People vs de los santos

Facts:

On or about Oct 5, 2010, the PNP trainess as a last phase of their training were undergoing an
endurance run around 2:20 am.

The endurance run from said Camp to Camp Alagar, Cagayan de Oro City.

The PNP trainees were divided into three columns: the first and second of which had 22
trainees each, and the third had 21.

The trainees were wearing black T-shirts, black short pants, and green and black combat
shoes.

At the start of the run, a Hummer vehicle tailed the jogging trainees. Since the jogging trainees
were occupying the right lane of the highway, two rear security guards were assigned to each
rear column. Their duty was to jog backwards facing the oncoming vehicles and give hand
signals for other vehicles to take the left lane.

While they were negotiating Maitum Highway, they saw an Isuzu Elf truck coming at high speed
towards them. The vehicle lights were in the high beam. At a distance of 100 meters, the rear
security guards started waving their hands for the vehicle to take the other side of the road, but
the vehicle just kept its speed, apparently ignoring their signals and coming closer and closer to
them. Realizing that the vehicle would hit them, the rear guards told their co-trainees to
retract. The guards forthwith jumped in different directions.

Some were thrown, and others were overrun by the vehicle. The driver did not reduce his
speed even after hitting the first and second columns. The guards then stopped oncoming
vehicles to prevent their comrades from being hit again.

In its decision of 26 August 1997, the trial court convicted GLENN of the
complex crime of multiple murder, multiple frustrated murder and multiple attempted
murder, with the use of motor vehicle as the qualifying circumstance. It sentenced him
to suffer the penalty of death and ordered him to indemnify each group of the heirs.
Hence, this automatic review, wherein GLENN contends that the trial court erred
(a) in finding that he caused the Isuzu Elf truck to hit the trainees even after seeing the
rear guards waving and the PNP trainees jogging; (b) in finding that he caused the
truck to run even faster after noticing the first thuds; and (c) in finding that he could
still have avoided the accident from a distance of 150 meters, despite the bright and
glaring light from the oncoming vehicle.
 In the absence of a criminal intent, he cannot be held liable for an intentional
felony. All reasonable doubt intended to demonstrate negligence, and not criminal
intent, should be indulged.
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides that when the single act constitutes
two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for
committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the
same to be applied in its maximum period. Since Article 48 speaks of felonies, it is
applicable to crimes through negligence in view of the definition of felonies in Article
3 as acts or omissions punishable by law committed either by means of deceit (dolo)
or fault (culpa).[26] In Reodica v. Court of Appeals,[27] we ruled that if a reckless,
imprudent, or negligent act results in two or more grave or less grave felonies, a
complex crime is committed. Thus, in Lapuz v. Court of Appeals,[28] the accused was
convicted, in conformity with Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, of the complex
crime of homicide with serious physical injuries and damage to property through
reckless imprudence, and was sentenced to a single penalty of imprisonment, instead
of the two penalties imposed by the trial court. Also, in Soriao v. Court of
Appeals,[29] the accused was convicted of the complex crime of multiple homicide with
damage to property through reckless imprudence for causing a motor boat to capsize,
thereby drowning to death its twenty-eight passengers.
The slight physical injuries caused by GLENN to the ten other victims through
reckless imprudence, would, had they been intentional, have constituted light
felonies. Being light felonies, which are not covered by Article 48, they should be
treated and punished as separate offenses. Separate informations should have,
therefore, been filed.
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, GLENN may be sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty whose minimum is within the range of the penalty next lower in
degree to that prescribed for the offense, and whose maximum is that which could
properly be imposed taking into account the modifying circumstances. Hence, for the
complex crime of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide with serious
physical injuries and less serious physical injuries, qualified by his failure to render
assistance to the victims, he may be sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty
ranging from arresto mayorin its maximum period to prision correccional in its
medium period, as minimum, to prision mayor in its medium period, as maximum. As
to the crimes of reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries, since the
maximum term for each count is only two months the Indeterminate Sentence Law
will not apply.
Ivler vs Modesto-San Pedroom

FACTS: Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler was charged before the

Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City (MeTC), with two separate offenses: (1) reckless imprudence

resulting in slight physical injuries for injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce; and (2)

reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to property for the death of respondent Ponces

husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponces vehicle.

Crimes charged: 1) reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries; and 2) reckless imprudence

resulting in homicide and damage to property

On September 7, 2004, Ivler pleaded guilty to the charge in reckless imprudence resulting in slight

physical injuries and was meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction, Ivler moved to

quash the Information of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to property for placing

him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence.

MeTC: denied the motion to quash

RTC: denied Ivlers Petition for Certiorari in dismissing his Motion to Quash

ISSUE: Whether or not Ivlers constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further

proceedings in the information charging him with reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and damage

to property (YES)

Defense: Ivler argues that his constitutional right not to be placed twice in jeopardy of punishment for the

same offense bars his prosecution in reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to property

having been previously convicted in reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries for injuries
for the same offense. Ivler submits that the multiple consequences of such crime are material only to

determine his penalty

HELD: The Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the RTC. Petitioners conviction in the case of reckless

imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries bars his prosecution in criminal reckless imprudence

resulting in homicide and damage to property

1) Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime; its Consequences on Persons and Property are Material Only to

Determine the Penalty

Quasi-offenses penalize the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack

of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible, unlike willful offenses which punish the intentional criminal

act. These structural and conceptual features of quasi-offenses set them apart from the mass of

intentional crimes.

2) Prior Conviction or Acquittal of Reckless Imprudence Bars Subsequent Prosecution for the Same Quasi-

offense

Once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted

again for that same act. For the essence of the quasi-offense of criminal negligence under Article 365 of

the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done,

would be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the negligent or careless act, not the result

thereof.

The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine the penalty, it does not qualify the

substance of the offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the injurious result should affect one

person or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains one and the same, and cannot be

split into different crimes and prosecutions.

3) Article 48 Does Not Apply to Acts Penalized Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code

Article 48 is a procedural device allowing single prosecution of multiple felonies falling under either of two

categories: (1) when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies (thus excluding from

its operation light felonies); and (2) when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other. The

legislature crafted this procedural tool to benefit the accused who, in lieu of serving multiple penalties,

will only serve the maximum of the penalty for the most serious crime.

In contrast, Article 365 is a substantive rule penalizing not an act defined as a felony but the mental

attitude behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, a single mental attitude

regardless of the resulting consequences. Thus, Article 365 was crafted as one quasi-crime resulting in

one or more consequences. Article 48 is incongruent to the notion of quasi-crime resulting in one or more

consequences.

Article 48 is incongruent to the notion of quasi-crimes under Article 365. It is conceptually impossible for

a quasi-offense to stand for (1) a single act constituting two or more grave or less grave felonies; or (2) an

offense which is a necessary means for committing another.

Prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed from a single charge regardless of the number or severity

of the consequences. In imposing penalties, the judge will do no more than apply the penalties under

Article 365 for each consequence alleged and proven. In short, there shall be no splitting of charges under

Article 365, and only one information shall be filed in the same first level court.
Celino vs CA

Facts:
Two separate Information were filed against the petitioner, Angel Celino: one for
violation of the Comelec gun ban; the other, for Illegal Possession of Firearm under R.A.
8294. After pleading not guilty to the former, he filed a Motion to Quash on the
latter contending that he cannot be prosecuted for illegal possession of firearms x x x if
he was also charged of having committed another crime of [sic] violating
the Comelecgun ban under the same set of facts x x x.

Issue:
Whether the mere filing of an information for gun ban violation against him
necessarily bars his prosecution for illegal possession of firearm because of the provision
of the law that "Provided, however, That no other crime was committed by the person
arrested."

Ruling:
Ruling against the petitioner, the High Court explained that he can be convicted
of illegal possession of firearms, provided no other crime was committed by the person
arrested. The word committed taken in its ordinary sense, (and in light of the
Constitutional presumption of innocence), necessarily implies a prior determination of
guilt by final conviction resulting from successful prosecution or voluntary admission.
Citing the case of People v. Valdez (1999), the Supreme Court ruled that all pending
cases involving illegal possession of firearm should continue to be prosecuted and tried
if no other crimes expressly indicated in Republic Act No. 8294 are involved x x x.
In sum, when the other offense involved is one of those enumerated under R.A.
8294, any information for illegal possession of firearm should be quashed because the
illegal possession of firearm would have to be tried together with such other offense,
either considered as an aggravating circumstance in murder or homicide,or absorbed as
an element of rebellion, insurrection, sedition or attempted coup detat. Conversely,
when the other offense involved is not one of those enumerated under R.A. 8294, then
the separate case for illegal possession of firearm should continue to be prosecuted.

SEC. 29. Use of Loose Firearm in the Commission of a Crime. The use of a loose firearm,
when inherent in the commission of a crime punishable under the Revised Penal Code or
other special laws, shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance: Provided, That if
the crime committed with the use of a loose firearm is penalized by the law with a
maximum penalty which is lower than that prescribed in the preceding section for illegal
possession of firearm, the penalty for illegal possession of firearm shall be imposed in lieu
of the penalty for the crime charged: Provided, further, That if the crime committed with
the use of a loose firearm is penalized by the law with a maximum penalty which is equal to
that imposed under the preceding section for illegal possession of firearms, the penalty of
prision mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed in addition to the penalty for the
crime punishable under the Revised Penal Code or other special laws of which he/she is
found guilty. If the violation of this Act is in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection
with the crime of rebellion of insurrection, or attempted coup d etat, such violation shall
be absorbed as an element of the crime of rebellion or insurrection, or attempted coup d
etat. If the crime is committed by the person without using the loose firearm, the violation
of this Act shall be considered as a distinct and separate offense.

NEW FIREARMS LAW (REPUBLIC ACT 10591)

Republic Act No. 10591, an Act Providing for a Comprehensive Law on
Firearms and Ammunition and Providing Penalties for Violations thereof
was signed into law on May 29, 2013.

Among the salient features of the new firearms law is its repeal of the
sweeping no other crime clause under the Sec.1 of P.D. 1866 as amended
by R.A. 8294. A person is not liable for violation of the old firearms law,
(say, illegal possession of firearm) if he also committed another crime (like
violation of COMELEC gun ban or even a lighter offense of Alarms and
Scandals under the Revised Penal Code). Prior conviction in the other
crime committed will obliterate ones otherwise separate liability under
the firearms law. In the old law, what is punished is the other crime
regardless if the use or possession of firearms is inherent or necessary in
the commission of that other crime.

Under the new law, the rules are different. The penalty for violation of the
new firearms law, particularly the use of loose firearms (Loose
firearm refers to an unregistered firearm, an obliterated or altered firearm, firearm
which has been lost or stolen, illegally manufactured firearms, registered firearms
in the possession of an individual other than the licensee and those with revoked
licenses in accordance with the rules and regulations)is not imposed only when
the use of loose firearms is inherent in the commission of the other
crime. In such case, the use or possession of loose firearms is merely
considered as an aggravating circumstance. Otherwise, the use or
possession of loose firearms and violation of other penal law shall be
treated as distinct crimes and will thus be punished separately. The new
law expressly provides that if the crime is committed without using the
loose firearm, the violation of this Act [RA No. 10591] shall be considered
as a distinct and separate offense.

The new law further provides that if the crime committed with the use of a
loose firearm is penalized by the law with a maximum penalty which is
lower than that prescribed for illegal possession of firearm, the penalty for
illegal possession of firearm shall be imposed IN LIEU OF the penalty for
the other crime charged. If the crime committed with the use of a loose
firearm is penalized by the law with a maximum penalty which is equal to
that imposed under the preceding section for illegal possession of
firearms, the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period shall be
imposed IN ADDITION to the penalty for the crime punishable under
the Revised Penal Code or other special laws of which he/she is found
guilty.(Please refer to Section 29 of RA 10591)