Litam vs Espiritu

Facts
On May 21, 1952, Gregorio Dy Tam instituted Special Proceeding No. 1537 of said court, entitled In the matter
of the Intestate Estate of the Deceased Rafael Litam. The petition therein filed, dated April 24, 1952, states that
Petitioner is the son of Rafael Litam, who died in Manila on January 10, 1951; that the deceased was survived by:

Li Hong Hap 40 years

Li Ho 37 years
Gregorio Dy Tam 33 years
Henry Litam alias Dy Bun Pho 29 years
Beatriz Lee Tam alias Lee Giak Ian 27 years
Elisa Lee Tam alias Lee Giok Bee 25 years
William Litam alias Li Bun Hua 23 years
Luis Litam alias Li Bun Lin 22 years

that the foregoing children of the decedent by a marriage celebrated in China in 1911 with Sia Khin, now
deceased; that after the death of Rafael Litam, Petitioner and his co-heirs came to know that the decedent had,
during the subsistence of said marriage with Sia Khin, contracted in 1922 in the Philippines another marriage
with Marcosa Rivera, Filipino citizen; that the decedent left as his property among others, his one-half (1/2) share
valued at P65,000 in the purported conjugal properties between him and Marcosa Rivera, which partnership consisted
of the following real property acquired during the marriage between him and Marcosa Rivera, to wit:

(1) Three (3) parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1228 of the Registry of Deeds of the
province of Pampanga:
(2) One (1) parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 26011 of the Registry of Deeds of the province
of Bulacan.

and that the decedent had left neither a will nor debt. Petitioner prayed, therefore, that, after appropriate proceedings,
letters of administration be issued to Marcosa Rivera, the surviving spouse of the decedent.
Soon thereafter, Marcosa Rivera filed a counter- petition: (1) substantially denying the alleged marriage of the
decedent to Sia Khin, as well as the alleged filiation of the persons named in the petition; (2) asserting that the
properties described herein are her paraphernal properties, and that the decedent had left unpaid debts, and
certain properties in Bulan and Casiguran, Sorsogon, and in Virac, Catanduanes, apart from shares of stock in a
private corporation known by the name of Litam Co., Inc.; and (3) praying that her nephew, Arminio Rivera, be
appointed administrator of the intestate estate of the deceased.
In due course, the court granted this petition and letters of administration were issued to Arminio Rivera,
who assumed his duties as such, and, later, submitted an inventory of the alleged estate of Rafael Litam. Inasmuch as
said inventory did not include the properties mentioned in the petition, dated April 24, 1952, of Gregorio Dy Tam, the
latter filed, on November 29, 1952, a motion for the removal of Rivera as administrator of the aforementioned
estate. This led to a number of incidents hinging on the question whether said properties belong in common to the
decedent and Marcosa Rivera or to the latter exclusively.
Meanwhile, Remedios R. Espiritu was appointed, in Special Proceeding No. 1709 of the Court of First Instance
of Rizal, guardian of Marcosa Rivera, who had been declared incompetent. Thereafter, or on April 20, 1953,
Gregorio Dy Tam and his alleged brothers and sisters aforementioned, filed the complaint in Civil Case No. 2071 of
the same court, against Remedios R. Espiritu, as guardian of Marcosa Rivera, and Arminio Rivera. In said
complaint, Plaintiffs therein reproduced substantially the allegations made in the aforementioned petition of Gregorio
Dy Tam dated April 24. 1952, except that the properties acquired during the existence of marriage between Rafael
Litam and Marcosa Rivera and/or with their joint efforts during the time that they lived as husband and wife were
said to be more than those specified in said petition, namely:

(1) 3 parcels of land situated in the Municipality of Macabebe, Province of Pampanga, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 1228 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Pampanga, issued on July 29, 1947;
(2) 2 Parcels of land, together with all buildings and improvements thereon except those expressly noted in the title
as belonging to other persons, situated in the Municipality of Navotas, Province of Rizal, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 35836 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Rizal, issued on October 4, 1938;
(3) 1 parcel of land situated in the Municipality of Malabon, Province of Rizal, covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 23248 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Rizal, issued on June 12, 1933;
(4) 1 parcel of land situated in Barrio of Kay-Badia, Municipality of Obando, Province of Bulacan, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 21809 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Bulacan, issued on May 25, 1939;
(5) 1 parcel of land (plan psu-93067, swo-16049) situated in Barrio of Quibadia, Municipality of Obando, Province
of Bulacan, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 26011 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Bulacan,
issued on April 9, 1943;
Other properties are located in Bataan province.
All properties total an assessed value of approximately P150,000.00.

In said complaint, Plaintiffs prayed that the judgment be rendered:

(1) declaring the aforesaid properties as belonging to the conjugal partnership or tenancy in common which existed
between the deceased Rafael Litam and the incompetent Marcosa Rivera;
(2) ordering the Defendants to deliver the aforesaid properties to the administration of the estate of the
deceased Rafael Litam (Rule 75, section 2, Rules of Court);
(3) ordering the said Defendants further to render an accounting of the fruits they collected from the aforesaid
properties and to deliver the same to the administration of the estate of the deceased Rafael Litam;
(4) ordering the said Defendants to pay the administration of the estate of the deceased Rafael Litam damages in
double the value of the fruits mentioned in the preceding paragraph which they embezzled;
(5) ordering the Defendants to pay the costs. The Plaintiffs further pray for such other remedy as the Court may
deem just and equitable in the premises.

In her answer to the complaint, Marcosa Rivera reiterated, in effect, the allegations in her counter-petition, dated
July 12, 1952, in Special Proceeding No. 1537, and set up some affirmative and special defenses, as well as a counter-
claim for attorneys fees and damages in the aggregate sum of P110,000.00.
Owning to the identity of the issue raised in said Civil Case No. 2071 and in the aforementioned incidents in
Special Proceeding No. 1537, both were jointly heard. Later on, the court rendered a decision.

(1) Dismissing Civil Case No. 2071, with costs against the Plaintiffs;
(2) Sentencing the Plaintiff in Civil Case No. 2071, under the Defendants counterclaim, to pay jointly and severally
each of the Defendants the sum of P5,000.00 as actual damages and P25,000.00 as moral damages;
(3) Declaring that the properties in question, namely: the fishponds, consisting of three parcels, situated in
Macabebe, Pampanga, with Transfer certificate of Title No. 1228 of the land records of Pampanga, one-half undivided
portion of the fishponds, consisting of two parcels, situated in Navotas, Rizal, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 35836, the parcel of land with the improvements thereon situated in Malabon, Rizal, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 23248, both of the land records of Rizal, and the fishponds, consisting of two parcels, situated in
Obando, Bulacan, covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 21809 and 26011, both of the land records of Bulacan,
are the exclusive, separate and paraphernal properties of Marcosa Rivera;
(4) Declaring that the Plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 2071 (who are the same persons alleged to be children of Rafael
Litam in the petition, dated April 24, 1952, filed by the Petitioner in Sp. Proc. No. 1537) are not the children of the
deceased Rafael Litam, and that his only heir is his surviving wife, Marcosa Rivera.

Issues
The two (2) Cases are now before us on appeal taken by the Petitioner in Special Proceeding No. 1537 and the
Plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 2071. The issues for determination are: (1) Are Appellants the legitimate children of Rafael
Litam? (2) Is Marcosa Rivera the exclusive owner of the properties in question, or do the same constitute a common
property of her and the decedent?
(RSPol Note: SP 1537 was the case filed by petitioners to liquidate the properties of their father Rafael Litam,
while CC 2071 was the case filed against Marcosa Rivera, the second wife of Rafael Litam, to deliver the properties to
the estate of Rafael Litam.)

SC Ruling
On the Issue of Marriage between Rafael Litam and Marcosa Rivera
The first issue hinges on whether Rafael Litam and Sia Khin were married in 1911, and whether Rafael Litam is
the father of Appellants herein.
Appellants evidence on this point consists of the testimony of Appellant Li Bun Lin, who said that he is, also
known as Luis Litam; that his co-Appellants are his brothers and sisters; that their parents are the decedent and Sia
Khin, who were married in China in 1911; and that Sia Khin died in Manila during the Japanese occupation. He
likewise, identified several pictures, marked Exhibits I to S, which were claimed to be family portraits, but the lower
court rejected their admission in evidence. Although we agree with herein Appellants that this was an error, it is clear to
us that said pictures and the testimony of Luis Litam, as well as the other evidence adverted to in the above-quoted
portion of the decision appealed from, are far from sufficient to outweigh, or even offset, the evidence in favor of the
Appellees.
It should be noted that the decedent had admittedly married Marcosa Rivera in 1922. In the very petition of
Appellant Gregorio Dy Tam, in Special Proceeding No. 1537, dated April 24, 1952, he alleged that Marcosa Rivera
is the surviving spouse of the decedent. In their complaint in Civil Case No. 2071, Appellants specifically
admitted and averred the existence of the marriage between said Rafael Litam and Marcosa Rivera which
would have been void ab initio, and, hence, inexistent legally, if Appellants pretense were true or they believed it to be
so and that they had lived as husband and wife. Again, although Gregorio Dy Tam, asserted, in his aforementioned
petition, that he and his co-heirs came to know about the marriage of the decedent and Marcosa Rivera after the
death of Rafael Litam, the very testimony of Li Bun Lin, as witness for the Appellants, show, beyond doubt, that
said Appellants knew, during the lifetime of Rafael Litam that he and Marcosa Rivera were living in Malabon,
Rizal, openly and publicly, as husband and wife, and regarded her as his lawful wife . Indeed, in the course of his
testimony, said Li Bun Lin alluded to her as his mother. In other words, aside from the circumstance that the
wedding and marital life of Marcosa Rivera and Rafael Litam is undisputed, it is, also, an established fact that
they had the general reputation of being legally married and were so regarded by the community and by
Appellants herein, during the lifetime of Rafael Litam.
Upon the other hand, Appellants maintain, in effect, that Rafael Litam was guilty of the crime of bigamy; that
he had, likewise, willfully and maliciously falsified public and official documents; and that, although Appellants and
Sia Khin were living in Manila and Marcosa Rivera whom Appellants knew resided only a few kilometers away,
in Malabon, Rizal where Rafael Litam returned daily, after attending to his business in Manila, the decedent had
succeeded, for about thirty (30) years, in keeping each party in complete ignorance of the nature of his alleged relations
with the other. Apart from the highly improbable nature of the last part of Appellants pretense, it is obvious that the
same cannot be sustained unless the evidence in support thereof is of the strongest possible kind, not only because it
entails the commission by Rafael Litam of grave criminal offenses which are derogatory to his honor, but, also, because
death has sealed his lips, thus depriving him of the most effective means of defense. The proof for Appellants
herein does not satisfy such requirement.

On the Issue of Title to the Properties

As regards the title to the properties in dispute, the evidence thereon was analyzed by the lower court in the
following language:

The fishponds situated in Obando, Bulacan, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 21809 and
26011, the one-half (1/2) undivided portion of the fishponds situated in Navotas, Rizal with Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 35836, and the property situated in Hulong-Duhat, Malabon, Rizal, with Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 23248 were all purchased by Marcosa Rivera with the money she earned and
accumulated while she was still single; ywhile the fishponds situated in Macabebe, Pampanga with
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1228 were purchased by her with the money she inherited from her
late sister, Rafaela Rivera and with the money she received from the proceeds of the sale of the pieces
of jewelry she inherited from her father Eduardo Rivera and her sister Rafaela Rivera. The properties
in question, having been bought by Marcosa Rivera, although during her marriage with Rafael Litam, with
her exclusive and separate money, said properties are undeniably her paraphernal properties.
In Exhibit 21, Rafael Litam unequivocably declared under his oath that the money paid by
Marcosa Rivera for the fishponds in Obando, Bulacan was her exclusive and separate money which
was earned by her while she was still single. In Exhibits 22 and 23, both dated June 16, 1947, same Rafael
Litam, also under oath, acknowledge the fact that the sums of P13,000.00 and P10,000.00 loaned by
Marcosa Rivera to the spouses Catalino Pascual and Juliana Pascual, and to Juliana Pascual, respectively,
are the separate and exclusive money of Marcosa Rivera, in which money Rafael Litam had no interest
whatsoever.
The finding of this Court that the properties in question are paraphernal properties of Marcosa Rivera,
having been bought by her with her separate and exclusive money, is further strengthened by the fact that,
as it is clearly disclosed by the evidence when Marcosa Rivera married Rafael Litam in 1922, she was
already rich, she having already earned and saved money as consignataria while she was still single.
On the other hand, it appears from the evidence that when Rafael Litam was on June 10, 1922,
married to Marcosa Rivera, he was poor. He had to borrow from Marcosa Rivera, the sum of
P135,000.00 belonging exclusively to her before the outbreak of the war, and to steal from her further sum
of P62,000.00 after the liberation (Exhibit 10). The said amounts totalling P197,000.00.
 Another circumstance which clearly proves that the properties in question belong exclusively to
Marcosa Rivera is the established fact that before she became incompetent sometime in the early part of the
year, 1953, she had been administering said properties, to the exclusion of Rafael Litam.
Further strong proofs that the properties in question are the paraphernal properties of Marcosa Rivera,
are the very Torrens Titles covering said properties. All the said properties are registered in the name
of Marcosa Rivera, married to Rafael Litam. This circumstance indicates that the properties in
question belong to the registered owner, Marcosa Rivera, as her paraphernal properties, for if they were
conjugal, the titles covering the same should have been issued in the names of Rafael Litam and Marcosa
Rivera. The words married to Rafael Litam written after the name of Marcosa Rivera, in each of
the above mentioned titles are merely descriptive of the civil status of Marcosa Rivera, the registered
owner of the properties covered by said titles.

As above pointed out, His Honor the trial Judge could have been, and should have been, more liberal in the
reception of evidence. Appellants witnesses (Li Bun Lin, Dominador Gadi, Benigno Musni and Rafael B. Suarez)
should have been allowed to testify on the alleged title of Rafael Litam to certain properties and on his alleged reasons
for the language used in the public and official documents relied upon by the Appellees. However, it is apparent to us
that said evidence cannot affect the decision in these cases.
The evidenciary value of the testimony of said witnesses would have depended mainly upon their individual
appraisal of certain facts, upon their respective inferences therefrom and their biases or view points, and upon a
number of other factors affecting their credibility. At best, said testimony could not possibly prevail over the
repeated admissions made by the decedent against his own interest in Exhibits 19, 21, 22, 23, 46 and 46-A (adverted
to in the abovequoted portion of the decision appealed from), which admissions are corroborated by the fact that
the deceased father of Marcosa Rivera was well to do; that aside from her share in his estate, she had, likewise,
inherited from a sister who died single and without issue; that the lands in dispute were registered, and some
were, also, leased, in her name, instead of hers and that of the decedent; and that the latter lived in her house in
Malabon, Rizal.

Parulan vs Garcia
Facts
In a Complaint for Annulment of Sale and Reconveyance of Property filed with the RTC of Malolos,
Bulacan on June 10, 1991, the respondents Rosario Calalang-Garcia, Leonora Calalang-Sabile, and Carlito S.
Calalang asserted their ownership over a certain parcel of land against the petitioners Nora B. Calalang-Parulan
and Elvira B. Calalang. The said lot with an area of 1,266 square meters and specifically identified as Lot 1132, Cad.
333, Bigaa Cadastre situated in Brgy. Burol 2nd, Municipality of Balagtas, Province of Bulacan, was allegedly
acquired by the respondents from their mother Encarnacion Silverio, through succession as the latters compulsory
heirs.

According to the respondents, their father, Pedro Calalang contracted two marriages during his lifetime. The
first marriage was with their mother Encarnacion Silverio. During the subsistence of this marriage, their parents
acquired the above-mentioned parcel of land from their maternal grandmother Francisca Silverio. Despite
enjoying continuous possession of the land, however, their parents failed to register the same. On June 7, 1942, the
first marriage was dissolved with the death of Encarnacion Silverio.

On November 6, 1967, Pedro Calalang entered into a second marriage with Elvira B. Calalang who then gave
birth to Nora B. Calalang-Parulan and Rolando Calalang, the petitioners. According to the respondents, it was
only during this time that Pedro Calalang filed an application for free patent over the parcel of land with the Bureau of
Lands. Pedro Calalang committed fraud in such application by claiming sole and exclusive ownership over the
land since 1935 and concealing the fact that he had three children with his first spouse . As a result, on September
22, 1974, the Register of Deeds of Bulacan issued Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-28715 in favor of
Pedro Calalang only.

On February 17, 1984, Pedro Calalang sold the said parcel of land to Nora B. Calalang-Parulan as evidenced
by a Deed of Sale executed by both Pedro Calalang and Elvira B. Calalang. Accordingly, the Register of Deeds of
Bulacan cancelled OCT No. P-2871 and issued Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 283321 in the name of Nora B.
Calalang-Parulan. On December 27, 1989,7 Pedro Calalang died.

The respondents assailed the validity of TCT No. 283321 on two grounds. First, the respondents argued that the
sale of the land was void because Pedro Calalang failed to obtain the consent of the respondents who were co-
owners of the same. As compulsory heirs upon the death of Encarnacion Silverio, the respondents claimed that they
acquired successional rights over the land. Thus, in alienating the land without their consent, Pedro Calalang allegedly
deprived them of their pro indiviso share in the property. Second, the respondents claimed that the sale was absolutely
simulated as Nora B. Calalang-Parulan did not have the capacity to pay for the consideration stated in the Deed of
Sale.

In their Answer, the petitioners argued that the parcel of land was acquired during the second marriage of Pedro
Calalang with Elvira B. Calalang. They stressed that OCT No. P-2871 itself stated that it was issued in the name of
"Pedro Calalang, married to Elvira Berba [Calalang]." Thus, the property belonged to the conjugal partnership of
the spouses Pedro Calalang and Elvira B. Calalang. The petitioners likewise denied the allegation that the sale of the
land was absolutely simulated as Nora B. Calalang-Parulan was gainfully employed in Spain at the time of the
sale. Moreover, they alleged that the respondents did not have a valid cause of action against them and that their cause
of action, if any, was already barred by laches, estoppel and prescription. By way of counterclaim, the petitioners also
sought the payment to them of moral and exemplary damages plus costs of suit for the filing of the clearly unfounded
suit.

RTC Ruling
The trial court rendered decision in favor of the respondents. The trial court declared that the parcel of land was
jointly acquired by the spouses Pedro Calalang and Encarnacion Silverio from the parents of the latter. Thus, it was
part of the conjugal property of the first marriage of Pedro Calalang. When this marriage was dissolved upon the
death of Encarnacion Silverio on June 7, 1942, the corresponding shares to the disputed property were acquired by
the heirs of the decedent according to the laws of succession. In particular, the trial court allocated half of the
disputed property to Pedro Calalang as his share in the conjugal partnership and allocated the other half to the three
respondents and Pedro Calalang to be divided equally among them.

CA Ruling
The CA modified the ruling of the RTC and ordered the defendants (now petitioners) to reconvey in favor of the
plaintiffs, their rightful share to the property owned by their common father Pedro Calalang, equivalent to one
half(1/2) portion of the whole area or 633 square meters to be divided equally by the three plaintiffs (now
respondents).
The CA reversed the factual findings of the trial court and held that Pedro Calalang was the sole and exclusive
owner of the subject parcel of land. Firstly, it held that there was insufficient evidence to prove that the disputed
property was indeed jointly acquired from the parents of Encarnacion Silverio during the first marriage. Secondly,
the CA upheld the indefeasibility of OCT No. P-2871. It held that although the free patent was issued in the name of
"Pedro Calalang, married to Elvira Berba [Calalang]" this phrase was merely descriptive of the civil status of Pedro
Calalang at the time of the registration of the disputed property. Thus, contrary to the ruling of the trial court, upon the
death of Encarnacion Silverio on June 7, 1942, the respondents did not acquire any successional rights to the
parcel of land which was exclusively owned by Pedro Calalang. However, applying the rules of succession, Pedros
heirs namely, Rosario Calalang-Garcia, Leonora Calalang-Sabile, Carlito Calalang, Nora B. Calalang-Parulan, Elvira
B. Calalang, and Rolando Calalang, succeeded Pedro to the land in equal shares upon his death. Thus, the CA ordered
the petitioners to reconvey in favor of the respondents their rightful shares to the land. The CA ruled that the sale by
Pedro Calalang to Nora B. Calalang-Parulan was fraudulent and fictitious as the vendee was in bad faith and
the respondents were unlawfully deprived of their pro indiviso shares over the disputed property . As regards the
issue of prescription, the CA ruled that the prescriptive period for reconveyance of fraudulently registered real property
is ten years. Since the property was registered in the name of Nora in1984 and the action for reconveyance was filed in
1991, the action has not yet prescribed.

Issue
Whether Pedro Calalang was the exclusive owner of the disputed property prior to its transfer to his daughter
Nora B. Calalang-Parulan.

SC Ruling
On the Ownership of the Subject Land
A close perusal of the records of this case would show that the records are bereft of any concrete proof to
show that the subject property indeed belonged to respondents maternal grandparents. The evidence respondents
adduced merely consisted of testimonial evidence such as the declaration of Rosario Calalang-Garcia that they
have been staying on the property as far as she can remember and that the property was acquired by her
parents through purchase from her maternal grandparents. However, she was unable to produce any document
to evidence the said sale, nor was she able to present any documentary evidence such as the tax declaration issued
in the name of either of her parents. Moreover, we note that the free patent was issued solely in the name of Pedro
Calalang and that it was issued more than 30 years after the death of Encarnacion and the dissolution of the
conjugal partnership of gains of the first marriage. Thus, we cannot subscribe to respondents submission that the
subject property originally belonged to the parents of Encarnacion and was acquired by Pedro Calalang and
Encarnacion.

On the Conjugal Property of the Second Marriage in the Title

We likewise cannot sustain the argument of the petitioners that the disputed property belongs to the conjugal
partnership of the second marriage of Pedro Calalang with Elvira B. Calalang on the ground that the title was issued
in the name of "Pedro Calalang, married to Elvira Berba [Calalang]."

The contents of a certificate of title are enumerated by Section 45 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise
known as the Property Registration Decree:

SEC. 45. Statement of personal circumstances in the certificate. Every certificate of title shall set forth
the full names of all persons whose interests make up the full ownership in the whole land, including their
civil status, and the names of their respective spouses, if married, as well as their citizenship, residence
and postal address. If the property covered belongs to the conjugal partnership, it shall be issued in the
names of both spouses.

A plain reading of the above provision would clearly reveal that the phrase "Pedro Calalang, married to Elvira
Berba [Calalang]" merely describes the civil status and identifies the spouse of the registered owner Pedro
Calalang. Evidently, this does not mean that the property is conjugal. In Litam v. Rivera, we declared:

Further strong proofs that the properties in question are the paraphernal properties of Marcosa Rivera, are
the very Torrens Titles covering said properties. All the said properties are registered in the name of "Marcosa
Rivera, married to Rafael Litam." This circumstance indicates that the properties in question belong to the
registered owner, Marcosa Rivera, as her paraphernal properties, for if they were conjugal, the titles covering
the same should have been issued in the names of Rafael Litam and Marcosa Rivera. The words "married
to Rafael Litam" written after the name of Marcosa Rivera, in each of the above mentioned titles are
merely descriptive of the civil status of Marcosa Rivera, the registered owner of the properties covered
by said titles.

It must likewise be noted that in his application for free patent, applicant Pedro Calalang averred that the land
was first occupied and cultivated by him since 1935 and that he had planted mango trees, coconut plants, caimito
trees, banana plants and seasonal crops and built his house on the subject lot. But he applied for free patent only in
1974 and was issued a free patent while already married to Elvira B. Calalang. Thus, having possessed the subject land
in the manner and for the period required by law after the dissolution of the first marriage and before the second
marriage, the subject property ipso jure became private property and formed part of Pedro Calalangs exclusive
property. It was therefore excluded from the conjugal partnership of gains of the second marriage.

As the sole and exclusive owner, Pedro Calalang had the right to convey his property in favor of Nora B.
Calalang-Parulan by executing a Deed of Sale on February 17, 1984. The CA therefore erred in ruling that Pedro
Calalang deprived his heirs of their respective shares over the disputed property when he alienated the same.

It is hornbook doctrine that successional rights are vested only at the time of death. Article 777 of the New Civil
Code provides that "[t]he rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent." In
Butte v. Manuel Uy and Sons, Inc., we proclaimed the fundamental tenets of succession:

The principle of transmission as of the time of the predecessor's death is basic in our Civil Code, and
is supported by other related articles. Thus, the capacity of the heir is determined as of the time the
decedent died (Art. 1034); the legitime is to be computed as of the same moment (Art. 908), and so is the in
officiousness of the donation inter vivas (Art. 771). Similarly, the legacies of credit and remission are valid
only in the amount due and outstanding at the death of the testator (Art. 935), and the fruits accruing after that
instant are deemed to pertain to the legatee (Art. 948).
 Thus, it is only upon the death of Pedro Calalang on December 27, 1989 that his heirs acquired their
respective inheritances, entitling them to their pro indiviso shares to his whole estate. At the time of the sale of the
disputed property, the rights to the succession were not yet bestowed upon the heirs of Pedro Calalang. And absent
clear and convincing evidence that the sale was fraudulent or not duly supported by valuable consideration (in
effect an in officious donation inter vivas), the respondents have no right to question the sale of the disputed
property on the ground that their father deprived them of their respective shares . Well to remember, fraud must
be established by clear and convincing evidence. Mere preponderance of evidence is not even adequate to prove fraud.

The Complaint for Annulment of Sale and Reconveyance of Property must therefore be dismissed.

Borromeo vs Descallar

Facts
Wilhelm Jambrich, an Austrian, arrived in the Philippines in 1983 after he was assigned by his employer,
Simmering-Graz Panker A.G., an Austrian company, to work at a project in Mindoro. In 1984, he transferred to Cebu
and worked at the Naga II Project of the National Power Corporation. There, he met respondent Antonietta Opalla-
Descallar, a separated mother of two boys who was working as a waitress at St. Moritz Hotel. Jambrich befriended
respondent and asked her to tutor him in English. In dire need of additional income to support her children,
respondent agreed. The tutorials were held in Antoniettas residence at a squatters area in Gorordo Avenue.

Jambrich and respondent fell in love and decided to live together in a rented house in Hernan Cortes,
Mandaue City. Later, they transferred to their own house and lots at Agro-Macro Subdivision, Cabancalan, Mandaue
City. In the Contracts to Sell dated November 18, 19851 and March 10, 19862 covering the properties, Jambrich and
respondent were referred to as the buyers. A Deed of Absolute Sale dated November 16, 19873 was likewise issued in
their favor. However, when the Deed of Absolute Sale was presented for registration before the Register of Deeds,
registration was refused on the ground that Jambrich was an alien and could not acquire alienable lands of the
public domain. Consequently, Jambrichs name was erased from the document. But it could be noted that his signature
remained on the left hand margin of page 1, beside respondents signature as buyer on page 3, and at the bottom of
page 4 which is the last page. Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 24790, 24791 and 24792 over the properties
were issued in respondents name alone.

Jambrich also formally adopted respondents two sons in Sp. Proc. No. 39-MAN, and per Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City dated May 5, 1988.

However, the idyll lasted only until April 1991. By then, respondent found a new boyfriend while Jambrich
began to live with another woman in Danao City. Jambrich supported respondents sons for only two months after
the break up.

Jambrich met petitioner Camilo F. Borromeo sometime in 1986. Petitioner was engaged in the real estate
business. He also built and repaired speedboats as a hobby. In 1989, Jambrich purchased an engine and some
accessories for his boat from petitioner, for which he became indebted to the latter for about 150,000.00. To pay for
his debt, he sold his rights and interests in the Agro-Macro properties to petitioner for 250,000, as evidenced by
a "Deed of Absolute Sale/Assignment." On July 26, 1991, when petitioner sought to register the deed of assignment, he
discovered that titles to the three lots have been transferred in the name of respondent, and that the subject
property has already been mortgaged.

On August 2, 1991, petitioner filed a complaint against respondent for recovery of real property before the
Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City.

Petitioner alleged that the Contracts to Sell dated November 18, 1985 and March 10, 1986 and the Deed of
Absolute Sale dated November 16, 1987 over the properties which identified both Jambrich and respondent as
buyers do not reflect the true agreement of the parties since respondent did not pay a single centavo of the
purchase price and was not in fact a buyer; that it was Jambrich alone who paid for the properties using his
exclusive funds; that Jambrich was the real and absolute owner of the properties; and, that petitioner acquired
absolute ownership by virtue of the Deed of Absolute Sale/Assignment dated July 11, 1991 which Jambrich executed
in his favor.
 In her Answer, respondent belied the allegation that she did not pay a single centavo of the purchase price. On the
contrary, she claimed that she "solely and exclusively used her own personal funds to defray and pay for the
purchase price of the subject lots in question," and that Jambrich, being an alien, was prohibited to acquire or
own real property in the Philippines.

RTC Ruling
At the trial, respondent presented evidence showing her alleged financial capacity to buy the disputed property
with money from a supposed copra business. Petitioner, in turn, presented Jambrich as his witness and documentary
evidence showing the substantial salaries which Jambrich received while still employed by the Austrian company,
Simmering-Graz Panker A.G.

Evidence on hand clearly show that at the time of the purchase and acquisition of [the] properties under litigation
that Wilhelm Jambrich was still working and earning much. This fact of Jambrich earning much is not only
supported by documentary evidence but also by the admission made by the defendant Antoniet[t]a Opalla. So
that, Jambrichs financial capacity to acquire and purchase the properties . . . is not disputed.

On the other hand, evidence . . . clearly show that before defendant met Jambrich sometime in the latter part
of 1984, she was only working as a waitress at the St. Moritz Hotel with an income of 1,000.00 a month and was .
. . renting and living only in . . . [a] room at . . . [a] squatter area at Gorordo Ave., Cebu City; that Jambrich took pity of
her and the situation of her children that he offered her a better life which she readily accepted. In fact, this miserable
financial situation of hers and her two children . . . are all stated and reflected in the Child Study Report dated April 20,
1983 (Exhs. "G" and "G-1") which facts she supplied to the Social Worker who prepared the same when she was
personally interviewed by her in connection with the adoption of her two children by Wilhelm Jambrich. So that, if
such facts were not true because these are now denied by her . . . and if it was also true that during this time she was
already earning as much as 8,000.00 to 9,000.00 as profit per month from her copra business, it would be
highly unbelievable and impossible for her to be living only in such a miserable condition since it is the
observation of this Court that she is not only an extravagant but also an expensive person and not thrifty as she
wanted to impress this Court in order to have a big saving as clearly shown by her actuation when she was already
cohabiting and living with Jambrich that according to her . . . the allowance given . . . by him in the amount of $500.00
a month is not enough to maintain the education and maintenance of her children.8

This being the case, it is highly improbable and impossible that she could acquire the properties under
litigation or could contribute any amount for their acquisition which according to her is worth more than
700,000.00 when while she was working as [a] waitress at St. Moritz Hotel earning 1,000.00 a month as salary
and tips of more or less 2,000.00 she could not even provide [for] the daily needs of her family so much so that it is
safe to conclude that she was really in financial distress when she met and accepted the offer of Jambrich to come and
live with him because that was a big financial opportunity for her and her children who were already abandoned by her
husband.

The only probable and possible reason why her name appeared and was included in [the contracts to sell dated
November 18, 1985 and March 10, 1986 and finally, the deed of absolute sale dated November 16, 1987] as buyer is
because as observed by the Court, she being a scheming and exploitive woman, she has taken advantage of the
goodness of Jambrich who at that time was still bewitched by her beauty, sweetness, and good attitude shown by
her to him since he could still very well provide for everything she needs, he being earning (sic) much yet at that
time. In fact, as observed by this Court, the acquisition of these properties under litigation was at the time when their
relationship was still going smoothly and harmoniously.

The RTC ruled in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant Antoniet[t]a Opalla.

CA Ruling
The appellate court reversed the decision of the trial court. In ruling for the respondent, the Court of Appeals
held:

We disagree with the lower courts conclusion. The circumstances involved in the case cited by the
lower court and similar cases decided on by the Supreme Court which upheld the validity of the title of the
subsequent Filipino purchasers are absent in the case at bar. It should be noted that in said cases, the title
to the subject property has been issued in the name of the alien transferee (Godinez et al., vs. Fong
Pak Luen et al., 120 SCRA 223 citing Krivenko vs. Register of Deeds of Manila, 79 Phils. 461; United
 Church Board for World Ministries vs. Sebastian, 159 SCRA 446, citing the case of Sarsosa Vda. De
Barsobia vs. Cuenco, 113 SCRA 547; Tejido vs. Zamacoma, 138 SCRA 78). In the case at bar, the title of
the subject property is not in the name of Jambrich but in the name of defendant-appellant . Thus,
Jambrich could not have transferred a property he has no title thereto.

SC Ruling
On Who Purchased the Property
The evidence clearly shows, as pointed out by the trial court, who between respondent and Jambrich possesses the
financial capacity to acquire the properties in dispute. At the time of the acquisition of the properties in 1985 to
1986, Jambrich was gainfully employed at Simmering-Graz Panker A.G., an Austrian company. He was earning
an estimated monthly salary of 50,000.00. Then, Jambrich was assigned to Syria for almost one year where his
monthly salary was approximately 90,000.00.

On the other hand, respondent was employed as a waitress from 1984 to 1985 with a monthly salary of not
more than 1,000.00. In 1986, when the parcels of land were acquired, she was unemployed, as admitted by her
during the pre-trial conference. Her allegations of income from a copra business were unsubstantiated. The
supposed copra business was actually the business of her mother and their family, with ten siblings. She has no license
to sell copra, and had not filed any income tax return. All the motorized bancas of her mother were lost to fire, and
the last one left standing was already scrap. Further, the Child Study Report submitted by the Department of Social
Welfare and Development (DSWD) in the adoption proceedings of respondents two sons by Jambrich disclosed that:

Antonietta tried all types of job to support the children until she was accepted as a waitress at St. Moritz
Restaurant in 1984. At first she had no problem with money because most of the customers of St. Moritz are
(sic) foreigners and they gave good tips but towards the end of 1984 there were no more foreigners coming
because of the situation in the Philippines at that time. Her financial problem started then. She was even
renting a small room in a squatters area in Gorordo Ave., Cebu City. It was during her time of great
financial distress that she met Wilhelm Jambrich who later offered her a decent place for herself and
her children.

Further, the following additional pieces of evidence point to Jambrich as the source of fund used to purchase the
three parcels of land, and to construct the house thereon:

(1) Respondent Descallar herself affirmed under oath, during her re-direct examination and during the
proceedings for the adoption of her minor children, that Jambrich was the owner of the properties in question,
but that his name was deleted in the Deed of Absolute Sale because of legal constraints. Nonetheless, his signature
remained in the deed of sale, where he signed as buyer.

(2) The money used to pay the subject parcels of land in installments was in postdated checks issued by
Jambrich. Respondent has never opened any account with any bank. Receipts of the installment payments were
also in the name of Jambrich and respondent.
(3) In 1986-1987, respondent lived in Syria with Jambrich and her two children for ten months, where she was
completely under the support of Jambrich.
(4) Jambrich executed a Last Will and Testament, where he, as owner, bequeathed the subject properties to respondent.

Thus, Jambrich has all authority to transfer all his rights, interests and participation over the subject
properties to petitioner by virtue of the Deed of Assignment he executed on July 11, 1991.

On Co-Ownership: None, there being a Legal Impediment

Further, the fact that the disputed properties were acquired during the couples cohabitation also does not help
respondent. The rule that co-ownership applies to a man and a woman living exclusively with each other as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, but are otherwise capacitated to marry each other, does not
apply. In the instant case, respondent was still legally married to another when she and Jambrich lived together.
In such an adulterous relationship, no co-ownership exists between the parties. It is necessary for each of the
partners to prove his or her actual contribution to the acquisition of property in order to be able to lay claim to any
portion of it. Presumptions of co-ownership and equal contribution do not apply.

On Registration
Second, we dispose of the issue of registration of the properties in the name of respondent alone. Having found
that the true buyer of the disputed house and lots was the Austrian Wilhelm Jambrich, what now is the effect of
registration of the properties in the name of respondent?

It is settled that registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. It is only a means of confirming the fact
of its existence with notice to the world at large. Certificates of title are not a source of right. The mere possession
of a title does not make one the true owner of the property. Thus, the mere fact that respondent has the titles of the
disputed properties in her name does not necessarily, conclusively and absolutely make her the owner. The rule
on indefeasibility of title likewise does not apply to respondent. A certificate of title implies that the title is quiet, and
that it is perfect, absolute and indefeasible. However, there are well-defined exceptions to this rule, as when the
transferee is not a holder in good faith and did not acquire the subject properties for a valuable consideration . This
is the situation in the instant case. Respondent did not contribute a single centavo in the acquisition of the properties.
She had no income of her own at that time, nor did she have any savings. She and her two sons were then fully
supported by Jambrich.

On Constitutional Prohibition Against Aliens

Respondent argued that aliens are prohibited from acquiring private land. This is embodied in Section 7, Article
XII of the 1987 Constitution, which is basically a reproduction of Section 5, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution, and
Section 14, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution. The capacity to acquire private land is dependent on the capacity
"to acquire or hold lands of the public domain." Private land may be transferred only to individuals or entities
"qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain." Only Filipino citizens or corporations at least 60% of the
capital of which is owned by Filipinos are qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain. Thus, as the rule now
stands, the fundamental law explicitly prohibits non-Filipinos from acquiring or holding title to private lands,
except only by way of legal succession or if the acquisition was made by a former natural-born citizen.

Therefore, in the instant case, the transfer of land from Agro-Macro Development Corporation to Jambrich, who is
an Austrian, would have been declared invalid if challenged, had not Jambrich conveyed the properties to petitioner
who is a Filipino citizen. In United Church Board for World Ministries v. Sebastian, the Court reiterated the consistent
ruling in a number of cases that if land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes
a Filipino citizen or transfers it to a Filipino, the flaw in the original transaction is considered
cured and the title of the transferee is rendered valid.

Ventura vs Abuda
Facts
Socorro Torres (Socorro) and Esteban Abletes (Esteban) were married on 9 June 1980. Although Socorro and
Esteban never had common children, both of them had children from prior marriages: Esteban had a daughter
named Evangeline Abuda (Evangeline), and Socorro had a son, who was the father of Edilberto U. Ventura, Jr.
(Edilberto), the petitioner in this case.
(RSPol Note: Edilberto Jr, the petitioner in this case, must be the son of someone name Edilberto Sr. who is the
son of Socorro. In other words, petitioner Edilberto is the grandson of Socorro.)

Evidence shows that Socorro had a prior subsisting marriage to Crispin Roxas (Crispin) when she married
Esteban. Socorro married Crispin on 18 April 1952. This marriage was not annulled, and Crispin was alive at the time
of Socorros marriage to Esteban.

Estebans prior marriage, on the other hand, was dissolved by virtue of his wifes death in 1960 . According
to Edilberto, sometime in 1968, Esteban purchased a portion of a lot situated at 2492 State Alley, Bonifacio Street,
Vitas, Tondo, Manila (Vitas property). The remaining portion was thereafter purchased by Evangeline on her fathers
behalf sometime in 1970. The Vitas property was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 141782, dated 11
December 1980, issued to "Esteban Abletes, of legal age, Filipino, married to Socorro Torres." Edilberto also claimed
that starting 1978, Evangeline and Esteban operated small business establishments located at 903 and 905 Delpan
Street, Tondo, Manila (Delpan property).

On 6 September 1997, Esteban sold the Vitas and Delpan properties to Evangeline and her husband, Paulino
Abuda (Paulino). According to Edilberto: when Esteban was diagnosed with colon cancer sometime in 1993, he
decided to sell the Delpan and Vitas properties to Evangeline. Evangeline continued paying the amortizations on the
two (2) properties situated in Delpan Street. The amortizations, together with the amount of Two Hundred Thousand
Pesos (Php 200,000.00), which Esteban requested as advance payment, were considered part of the purchase price of
the Delpan properties. Evangeline likewise gave her father Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php 50,000.00) for the purchase of
the Vitas properties and she shouldered his medical expenses.

Esteban passed away on 11 September 1997, while Socorro passed away on 31 July 1999.

Sometime in 2000, Leonora Urquila (Leonora), the mother of Edilberto, discovered the sale. Thus, Edilberto,
represented by Leonora, filed a Petition for Annulment of Deeds of Sale before the RTC-Manila . Edilberto
alleged that the sale of the properties was fraudulent because Estebans signature on the deeds of sale was forged.
Respondents, on the other hand, argued that because of Socorros prior marriage to Crispin, her subsequent
marriage to Esteban was null and void. Thus, neither Socorro nor her heirs can claim any right or interest over the
properties purchased by Esteban and respondents.

RTC Ruling
The RTC-Manila ruled that the marriage between Socorro and Esteban was void from the beginning. Article 83
of the Civil Code, which was the governing law at the time Esteban and Socorro were married. During trial, Edilberto
offered the testimony of Socorros daughter-in-law Conchita Ventura (Conchita). In her first affidavit, Conchita claimed
that Crispin, who was a seaman, had been missing and unheard from for 35 years. However, Conchita recanted her
earlier testimony and executed an Affidavit of Retraction.

The RTC-Manila concluded that Socorro did not contribute any funds for the acquisition of the properties.
Hence, she cannot be considered a co-owner, and her heirs cannot claim any rights over the Vitas and Delpan
properties.

CA Ruling
The CA sustained the decision of the RTC-Manila.

SC Ruling
Edilberto admitted that in unions between a man and a woman who are incapacitated to marry each other, the
ownership over the properties acquired during the subsistence of that relationship shall be based on the actual
contribution of the parties. He even quoted our ruling in Borromeo v. Descallar in his petition:

It is necessary for each of the partners to prove his or her actual contribution to the acquisition of property
in order to be able to lay claim to any portion of it. Presumptions of co-ownership and equal contribution do
not apply.

This is a reiteration of Article 148 of the Family Code, which the CA applied in the assailed decision:

Art 148. In cases of cohabitation [wherein the parties are incapacitated to marry each other], only the
properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or
industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of
proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule
and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.

If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the
absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is
not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the
preceding Article.

The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith. Applying the foregoing
provision, the Vitas and Delpan properties can be considered common property if: (1) these were acquired during the
cohabitation of Esteban and Socorro; and (2) there is evidence that the properties were acquired through the parties
actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry.

Edilberto argues that the certificate of title covering the Vitas property shows that the parcel of land is co-owned
by Esteban and Socorro because: (1) the Transfer Certificate of Title was issued on 11 December 1980, or several
months after the parties were married; and (2) title to the land was issued to "Esteban Abletes, of legal age, married
to Socorro Torres."
 We disagree. The title itself shows that the Vitas property is owned by Esteban alone. The phrase "married to
Socorro Torres" is merely descriptive of his civil status, and does not show that Socorro co-owned the property. The
evidence on record also shows that Esteban acquired ownership over the Vitas property prior to his marriage to
Socorro, even if the certificate of title was issued after the celebration of the marriage.

Edilberto claims that Estebans actual contribution to the purchase of the Delpan property was not sufficiently
proven since Evangeline shouldered some of the amortizations. Thus, the law presumes that Esteban and Socorro
jointly contributed to the acquisition of the Delpan property.

We cannot sustain Edilbertos claim. Both the RTC-Manila and the CA found that the Delpan property was
acquired prior to the marriage of Esteban and Socorro. Furthermore, even if payment of the purchase price of the
Delpan property was made by Evangeline, such payment was made on behalf of her father. Article 1238 of the Civil
Code provides:

Art. 1238. Payment made by a third person who does not intend to be reimbursed by the debtor is deemed
to be a donation, which requires the debtors consent. But the payment is in any case valid as to the creditor
who has accepted it.

Thus, it is clear that Evangeline paid on behalf of her father, and the parties intended that the Delpan property
would be owned by and registered under the name of Esteban. During trial, the Abuda spouses presented receipts
evidencing payments of the amortizations for the Delpan property. On the other hand, Edilberto failed to show any
evidence showing Socorros alleged monetary contributions.

Sps Supapo vs De Jesus

Facts
The Spouses Supapo filed a complaint for accion publiciana against Roberto and Susan de Jesus (Spouses
de Jesus), Macario Bernardo (Macario), and persons claiming rights under them (collectively, the respondents), with
the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Caloocan City.

The complaint sought to compel the respondents to vacate a piece of land located in Novaliches, Quezon
City, described as Lot 40, Block 5 (subject lot). The subject lot is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
C-284416 registered and titled under the Spouses Supapo's names. The land has an assessed value of thirty-nine
thousand nine hundred eighty pesos (39,980.00) as shown in the Declaration of Real Property Value (tax
declaration) issued by the Office of the City Assessor of Caloocan.

The Spouses Supapo did not reside on the subject lot. They also did not employ an overseer but they made
sure to visit at least twice a year. During one of their visits in 1992, they saw two (2) houses built on the subject
lot. The houses were built without their knowledge and permission. They later learned that the Spouses de Jesus
occupied one house while Macario occupied the other one.

The Spouses Supapo demanded from the respondents the immediate surrender of the subject lot by
bringing the dispute before the appropriate Lupong Tagapamayapa. The Lupon issued a Katibayan Upang
Makadulog sa Hukuman (certificate to file action) for failure of the parties to settle amicably.

The Criminal Case on Anti-Squatting Law

The Spouses Supapo then filed a criminal case against the respondents for violation of Presidential Decree No.
772 or the Anti-Squatting Law. The trial court convicted the respondents. The dispositive portion of the decision
reads: accused ROBERTO DE JESUS, SUSAN DE JESUS and MACARIO BERNARDO, are GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt for Violation of Presidential Decree No. 772, and each accused is hereby ordered to pay a fine of
ONE THOUSAND PESOS (P1,000.00), and to vacate the subject premises.

The respondents appealed their conviction to the CA. While the appeal was pending, Congress enacted Republic
Act (RA) No. 8368, otherwise known as "An Act Repealing Presidential Decree No. 772," which resulted to the
dismissal of the criminal case. On April 30, 1999, the CA's dismissal of the criminal case became final.

Civil Liability
 The Spouses Supapo moved for the execution of the respondents' civil liability, praying that the latter vacate
the subject lot. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) granted the motion and issued the writ of execution. The
respondents moved for the quashal of the writ but the RTC denied the same. The RTC also denied the respondents'
motion for reconsideration.

The respondents thus filed with the CA a petition for certiorari to challenge the RTC's orders denying the quashal
of the writ and the respondent's motion for reconsideration. The CA granted the petition and held that with the
repeal of the Anti-Squatting Law, the respondents' criminal and civil liabilities were extinguished. The dispositive
portion of the decision reads:

The CA, however, underscored that the repeal of the Anti-Squatting Law does not mean that people now have
unbridled license to illegally occupy lands they do not own, and that it was not intended to compromise the property
rights of legitimate landowners. In cases of violation of their property rights, the CA noted that recourse may be had
in court by filing the proper action for recovery of possession.

Action Publiciana Case

The Spouses Supapo thus filed the complaint for action publiciana. After filing their Answer, the respondents
moved to set their affirmative defenses for preliminary hearing and argued that: (1) there is another action pending
between the same parties; (2) the complaint for accion publiciana is barred by statute of limitations; and (3) the
Spouses Supapo's cause of action is barred by prior judgment.

MTC Ruling
The MeTC denied the motion to set the affirmative defenses for preliminary hearing. It ruled that the arguments
advanced by the respondents are evidentiary in nature, which at best can be utilized in the course of the trial. The
MeTC likewise denied the respondents' motion for reconsideration. From the MeTC's ruling, the respondents filed a
petition for certiorari with the RTC.

RTC Ruling
The RTC granted the petition for certiorari on two grounds, viz.: (i) the action has prescribed; and (ii) accion
publiciana falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC.

It held that in cases where the only issue involved is possession, the MeTC has jurisdiction if the action for
forcible entry or unlawful detainer is filed within one (1) year from the time to demand to vacate was made.
Otherwise, the complaint for recovery of possession should be filed before the RTC.

CA Ruling
The CA dismissed the appeal and held that the complaint for accion publiciana should have been lodged
before the RTC and that the period to file the action had prescribed.

The Petition
In seeking reversal of the CA's ruling, the Spouses Supapo essentially argue that:
(1) the MeTC exercises exclusive original jurisdiction over accion publiciana where the assessed value of the
property does not exceed P20,000.00, or P50,000.00 if the property is located in Metro Manila; and that
(2) prescription had not yet set in because their cause of action is imprescriptible under the Torrens system.

The Respondents' Case

The respondents argue that the complaint for accion publiciana was (1) filed in the wrong court; (2) barred by
prescription; and (3) barred by res judicata.

Issues

1. Whether the MeTC properly acquired jurisdiction;

2. Whether the cause of action has prescribed; and
3. Whether the complaint for accion publiciana is barred by res judicata.

SC Ruling
On the Jurisdiction of the MTC and Accion Publiciana
Accion publiciana is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty
independent of title. It refers to an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year from the accrual of the
cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the realty. In the present case, the Spouses
Supapo filed an action for the recovery of possession of the subject lot but they based their better right of possession on
a claim of ownership.

This Court has held that the objective of the plaintiffs in accion publiciana is to recover possession only, not
ownership. However, where the parties raise the issue of ownership, the courts may pass upon the issue to determine
who between the parties has the right to possess the property. This adjudication is not a final determination of the issue
of ownership; it is only for the purpose of resolving the issue of possession, where the issue of ownership is inseparably
linked to the issue of possession. The adjudication of the issue of ownership, being provisional, is not a bar to an action
between the same parties involving title to the property. The adjudication, in short, is not conclusive on the issue of
ownership.

Thus, while we will dissect the Spouses Supapo's claim of ownership over the subject property, we will only
do so to determine if they or the respondents should have the right of possession. Having thus determined that the
dispute involves possession over a real property, we now resolve which court has the jurisdiction to hear the case.
Under Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, the jurisdiction of the RTC over actions involving title to or possession of
real property is plenary.

RA No. 7691, however, divested the RTC of a portion of its jurisdiction and granted the Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts the exclusive and original jurisdiction to hear actions
where the assessed value of the property does not exceed Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), or Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00), if the property is located in Metro Manila. In view of these amendments,
jurisdiction over actions involving title to or possession of real property is now determined by its assessed value . The
assessed value of real property is its fair market value multiplied by the assessment level. It is synonymous to taxable
value.

In Quinagoran v. Court of Appeals, we explained: [D]oes the RTC have jurisdiction over all cases of recovery of
possession regardless of the value of the property involved? The answer is no. The doctrine on which the RTC
anchored its denial of petitioner's Motion to Dismiss, as affirmed by the CA that all cases of recovery of
possession or accion publiciana lies with the regional trial courts regardless of the value of the property no
longer holds true. As tilings now stand, a distinction must be made between those properties the assessed value of
which is below P20,000.00, if outside Metro Manila; and P50,000.00, if within.

In this regard, the complaint must allege the assessed value of the real property subject of the complaint or the
interest thereon to determine which court has jurisdiction over the action. This is required because the nature of the
action and the court with original and exclusive jurisdiction over the same is determined by the material allegations of
the complaint, the type of relief prayed for by the plaintiff, and the law in effect when the action is filed, irrespective of
whether the plaintiffs are entitled to some or all of the claims asserted therein.

In the present case, the Spouses Supapo alleged that the assessed value of the subject lot, located in Metro
Manila, is P39,980.00. This is proven by the tax declaration issued by the Office of the City Assessor of Caloocan. The
respondents do not deny the genuineness and authenticity of this tax declaration. Given that the Spouses Supapo duly
complied with the jurisdictional requirements, we hold that the MeTC of Caloocan properly acquired jurisdiction
over the complaint for accion publiciana.

On Prescription
Art 555 CC: By the possession of another, subject to the provisions of Article 537, if the new possession has lasted
longer than one year. But the real right of possession is not lost till after the lapse of ten years. The respondents point
out that the Spouses Supapo filed the complaint for accion publiciana on March 7, 2008 or more than ten (10) years
after the certificate to file action was issued on November 25, 1992. The respondents contend that the Spouses
Supapo may no longer recover possession of the subject property, the complaint having been filed beyond the period
provided by law.
At the core of this controversy is a parcel of land registered under the Torrens system. The Spouses Supapo
acquired the TCT on the subject lot in 1979. Interestingly, the respondents do not challenge the existence, authenticity
and genuineness of the Supapo's TCT. In defense, the respondents rest their entire case on the fact that they have
allegedly been in actual, public, peaceful and uninterrupted possession of the subject property in the concept of an
owner since 1992. The respondents contend that they built their houses on the subject lot in good faith. Having
possessed the subject lot for more than ten (10) years, they claim that they can no longer be disturbed in their
possession.

In a long line of cases, we have consistently ruled that lands covered by a title cannot be acquired by
prescription or adverse possession. We have also held that a claim of acquisitive prescription is baseless when the
land involved is a registered land because of Article 1126 of the Civil Code in relation to Act 496 [now, Section 47
of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529]. The Spouses Supapo (as holders of the TCT) enjoy a panoply of benefits under
the Torrens system. The most essential insofar as the present case is concerned is Section 47 of PD No. 1529 which
states: Registered land not subject to prescriptions. No title to registered land in derogation of the title of the
registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession.

In addition to the imprescriptibility, the person who holds a Torrens Title over a land is also entitled to the
possession thereof. The right to possess and occupy the land is an attribute and a logical consequence of ownership.
Corollary to this rule is the right of the holder of the Torrens Title to eject any person illegally occupying their
property. Again, this right is imprescriptible.

In Bishop v. CA, we held that even if it be supposed that the holders of the Torrens Title were aware of the
other persons' occupation of the property, regardless of the length of that possession, the lawful owners have a
right to demand the return of their property at any time as long as the possession was unauthorized or merely
tolerated, if at all.

A case in point is Umpoc v. Mercado in which we gave greater probative weight to the plaintiffs TCT vis-a-vis the
contested unregistered deed of sale of the defendants. Unlike the defendants in Umpoc, however, the respondents did
not adduce a single evidence to refute the Spouses Supapo's TCT. With more reason therefore that we uphold
the indefeasibility and imprescriptibility of the Spouses Supapo's title.

By respecting the imprescriptibility and indefeasibility of the Spouses Supapo's TCT, this Court merely recognizes
the value of the Torrens System in ensuring the stability of real estate transactions and integrity of land registration.

On Laches
With respect to the respondents' defense of laches, suffice it to say that the same is evidentiary in nature and
cannot be established by mere allegations in the pleadings. In other words, the party alleging laches must adduce in
court evidence proving such allegation. This Court not being a trier of facts cannot rule on this issue; especially so
since the lower courts did not pass upon the same.

Thus, without solid evidentiary basis, laches cannot be a valid ground to deny the Spouses Supapo's
petition. On the contrary, the facts as culled from the records show the clear intent of the Spouses Supapo to exercise
their right over and recover possession of the subject lot, viz.: (1) they brought the dispute to the appropriate
Lupon; (2) they initiated the criminal complaint for squatting; and (3) finally, they filed the action publiciana. To
our mind, these acts negate the allegation of laches.

With these as premises, we cannot but rule that the Spouses Supapo's right to recover possession of the subject
lot is not barred by prescription.

On Prior Judgment
To recall, CA-G.R. SP No. 78649 is the petition for certiorari filed by the respondents to challenge the RTC's
issuance of the writ enforcing their civil liability (i.e., to vacate the subject property) arising from their conviction
under the Anti-Squatting Law. The CA granted the petition and permanently enjoined the execution of the respondents'
conviction because their criminal liability had been extinguished by the repeal of the law under which they were tried
and convicted. It follows that their civil liability arising from the crime had also been erased.

The respondents' reliance on the principle of res judicata is misplaced. Res judicata embraces two concepts: (1)
bar by prior judgment as enunciated in Rule 39, Section 47(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure; and (2)
conclusiveness of judgment in Rule 39, Section 47(c).

"Bar by prior judgment" means that when a right or fact had already been judicially tried on the merits and
determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, the final judgment or order shall be conclusive upon the parties and
those in privity with them and constitutes an absolute bar to subsequent actions involving the same claim, demand or
cause of action.

The requisites for res judicata under the concept of bar by prior judgment are:

(1) The former judgment or order must be final;

(2) It must be a judgment on the merits;
(3) It must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; and
(4) There must be between the first and second actions, identity of parties, subject matter, and cause of action.

Res judicata is not present in this case. While requisites one to three may be present, it is obvious that the there is
no identity of subject matter, parties and causes of action between the criminal case prosecuted under the Anti-
Squatting Law and the civil action for the recovery of the subject property.

First, there is no identity of parties. The criminal complaint, although initiated by the Spouses Supapo, was
prosecuted in the name of the people of the Philippines. The accion publiciana, on the other hand, was filed by
and in the name of the Spouses Supapo.

Second, there is no identity of subject matter. The criminal case involves the prosecution of a crime under the
Anti-Squatting Law while the accion publiciana is an action to recover possession of the subject property.

And third, there is no identity of causes of action. The people of the Philippines filed the criminal case to
protect and preserve governmental interests by prosecuting persons who violated the statute. The Spouses Supapo
filed the accion publiciana to protect their proprietary interests over the subject property and recover its
possession.

Even casting aside the requirement of identity of causes of action, the defense of res judicata has still no basis.
The concept of "conclusiveness of judgment" does not require that there is identity of causes of action provided
that there is identity of issue and identity of parties.

Under this particular concept of res judicata, any right, fact, or matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily
involved in the determination of an action before a competent court in which judgment is rendered on the merits is
conclusively settled by the judgment therein and cannot again be litigated between the parties and their privies, whether
or not the claim, demand, purpose, or subject matter of the two actions is the same.

For all these reasons, the defense of res judicata is baseless.

Taparuc vs Vda de Mende

Facts
On September 19, 1996, in the RTC of Tagbilaran City, a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Sale,
Cancellation of TCT No. (8585) T-4767 and all Subsequent Documents and Damages was filed by the petitioners
against respondents Carmelita Loquellano Vda. de Mende, the Heirs of Evans B. Mende, and the Register of Deeds
of the City of Tagbilaran. Thereat docketed as Civil Case No. 5970 and raffled to Branch 47 of the court, the Complaint
alleges that petitioners Procopio Tapuroc and all the successors-in-interest of deceased co-owner Antonia Ebe are
the co-owners, co-heirs and/or descendants of the original owners of a parcel of land with an area of 5,795 square
meters, more or less, situated in the Barrio (now District) of Booy, Tagbilaran, Bohol and previously covered by TCT
No. 3444; that sometime in 1992, when the petitioners decided to partition the subject property, they discovered
from the Office of the City Assessor that the title covering the land was already in the name of a certain Evans
Mende by virtue of a Deed of Sale purportedly executed in favor of the latter by their predecessors-in-interest on
December 30, 1967; that said Deed of Sale is a forged document because the alleged vendors therein, who were
Procopio Tapuroc and the predecessors-in-interest of the other petitioners, did not sign the conveying deed nor
receive any consideration therefor; and that one of the alleged vendors, Antonia Ebe, had already passed away in
1960, or long before the purported Deed of Sale was said to have been executed in 1967 . Petitioners, as plaintiffs,
thus pray for the nullification of the same Deed of Sale, the cancellation of the title issued pursuant thereto in the name
of Evans Mende and the restoration of the previous title in their names, plus damages.
 In their Answer, the respondent Mendes, as defendants, denied the material allegations of the Complaint and
averred that the late Evans Mende, husband of respondent Carmelita Loquellano Vda. de Mende and father of
the herein co-respondents, bought the subject parcel of land from its previous owners on December 12, 1967 as
evidenced by a Deed of Sale duly notarized by Atty. Rodolfo Yap. They further assert that they had been in open,
continuous, and peaceful possession of the land in question from the time of said sale, and had been religiously
paying the realty taxes due thereon. By way of affirmative defense, the respondents assert that petitioners cause of
action, if any, had already prescribed in view of the unreasonable delay in filing the suit in court, let alone the fact that
their (respondents) title has become indefeasible.

RTC Ruling
On June 7, 1999, after due proceedings, the trial court came out with its decision finding that the evidence
adduced by the plaintiffs (now petitioners) was insufficient to establish their claim that the questioned Deed of Sale was
a forgery. The court explained that despite the opportunity given them, the plaintiffs failed to present a handwriting
expert to determine whether the said Deed of Sale was indeed a forged instrument, adding that laches had already
set in because of plaintiffs inaction and neglect in questioning the supposed forged character of the document after the
lapse of more than twenty-nine (29) years from the time of its execution. Accordingly, the trial court rendered
judgment dismissing the Complaint.
(RSPol Note: The sale was on Dec 12, 1976 and the action to nullify the sale by the petitioners was on Sept 19,
1996.)

CA Ruling
The appellate court, in its Decision of September 21, 2001, dismissed the petitioners appeal and affirmed that of
the trial court.

SC Ruling
The issue in the case at bar boils down to whether or not the signatures of the petitioners predecessors-in-interest
and Procopio Tapuroc (the only surviving vendor to the alleged deed of sale) were forged; and if they were, is the
declaration of nullity of the said deed of sale dated December 13, 1967 proper.

Clearly, the foregoing statement calls for a determination of the truth or falsehood of an alleged fact, a matter not
for this Court to resolve. Well-settled is the rule that factual questions may not be raised in a petition for review
on certiorari.

On Forgery
It appears undisputed that the assailed Deed of Sale is a public document, having been duly notarized by a
certain Atty. Rodolfo Yap who, unfortunately, had already passed away. Being a notarial instrument, the deed in
question is a public document and as such enjoys the presumption of regularity in its execution. To overthrow that
presumption, sufficient, clear and convincing evidence is required, otherwise the document should be upheld.

Petitioners maintain, however, that by merely examining the signatures in the questioned Deed of Sale and the
genuine signatures of their predecessors-in-interest in their Special Power of Attorney, the glaring dissimilarities
between the two sets of signatures are immediately evident to support their claim of forgery. As a rule, forgery cannot
be presumed. It must be proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence. Mere allegation of forgery is not
evidence and the burden of proof lies on the party alleging it. Here, the petitioners failed to discharge their
burden.