ELECTION LAW
Case No. 01 ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC should conduct a
Yra v. Abao
G.R. No. 30187, November 15, 1928
FACTS: Maximo Abao is a native of the municipality
of Meycauayan, Bulacan. At the proper age, he
transferred to Manila to complete his education. Abao
returned to Meycauayan to live. From May 10, 1927,
until the present, Abao has considered himself a
resident of Meycauayan. When the 1928 elections
were approaching, he made an application for
cancellation of registration in Manila which was dated
April 3, 1928, but this application was rejected by the
city officials for the reason that it was not deposited in
the mails on or before April 4, 1928. Nevertheless
Abao presented himself as a candidate for municipal
president of Meycauayan in the 1928 elections and
was elected by popular vote to that office. The
petitioner, Marcos Yra, the vice-president elect of
Meycauayan, Bulacan, challenges the right of the
respondent, Abao, the municipal president elect of
Meycauayan, to the position to which elected on the
ground that the respondent is ineligible. The decision
in the lower court, Judge was in favor of the
respondent and declared the complaint as without
merit. Hence, the quo warranto proceeding before the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Abao was eligible to run for
public office as he did not appear to be a registered
voter in the municipality he is running at.
l A System of Overseas Absentee Voting by Qualified
HELD: Yes. The Election Law makes use of the terms
"qualified voter in his municipality," and "qualified
elector therein." To be a qualified voter, does not
necessarily mean that a person must be a registered
voter. It is sufficient for the candidate to possess all of
the qualifications prescribed in section 431 and none
of the disqualifications prescribed in section 432. The
fact that a candidate failed to register as an elector in
the municipality does not deprive him of the right to
become a candidate and to be voted for.||| One may
be a qualified voter without exercising the right to vote.
Registering does not confer the right; it is but a
condition precedent to the exercise of the right.
Registration regulates the exercise of the right of
suffrage. It is not a qualification for such right.
Case No. 02
AKBAYAN Youth, et. al. v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 147066, 147179, March 26, 2001
FACTS: Invoking this right, herein petitioners
representing the youth sector seek to direct the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to conduct a
special registration before the May 14, 2001 General
Elections, of new voters ages 18 to 21. According to
petitioners, around four million youth failed to register
on or before the December 27, 2000 deadline set by
the respondent COMELEC under Republic Act No.
8189. It was denied by the majority of the
Commissioners, stating that, Section 8 of R.A. 8189
explicitly provides that no registration shall be
conducted during the period starting one hundred
twenty (120) days before a regular election and that
the Commission has no more time left to accomplish
all pre-election activities. Hence, the instant petition for
Certiorari and Mandamus before the Supreme Court.
special registration as asked by the petitioners.
HELD: No. The right of suffrage invoked by petitioners
is not at all absolute. The exercise of the right of
suffrage, as in the enjoyment of all other rights is
subject to existing substantive and procedural
requirements embodied in our Constitution, statute
books and other repositories of law. Section 8, of the
R.A. 8189 (Voters Registration Act) ,explicitly provides
that, No registration shall, however, be conducted
during the period starting one hundred twenty (120)
days before a regular election and ninety (90) days
before a special election. The 100-day prohibitive
period serves a vital role in protecting the integrity of
the registration process. Without the prohibitive
periods, the COMELEC would be deprived of any time
to evaluate the evidence on the application. If we
compromise on these safety nets, we may very well
end up with a voters list full of flying voters,
overflowing with unqualified registrants, populated with
shadows and ghosts.
Case No. 03
Macalintal v. Commission on Elections
G.R. No. 157013, July 10, 2003
FACTS: Petitioner Romulo B. Macalintal, a member of
the Philippine Bar, sought to declare certain provisions
of Republic Act No. 9189 entitled, "An Act Providing for
Citizens of the Philippines Abroad, Appropriating
Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes" as
unconstitutional. Petitioner contended that Section
5(d) is unconstitutional because it violates Section 1,
Article V of the 1987 Constitution which requires that
the voter must be a resident in the Philippines for at
least one year and in the place where he proposes to
vote for at least six months immediately preceding an
election.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 5(d) of Rep. Act No.
9189 allowing the registration of voters who are
immigrants or permanent residents in other countries
by their mere act of executing an affidavit expressing
their intention to return to the Philippines, violate the
residency requirement in Section 1 of Article V of the
Constitution.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189.
According to the Court, Section 2 of Article V of the
Constitution is an exception to the residency
requirement found in Section 1 of the same Article.
Ordinarily, an absentee is not a resident and vice
versa; a person cannot be at the same time, both a
resident and an absentee. However, under existing
election laws and the countless pronouncements of
the Court pertaining to elections, an absentee remains
attached to his residence in the Philippines as
residence is considered synonymous with domicile.
Aware of the domiciliary legal tie that links an overseas
Filipino to his residence in this country, the framers of
the Constitution considered the circumstances that
impelled them to require Congress to establish a
system for overseas absentee voting. Thus, Section 2,
Article V of the Constitution came into being to remove
any doubt as to the inapplicability of the residency
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requirement in Section 1. It is precisely to avoid any
problems that could impede the implementation of its
pursuit to enfranchise the largest number of qualified
Filipinos who are not in the Philippines that the
Constitutional Commission explicitly mandated
Congress to provide a system for overseas absentee
voting.
Case No. 04
Ututalum v. COMELEC
G.R. Nos. 84843-44, January 22, 1990
FACTS: Petitioner Ututalum and private respondent,
Arden S. Anni, were among the candidates in the 1987
May Congressional elections for the Second District of
Sulu. In the said election, Petitioner Ututalum obtained
482 votes while respondent Anni received 35,581
votes out of the 39,801 voters. If the returns of Siasi
were excluded, petitioner would have lead of 5,301
votes. Petitioner contends that returns from Siasi
should be excluded on the ground that they appear to
be tampered with or falsified owing to the great
excess of votes appearing in the said returns. This
was rejected by the Provincial Board of Canvass of
Sulu. Subsequently, based on another action filed
before them, COMELEC issued annulling the Siasi List
of Voters on the ground of massive irregularities
committed in the preparation and being statistically
improbable, and ordering a new registration of voters
for the local elections. Petitioner contends that the
issue he raised referred to obvious manufactured
returns, a proper subject matter for a pre-
proclamation controversy and therefore cognizable by
the COMELEC; that election returns from Siasi should
be excluded from the canvass of the results since its
original List of Voters had already been finally
annulled.
ISSUE: Whether or not the election returns from Siasi
should be excluded from the canvass of the results
since the original List of Voters had been finally
annulled.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court held that the Siasi
returns do not show prima facie that on the basis of the
old List of Voters, there is actually a great excess of
votes over what could have been legally cast
considering that only 36,000 persons actually voted
out of the 39,801 voters. It was also held that
petitioner's cause of action is the padding of the Siasi
List of Voters, which, indeed, is not a listed ground for
a pre-proclamation controversy. To allow the
COMELEC to do so retroactively would be to empower
it to annul a previous election because of the
subsequent annulment of a questioned registry. The
list must then be considered conclusive evidence of
persons who could exercise the right of suffrage in a
particular election. Furthermore, the preparation of a
voters list is not a proceeding before the Board of
Canvassers. A pre-proclamation controversy is limited
to challenges directed against the Board of
Canvassers, not the Board of Election Inspectors and
such challenge should relate to specified election
returns against which the petitioner should have made
verbal elections.
Case No. 05
Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections
G.R. No. 87193, June 23, 1989
FACTS: Petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed
governor-elect of the province of Sorsogon on January
22, 1988, and assumed office in due time. On October
27, 1988, the league of Municipalities, Sorsogon
Chapter (hereafter, League), represented by its
President, Salvador Estuye, who was also suing in his
personal capacity, filed with the Commission on
Elections a petition for the annulment of Frivaldo's
election and proclamation on the ground that he was
not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the
United States on January 20, 1983. Frivaldo answered
that his naturalization was "merely forced upon himself
as a means of survival against the unrelenting
persecution by the Martial Law Dictator's agents
abroad." He added that he had returned to the
Philippines after the EDSA revolution to help in the
restoration of democracy. He also argued that the
challenge to his title should be dismissed, being in
reality a quo warranto petition that should have been
filed within ten days from his proclamation, in
accordance with Section 253 of the Omnibus Election
Code. The League, moreover, was not a proper party
because it was not a voter and so could not sue under
the said section.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner Juan G. Frivaldo was
a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election on
January 18, 1988, as provincial governor of Sorsogon.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that he
deliberately took the oath of allegiance to the United
States. Furthermore, if he really wanted to disavow his
American citizenship and reacquire Philippine
citizenship, the petitioner should have done so in
accordance with the laws of our country. Under CA No.
63 as amended by CA No. 473 and PD No. 725,
Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act
of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation.
While Frivaldo does not invoke either of the first two
methods, he nevertheless claims he has reacquired
Philippine citizenship by virtue of a valid repatriation.
He claims that by actively participating in the elections
in this country, he automatically forfeited American
citizenship under the laws of the United States. Such
laws do not concern us here.
Case No. 06
Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 86564, August 1, 1989
FACTS: Petitioner and Respondent were candidates
for the office of the Mayor of Baguio City during
Elections. In the said election, petitioner was elected
and proclaimed winner having garnered the highest
number of votes while Respondent garnered the
second highest number of votes. Due to this,
respondent filed a petition for quo warranto contesting
the election of the petitioner on the ground that the
latter is a naturalized Australian citizen and was
divested of his Philippine citizenship having sworn
allegiance to the Queen of Australia. Petitioner
opposes to the contrary. Section 42 of the Local
Government Code provides for the qualifications that
an elective official must be a citizen of the Philippines.
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From the evidence adduced, it was found out that
citizenship requirements were not possessed by the
petitioner during elections. He was disqualified from
running as mayor and, although elected, is not now
qualified to serve as such. Respondent now contend
that he should be given the position a he has garnered
the second highest vote for said position.
ISSUE: Whether or not private respondent, having
garnered the 2nd highest number of votes, can replace
the petitioner as mayor.
HELD: No. The simple reason is that he obtained only
the second highest number of votes in the election, he
was obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio
City. The fact that the candidate who obtained the
highest number of votes is later declared to be
disqualified or not eligible for the office to which he was
elected does not necessarily entitle the candidate who
obtained the second highest number of votes to be
declared the winner of the elective office.
Case No. 07
Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 119976, September 18, 1995
FACTS: Filing a Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for the
position of Representative of the First District of Leyte,
Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos provided in the
required information that she is a resident for seven
months in the constituency where she seeks to be
elected immediately preceding the election.
Thereafter, private respondent Montejo filed a Petition
for Cancellation and Disqualification, contending that
petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement
for residency (must have been a resident for not less
than one year). Petitioner thus amended her COC,
changing seven months to since childhood which Makati (and the fact of his stated domicile in Tarlac and
was refused for reason that it was filed out of time.
Hence, petitioner filed her amended COC with
COMELEC in division.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner has satisfied the
residency requirement as mandated by Art. VI, Sec. 6
of the Constitution.
HELD: Yes. For election purposes, residence is used
synonymously with domicile. The Court upheld the
qualification of petitioner, despite her own declaration
in her certificate of candidacy that she had resided in
the district for only 7 months, because of the following:
(a) a minor follows the domicile of her parents; b)
domicile of origin is lost only when there is actual
removal or change of domicile, a bona fide intention of
abandoning the former residence and establishing a
new one, and acts which correspond with the purpose;
in the absence of clear and positive proof of the
concurrence of all these, the domicile of origin should
be deemed to continue; (c) the wife does not
automatically gain the husbands domicile because the
term residence in Civil Law does not mean the same
thing in Political Law; .(d) even assuming that she
gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired
the right to choose a new one only after her husband
died, her acts following her return to the country clearly
indicate that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of
origin, as her domicile of choice.
Case No. 08
Aquino v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 120265, September 18, 1995
FACTS: Agapito A. Aquino filed his Certificate of
Candidacy for the position of Representative for the
new Second Legislative District of Makati City stating
that he was a resident of the aforementioned district
for 10 months. Thereafter, a petition for disqualification
was filed against him causing him to amend the entry
regarding his residency, changing it to 1 year and 13
days. The Commission on Elections dismissed the
petition on 6 May and allowed Aquino to run in the
election of 8 May. Aquino won in the said election.
Acting on a motion for reconsideration of the above
dismissal, the Commission on Election later issued an
order suspending the proclamation of Aquino until the
Commission resolved the issue. On 2 June, the
Commission on Elections found Aquino ineligible and
disqualified for the elective office for lack of
constitutional qualification of residence. Hence, the
petition before the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is eligible to run
for the position he seeks.
HELD: No. Aquinos certificate of candidacy in a
previous (1992) election indicates that he was a
resident and a registered voter of San Jose,
Concepcion, Tarlac for more than 52 years prior to that
election. Aquinos connection to the Second District
of Makati City is an alleged lease agreement of a
condominium unit in the area. The intention not to
establish permanent home in Makati City is evident in
his leasing a condominium unit instead of buying one.
The short length of time he claims to be a resident of
his claims of other residences in Metro Manila)
indicate that his sole purpose in transferring his
physical residence is not to acquire a new, residence
or domicile but only to qualify as a candidate for
Representative of the Second District of Makati City.
Aquino was thus rightfully disqualified by the
Commission on Elections.
Case No. 09
Dela Torre v. Commission on Elections
G.R. No. 121592, July 5, 1996
FACTS: Petitioner Rolando P. Dela Torre seeks the
nullification of two resolutions issued by the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) disqualifying
him for the position he seeks to run, citing as the
ground therefor, Section 40(a) of Republic Act No.
7160 (the Local Government Code of 1991) which
provides that those sentenced by final judgment for an
offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense
punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment
within two (2) years after serving sentence are
disqualified from running for any elective local position.
In disqualifying the petitioner, the COMELEC held that
it was established that he was found guilty by the
Municipal Trial Court for violation of P.D. 1612,
(otherwise known as the Anti-Fencing Law) which was
affirmed by the Regional Trial Court. Although there is
'dearth of jurisprudence involving violation of the Anti-
Fencing Law of 1979 or P.D. 1612', the nature of the
offense under P.D. 1612 with which respondent was
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convicted certainly involves moral turpitude
Furthermore, petitioner claimed that Section 40 (a) of
the Local Government Code does not apply to his case
inasmuch as the probation granted him by the MTC on
December 21, 1994 which suspended the execution of
the judgment of conviction and all other legal
consequences flowing therefrom, rendered
inapplicable Section 40 (a) as well.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the crime of fencing involves
moral turpitude.
2. Whether or not the grant of probation affects
Section 40 (a)'s applicability.
HELD:
1. Yes. Fencing is defined in Section 2 of P.D.
1612 (Anti-Fencing Law) is the act of any
person who, with intent to gain for himself or
for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep,
acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall
buy and sell, or in any manner deal in any
article, item, object or anything of value which
he knows, or should be known to him, to have
been deprived from the proceeds of the crime
of robbery or theft." Moral turpitude is
deducible from the third element.
2. The legal effect of probation is only to suspend
the execution of the sentence. Petitioner's
conviction of fencing which we have
heretofore declared as a crime of moral
turpitude and thus falling squarely under the
disqualification found in Section 40 (a),
subsists and remains totally unaffected
notwithstanding the grant of probation.
Case No. 10
Villaber v. Commission on Elections
G.R. No. 148326, November 15, 2001
FACTS: During an election, Petitioner Villaber and
respondent Cagas were rival candidates for a
congressional seat. Cagas filed a petition to disqualify
Villaber and to cancel the latter's certificate of
candidacy for the reason that Villaber was convicted
by the Regional Trial Court for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 and was sentenced to suffer one
(1) year imprisonment. Under Section 12 of the
Omnibus Election Code, he was disqualified to run for
any public office. Villaber countered mainly that his
conviction has not become final and executory and that
it cannot be the basis for his disqualification since
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 does not involve moral
turpitude.
ISSUE: Whether or not violation of B.P. Blg. 22
involves moral turpitude.
HELD: Yes. The elements of the offense under
Section 1 of B.P. Blg. 22 are: 1. The accused makes,
draws or issues any check to apply to account or for
value; 2. The accused knows at the time of the
issuance that he or she does not have sufficient funds
in, or credit with, the drawee bank for the payment of
the check in full upon its presentment; and 3. The
check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank
for insufficiency of funds or credit, or it would have
been dishonored for the same reason had not the
drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to
stop payment. The presence of the second element
manifests moral turpitude. A conviction for violation of
B.P Blg. 22 "imports deceit" and "certainly relates to
and affects the good moral character of a person."
Case No. 11
Moreno v. Commission on Elections
G.R. No. 168550, August 10, 2006
FACTS: Mejes filed a petition to disqualify Moreno
from running for an elective position on the ground that
the latter was convicted by final judgment of the crime
of Arbitrary Detention. Moreno filed an answer averring
that the petition states no cause of action because he
was already granted probation also arguing that under
Sec. 16 of the Probation Law of 1976 (Probation Law),
the final discharge of the probation shall operate to
restore to him all civil rights lost or suspended as a
result of his conviction and to fully discharge his liability
for any fine imposed. Moreno argues that the
disqualification under Sec. 40 (a) of the Local
Government Code (LGC) applies only to those who
have served their sentence and not to probationers
because the latter do not serve the adjudged
sentence.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner should be
disqualified because he did not serve the adjudged
sentence having been granted probation and finally
discharged by the trial court.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that an order
placing defendant on probation is not a sentence but
is rather, in effect, a suspension of the imposition of
sentence. The grant of probation to petitioner
suspended the imposition of the principal penalty of
imprisonment, as well as the accessory penalties of
suspension from public office. During the period of
probation, the probationer is not even disqualified from
running for a public office because the accessory
penalty of suspension from public office is put on hold
for the duration of the probation. During the period of
probation, the probationer does not serve the penalty
imposed upon him by the court but is merely required
to comply with all the conditions prescribed in the
probation order.
Case No. 12
Grego v. COMELEC
G. R. No. 125955, June 19, 1997
FACTS: Before the subject election, Basco was
removed from his position as Deputy Sheriff upon a
finding of serious misconduct in an administrative
complaint. Thereafter, he ran as a candidate for
Councilor position three consecutive term. It was this
latest re-election which is the subject of the present
petition on the ground that he is disqualified under
Section 40(b) of the LGC of 1991. Under said section,
those removed from office as a result of an
administrative case are disqualified to run for any
elective local position. However, the respondent
contends that the petitioner is not entitled to said relief
because Section 40 (b) of the Local Government Code
may not be validly applied to persons who were
dismissed prior to its effectivity. To do so would make
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it retroactive legislation which would impair vested
rights.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 40(b) of the Local
Government Code of 1991 apply retroactively to those
removed from office before it took effect on January 1,
1992.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court held that its refusal to
give retroactive application to the provision of Section
40(b) is already a settled issue and there exist no
compelling reason for the Court to depart therefrom.
That the provision of the Code in question does not
qualify the date of a candidates removal from office
and that it is couched in the past tense should not deter
the Court from applying the law prospectively. A
statute, despite the generality in its language, must not
be so construed as to overreach acts, events or
matters which transpired before its passage.
Case No. 13
Reyes v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 120905, 120940, March 7, 1996
FACTS: Petitioner Renato U. Reyes was the
incumbent mayor of the municipality of Bongabong
when an administrative complaint was filed against
him with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan by Dr.
Ernesto Manalo. A temporary restraining order was
issued by the trial court on February 7, 1995, upon
request by the petitioner, enjoining
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan from proceeding with
the case. As a result, the decision of
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan could not be
served upon Reyes. After expiration of the temporary
restraining order, an attempt was made to serve the
decision upon petitioners counsel in Manila but it was
futile. Meanwhile, on March 20, 1995, petitioner filed a
certificate of candidacy with the Office of the Election
Officer of the COMELEC in Bongabong. On March 24,
1995, private respondent Rogelio de Castro, as
registered voter of Bongabong, sought the
disqualification of petitioner as candidate for mayor.
ISSUE: Whether or not Reyes is disqualified for the
position he seeks to be elected.
HELD: Here, although petitioner Reyes brought an
action to question the decision in the administrative
case, the temporary restraining order issued in the
action he brought lapsed, with the result that the
decision was served on petitioner and it thereafter
became final on April 3, 1995, because petitioner failed
to appeal to the Office of the President. He was thus
validly removed from office and, pursuant to 40 (b) of
the Local Government Code, he was disqualified from
running for reelection.
Case No. 14
Mercado v. Manzano
G.R. No. 135083, May 26, 1999
FACTS: Petitioner Mercado and private respondent
Manzano were candidates for vice mayor of the City of
Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. The
proclamation of private respondent was suspended in
view of a pending petition for disqualification alleging
that that Manzano was not a citizen of the Philippines
but of the United States which was granted causing the
cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of private
respondent on the ground that he is a dual citizen and
under Sec. 40 of the Local Government Code, persons
with dual citizenship are disqualified from running for
any elective position.
ISSUE: Whether or not private respondent is qualified
to hold office as Vice-Mayor on the grounds that he has
dual citizenship.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that dual
citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former
arises when, as a result of the concurrent application
of the different laws of two or more states, a person is
simultaneously considered a national by the said
states. On the other hand, the latter is a situation
where a person simultaneously owes loyalty to two or
more states. By filing a certificate of candidacy when
he ran for his present post, private respondent elected
Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his
American citizenship. The filing of such certificate of
candidacy sufficed to renounce his American
citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he
might have as a dual citizen.
Case No. 15
Lopez v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 182701, July 23, 2008
FACTS: Petitioner Eusebio Eugenio K. Lopez was a
candidate for the position of Chairman of Barangay
Bagacay, San Dionisio, Iloilo. Days before the election,
respondent Tessie P. Villanueva filed a petition for the
disqualification of petitioner on the ground that he is an
American citizen, hence, ineligible from running for any
public office. Petitioner argued that he is a dual citizen,
a Filipino and at the same time an American, by virtue
of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225, otherwise known as
the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of
2003. He returned to the Philippines and resided in
Barangay Bagacay. Thus, he said, he possessed all
the qualifications to run for Barangay Chairman. After
the votes for Barangay Chairman were canvassed,
petitioner emerged as the winner. On February 6,
2008, COMELEC issued the assailed Resolution
granting the petition for disqualification, stating that
petitioner was not able to regain his Filipino citizenship
in the manner provided by law. According to the poll
body, to be able to qualify as a candidate in the
elections, petitioner should have made a personal and
sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship.
This, petitioner failed to do. His motion for
reconsideration having been denied, petitioner
resorted to the present petition, imputing grave abuse
of discretion on the part of the COMELEC for
disqualifying him from running and assuming the office
of Barangay Chairman.
ISSUE: Whether or not the filing of a certificate of
candidacy operated as an effective renunciation of
foreign citizenship.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court held that petitioner
was born a Filipino but he deliberately sought
American citizenship and renounced his Filipino
citizenship. He later on became a dual citizen by re-
acquiring Filipino citizenship. More importantly, the
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Court's 2000 ruling in Valles has been superseded by
the enactment of R.A. No. 9225 in 2003. R.A. No. 9225
expressly provides for the conditions before those who
re-acquired Filipino citizenship may run for a public
office in the Philippines. Petitioner re-acquired his
Filipino citizenship under the cited law. This new law
explicitly provides that should one seek elective public
office, he should first "make a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before
any public officer authorized to administer an oath".
Petitioner failed to comply with this requirement. While
it is true that petitioner won the elections, took his oath
and began to discharge the functions of Barangay
Chairman, his victory cannot cure the defect of his
candidacy. Garnering the most number of votes does
not validate the election of a disqualified candidate
because the application of the constitutional and
statutory provisions on disqualification is not a matter
of popularity.
Case No. 16
Rodriguez v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 120099, July 24, 1996
FACTS: Petitioner Eduardo T. Rodriguez and private
respondent Bienvenido O. Marquez, Jr. were both
candidates for an elective official position of Quezon
Province in the May 1992 elections. Rodriguez won
and was proclaimed duly-elected governor. However,
Marquez challenged Rodriguez' victory via petition for
quo warranto before the COMELEC stating that
Rodriguez left the United States where a charge, filed
on November 12, 1985, is pending against the latter
before the Los Angeles Municipal Court for fraudulent
insurance claims, grand theft and attempted grand
theft of personal property. Rodriguez is therefore a
"fugitive from justice" which is a ground for his
disqualification/ineligibility under Section 40(e) of the
Local Government Code (R.A. 7160), so argued
Marquez.
ISSUE: Whether or not Rodriguez is a fugitive from
justice and thus should be disqualified.
HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that a "fugitive from
justice" includes not only those who flee after
conviction to avoid punishment but likewise who, after
being charged, flee to avoid prosecution." The
definition thus indicates that the intent to evade is the
compelling factor that animates one's flight from a
particular jurisdiction. And obviously, there can only be
an intent to evade prosecution or punishment when
there is knowledge by the fleeing subject of an already
instituted indictment, or of a promulgated judgment of
conviction.||| Intent to evade on the part of a candidate
must therefore be established by proof that there has
already been a conviction or at least, a charge has
already been filed, at the time of flight. Not being a
"fugitive from justice" under this definition, Rodriguez
cannot be denied the Quezon Province gubernatorial
post.
Case No. 17
Caasi v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 88831, November 8, 1990
FACTS: Merito Miguel was sought to be disqualified
for the position of municipal mayor to which he was
elected on the ground that he is a green card holder,
hence, a permanent resident of the United States of
America, not of Bolinao. Miguel admitted that he holds
a green card issued to him by the US Immigration
Service, but he denied that he is a permanent resident
of the United States. He allegedly obtained the green
card for convenience in order that he may freely enter
the United States for his periodic medical examination
and to visit his children there. He alleged that he is a
permanent resident of Bolinao, Pangasinan, that he
voted in all previous elections.
ISSUE: Whether a green card is proof that the holder
is a permanent resident of the United States
HELD: Miguels immigration to the United States in
1984 constituted an abandonment of his domicile and
residence in the Philippines. For he did not go to the
United States merely to visit his children or his doctor
there; he entered the limited States with the intention
to have there permanently as evidenced by his
application for an immigrants visa. Based on that
application of his, he was issued by the U.S.
Government the requisite green card or authority to
reside there permanently. To be qualified to run for
elective office in the Philippines, the law requires that
the candidate who is a green card holder must have
waived his status as a permanent resident or
immigrant of a foreign country. Therefore, his act of
filing a certificate of candidacy for elective office in the
Philippines, did not of itself constitute a waiver of his
status as a permanent resident or immigrant of the
United States. The waiver of his green card should be
manifested by some act or acts independent of and
done prior to filing his candidacy for elective office in
this country. Without such prior waiver, he was
disqualified to run for any elective office.