PROTECTION SWITCHING
1 INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................... 2
2 DEFINITIONS .............................................................................................................. 2
1 INTRODUCTION
Now ATM VP and ATM VC linear protection switching definitions (in I.630) are almost completed, it is
necessary to extend and update the generic linear protection switching description that has been created in
1992/1993. This document presents the generic principles underlying SDH and ATM linear protection
switching (G.841, I.630). Future versions of this document will include also the generic principles of shared
protection rings for SDH (and OTN), as well as dual node interconnects (e.g. SDH/SDH, SDH/ATM,
ATM/ATM, OTN/OTN, OTN/SDH).
to be added linear and logical ring "Link Connection (Group) Protection" protection class
2 DEFINITIONS
Action:
Switch For the selector, the action of selecting normal traffic from the (currently) standby transport
entity rather than the (currently) active transport entity. For the bridge, (case of permanent
connection to working) the action of connecting or disconnecting the normal traffic to the
protection transport entity. (For the case of non-permanent connection to working) the action of
connecting the normal signal to the (currently) standby transport entity.
APS Protocol:
1-phase a means to align the two ends of the protected domain via the exchange of a single message
(Z A). The bridge/selector at Z are operated before it is known if Zs condition has priority
over the condition at A. Applicable for (1:1)n and 1+1 architectures.
2-phase a means to align the two ends of the protected domain via the exchange of two messages (Z
A, A Z). Applicable for 1+1 architectures with its permanent bridges. Z doesnt perform
any switch action until A confirms the priority of the condition at Z. When A confirms the
priority, it operates the selector. On receipt of confirmation, Z operates its selector.
3-phase a means to align the two ends of the protected domain via the exchange of three messages
(Z A, A Z, Z A). For case of 1:n, m:n architectures, Z doesnt perform any switch
action until A confirms the priority of the condition at Z. When A confirms the priority, it
operates the bridge. On receipt of confirmation, Z operates its selector and bridge and indicates
the bridge action to A. A finally operates the selector. For case of 1+1 architecture with its
permanent bridges, selectors are operated only like described for 1:n case.
Protection Class:
Trail protection - Transport entity protection for the case the transport entity is a trail.
Sub-network connection protection - Transport entity protection for the case the transport entity is
a sub-network connection.
Sublayer monitored -
Non-intrusive monitored -
Inherent monitored
Test monitored -
Network connection protection Special case of sub-network connection protection. A network
connection is the maximum sub-network connection.
Individual
Group -
Protection Sub-Class:
Inherent -
End-to-end overhead /OAM -
LUCENT TECHNOLOGIES NEDERLAND DRAFT 0.7 MAARTEN VISSERS
Page 3 of 46 1999-10-26
Sublayer overhead /OAM -
Component:
Protected domain - The protected domain defines one or more transport entities (trails, sub-network
connections), for which a survivability mechanism is provided in the event of impairment
affecting that or those transport entities. It begins from the selector/bridge of one endpoint to the
selector/bridge of the other endpoint.
Bridge - The function that connects the normal and extra traffic signals to the working and protection
transport entities. For a 1+1 architecture, the bridge connects the normal traffic signal to both the
working and protection entities. For 1:n, m:n, (1:1)n architectures, the bridge connects the normal
traffic signal either to working and optionally to the protection transport entity (broadcast
bridge), or to either the working or the protection transport entity (selector bridge). The extra
traffic signal is either not connected or connected to the protection transport entity.
Selector The function that extracts the normal signal either from the working or the protection
transport entity. The extra traffic signal is either extracted from the protection transport entity,
or is not extracted; in the latter case, an AIS signal will be output.
Sink node - The node at the egress of a protected domain, where working traffic may be selected
from either the working entity or the protection entity.
Source node - The node at the ingress to a protected domain, where working traffic may be bridged
to the protection entity.
Intermediate node - A node on either the working entity physical route or the protection entity
physical route in between the source and sink nodes of the corresponding protected domain.
Condition:
Signal Degrade (SD) - A signal indicating the associated data has degraded in the sense that a
degraded defect (e.g. dDEG) condition is active.
Signal Fail (SF) - A signal indicating the associated data has failed in the sense that a signal
interrupting near-end defect condition (not being the degraded defect) is active.
Signal Degrade Group (SDG) - A signal indicating the associated group data has degraded.
Signal Fail Group (SFG) - A signal indicating the associated group has failed.
Server Signal Degrade (SSD) - A signal degrade indication output at the CP of an adaptation
function.
Server Signal Fail (SSF) - A signal fail indication output at the CP of an adaptation function.
Trail Signal Degrade (TSD) - A signal degrade indication output at the AP of a termination
function.
Trail Signal Fail (TSF) - A signal fail indication output at the AP of a termination function.
Architecture:
1+1 (protection) architecture - A 1+1 protection architecture has one normal traffic signal, one
working transport entity, one protection transport entity and a permanent bridge.
At the source end, the normal traffic signal is permanently bridged to both the working and
protection transport entity. At the sink end, the normal traffic signal is selected from the better of
the two transport entities.
Due to the permanent bridging, the 1+1 architecture does not allow an extra unprotected traffic
signal to be provided.
1:n (protection) architecture (n 1) - A 1:n protection architecture has n normal traffic signals, n
working transport entities and 1 protection transport entity. It may have 1 extra traffic signal.
The signals on the working transport entities are the normal traffic signals.
The signal on the protection transport entity may either be one of the normal traffic signals, an
extra traffic signal, or the null signal (e.g. a test signal, one of the normal traffic signals, an AIS
Protection
(0)
AIS AIS
Figure 2 - 1:n protection architecture (broadcast bridge option: normal permanent connected to working and
occasional to protection)
AIS AIS
Figure 3 - 1:n protection architecture (selector bridge option: normal connected to either working or protection)
AIS AIS
Figure 4 m:n protection architecture (broadcast bridge option: normal permanent connected to working and
occasional to protection)
Protection
(1)
"n" signals
Protection
(2)
Working Bandwidth
Protection Bandwidth
Protection
(n)
AIS AIS
n
Figure 5 band width sharing (1:1) protection architecture (broadcast bridge option: normal permanent
connected to working and occasional to protection)
All n working transport entities are routed via different facilities and equipment (to prevent a common point
of failure that can not be protected). All n+1 protection transport entities are routed via the same facilities
and equipment, diverse from the working facilities and equipment.
The bandwidth occupied by each working transport entity is BWi = BNi+BOAM-Wi. The bandwidth occupied by
the protection transport entities is Bp = MAX(BN1,BN2,..,BNn,BNn+1) + (BOAM-P1+BOAM-P2+..+B OAM-Pn+BOAM-P0).
From a bandwidth perspective, this (1:1)n protection architecture behaves as a 1:n architecture.
Mis-connection can not occur, and consequently the APS protocol can be simple: a 1-phase protocol is
required only, whereas a 1:n architecture requires a 3-phase protocol.
SNC/Ni - - - - - -
SNC/Ne - - - - - -
SNC/Ns - - - - - -
SNC/Si
SNC/Ti - - - -
SNC/Te - - - - n=1
SNC/Ts - - - -
trail/i
trail/e n=1
trail/Ti - - - -
trail/Te - - - - n=1
CI CI
E E
AI AI
CI CI
E E
Protected Domain
Note: As 1:1, 1:n, m:n trail protection are linear protection mechanisms, the normal and extra traffic trail termination
functions are located in the same NE. In a network application this implies that the normal and extra traffic patterns
must coincide.
Trail protection does not support network architectures, which make use of cascaded protected subnetworks in
the same layer. Consequently traffic can be restored under single fault conditions only. To restore traffic under
multiple fault conditions SNC protection has to be used, or trail protection has to be supplemented with
protection at server layers.
NOTE: For the case of an 1:1, m:n, or (1:1)n architecture in ATM, the protection trail(s) should contain a signal that
allows accurate monitoring of its status. In normal conditions, in which the normal signal is transported via the
working trail, there is no signal to be transported via protection. If CC would be inactive, such protection trail will not
transport any information under normal fault free conditions. When a fault occurs, AIS cells are inserted. When the
fault was present for a short period only (e.g. due to a physical layer protection action), the AIS defect detector at the
protection trail endpoint will detect the AIS defect condition for 2 to 3 seconds according the I.610 defined AIS state
definition. With CC activated, the AIS defect condition will clear on the receipt of a CC cell, i.e. within a period of 1
second after the traffic interruption was cleared.
NE A NE Z
W Y_CI W
Y Y
Selector
N N
Bridge
Z_CI
Y/Z
Y/Z
Z_CI
P
P Y_CI
Y Y
APS APS
W Y_CI W
Y Y
Selector
N N
Bridge
Z_CI
Y/Z
Y/Z
Z_CI
P Y_CI P
Y Y
APS APS
trail protection sublayer (unreliable) Y trails trail protection sublayer
NE A NE Z
W Y_CI W
Y Y
Selector
N
Bridge
N
Z_CI
Y/Z
Y/Z
Z_CI
P
P Y_CI
Y Y
APS APS
W Y_CI W
Y Y
Selector
Bridge
N N
Z_CI
Y/Z
Y/Z
Z_CI
P Y_CI P
Y Y
APS APS
trail protection sublayer (unreliable) Y trails trail protection sublayer
(reliable) Y trails
1 1
2 2
Working group 3 Working group 3
X X
Test
protection
protection
TSD SFG TSD SFG
engine
engine
W-SDG 3 W-SDG 3
SDG SDG
logic P-SFG 2 Normal group logic P-SFG 2 Normal group
TSF TSF
P-SDG 1 P-SDG 1
TSD TSD
remote control Test remote control
information X information X
3 3
Protection group Protection group
2 2
1 1
APS APS
APS APS
process external process external
commands commands
working group
E test trail E
CI CI
E E
N
Working transport
N entity group N
AI AI
Protection transport
entity group
N
E E
CI CI
protection group
E E
test trail
Protected Domain
NE A NE Z
Y_CI
Y Y
Working Group Test signal
W Y_CI W
Y Y
Selector
N
Bridge
N
Z_CI
Y/Z
Y/Z
Z_CI
P
P Y_CI
Y Y
Y_CI
Y Y
APS Protection Group Test signal APS
Y_CI
Y Y
Working Group Test signal
W Y_CI W
Y Y
Selector
Bridge
N N
Z_CI
Y/Z
Y/Z
Z_CI
P Y_CI P
Y Y
Y_CI
Y Y
APS Protection Group Test signal APS
(reliable) Y trails
S S
CI CI
AI CI CI AI
E E
S S
Protected Domain
S S
CI CI
AI CI AI
E E
S S
Protected Domain
S S
CI CI
AI AI
E E
CI Protection transport entity CI
S S
Protected Domain
CI CI
AI CI CI AI
E E
Protected Domain
SNC protection supports network architectures, which make use of cascaded protected subnetworks. Such
network architectures are able to restore traffic for the case of multiple faults (one fault per protected
subnetwork); refer to figure 16.
S S S S
E E
S S S S
The fault tolerance (and reliability) of the cascaded SNC protected subnetworks is increased when the
interconnection between the subnetworks is duplicated (figure 17), removing the single point of failure. This
requires the use of 1+1, unidirectional switched SNC/N or SNC/I protection types. Using 1:n, m:n, (1:1)n
and/or bidirectional switching is not possible.
E E
Network layer
Connection point E Protection switching function
trail end point
Figure 17: Cascaded 1+1 SNC protection with fault tolerant subnetwork interconnects
NOTE: For the case of an 1:1, m:n, or (1:1)n architecture in ATM, the protection subnetwork connection(s) should
contain a signal that allows accurate monitoring of its status. In normal conditions, in which the normal signal is
transported via the working SNC, there is no signal to be transported via protection. If CC would be inactive, such
protection SNC will not transport any information under normal fault free conditions. When a fault occurs, AIS cells
are inserted. When the fault was present for a short period only (e.g. due to a physical layer protection action), the
AIS defect detector at the protection segment endpoint will detect the AIS defect condition for 2 to 3 seconds
according the I.610 defined AIS state definition. With CC activated, the AIS defect condition will clear on the receipt
of a CC cell, i.e. within a period of 1 second after the traffic interruption was cleared.
NE A NE Z
W X_AI W
X/Y
X/Y
Y_S Y_S
Y_CI Y_CI
Selector
N N
Bridge
X_AI
X/Y
X/Y
X_AI
P
P X_AI
X/Y
X/Y
Y_S Y_S
APS APS
Y Y
W X_AI W
X/Y
X/Y
Y_S Y_S
Selector
N N
Bridge
X_AI
X/Y
X/Y
X_AI
P X_AI P
X/Y
X/Y
Y_S Y_S
NE A NE Z
Ym
X/Y
X/Y
Selector
N N
Bridge
X_AI
X/Y
X/Y
X_AI
Ym
Y_CI P
P Y_CI X_AI
X/Y
X/Y
APS APS
Y Ym Y
X/Y
Selector
N N
Bridge
X_AI
X/Y
X/Y
X_AI
Ym
APS APS
(unreliable) Y subnetwork connections
NE A NE Z
Y_Sm
X/Y
X/Y
Selector
N N
Bridge
X_AI
X/Y
X/Y
X_AI
Y_Sm
Y_CI P
P Y_CI X_AI
X/Y
X/Y
APS APS
Y Y_Sm Y
X/Y
Selector
N N
Bridge
X_AI
X/Y
X/Y
X_AI
Y_Sm
X/Y
X/Y
APS APS
(unreliable) Y subnetwork connections
Note: APS signal not applicable for (reliable) Y subnetwork connection (inside a sublayer trail)
1+1 unidirectional switched case
X/Y
X/Y
Selector
N N
Bridge
X_AI
X/Y
X/Y
X_AI
Y_CI P
P Y_CI X_AI
X/Y
X/Y
APS APS
Y Y
X/Y
Selector
N N
Bridge
X_AI
X/Y
X/Y
X_AI
P Y_CI X_AI Y_CI P
X/Y
X/Y
APS APS
(unreliable) Y subnetwork connections
NE A NE Z
W X_AI W
X/Y
X/Y
Y_S Y_S
Y_CI Y_CI
Selector
N N
Bridge
X_AI
X/Y
X/Y
X_AI
P
P X_AI
X/Y
X/Y
Y_S Y_S
APS APS
Y Y
W X_AI W
X/Y
X/Y
Y_S Y_S
Selector
N N
Bridge
X_AI
X/Y
X/Y
X_AI
P X_AI P
X/Y
X/Y
Y_S Y_S
X/Y
X/Y
Selector
N N
Bridge
X_AI
X/Y
X/Y
X_AI
Ym
Y_CI P
P Y_CI X_AI
X/Y
X/Y
APS
APS
Y Ym Y
X/Y
X/Y
Selector
N N
Bridge
X_AI
X/Y
X/Y
X_AI
Ym
APS APS
(unreliable) Y subnetwork connections
NE A NE Z
X/Y
X/Y
Selector
N N
Bridge
X_AI
X/Y
X/Y
X_AI
Y_CI P
P Y_CI X_AI
X/Y
X/Y
APS APS
Y Y
X/Y
Selector
N N
Bridge
X_AI
X/Y
X/Y
X_AI
P Y_CI X_AI Y_CI P
X/Y
X/Y
APS APS
(unreliable) Y subnetwork connections
3.6.2.2.4 SNC/T
As a result of the large number of tributary slots in some transmission technologies (e.g. ATM) extra tributary
slots in the working and protection server layer signals can be allocated to transport test signals via test
transport entities (figures 25, 27). These test signals (one per working, one per protection) can be used instead
of the SFG, SDG information as described above. The APS signal is transported via the test protection
transport entity.
The SFG/SDG logic operates now as follows:
W-SFG = Wt-TSF
P-SFG = Pt-TSF
W-SDG = Wt-TSD
P-SDG = Pt-TSD
working group
Working transport test sublayer trail
entity group
S S
N
CI CI
N N
AI CI CI AI
E E
CI Protection transport CI
entity group
N
S S
protection group
test sublayer trail
Protected Domain
Figure 25: 1:1 or 1+1 SNC/Ts group protection using sublayer trail terminations
Group SNC/T protection can also use the end-to-end overhead/OAM to create an end-to-end layer network trail as a
test trail (figure 26). Equipment designs typically locate those layer termination functions at port units at the other
side of the connection function; i.e. not readily available for group protection test trail purposes.
working group
Working transport test trail
entity group
E E
N
CI CI
N N
AI CI CI AI
E E
CI Protection transport CI
entity group
N
E E
protection group
test trail
Protected Domain
Figure 26: 1:1 or 1+1 SNC/Te group protection using layer network trail terminations
NE A X_AI
NE Z
X/Y
X/Y
Y_S Y_S
Working Group Test signal
X/Y
X/Y
N
Bridge
Selector
N
X_AI
X/Y
X/Y
X_AI
Y_CI P
P Y_CI X_AI
X/Y
X/Y
X_AI
X/Y
X/Y
Y_S Y_S
APS Protection Group Test signal APS
Y X_AI Y
X/Y
X/Y
Y_S Y_S
Working Group Test signal
X/Y
X/Y
Selector
Bridge
N
X_AI
X/Y
X/Y
X_AI
P Y_CI X_AI Y_CI P
X/Y
X/Y
X_AI
X/Y
X/Y
Y_S Y_S
APS Protection Group Test signal APS
Figure 27 - 1+1/1:1 Group SNC/Ts protection functional model using sublayer trail terminations
NOTE: For the case of ATM, the test (sublayer) trail should contain a test signal that has Continuity Check (CC)
activated. If CC would be inactive, such test (sublayer) trail would not transport any information under normal fault
free conditions. When a fault occurs, AIS cells are inserted. When the fault was present for a short period only (e.g.
due to a physical layer protection action), the AIS defect detector at the test (sublayer) trail endpoint will detect the
AIS defect condition for 2 to 3 seconds according the I.610 defined AIS state definition. With CC activated, the AIS
defect condition will clear on the receipt of a CC cell, i.e. within a period of 1 second after the traffic interruption was
cleared.
NE A X_AI
NE Z
X/Y
X/Y
Y Y
Working Group Test signal
X/Y
X/Y
N
Bridge
Selector
N
X_AI
X/Y
X/Y
X_AI
Y_CI P
P Y_CI X_AI
X/Y
X/Y
X_AI
X/Y
X/Y
Y Y
APS APS
Protection Group Test signal
Y Y
X_AI
X/Y
X/Y
Y Y
Working Group Test signal
X/Y
X/Y
Selector
Bridge
N
X_AI
X/Y
X/Y
X_AI
P Y_CI X_AI Y_CI P
X/Y
X/Y
X_AI
X/Y
X/Y
Y Y
APS APS
Protection Group Test signal
Figure 28 - 1+1/1:1 Group SNC/Te protection functional model using layer network trail terminations
T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 Tim e
Tc Tt
Tr
HO timer HO timer
inactive active
NR -> SD NR -> SD
NR -> SF NR -> SF HO timer
W input P input expires
SD -> SF SD -> SF
state state
SD -> NR SD -> NR
change change
SF -> NR SF -> NR
SF -> SD SF -> SD read status
of W and P
input signal
start [NR,SD,SF]
HO timer
output status
of W and P
HO timer
input signals
active
[NR,SD,SF]
Working Working
transport
transport
entity B entity B
Protection
transport
A-B entity
A C A C
B-A
Selector
Working
transport
entity B B
A-B
A C A C
B-A
D Protection D
transport
entity
Selector
In 1+1 SNC/N [and SNC/I] protection SF and SD conditions for the group are the SFG(roup) and SDG(roup)
SF and SD conditions that are the inputs for the SNC protection process. The logic that computes the SFG
and SDG conditions operates as follows:
Working SFG = (W-SF1 and not P-SF1) or (W-SF2 and not P-SF2) or ....
Protection SFG = (P-SF1 and not W-SF1) or (P-SF2 and nor W-SF2) or ....
Working SDG = (W-SD1 and not P-SD1) or (W-SD2 and not P-SD2) or ....
Protection SDG = (P-SD1 and not W-SD1) or (P-SD2 and nor W-SD2) or ....
This definition of SFG and SDG allows differentiating between a fault occurring in front of or within the
protected domain. A fault in front of the protected domain in a single signal will neither activate W-SFG
[SDG] nor P-SFG [SDG], while in both the W-bundle and the P-bundle SF-i will be activated; the terms (W-
SF-i and not P-SF-i) and (P-SF-i and not W-SF-i) will however be false.
disconnection
B
W
cable break
A E
C D
P
protection domain
errors
FIGURE A-1
A fault between NEs A and B (figure A-1) will cause W-SFG [or W-SDG] to be activated. If it is a server
signal fault, all signals within the bundle will experience a SF condition. If it is a connectivity fault, a single
signal may experience a SF condition. Both situations will cause W-SFG to be activated.
If at the same time e.g. a disconnection or cable break before NE A is present (impacting one of the signals in
the group), W-SF-i and P-SF-i will be active. When the fault in the protection domain is a server fault, W-
SFG will still be active, and P-SFG is inactive. In the other case (connectivity fault in the protection domain),
the group will be switched if the failed signals in front of and within the protection domain are different.
NOTE: The special case that all signals already failed before the protection domain result in inactive W-SFG and P-
SFG. But this special case does not corrupt the operation of the protection process; there is nothing left to protect.
The errors/faults within the protected domain that cause AIS and DEG defects will do this on all members of
the Group at the same moment (assuming it is required that all signals within the group are transported in the
same server signal). As such, the ORing of the individual SF and SD conditions can be used as trigger.
With respect to a signal loss (e.g. loss of continuity, unequipped) or a connectivity (e.g. trace identifier
mismatch) defect, this group behaviour might not be present. The signals are (in principle) individually cross
connected in each network element. As such, the ORing of the individual signals will initiate a protection
switch for the group when only one (or a subset) of the signals has a signal loss defect condition. This is the
consequence for the complexity reduction.
Figure B-1: Port Unit detailed view (left) and compressed view (right) (basic functionality only)
PU TSI PU
VC4 TU TU VC4
POH PP PP POH
AU AU
SOH SOH
PP PP
Implementation view
MS S4 S12 S4 MS
RS RS
/ S4 / S2 / S4 /
MS MS
S4 SX S3 SX S4
S4
"Functional" view
TSI
S12 VC12
S2 VC2
S3 VC3
AcSL PU PU
cPLM cLOM_W cLOM_P
cLOM S4/SX cUNEQ cAIS_W TU TU cAIS_P
cAIS cTIM cLOP_W PP PP cLOP_P
TxTI cUNEQ_W cUNEQ_P
cLOP cDEG
S4 ExTI cTIM_W TxTI_W TxTI_P cTIM_P
cRDI
AcTI cDEG_W ExTI_W ExTI_P cDEG_P
cSSF VC4 VC4
TIMdis cRDI_W AcTI_W AcTI_P cRDI_P
PMON POH POH
cSSF_W AcSL_W AcSL_P cUAV_P
S4 cPLM_W TIMdis_W W P TIMdis_P cPLM_P
W P
PMON_W RDI/REI PMON_P
cAIS_W cAIS_P cAIS_W AU X-coupling AU cAIS_P
cLOP_W MS/S4 MS/S4 cLOP_W PP PP cLOP_P
cLOP_P
SOH SOH
Figure B-3: Mapping of implementation into functional view: VC-4 SNC/I protection
TSI
S12 VC12
S2 VC2
S3 VC3
AcSL PU PU
cPLM cLOM_W cLOM_P
cLOM S4/SX cAIS_W TU TU cAIS_P
cUNEQ
cAIS TxTI cTIM cUNEQ_W cLOP_W PP PP cLOP_P cUNEQ_P
cLOP S4 ExTI cDEG cTIM_W TxTI_W TxTI_P cTIM_P
AcTI cRDI cDEG_W ExTI_W ExTI_P cDEG_P
cRDI_W AcTI_W VC4 VC4 AcTI_P cRDI_P
TIMdis cSSF
cSSF_W AcSL_W POH POH AcSL_P cSSF_P
cAIS PMON
MS/S4 cPLM_W TIMdis_W TIMdis_P cPLM_P
cLOP RDI/REI
PMON_W PMON_P
cAIS_W AU X-coupling AU cAIS_P
W MSP P cLOP_W PP PP cLOP_P
W P
MS MS
RS RS SOH SOH
VP RDI/BR X-coupling
OAM S
E
AU4 VC4 CELL L PU
SOH
PP POH DEL VP
SEL OAM
local external
AU4 VC4 CELL
SOH
VP PP POH DEL
S OAM
AU4 VC4 HDR
SOH E
PTR POH GEN
L
Figure B-5: ATM Port Unit detailed view (left) and compressed view (right) (basic functionality only)
VP VP
OAM OAM
VC4 VC4
SOH AU CELL CELL AU SOH
POH POH
Implementation view
S4 Avp Avp S4
RS RS
S4 / Avp / Avc / Avp / S4
MS MS
Avp Avc Avc Avp
Avp
"Functional" view
Figure B-6: ATM Mapping of implementation into functional view: basic operation
FABRIC
Avc ATM VC
PU PU
Avp/Avc
cLOC
cAIS cLOC_W cLOC_P
Avp cRDI cAIS_W cAIS_P
cSSF cRDI_W cRDI_P
VP VP
PMON cSSF_W cSSF_P
OAM OAM
PMON_W PMON_P
W Avp P W P
RDI/BR
cPLM_W cPLM_W CELL X-coupling CELL cAIS_P
cPLM_P
cLCD_W S4/Avp S4/Avp cLCD_W cLCD_P
cLCD_P
AcSL_W AcSL_P
AcSL_W AcSL_P
S4 S4 VC4 VC4
POH POH
Figure B-7: ATM Mapping of implementation into functional view: VP SNC protection
NOTE: figures B-6 and B-7 only represent the issue from the RDI/BR viewpoint. Those figures do not show
the segment termination or non-intrusive monitor functions that are required to control the protection switch.
A B 10 ms
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
Hold off time is
between 90 - 100 ms
load 10 decrement hold off
into hold off counter timer
timer counter expired
A B 25 ms
4 3 2 1 0
Hold off time is
between 75 - 100 ms
load 4 decrement hold off
into hold off counter timer
timer counter expired
With a 10 ms decrement period, the effect of transfer delay differences between working and protection
transport entities in 1+1 SNC/I and SNC/N protection can be compensated when a hold off time of "0" is
selected. When the hold off timer is actually used (in stead of disabled) and the counter is loaded with a value
of "2", differential delays of 10 ms can be compensated.