G.R. No.

L-23882 February 17, 1968

M. D. TRANSIT & TAXI CO., INC., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and DAVID EPSTEIN, respondents.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals.
While crossing Taft Avenue extension, near its intersection with Castro Street, Manila, passing by the pedestrian
lane on August 18, 1958, about 8:30 a.m., and as he was about to reach the island in the middle of the road, David Epstein
hereinafter referred to as plaintiff was hit by a Pasay bound bus of the MD Transit & Taxi Co., Inc. hereinafter
referred to as appellant driven by Dominador Sembrano, in consequence of which plaintiff's left femur and right fibula
were fractured, apart from sustaining lacerations in the scalp, occipital region. Prosecuted for serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence, the Court of First Instance of Manila found Sembrano guilty thereof beyond reasonable
doubt and sentenced him to suffer the corresponding penalty of imprisonment, 1 but, refrained from making any
pronouncement on his civil liability, plaintiff having reserved the right to file a separate civil action for damages.
Although, from the decision of said court, Sembrano appealed to the Court of Appeals, he, later, withdrew the appeal. As a
consequence, said decision became final and executory on May 5, 1961.
Meanwhile, or on January 23, 1959, plaintiff had commenced the present action for damages against Sembrano and
appellant herein. Sembrano was declared in default, whereas appellant filed its answer alleging that it had exercised due
diligence in the selection of its employees and in supervising them in the performance of their duties, and that the accident
was due to plaintiff's recklessness or negligence. After appropriate proceedings, the Court of First Instance of Manila
rendered a decision, the dispositive part of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding defendant, Dominador Sembrano, primarily liable to
plaintiff, David Epstein, for the damages sustained by the latter, and hereby orders the former to pay the latter the
following:
(1) Actual damages in the amount of P3,161.10;
(2) Compensatory damages in the amount of P12,000.00;
(3) Moral damages in the amount of P5,000.00; and
(4) Counsel fees in the amount of P1,000.00; and
Finding defendant MD Transit and Taxi Co., Inc., subsidiarily liable to plaintiff, David Epstein, in the
amounts above-indicated, in the event that defendant, Dominador Sembrano, fails to pay the same or is insolvent.
Costs against defendants.
On appeal, said decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Hence, this petition for review by certiorari, filed
by appellant.
The main issue raised by the latter refers to the nature of the present action, namely, whether the liability sought to
be enforced therein arises from a crime, as contended by the plaintiff, or from a quasi-delict, as urged by appellant. The
importance of this issue is due to the fact that appellant's alleged diligence in the selection of its employees and in
exercising supervision over them would be a good defense should the action be based upon a quasi-delict, but not if
predicated upon a liability springing from a crime. The trial court and the appellate court rejected appellant's pretense and
sustained that of the plaintiff, and, we think, correctly.
Indeed, in his complaint, plaintiff premised his action against herein appellant upon the allegation that the latter is
"subsidiary liable for all damages caused by the negligence of its employee in the performance of his duties," and,
accordingly, prayed that Sembrano be ordered and, "upon his inability," appellant herein, to pay the damages claimed in
said pleading. In other words, plaintiff maintained that Sembrano is primarily liable for said damages, and that appellant's
liability therefor is purely secondary, which is typical of the civil liability arising from crimes, pursuant to articles 102 and
103 of the Revised Penal Code. The effect of said allegation and subsequent prayer upon the nature of the present action is
illustrated by the case of De Leon Brokerage v. Court of Appeals 2in which the allegations of the complaint were not clear
on whether or not the damages sued for resulted from a crime or from a quasi-delict. The issue was resolved in favor of
the latter alternative, in view of the prayer in said pleading to the effect that the employer be hold "solidarily" liable with
his employee. In fact, solidarity is one of the main characteristics of obligations arising from quasi-delicts. 3
Another circumstance militating in favor of plaintiff's contention is the fact that, in the criminal action, he had
reserved the right to seek indemnity in a separate civil action. There can be no doubt that the present action was filed in
pursuance of said reservation, which would have been unnecessary had plaintiff not based his right of action upon
Sembrano's criminal liability. Further corroboration is supplied by the fact that the first piece of evidence offered by
plaintiff herein, at trial of this case in the court of origin, was the decision of conviction rendered in the criminal case
against Sembrano.
Contrary to appellant's pretense, the absence of allegations, in plaintiff's complaint, about Sembrano's conviction in
the criminal case, and about his insolvency, does not impair the theory of the plaintiff, for such allegations are not
indispensable in an action for damages sustained on account of a crime committed by the employee. Indeed, the law
authorizing the commencement of a civil action based upon a liability arising from a crime, even before the institution of
the criminal action, 4 necessarily implies that the rendition of a judgment of conviction in the latter need not be alleged in
the civil complaint.
Neither is an allegation of insolvency of the employee essential to an action to enforce the subsidiary liability of the
employer, particularly when both are sued in the same action as in the case at bar to exact theprimary liability of the
employee, and the subsidiary liability of the employer. To be sure, the secondary nature of the latter's obligation
necessarily connotes that his properties may not be levied upon, in pursuance of a writ of execution of the judgment
declaring the existence of both liabilities, as long and so long as the employer can point out properties of the employee
which may be levied upon in satisfaction of said judgment. 5 Thus, the employee's solvency is merely a matter
of defense which may be availed of by the employer.
 It is next urged that the lower courts erred in considering in this case the judgment of conviction in the criminal
case, in which appellant was not a party, and in disregarding appellant's evidence on the alleged diligence exercised in
selecting its employees and in supervising them in the discharge of their duties. Though relevant in an action based upon a
quasi-delict, said diligence is, however, immaterial in the case at bar, the same being predicated upon a liability arising
from a crime. Moreover, it is already settled that the judgment of conviction in the criminal case against an employee
is, not only admissible in evidence in the civil case against the employer, but, also, conclusive upon his subsidiary
liability arising from the employee's criminal liability. Thus inMiranda v. Malate Garage & Taxicab, Inc. 6 we held:
It is true that an employer, strictly speaking is not a party to the criminal case instituted against his
employee but in substance and in effect he is, considering the subsidiary liability imposed upon him by law. It is
his concern, as well as of his employee, to see to it that his interest be protected in the criminal case by taking
virtual participation in the defense of his employee. He cannot leave him to his own fate because his failure is
also his. And if because of his indifference or inaction the employee is convicted and damages are awarded
against him he cannot later be heard to complain if brought to court for the enforcement of his subsidiary liability
that he was not given his day in court. (Emphasis supplied.)1wph1.t
The language used in Martinez v. Barredo 7 was:
The important question is whether a judgment of conviction sentencing the defendant to pay an indemnity is
conclusive in an action against his employer for the enforcement of the latter's subsidiary liability under Articles
102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code. The appealed decision makes reference to two earlier decisions of this
Court, namely, City of Manila vs. Manila Electric Co., 52 Phil., 586, holding that such judgment of conviction
is not admissible, and Arambulo vs. Manila Electric Co., 55 Phil., 75, in effect holding that it is merely prima
facie evidence, and to the prevailing view in the United States to the effect that the person subsidiarily liable is
bound by the judgment if the former had notice of the criminal case and could have defended it had he seen fit to
do so, and that otherwise such judgment is only prima facie evidence.
After very careful reflection, we have arrived at the opinion that the judgment of conviction, in the absence
of any collusion between the defendant and the offended party, should bind the person subsidiarily liable. The
stigma of a criminal conviction surpasses in effect and implications mere civil liability. Common sense dictates
that a finding of guilt in a criminal case in which proof beyond reasonable doubt is necessary, should not be
nullified in a subsequent civil action requiring only preponderance of evidence to support a judgment, unless
those who support the contrary rule should also hold that an absolution in a civil case will operate to automatically
set aside the verdict against the defendant in the criminal case. It is anomalous, to say the least, to suppose that the
driver, excelling "Dr. Jekyl and Mr. Hyde", could be guilty of reckless negligence in so far as his obligation to
pay indemnity is concerned, and at the same time could befree from blame when said indemnity is sought to be
collected from his employer, although the right to the indemnity arose from and was based on one and the same
act of the driver.
The employer cannot be said to have been deprived of his day in court, because the situation before us
is not one wherein the employer is sued for a primary liability under article 1903 of the Civil Code, but one in
which enforcement is sought of a subsidiary civil liability incident to and dependent upon his
driver'scriminal negligence which is a proper issue to be tried and decided only in a criminal action. In other
words,the employer becomes ipso facto subsidiarily liable upon his driver's conviction and upon proof of the
latter's insolvency, in the same way that acquittal wipes out not only the employee's primary civil liability but also
his employer's subsidiary liability for such criminal negligence. . . . (Emphasis supplied.)
These views were reiterated in Nagrampa v. Mulvaney 8 and Orsal v. Alisbo. 9
Although conceding that the sum of P3,161 awarded as actual damages "is not too excessive," appellant maintains
that it is "unreasonable and ought to be reduced." Actual damages is, however, a question of fact, and the findings thereon
of the Court of Appeals, adopting those of the trial court, are conclusive upon us.
Appellant likewise impugns the awards to plaintiff of P5,000 as moral damages, P12,000 as compensatory damages
and P1,000 as attorney's fees. In connection therewith, the Court of Appeals, after quoting the findings of the court of
origin on the facts and circumstances justifying said awards, had the following to say:
Bearing in mind that in crimes, the defendant is liable for all damages which are the natural and probable
consequences of the act or omission complained of, including loss or impairment of earning capacity of the
offended party and injury to his business standing or commercial credit as well as compensation for physical pain
and suffering and mental anguish, which was a gap in our legal system, filled in by the new Civil Code, and that
attorney's fees are recoverable in a separate action to recover civil liability arising from crime, and considering
that appellant has not adduced compelling reasons to justify us in disturbing the abovementioned findings of the
lower court, by substituting ours for its sound discretion, exercised in the light of the facts and circumstances
obtaining in this case as observed by it, the said last three assigned errors of appellant are likewise declared
without sufficient merit.
Upon a review of the record, we do not feel justified in disturbing the conclusions reached by the appellate court
and the court of origin.
It may not be amiss to note that "actual" damages and "consequential damages" are dealt with in the Civil Code of
the Philippines under the same Chapter; 10 thereof that the two (2) terms are thus used therein as equivalent to one another;
and that the decision appealed had characterized as "actual damages" the expenses incurred by the plaintiff for his medical
treatment and as "compensatory damages" the earnings he failed to make due to his consequent "inability to pursue his
normal work or occupation." Considering, however, that in the language of Article 2200 of said Code, which is part of
the aforementioned Chapter 2 "indemnification for damages shall comprehend not only the value of the loss suffered"
otherwise known as "damnum emergens," and alluded to in said decision as "actual damages" "but also that of the
profits which the obligee failed to obtain" or "lucrum cessans" or "compensatory damages," pursuant to the same
decision the distinction therein made appears to be inconsequential, insofar as the law and this case is concerned.
 WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against appellant, MD Transit & Taxi Co.,
Inc. It is so ordered.

G.R. No. L-23882 February 17, 1968

M. D. TRANSIT & TAXI CO., INC., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and DAVID EPSTEIN, respondents.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:

Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals.

While crossing Taft Avenue extension, near its intersection with Castro Street, Manila, passing by the pedestrian
lane on August 18, 1958, about 8:30 a.m., and as he was about to reach the island in the middle of the road, David Epstein
hereinafter referred to as plaintiff was hit by a Pasay bound bus of the MD Transit & Taxi Co., Inc. hereinafter
referred to as appellant driven by Dominador Sembrano, in consequence of which plaintiff's left femur and right fibula
were fractured, apart from sustaining lacerations in the scalp, occipital region. Prosecuted for serious physical injuries
through reckless imprudence, the Court of First Instance of Manila found Sembrano guilty thereof beyond reasonable
doubt and sentenced him to suffer the corresponding penalty of imprisonment, 1 but, refrained from making any
pronouncement on his civil liability, plaintiff having reserved the right to file a separate civil action for damages.
Although, from the decision of said court, Sembrano appealed to the Court of Appeals, he, later, withdrew the appeal. As a
consequence, said decision became final and executory on May 5, 1961.
Meanwhile, or on January 23, 1959, plaintiff had commenced the present action for damages against Sembrano and
appellant herein. Sembrano was declared in default, whereas appellant filed its answer alleging that it had exercised due
diligence in the selection of its employees and in supervising them in the performance of their duties, and that the accident
was due to plaintiff's recklessness or negligence. After appropriate proceedings, the Court of First Instance of Manila
rendered a decision, the dispositive part of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding defendant, Dominador Sembrano, primarily liable to
plaintiff, David Epstein, for the damages sustained by the latter, and hereby orders the former to pay the latter the
following:
(1) Actual damages in the amount of P3,161.10;
(2) Compensatory damages in the amount of P12,000.00;
(3) Moral damages in the amount of P5,000.00; and
(4) Counsel fees in the amount of P1,000.00; and
Finding defendant MD Transit and Taxi Co., Inc., subsidiarily liable to plaintiff, David Epstein, in the
amounts above-indicated, in the event that defendant, Dominador Sembrano, fails to pay the same or is insolvent.
Costs against defendants.
On appeal, said decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Hence, this petition for review by certiorari, filed
by appellant.
The main issue raised by the latter refers to the nature of the present action, namely, whether the liability sought to
be enforced therein arises from a crime, as contended by the plaintiff, or from a quasi-delict, as urged by appellant. The
importance of this issue is due to the fact that appellant's alleged diligence in the selection of its employees and in
exercising supervision over them would be a good defense should the action be based upon a quasi-delict, but not if
predicated upon a liability springing from a crime. The trial court and the appellate court rejected appellant's pretense and
sustained that of the plaintiff, and, we think, correctly.
Indeed, in his complaint, plaintiff premised his action against herein appellant upon the allegation that the latter is
"subsidiary liable for all damages caused by the negligence of its employee in the performance of his duties," and,
accordingly, prayed that Sembrano be ordered and, "upon his inability," appellant herein, to pay the damages claimed in
said pleading. In other words, plaintiff maintained that Sembrano is primarily liable for said damages, and that appellant's
liability therefor is purely secondary, which is typical of the civil liability arising from crimes, pursuant to articles 102 and
103 of the Revised Penal Code. The effect of said allegation and subsequent prayer upon the nature of the present action is
illustrated by the case of De Leon Brokerage v. Court of Appeals 2in which the allegations of the complaint were not clear
on whether or not the damages sued for resulted from a crime or from a quasi-delict. The issue was resolved in favor of
the latter alternative, in view of the prayer in said pleading to the effect that the employer be hold "solidarily" liable with
his employee. In fact, solidarity is one of the main characteristics of obligations arising from quasi-delicts. 3
Another circumstance militating in favor of plaintiff's contention is the fact that, in the criminal action, he had
reserved the right to seek indemnity in a separate civil action. There can be no doubt that the present action was filed in
pursuance of said reservation, which would have been unnecessary had plaintiff not based his right of action upon
Sembrano's criminal liability. Further corroboration is supplied by the fact that the first piece of evidence offered by
plaintiff herein, at trial of this case in the court of origin, was the decision of conviction rendered in the criminal case
against Sembrano.
Contrary to appellant's pretense, the absence of allegations, in plaintiff's complaint, about Sembrano's conviction in
the criminal case, and about his insolvency, does not impair the theory of the plaintiff, for such allegations are not
indispensable in an action for damages sustained on account of a crime committed by the employee. Indeed, the law
authorizing the commencement of a civil action based upon a liability arising from a crime, even before the institution of
the criminal action, 4 necessarily implies that the rendition of a judgment of conviction in the latter need not be alleged in
the civil complaint.
Neither is an allegation of insolvency of the employee essential to an action to enforce the subsidiary liability of the
employer, particularly when both are sued in the same action as in the case at bar to exact theprimary liability of the
employee, and the subsidiary liability of the employer. To be sure, the secondary nature of the latter's obligation
necessarily connotes that his properties may not be levied upon, in pursuance of a writ of execution of the judgment
declaring the existence of both liabilities, as long and so long as the employer can point out properties of the employee
which may be levied upon in satisfaction of said judgment. 5 Thus, the employee's solvency is merely a matter
of defense which may be availed of by the employer.
It is next urged that the lower courts erred in considering in this case the judgment of conviction in the criminal
case, in which appellant was not a party, and in disregarding appellant's evidence on the alleged diligence exercised in
selecting its employees and in supervising them in the discharge of their duties. Though relevant in an action based upon a
quasi-delict, said diligence is, however, immaterial in the case at bar, the same being predicated upon a liability arising
from a crime. Moreover, it is already settled that the judgment of conviction in the criminal case against an employee
is, not only admissible in evidence in the civil case against the employer, but, also, conclusive upon his subsidiary
liability arising from the employee's criminal liability. Thus inMiranda v. Malate Garage & Taxicab, Inc. 6 we held:
It is true that an employer, strictly speaking is not a party to the criminal case instituted against his
employee but in substance and in effect he is, considering the subsidiary liability imposed upon him by law. It is
his concern, as well as of his employee, to see to it that his interest be protected in the criminal case by taking
virtual participation in the defense of his employee. He cannot leave him to his own fate because his failure is
also his. And if because of his indifference or inaction the employee is convicted and damages are awarded
against him he cannot later be heard to complain if brought to court for the enforcement of his subsidiary liability
that he was not given his day in court. (Emphasis supplied.)1wph1.t
The language used in Martinez v. Barredo 7 was:
The important question is whether a judgment of conviction sentencing the defendant to pay an indemnity is
conclusive in an action against his employer for the enforcement of the latter's subsidiary liability under Articles
102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code. The appealed decision makes reference to two earlier decisions of this
Court, namely, City of Manila vs. Manila Electric Co., 52 Phil., 586, holding that such judgment of conviction
is not admissible, and Arambulo vs. Manila Electric Co., 55 Phil., 75, in effect holding that it is merely prima
facie evidence, and to the prevailing view in the United States to the effect that the person subsidiarily liable is
bound by the judgment if the former had notice of the criminal case and could have defended it had he seen fit to
do so, and that otherwise such judgment is only prima facie evidence.
After very careful reflection, we have arrived at the opinion that the judgment of conviction, in the absence
of any collusion between the defendant and the offended party, should bind the person subsidiarily liable. The
stigma of a criminal conviction surpasses in effect and implications mere civil liability. Common sense dictates
that a finding of guilt in a criminal case in which proof beyond reasonable doubt is necessary, should not be
nullified in a subsequent civil action requiring only preponderance of evidence to support a judgment, unless
those who support the contrary rule should also hold that an absolution in a civil case will operate to automatically
set aside the verdict against the defendant in the criminal case. It is anomalous, to say the least, to suppose that the
driver, excelling "Dr. Jekyl and Mr. Hyde", could be guilty of reckless negligence in so far as his obligation to
pay indemnity is concerned, and at the same time could befree from blame when said indemnity is sought to be
collected from his employer, although the right to the indemnity arose from and was based on one and the same
act of the driver.
The employer cannot be said to have been deprived of his day in court, because the situation before us
is not one wherein the employer is sued for a primary liability under article 1903 of the Civil Code, but one in
which enforcement is sought of a subsidiary civil liability incident to and dependent upon his
driver'scriminal negligence which is a proper issue to be tried and decided only in a criminal action. In other
words,the employer becomes ipso facto subsidiarily liable upon his driver's conviction and upon proof of the
latter's insolvency, in the same way that acquittal wipes out not only the employee's primary civil liability but also
his employer's subsidiary liability for such criminal negligence. . . . (Emphasis supplied.)
These views were reiterated in Nagrampa v. Mulvaney 8 and Orsal v. Alisbo. 9
Although conceding that the sum of P3,161 awarded as actual damages "is not too excessive," appellant maintains
that it is "unreasonable and ought to be reduced." Actual damages is, however, a question of fact, and the findings thereon
of the Court of Appeals, adopting those of the trial court, are conclusive upon us.
Appellant likewise impugns the awards to plaintiff of P5,000 as moral damages, P12,000 as compensatory damages
and P1,000 as attorney's fees. In connection therewith, the Court of Appeals, after quoting the findings of the court of
origin on the facts and circumstances justifying said awards, had the following to say:
Bearing in mind that in crimes, the defendant is liable for all damages which are the natural and probable
consequences of the act or omission complained of, including loss or impairment of earning capacity of the
offended party and injury to his business standing or commercial credit as well as compensation for physical pain
and suffering and mental anguish, which was a gap in our legal system, filled in by the new Civil Code, and that
attorney's fees are recoverable in a separate action to recover civil liability arising from crime, and considering
that appellant has not adduced compelling reasons to justify us in disturbing the abovementioned findings of the
lower court, by substituting ours for its sound discretion, exercised in the light of the facts and circumstances
obtaining in this case as observed by it, the said last three assigned errors of appellant are likewise declared
without sufficient merit.
Upon a review of the record, we do not feel justified in disturbing the conclusions reached by the appellate court
and the court of origin.
It may not be amiss to note that "actual" damages and "consequential damages" are dealt with in the Civil Code of
the Philippines under the same Chapter; 10 thereof that the two (2) terms are thus used therein as equivalent to one another;
and that the decision appealed had characterized as "actual damages" the expenses incurred by the plaintiff for his medical
treatment and as "compensatory damages" the earnings he failed to make due to his consequent "inability to pursue his
normal work or occupation." Considering, however, that in the language of Article 2200 of said Code, which is part of
the aforementioned Chapter 2 "indemnification for damages shall comprehend not only the value of the loss suffered"
otherwise known as "damnum emergens," and alluded to in said decision as "actual damages" "but also that of the
profits which the obligee failed to obtain" or "lucrum cessans" or "compensatory damages," pursuant to the same
decision the distinction therein made appears to be inconsequential, insofar as the law and this case is concerned.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against appellant, MD Transit & Taxi Co.,
Inc. It is so ordered.

G.R. No. L-49308 May 13, 1948

MARIA LUISA MARTINEZ, petitioner,
vs.
MANUEL H. BARREDO, ET AL., respondents.
PARAS, J.:

On April 11, 1940, a taxicab owned by Fausto Barredo and driven by Rosendo Digman collided in Manila thoroughfare
with Chevrolet car driven by Maria Luisa Martinez. The collision gave rise to mutual charges to damage to property
through reckless imprudence, one by Maria Luisa Martinez against Digman, and the other by Fausto Barredo against
Maria Luisa Martinez. After investigation, the fiscal filed an information against Digman and quashed Barredo's
complaint. Digman entered a plea of guilty of criminal case and was therefore sentenced to pay a fine of P605.97 and to
indemnify Maria Luisa Martinez in the same amount, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and the costs.
Digman failed to pay any of these amounts and had to undergo corresponding subsidiary imprisonment. Due to the
inability of Digman to pay the indemnity, Maria Luisa Martinez, filed an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila
against Fausto Barredo, as Digman's employer, for the purpose of holding him subsidiarily liable for said indemnity under
articles 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code. At the trial Maria Luisa Martinez relied solely of the judgment of
conviction against Rosendo Digman, the writ of execution issued against him, a certificate of the Director of Prisons
regarding Digman's service of subsidiary imprisonment, and the information filed against Digman. Maria Luisa Martinez
obtained a favorable judgment from which Barredo appealed to the Court of Appeals. The letter court, reversing the
decision of the Court of First Instance, held that the judgment of conviction was not conclusive against Barredo and its
weight asprima facie evidence was overcome by the evidence presented by Barredo. Hence the present appeal of Maria
Luisa Martinez by way of certiorari.

The important question is whether a judgment of conviction sentencing the defendant to pay an indemnity is conclusive in
an action against his employer for enforcement of the latter's subsidiary liability under articles 102 and 103 of the Revised
Penal Code. The appealed decision makes reference to two earlier decision of this Court, namely, City of Manila vs.
Manila Electric Co., 52 Phil., 586, holding that such judgment of conviction is not admissible, and Arambulo vs. Manila
Electric Co., 55 Phil., 75, in effect holding that it is merely prima facieevidence, and to the prevailing view in the United
States to the effect that the person subsidiary liable is bound by the judgment if the former had the notice of the criminal
case and could have defendant it had he seen fit to do so, and that otherwise such judgment is only prima facie evidence.

After very careful reflection, we have arrived at the opinion that the judgment of conviction, in the absence of any
collusion between the defendant and the offended party, should bind the person subsidiary liable. The stigma of a criminal
conviction surpasses in effect and implications mere civil liability. Common sense dictates that a finding of guilt in a
criminal case in which proof beyond reasonable doubt is necessary, should be nullified in a subsequent civil action
requiring only preponderance of evidence to support a judgment, unless those who support the contrary rule should also
hold that an absolution in a civil case will operate to automatically set aside the verdict against the defendant in a criminal
case. It is anomalous, to say the least, to suppose that the driver, excelling that "Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde", could be guilty
of reckless negligence in so far as his obligation to pay indemnity is concerned, and at the same time could be free from
any blame when said indemnity is concerned, and at the same time could be free from any blame when said indemnity is
sought to be collected in his employer, although the right to indemnity arose from and was based on one and the same act
of the driver.

The employer can not be said to have been deprive of his day in court, because the situation before us is not one wherein
the employer is sued for a primary liability under article 1903 of the Civil Code, but one in which enforcement is sought
of a subsidiary civil liability incident to and defendant upon his driver's criminal negligence which is a proper issue to be
tried and decided only in criminal action. In other words, the employer becomes ipso facto subsidiary liable upon his
driver's conviction and upon proof of the latter's insolvency, in the same way that acquittal wipes out not only the
employee's primary civil liability but also his employer's subsidiary liability for such criminal negligence. (Almeida et al.,
vs. Abaroa, 8 Phil., 178, affirmed in 218 U.S., 476; Law ed., 1116; Wise and Co. vs. Lariton, 45 Phil., 314, 320; Francisco
vs. Onrubia, 46 Phil., 327; Province of Ilocos Sur vs. Tolentino, G.R. No. 34186, 56 Phil., 829; Moran, Comments on the
Rules of Court, Vol. II, p. 403.).

It is high time that the employer exercise the greatest care in selecting his employees, taking real and deep interest in their
welfare; intervening in any criminal action brought against them by reason of or as a result of the performance of their
duties if only in the way of giving them the benefit of counsel; and consequently doing away with practice of leaving them
to their fates. If this be done, the American rule requiring notice on the part of the employer shall have been satisfied.

It becomes unnecessary to rely on the circumstance that the filing of mutual charges by Fausto Barredo and Maria Luisa
Martinez, with the result, as abovestated, that while the fiscal proceeded in filing the information against Digman, he
quashed the charges of Fausto Barredo, may easily lead to the presumption that the latter should have had knowledge of
the criminal case against his driver. We need not also make any pronouncement to the effect that the prevailing American
view is based upon substantive and procedural laws not similar to those obtaining to his jurisdiction.

Wherefore, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and Fausto Barredo, now substituted by his heirs and legal
representatives, are hereby sentenced to pay, subject to Executive Order No. 32 on Moratorium, to the petitioner, Maria
Luisa Martinez, the sum of P605.97, with legal interest from the date of the filing of complaint. So ordered with costs
against the respondents.

L.G. FOODS CORPORATION and G.R. No. 158995

VICTORINO GABOR, Vice-President and
General Manager, Present:
Petitioners,
PUNO, J., Chairperson,
- versus - SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CORONA,
HON. PHILADELFA B. PAGAPONG- AZCUNA, and
AGRAVIADOR, in her capacity as Presiding GARCIA, JJ.
Judge of Regional Trial Court, Branch 43,
Bacolod City, and SPS. FLORENTINO and Promulgated:
THERESA VALLEJERA,
Respondents. September 26, 2006

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

GARCIA, J.:

Assailed and sought to be set aside in this petition for review on certiorari is the Decision[1] dated April 25, 2003 of the
Court of Appeals (CA), as reiterated in its Resolution of July 10, 2003, [2] in CA-G.R. SP No. 67600, affirming an earlier
Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City, Branch 43, which denied the petitioners motion to dismiss in
Civil Case No. 99-10845, an action for damages arising from a vehicular accident thereat instituted by the herein private
respondents - the spouses Florentino Vallejera and Theresa Vallejera - against the petitioners.
The antecedent facts may be briefly stated as follows:
On February 26, 1996, Charles Vallereja, a 7-year old son of the spouses Florentino Vallejera and Theresa Vallejera, was
hit by a Ford Fiera van owned by the petitioners and driven at the time by their employee, Vincent Norman Yeneza y
Ferrer. Charles died as a result of the accident.
In time, an Information for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Homicide was filed against the driver before the Municipal
Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Bacolod City, docketed as Criminal Case No. 67787, entitled People of the Philippines v.
Vincent Norman Yeneza.
Unfortunately, before the trial could be concluded, the accused driver committed suicide, evidently bothered by
conscience and remorse. On account thereof, the MTCC, in its order of September 30, 1998, dismissed the criminal case.
On June 23, 1999, in the RTC of Bacolod City, the spouses Vallejera filed a complaint [3] for damages against the
petitioners as employers of the deceased driver, basically alleging that as such employers, they failed to exercise due
diligence in the selection and supervision of their employees. Thereat docketed as Civil Case No. 99-10845, the complaint
was raffled to Branch 43 of the court.
In their Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim,[4] the petitioners as defendants denied liability for the
death of the Vallejeras 7-year old son, claiming that they had exercised the required due diligence in the
selection and supervision of their employees, including the deceased driver. They thus prayed in their
Answer for the dismissal of the complaint for lack of cause of action on the part of the Vallejera couple.
During pre-trial, the defendant petitioners insisted that their dismissal prayer be resolved. Hence, the trial court required
them to file within ten days a memorandum of authorities supportive of their position.
Instead, however, of the required memorandum of authorities, the defendant petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss,
principally arguing that the complaint is basically a claim for subsidiary liability against an employer under the provision
of Article 103[5] of the Revised Penal Code. Prescinding therefrom, they contend that there must first be a judgment of
conviction against their driver as a condition sine qua non to hold them liable. Ergo, since the driver died during the
pendency of the criminal action, the sine qua noncondition for their subsidiary liability was not fulfilled, hence the of lack
of cause of action on the part of the plaintiffs. They further argue that since the plaintiffs did not make a reservation to
institute a separate action for damages when the criminal case was filed, the damage suit in question is thereby deemed
instituted with the criminal action. which was already dismissed.
In an Order dated September 4, 2001,[6] the trial court denied the motion to dismiss for lack of merit and set the case for
pre-trial. With their motion for reconsideration having been denied by the same court in its subsequent
order[7] of September 26, 2001, the petitioners then went on certiorari to the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 67600, imputing grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge in refusing to dismiss the basic complaint for damages in Civil Case No.
99-10845.
In the herein assailed decision [8] dated April 25, 2003, the CA denied the petition and upheld the trial court. Partly says the
CA in its challenged issuance:
 xxx xxx xxx
It is clear that the complaint neither represents nor implies that the responsibility charged was the
petitioners subsidiary liability under Art. 103, Revised Penal Code. As pointed out [by the trial court] in
the Order of September 4, 2001, the complaint does not even allege the basic elements for such a liability,
like the conviction of the accused employee and his insolvency. Truly enough, a civil action to enforce
subsidiary liability separate and distinct from the criminal action is even unnecessary.
xxx xxx xxx
Specifically, Civil Case No. 99-10845 exacts responsibility for fault or negligence under Art.
2176, Civil Code, which is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence
under the Revised Penal Code. Verily, therefore, the liability under Art. 2180, Civil Code, is direct and
immediate, and not conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee or prior showing of
the latters insolvency. (Underscoring in the original.)

In time, the petitioners moved for a reconsideration but their motion was denied by the CA in its
resolution[9] of July 10, 2003. Hence, the petitioners present recourse on their submission that the
appellate court committed reversible error in upholding the trial courts denial of their motion to dismiss.

We DENY.

As the Court sees it, the sole issue for resolution is whether the spouses Vallejeras cause of action in Civil Case
No. 99-10845 is founded on Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, as maintained by the petitioners, or derived from
Article 2180[10] of the Civil Code, as ruled by the two courts below.

It thus behooves us to examine the allegations of the complaint for damages in Civil Case No. 99-10845. That
complaint alleged, inter alia, as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

3. That defendant [LG Food Corporation] is the registered owner of a Ford Fiera Van with Plate No. NMS
881 and employer sometime February of 1996 of one Vincent Norman Yeneza y Ferrer, a salesman of said
corporation;

4. That sometime February 26, 1996 at around 2:00 P.M. at Rosario St., Bacolod City, the minor son of
said plaintiffs [now respondents], Charles Vallejera, 7 years old, was hit and bumped by above-described
vehicle then driven by said employee, Vincent Norman Yeneza y Ferrer;

5. That the mishap was due to the gross fault and negligence of defendants employee, who drove said
vehicle, recklessly, negligently and at a high speed without regard to traffic condition and safety of other
road users and likewise to the fault and negligence of the owner employer, herein defendants LG Food
Corporation who failed to exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of his employee,
Vincent Norman Yeneza y Ferrer;

6. That as a result of said incident, plaintiffs son suffered multiple body injuries which led to his untimely
demise on that very day;
7. That a criminal case was filed against the defendants employee, docketed as Criminal Case No. 67787,
(earlier filed as Crim. Case No. 96-17570 before RTC) before MTC-Branch III, entitled People v. Yeneza
for Reckless Imprudence resulting to Homicide, but the same was dismissed because pending litigation,
then remorse-stricken [accused] committed suicide;

xxx xxx xxx

8. That the injuries and complications as well as the resultant death suffered by the late minor Charles
Vallejera were due to the negligence and imprudence of defendants employee;

9. That defendant LG Foods Corporation is civilly liable for the negligence/imprudence of its
employee since it failed to exercise the necessary diligence required of a good father of the family in
the selection and supervision of his employee, Vincent Norman Yeneza y Ferrer which diligence if
exercised, would have prevented said incident. (Bracketed words and emphasis ours.)

Nothing in the foregoing allegations suggests, even remotely, that the herein petitioners are being made to account for
their subsidiary liability under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. As correctly pointed out by the trial court in its
order of September 4, 2001 denying the petitioners Motion to Dismiss, the complaint did not even aver the basic elements
for the subsidiary liability of an employer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, such as the prior conviction of the
driver in the criminal case filed against him nor his insolvency.
Admittedly, the complaint did not explicitly state that plaintiff Vallejeras were suing the defendant petitioners for damages
based on quasi-delict. Clear it is, however, from the allegations of the complaint that quasi-delict was their choice of
remedy against the petitioners. To stress, the plaintiff spouses alleged in their complaint gross fault and negligence on the
part of the driver and the failure of the petitioners, as employers, to exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision
of their employees. The spouses further alleged that the petitioners are civilly liable for the negligence/imprudence of their
driver since they failed to exercise the necessary diligence required of a good father of the family in the selection and
supervision of their employees, which diligence, if exercised, could have prevented the vehicular accident that resulted to
the death of their 7-year old son.

Section 2, Rule 2, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines cause of action as the act or omission by which a party
violates the right of another. Such act or omission gives rise to an obligation which may come from law,
contracts, quasi contracts, delicts or quasi-delicts.[11]

Corollarily, an act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part of the
offender, i.e., 1) civil liability ex delicto;[12] and 2) independent civil liabilities, such as those (a) not arising from an act or
omission complained of as felony (e.g., culpa contractual or obligations arising from law; [13] the intentional torts;
[14]
and culpa aquiliana[15]); or (b) where the injured party is granted a right to file an action independent and distinct from
the criminal action.[16] Either of these two possible liabilities may be enforced against the offender. [17]

Stated otherwise, victims of negligence or their heirs have a choice between an action to enforce the civil liability arising
from culpa criminal under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, and an action for quasi-delict (culpa aquiliana) under
Articles 2176 to 2194 of the Civil Code. If, as here, the action chosen is for quasi-delict, the plaintiff may hold the
employer liable for the negligent act of its employee, subject to the employers defense of exercise of the diligence of a
good father of the family. On the other hand, if the action chosen is for culpa criminal, the plaintiff can hold the employer
subsidiarily liable only upon proof of prior conviction of its employee.[18]

Article 1161[19] of the Civil Code provides that civil obligation arising from criminal offenses shall be governed by penal
laws subject to the provision of Article 2177 [20] and of the pertinent provision of Chapter 2, Preliminary Title on Human
Relation, and of Title XVIII of this Book, regulating damages. Plainly, Article 2177 provides for the alternative remedies
the plaintiff may choose from in case the obligation has the possibility of arising indirectly from the delict/crime or
directly from quasi-delict/tort. The choice is with the plaintiff who makes known his cause of action in his initiatory
pleading or complaint,[21] and not with the defendant who can not ask for the dismissal of the plaintiffs cause of action or
lack of it based on the defendants perception that the plaintiff should have opted to file a claim under Article 103 of the
Revised Penal Code.

Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the liability of the employer is direct or immediate. It is not conditioned upon prior
recourse against the negligent employee and a prior showing of insolvency of such employee. [22]

Here, the complaint sufficiently alleged that the death of the couples minor son was caused by the negligent act of the
petitioners driver; and that the petitioners themselves were civilly liable for the negligence of their driver for failing to
exercise the necessary diligence required of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of [their]
employee, the driver, which diligence, if exercised, would have prevented said accident.

Had the respondent spouses elected to sue the petitioners based on Article 103 of the Revised Penal
Code, they would have alleged that the guilt of the driver had been proven beyond reasonable doubt; that such accused
driver is insolvent; that it is the subsidiary liability of the defendant petitioners as employers to pay for the damage done
by their employee (driver) based on the principle that every person criminally liable is also civilly liable. [23] Since there
was no conviction in the criminal case against the driver, precisely because death intervened prior to the termination of the
criminal proceedings, the spouses recourse was, therefore, to sue the petitioners for their direct and primary liability based
on quasi-delict.

Besides, it is worthy to note that the petitioners, in their Answer with Compulsory Counter-Claim,[24] repeatedly made
mention of Article 2180 of the Civil Code and anchored their defense on their allegation that they had exercised due
diligence in the selection and supervision of [their] employees. The Court views this defense as an admission that indeed
the petitioners acknowledged the private respondents cause of action as one for quasi-delict under Article 2180 of the
Civil Code.

All told, Civil Case No. 99-10845 is a negligence suit brought under Article 2176 - Civil Code to recover damages
primarily from the petitioners as employers responsible for their negligent driver pursuant to Article 2180 of the Civil
Code. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or omissions, but also for those
of persons for whom one is responsible. Thus, the employer is liable for damages caused by his employees and household
helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former is not engaged in any business or industry.

Citing Maniago v. CA,[25] petitioner would argue that Civil Case No. 99-10845 should have been dismissed for failure of
the respondent spouses to make a reservation to institute a separate civil action for damages when the criminal case
against the driver was filed.
The argument is specious.
To start with, the petitioners reliance on Maniago is obviously misplaced. There, the civil case was filed while the
criminal case against the employee was still pending. Here, the criminal case against the employee driver was prematurely
terminated due to his death. Precisely, Civil Case No. 99-10845 was filed by the respondent spouses because no remedy
can be obtained by them against the petitioners with the dismissal of the criminal case against their driver during the
pendency thereof.
The circumstance that no reservation to institute a separate civil action for damages was made when the criminal case was
filed is of no moment for the simple reason that the criminal case was dismissed without any pronouncement having been
made therein. In reality, therefor, it is as if there was no criminal case to speak of in the first place. And for the petitioners
to insist for the conviction of their driver as a condition sine qua non to hold them liable for damages is to ask for the
impossible.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

[G.R. No. 131280. October 18, 2000]

PEPE CATACUTAN and AURELIANA CATACUTAN, petitioners, vs. HEIRS OF NORMAN KADUSALE,
HEIRS OF LITO AMANCIO and GIL B. IZON,respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The issue raised in this petition for review on certiorari is whether or not a subsidiary writ of execution may issue
against the employers of an accused, against whom a judgment of conviction had been entered, even when said employers
never took part in the criminal proceedings where the accused was charged, tried and convicted.
Assailed in the instant petition is the August 12, 1997 Decision [1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 43617,
directing the issuance of a subsidiary writ of execution against petitioners, as well as its October 9, 1997 Resolution,
[2]
denying petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration.
The antecedent facts relevant to the issue before us may be summarized, as follows -
Petitioner Aureliana Catacutan is the registered owner and operator of a jeepney, driven by the accused Porferio
Vendiola, which bumped a tricycle on April 11, 1991, in Banilad, Bacong, Negros Oriental, thereby causing the death of
its driver, Norman Kadusale, and its passenger, Lito Amancio, and serious physical injuries to another passenger,
respondent Gil B. Izon.
Respondents thus filed a criminal case against Porferio Vendiola, for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Double
Homicide with Physical Injuries and Damages to Property on July 26, 1991, before the Regional Trial Court of Negros
Oriental.
On December 1, 1995, the trial court rendered judgment, [3] the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

Wherefore, foregoing considered, this court is convinced beyond doubt that accused is guilty of negligence and
imprudence under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code in the collision which occurred in Banilad, Bacong, Negros
Oriental on April 11, 1991 which claimed the lives of Norman Kadusale, the driver of the motortricycle, and Lito
Amancio, a passenger of the motortricycle, and caused injury to Gil B. Izon.

He is therefore sentenced to suffer the penalty of prision correccional medium and maximum periods. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the accused is sentenced to one year eight months and one day of prision correccional as
minimum to two years, four months and one day of prision correccional as maximum for each death to be served
successively, and for the physical injuries suffered by Gil B. Izon, accused is ordered to suffer the penalty of thirty days
of arresto mayor straight. He is likewise ordered to indemnify the heirs of Norman Kadusale and Lito Amancio in the
amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos each victim; and to pay actual damages to:

1. Norman Kadusale or his heirs the amount of P170,543.24;

2. Lito Amancio or his heirs the amount of P38,394.35; and
3. Gil B. Izon, the amount of P23,454.00.

SO ORDERED.[4]

Accused Vendiola did not appeal the judgment of conviction. Instead, he applied for probation. Meanwhile, when the
judgment became final and executory, respondents moved for the issuance of a writ of execution and the corresponding
writ was issued by the trial court on April 24, 1996. However, per the Sheriff's Return of Service, [5] dated July 3, 1996, the
writ was unsatisfied as the accused had "nothing to pay off the damages in the decision."
On August 28, 1996, respondents filed a Motion for Subsidiary Writ of Execution [6] before the trial court, praying that
such writ be issued against petitioner Aureliana Catacutan as registered owner and operator of the jeepney driven by the
accused when the collision occurred. Petitioner Aureliana Catacutan filed her Opposition [7] thereto, arguing that she was
never a party to the case and that to proceed against her would be in violation of the due process clause of the
Constitution. Petitioner also argued that the subsidiary liability of the employer is not determined in the criminal case
against the employee.
On October 3, 1996, the trial court issued an Order [8] denying the said Motion for lack of merit. According to the trial
court, it never acquired jurisdiction over petitioner Aureliana Catacutan since she was never impleaded as party to the
case, and respondents' remedy was to file a separate case for damages. Respondents' Motion for Reconsideration was also
denied on December 3, 1996.[9]
 Undaunted, respondents went on certiorari to the Court of Appeals. On August 12, 1997, the Court of Appeals
rendered the assailed Decision.
The issue raised in the instant petition is not new. It has been passed upon in the case of Yusay v. Adil,[10] where this
Court held -

Petitioners contend that they were not informed of Criminal Case No. 11828 nor heard therein, in the matter of their
alleged subsidiary liability and that they were thus denied their day in court, and that the court did not acquire jurisdiction
over them.

We hold otherwise. Petitioners were given ample opportunity to present their side. The respondent judge admitted their
"Urgent Ex Parte Motion for Time to File Necessary Pleadings." The respondent judge also issued an order suspending the
execution of the writ dated 24 October 1980 and granting petitioners until 5 November 1980 within which to file their
comment and/or opposition to the Motion for Issuance of the Writ of Subsidiary Execution. On 4 November 1980,
petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration of the order of 24 October 1980 and To Set Aside Subsidiary Writ of
Execution. This was opposed by private respondent. On 21 November 1980, an order of denial of the Motion dated 4
November 1980 was issued. A second motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioners which was again opposed by
private respondent. Petitioners filed their reply thereto. Acting on the pleadings, respondent judge issued a resolution
denying petitioners' second motion for reconsideration.

As stated in Martinez v. Barredo:

"The employer cannot be said to have been deprived of his day in court, because the situation before us is not one wherein
the employer is sued for a primary liability under article 1903 of the Civil Code, but one in which enforcement is sought
of a subsidiary civil liability incident to and dependent upon his driver's criminal negligence which is a proper issue to be
tried and decided only in a criminal action. In other words, the employer becomes ipso facto subsidiarily liable upon his
driver's conviction and upon proof of the latter's insolvency, in the same way that acquittal wipes out not only the
employee's primary liability but also his employer's subsidiary liability for such criminal negligence (81 Phil. 1, 3, G.R.
No. L-49308, May 13, 1948, citing Almeida et al., vs. Abaroa, 8 Phil., 178, affirmed in 218 U.S. 476; 54 Law ed., 1116;
Wise & Co. vs. Larion, 45 Phil. 314, 320; Francisco vs. Onrubia, 46 Phil. 327; Province of Ilocos Sur vs. Tolentino, G.R.
No. 34186, 56 Phil., 829; Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. II, p. 403)."

The employer is, in substance and in effect, a party to the criminal case against his employee, considering the subsidiary
liability imposed upon him by law. Thus:

"It is true that an employer, strictly speaking, is not a party to the criminal case instituted against his employee but in
substance and in effect he is considering the subsidiary liability imposed upon him by law.It is his concern, as well as his
employee, to see to it that his interest be protected in the criminal case by taking virtual participation in the defense of his
employee. He cannot leave him to his own fate because his failure is also his. And if because of his indifference or
inaction the employee is convicted and damages are awarded against him, he cannot later be heard to complain, if brought
to court for the enforcement of his subsidiary liability, that he was not given his day in court. It was not without purpose
that this Court sounded the following stern warning:

"It is high time that the employer exercised the greatest care in selecting his employees, taking real and deep interest in
their welfare; intervening in any criminal action brought against them by reason or as a result of the performance of their
duties, if only in the way of giving them benefit of counsel; and consequently doing away with the practice of leaving
them to their fates. If these be done, the American rule requiring notice on the part of the employer shall have been
satisfied (Miranda vs. Malate Garage and Taxicab, Inc., 99 Phil. 670, 675, citing Martinez vs. Barredo, supra)."

More recently, in the case of Basilio v. Court of Appeals,[11] the issuance of a subsidiary writ of execution against the
employer of the accused therein was once more upheld, notwithstanding the non-participation of such employer in the
criminal case against the accused. Instructive as it is on the issue at hand, we are reproducing hereunder this Court's
pronouncement in said case, to wit -

The statutory basis for an employer's subsidiary liability is found in Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. This liability
is enforceable in the same criminal proceeding where the award is made. (Rules of Court, Rule 111, Sec. 1) However,
before execution against an employer ensues, there must be a determination, in a hearing set for the purpose of 1) the
existence of an employer-employee relationship; 2) that the employer is engaged in some kind of industry; 3) that the
employee is adjudged guilty of the wrongful act and found to have committed the offense in the discharge of his duties
(not necessarily any offense he commits "while" in the discharge of such duties); and 4) that said employee is insolvent.
(Yonaha vs. CA, 255 SCRA 397, 402 [1996].)

In Vda. De Paman vs. Seeris, 115 SCRA 709, 714 (1982), the Court observed that the drawback in the enforcement of the
subsidiary liability in the same criminal proceeding is that the alleged employer is not afforded due process. Not being a
party to the case, he is not heard as to whether he is indeed the employer. Hence, we held:
To remedy the situation and thereby afford due process to the alleged employer, this Court directed the court a quo in
Pajarito vs. Seeris (supra) to hear and decide in the same proceeding the subsidiary liability of the alleged owner and
operator of the passenger bus. It was explained therein that the proceeding for the enforcement of the subsidiary liability
may be considered as part of the proceeding for the execution of the judgment. A case in which an execution has been
issued is regarded as still pending so that all proceedings on the execution are proceedings in the suit. (Vda. De Paman vs.
Seeris, 115 SCRA 709, 714 [1982].)

There are two instances when the existence of an employer-employee relationship of an accused driver and the alleged
vehicle owner may be determined. One during the criminal proceeding, and the other, during the proceeding for the
execution of the judgment. In both instances, petitioner should be given the opportunity to be heard, which is the essence
of due process. (National Federation of Labor vs. National Labor Relations Commissions, 283 SCRA 275, 284 [1997].)

Petitioner knew of the criminal case that was filed against accused because it was his truck that was involved in the
incident. Further, it was the insurance company, with which his truck was insured, that provided the counsel for the
accused, pursuant to the stipulations in their contract. Petitioner did not intervene in the criminal proceedings, despite
knowledge, through counsel, that the prosecution adduced evidence to show employer-employee relationship. With the
convict's application for probation, the trial court's judgment became final and executory. All told, it is our view that the
lower court did not err when it found that petitioner was not denied due process. He had all his chances to intervene in the
criminal proceedings, and prove that he was not the employer of the accused, but he chooses not to intervene at the
appropriate time.

Petitioner was also given the opportunity during the proceedings for the enforcement of judgment. Even assuming that he
was not properly notified of the hearing on the motion for execution of subsidiary liability, he was asked by the trial court
to make an opposition thereto, which he did on October 17, 1991, where he properly alleged that there was no employer-
employee relationship between him and accused and that the latter was not discharging any function in relation to his
work at the time of the incident. In addition, counsel for private respondent filed and duly served on December 3, 1991,
and December 9, 1991, respectively, a manifestation praying for the grant of the motion for execution. This was set for
hearing on December 13, 1991. However, counsel for petitioner did not appear.Consequently, the court ordered in open
court that the matter be submitted for resolution. It was only on January 6, 1992, that the petitioner's counsel filed a
counter-manifestation that belatedly attempted to contest the move of the private prosecutor for the execution of the civil
liability. Thus, on April 7, 1992, the trial court issued the Order granting the motion for execution of the subsidiary
liability. Given the foregoing circumstances, we cannot agree with petitioner that the trial court denied him due process of
law. Neither can we fault respondent appellant court for sustaining the judgment and orders of the trial court.

In the instant case, we find no reason why the subsidiary writ of execution issued against petitioner Aurelianana
Catacutan should be set aside. To begin with, as in Yusay and Basilio,supra, petitioners cannot complain of having been
deprived of their day in court. They were duly furnished a copy of respondents' Motion for Subsidiary Writ of Execution
to which they filed their Opposition.
So, too, we find no good ground to order a separate hearing to determine the subsidiary liability of petitioner
Aureliana Catacutan, as was ordered in the case of Pajarito v. Seeris,supra. To do so would entail a waste of both time and
resources of the trial court as the requisites for the attachment of the subsidiary liability of the employer have already been
established, to wit: First, the existence of an employer-employee relationship. [12] Second, the employer is engaged in some
kind of industry, land transportation industry in this case as the jeep driven by accused was admittedly a passenger jeep.
[13]
Third, the employee has already been adjudged guilty of the wrongful act and found to have committed the offense in
the discharge of his duties.[14] Finally, said employee is insolvent.[15]
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the petition is DENIED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.