ROLANDO N. CANET, Petitioner, vs. MAYOR JULIETA A. DECENA, Respondent.

Petitioner filed a complaint against respondent for denying the application for a mayors permit to
establish, operate and maintain a cockpit on the ground that under the LGC, the authority is vested in the
Sanguniang Bayan through an ordinance.

Issue: whether or not respondent can be compelled to issue the necessary business permit to
petitioner absent a municipal ordinance, which would empower her to do so.

No, They cannot compel to issue in the absence of an ordinance. The LGC is vested with the
authority to enact an ordinance authorizing the grant of a mayors permit to operate and
maintain a cockfighting arena; To compel respondent to issue the mayors permit would be a
violation of Section 447 of the Local Government Code and an undue encroachment on
respondents administrative prerogatives.

Along the same vein, to read into the ordinances relied upon by petitioner objects which were neither
specifically mentioned nor enumerated would be to run afoul of the dictum that where a statute, by its
terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to
other matters.13 It is a basic precept of statutory construction that the express mention of one person,
thing, act, or consequence excludes all others, as expressed in the oft-repeated maxim expression unius
est exlusio alterius.14 Elsewise stated, expressium facit cessare tacitum what is expressed puts an end to
what is implied.15 The rule proceeds from the premise that the legislative body would not have made
specific enumerations in a statute, if it had the intention not to restrict its meaning and confine its terms to
those expressly mentioned.

Courts should not, by construction, revise even the most arbitrary and unfair action of the legislature, nor
rewrite the law to conform with what they think should be the law. 19 Nor may they interpret into the law a
requirement which the law does not prescribe.20 Where a statute contains no limitations in its operation or
scope, courts should not engraft any.21 And where a provision of law expressly limits its application to
certain transactions, it cannot be extended to other transactions by interpretation. 22 To do any of such
things would be to do violence to the language of the law and to invade the legislative sphere. 23

It should, furthermore, be borne in mind that cockfighting although authorized by law is still a form of
gambling. A statute, which authorizes a gambling activity or business should be strictly construed, and
every reasonable doubt resolved so as to limit rather than expand the powers and rights claimed by
franchise holders under its authority.25
 EFREN RACEL ARATEA, Petitioner, vs. COMELEC and ESTELA D. ANTlPOLO, Respondents. G.R. No. 195229,
October 9, 2012

FACTS:
Lonzanida and Antipolo ran for Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales in 2010. Rodolfo filed a petition under
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC) to disqualify Lonzanida and to deny due course or to cancel
Lonzanidas certificate of candidacy on the ground that Lonzanida was elected, and had served, as mayor
of San Antonio, Zambales for four (4) consecutive terms. The COMELEC Second Division cancelled
Lonzanidas certificate of candidacy. Lonzanidas motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc
remained pending during said elections. Lonzanida and Aratea garnered the highest number of votes and
were proclaimed Mayor and Vice-Mayor, respectively. Vice-Mayor elect Aratea took his oath of office as
Acting Mayor. Subsequently, the COMELEC En Banc disqualified Lonzanida from running for Mayor based
on two grounds: (1), Lonzanida had served as Mayor for more than three consecutive terms without
interruption; and (2) Lonzanida had been convicted by final judgment of ten counts of falsification under
the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Second-placer Antipolo intervened and claimed her right to be proclaimed
as Mayor because Lonzanida ceased to be a candidate when the COMELEC Division ordered the
cancellation of his certificate of candidacy and the striking out of his name from the list of official
candidates. Aratea asserted that Antipolo could not be proclaimed as the winning candidate. He reasoned
that since Lonzanidas disqualification was not yet final during election day, the votes cast in his favor
could not be declared stray. Lonzanidas subsequent disqualification resulted in a permanent vacancy in
the Office of Mayor, and Aratea, as the duly-elected Vice-Mayor was mandated to succeed as Mayor.

ISSUE:
Whether Lonzanida was disqualified under Section 68 of the OEC, or made a false material representation
under Section 78 of the OEC that resulted in his certificate of candidacy being void ab initio
Whether the second-placer or the Vice-Mayor elect should succeed as Mayor in this case.

RULING:
The Court ruled that Lonzanida was disqualified under Sec. 78 of the OEC. It also held that Antipolo, the
"second placer," should be proclaimed Mayor because Lonzanidas certificate of candidacy was void ab
initio. In short, Lonzanida was never a candidate at all. All votes for Lonzanida were stray votes. Thus,
Antipolo actually garnered the highest number of votes for the position.

Qualifications and Disqualifications

The qualifications and disqualifications are laid by Sections 39 and 40 of the Local Government Code.
Section 40 expressly provides, among others:
Sec. 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local
position: (a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense
punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence; x x x

Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code provides: Sec. 12.

Disqualification. Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or incompetent, or
has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for which he
was sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall
be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or
granted amnesty. x x x

False Material Representation

Section 78 of the OEC states that a certificate of candidacy may be denied or cancelled when there is false
material representation of the contents of the certificate of candidacy. Section 74 of the OEC details the
contents of the certificate of candidacy. This included among others a statement that the person filing it is
eligible for said office. The conviction of Lonzanida by final judgment, with the penalty of prisin mayor,
disqualifies him perpetually from holding any public office, or from being elected to any public office. This
perpetual disqualification took effect upon the finality of the judgment of conviction, before Lonzanida filed
his certificate of candidacy. The penalty of prisin mayor automatically carries with it, by operation of law,
the accessory penalties of temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special disqualification. Under
Article 30 of the RPC, temporary absolute disqualification produces the effect of "deprivation of the right to
vote in any election for any popular elective office or to be elected to such office. The duration of
temporary absolute disqualification is the same as that of the principal penalty of prisin mayor. On the
other hand, under Article 32 of the RPC, perpetual special disqualification means that "the offender shall
not be permitted to hold any public office during the period of his disqualification, which is perpetually.

Both temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special disqualification constitute ineligibilities to
hold elective public office.
A person suffering from these ineligibilities is ineligible to run for elective public office, and commits a false
material representation if he states in his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to so run.

Lonzanida became ineligible perpetually to hold, or to run for, any elective public office from the time the
judgment of conviction against him became final. The judgment of conviction was promulgated on 20 July
2009 and became final on 23 October 2009, before Lonzanida filed his certificate of candidacy on 1
December 2009 .

Perpetual special disqualification is a ground for a petition under Section 78 of the OEC because this
accessory penalty is an ineligibility, which means that the convict is not eligible to run for public office,
contrary to the statement that Section 74 requires him to state under oath in his certificate of candidacy.
As this Court held in Fermin v. Commission on Elections, the false material representation may refer to
"qualifications or eligibility. One who suffers from perpetual special disqualification is ineligible to run for
public office. If a person suffering from perpetual special disqualification files a certificate of candidacy
stating under oath that "he is eligible to run for (public) office," as expressly required under Section 74,
then he clearly makes a false material representation that is a ground for a petition under Section 78. The
dissenting opinions place the violation of the three-term limit rule as a disqualification under Section 68 as
the violation allegedly is "a status, circumstance or condition which bars him from running for public office
despite the possession of all the qualifications under Section 39 of the LGC." In so holding the dissenting
opinions write in the law what is not found in the law.

Legal Duty of COMELEC to Enforce Perpetual Special Disqualification

Even without a petition, the COMELEC is under a legal duty to cancel the certificate of candidacy of anyone
suffering from perpetual special disqualification to run for public office by virtue of a final judgment of
conviction. The final judgment of conviction is judicial notice to the COMELEC of the disqualification of the
convict from running for public office.
Effect of a Void Certificate of Candidacy

A cancelled certificate of candidacy void ab initio cannot give rise to a valid candidacy, and much less to
valid votes. Lonzanidas disqualification is two-pronged: first, he violated the constitutional fiat on the
three-term limit; and second, he is known to have been convicted by final judgment for ten (10) counts of
Falsification. In other words, on election day, responden Lonzanidas disqualification is notoriously known in
fact and in law. Ergo, since respondent Lonzanida was never a candidate for the position, the votes cast for
him should be considered stray votes. Consequently, Intervenor Antipolo should now be proclaimed as the
duly elected Mayor.

DISSENTING OPINION
BRION: The violation of the three-term limit rule cannot be a ground for the cancellation of a CoC. It is an
appropriate ground for disqualification; thus, Dr. Rodolfo should be deemed to have filed a petition for
disqualification, not a petition for the cancellation of Lonzanidas CoC. A resulting disqualification based on
a violation of the three-term limit rule cannot begin to operate until after the elections, where the three-
term official emerged as victorious. The prohibition against Lonzanida only took place after his election for
his fourth consecutive term. With Lonzanida ineligible to assume office, the Vice-Mayor takes over by
succession.

DISSENTING OPINION
REYES, J.: The violation of the three-term limit cannot be a ground for cancellation of COC. To emphasize,
this remedy can only be pursued in cases of material misrepresentation in the CoC, which are limited to
the details that must be stated therein. Antipolos contention that Lonzanida should be deemed to have
made a misrepresentation in his COC when he stated that he was eligible to run when in fact he was not is
inconsistent with the basic rule in statutory construction that provisions of a law should be construed as a
whole and not as a series of disconnected articles and phrases. Considering that the number of terms for
which a local candidate had served is not required to be stated in the CoC, it cannot be a ground for a
petition to cancel a CoC. The petition filed by Dra. Rodolfo against Lonzanida should be considered a
petition for disqualification and not a petition to cancel a CoC. In the event that a vacancy is created in the
office of the mayor, it is the duly-elected vice-mayor, petitioner Aratea in this case, who shall succeed as
mayor.
Federation of Free Farmers vs CA
September 10, 1981

Facts: Four separate petitions of the respective parties concerned for the review of the decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA G.R. No. 47298-R, entitled Federation of Free Farmers, et al. vs. Victorias Milling Co.,
Inc., et al. of August 12,1975.
The appellate court held that notwithstanding the provisions of Section 9, in relation to Section 1 of
the Sugar Act of 1952, Republic Act 809, providing that of any increase in the share of the proceeds of
milled sugarcane and derivatives obtained by the planters from the centrals in any sugar milling district in
the Philippines, 60% of said increase shall correspond to and should be paid by the planters to their
respective laborers, the laborers of the planters affiliated to the Victorias Milling District who are members
of or represented by the Federation of Free Farmers, one of the petitioners, have not been fully paid their
share thus provided by law, corresponding to crop years 1955 to 1974, in spite of clear evidence in the
record showing that the increase of 4% in the share of the Planters, Victorias Milling District, corresponding
to all the years since the enforcement of the aforementioned Act had already been paid by petitioner
Victorias Milling Co., Inc. to said planters. The Court of Appeals further found that even the shares of the
laborers corresponding to crop years 1952-1955, when by operation of the Act, the increase was 10%, had
not been paid. The appellate court rendered judgment holding the planters of the district and Victorias
Milling Co., Inc. jointly and severally liable to the said laborers for all said alleged unpaid amounts.
The four parties involved in the case were the FEDERATION, the PLANTERS (in behalf of all planters
in the Victorias district), two individual planters (Santos and Tirol), and Central (Victorias), and each of
them filed different assignment of errors on behalf of the ruling of the Court of Appeals.
Among these errors, the court had already resolved a number of these in relation to the case Asociacion de
Agricultores de Talisay-Silay, Inc. vs. Talisay-Silay Milling Co.
With regard to the case of the constitutionality of R.A. No. 809, it was held constitution as it was
founded by the legislation not only on police power but also on the social welfare mandates of the
Constitution.
It was also stated in the ruling in Talisay-Silay that the prerequisite of absence of milling agreements for
the application of Sec.1 of the act does not refer exclusively to the expiration of the then existing contracts
but even to future failure of centrals and planters to enter into new contracts, and that in said new
contracts, they could provide for a ratio of sharing different from the stipulated in Sec. 1, provided that any
increase of their share in the proceeds of milling that the PLANTERS would get 60% thereof must be paid
by them to their laborers.
Another issue resolved through the courts was the validity of the Amicable Settlement- Compromise
Agreement between Victorias and the Planters. It was present in such Agreement that the share of 60-40
between the company and planters, respectively, were distributed and it was the planters who were to
distribute the share of the laborers.
The question of how the laborers were compensated and the liability of the three groups to the laborers
were now at hand.

Issue/s:
1. Whether the CA is correct in holding that the LABORERS are entitled to the payment of 60% of the 4%
increase paid by VICTORIAS to the PLANTERS every crop year.
2. Whether VICTORIAS and the PLANTERS have a joint and several solidary liability on the amounts due to
the LABORERS.

Ruling:
In the first issue, the Supreme Court affirms the decision of the CA with regard to the payment of
60% of the 4% increase to the LABORERS, every crop year, from 1955-56 to 1973-74, including the sum of
P180,679.38 which was a balance of the share unpaid to the Laborers (10% of their reserve actually
intended for such laborers). This was part of the 5 Million pesos due and paid to the laborers, according to
the stipulation of the Amicable Settlement-Compromise Agreement.

As for the second issue, the court states that R.A. 809, does not impose upon the centrals, whether
expressly or impliedly, any joint and several liability with the planters fro the share which the Act
apportions for the laborers of the planters, since it is the responsibility exclusively of the planters to pay
their laborers after they have been given by the central what is due them. The inherent nature of the
obligation of the planters, that of paying their own laborers, has never been from the inception of the
sugar industry up to the present, solidary with the Centrals.