Anaya vs Palaroan
Anaya vs. Palaroan
36 SCRA 97
FACTS:
Aurora Anaya and Fernando Palaroan were
married in 1953. Palaroan filed an action for
annulment of the marriage in 1954 on the
ground that his consent was obtained
through force and intimidation. The
complaint was dismissed and upheld the
validity of the marriage and granting
Auroras counterclaim. While the amount of
counterclaim was being negotiated,
Fernando divulged to her that several
months prior to their marriage, he had pre-
marital relationship with a close relative of
his. According to her, the non-divulgement
to her of such pre-marital secret
constituted fraud in obtaining her consent.
She prayed for the annulment of her
marriage with Fernando on such ground.
ISSUE: Whether or not the concealment to
a wife by her husband of his pre-marital
relationship with another woman is a
ground for annulment of marriage.
HELD:
The concealment of a husbands pre-marital
relationship with another woman was not
one of those enumerated that would
constitute fraud as ground for annulment
and it is further excluded by the last
paragraph providing that no other
misrepresentation or deceit as to.. chastity
shall give ground for an action to annul a
marriage. Hence, the case at bar does not
constitute fraud and therefore would not
warrant an annulment of marriage.
Aquino vs Delizo
Aquino vs. Delizo
109 Phil 21
FACTS:
Fernando Aquino filed a complaint in
September 1955 on the ground of fraud
against Conchita Delizo that at the date of
her marriage with the former on December
1954, concealed the fact that she was
pregnant by another man and sometime in
April 1955 or about 4 months after their
marriage, gave birth to a child. During the
trial, Provincial Fiscal Jose Goco represent
the state in the proceedings to prevent
collusion. Only Aquino testified and the only
documentary evidence presented was the
marriage contract between the parties.
Delizo did not appear nor presented any
evidence.
CFI-Rizal dismissed petitioners complaint
for annulment of marriage, which was
affirmed by CA thus a petition for certiorari
to review the decisions.
ISSUE: Whether or not concealment of
pregnancy as alleged by Aquino does not
constitute such fraud as would annul a
marriage.
HELD:
The concealment by the wife of the fact
that at the time of the marriage, she was
pregnant by a man other than her husband
constitutes fraud and is a ground for
annulment of marriage. Delizo was allegedly
to be only more than four months pregnant
at the time of her marriage. At this stage, it
is hard to say that her pregnancy was
readily apparent especially since she was
naturally plump or fat. It is only on the 6th
month of pregnancy that the enlargement
of the womans abdomen reaches a height
above the umbilicus, making the roundness
of the abdomen more general and
apparent.
In the following circumstances, the court
remanded the case for new trial and
decision complained is set aside.

Buccat v Buccat (1941)
Buccat v. Mangonon de Buccat
April 25, 1941
Appeal from a decision of the Court of First
Instance of Baguio.
Facts:
Godofredo Buccat and Luida Mangonon de
Buccat met in March 1938, became
engaged in September, and got married in
Nov 26.
On Feb 23, 1939 (89 days after getting
married) Luida, who was 9 months
pregnant, gave birth to a son. After knowing
this, Godofredo left Luida and never
returned to married life with her.
On March 23, 1939, he filed for an
annulment of their marriage on the grounds
that when he agreed to married Luida, she
assured him that she was a virgin.
The Lower court decided in favor of Luida.
Issue:
Should the annulment for Godofredo
Buccats marriage be granted on the
grounds that Luida concealed her
pregnancy before the marriage?
Held:
No. Clear and authentic proof is needed in
order to nullify a marriage, a sacred
institution in which the State is interested
and where society rests.
In this case, the court did not find any proof
that there was concealment of pregnancy
constituting fraud as a ground for
annulment. It was unlikely that Godofredo,
a first-year law student, did not suspect
anything about Luidas condition
considering that she was in an advanced
stage of pregnancy (highly developed
physical manifestation, ie. enlarged
stomach ) when they got married.
Decision:
SC affirmed the lower courts decision.
Costs to plaintiff-appellant
Case Digest: Estrella de la Cruz vs. Severino
de la Cruz
No. L-19565 30 January 1968
Castro, J.
FACTS:
On 01 February 1938, Estrella and Severino
married in Bacolod City. During their union,
six (6) children were born, and seven (7)
parcels of land from Bacolod Cadastre and
three (3) parcels of land from Silay Cadastre
were acquired. These lands were assessed
at P45,429 and P43,580, respectively. The
hacienda in Silay had a net profit of
P3,309.49 in 1957. Aside from these
properties, the spouses also owned a
number of varied businesses and
subdivisions.
On 22 July 1958, Estrella de la Cruz filed a
complaint alleging that her husband had
not only abandoned her, but also
mismanaged their conjugal partnership
properties. According to Estrella, since
1955, Severino had not lived in their
conjugal home, but instead had lived in his
office and thereafter had been living in
Manila with his concubine, Nenita
Hernandez. This was supported by notes
and letters written by Nenita which Estrella
found hidden in the pocket of her
husbands polo shirt and then in his iron
safe thereafter. When confronted, Severino
denied of abandoning his wife and children.
He reasoned that he was only living in his
office to teach a lesson to his quarrelsome
and extremely jealous wife. He further
averred that he never failed to give his
family financial support as evidenced by the
allowance drawings of the wife in the
amounts ranging from P1000 to P1500 from
the office, which was corroborated by
Marcos Ganaban, the assistant general
manager of Philippine Textboard Factory.
Furthermore, Estrella insists that her
husband refused and failed to inform her of
the status of their various business
concerns. She further claims that such
actuations are tantamount to an abuse of
administrative powers over the conjugal
partnership properties. However, no
evidence from the plaintiff was presented.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the separation of the
defendant from the plaintiff
constitute abandonment in law and
would justify a separation of the
conjugal partnership properties?
Whether the defendants failure and/or
refusal to inform the plaintiff of the
state of their business enterprises
such an abuse of his powers of
administration of the conjugal
partnership as to warrant a division
of matrimonial assets?
HELD:
NO, THE DEFENDANT IS NOT GUILTY OF
ABANDONMENT.
The Court held that the plaintiffs prayer
that her plea for separation of conjugal
partnership properties under Articles 167
and 178 of the new Civil Code requires a
presentment of real abandonment and not
mere separation. The abandonment must
not only be physical estrangement but also
amount to financial and moral desertion.
Physical separation alone is not the full
meaning of the term abandonment, if the
husband, despite his voluntary departure
from the society of his spouse, neither
neglects the management of the conjugal
partnership nor ceases to give support to
his wife. The Court further believed that the
defendant did not intend to leave his wife
and children permanently despite his
absence from the conjugal home, as shown
by the evidence on record that he
continued to give support to his family.
Furthermore, the evidence on record fails
to preponderate in favour as to whether
Severino kept Nenita as a concubine.
Credible evidence is needed, which the
plaintiff failed to show and is negatived by
her testimony that she had not seen
Nenitas handwriting before.
NO, THE DEFENDANT IS NOT GUILTY OF
ABUSING HIS POWERS OF
ADMINISTRATION OVER THE
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP
PROPERTIES.
There is no evidence on the record to show
that he has squandered the conjugal assets.
The refusal or failure of the husband as
administrator of the conjugal partnership to
inform the wife of the progress of the
family businesses does not constitute in
abuse.
Gandiongco vs Penaranda
Gandionco vs Penaranda
GR No. 72984, November 27, 1987
FACTS:
Private respondent, Teresita Gandionco,
filed a complaint against herein petitioner,
Froilan Gandionco for legal separation on
the ground of concubinage as a civil case.
Teresita also filed a criminal complaint of
concubinage against her husband. She
likewise filed an application for the
provisional remedy of support pendent elite
which was approved and ordered by the
respondent judge. Petitioner moved to
suspend the action for legal separation and
the incidents consequent thereto such as
the support for pendent elite, in view of the
criminal case for concubinage filed against
him. He contends that the civil action for
legal separation is inextricably tied with the
criminal action thus, all proceedings related
to legal separation will have to be
suspended and await the conviction or
acquittal of the criminal case.
ISSUE: Whether or not a civil case for legal
separation can proceed pending the
resolution of the criminal case for
concubinage.
HELD:
Supreme Court ruled that the contentions
of the petitioner were incorrect. A civil
action for legal separation on the ground of
concubinage may proceed ahead of, or
simultaneously with, a criminal action for
concubinage, because said civil action is not
one to enforce the civil liability arising from
the offense, even if both the civil and
criminal actions arise from or are related to
the same offense. Such civil action is one
intended to obtain the right to live
separately, with the legal consequences
thereof including the dissolution of the
conjugal partnership of gains, custody of
the children, support and disqualifications
from inheriting from the innocent spouse.
Decree of legal separation may be issued
upon proof by preponderance of evidence,
where no criminal proceeding or conviction
is necessary.
Furthermore, the support pendente lite, as
a remedy, can be availed of in an action for
legal separation, and granted at the
discretion of the judge. If in case, the
petitioner finds the amount of support
pendente lite ordered as too onerous, he
can always file a motion to modify or
reduce the same.
Jimenez vs. Canizares
L-12790, August 31, 1960
FACTS:
Joel Jimenez, the petitioner, filed a petition
for the annulment of his marriage with
Remedios Canizares on the ground that the
orifice of her genitals or vagina was too
small to allow the penetration of a male
organ for copulation. It has existed at the
time of the marriage and continues to exist
that led him to leave the conjugal home
two nights and one day after the marriage.
The court summoned and gave a copy to
the wife but the latter did not file any
answer. The wife was ordered to submit
herself to physical examination and to file a
medical certificate within 10 days. She was
given another 5 days to comply or else it
will be deemed lack of interest on her part
and therefore rendering judgment in favor
of the petitioner.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage can be
annulled with only the testimony of the
husband.
HELD:
The wife who was claimed to be impotent
by her husband did not avail of the
opportunity to defend herself and as such,
claim cannot be convincingly be concluded.
It is a well-known fact that women in this
country are shy and bashful and would not
readily and unhesitatingly submit to a
physical examination unless compelled by
competent authority. Such physical
examination in this case is not self-
incriminating. She is not charged with any
offense and likewise is not compelled to be
a witness against herself. Impotence being
an abnormal condition should not be
presumed. The case was remanded to trial
court
Lapuz-Sy vs Eufemio
Lapuz-Sy vs. Eufemio
43 SCRA 177
FACTS:
Carmen Lapuz-Sy filed a petition for legal
separation against Eufemio Eufemio on
August 1953. They were married civilly on
September 21, 1934 and canonically after
nine days. They had lived together as
husband and wife continuously without any
children until 1943 when her husband
abandoned her. They acquired properties
during their marriage. Petitioner then
discovered that her husband cohabited with
a Chinese woman named Go Hiok on or
about 1949. She prayed for the issuance of
a decree of legal separation, which among
others, would order that the defendant
Eufemio should be deprived of his share of
the conjugal partnership profits.
Eufemio counterclaimed for the declaration
of nullity of his marriage with Lapuz-Sy on
the ground of his prior and subsisting
marriage with Go Hiok. Trial proceeded and
the parties adduced their respective
evidence. However, before the trial could
be completed, respondent already
scheduled to present surrebuttal evidence,
petitioner died in a vehicular accident on
May 1969. Her counsel duly notified the
court of her death. Eufemio moved to
dismiss the petition for legal separation on
June 1969 on the grounds that the said
petition was filed beyond the one-year
period provided in Article 102 of the Civil
Code and that the death of Carmen abated
the action for legal separation. Petitioners
counsel moved to substitute the deceased
Carmen by her father, Macario Lapuz.
ISSUE: Whether the death of the plaintiff,
before final decree in an action for legal
separation, abate the action and will it also
apply if the action involved property rights.
HELD:
An action for legal separation is abated by
the death of the plaintiff, even if property
rights are involved. These rights are mere
effects of decree of separation, their source
being the decree itself; without the decree
such rights do not come into existence, so
that before the finality of a decree, these
claims are merely rights in expectation. If
death supervenes during the pendency of
the action, no decree can be forthcoming,
death producing a more radical and
definitive separation; and the expected
consequential rights and claims would
necessarily remain unborn.
The petition of Eufemio for declaration of
nullity is moot and academic and there
could be no further interest in continuing
the same after her demise, that
automatically dissolved the questioned
union. Any property rights acquired by
either party as a result of Article 144 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines 6 could be
resolved and determined in a proper action
for partition by either the appellee or by the
heirs of the appellant.
Case on Moe v. Dinkins (Unstable
Marriage)
Facts:
Plaintiffs seek judgment declaring
unconstitutional, and enjoining the
enforcement of a statute requiring parental
consent of both parents prior to marriage of
unemancipated minors. (males, 16-18;
females, 14-18). They raised the issue of
the statute impeding the exercise of their
liberty, and they do not want to have their
child stigmatized as illegitimate. Plaintiff
Maria got pregnant at 15, and her mother
refused to give consent because she wished
to continue receiving welfare benefits for
Maria. Intervenors Cristina Coe and Pedro
Doe also raised the same issues.
Issue: Whether or not the statute is
unconstitutional on the basis of substantive
issues. (Whether there exists a rational
relation between the mean chosen b the NY
legislature and the legitimate state
objective)
Held: The statute is upheld. It is the states
interest to protect the minors from
immature decision-making and preventing
unstable marriages. The state, in its
exercise of parens patriae, possess the
power to protect and promote the welfare
of the children who lack the capacity to act
in their own best interests. The
requirement of parental consent ensures
that at least 1 mature person will
participate in the decision of a minor to
marry. Though petitioners suggest that the
courts are in a better position to judge
whether a minor is prepared to marry, the
law presumes that the parents possess
what the child lacks in maturity, and that
parents are more capable to act in their
best interests.
There is no denial of right to marry. The
Statue merely delays plaintiff access to the
institution of marriage until they comply
with the necessary requirements of
parental consent, or emancipation. The
illegitimacy of the child would only be a
temporary situation. Subsequent marriage
of the parents legitimizes the child.
Citation. 669 F.2d 67,1982 U.S. App.
Brief Fact Summary. Plaintiffs were
prevented from entering into marriage
because a New York law required minors to
obtain parental consent prior to marriage.
Plaintiffs brought suit claiming the law
violated the Due Process Clause of the
United States Constitution.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. Because of the
unique position between minors and
marriage, the law is examined under a
rational relationship test rather than strict
scrutiny.
Facts. A New York Domestic Relations Law
provided that all male marriage license
applicants between 16 and 18 and all
female applicants between 14 and 18 must
obtain written consent from both parents
(that are living). Section 15.3 of the law
requires women between the ages of 14
and 16 to obtain judicial approval of the
marriage in addition to parental consent.
Plaintiff Raoul Roe, 18, and Plaintiff Maria
Moe, 15, had a one year old son, Plaintiff
Ricardo Roe. Plaintiffs live together as a
family unit and desire to be married to
cement their family unit and remove the
stigma of illegitimacy from their son. Maria
requested consent from her widowed
mother to marry Raoul, but she refused,
allegedly because she wished to continue
receiving welfare benefits for Maria.
Proposed plaintiff-intervenors Pedro Doe,
17, and Christina Coe, 15, reside in the
home of Pedros father and step-mother.
Christina is eight months pregnant with
Pedros child. Christinas mother refused a
Christinas request to marry Pedro, and
arranged for Christina to have an abortion.
Christina refused to do so, and
consequently her mother told her she
wished to have nothing more to do with her
and was leaving the country to return to the
Dominican Republic.
Issue. Does the law requiring parental
consent to marry deprive Plaintiffs of the
liberty guaranteed them by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the Federal Constitution?
Held. The law is constitutional because the
State has a legitimate interest in protecting
minors from immature decision making.
Previous case law has recognized a
constitutional liberty interest in marriage,
but has not addressed the marriages of
minors. The constitutional rights of children
cannot be equated with adults for three
reasons: a) the peculiar vulnerability of
children; (b) the inability to make critical
decisions in an informed and mature
matter; (c) the importance of the parental
role in child-rearing.
This law should not be examined under a
strict scrutiny standard, but rather it must
be determined if there is a rational
relationship between the means chosen
and the legitimate state interests advanced.
The parent consent requirement ensures
that at least one mature person will
participate in the marriage decision.
Because of this and minors lack of
experience, perspective, and judgment, the
law is rationally related to a legitimate state
interest.
Plaintiffs also allege that the courts as a
non-interested party would be in a better
position to judge than parents that are
potentially biased. However, the law
assumes that parents will act in the best
interests of their children. Plaintiffs also
claim that this law should be analogized
with contraception and abortion laws, and
that the law denies them the means with
which to legitimize their children. However,
this ignores the fact that the law is only a
postponement to the right to marry.
Discussion. The court applied a rational
relationship test to the New York law rather
than strict scrutiny because the rights
involved were those of minors.
William Ong and Lucita Ong
FACTS:
William Ong and Lucita Ong were married
on July 13, 1975. Union was blessed with 3
children. On March 21, 1996, Lucita filed a
complaint for legal separation under Art 55
(1) of FC on grounds of physical violence,
threats, intimidation and grossly abusive
conduct of petitioner. RTC granted prayer
for legal separation. CA upheld RTCs
decision when herein petitioner filed a
Motion for Reconsideration (MR). The
climax of the couples drama was on
December 14, 1995when the respondent
asked petitioner to bring Kingston, their
son, back from Bacolod which turned into a
violent quarrel with the petitioner hitting
the respondent on the head, left cheek,
eye, stomach, arms, and ultimately pointing
a gun at respondents head asking her to
leave the conjugal house.
ISSUES:Whether or not CA erred in
upholding the RTCs decision granting legal
separation to Lucita when she herself has
given ground for legal separation when
abandoned her family.
HELD:No.
RATIO:
It is true that a decree of legal separation
should not be granted when both parties
have given ground for legal separation (Art
56 (4) FC). However, the abandonment
referred to in the Family Code is
abandonment without justifiable cause for
more than one year. Also, it was established
that Lucita left William due to his abusive
conduct which does not constitute the
abandonment contemplated in the said
provision.
DISPOSITION:
Petition denied for lack of merit
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellant, vs. GUADALUPE ZAPATA and
DALMACIO BONTOC, defendants-
appellees.
FACTS:
In the Court of First Instance of Pampanga,
Andres Bondoc filed a complaint for
adultery against Guadalupe Zapata, his
wife, and Dalmacio Bondoc, her paramour,
for cohabiting and having repeated sexual
intercourse from 1946 to March 14, 1947,
the date of the filing of the complaint
(Criminal Case No. 426). Dalmacio Bondoc
knew his codefendant to be a married
woman. Zapata pleaded guilty and was
sentenced to suffer four months of arresto
mayor, which she served.
In the same court, the offended husband
filed another complaint for adulterous acts
committed by his wife and her paramour
from March 15, 1947, to September 17,
1948, the date of the filing of the second
complaint (Criminal Case No. 735).
On February 21, 1949, each of the
defendants filed a motion to quash the
complaint of the ground that they would be
twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the
same offense. The trial court upheld the
contention of the defendants and quashed
the second complaint.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the second complaint
would prosper.
HELD:
Each sexual intercourse of the wife outside
marriage is a separate act of adultery.
Therefore, condonation of one act does not
necessarily imply condonation of the
others.
Munoz v. del Barrio
Facts:
The plaintiff and the respondent were
married in 1942. They had frequent
quarrels. During these quarrels, the
husband maltreated the wife. Unable to
stand the maltreatment she suffered, she
lived separately and two more incidents of
maltreatment occurred. She filed a petition
seeking legal separation, custody and child
support. Upon the testimonies of witnesses,
it was established that the maltreatment of
the wife consisted: boxing in the face or
abdomen, hair pulling and twisting her
neck.
Issue:
WON the maltreatment in this case in a
ground for legal separation.
Held/Ratio:
No. Prior to the effectivity of the Family
Code, maltreatment suffered by the wife
does not constitute attempts on her life.
Intent to kill must be established with clear
and convincing evidence.
Ruiz v. Atienza (1941) - 40 OG 1903
FACTS: Jose Ruiz impregnated Pelagia
Atienza out of wedlock. On November 14,
1938, her father, cousin-in-law, and 3
other persons visited Jose
Ruiz and convinced him to marry Pelagia.
The party, joined by Joses cousin and
Pelagia, went to the Aglipayan Church,
secured a marriage license and went back
to the Aglipayan Church to celebrate
thewedding. Four days later, Jose Ruiz filed
a suit for annulment claiming that he had
been forced into wedlock.
ISSUE: WON Ruiz was forced into wedlock
HELD : NO. There is no ground for
annulment. Neither violence nor duress
attended the marriage celebration. Threat
cannot come from lawful actions such as
threat to obstruct his admission to the Bar
based on immorality. He was also not
kidnapped by the wifes relatives. He had
many occasions to escape.
FERNANDO AQUINO, petitioner, vs.
CONCHITA DELIZO, respondent.
G.R. No. L-15853 July 27, 1960
Facts:
On December 27, 1954, Fernando Aquino
and Conchita Delizo were married.
However, after four months of their
marriage, Conchita Delizo gave birth to a
child. By reason thereof, Fernando filed a
complaint for annulment on the ground of
fraud, it being alleged, among other things,
that then defendant Conchita Delizo
concealed from the latter the fact that she
was pregnant by another man. In her
answer, defendant claimed that the child
was conceived out of lawful wedlock
between her and the plaintiff.
On June 16, 1956, the trial court dismissed
the complaint noting that no birth
certificate was presented to show that the
child was born within 180 days after the
marriage between the parties, and holding
that concealment of pregnancy as alleged
by the plaintiff does not constitute such
fraud as would annul a marriage. Through a
verified "petition to reopen for reception of
additional evidence", plaintiff tried to
present the certificates of birth and delivery
of the child born of the defendant on April
26, 1955, which documents, according to
him, he had failed to secure earlier and
produce before the trial court thru
excusable negligence. The petition was
denied as well.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that
there has been excusable neglect in
plaintiff's inability to present the proof of
the child's birth, through her birth
certificate, and for that reason the court a
quo erred in denying the motion for
reception of additional evidence.
On the theory, however, that it was not
impossible for plaintiff and defendant to
have had sexual intercourse during their
engagement so that the child could be their
own, and finding unbelievable plaintiff's
claim that he did not notice or even suspect
that defendant was pregnant when he
married her, the appellate court affirmed
the dismissal of the complaint.
On March 17, 1959, plaintiff filed a motion
praying that the decision be reconsidered,
or, if such reconsideration be denied, that
the case be remanded to the lower court
for new trial. The Court of Appeals denied
the motion. From that order, the plaintiff
filed the present petition for certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not the concealment of
Conchita Delizos pregnancy to her then
husband Fernando Aquino constitutes fraud
which can be used as basis for the
annulment of their marriage.
Ruling:
The dismissal of plaintiff's complaint cannot
be sustained. Under the new Civil Code,
concealment by the wife of the fact that at
the time of the marriage, she was pregnant
by a man other than her husband
constitutes fraud and is ground for
annulment of marriage. Here the defendant
wife was alleged to be only more than four
months pregnant at the time of her
marriage to plaintiff. At that stage, we are
not prepared to say that her pregnancy was
readily apparent, especially since she was
"naturally plump" or fat as alleged by
plaintiff. If, as claimed by plaintiff,
defendant is "naturally plump", he could
hardly be expected to know, merely by
looking, whether or not she was pregnant
at the time of their marriage more so
because she must have attempted to
conceal the true state of affairs. Even
physicians and surgeons, with the aid of the
woman herself who shows and gives her
subjective and objective symptoms, can
only claim positive diagnosis of pregnancy
in 33% at five months, and 50% at six
months.
The appellate court also said that it was not
impossible for plaintiff and defendant to
have had sexual intercourse before they got
married and therefore the child could be
their own. This statement, however, is
purely conjectural and finds no support or
justification in the record. The Court of
Appeals should not have denied the motion
praying for new trial simply because
defendant failed to file her answer thereto.
As to the veracity of the contents of the
motion and its annexes, the same can best
be determined only after hearing evidence.
In the circumstance, we think that justice
would be better served if a new trial were
ordered.
Wherefore, the decision complained of is
set aside and the case remanded to the
court a quo for new trial.
Federico Suntay vs. Isabel Cojuangco-
Suntay
Federico Suntay married to Cristina
Aguinaldo Suntay (grandmother of Isable
cojuangco-suntay)
Emilio Suntay son of Federico suntay,
married to Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay
Petitioner Federico opposed to respondent
Isabels Petition for Letters of
Administration over the estate of Cristina A.
Suntay who had died without leaving a will.
The decedent is the wife of Federico and
the grandmother of Isabel. Isabels father
Emilio, had predeceased his mother
Cristina. The marriage of Isabels parents
had previously been declared by the Court
of first Instance as null and void. Federico
anchors his opposition on this fact, alleging
based on Art. 992 of the CC, that Isabel has
no right to succeed by right of
representation as she is an illegitimate
child. The trial court had denied Federicos
Motion to Dismiss. Federico contends that,
inter alia, that the dispositive portion of the
decision declaring the marriage of Isabels
parents null and void be upheld.
Issue: In case of conflict between the body
of the decision and the dispositive portion
thereof, which should prevail? Related
thereto, was the marriage of Isabels
parents a case of a void or voidable
marriage? Whether or not Isabel is a
legitimate child?
Ruling: Petition dismissed Art. 10 of the Civil
Code states that in case of doubt in the
interpretation and application of laws, it is
presumed that the lawmaking body
intended right and justice to prevail. This is
also applicable and binding upon courts in
relation to its judgment. While the
dispositive portion of the CFI decision states
that the marriage be declared null and
void, the body had shown that the legal
basis was par. 3 Art. 85 of the Civil Code,
which was in effect at the time. Art. 85
enumerates the causes for which a
marriage may be annulled. As such the
conflict between the body and the
dispositive portion of the decision may be
reconcilable as noted by the Supreme
Court. The fundamental distinction
between void and voidable marriages is
that void marriage is deemed never to have
taken place at all. The effects of void
marriages, with respect to property
relations of the spouses are provided for
under Article 144 of the Civil Code. Children
born of such marriages who are called
natural children by legal fiction have the
same status, rights and obligations as
acknowledged natural children under
Article 89 irrespective of whether or not the
parties to the void marriage are in good
faith or in bad faith. On the other hand, a
voidable marriage, is considered valid and
produces all its civil effects, until it is set
aside by final judgment of a competent
court in an action for annulment. Juridically,
the annulment of a marriage dissolves the
special contract as if it had never been
entered into but the law makes express
provisions to prevent the effects of the
marriage from being totally wiped out. The
status of children born in voidable
marriages is governed by the second
paragraph of Article89 which provides that:
Children conceived of voidable marriages
before the decree of annulment shall be
considered legitimate; and children
conceived thereafter shall have the same
status, rights and obligations as
acknowledged natural children, and are also
called natural children by legal fiction. In
view thereof, the status of Isabel would be tumorsurgically removed with consent of
covered by the second paragraph of Article
plaintiff
89 of the Civil Code which provides that
children conceived of voidable marriages - Rendered defendant incapable of
before the decree of annulment shall be
procreation but did not incapacitate her to
considered legitimate.
copulate
- Under marriage law: marriage may be
SARAO vs GUEVARRA
annulled if the party, was at the time of
May 31, 1940
marriage, physically incapable of entering
into the married state and such incapacity
Nature of the Case: Appeal from a judgment
remains incurable
of the CFI of laguna Ponente: Reyes, A.
- Plaintiff wants to construe phrase of
J,Issue: NO reason in disturbing the decision
physically incapable of entering into
appealed from. Decision CONFIRMED.
married state into incapacity to procreate
- US generally held that the meaning on
Facts:
impotency is not the ability to procreate but
- Appeal from decision of CFI dismissing
the inability to copulate
plaintiffs complaint for annulment of
- Defect must be of copulation not
marriage in the ground of impotency
reproductionbarrenness will not
- Married: June 3, 1936: Manila
invalidate the marriage
- Afternoon: plaintiff tried to have carnal
- Defendant is not impotent in this case
knowledge but defendant asked to wait for
removal of parts rendered her sterile but it
the evening
by no means made her unfit for sexual
- Night came: plaintiff again approached
intercourse
defendantthough he found orifice of her
- It was due to plaintiffs own voluntary
vagina sufficiently large for his organ, she
desistance (memory of first unpleasant
complained of pains of her private parts
experience) that made him give up the idea
and he notices oozing there from some
of again having carnal knowledge of her
purulent matter offensive to the smell
even after she had already been rid of her
- Upon advice of physiciandefendant
disease
submitted to operation (august 7, 1936)
- Contention of fraud: she did not inform
and as medical verdict that the uterus and
him of her disease in sex organsbut this
the ovaries were bound to be effected with
contention is untenable since fraud is not
alleged in the complaint and has not been
proved at the trial.