merely the appellee's "desires are thwarted by its own
doubts, or by the fears of others" which admittedly does not confer
a cause of action. Doubt, if any there was, has ripened into a
justiciable controversy when, as in the case at bar, it was translated
into a positive claim of right which is actually contested (III Moran,
Comments on the Rules of Court, 1963 ed., pp. 132-133, citing:
Woodward vs. Fox West Coast Theaters, 36 Ariz., 251, 284 Pac. 350).
It is not amiss to point out at this juncture that the conclusion we have
herein just reached is not without precedent. In Liberty Calendar Co.
vs. Cohen, 19 N.J., 399, 117 A. 2d., 487, where a corporation engaged
in promotional advertising was advised by the county prosecutor that
its proposed sales promotion plan had the characteristics of a lottery,
and that if such sales promotion were conducted, the corporation
would be subject to criminal prosecution, it was held that the
corporation was entitled to maintain a declaratory relief action against
the county prosecutor to determine the legality of its sales promotion
plan. In pari materia, see also: Bunis vs. Conway, 17 App. Div. 2d.,
207, 234 N.Y.S. 2d., 435; Zeitlin vs. Arnebergh, supra; Thrillo, Inc. vs.
Scott, 15 N.J. Super. 124, 82 A. 2d., 903.
In fine, we hold that the appellee has made out a case for declaratory
relief.
Taking this cue, we note that in the Postal Law, the term in question is
used in association with the word "lottery". With the meaning of lottery
settled, and consonant to the well-known principle of legal
hermeneutics noscitur a sociis which Opinion 217 aforesaid also
relied upon although only insofar as the element of chance is
concerned it is only logical that the term under a construction
should be accorded no other meaning than that which is consistent
with the nature of the word associated therewith. Hence, if lottery is
prohibited only if it involves a consideration, so also must the term
"gift enterprise" be so construed. Significantly, there is not in the law
the slightest indicium of any intent to eliminate that element of
consideration from the "gift enterprise" therein included.
This conclusion firms up in the light of the mischief sought to be
remedied by the law, resort to the determination thereof being an
accepted extrinsic aid in statutory construction. Mail fraud orders, it is
axiomatic, are designed to prevent the use of the mails as a medium
for disseminating printed matters which on grounds of public policy are
declared non-mailable. As applied to lotteries, gift enterprises and
similar schemes, justification lies in the recognized necessity to
suppress their tendency to inflame the gambling spirit and to corrupt
public morals (Com. vs. Lund, 15 A. 2d., 839, 143 Pa. Super. 208).
Since in gambling it is inherent that something of value be hazarded
for a chance to gain a larger amount, it follows ineluctably that where
no consideration is paid by the contestant to participate, the reason
behind the law can hardly be said to obtain. If, as it has been held
SECOND DIVISION
ANTONIO, J.:p
V
e
r
y
t
r
u
l
y
y
o
u
r
s
,
(
S
g
d
.
)
F
E
L
I
C
I
A
N
O
L
E
V
I
S
T
E
P
r
o
v
i
n
c
i
a
l
G
o
v
e
r
n
o
r
Kind: ROHM-Revolver
Make: German
SN: 64
Cal: .22
The accused contended before the court a quo that in view of his
above-mentioned appointments as Secret Agent and Confidential
Agent, with authority to possess the firearm subject matter of the
prosecution, he was entitled to acquittal on the basis of the Supreme
Court's decision in People vs. Macarandang 2 and People vs.
Lucero. 3 The trial court, while conceding on the basis of the evidence
of record the accused had really been appointed Secret Agent and
Confidential Agent by the Provincial Governor and the PC Provincial
Commander of Batangas, respectively, with authority to possess and
carry the firearm described in the complaint, nevertheless held the
accused in its decision dated December 27, 1968, criminally liable for
illegal possession of a firearm and ammunition on the ground that the
rulings of the Supreme Court in the cases
of Macarandang and Lucero were reversed and abandoned in People
vs. Mapa, supra. The court considered as mitigating circumstances the
appointments of the accused as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent.
It will be noted that when appellant was appointed Secret Agent by the
Provincial Government in 1962, and Confidential Agent by the
Provincial Commander in 1964, the prevailing doctrine on the matter
was that laid down by Us in People v. Macarandang (1959) and People
v. Lucero (1958). Our decision in People v. Mapa reversing the
aforesaid doctrine came only in 1967. The sole question in this appeal
is: Should appellant be acquitted on the basis of Our rulings
in Macarandang and Lucero, or should his conviction stand in view of
the complete reversal of the Macarandang and Lucero doctrine
in Mapa? The Solicitor General is of the first view, and he accordingly
recommends reversal of the appealed judgment.
EN BANC
Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and
of the United States." By his first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he
divorced, he had five legitimate children: Edward A. Bellis, George
Bellis (who pre-deceased him in infancy), Henry A. Bellis, Alexander
Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman; by his second wife, Violet Kennedy,
who survived him, he had three legitimate children: Edwin G. Bellis,
Walter S. Bellis and Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he had three
illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam
Palma Bellis.
On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in
which he directed that after all taxes, obligations, and expenses of
administration are paid for, his distributable estate should be divided,
in trust, in the following order and manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his
first wife, Mary E. Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate
children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis, Miriam Palma Bellis, or
P40,000.00 each and (c) after the foregoing two items have been
satisfied, the remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his
first and second wives, namely: Edward A. Bellis, Henry A. Bellis,
Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman, Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S.
Bellis, and Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal shares.1wph1.t
The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid all
the bequests therein including the amount of $240,000.00 in the form
of shares of stock to Mary E. Mallen and to the three (3) illegitimate
children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis,
various amounts totalling P40,000.00 each in satisfaction of their
respective legacies, or a total of P120,000.00, which it released from
time to time according as the lower court approved and allowed the
various motions or petitions filed by the latter three requesting partial
advances on account of their respective legacies.
On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis
filed their respective oppositions to the project of partition on the
ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate
children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased.
After the parties filed their respective memoranda and other pertinent
pleadings, the lower court, on April 30, 1964, issued an order
overruling the oppositions and approving the executor's final account,
report and administration and project of partition. Relying upon Art. 16
of the Civil Code, it applied the national law of the decedent, which in
this case is Texas law, which did not provide for legitimes.
In this regard, the parties do not submit the case on, nor even discuss,
the doctrine of renvoi, applied by this Court in Aznar v. Christensen
Garcia, L-16749, January 31, 1963. Said doctrine is usually pertinent
where the decedent is a national of one country, and a domicile of
another. In the present case, it is not disputed that the decedent was
both a national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of his
death.2 So that even assuming Texas has a conflict of law rule
providing that the domiciliary system (law of the domicile) should
govern, the same would not result in a reference back (renvoi) to
Philippine law, but would still refer to Texas law. Nonetheless, if Texas
has a conflicts rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for
the application of the law of the place where the properties are
situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties here involved are
found in the Philippines. In the absence, however, of proof as to the
conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not be presumed different from
ours.3 Appellants' position is therefore not rested on the doctrine of
renvoi. As stated, they never invoked nor even mentioned it in their
arguments. Rather, they argue that their case falls under the
circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Article 17 in
relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code.
Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable
the national law of the decedent, in intestate or testamentary
successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b)
the amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the
provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed. They provide
that
prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code afore-
quoted. This is not correct. Precisely, Congress deleted the phrase,
"notwithstanding the provisions of this and the next preceding article"
when they incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil Code as Art. 17 of the
new Civil Code, while reproducing without substantial change the
second paragraph of Art. 10 of the old Civil Code as Art. 16 in the new.
It must have been their purpose to make the second paragraph of Art.
16 a specific provision in itself which must be applied in testate and
intestate succession. As further indication of this legislative intent,
Congress added a new provision, under Art. 1039, which decrees that
capacity to succeed is to be governed by the national law of the
decedent.
Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two wills
one to govern his Texas estate and the other his Philippine estate
arguing from this that he intended Philippine law to govern his
Philippine estate. Assuming that such was the decedent's intention in
executing a separate Philippine will, it would not alter the law, for as
this Court ruled in Miciano v. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867, 870, a provision in a
foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in
accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal
and void, for his national law cannot be ignored in regard to those
matters that Article 10 now Article 16 of the Civil Code states
said national law should govern.
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of
the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there are
no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of
the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights are to
be determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot
be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
(d) Los Angeles to San Francisco (01 May 1989 for petitioners wife and
05 May 1989 for petitioner and his son).[1]
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[16]
II
III
IV
The object of the rule is to relieve a party of the trouble and expense
in proving in the first instance an alleged fact, the existence or non-
existence of which is necessarily within the knowledge of the adverse
party, and of the necessity (to his opponents case) of establishing
which such adverse party is notified by his opponents pleadings.
The plaintiff may, of course, waive the rule and that is what must be
considered to have done (sic) by introducing evidence as to the
execution of the document and failing to object to the defendants
evidence in refutation; all this evidence is now competent and the case
must be decided thereupon.[23]
(a) The passenger does not comply with the carriers contract of
carriage or tariff provisions regarding ticketing, reconfirmation, check-
in, and acceptability for transformation.
What this Court considers as bad faith is the willful and deliberate
overbooking on the part of the airline carrier. The above-mentioned
law clearly states that when the overbooking does not exceed ten
percent (10%), it is not considered as deliberate and therefore does
not amount to bad faith. While there may have been overbooking in
this case, private respondents were not able to prove that the
overbooking on United Airlines Flight 1108 exceeded ten percent.
As earlier stated, the Court is of the opinion that the private
respondents were not able to prove that they were subjected to coarse
and harsh treatment by the ground crew of United Airlines. Neither
were they able to show that there was bad faith on part of the carrier
airline. Hence, the award of moral and exemplary damages by the
Court of Appeals is improper. Corollarily, the award of attorney's fees
is, likewise, denied for lack of any legal and factual basis.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 37044 is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City in
Civil Case No. 89-4268 dated April 8, 1991 is hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman), Puno, and Ynares-Santiago,
JJ., concur.
Pardo, J., on sick leave.
THIRD DIVISION
BIDIN, J.:
When presented for payment, the check was dishonored for the reason
"Account Closed." Thereafter, petitioner Albenson, through counsel,
traced the origin of the dishonored check. From the records of the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Albenson discovered that
the president of Guaranteed, the recipient of the unpaid mild steel
plates, was one "Eugenio S. Baltao." Upon further inquiry, Albenson
was informed by the Ministry of Trade and Industry that E.L.
Woodworks, a single proprietorship business, was registered in the
name of one "Eugenio Baltao". In addition, upon verification with the
drawee bank, Pacific Banking Corporation, Albenson was advised that
the signature appearing on the subject check belonged to one
"Eugenio Baltao."
On February 14, 1983, Albenson filed with the Office of the Provincial
Fiscal of Rizal a complaint against Eugenio S. Baltao for violation of
Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. Submitted to support said charges was an
affidavit of petitioner Benjamin Mendiona, an employee of Albenson. In
said affidavit, the above-mentioned circumstances were stated.
Because of the alleged unjust filing of a criminal case against him for
allegedly issuing a check which bounced in violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 for a measly amount of P2,575.00, respondent
Baltao filed before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint
for damages against herein petitioners Albenson Enterprises, Jesse
Yap, its owner, and Benjamin Mendiona, its employee.
In its decision, the lower court observed that "the check is drawn
against the account of "E.L. Woodworks," not of Guaranteed Industries
of which plaintiff used to be President. Guaranteed Industries had been
inactive and had ceased to exist as a corporation since 1975. . . . . The
possibility is that it was with Gene Baltao or Eugenio Baltao III, a son
of plaintiff who had a business on the ground floor of Baltao Building
located on V. Mapa Street, that the defendants may have been dealing
with . . . ." (Rollo, pp. 41-42).
5 costs.
5. Awarding respondents
Petitioners contend that the civil case filed in the lower court was one
for malicious prosecution. Citing the case of Madera vs. Lopez (102
SCRA 700 [1981]), they assert that the absence of malice on their part
absolves them from any liability for malicious prosecution. Private
respondent, on the other hand, anchored his complaint for Damages
on Articles 19, 20, and 21 ** of the Civil Code.
There is a common element under Articles 19 and 21, and that is, the
act must be intentional. However, Article 20 does not distinguish: the
act may be done either "willfully", or "negligently". The trial court as
well as the respondent appellate court mistakenly lumped these three
(3) articles together, and cited the same as the bases for the award of
damages in the civil complaint filed against petitioners, thus:
With the foregoing legal provisions (Articles 19, 20, and 21)
in focus, there is not much difficulty in ascertaining the
means by which appellants' first assigned error should be
resolved, given the admitted fact that when there was an
attempt to collect the amount of P2,575.00, the defendants
were explicitly warned that plaintiff Eugenio S. Baltao is not
the Eugenio Baltao defendants had been dealing with
(supra, p. 5). When the defendants nevertheless insisted
and persisted in filing a case a criminal case no less
against plaintiff, said defendants ran afoul of the legal
provisions (Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code) cited
by the lower court and heretofore quoted (supra).
Assuming, arguendo, that all the three (3) articles, together and not
independently of each one, could be validly made the bases for an
award of damages based on the principle of "abuse of right", under the
circumstances, We see no cogent reason for such an award of
damages to be made in favor of private respondent.
In the case at bar, private respondent does not deny that the mild
steel plates were ordered by and delivered to Guaranteed at Baltao
building and as part payment thereof, the bouncing check was issued
by one Eugenio Baltao. Neither had private respondent conveyed to
petitioner that there are two Eugenio Baltaos conducting business in
the same building he and his son Eugenio Baltao III. Considering
that Guaranteed, which received the goods in payment of which the
bouncing check was issued is owned by respondent, petitioner acted in
good faith and probable cause in filing the complaint before the
provincial fiscal.
Thus, a party injured by the filing of a court case against him, even if
he is later on absolved, may file a case for damages grounded either
on the principle of abuse of rights, or on malicious prosecution. As
earlier stated, a complaint for damages based on malicious prosecution
will prosper only if the three (3) elements aforecited are shown to
exist. In the case at bar, the second and third elements were not
shown to exist. It is well-settled that one cannot be held liable for
maliciously instituting a prosecution where one has acted with
probable cause. "Probable cause is the existence of such facts and
circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting
on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person
charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted. In other
words, a suit will lie only in cases where a legal prosecution has been
carried on without probable cause. The reason for this rule is that it
would be a very great discouragement to public justice, if prosecutors,
who had tolerable ground of suspicion, were liable to be sued at law
when their indictment miscarried" (Que vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 169 SCRA 137 [1989]).
Furthermore, the adverse result of an action does not per se make the
act wrongful and subject the actor to the payment of moral damages.
The law could not have meant to impose a penalty on the right to
litigate, such right is so precious that moral damages may not be
charged on those who may even exercise it erroneously. And an
adverse decision does not ipso facto justify the award of attorney's
fees to the winning party (Garcia vs. Gonzales, 183 SCRA 72 [1990]).
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
TORRES, J.:
On August 27, 1902, Don Vicente Perez filed in the Court of First
Instance of Laguna a complaint, which was amended on the 17th of
January of this year, asking that the court determine the amount due
the plaintiff, at the customary rate of compensation for interpreting in
these Islands, for services rendered in the Tabacalera Company, and
that, in view of the circumstances of the case, judgment be rendered
in his favor for such sum. The complaint also asked that the defendant
be condemned to the payment of damages in the sum of $3,200, gold,
together with the costs of suit. In this complaint it was alleged that
Don Eugenio Pomar, as general agent of the Compaia General de
Tabacos in the said province, verbally requested the plaintiff on the
8th of December, 1901, to act as interpreter between himself and the
military authorities; that after the date mentioned the plaintiff
continued to render such services up to and including May 31, 1902;
that he had accompanied the defendant, Pomar, during that time at
conferences between the latter and the colonel commanding the local
garrison, and with various officers and doctors residing in the capital,
and at conferences with Captain Lemen in the town of Pilar, and with
the major in command at the town of Pagsanjan, concerning the
shipment of goods from Manila, and with respect to Pagsanjan to this
city; that the plaintiff during this period held himself in readiness to
render services whenever required; that on this account his private
business, and especially a soap factory established in the capital, was
entirely abandoned; that to the end that such services might be
punctually rendered, the agent, Pomar, assured him that the
Tabacalera Company always generously repaid services rendered it,
and that he therefore did not trouble himself about his inability to
devote the necessary amount of time to his business, the defendant
going so far as to make him flattering promises of employment with
the company, which he did not accept; that these statements were
made in the absence of witnesses and that therefore his only proof as
to the same was Mr. Pomar's word as a gentleman; that the
employees of the company did not understand English, and by reason
of the plaintiff's mediation between the agent, and the military
authorities large profits were obtained, as would appear from the
account and letterpress books of the agency corresponding to those
dates. In the amended complaint it was added that the defendant, on
behalf of the company, offered to renumerate the plaintiff for the
services rendered in the most advantageous manner in which such
services are compensated, in view of the circumstances under which
they were requested; and that the plaintiff, by rendering the company
such services, was obliged to abandon his own business, the
manufacture of soap, and thereby suffered damages in the sum of
$3,200, United States currency.
From the oral testimony introduced at the trial, it appears that the
plaintiff, Perez, did on various occasions render Don Eugenio Pomar
services as interpreter of English; and that he obtained passes and
accompanied the defendant upon his journeys to some of the towns in
the Province of Laguna. It does not appear from the evidence,
however, that the plaintiff was constantly at the disposal of the
defendant during the period of six months, or that he rendered
services as such interpreter continuously and daily during that period
of time.
It does not appear that any written contract was entered into between
the parties for the employment of the plaintiff as interpreter, or that
any other innominate contract was entered into; but whether the
plaintiff's services were solicited or whether they were offered to the
defendant for his assistance, inasmuch as these services were
accepted and made use of by the latter, we must consider that there
was a tacit and mutual consent as to the rendition of the services. This
gives rise to the obligation upon the person benefited by the services
to make compensation therefor, since the bilateral obligation to render
services as interpreter, on the one hand, and on the other to pay for
the services rendered, is thereby incurred. (Arts. 1088, 1089, and
1262 of the Civil Code). The supreme court of Spain in its decision of
February 12, 1889, holds, among other things, "that not only is there
an express and tacit consent which produces real contract but there is
also a presumptive consent which is the basis of quasi contracts, this
giving rise to the multiple juridical relations which result in obligations
for the delivery of a thing or the rendition of a service."
The consideration for the contract is also evident, it being clear that a
mutual benefit was derived in consequence of the service rendered. It
is to be supposed that the defendant accepted these services and that
the plaintiff in turn rendered them with the expectation that the
benefit would be reciprocal. This shows the concurrence of the three
elements necessary under article 1261 of the Civil Code to constitute a
contract of lease of service, or other innominate contract, from which
an obligation has arisen and whose fulfillment is now demanded.
Article 1254 of the Civil Code provides that a contract exists the
moment that one or more persons consent to be bound, with respect
to another or others, to deliver some thing or to render some service.
Article 1255 provides that the contracting parties may establish such
covenants, terms, and conditions as they deem convenient, provided
they are not contrary to law, morals or public policy. Whether the
service was solicited or offered, the fact remains that Perez rendered
to Pomar services as interpreter. As it does not appear that he did this
gratuitously, the duty is imposed upon the defendant, having accepted
the benefit of the service, to pay a just compensation therefor, by
virtue of the innominate contract of facio ut des implicitly established.
The obligations arising from this contract are reciprocal, and, apart
from the general provisions with respect to contracts and obligations,
the special provisions concerning contracts for lease of services are
applicable by analogy.
In contracts the will of the contracting parties is law, this being a legal
doctrine based upon the provisions of articles 1254, 1258, 1262, 1278,
1281, 1282, and 1289 of the Civil Code. If it is a fact sufficiently
proven that the defendant, Pomar, on various occasions consented to
accept an interpreter's services, rendered in his behalf and not
gratuitously, it is but just that he should pay a reasonable
remuneration therefor, because it is a well-known principle of law that
no one should be permitted to enrich himself to the damage of
another.
Upon the supposition that the recovery of the plaintiff should not
exceed 200 Mexican pesos, owing to the inconsiderable number of
times he acted as interpreter, it is evident that the contract thus
implicitly entered into was not required to be in writing and that
therefore it does not fall within article 1280 of the Civil Code; nor is it
included within the provisions of section 335 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, as this innominate contract is not covered by that section.
The contract of lease of services is not included in any of the cases
expressly designated by that section of the procedural law, as affirmed
by the appellant. The interpretation of the other articles of the Code
alleged to have been infringed has also been stated fully in this
opinion.
For the reasons stated, we are of the opinion that judgment should be
rendered against Don Eugenio Pomar for the payment to the plaintiff
of the sum of 200 Mexican pesos, from which will be deducted the sum
of 50 pesos is made as to the costs of this instance. The judgment
below is accordingly affirmed in so far as it agrees with this opinion,
and reversed in so far as it may be in conflict therewith. Judgment will
be entered accordingly twenty days after this decision is filed.
THIRD dIVISION
On April 27, 1966, the petitioner received by mail the decision of the
Director and all the records of the case. On the same day, petitioner
received a telegram stating the following:
"AIRMAIL RECORDS DELMO CASE MISSENT THAT OFFICE"
The Director asked for the return only of the records but the petitioner
allegedly mistook the telegram as ordering him to also send the
decision back. On the same day, he returned by mail all the records
plus the decision of the Director to the Bureau of Public Schools.
The next day, the petitioner received another telegram from the
Director order him to furnish Delmo with a copy of the decision. The
petitioner, in turn, sent a night letter to the Director informing the
latter that he had sent the decision back and that he had not retained
a copy thereof..
To delay the matter further, the petitioner on May 5, 1966, wrote the
Director for a reconsideration of the latters" decision because he
believed that Delmo should not be allowed to graduate with honors.
The Director denied the petitioner's request.
On July 12, 1966, the petitioner finally instructed the Registrar of the
school to enter into the scholastic records of Delmo the honor, "Magna
Cum Laude."
On July 30, 1966, Delmo, then a minor, was joined by her parents in
flag action for damages against the petitioner. During the pendency of
the action, however, Delmo passed away, and thus, an Amended and
Supplemental Complaint was filed by her parents as her sole and only
heirs.
The trial court after hearing rendered judgment against the petitioner
and in favor of the spouses Delmo. The court said:
The issues raised in this petition can be reduced to the sole question of
whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals erred in affirming the
trial court's finding that petitioner is liable for damages under Article
27 of the New Civil Code.
We find no reason why the findings of the trial and appellate courts
should be reversed. It cannot be disputed that Violeta Delmo went
through a painful ordeal which was brought about by the petitioner's
neglect of duty and callousness. Thus, moral damages are but proper.
As we have affirmed in the case of (Prudenciado v. Alliance Transport
System, Inc., 148 SCRA 440, 448):
SO ORDERED.