Basic Legal Ethics

Vda Mijares vs Villaluz

FACTS:
The Complainant filed a disbarment case against the respondent on grounds of gross
immorality, misconduct and bigamy
a f t e r c o n t r a c t i n g a m a r r i a g e w i t h a n o t h e r wo m a n s e v e r a l m o n t h s a f t e r
t h e i r marriage. Respondent contends that theirs was a sham marriage in an effort to
protect the complainant from the administrative case on immorality to be charged
against her by her legal researcher and that during their marriage his marriage with his
first wife was subsisting since the declaration of its annulment was not yet
final and executory pending publication of the decision.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Juctice Onofre Villaluz is subject to disbarment or be suspend from his
practice of law.

RULING:

Yes. The respondent is undeniably guilty of deceit and grossly immoral conduct. He has
made a mockery of marriage which is a sacred institution demanding respect and
dignity. It has been proved that the respondent dismally fails to meet the standard of
moral fitness for continued membership in the legal profession. The nature of the office
of an attorney at law requires that he shall be a person of good moral character. This
qualification is not only a condition precedent for admission to the practice of law; its
continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law. Under Rule
1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. The commission of grossly immoral conduct
and deceit are grounds for suspension or disbarment of lawyers.
However, considering that respondent is in the declining years of his life; that his
impulsive conduct during some episodes of the investigation reveal a degree of aberrant
reactive behavior probably ascribable to advanced age; and the undeniable fact that he
has rendered some years of commendable service in the judiciary, the Court feels that
disbarment would be too harsh a penalty in this peculiar case. Hence, a suspension of
two years, as recommended, would suffice as a punitive but compassionate disciplinary
measure with the specific warning that a more severe penalty shall be imposed if he
commits the same or a similar offense again.
Engineer Edgardo C. Garcia v. Judge Meljohn de la Pea, February 9, 1994
Facts:
A criminal case for grave oral defamation was filed by Dr. Melencio de la Pea against Ignacia
G. Garcia, petitioners wife, docketed as Criminal Case No. 2577. Judge Meljohn de la Pea in
his capacity as acting judge of Municipal Trial Court of Naval, Leyte took cognizance of the
criminal case. He issued a warrant of arrest to petitioners wife and June 8, 1992 and was
detained for twenty hours since they cannot process the posting of bail due to respondent judges
absence as well as of the Release Order which was unknowingly left with his wife. On June 15,
1992, they received a copy of the criminal complaint, affidavit of the witnesses and respondent
judge's inhibition order dated June 15, 1992. Outraged, petitioner filed an administrative case
against Judge de la Pea for partiality, abuse of authority and grave abuse of discretion in
connection with Criminal Case No. 2577 which was filed by the Judges brother against his wife.

Issue:
Whether or not Judge de la Pea committed grave abuse of authority.
Ruling:
Yes, Judge de la Pea committed grave abuse of authority. Rule 137, Section 1 of the Rules of
Court provides in part that no judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his
wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is
related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within
the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been
executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior
court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all
parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record. In this case, respondent judge
took cognizance of the criminal case, notwithstanding the fact that he is related within the second
degree of consanguinity to private complainant. With such situation, it is compulsory that the
respondent judge should have inhibited from sitting in the case. Hence, Judge de la Pea, in
committing grave abuse of authority, was hereby dismissed from the service with forfeiture of all
benefits and with prejudice to reinstatement or reappointment to any public office, including
government-owned or controlled corporations.
Parayno vs Meneses

FACTS:

Petitioner Rodolfo Parayno is the incumbent municipal mayor of Urdaneta, Pangasinan who has
pending election protests and now petitioning for certiorari seeking to set aside the orders, dated
22 October 1993 and 16 November 1993, of respondent Judge Iluminado Meneses of Branch
49, Regional Trial Court, of Urdaneta, Pangasinan, voluntarily inhibiting himself from hearing
the election cases and denying petitioners' motion for the reconsideration thereof.

ISSUE:

Whether or not this petition for certiorari is meritorious

HELD:

Yes, the court finds and ruled that this petition is meritorious citing Section 1, Rule 137, of the
Rules of Court which reads:

Sec. 1. Disqualification of Judges. No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case
in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, or
creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth
degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree,
computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been
executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided
in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without
the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the
record.

A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from
sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above.

Further, a Judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, inhibit himself voluntarily from
sitting in a case, but it should be based on good, sound or ethical grounds, or for just and valid
reasons. It is not enough that a party throws some tenuous allegations of partiality at the judge.
No less than imperative is that it is the judge's sacred duty to administer justice without fear or
favor.

Wherefore, this petition is GRANTED and the assailed Orders of the respondent Judge are SET
ASIDE and he is directed to proceed with dispatch in resolving the election protests at bar.