A contradiction exists at the very core of Marx and Engels The Communist Manifesto. On the one
hand, chapter one states that the fall of the bourgeoisie and the victory of the proletariat are equally
inevitable.1 On the other hand, the text ends with the imperative working men of all countries,
unite. Both passages are at odds with each other, as the former is an invitation to stand back and
watch social change take care of itself, while the latter is a call to arms, a command to take
immediate action; nevertheless, both positions try to achieve the same end. Is this aporia then,
In this essay, I will explore to what degree The Communist Manifesto conceives free will
as the driving force of social change. However, instead of conducting a purely rhetorical analysis,
I plan to address the issue of free will from a philosophical standpoint. This means that rather than
dissecting individual passages of the text, I intend to comment on the ideological premises it leaves
behind unsaid, but which represent its theoretical foundation. In Marxist terminology, and for the
time being, I am concerned with the base rather than the superstructure. This base, I believe, starts
Whereas classical definitions of man have traditionally presented Reason as the foremost
component of what constitutes mans humanity, Marx espouses a different perspective. His
concept of man is not static, but dynamic, and we could even argue that for him man is a historical
process.
1
Marx, Karl & Engels, Friedrich. The Communist Manifesto. London: Pluto Books, 2008. p. 51
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Let us briefly contrast the classical (here rather Kantian) and Marxist positions. If Reason
is something that we can regard as existing (and being utilised) outside of time, then it must be
able to escape material conditions; these, after all, presuppose both space and time, Kants
fundamental a-prioris. It follows that Reason is ahistorical, and, because it does not move
Marx does not deny mans reason, but he certainly does not place it at the very top of the
hierarchy in his conception of the human. This poses a problem. For Marx, history and mankind
are sometimes hard to tell apart. Reason, in all its ahistoricity therefore cannot be all that there is
to humanity, because, in Marxs thought, man himself is deeply imbedded in history. As he says
himself, The whole of what is called world history is nothing but the creation of man by human
Let us underscore two aspects of this passage. First of all, it understands human essence as
subjected to time. Man is a creation of a set of material conditions which he then will alter, and in
the future new material conditions will create new men. Secondly, eschewing Reason, this quote
introduces a fundamental concept in Marxs conception of what is human, i.e., labour, whereof
First, according to the quote above, it is both cause and effect: it creates man and it is
created by man. It is in flux, and is therefore dynamic. Secondly, because labour is the process
whereby man effects change, it also fundamentally implies agency; this, in turn, makes us consider
2
Cited by Fromm, Erich. Marx's Concept of Man. Bloomsbury Academic, 2013. p 138
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free will. Man is unique in that he can choose how to labour and to what material end; animals
labour too, but their toil is born of instinct. Only man chooses to labour through an act of will.
In short, Reason is ahistorical and static, whereas labour is historical and dynamic, as well
as dependant on free choice. By espousing a definition that focuses on the latter paradigm, Marx
considers free will as an unspoken cornerstone of humanity. Let us consider one final proposition
before moving more formally onto The Manifesto. If free will is what makes labour possible, and
labour is what makes man qua man possible, then we might conclude that free will is the driving
We arrived at this by following some of the fundamental concepts of Marxs thought in the
abstract; now we must apply them to The Communist Manifesto. In this second section, I will focus
principally on the concept of alienation, understood generally as the lack of a sense of meaning.3
Owing to the extensive use of machinery, and to the division of labour, Marx and Engels
argue, the work of the proletarians has lost all individual character [] for the workman.4 Let us
In earlier modes of production, a labourer would have had a craft, one chosen by himself
(with varying degrees of freedom). This craft would have defined that individual to the point in
which if someone worked as a cobbler, his surname was probably Schumacher. Marx believed that
the good life for the individual was one of active self-realization. [] the full and free
making public of the private, the example of the man named Schumacher is pertinent, as a private
3 Elster, Jon. An Introduction to Karl Marx. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. p. 41
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Elster p 43
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man is defined by his public role, but by a role he arrived at as a conscious act of choice. What we
must bear in mind is that, in picking a craft, even if the decision is determined by material
conditions, there is a clear object of choice, which then becomes a creator of identity. Someone
who likes shoes becomes a shoemaker; on the other hand, what is a worker of the proletariat?
Etymologically, a man whose only wealth is his offspring, i.e. future members of his same class;
his identity as a human being cannot be established from his role in society.
In the capitalist mode of production, the possibility for self-realisation is therefore replaced
by monotonous, simple tasks that make a worker in an assembly line building cars no different
than one who builds refrigerators. Identification with the fruits of ones labour is impossible
because there is nothing characteristic to that labour that differentiates it from any other. The craft
of old was subservient to man, now man is become, in Marxs words, an appendage of the
creation resembling the human form, but without will. Furthermore, if, as we discussed in the first
pages of this essay, labour cum free will, is at the heart of mans essence, the impossibility to
With this in mind, let us turn on its head the guiding question of this essay, as I propose to
answer it by addressing its opposite. If we take free will to be the driving force behind social
change, then the driving force behind social stagnancy is its suppression. A corollary is: if free will
What characterises capitalism is its resilience, its way of adapting to new material
conditions, and thereby creating a dialectical gridlock. Feudalism was not able to do this because,
unlike capitalism, I propose, it did not engage in the systematic suppression of free will. A
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homogenous workforce loses its individuality. Under exploitative systems, the proletarian only
sells his time, and not his skill, which, translated into the fruits of his labour, would have defined
him in terms of the human. Therefore, he is inhuman. Marx does not consider the corollary: if
social change can only be wrought by a human with free will, the mechanical proletariat will never
In conclusion, Marx conceives free will as the driving force of social change in that free
will finds its physical manifestation in labour. In the abstract, inevitability does not enter into the
The Communist Manifesto uses Marxs conception of man as its base; however, its rhetoric
is problematic. The inevitability I referenced in the introduction to this essay, is, I believe, a
subconscious symptom of the impossibility of overthrowing capitalism by dint of pure free will. It
rhetorical characteristic, rather than a philosophical one in the text. Furthermore, in the world at
large, capitalism lives on 134 years after Marxs death, even if his rhetoric makes the revolution
seem imminent.
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