Anda di halaman 1dari 17

Sonderdrucke aus der Albert-Ludwigs-Universitt Freiburg

KLAUS JACOBI

Abelard and Frege:


The semantics of words and propositions

Originalbeitrag erschienen in:


Vito M. Abrusci (Hrsg.): Atti del Convegno Internazionale di Storia della Logica : San Gimignano, 4 - 8
dic. 1982. Bologna: Ed. CLUEB, 1983, S. [81] - 96
A 7 T I d d Convr~noInlrrnazionulr di Boria drllo
Lo~ic-U. Saii Giiriigiinno. 4-8 diicrnbrc 1982.
(-'IIJFIt. tIoIog11a (llaly) C) 1983.

ABELARD AND FREGE:


THE SEMANTlCS OF WORDS AND PROPOSITIONS
Klaus Jacobi
Universiiic lluisburg, Ciesaniihochschulc. FB I -
Fach Philosophic. Lotharstr. 65. 4100 Duibburg

Petcr iibrlard was born in the year 1 0 7 9 and djcd in 1142.


Gottlob Frcge lived from 1 8 4 8 to 1925. Frcgc's Begriffsschrift
was published in 1879, eight hundred years after Abelard's birth.
Historians of uhilosophy say that cach man marks the beginning of
an epoch in the history of logic, and beyond that, that each left
a deep imprint on thc coursc of further developments.
It is wcll-known that Preqe felt himself isolated and deprived
of due recognjtion. Fcw of his colleaques, whether from thc-mathe-
matics or the philosophy dcpartmcnt, bothered to study his works.
Surcly none of his contemporaries adjudqed Frege's works to be
epoch-makina. Nor did F'regc havc students who continucd his in-
vestigations. His impact began with Russeii, Wittgenstein, and
Carnap. Although the threc diffcr widely in the style of thcir
thinking and in the questions they pose, all claim Freqe as their
true intellectual fathcr.
Abelard, on the other hand, found cnthusiastic listeners
wherever he lcctured. He was a famous man, such that the mention
of his namc cvokcd either sreat admiration or bitter enmity.
Nonetheless, thc substance of his success as a teacher is not
casy to grasp. Abelard was not dcstined to found a ncw nhilo-
sophical tradition, as Peter Lombard and latcr Thomas Aquinas
and John Duns Scotus were. Abelard was never an "authority" in
thc scnsc in which thc scholdstics used the word. His influence
is less to be attributed to a sct of theses which he developed
than to his distinctive manner of approaching questions. The
historical transmission of his thcological and loqical works was
weak, but his philosophically probinq, discussinq, and analyzinq
attitude toward knowledgc camc to be reaarded as exemplary.
Frege was not familiar with Abelard or any of the other
scholastics. Thcre is no hjstorical connection between the two
philosophers, be it direct or indirect. When I speak on Rbelard
and Fregc hcre, the theme is selected with different intentions
from thosc for a papcr on say Freqe and Leibniz. I intend to
conduct a comparison in systematic perspective. This comparison
cannot bc bascd on thc dcmonstration of an influence of Abelard
on Preqe undiscovered until now or upon somc aqreeing or dis-
s e n t i n g r e f e r e n c e t o A b e l a r d i n F r e q e ' s works. Thus I v o u l d l i k c
t o p r o v i d e you w i t h a b r i e f e x p l a n a t i o n o f w h a t m o t i v a t e d m e t o
t h e comparison.
F i r s t , I w i s h t o makc c l c a r t h a t i n s e l e c t i n u t h i s theme I d o
n o t i n t e n d t o Open a d e b a t e n n P r o g r e s s o r r e q r c s s i o n i n phi.10-
s o p h y o r t h e f i e l d o f l o g i c . I am n o t g o i n q t o h a v e t h e two
p h i l o s o p h c r s c o m p e t e w i t h e a c h o t h e r . I am n o t g o i n g t - o m e a s u r e
t h e o n e a g a i n s t t h e o t h e r . T h u s n o a t t e m p t w i l l b e madc h e r e t o
demonstrate t h a t Abelard " a n t i c i p a t e d " l a t e r i n s i g h t s of Frege
o r t h a t F r e q e " r e d i s c o v e r e d " c a r l i e r i n s i q h t s which A b e l a r d had
reached.
I n my l e c t u r e s a n d w r i t i n g s o n s c h o l a s t i c l o q i c , I am c o n -
f r o n t e d w i t h t h c problem o f t r a n s l a t i n q t h e medieval t e c h n i c a l
t e r m s i n t o a modern v o c a b u l a r y . One h a s n o c h o i c c h e r c b u t t o
cmploy w o r d s whi.ch h a v e become t e c h n i c a l t e r m s i n modcrn l o q i c
t h e o r y t h a n k s t o F r e q e a n d h i s s u c c e s s o r s . Now we a r e o f t e n
warned o f t h e d a n g c r s i n h e r e n t i n a t r a n s l a t i o n o f s c h o l a s t i c
d . i s c u s s i o n s i n t o modern synibolic l a n q u a g c . But whercas o n c c a n
f o r e g o s u c h t r a n s l a t i o n s o r d e v c l o p a more a p p r o p r i a t e syrnbolisni
i n t h e f i e l d of l o q i c a l Syntax, i n scmantics and philosophy of
l o g i c onc c a n n o t a v o i d t h e dangcr o f m i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n by simply
r e n o u n c i n g a l l t r a n s l a t i o n . One d o c s n ' l : n c t v e r y f a r w i t h o u t s u c h
t e r m s a s ' s e n s e ' , ' r e f c r c n c c ' , ' d e s i g n a t i o n ' , and 'dcnomination'.
I n o r d i n a r y languagc, t h e s e t e r m s have hroad semantic f i e l d s .
Thcy a r e u s e d i n v a r i o u s s e n s e s w h i c h o f t c n o v c r l a p . I n s c h o l a r l y
u s a g e t h e m c a n i n q s o f s u c h t e r m s a r c d e f i n e d more p r e c i s e l y ,
a t t h e v e r y minimum b y c o o r d i n a t i n ~them wiLh o r s c t t i n q t h c m i n
o p p o s i t i o n t o o t h e r terms w i t h i n t h c t h e o r y n t h n n d . When o n e
makcs u s e o f them t o t r a n s l a t e s c h o l a s t i c t e r m s , i t i s n e c e s s a r y
t o s t a t e p l a i n l y which s c n s e i s c o n s i d e r e d a p p r o p r i a t c r o r t h c
new c o n t e x t . A r c t u r n t o t h e e v e r y d a y u s a g c c a n h a r d l y b e s a t i s -
factory, f o r t h e philnsophical o r s c i e n t i f i c theorics within
w h i c h t h e s e w o r d s h a v c become t e c h n i c a l tcrnis m u s t a l s o b e
taken i n t o consideration.
I am m y s e l f b e t t e r v e r s e d i n t h c s c h o l a s t i c s c i e n t i a sermo-
cin
- - a l i s khan i n modern t h e o r i c s o f l o q i c . O c c a s i o n a l l y , i n
r e a d i n g F r e g c o r one o f h i s s u c c c s s o r s , I t r y o u t t r a n s l a t i o n s
i n t o t h e tcrminoloqy of t h c s c h o l a s t i c c o n t r o v e r s i c s i n o r d c r
t o s h a r p e n my c o n c e p t i o n o f t h c p r o b l e m u n d e r d i s c u s s i n n . I n -
e v i t a b l y , I a s k m y s e l F i f a n y s i m i l a r i t i c s b e t w e e n t h e modern
t r a i n s O E t h o u g h t a n d c c r t a i n p o s i t i o n s i n t h e s c h o l a s t i c con-
t r o v e r s i e s c a n b e f o u n d , T h i s i s o f C o u r s e j u s t a s much a
m a t t e r of c l a r i f y i n g t h c d i f f e r e n c e s a s o f h o l d i n q o n t o TO-
inciding elemcnts.
Abclard s t a n d s a t t h e o u t s e t of t h e s c h o l a s t i c development
i n l o q i c , F r e g e a t t h e o u t s e t o f modern d e v e l o p m e n t s . N e i t h e r
f i n d s a f i n i s h e d terminology f o r h i s philosoylhical i n v e s t i q a -
t i o n s l a i d a t h i s d i s p o s a l . H e must d e v e l o p such a terminology
h i m s c l f . I n q u e s t i o n s o f s e m a n t i c s , A b e l a r d c o u l d f i n d more
S u p p o r t i n t h e p r e p a r a t o r y work o f h i s p r e d c c e s s o r s t h a n F r e q e .
A b e l a r d worked o n q u e s t i o n s w h i c h h a d b e e n d e a l t w i t h h y
Boethius, P r i s c i a n , grammarians of t h e t i m e , and A b e l a r d ' s
own l o g i c t e a c h e r s . Y e t h i s l a n q u a g e o f t e n i m p r e s s e s u s a s b e i n g
awkward a n d f o r c c d i n c o m p a r i s o n w i t h t h e c r y s t a l l i n e c l a r i t y a n d
e l c q a n t b r e v i t y o f t i i q h s c t i o l n s t i.c a i i t h o r s . On t h c o t h c r h a n d ,
A h c l a r d i s f r e e o f t t i e Set s c h e n i a t a o f q u c s t i o n i n q a n d t h i n k i n g
wiiich bccamc c h a r a c t c : r i s t i c o f l a t e r s c t i o l a s t i c s . H e d i s c u s s e d
l i n c j u i s t i c [ihenomena s u c h a s i m p e r s o n a l . c o n s t r u c t i . o n s whi c h
a r c l a t . c r n c g l . c c t c d bc:causc t h e y a r c s i m ~ l yn o t a c c e s s i b l e t o
t t i e a n a l y t i c i r i s t r u n i e n t s o f t h e t h c o r y o f t h e s u p ~ i o s j . t i o .I r e
f u r t h c r m o r c c o n s i d c r e d a l t e r n a t i v e a p p r o a c h e s t o sucti problems
a s t h e t h e o r y of p r e d i c a t i o n , whereas l a t e r o t h e r a u t h o r s d i s -
c u s s c d a c o n s p i c i o u s l y n a r r o w c r s p c c t r u m o F l i h c o r i c s . - The
samc c a n g c n c r a l l y b e s a i d o f F r c q c i n c o m p a r i s o n w i t h s a y
Carnap, t o t a k c o n c cxamplc. F r c g c Corcihly w r c s L c d h i s tcrmino-
l o q i c a l d i s t i n c t i o n s , s u c h a s t h a t b e t w e e n 'Sinn' and ' W e u t u n g ' ,
froin t t i e languacyc, w h c r e a s Carriap s i m p l y l a i d down s u c h d i s t i n c -
t i o n s by d e f i n i t i o n . F r e q e s t r a i n e d t o d c v e l o ? a d e q u a t e formu-
1 . a t i o n s 01 new q u e s t i o n s a n d t o d i s c o v e r new i n t e r g r e t a t i o n a l
t . c c h n i q u c s . I I i s s u c c e s s o r s r n e r e l y t o o k ttiern o v e r . - T h u s i t
s c c m s L h a t a c o m p a r i s o n 01 A b e l a r d a n d F r e q e recommends i t s e l f
a s a s t a r t i n g p o i n t whcn o n c w i s h e s t o u n d c r t - a k c a c o m p a r i s o n
01 s c h o l a s t i c a n d rriodern l o c ~ i c .
Howevcr, a c o m p a r i s o n w i l l b e m c a n i n g f u l o n l y i f t h c r c i s
a m a n i f e s t C o n s e n s u s o n r e l e v a n t p o i n t s . T h i s a l s o t i o l d s wtien
Lhc o b j c c t o f t h e comy?arison i s t o p o i n t o u t t h e d i f f e r e n c e s
i n t h e rcspccLivc p o s i t i o n s . O r c o u r s c , d i.sti n c t i o n s a r c of
v a l i i c o n l y when i t i s p o s s i b l e t o mark o u t p r e c i s e l v t o wtiat
e x t e n t t h e b a s i s upon w h i c h t h e d i s L i n c L i o n s h a v c b c c n d r a w n
i s a common o n e .
T h u s t h e q u e s t i o n p r e s e n t s i t s e l f w h c t h e r t h i s fundamental
p r c r c q u i s i t c For a comyiarison i s f u l f i l l e d i n o u r c a s e . W e l l , i n
t h e C o u r s e o f rny s t u d i e s o f A b e l a r d w i t h a n c y c t o p a r a l l e l s t o
P r e q c a n d o f F r c g c wiLh a n e y e t o A b c l a r d , I h a v e swayed b a c k
and r o r t - h o n how t o a n s w e r t t i i s r : u e s t i o n . Sornetimes I f i n d a
s u r p r i s i n g d c g r c e O E s i m i l a r i t y i n t h e way e a c h a p p r o a c h e s
semantic questions, d e s p i t e t h e i r q u i t c diffcrcnL sLartinq
p o i n t s - f o r Abclard t h c s c i c n i i a scrmoncinal i s a s a Loqical
a n a l y s i s of t h e language of argumcnLaiion and s c h o l a r l y in-
v c s t j . g a ( i i o n , Tor F r e q e t h e d e m o n s t r a t i o n t t i a t t t i e axiorns o f
a r i t h m e t i c a c c of a p u r e l y lociical n a t u r e . At ottier t i m e s , I
s c c m t o have deceived niyself: t h e aqreemcnt s e c m s t o b e no
more ttiari v e r b a l - c a c h man u s c s c x n r e s s i o n s w h i c h s o u n d p r a c -
t i c a l l y a l i k e t o d i s c u s s cornpletcly diFFcrcnti m a t t c r s .
To work my wav o u t o f t h i s c o n " u s i o n , I h a v e c a r e f u l l y
n o t e d what i t i s T p a y a t t e n t i o n t o i n e a c t i c a s e . 1 would l i . k c
t-o t a k e you a l o n q f o r a p a r t o f my s c a r c h .
I n t h e c x c c l , l c n t p r c s c n L a t i . o n o f I r c q c ' s work g i v c n b y
W i l l i a ~ nK n e a l e , o n c f i n d s t h c f o l l o w i n g : " I n t h c o r d i n a r y u s e
01 l a n g u a q e f o r maklncj s t a t e m e n t s , a s k i n g y u e s t i o n s , q i v i n g
o r d e r s , & C . , ii i s t o b c a s s u m e d t h a t e v e r y d i s t - i n q u i s h a b l e
c o m p l c t c s i g n h a s b o t h s e n s e a n d r e f e r e n c e . The r e f e r e n c e i s a n
o b j e c t o f some k i n d , b u t n o t n c c e s s a r i l y a p e r c e p t i b l e o b j e c t .
... T h c s e n s e , o n t h e o t t i e r h a n d , i s s o r n c t h i n g by w h i c h t h e
o b j e c t may b c s i n g l c d o u t f o r a t t e n t i o n . I t i s n o t a n i d c a , i f
by t h a t we mean a n i m a q e o r s o r n c t h i n g p r i v a t e t o a n i n d i v i d u a l
t h i n k c r . F o r a l l comniunication d c p e n d s o n t h c e x n r e s s i o n o f
s e n s e b y o n e man t o a n o t h e r , a n d i n s p c c i a l c i r c u m s t a n c e s s i y s
may h a v e a p u b l i c s e n s e c v c n t h o u g h t h e y l a c k a l l r e f e r e n c e . "
84 KIA IJSJ A CORI

(The Development of Loqic, p. 496; cf. p. 578).


The Passage could be taken word for word to characterize Abe-
lard's semantics. Comparc: "Nomina ... et verba duplicem siqni-
ficationem habent, unam cpidrm dc rcbus, altcram dc intcllccti-
,~us.Res enim significant constituendo intellectus ad eas per-
tinentes, hoc est naturam aliquam earum vel proprietatem at-
tendentes." (Super Peri crm., 307, 26-30; cf. 308, 19-22; 367,
9-10).
'Res' is the name Abelard gives to that which we refer to in
speaking and comprehendinq, that which we reqard as qiven to our
understanding. In his writings on the question of universals, hc
emphasizes that the thinq (E) is in each case definite and
singular, whercas generality is a characteristic of the sense of
expressions in languagc. Don't thcsc cxplanations also fit well
for what Fregc means with 'Gcgcnstand' as the 'Bedeutunq' of
a sign? One also seems to be ablc to usc 'i~tcllcctus'in Abe-
lard's sense for Frege's 'U'and vice versa. We do not ap-
prehend the thina in its full concrete rcality. In speakinq and
understanding, we attend to certain pcculiaritics of thc thing.
Isn't the point of view from which the attention is concentrated
and directed at a given object the Same as what Frcqe mcans when
he explains his tcrm 'Sinn',namely the mode of presentation of
the object and the way in which we conceive of it? Just as Frcgc
distinguishes the Sinn, Abelard distinguishes the intellectus
from ideas. An idea is a picture of an object; in this manner
thc indivi.dua1 subject retains a mcmory of the object. By con-
trast, the sense which is understood is not private in this rc-
spect; it is thc result of the dircction of thc attcntiveness
of the distinguishing mind at a given object inasmuch as this
object shows definite characteristics.
But after more exact study, doubt arises as to whether Vrcqc's
and Abelard's terms can really be used for each othcr in all
contexts without disturbinq the cohcrence of the line of thought.
Frcge's thesis that sentences stand either for the True or fnr
the Falsc, from which follows that thc Truc and the False are
objccts which we refer to in sentcnccs, will.not bc discussed
here in detail. X.ct it suffice for thc moment to mention that.
Abclard introduces the terms 'truc' and 'Talsc' quite different-
ly. What these words mean could never be called a '='. Such
an "expansion" of the use of the term 'E' as Frcgc undertook
for 'Gegenstand' would have spoiled Abelard's contribution to
khc question of univcrsals.
The doubts which accumulate about the equi.valence of 'e'
and 'intcllcctus' arc cvcn more insistcnt. 'Intellectus', neu-
trally translated by "understanding". can often bc translated
by 'concept'. Thus Abelard savs in Super Peri ermenias, "when
thc mind attends to somc charactcristic of a thing, inasmuch as
it is a thing or it exists or it is a substance or a body or
white or Socrates, this is then called an understanding (G-
tellectus) ." ( S u ~ e rPeri erm. 317, 12-13; cf. 313, 10-15). For
Frcgc, however, the concept which an objcct fal-1sunder, and
the mode in whj.ch an objcck prcscnts itsclf and is apprehendcd
scem to have nothinq to do with each other at all. Frege makes
a sharp distinction between predicative propositions and
idcntity propositions. The distjnction bctwecn Sinn and Bedcu-
AEIARD AND 1;KEL'E 8)

tung is infroduced to make CI-ear how identity propositions can


be informative. An equatioh or identity proposition 'a = b' ex-
prcsscs that one and the Same object has different modcs of pre-
sentation. 'a' and 'b' as desiqnations for thcsc different modes
are "propcr names" for the object. Conccpt words must be strict-
ly distinquished from propcr names. Freqe would have broken down
the list of examples cited abovc for modes in which the mind can
attend to Socrates into three complctcly different types of pro-
positions. First, Socrates' name is 'Socratcs'. Second, Socratfs
falls under the concept 'white', undcr the concept 'body' and
under the conccpt 'substance'. Third, Socratcs is an instantia-
tion of some concepts, through reference to which onc can show
that thcsc concepts are not em~lty.
Anyone trained on scholastic texts would wish to inquire more
prcciscly here. Can the mode in which an objcct presents itself
be so clearly scparated from the concepts which this objcct
falls under? Preqe uses various dcscriptions of the samc objtct
in tiis examples of informative idcntity propositions. In bhcse
dcscriptions, for example 'morninq star' and 'evenin7 star' or
'the student of Plato and teacher of Alexander the Great who was
born in Stagira', we find concept words, and ncccssarily so. 1s
the sense of descriptions providcd not just by the concept words?
Dy this point at thc latcst, I reach the state of perplcxity
mentioned earlier. I feel like somcone who is trying to keep his
balance with zach foot in a different boat and who suddenly rea-
lizes to his consternation that thc hoats have bequn to drift
in opposite directions.
'Ln ordcr to gct hold on soniethinq steady oncc morc, I ask
wtiat kind of words it is that Abclard is talkinq about with his
distinction betwecn siynificatio intellectus and signj.fj.catio
reit and what kind of words it is Frcqe is talking about with
his distinction betwccn cxprcsscd sense and designated referencc.
Thc Eormulation uscd by W. Kneale seems to fit Abelard and Frcgc
equally well. Kneale says "Every distinguishable complete sign
has both scnsc and refcrence". Perhaps the aqreement is mcrcly
verbal. Whisch speech sisns are "complete"? For Abelard we havc
ttie information:' "Nomina '. . . et vcrba duplicem sicynificationem
habent". For Freqe the answer is thnt propcr names and - some-
thing wc havcn't mentioned yet - sentences are complcte ex-
pressions. In order to understand each man's answer, it is
ncccssary to makc clear to oneself ttie purpose of the distinc-
- -

tion in each answer.


For Abclard, nomina et verba constitute the sum total of all
words which are mcaningful in and of themselves. Since he qroups
nouns and verbs together, wc can assume that he firimarily has
qeneral terms in mind. The difference between gcneral terms
and singular terms docs not come to bcar in this context. Pre-
positions and conjunctions stand in contrast to nouns and verbs
as mcrely "CO-significative" words, later called 'svncateqorema-
ta'. In Abelard's time there were two theories about such words.
-
Tbc first thcory was maintained principally by grammarians and
held that such wocds have mcrcly an indefinite and vague nieaninq
Their mcaning becomes dcfinite only through their association
in sptech with words which are meaningful in and of them-
s e l v e s . Accordi.ng t o t h e second t h e o r y , m a i n t a i n e d by l o q i c i a n s
f o r t h e most p a r t , p r e p o s i t i o n s and c o n j u n c t i o n s convey nothiny
a t a l l . One d o e s n o t c o m p r e h e n d a c o n c c p t u a l c o n t e n t t h r o u g h
them. What t h e y d o i s t o d i r e c t o n e t o comprchcnd i n a c c r t a i n
way t h e c o n c e p t . u a 2 c o n t c n t o f t h c c a t e q o r e m a t i c w o r d s w i t h w h i c h
t h e y a r e a s s o c i a t e d i n s p e e c h , namely t h a L t h c y a r c t o b c undcr-
stood a s r e l a t i n q t o each o t h c r , a s joined t o each o t h e r , a s
disjojned, et cetera.
When A b e l a r d t a l k s a b o u t t h e d o u b l e d c s i g n a t j . v e f u n c t i o n o f
s p e e c h s i g n s , h c i s r e f e r r i n q t o c a t e q o r e m a t i c words. I n t h e
f i r s t f u n c t i o n , t h e s i q n i f i c a t i o i n t e l l e c t u s , t h e y c o n v e y some-
t h i n g . What t h e y c o n v e y c a n b e e x p l a i n e d i n a p a r a p h r a s c o r a
d e f i n i t i o n , f o r c x a m p l c . The word i s t o b e t a k e n h e r c a s i t
a p p e a r s t o u s i n a d i c t i o n a r y e n t r y . The s e c o n d f u n c t i i o n n o r n a l l y
s t i p u l a t e d of c a t e g o r c m a t i c words, t h e s i q n i f i c a t i o rei, i s
t h a t t h c r c i s s o m e t h i n g o u t s i d e o f t h c mlnd f o r w h i c h t h e s e w o r d s
s t a n d . Ttie w o r d s s c r v c t o d e s c r i b e a ciiven t h i n q . What a word
d e s i q n a t e s i n t h i s s e c o n d s c n s c i s c x p l a i n e d b y c ~ i v i n qexarririles
o f i t s u s e . The word i s a k t r i b u t c d ( i m p o s i t i o v o c a b u l o r u m ) .
For Abelard t h e s i q n i f i c a t i o i.ntcll.cctus is primary, t h e
s i q n i f i c a t i o r e i s u b o r d i n a t e . Two o f h i s a r g u m e n t s s h o u l d b e
m e n t i o n c d h e r e . A n o t h e r two w i l l o c c u p y u s l a t e r . F i r s t , t h e
m e a n i n q o f a word t o t h c i n t e l l e c t r e m a i n s c o n s t a n t , w h e r c a s i L s
m e a n i n g i n r c s p c c t t o t h e t h i n g c h a n g c s . A s c n s i b l e word r e t a i n s
its s e n s e i r r c s p e c t i v e o f whether o r n o t t h e r c is a t a l l t i m e s
a n e x i s t c n t thincj which i t s t a n d s f o r . Second, o n e must a l w a y s
a s k , p a r t i c u l a r l y whcn j o i n i n q s e v e r n l c a t e q o r e m a t i c w o r d s t o -
g e t h e r , whctihcr t h e t t i u s f o r m e d " c o m p l e x c o n c e p t " ( i n t e l l e c t u s
c o m p o s i L u s ) means s o r n e t h i n q o r j.s a n o t i o n t o w h i c h n o t h i n g
c o r r e s p o n d s . Each o f i t s c o n s t i t u c n t p a r t s may mean s o m e t h i n q
w h i l e a t t h e Same time t h e r e i s n o t h i n q t o whicli t h e complex
a s a whole c a n b e a p p l i e d .
I t s h o u l d now h a v e become c l e a r t h a t t h e c a t c g o r e m a t i c w o r d s
t o which Abelard a t t r i b u t e s s e n s c ( s i q n i f i c a t i o i n t e l l e c t ~ : ~ )
a n d r e f c r c n c c ( s i q n i f i c a t i o r e i ) a r c p r e d i c a t i v e w o r d s . They
a r c t h e s m a l l e s t unitis of s p c e c h which a r e m e a n i n g f u l i n and
of themselvcs.
When w e d i r e c t o u r a t t c n t i o n t o P r e q e , e v e r l r t h i n q b e g i n s t o
l o o k q u i t c d i f f e r e n t . P r e d i c a t i v e c x p r e s s i o n s a r e c o n c e p t words.
F r e g e Sees c o n c c p t s a s a s p e c i a l k i n d o f f u n c t i o n . I t i s
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of functional expressions t h a t they include an
e m p t y p l a c e o r a p l a c c h o l d e r f o r a n a r n u m e n t s i g n . The f u n c t i o n -
a l e x p r e s s i o n is n o t a c o m p l e t e e n t i t y ; t h e p l a c e h o l d e r ex-
presses t h a t a c o m p l c t i o n i s n e c e s s a r y . What was s a i d a b o u t t h e
f u n c t i o n a l e x p r e s s i o n h o l d s f o r t h c f u n c t i o n i t s e l f , t o o . The
f u n c t i o n m u s t b e made c o m p l c t c by i n s e r t i n q a p a r t i c u l a r a r p u -
ment f o r t h e p l a c e h o l d e r . The c o m p l e t c e n t i t y r e s u l t i n q o n c e
t h e g a p h a s been f i l l c d w i t h a p a r t i c u l a r argument is c a l l e d t h e
v a l u e o f t h e f u n c t i o n f o r t h i s argument.
Dy f i l l i n q i n t h c g a p , t h e f u n c t i o n r e a c h e s c o m p l e t i o n . B u t
t h e c o m p l e t i n g c l e m e n t , t h e argument, is a l s o a complete e n t i t y .
The f u n c t i o n i s a n i n s t r u c t i o n t o a s s o c i a t e t w o e n t i t i e s w i t h
e a c h o t h c r , namely argument and v a l u c .
I f concepts a r e f u n c t i o n s o f a p a r t i c u l a r kind, then cvcry-
Lhinq s p e c i f i e d a b o u t f u n c t i o n s i n g c n c r a l m u s t i i l s o a p p l y t.o
c o n c e p t s . Ttie i n h c r c n t : i n c o n i p l e t e n e s s o f c o n c c p t s c a n b e e x -
p r e s s e d by usi-ng u r e d i c a t i v e c x p r c s s i o n s i n s t e a d o f c o n c c p t : ~
w o r d s s u c h a s 'man' o r ' w i s e ' a n d by m a r k i n g t h c s u b j e c t p o s i t i o n
w i t h a p l a c e h o l d e r . T h u s , 'C i s a man' a n d ' 5 i s w i s e ' . P r o p e r
namcs c a n b e i n s e r t e d a s a r ~ u m e n ts i q n s . Each s t a n d s f o r a p a r t i -
c u l a r o b j c c t . With e a c h i n s e r t i o n , a tirue o r f a l s e p r o p o s i t i - o n
i s c r c a k c d . T h a t i s t o s a y , t.hc p r e d i c a t i o n a l l o w s o n l y o n e o f
t h c two t r u t k v a l u c s f o r e a c h a r q u m c n t .
l'hus a c c o r d i . n g t o F r e q e a c o n c c p t i i s a f u n c t i o n w i t h o n e c m p t y
p l a c e , ttie vrilue o f which f o r e v e r y arquinent i s o n c o r t h e o t h e r
o f t h c t w c ~ t r u t h v a l u e s . An o b j c c L i s s o r n e t h i n g whicli i s n c v e r
p r e d i c a b l e b u t r a t h c r t h a t o f w h i c h s o n i e t t i i n q i s p r e d j c a t c d . Ob-
jccLs f a l l under c o n c e p t s , n o t undcr o t h c r o b j e c t s . Concepts
s t a n d i n r e l a t i o n s of s u b o r d i n a t i o n and s u y > e r n r d i n a t i o n t o e a c h
o t h c r . The s u b o r d i n a t i o n o f o n e c o n c c p L L o a n o t h e r m u s t b c k c p t
s t - r i c t l y scparatic from a n o b j e c t ' s f a l l i n q undcr a coricept.
From t.hi.s b r i c f r e v i e w o f !?rege's d i s t i n c t i o n s b e t w e e n f u n c -
t i o n and argumcnt on t h c o n c hand and c o n c e n t and o b j c c t o n
t h e o t l h c r , i t i s c v i d e n t w h i c h e x p r e s s i o n s F r c g c r e g a r d s as
cornplcte and which ho c o n s i d e r s incorriplete. E x p r c s s i o n s r e q a r d -
cd a s complete a r e , f i r s t , propcr names f o r p a r t i c u l a r o b j c c t s
and, second, s e n t e n c c s . f r r c s p c c t i v e of t h e i r c a p a c i t y t o t a k e
t h c s u b j e c t i p o s i t i o n i n s e n t e n c e s , p r o p e r names h a v e t o p e r -
f o r m s o n i e t h i n q f o r w h i c h t h c y a r e f u l l y a d e q u a t e , b e i n g t o name
ohjectis. Frege a l s o r e g a r d s d e f i n i t c d c s c r i p t i o n s a s p r o p e r
names, f o r a d e f i n i t c d c s c r i p t i o n a l s o s e r v e s t o namc a p a r t i c u -
L a r object.
F r o p c r names a n d d e f i n i t c d c s c r i p t i o n s a r c f o r F r e g e t t i e s i g n s
w h i c h a r e p r i m a r i l y s a i d ko h a v e s e n s e a n d r e f c r e n c e . Two p r o p c r
namcs o r d e f i n i t e d e s c r i p t i o n s h a v c d i f f e r e n t r e f e r e n c c s i f a n d
o n l y i f t h e y name d i f f e r e n t o b j e c t s . They h a v e t h e samc r e f e r e n c e
b u t d i f f e r i n s c n s c i f a n d o n l y i f t h e y c h a r a c t c r i z c t h e Same
o b j e c t i n d i f f e r e n t ways.
Wien A b e l a r d d i s t i n g u i s h e s b e t w e e n t h e s i c l n i f i c a t i o i n t e l l e c -
Lus a n d t h e s i q n i f i c a t i o r e i , h c i s t a l k i n g a b o u t c a t e q o r e m a k i c
words. H i s g o a l i s t o d e m o n s t r a t c t h a t s u c h words d o n o t s t a n d
d i r c c t l y f o r t h i n g s . Thcy s t a n d f o r t h i n g s o n l y by means o f
t k e i n t e l l i g i b l e c o n t c n t which t h e y d e s i q n a t e d i r c c t l y .
When F r e g e d i s t i n g u i s h e s b e t w e e n Sinn a n d I i c d c u t u n g , h e
i s m a i n l y t a l k i n g a b o u t p r o o c r namcs. H e a p p l i e s t h e samc
d i s t i n c t i o n t o s e n t e n c c s , t o o . H i s a t t e m p t s t o a p p l y it t o
c o n c e p t words d o n o t l e a d t o s a t i s f a c t o r y r e s u l t s . F r e g e
a s s u m c s t h a t names s t a n d f o r o b j e c t s . Now i t h a p p e n s t t i a t
t h e Same o b j e c t s o m e t i m e s h a s b e e n a i v c n v a r i o u s nanies. T h i s
occurs n o t j u s t i n o r d i n a r y languaqe b u t a l s o i n s c h o l a r l y
language. Seeinq t h a t t h e d i f f e r e n c e is n o t simply a m a t t e r
o f t h c p h o n e t i c o r w r i t t e n forrns o f t h e s i . q n s , t h e real b a s i s
o f t h e d i f f e r c n c c m u s t b c s o u g h t i n t h e d i m e n s i o n OE t h a t w h i c h
t h c s c s i g n s d e s i g n a t e . Thus F r e q e r e a c h e s t h e f o l l o w i n g t h e s i s :
"A p r o p e r name ( w o r d , s i g n , s i g n c o r n b i n a t i o n , e x p r e s s i o n ) - ex-
presses i t s s e n s e , s t a n d s f o r o r d e s i g n a t e s i t s r e f e r e n c e . "
( u b e r S i n n und B e d e u t u n g , S. 3 1 ) .
A b c l a r d a n d F r e g e , we r e a l i z e a t t h i s s t a q e o f o u r i n v e s t i g a -
tion, use similar a n a l y t i c t e r m s t o d e a l with very d i f f e r e n t
88 KLA lJ.S,]ACOI

questions. Thus the deqree of commonality necessary for contro-


versy, not to mention aqreemcnt, is lacking. For it would only
makc scnsc to speak of different views when the viewpoints con-
cerned the Same themes and questions. Let us imaginc an cx-
change of thoughts betwecn Abelard and Fregc on the basis of
what has bccn said up to now. It seems that this exchanqe could
hardly turn out to be morc than expressions of incomnrehension.
In any case, each author could reproach the other with the ob-
servation that his semantic tlieory has unity thanks only to the
circunistance that hc has failed to draw certain critical dis-
tinctions.
Abelard could point out to Fregc the differencc bctwcen mere
proper names and definite descriptions. IIe would surcly arguc
that the idea of "scnse" is applicable only to dcscriptions,
and this thanks to the conceptual clements in them. He would
furthcrmore express reservations about the talk of "truth
values", which is based On an unconfirmed "expansion" of the
word 'function' to include whole propositions. Freqe's thcory
of concepts seems to depend on whcthcr this expansion is a d -
missible.
Frege, for his part, would objcct that Abclard's theory of
concepts is based on assuniptions which are not introduced in
the framework of the thcory. IIe wvuld say that Abelard simply
calls one's attcntion to the fact that cateqorematic words scrve
to convey intelligible contents from speaker to listcncr. Abc-
lard fails to provide criteria with which one can decide when
words are diffcrent in respect to their intelligible meaning
and whcn in respect to thcir referencc. Such criteria could
only be provided if one were to dctermine the objcct mcaninq
completely, that is to say, only in such a way that onc would
speak of the proper name for a particular object. The criticnl
distinction which Abelard Eailed to make was that between iden-
tity propositions with the form 'a = b' on the nnc sidc and
predications with the form 'IJJ ( a ) ' On the other. Finally, one
must distinguish both from propositions about the marks of a
concept.
Are we thus forccd to relinquish our hope of findinq a
point of accord betwccn Abelard and Frege? I believc not. For
there is indeed a more deeply lyins and far-reaching cnnforrni-
ty in the way both philosophcrs apwronch semantic questions.
One discovcrs this conformity once onc has ceased tryinq to
match the individual theses and terms directly. I call this
point of accord the propositional approach of both loqicians.
As previously mentioned, two of Abelard's arquments remain
to be presented in which he intcnds to demonstrate why logical
analysis must takc intelliqible mcaninq (significatio intellec-
tuum) as its starting point. According to Abelard, thc logician
occupies himself with the scmantics of nouns and verbs because
he is striving toward a theory of the proposition. A proposi-
tion consists minimally of a noun and a verb. What consituLcs
t h c differencc between these two parts of the proposition? This
diffcrence, argues Abelard, "cannot be discovcrcd throuqh thc
consideration of the manifold charactcr of thinqs. For nouns
and verbs dcsignate the samc things. Thus the verb 'runs
(curi-it)'and the noun 'runninq (cursus)' desiqnate thc Same
t h i n y . " The d i f f e r c n c c b e t w e e n thcm l i e s i n t h e i n t e l l i q i b l c
c o n t c n t . I n t h e noun ' r u n n i r i q ' , tl-ic thiricr d e s i g n a i e d i s u n d c r -
sLood a s a n c n t i t y a n d " w i t h o u t a n y t e m p o r a l d i s t i n c t i o n " . I n
t h e v e r b ' r u n s ' , it i s u n d e r s t o o d a s b e i n g t t r i b u t c d t o a
s u b j c c t a n d a s i n d i - c a t i n q a p a r t i c u l a r t i m e . ( S u p e r e r i erm.,
300, 1 9 - 3 3 ) . A f u l l p o r t r a y a l o f A b c l a r d ' s s e a r c h Eor r e l i a b l e
c r i t e r i a t o d i s i i n g u i s t i n o u n s Kram v e r b s c a n n o t b e q i v e n h c r e .
I w i l l summarizc h i s r e s u l t s h r i e f l y :
1 ) l L i s n o t p o s s i b l c t o niake a c a i c g o r i a l d i s t j n c t i o n b e t w e c n
nouns a n d v e r b s o n t h e b a s i s o f f u n d a m e n t a l l y d c s i g n a t e d c o n t e r i t .
V e r b s a r e n o t u n i v e r s a l l y words f o r a c t i o n s .
2 ) A c c o r d i n g t o A r i s t o t l c , v e r b s , a s d i s t i n g u i s h e d Erom n o u n s ,
d c s i q n a t e i n a d d i t i - o n Lo t t i e i r [ ) r i m a r y s e n s e a p a r t i c u l a r t i m e .
This suggested d i s t i n c t i o n should not be misinterpreted a s an
a d v i c e f o r g r a m m a i i c a l l y d e t e r m i n i n g a k i n d of word. C o r r e c t l y
undcrstood, i t is a maLter of a l o g i c a l d i s t i n c t - i o n . Every
i n t e l l i q i b l c c o n t e n t c a n b c c x p r e s s e d i n b o t h a nominal and a
v e r b a l . f o r m u l a t i o n , j u s t a s w e l l w i t h o u t c o n s i q n i f i c a t i o tcmpo-
r i s a s w i t h ii. Where no v e r b i s t o b e f o u n d i n t h c l a n g u a q e Tor
--
a c c r L a i n c o n t e n t , a noun c a n b e q i v e n t c m p o r a l c o - s i q n i f i c a t i o n
by s u p p l e m e n t i n q i t w i t h a h c l p i n q v e r b .
3 ) The i n f l e c t e d v c r b s h o u l d b e c o n c e i v c d o f a s a s i n q l c u n i t
o f s p e e c h , n o t a s , s a y , a b a s t a r d compound c o n s i s t i n g o f a
n o m i n a l e l e m e n t a n d a t e m p o r a l e l e m e n t . Evcn when 'G', 'fuit',
o r 'G'i s s u b s t i t u t e d f o r t-he t c n s e i n d i c a t - o r o f t h c i n f l e c t -
c d f o r m , t h e h e l p i n g v e r b a n d t h e word i t b e l o n g s t o makc u p a
s i n g l e u n i l of spcech.
4) W c t r a n s f o r m a noun i n t a a v e r b when and o n l y when we mean
t o u s c j.C i n t h e p r e d i c a t e p o s i t i . o n . T e m p o r a l C O - s i g n i f i c a t i o n
i s e x p l a i n e d by t h e p r c d i c a t i v e f u n c t i o n .
5 ) The m o s i s u i t a b l e a n a l y s i s o f p r o p o s i t i o n s i s n o t t - h a t w h i c h
r c s o l v c s t t i e p r o p o s i t i o n i n t o two t e r m s bound t o q e t h c r b y t h e
copula b u t r a t l i c r t h a t which r e s o l v e s t h e p r o p o s i t i o n i n t o a
s u b j c c t and a p r e d i c a t e .
F o r a s u c c i n t f o r m u l a t i o n o f t h e s e r e s u l t s , t h e f o r m o f no-
t a t i o n i n t r o d u c e d by F r e g e ( o r o n e s i m i l a r t o i t ) p r c s c n t s it-
s e l f q u i t e n a t u r a l l y . Herc p r c d i c a t i v e e x p r e s s i o n s and p r o p e r
namcs a r c p o r t r a y c d by v a r i o u s syinbols. The 1cC-C-erso f t h e
Greek a l p h a b c t , w h i c h F r e g c u s e d f o r p r e d i c a t i v c c x p r e s s i o n s ,
m u s t s i m p l y b e g i v e n a t e m p o r a l i n d c x . A b c l a r d ' s work o n t h e
c o n v e r s i o n o f t e m p o r a l l y d e f i n i t e p r o p o s i t i o n s b r i n g s hin1 i n -
dccd t o i n s i g h t s which a r e s u r p r i s i n q l y c l o s e t o t h o s e o f
modern q u a n t i f i c a t i - o n t h e o r y . Yor i f t h e s u b j e c t a n d p r e d i c a t e
o f a f f i r r r i a t i v e p a r t i c u l a r p r o p o s i t i o n s a n d n e g a t i v e universal
p r o p o s i t i o n s a r e i n t e r c h a n g c a b l c , t h i s shows t h a t p r e d i c a t i o n
i s a t t h c b a s i s of ttie s u b j e c t e x p r e s s i o n , t o o . Only p r o p e r
names a r e r e a l l y s u b j e c t c x p r c s s i o n s : a l l o t h e r n o u n s a r c ab-
b r e v i a t e d p r e d i c a t i o n s . U s i n g s y m b o l i c l a n q u a g e , we c o u l d cx-
p r e s s t h c form of p r o p o s i t i o n s a s f o l l o w s :
' A l l / some whl.ch Lnotl ili-t ( ' n o w ' o r ' b c f o r e ' o r ' a f t e r ' )
[riotl <p-t ('now' o r ' b c f o r e ' o r ' a f t e r ' ) . '

T h o s e who s c c i n F r e g e ' s l o q i c a s t r o n q c o n t r a s t t o t r a d i -
t i o n a l L o g i c commonly r e g a r d t h e t h r e e - p a r t a n a l . y s i s o f t h e p r o -
p o s i t i o n , r e s o l v i n q i t i n t o two t e r m s bound t o g c t h e r by t h e
90 KLA 1.I.S JACORI

c o p u l a , a s t y p i c a l f o r t r a d i t i o n a l l o q i c . And I d o i n f a c t f i n d
t h a t Abclard a l o n e of t r a d i t i o n a l l o g i c i a n s weighs and q i v e s
h i s p r e f c r c n c e t o t h c t w o - p a r t a n a l y s i s . T h a t t h i s a n a l y s i s was
a t a l l t h i n k a b l e a n d c o u l d b e f o r m u l a t c d w i t h i n t h c framework
o f t r a d i t i o n a l l o g i c s u f f i c c s t-o u n s e t t l e many a n a l l t o o a u d a -
c i o u s a n d a l l t o o s l i c k c o n c e l ~ t i o no f t h c C o u r s e o f t h c h i s t o r y
of loyic.
I would l i k e t o q o b a c k t o A b e l a r d ' s d i s t i n c t i o n bct-wccn
s i g n i f i c a L i o i n ~ cl.cG~us
l and s i g n i f i c a t i o rei once a g a i n i n o r -
d e r t o t h r o w l i g h t o n a n o t h c r p o i n t . H e r e , t:oo, t h e ttieme i s
e x p l a n a t i o n w h y - l o g i c a l a n a l y s i s must t a k c intelligible meanin~
a s i t s s t a r t i n q p o i n t . A b c l a r d a r g u e s a s I o l l o w s : On t h c l e v e l
o f s i q n s , a propos.i..t.ion c o n s i s t s m i n i n i a l l y oT a noun a n d a v c r b .
A p r o p o s i t i o n i s u n d e r s t o o d by j o i n i n g t o q c t h e r t h e u n d c r s C a n d -
i n g s o f i,ts p a r t s ( I n t c l l e c t u s p r o p o s i t i o n i s i u n g i t u r e x-i- ntel-
l e c t i h u s p a r L i i i m ) . But o n c c a r i n o t c a r r y t h e p a r a l l e l r u r t h e r
a n d s a y t - h a t " t h e t h i n q o f t h c p r o p o s i t i o n " " i s made u p o f " Lhc
t h i n g s d e s i q n a t c d by t h c u n i t s o f s p c c c h . P o r " t h e p r o p n s i t i n n , "
s a y s ~ b e l a r d ," i s n o t b a s c d on a t h i n g " ( X a u t c m p r o p o s i t i o ~ ,
cum n u l l a m t i a b e a t p r o p o s i t i . 0 r c m s u b i e c t a m , e x r e b u s vi,cahuloriim
non c o n s i s t i t ) . T h u s , o n l y t h c i n t i c l l i g i b l e mcani n g s o f t t i e neun
and t h e v e r b hclonq t o t h c c o n s t i t u t i o n of a p r o p o s i t i o n . (Super
P c r i erni., 308, 3 4 - 4 0 ) .
A t t h i s p o i n t , somcone w e l l - v c r s c d i n F r e g c would s u r e l y Cry
o u t t h e f o l l o w i n g t - r a n s l a t i o n o f A b e l a r d ' s a r g u m e n t : On t h c
l e v e l o f s i g n s , a s e n t e n c c c o n s i s t s o f a p r o p e r narnc a n d a p r e -
d i c a t o r . To t h e e x t e n t t h a t t t i c " q u c s t i o n ( i s ) o n l y , o f t h c
s e n s e oF t t i e s c n t e n c e , t h c t h o u g h t , i t woiild b e u n n e c c s s s r y t o
b o t h c r w i t h t h c r e f e r e n c e o f a p a r t 01 a s e n t e n c c ; o n l y t h e
sense, not t h e rcIcrence, of t h e p a r t is relevant t o t h c scnsc
o f t h e wtiolc s c n t e n c e . " ( i i b e r S i n n und n c d e u t u n q , S . 3 3 ) . In
t-his suggcsted t r a n s l a t i o n lies a c h a l l e n q e t o Ahclard n o t t o
s t o p w i t h t h e s i q n j f i c a t i o i n t e l l e c t u u m . A s s o o n a s a judgmcnt
n i u s t b c made a s t o t h e t r u t i h o r f a l s i t y o f t t i e t t i o u g h t e x p r e s s e d
i n a s c n t e n c e , one must a s c c r t a i n , s a y s Yrcge, t h a t "cvcry
p r o p e r nme ... (tias) n o t o n l y a s e n s e , b u t a l s o a rcfererice"
(ibd.).
I n t h e r e m a r k s t o f o l l o w , I w i l l g o o n t h e assu:nption t h a t
t h e s u g g c s t e d t r a n s l a t i o n i s r c l i a b l e , a n d s o I w i l l now a d d r c s s
m y s e l f t o t h e c h a l l c n g c p o s e d i n i t . What i s A h c l a r d ' s t h e o r y
o n t h e s i ~ n i f i c a t u mp r o p o s i t i o n s ? Wlint d o e s h c mcan i n s a y i n g
t h a t t h e p r o p o s i t i o n h a s no rtt:; s ~ ~ b i c c t Oncc i? a g a i n I must
l i m i t r n y s c l f t o p r o v i d i n q you wit.h a sununary o f t t i e r e s u l t s oT
Abelard's invcstiqations:
1 ) A word s t r i n q s u c h a s ' S ~ a t c ss e d e n s ' , a s e n t e n c e nomi-
n a l i z a t i o n s u c h a s 'Socratcm s c d e r e ' ( ' Lhat S o c r a t e s i s s i t t i n q ' ) ,
a "completc s e n t e n c e " such a s ' S o c r a t e s sedrt:' o r even c o r r c s -
ponding imgerativc, i n t e r r o g a t o r y , o r wish sentenccs a r e n o t
d i f f e r e n t i n r e s p e c t t o t h e i r u n d e r s t a n d a h l e c o n t e n t s . The p r o -
p o s i t i o n ' S o c r a t e s s e d e t ' h a s n o new i i n d e r s t a n d a b l c c o n t e n t o v e r
' S o c r a t e s s e n d e n s ' . I n t h e word s t r i n y ' S o c r a t c s s e n d e n s ' , t h e
two c l e m e n t s ' S o c r a t e s ' and ' s e d e r c ' a r e rerjardcd a s a l r e a d y
b e i n g j o i n e d t o q c L h c r . Thev a r c n o t j o i n e d f o r t h e f i r s t t i m e
i n a proposition of corresponding character. It is c l e a r t h a t
t h i s t h c o r y came a s a r e s u l L o f t l i e d e b a t e A b c l a r d c o n d u c t e d
ABELAKLI A NLI IXLGK 91

with logicians who wished to base the theory of the proposition


upon a thcory of thc copula.
2) Although we understand the Same contcnts in all three word
strinqs, we don't undcrstand them in the Same way. We under-
st-and thc proposition 'Socratcs sedet' as an assertion. Thc
listener does not expcct rurthcr information. His question is
wlietlier the claim to truth which lies in the asscrtion will
sLand whcn put t.o LcsL. (Note: 'Socrates. s e d s ' will not hc
understood as a complete sentence in every contcxt in which it
appears. As the antecedent in a conditional scntcncc, for ex-
ample, it would not be asserted itself. The conditional sen-
tence would be asserted as a wliole.) When one hears an cx-
pression sucli as 'Socratem sedere', one expects it to he com-
pleted with an cvaiuation. The possible completions which inter-
cst loyicians are tlie modes 'is true' , 'is possi hle' , 'is ne-
cessry', and thcir neqations. When one hears a word stri-ng
such as 'Socratcs scdcnz' onc cxpccts it to be completed by a
predicatc. O f coursc the atLribution (of 'sedens') is thc rc-
sulL oT a prior act oT prcdication the Crut-h of which is pos-
tulated to be known and accepted in the context.
3) The proposition does not dcsiqnate only a complex conccpli
(intellectus compositus). In a propositions Chc truth of a com-
plex, undcrstood content is asserted. '... is true' means
'such is thc casc with thc thing (jta cst in re)'.
4) The object meaninq of the proposition cannot be rcduccd to
the object meaninqs of the elements of the proposition. Thc
truth oT propositions is not in principle depcndcnt upon the
subjcct ierm's mcaning an cxisking Lhinq. (Abclard shows this
hy an analysis of jrnplicational propositions, negations, and
tautoloqies.) 'Such is the case with the thinq' is not syno-
nymous wit-h 'l'here is a thing which is so'.
5 ) '... is triic' and '... is false' secm to be predicates
grammatically. Appcaranccs arc dcccptivc hcrc. Predicatcs are
used "personally": 'Something $-t, naniely a'. The attempt to
construc 'truc' and 'fa1,se' in a simi-larway as predicates
(on sentence noniinalizations as subjects), as in 'something
i.s true, namely p ' , leads one astray. l'he use of '... is true'
and '... is false' is "impersonal". 'True' and 'falsc' arc not
qeneral terms which may bc applied to specific cases. What
is said in propositions is not a bearer of truth or falsity
in the samc way thai things are bcarers of properties.
No one can fail to See that Abelard's expositions have an
essentially negative character. I emphasize: essentially neg-
ative. All thc invcstiqations which Abclard madc in logic,
all distinctions which he drew, all discussions which he con-
ductcd, were quided by his conccntration on thc proposition.
We have scen that Abclard rcjccts all attcmpts to differen-
tiate nouns and verbs on the basis of their contents. They
arc to bc difrcrentiated accordinq to thc function Chcy have
in the proposition. Thc proposition is the point of depar-
ture for the thcory. Its various aspects arc analyzed; but
it is not broken down into separate elements. All o f Abelard's
discussions on the scmantics of the proposition are warninqs
against reductional attempts. The various aspects differen-
tiated from cach obher in thc Course of the analysis - the
92 K1.A 11.7J A CORI

thouqht, the way things rclatc to cach nthcr (cerum modus habcn-
di se, W . , 160, 3 5 ) , the assertion - cannot be understood
alonc. They can be understood only in the context of the pro-
position. The theories of the proposition with which Abelard
contended bcgin with thc false assuumption that some or a1.L of
thc various aspects of the proposition are independent and in
themselves understandable elcmcnts which should thus servc as
thc basis for a semantics of the proposition.
Lct us turn once again to Frege in closing. His notaiiion of-
fers itself here, too, for the symbolic expression of the dif-
ference between the assertivc aspcct of thc proposition and
what can be evaluated. It is not my purpose here to elucidate
the difference betwecn Frcge's introduction early on of the
content and judgmcnt strokes and their later reinterpretation,
nor to elucidate what is needcd in ordcr to asscrt a proposition
of event on the one hand and a matheniatical proposition on the
other (compare Der Gedanke, C. 64). Thcsc arc susidiary qucs-
tions which would play a part in an extended comparison. For
the present I wish mcrcly to mark the point of comparibility.
It sccms to me worthy of noticc that Freqe introduces his dis-
tinction analytically. The content strokc dcsignates what re-
mains when the judgment stroke is "omitted" (~e~riffsschrift,
6
" 2 .) .
Frcgc formulates the propositional approach of his semantic
theory in the second methodological principle of the Grundla-
gen, which states that "onc must ask for the meaninq of words
in the contcxt of a proposition and not in their isolation"
(Grundlaqen der Ari.thmetik, S. XXII). Seeing that conccpts are
nothing other than predicates, the semantics oF thc proposition
cannot be built upon a semantics of words which pretends to bc
prior to and independcnt of it. (Compare Frecje ' s Briefwechsel,
C . 1641.
- - ~

For both Abelard and Frege it is cxtremely difficult to


kccp a firm grasp on thc propositional approach. Abclard
follows the synthetic tradition of Peri Hermcncias in struc-
turing his writings: the theory of the proposition follows the
theory of individual words. Aqain and acrain Abelard must makc
himsclf conscious of his own point of vicw, that of the logi-
cian. And Freqe tends again and aqain to succumb to thc tcmp-
tation to impose a synthetic structurc on his seniantic theory.
For example he speaks first of functions and then of an "ex-
pansion" of the conccpt of the function to include function
equations and truth functions. Onc must bear in mind, however,
that he can introduce the concept of thc valuc of a function
only by alrcady making use of cquations which are true (Funk-
tion und Begriff, S. 8).
An element of Prege's teachings held by him to be central
but dcstined to drive all students of Freqc to wrack their
brains is the thesis that thc reference of evcry scntence is
either the Truc or the Palse and that all true sentences (and
likewise all false sentences) are thus identical in cach casc
in " B e d e u M " and different only in "Sinn".If Abelard had
been prcsented with this thesis, he would surely have rejected
it as a furthcr attempt at rcduction. The scmantics of the pro
position is reduced here to thc paradigm of naminq. Abelard
AREIARD ANU FREGE 93

would c o u n t e r t h a t naming i s a l s o b a s e d u p o n t h c a c t of p r c -
d i c a t i o n , a t l e a s t t o t t i e e x t e n t t t i a t t h e name h a s a n u n d c r -
s t a n d a b l e s e n s e and n o t merely a r e f e r e n c e f u n c t i o n .

Note :
I h a v c p r e s e n t c d t h i s p a p e r a s a r e p o r t o n c u r r e n t a n d on-
g o i n g work. I t i s i n t e n d e d t o be a s t i m u l u s t o d i s c u s s i o n .
It d i d n o t s c c m a p p r o p r i a t e t o r e w o r k i t i n t o a f o r m a l e s s a y
a f t e r t h e f a c t . I have t h u s d i s p e n s e d w i t h t h e u s u a l s c h o l a r l y
a p p a r a t u s a n d p r o v i d c s i r n p l y a b i b l i o g r a p h y of t h c w o r k s c o n -
s u l t c d i n t h e c o u r s c o f my r c s c a r c h .
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'Ingredientibus' ) .BGPhTtiMA 2 1 , 3 . M n s t e r 1927

P e t r i A b a e l a r d G l o s s a e s u p e r P e r i e r n i e n i a s B, carip. X I 1 - XIV.
Ed. L. M i n i o - P a l u e l l o ( T w e l E t h C e n t u r y L o q i c . T e x t s a n d S t u d i e s
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Roma 1 9 5 8

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