- versus - Present:
DECISION
The police authorities are the ones tasked to promote and maintain peace and order in our
country. Thus, it becomes doubly deplorable when they themselves commit the criminal
act. In this case, appellants insist on their innocence; they deny that they killed the
victim Romeleo Quintos on June 1, 1997 inside the detention cell of the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport (NAIA).But we are not persuaded. We took a second hard look at
the evidence presented and we hold that both the trial court and the appellate court
correctly found that the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the appellants
are guilty of murder.
This is an appeal from the July 19, 2005 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00665 which affirmed in toto the March 17, 2000 Decision[2] of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City, Branch 109, finding the appellants guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder. Also assailed is the March 6,
2006 Resolution[3] of the CA denying the separate motions for reconsideration filed by
the appellants.
Factual Antecedents
On May 22, 1998, two Informations were filed against the herein appellants,
together with Carlito Lingat and Mutalib Abdulajid, charging them with the crimes of
Murder and Arbitrary Detention. The Informations read:
The undersigned Ombudsman Investigator, Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the
Military, hereby accuses NEIL BALUYOT, RICHARD DELOS TRINO, HERMINIO
JOSE, EDWIN SORIANO, MARCELO BUSTAMANTE, CARLITO LINGAT,
MUTALIB ABDULAJID, AND ELMER SALVADOR of the crime of MURDER
defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, committed as
follows:
That in the early morning of June 01, 1997, between 2:00 to 3:00 oclock [in the
morning], or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Pasay City, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused NEIL BALUYOT, RICHARD
DELOS TRINO, HERMINIO JOSE, EDWIN SORIANO, MARCELO
BUSTAMANTE, and CARLITO LINGAT, all public officers, being then members of
the Philippine National Police (PNP) Force, assigned [at] the Ninoy Aquino International
Airport (NAIA), and accused ELMER SALVADOR and MUTALIB ABDULAJID,
security guards, also assigned at the NAIA, conspiring and confederating with one
another, with intent to kill and taking advantage of their superior strength, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously tie a plastic nylon cord around the neck of
one Romeleo A. Quintos, and hang him at the end portion of the detention cell, which
caused the instantaneous death of said Romeleo A. Quintos to the damage and prejudice
of the heirs of said victim.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
Criminal Case No. 98-0548 (for Arbitrary Detention)
CONTRARY TO LAW.[5]
Neil Baluyot (Baluyot), Richard Delos Trino (Delos Trino), Herminio Jose (Jose),
Edwin Soriano (Soriano), Marcelo Bustamante (Bustamante), Carlito Lingat (Lingat) and
Elmer Salvador (Salvador), were arraigned on July 14, 1998 where they all entered a plea
of not guilty.[6] Mutalib Abdulajid (Abdulajid) remains at large.
Gasping for breath, Romeleo sought succor from Gabornes but the latter declined,
afraid to get involved. After a while, Gabornes asked Jose if he could go home but the
latter did not answer. Instead, Jose directed Salvador to transfer Gabornes to an adjacent
cell. Thereafter, Gabornes overheard Jose
saying tapusin na natin ito. Intrigued, Gabornes peered through the iron grill to see what
was happening. From his vantage point, he saw Baluyot handing a piece of grayish
plastic cord to Salvador. Thereafter, he heard Romeleo coughing and gasping for breath
as if he was being strangled. Peering closely, the witness
saw Salvador and Abdulajid twisting the cord with a piece of
wood, garrote style. Romeleos hand could be seen trying to reach for the piece of wood
in a backward angle in a vain effort to stop the twisting. After a couple of
minutes, Gabornes saw a body being carried out of the cell. Delos Trino then
approached Gabornesand said: Kung anong nakita mo, nakita mo lang.
Kung anong narinig mo, narinig mo lang. Sana huwag mo ng ikalat ito. Fearing for his
life, Gabornes promised not to tell anybody about the incident. Thereafter, he was
released.
At about that time, the victims brother, Rolando, had already arrived from
the United States. Informed by Ancirell of the detention of his brother Romeleo, Rolando
set out for home to deposit his luggage but immediately went back to the airport
with Ancirell and a cousin, Rabadon Gavino (Gavino), to check on Romeleo. At
around 3:00 a.m. of the same day, they arrived at the IID-NAIA office and were met in
the hallway by Bustamante who told them that Romeleo was in the detention cell. Asking
for directions, the group was ushered towards a dark cell. When the lights were turned on,
they were horrified to see the lifeless body of Romeleo hanging with a cord around his
neck with the other end tied around the iron grills of the cell window.
Rolando, Ancirell and Gavino, along with Soriano and Lingat, immediately
brought the victim to the San Juan De Dios Hospital aboard a police car. Rolando and his
companions carried the victim to the emergency room. Soriano and Lingat remained in
the vehicle but returned to the NAIA after a while. Romeleo was declared dead on arrival
by the attending physician. Gabornes later learned of the victims identity through the
newspapers.
Baluyot, Delos Trino, Jose, Soriano, Bustamante, and Lingat, were all members of the
Philippine National Police (PNP) assigned with the IID-NAIA,
while Salvador and Abdulajid were security guards of the Lanting Security Agency
assigned at NAIA.
After due proceedings, the trial court promulgated its Decision dated March 17, 2000,
the decretal portion reads:
In view of all the foregoing, the Court finds the accused Neil Baluyot y Tabisora,
Richard delos Trino y Sarcilla, Herminio Jose y Mozon, Edwin Soriano y dela Cruz,
Marcelo Bustamante y Zapanta, CarlitoLingat y Salvador, Elmer Salvador y Javale,
and Mutalib Abdulajid guilty beyond reasonable doubt of MURDER in Criminal Case
No. 98-0457. It appearing on evidence that the accused voluntarily surrendered at the
Criminal Investigation and Detection Group as evidenced by Exh. 21, the Court credits
them with the mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and hereby sentences each
of them to RECLUSION PERPETUA and for each accused to pay the heirs of the victim
indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00.
In Criminal Case No. 98-0548 for Arbitrary Detention, it appearing from the evidence
that the victim Romeleo Quintos was detained at the IID for three (3) hours and fifteen
(15) minutes, the same is punished or penalized under Art. 124, paragraph 1 of the
Revised Penal Code which is herein below reproduced:
xxxx
The OIC of this Court is hereby ordered to transmit the records of Criminal Case No. 98-
0548 for Arbitrary detention to the Metropolitan Trial Court.
The Petition for Bail filed by all the accused is hereby considered moot and academic.
SO ORDERED.[7]
The CA affirmed the Decision of the RTC in a Decision dated July 19, 2005, thus:
SO ORDERED.[8]
The issues raised are: (1) whether the uncorroborated testimony of the lone
eyewitness, Gabornes, is sufficient to produce a judgment of conviction; (2) whether
conspiracy was proven beyond reasonable doubt; and (3) whether appellants should be
held liable only for homicide, and not for murder.
Our Ruling
Upon careful consideration of the evidence presented by both the prosecution and the
defense, we are unable to consider the appellants appeal with favor.
We find that the CA did not err in affirming the Decision of the trial court convicting the
appellants of murder based on the testimony of Gabornes, the lone eyewitness. It is
settled jurisprudence that the testimony of a single witness, if credible, is enough to
warrant conviction. Both the trial court and the CA found Gabornes to be credible and
whose testimony is entitled to full faith. We find no cogent reason to depart from said
findings.
As borne out by the records, Gabornes positively identified and categorically pointed to
appellants as the ones who conspired with one another to kill Romeleo on June 1,
1997. He narrated the incident in a clear and convincing manner. He testified on the
degree of participation of each of the accused with regard to the killing of Romeleo inside
the IID-NAIA detention cell in such a manner that only an unbiased eyewitness could
narrate. Gabornes was not shown to have had any ill motives to testify falsely against the
appellants. As correctly observed by both the trial court and the CA, the fact
that Gabornes was previously arrested for being an unauthorized porter is not enough
reason for him to falsely accuse appellants of a very grave offense.
We also hold that the CA correctly disregarded the affidavit of recantation
of Gabornes dated February 21, 2005. In the said affidavit, Gabornes denied that he was
inside the detention cell of the NAIA on June 1, 1997. Instead, he claimed that he was
under the fly-over near the NAIA playing a card game. Consequently, he averred that
there is no truth to his testimony given before the trial court pointing to the appellants as
the perpetrators of the crime. We are not persuaded.
It is absurd to disregard a testimony that has undergone trial and scrutiny by the court and
the parties simply because an affidavit withdrawing the testimony is subsequently
presented by the defense. In the first place, any recantation must be tested in a public trial
with sufficient opportunity given to the party adversely affected by it to cross-examine
the recanting witness. x x x
In the second place, to accept the new evidence uncritically would be to make a solemn
trial a mockery and place the investigation at the mercy of unscrupulous witnesses. For
even assuming that Tessie Asenitahad made a retraction, this circumstance alone does not
require the court to disregard her original testimony. A retraction does not necessarily
negate an earlier declaration. For this reason, courts look with disfavor upon retractions
because they can easily be obtained from witnesses usually through intimidation or for
monetary considerations. Hence, when confronted with a situation where a witness
recants his testimony, courts must not automatically exclude the original testimony solely
on the basis of the recantation. They should determine which testimony should be given
credence through a comparison of the original testimony and the new testimony,
applying the general rules of evidence. x x x [14]
We are not persuaded by the contention of the appellants that there was no
conspiracy considering that they were in different areas of the NAIA premises when the
crime took place. As correctly held by the CA:
At bar, appellants claimed that they were either at the NAIA parking lot or were
at the adjacent IID-NAIA office when the crime took place. These places, however, are
but a short distance away from the scene of the crime and one could travel to and from
these points in a little over a few seconds or minutes of leisure walking, as readily
admitted by appellants in their own version of the event. Verily, the possibility of
appellants to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission, is thus not
farfetched.[15]
Besides, it is not required for conspiracy to exist that there be an agreement for an
appreciable period prior to the occurrence. It is sufficient that at the time of the
commission of the offense, the accused had the same purpose and were united in its
execution. Direct proof of such agreement is not necessary. It may be deduced from the
mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the
accused which point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and community of
interest.[16]
This community of design is present among the appellants as deduced from their
individual acts. The RTC observed thus:
The act of the accused Elmer Salvador, Neil Baluyot y Tabisora, and Richard
Delos Trino y Sarcilla of boxing the victim on the stomach and the act of
accused Herminio Jose who said tapusin na natin itotogether with the act of accused
Neil Baluyot of handing a tale or cord to Elmer Salvador who thereafter twisted the cord
which was around the neck of the victim with a piece of wood with the help of
accused Mutalib Abdulajid who up to the present remained at large, all acts of which
were done in the presence of all the accused namely: Neil Baluyot y Tabisora, Richard
Delos Trino y Sarcilla, Herminio Jose y Mozon, Edwin Soriano y dela Cruz, Marcelo
Bustamante y Zapanta, Carlito Lingat y Damaso and Elmer Salvador (including the
accused who is at large) clearly show that all accused conspired, confederated and helped
one another in murdering the victim with abuse of superior strength by strangling and
hanging the victim Romeleo Quintos causing him to die of asphyxia. In conspiracy, the
act of one is the act of all.
xxxx
Likewise, the act of accused Carlito Lingat y Damaso and Edwin Soriano y Dela Cruz of
not coming to the hospital to give the medical clerk the name and circumstances of the
victim including the facts surrounding the victims death is very suspicious indeed and is
contrary to the SOP of officers who bring victims to the hospital. Also the failure of all
the accused to immediately report to the police investigator of Pasay City is quite
unusual. In the same manner the acts of accused Neil Baluyot y Tabisora, Herminio Jose
y Mozon and Richard Delos Trino y Sarcilla of leaving the IID office and cell which is
the scene of the crime and then going to Bian and to Atty. Augusto Jimenez is quite
unusual for persons who professed innocence.[17]
Moreover, the doctrine is well settled that conspiracy need not be proved by direct
evidence but may be proven through the series of acts done by each of the accused in
pursuance of their common unlawful purpose. For collective responsibility among the
accused to be established, it is sufficient that at the time of the aggression, all of them
acted in concert, each doing his part to fulfill their common design to kill the victim.[18]
There is likewise no merit to appellants contention that they should only be held liable for
homicide, and not for murder, because the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior
strength was not specifically alleged in the Information.
Contrary to the assertion of the appellants, the Information specifically alleged that the
appellants were
x x x conspiring and confederating with one another, with intent to kill and taking
advantage of their superior strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously tie a plastic nylon cord around the neck of one Romeleo A. Quintos, and hang
him at the end portion of the detention cell, which caused the instantaneous death of
said Romeleo A. Quintos to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said victim.
It has been satisfactorily established that Baluyot, Delos Trino, Jose, Soriano,
Bustamante, and Lingat, were all members of the PNP assigned with the IID-NAIA,
while Salvador and Mutalib were security guards of the Lanting Security Agency
assigned at NAIA. The eight of them acted in concert and definitely took advantage of
their superior strength in subduing and killing their lone victim who was unarmed. Thus,
all the appellants must be held liable for the crime of murder.
All told, appellants miserably failed to show convincing reasons to overturn the Decision
of both the trial court and the CA. In this case, the CA ascertained the factual findings of
the trial court to be supported by proof beyond reasonable doubt which led to the
conclusion that appellants acted in unison in killing Romeleo. It is worthy to stress that
findings of fact of the CA, especially if they affirm factual findings of the trial court, will
not be disturbed by this Court, unless these findings are not supported by evidence.[20]
The liabilities
of Carlito Lingat and Mutalib Abdulajid
It has not escaped our notice that Abdulajid was not arraigned and remains at large up to
this time. However, in the Decision of the trial court which was affirmed by the
CA, Abdulajid was likewise found guilty as charged. This is erroneous considering that
without his having been arraigned, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over his
person.
As regards Lingat, his death pending appeal and prior to the finality of conviction
extinguished his criminal and civil liabilities.[21] Moreover, the death of Lingat would
result in the dismissal of the criminal case against him.[22]
Damages
We note that both the trial court and the CA awarded the heirs of the victim only the
amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity. In line with prevailing jurisprudence,[23] we also
award the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages. Further, we also award the amount
of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages pursuant to our ruling in People v.
Angeles[24] where we held that under Article 2230 of the Civil Code, exemplary
damages may be awarded in criminal cases when the crime was committed with
one or more aggravating circumstances, (in this case, abuse of superior strength).
This is intended to serve as deterrent to serious wrongdoings and as vindication of
undue sufferings and wanton invasion of the rights of an injured, or as a
punishment for those guilty of outrageous conduct. The imposition of exemplary
damages is also justified under Article 2229 of the Civil Code in order to set an
example for the public good. In addition, and in lieu of actual damages, we also
award temperate damages in the amount of P25,000.00.[25]
Likewise, we note that both the trial court and the CA overlooked the fact that during the
testimony of Clementina Quintos, the mother of the victim, sufficient evidence was
presented to show that the victim before his untimely death, was gainfully employed in a
private company with a monthly salary of P15,000.00.
Fiscal Barrera:
xxxx
Q How much was your son Romeleo Quintos receiving as operation officer at IPC?
A P15,000.00, sir, monthly.
Q Do you have any evidence to show that he earn Five Thousand pesos [sic]
(P15,000.00) a month as project engineer?
A Yes, sir.
Fiscal Barrera:
May I request that the Certification dated January 22, 1999 issued by IPC be marked
as Exh. EEE; the name appearing thereat that Romeleo Quintos has been an employee of
IPC from January 8, 1997 up to June 1, 1997 with the position of operation officer with
monthly salary of P15,000.00 x x x be marked as Exh. EEE-1 and the signature of a
person who issued the certification be marked as Exh. EEE-2.[26]
Art. 2206. That amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall be at
least Three Thousand Pesos, even though there may have been mitigating
circumstances. In addition:
(1) the defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased, and
the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter, such indemnity shall in every case be
assessed and awarded by the court, unless the deceased on account of permanent physical
disability not caused by the accused, had no earning capacity at the time of his death;
xxxx
Hence, the testimony of the victims mother that Romeleo was earning P15,000.00 per
month is sufficient basis for an award of damages for loss of earning capacity.
It is well settled that the factors that should be taken into account in determining the
compensable amount of lost earnings are: (1) the number of years for which the victim
would otherwise have lived; (2) the rate of loss sustained by the heirs of the deceased.
WHEREFORE, the July 19, 2005 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-
H.C. No. 00665 is MODIFIED. Appellants Neil Baluyot, Richard
Delos Trino, Herminio Jose, Edwin Soriano, Marcelo Bustamante, and Elmer Salvador,
are hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and are
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetuaand to pay the heirs
of Romeleo Quintos the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral
damages, P25,000.00 as temperate damages, P25,000.00 as exemplary damages,
and P3,000,000.00 as lost income. In view of the death of Carlito Lingat pending appeal
and prior to the finality of his conviction, Criminal Case No. 98-0547
is DISMISSED and the appealed Decision is SET ASIDE insofar as Carlito Lingat is
concerned. Insofar as Mutalib Abdulajid is concerned, the March 17, 2000 Decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 109 in Criminal Case No. 98-0547
is NULLIFIED for failure of the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over his
person. Consequently, the appealed July 19, 2005 Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00665 is likewise SET ASIDE insofar as Mutalib Abdulajid is
concerned.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Yet again, we are tasked to substitute our judgment for that of the Office of the
Ombudsman in its finding of lack of probable cause made during preliminary
investigation. And, yet again, we reaffirm the time-honored practice of non-interference
in the conduct of preliminary investigations by our prosecutory bodies absent a showing
of grave abuse of discretion on their part.
Petitioners, thru a special civil action for certiorari,[1] contend precisely that the
public respondents herein officers of the Office of the Ombudsman gravely abused their
discretion in dismissing the complaint for violation of Article 125 of the Revised Penal
Code (Delay in the delivery of detained persons) against private respondents herein,
members of the Philippine National Police stationed at the Municipality of Santa, Ilocos
Sur.
From the respective pleadings[2] of the parties, the following facts appear to be
indubitable:
1. On or about 8:30 in the evening of 13 May 2001 (a Sunday and the day before the
14 May 2001 Elections[3]), petitioners were arrested without a warrant by respondents
police officers for alleged illegal possession of firearms and ammunition;
2. Petitioner Soria was arrested for alleged illegal possession of .38 cal. revolver (a
crime which carries with it the penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period)
and for violation of Article 261 par. (f) of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to
the Commission on Election Resolution No. 3328 (which carries the penalty of
imprisonment of not less than one [1] year but not more than six [6] years);
3. Petitioner Bista was arrested for alleged illegal possession of sub-machine pistol
UZI, cal. 9mm and a .22 cal. revolver with ammunition;
4. Immediately after their arrest, petitioners were detained at the Santa, Ilocos Sur,
Police Station. It was at the Santa Police Station that petitioner Bista was identified by
one of the police officers to have a standing warrant of arrest for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 6 issued by the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Vigan, Ilocos Sur,
docketed as Criminal Case No. 12272;
5. The next day, at about 4:30 p.m. of 14 May 2001 (Monday and election day),
petitioners were brought to the residence of Provincial Prosecutor Jessica Viloria in
San Juan, Ilocos Sur, before whom a Joint-Affidavit against them was subscribed and
sworn to by the arresting officers. From there, the arresting officers brought the
petitioners to the Provincial Prosecutors Office in Vigan, Ilocos Sur, and there at
about 6:00 p.m. the Joint-Affidavit was filed and docketed;
6. At about 6:30 in the evening of the same day, 14 May 2001, petitioner Soria
was released upon the order of Prosecutor Viloria to undergo the requisite
preliminary investigation, while petitioner Bista was brought back and continued to be
detained at the Santa Police Station. From the time of petitioner Sorias detention up to
the time of his release, twenty-two (22) hours had already elapsed;
7. On 15 May 2001, at around 2:00 in the afternoon, petitioner Bista was brought
before the MTC of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, where the case for violation of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 6 was pending. Petitioner Bista posted bail and an Order of Temporary Release
was issued thereafter;
8. At this point in time, no order of release was issued in connection with petitioner
Bistas arrest for alleged illegal possession of firearms. At 4:30 in the afternoon of
the same day (15 May 2001), an information for Illegal Possession of Firearms and
Ammunition, docketed as Criminal Case No. 4413-S, was filed against petitioner
Bista with the 4th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Narvacan, Ilocos Sur. At 5:00 in
the afternoon, informations for Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition and
violation of Article 261 par. (f) of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to
COMELEC Resolution No. 3328, docketed as Criminal Cases No. 2269-N and No.
2268-N, respectively, were filed in the Regional Trial Court at Narvacan, Ilocos Sur;
9. On 08 June 2001, petitioner Bista was released upon filing of bail bonds in
Criminal Cases No. 2268-N and No. 4413-S. He was detained for 26 days.
10. On 15 August 2001, petitioners filed with the Office of the Ombudsman for
Military Affairs a complaint-affidavit for violation of Art. 125 of the Revised Penal
Code against herein private respondents.
11. After considering the parties respective submissions, the Office of the
Ombudsman rendered the first assailed Joint Resolution dated 31 January 2002
dismissing the complaint for violation of Art. 125 of the Revised Penal Code for lack
of merit; and
12. On 04 March 2002, petitioners then filed their motion for reconsideration which
was denied for lack of merit in the second assailed Resolution dated 25 March 2002.
Art. 125. Delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial authorities. -
The penalties provided in the next preceding article shall be imposed upon the public
officer or employee who shall detain any person for some legal ground and shall fail
to deliver such person to the proper judicial authorities within the period of: twelve
(12) hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by light penalties, or their equivalent;
eighteen (18) hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by correctional penalties, or
their equivalent; and thirty-six (36) hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by
afflictive or capital penalties, or their equivalent.
In every case, the person detained shall be informed of the cause of his detention and
shall be allowed, upon his request, to communicate and confer at any time with his
attorney or counsel.
It is not under dispute that the alleged crimes for which petitioner Soria was arrested
without warrant are punishable by correctional penalties or their equivalent, thus,
criminal complaints or information should be filed with the proper judicial authorities
within 18 hours of his arrest. Neither is it in dispute that the alleged crimes for which
petitioner Bista was arrested are punishable by afflictive or capital penalties, or their
equivalent, thus, he could only be detained for 36 hours without criminal complaints or
information having been filed with the proper judicial authorities.
The sole bone of contention revolves around the proper application of the 12-18-36
periods. With respect specifically to the detention of petitioner Soria which lasted for 22
hours, it is alleged that public respondents gravely erred in construing Article 125 [4] as
excluding Sundays, holidays and election days in the computation of the periods
prescribed within which public officers should deliver arrested persons to the proper
judicial authorities as the law never makes such exception. Statutory construction has it
that if a statute is clear and unequivocal, it must be given its literal meaning and applied
without any attempts at interpretation.[5] Public respondents, on the other hand, relied on
the cases of Medina v. Orozco, Jr.,[6] and Sayo v. Chief of Police of Manila[7] and on
commentaries[8] of jurists to bolster their position that Sundays, holidays and election
days are excluded in the computation of the periods provided in Article 125,[9] hence,
the arresting officers delivered petitioners well within the allowable time.
In addition to the foregoing arguments and with respect specifically to petitioner
Bista, petitioners maintain that the filing of the information in court against petitioner
Bista did not justify his continuous detention. The information was filed at 4:30 p.m. of
15 May 2001 but the orders for his release were issued by the Regional Trial Court and
Municipal Trial Court of Narvacan, Ilocos Sur, only on 08 June 2001. They argued that
based on law and jurisprudence, if no charge is filed by the prosecutor within the period
fixed by law, the arresting officer must release the detainee lest he be charged with
violation of Article 125.[10] Public respondents countered that the duty of the arresting
officers ended upon the filing of the informations with the proper judicial authorities
following the rulings in Agbay v. Deputy Ombudsman for the Military,[11] and People v.
Acosta.[12]
From a study of the opposing views advanced by the parties, it is evident that public
respondents did not abuse their discretion in dismissing for lack of probable cause the
complaint against private respondents.
Grave abuse of discretion is such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment on
the part of the public officer concerned which is equivalent to an excess or lack of
jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act
at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.[13]
No grave abuse of discretion, as defined, can be attributed to herein public
respondents. Their disposition of petitioners complaint for violation of Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code cannot be said to have been conjured out of thin air as it was
properly backed up by law and jurisprudence. Public respondents ratiocinated thus:
As aptly pointed out by the respondents insofar as the complaint of Rodolfo Soria is
concerned, based on applicable laws and jurisprudence, an election day or a special
holiday, should not be included in the computation of the period prescribed by law for
the filing of complaint/information in courts in cases of warrantless arrests, it being a
no-office day. (Medina vs. Orosco, 125 Phil. 313.) In the instant case, while it appears
that the complaints against Soria for Illegal Possession of Firearm and Violation of
COMELEC Resolution No. 3328 were filed with the Regional Trial Court and
Municipal Trial Court of Narvacan, Ilocos Sur, only on May 15, 200[1] at 4:30 p.m.,
he had already been released the day before or on May 14, 2001 at about 6:30 p.m. by
the respondents, as directed by Prov. Prosecutor Jessica [Viloria]. Hence, there could
be no arbitrary detention or violation of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code to
speak of.[14]
. . . The arresting officers duty under the law was either to deliver him to the proper
judicial authorities within 18 hours, or thereafter release him. The fact however is that
he was not released. From the time of petitioners arrest at 12:00 oclock p.m. on
November 7 to 3:40 p.m. on November 10 when the information against him for
murder actually was in court, over 75 hours have elapsed.
But, stock should be taken of the fact that November 7 was a Sunday; November 8
was declared an official holiday; and November 9 (election day) was also an official
holiday. In these three no-office days, it was not an easy matter for a fiscal to look for
his clerk and stenographer, draft the information and search for the Judge to have him
act thereon, and get the clerk of court to open the courthouse, docket the case and
have the order of commitment prepared. And then, where to locate and the uncertainty
of locating those officers and employees could very well compound the fiscals
difficulties. These are considerations sufficient enough to deter us from declaring that
Arthur Medina was arbitrarily detained. For, he was brought to court on the very first
office day following arrest.
As to the issue concerning the duty of the arresting officer after the information has
already been filed in Court, public respondents acted well within their discretion in ruling
thus:
In the same vein, the complaint of Edimar Bista against the respondents for Violation
of Article 125, will not prosper because the running of the thirty-six (36)-hour period
prescribed by law for the filing of the complaint against him from the time of his
arrest was tolled by one day (election day). Moreover, he has a standing warrant of
arrest for Violation of B.P. Blg. 6 and it was only on May 15, 2001, at about 2:00 p.m.
that he was able to post bail and secure an Order of Release. Obviously, however, he
could only be released if he has no other pending criminal case requiring his
continuous detention.
The criminal Informations against Bista for Violations of Article 125, RPC and
COMELEC Resolution No. 3328 were filed with the Regional Trial Court and
Municipal Trial Court of Narvacan, Ilocos Sur, on May 15, 2001 (Annexes G and I,
Complaint-Affidavit of Edimar Bista) but he was released from detention only on
June 8, 2001, on orders of the RTC and MTC of Narvacan, Ilocos Sur (Annexes J and
K, Complaint-Affidavit). Was there a delay in the delivery of detained person to the
proper judicial authorities under the circumstances? The answer is in the negative.
The complaints against him was (sic) seasonably filed in the court of justice within the
thirty-six (36)-hour period prescribed by law as discussed above. The duty of the
detaining officers is deemed complied with upon the filing of the complaints. Further
action, like issuance of a Release Order, then rests upon the judicial authority (People
v. Acosta [CA] 54 O.G. 4739).[17]
The above disposition is in keeping with Agbay v. Deputy Ombudsman for the
Military,[18] wherein we ordained that
. . . Furthermore, upon the filing of the complaint with the Municipal Trial Court, the
intent behind Art. 125 is satisfied considering that by such act, the detained person is
informed of the crime imputed against him and, upon his application with the court,
he may be released on bail. Petitioner himself acknowledged this power of the MCTC
to order his release when he applied for and was granted his release upon posting bail.
Thus, the very purpose underlying Article 125 has been duly served with the filing of
the complaint with the MCTC. We agree with the position of the Ombudsman that
such filing of the complaint with the MCTC interrupted the period prescribed in said
Article.
All things considered, there being no grave abuse of discretion, we have no choice
but to defer to the Office of the Ombudsmans determination that the facts on hand do
not make out a case for violation of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code.
As we have underscored in numerous decisions --
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Assailed herein by Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court are the October 30, 2003 Resolution[1] of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for
the Military and Other Law Enforcement Offices - Office of the Ombudsman
(Ombudsman) which dismissed for lack of probable cause the criminal complaint,
docketed as OMB-P-C-02-0109-B, filed by Feliciano Galvante[2] (petitioner) against SPO4
Benjamin Conde, PO1 Ramil Avenido, PO1 Eddie Degran, PO1 Valentino Rufano, and
PO1 Federico Balolot (private respondents) for arbitrary detention, illegal search and grave
threats; and the January 20, 2004 Ombudsman Order[3] which denied his motion for
reconsideration.
The facts are of record.
In the afternoon of May 14, 2001 at Sitio Cahi-an, Kapatungan, Trento, Agusan del Sur,
private respondents confiscated from petitioner one colt pistol super .38 automatic with
serial no. 67973, one short magazine, and nine super .38 live ammunitions.[4] The
confiscated materials were covered by an expired Memorandum Receipt dated September
2, 1999.[5]
Pending resolution of Criminal Case No. 5047, petitioner filed against private respondents
an administrative case, docketed as Administrative Case No. IASOB-020007 for Grave
Misconduct,before the Internal Affairs Service (IAS), Region XIII, Department of Interior
and Local Government (DILG);[7] and a criminal case, docketed as OMB-P-C-02-0109-B
for Arbitrary Detention, Illegal Search and Grave Threats, before the Ombudsman.[8]
In the June 21, 2001 Affidavit-Complaint he filed in both cases, petitioner narrated
how, on May 14, 2001, private respondents aimed their long firearms at him, arbitrarily
searched his vehicle and put him in detention, thus:
1. That sometime on May 14, 2001 I left my house at around 1:00 oclock in the
afternoon after having lunch for Sitio Cahi-
an, Brgy. Kapatungan, Trento, Agusan del Sur to meet retired police Percival Plaza and
inquire about the retirement procedure for policemen;
2. That upon arrival at the house of retired police Percival Plaza, together with
Lorenzo Sanoria, Delfin Ramirez and Pedro Ramas who asked for a ride from the
highway in going to Sitio Cahi-an, I immediately went down of the jeep but before I
could call Mr. Plaza, four policemen in uniform blocked my way;
3. That the four policemen were [private respondents] PO1 Romil Avenido PNP, PO1
Valentino Rufano, PNP both member of 142nd Company, Regional Mobile Group and
PO1 Eddie Degran PNP and PO1 Federico Balolot PNP members of
1403 Provl Mobile Group, all of Bunawan Brook, Bunawan, Agusan del Sur; who all
pointed their long firearms ready to fire [at] me, having heard the sound of the release
of the safety lock;
4. That raising my arms, I heard [private respondent] PO1 Avenido saying, ANG
IMONG PUSIL, IHATAG which means Give me your firearm, to which I answered,
WALA MAN KO'Y PUSIL translated as I have no firearm, showing my waistline
when I raised my T-shirt;
5. That my other companions on the jeep also went down and raised their arms and
showed their waistline when the same policemen and a person in civilian attire holding
an armalite also pointed their firearms to them to which Mr. Percival Plaza who came
down from his house told them not to harass me as I am also a former police officer but
they did not heed Mr. Plaza's statements;
6. That while we were raising our arms [private respondent] SPO4 Benjamin Conde, Jr.
went near my owner type jeep and conducted a search. To which I asked them if they
have any search warrant;
7. That after a while they saw my super .38 pistol under the floormat of my jeep and
asked me of the MR of the firearm but due to fear that their long arms were still pointed
to us, I searched my wallet and gave the asked [sic] document;
9. That at about 2:30 p.m., I left Mr. Percival's house and went to Trento Police Station
where I saw a person in civilian attire with a revolver tucked on his waist, to which I
asked the police officers including those who searched my jeep to apprehend him also;
10. That nobody among the policemen at the station made a move to apprehend the
armed civilian person so I went to the office of Police Chief Rocacorba who
immediately called the armed civilian to his office and when already inside his office,
the disarming was done;
11. That after the disarming of the civilian I was put to jail with the said person by Police
Chief Rocacorba and was released only at 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of May 16,
2001 after posting a bailbond;
12. That I caused the execution of this document for the purpose of filing cases of Illegal
Search, Grave Misconduct and Abuse of Authority against SPO4 Benjamin Conde, Jr.,
of Trento Police Station; PO1 RamilAvenido, PO1 Velantino Rufano, PO1
Federico Balolot and PO1 Eddie Degran.[9]
Private respondent Conde filed a Counter-Affidavit dated March 20, 2002, where he
interposed the following defenses:
First, he had nothing to do with the detention of petitioner as it was Chief of Police/Officer-
in-Charge Police Inspector Dioscoro Mehos Rocacorba who ordered the detention.
Petitioner himself admitted this fact in his own Complaint-Affidavit;[11] and
Second, he denies searching petitioner's vehicle,[12] but admits that even though he was not
armed with a warrant, he searched the person of petitioner as the latter, in plain view, was
committing a violation of COMELEC Resolutions No. 3258 and No. 3328 by carrying a
firearm in his person.
Private respondents Avenido, Degran, Rufano and Balolot filed their Joint-Affidavit
dated March 25, 2002, which contradicts the statements of private respondent Conde, viz:
1. that we executed a joint counter-affidavit dated August 28, 2001 where we stated among
other things, that we saw Feleciano Nani Galvante armed with a handgun/pistol tucked
on his waist;
2. that this statement is not accurate because the truth of the matter is that the said handgun
was taken by SPO4 BENJAMIN CONDE, JR., who was acting as our team leader
during the May 14, 2001 Elections, from the jeep of Mr. Galvante after searching the
same; and
3. that we noticed the aforementioned discrepancy in our affidavit dated August 28,
2001 after we have already affixed our signatures thereon.[13]
Consequently, petitioner filed an Affidavit of Desistance dated March 25, 2002 with both
the IAS and Ombudsman, absolving private
respondents Avenido, Degran, Rufano and Balolot, but maintaining that private
respondent Conde alone be prosecuted in both administrative and criminal cases.[14]
On July 17, 2002, the IAS issued a Decision in Administrative Case No. IASOB-020007,
finding all private respondents guilty of grave misconduct but penalized them with
suspension only. The IAS noted however that private respondents were merely being
[enthusiastic] in the conduct of the arrest in line of duty. [15]
Meanwhile, in Criminal Case No. 5047, petitioner filed with the RTC a Motion for
Preliminary Investigation and to Hold in Abeyance the Issuance of or Recall the Warrant of
Arrest.[16] The RTC granted the same in an Order[17] dated August 17, 2001. Upon
reinvestigation, Prosecutor II Eliseo Diaz, Jr. filed a Reinvestigation with Motion to
Dismiss dated November 22, 2001, recommending the dismissal of Criminal Case No.
5047 on the ground that the action of the policemen who conducted the warrantless search
in spite of the absence of any circumstances justifying the same intruded into the privacy of
the accused and the security of his property.[18] Officer-in-Charge Prosecutor
II Victoriano Pag-ong approved said recommendation.[19]
The RTC granted the prosecution's motion to dismiss in an Order[20] dated January 16,
2003.
After a careful evaluation, the undersigned prosecutor finds no probable cause for any of
the offenses charged against above-named respondents.
The allegations of the complainant failed to establish the factual basis of the complaint, it
appearing from the records that the incident stemmed from a valid warrantless arrest.
The subsequent execution of an affidavit of desistance by the complainant rendered the
complaint even more uncertain and subject to doubt, especially so since it merely
exculpated some but not all of the respondents. These circumstances, coupled with the
presumption of regularity in the performance of duty, negates any criminal liability on the
part of the respondents.
In his Motion for Reconsideration,[23] petitioner called the attention of the Ombudsman to
the earlier IAS Decision, the Reinvestigation with Motion to Dismiss of Prosecutor
II Eliseo Diaz, Jr. and the RTC Order, all of which declared the warrantless search
conducted by private respondents illegal,[24] which are contradicted by the October 30,
2003 Ombudsman Resolution declaring the warrantless search legal.
The Ombudsman denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration on the ground that the
latter offered no new evidence or errors of law which would warrant the reversal or
modification[25] of itsOctober 30, 2003 Resolution.
A. Petitioner has clearly shown that the search conducted by the private
respondents was made without a valid warrant, nor does it fall under any of the
instances of valid warrantless searches.
II. Public respondents acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction and/or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when, in their Order dated
January 20, 2004, public respondents denied the petitioner's motion for reconsideration in a
capricious, whimsical, despotic and arbitrary manner. [26]
In its Memorandum,[27] the Office of the Solicitor General argued that public respondents
acted within the bounds of their discretion in dismissing OMB-P-C-02-0109-B given that
private respondents committed no crime in searching petitioner and confiscating his
firearm as the former were merely performing their duty of enforcing the law against illegal
possession of firearms and the COMELEC ban against the carrying of firearms outside of
one's residence.
Private respondent Conde filed a Comment[28] and a Memorandum for himself.[29] Private
respondents Avenido, Degran, Rufano and Balolot filed their separate Letter-Comment
dated June 25, 2004.[30]
It is noted that the criminal complaint which petitioner filed with the Ombudsman charges
private respondents with warrantless search, arbitrary detention, and grave threats.
The complaint for warrantless search charges no criminal offense. The conduct of
a warrantless search is not a criminal act for it is not penalized under the Revised Penal
Code (RPC) or any other special law. What the RPC punishes are only two forms of
searches:
Art. 129. Search warrants maliciously obtained and abuse in the service of those legally
obtained. - In addition to the liability attaching to the offender for the commission of any
other offense, the penalty of arrestomayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in
its minimum period and a fine not exceeding P1,000.00 pesos shall be imposed upon any
public officer or employee who shall procure a search warrant without just cause, or,
having legally procured the same, shall exceed his authority or use unnecessary severity in
executing the same.
Art. 130. Searching domicile without witnesses. - The penalty of arresto mayor in its
medium and maximum periods shall be imposed upon a public officer or employee who, in
cases where a search is proper, shall search the domicile, papers or other belongings of any
person, in the absence of the latter, any member of his family, or in their default, without
the presence of two witnesses residing in the same locality.
Petitioner did not allege any of the elements of the foregoing felonies in his Affidavit-
Complaint; rather, he accused private respondents of conducting a search on his vehicle
without being armed with a valid warrant. This situation, while lamentable, is not covered
by Articles 129 and 130 of the RPC.
The remedy of petitioner against the warrantless search conducted on his vehicle is
civil,[35] under Article 32, in relation to Article 2219[36] (6) and (10) of the Civil Code,
which provides:
Art. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or
indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the
following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages:
xxxx
(9) The right to be secure in ones person, house, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures;
xxxx
The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be
adjudicated.
and/or disciplinary and administrative, under Section 41 of Republic Act No. 6975.[37]
To avail of such remedies, petitioner may file against private respondents a complaint for
damages with the regular courts[38] or an administrative case with the PNP/DILG,[39] as
petitioner did in Administrative Case No. IASOB-020007, and not a criminal action with
the Ombudsman.
Public respondents' dismissal of the criminal complaint for illegal search which petitioner
filed with the Ombudsman against private respondents was therefore proper, although the
reasons public respondents cited for dismissing the complaint are rather off the mark
because they relied solely on the finding that the warrantless search conducted by private
respondents was valid and that the Affidavit of Desistance which petitioner executed cast
doubt on the veracity of his complaint.[40] Public respondents completely overlooked the
fact that the criminal complaint was not cognizable by the Ombudsman as illegal search is
not a criminal offense. Nevertheless, the result achieved is the same: the dismissal of a
groundless criminal complaint for illegal search which is not an offense under the
RPC. Thus, the Court need not resolve the issue of whether or not public respondents erred
in their finding on the validity of the search for that issue is completely hypothetical under
the circumstance.
The criminal complaint for abitrary detention was likewise properly dismissed by public
respondents. To sustain a criminal charge for arbitrary detention, it must be shown that (a)
the offender is a public officer or employee, (b) the offender detained the complainant, and
(c) the detention is without legal grounds.[41] The second element was not alleged by
petitioner in his Affidavit-Complaint. As pointed out by private respondent Conde in his
Comment[42] and Memorandum,[43] petitioner himself identified in his Affidavit-Complaint
that it was Police Chief Rocacorbawho caused his detention. Nowhere in said affidavit did
petitioner allege that private respondents effected his detention, or were in any other way
involved in it.[44] There was, therefore, no factual or legal basis to sustain the criminal
charge for arbitrary detention against private respondents.
Finally, on the criminal complaint for grave threats, the Solicitor General aptly pointed out
that the same is based merely on petitioner's bare allegation that private respondents aimed
their firearms at him.[45] Such bare allegation stands no chance against the well-entrenched
rule applicable in this case, that public officers enjoy a presumption of regularity in the
performance of their official function.[46] The IAS itself observed that private respondents
may have been carried away by their enthusiasm in the conduct of the arrest in line of
duty.[47] Petitioner expressed the same view when, in his Affidavit of Desistance, he
accepted that private respondents may have been merely following orders when they
pointed their long firearms at him.
All said, public respondents did not act with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the
criminal complaint against private respondents.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
SECOND DIVISION
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Ernesto J. San Agustin of the
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 71925 dismissing his petition
for certiorari.
The Antecedents
Luz Tan executed a notarized criminal complaint and filed the same with the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) charging the petitioner, the Barangay Chairman
of Barangay La Huerta, Paraaque City, with serious illegal detention alleging that the
petitioner detained her husband Vicente Tan, on June 19, 2002, without lawful ground
therefor.[2]
On June 25, 2002, the petitioner received a subpoena from Ferdinand M. Lavin, the
Chief of the Anti-Organized Crime Division of the NBI, requiring him to appear before
said office the next day, on June 26, 2002, in order to give his evidence in connection
with said complaint and to bring with him the barangay logbook for June 19, 2002. The
petitioner complied with the subpoena and presented himself at the NBI with the
barangay logbook. However, the petitioner was placed under arrest and prevented from
going back home.
On June 27, 2002, the NBI Director transmitted to the Department of Justice the
findings of the NBI on its investigation of the case:
On June 19, 2002 at around 9:00 oclock in the morning while Victim RICARDO
TAN and Witness ANTONIO GERONIMO were selling their wares of kitchen
utensils along the highway of La Huerta, Paraaque City, Victim TAN was mistaken as
a snatcher by two tricycle drivers, namely, ROMEO C. ALCANTARA and
JOSEFINO FERRER, JR. Victim was turned-over to Subject SAN AGUSTIN and
other Subjects at the Barangay Hall of La Huerta, Paraaque City; witness
GERONIMO followed them. GERONIMO witnessed that Victim was beaten by
Subjects and locked-up at the Barangay jail so he decided to inform the wife of the
Victim (Complainant) who was residing in San Pedro, Laguna. When Complainant
went to the Barangay Hall on the same day and inquired on the whereabouts of his
husband, two female clerks thereat denied having seen the Victim. Complainant was
able to talk to Subject SAN AGUSTIN the following day but he also denied having
seen Victim, worst Subject SAN AGUSTIN was furious and even shouted at them and
brought out his knife. Up to date, Victim, never resurfaced nor his whereabouts
located. Record at the NBI central file of Subject SAN AGUSTIN revealed that he has
several cases of homicide, murder and multiple murder. [3]
The NBI Director stated that the basis for the arrest of the petitioner was:
BASIS OF ARREST:
1. Whether or not respondent Judge De Leon acted arbitrarily and in grave abuse of
discretion in not granting petitioners Urgent Motion to Quash Information dated 01
July 2002.
2. Whether or not respondent Judge De Leon acted arbitrarily and in grave abuse of
discretion in not granting petitioners Urgent Motion to Quash On The Ground That
The Facts Charged Do Not Constitute An Offense dated 04 July 2002.
3. Whether or not respondent Judge De Leon acted arbitrarily and in grave abuse of
discretion in not granting bail as a matter of right in favor of the petitioner.
4. Whether or not respondent Judge Jose S. Jacinto, Jr. of the Metropolitan Trial Court
of Paraaque, Branch 77, can validly and legally proceed with the hearing of Criminal
Case No. 02-2486. [8]
In the meantime, on August 27, 2002, the Assistant City Prosecutor came out with a
Resolution finding probable cause of arbitrary detention against the petitioner and
recommending that the Information for arbitrary detention and the Motion to Withdraw
Information appended thereto be approved.[9] The City Prosecutor opposed the said
Resolution.
On August 28, 2002, the Assistant City Prosecutor filed with the trial court a Motion
to Withdraw Information.[10] On August 30, 2002, the RTC issued an Order granting the
motion and considered the Information withdrawn.
On the same day, an Information was filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC)
docketed as Criminal Case No. 02-2486, charging the petitioner with arbitrary
detention, viz:
That on or about the 19th day of June 2002 and subsequent thereto, in the City of
Paraaque, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, being a Barangay Chairman of Brgy. La Huerta, Paraaque City, a
public officer, committing the offense in relation to office, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously detain one RICARDO TAN, an act done as he
well knew, arbitrary and without legal ground (sic).
CONTRARY TO LAW.[11]
The case was raffled to Branch 77 of the court. The petitioner posted a cash bond
of P3,000.00 for his provisional release without prejudice to the outcome of his petition
in the Court of Appeals.[12]
On April 15, 2003, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision denying due course
and dismissing the petition for certiorari of the petitioner.
The petitioner filed the petition at bar contending that:
4.1 THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT NO GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION WAS COMMITTED BY JUDGE RAUL E. DE LEON
WHEN HE DENIED PETITIONERS URGENT MOTION TO QUASH
INFORMATION DATED JULY 01, 2002.
4.2. THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT NO GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION WAS COMMITTED BY JUDGE RAUL E. DE LEON
WHEN HE DENIED PETITIONERS URGENT MOTION TO QUASH ON THE
GROUND THAT THE FACTS CHARGED DO NOT CONSTITUTE AN OFFENSE
DATED 04 JULY 2002.
4.3. THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT NO GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION WAS COMMITED BY JUDGE RAUL E. DE LEON
WHEN HE DENIED PETITIONER OF HIS CONSTITUTIONALLY-GUARANTEED
RIGHT TO BAIL.
4.4. THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT JUDGE
JOSE S. JACINTO OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT OF PARAAQUE,
BRANCH, (sic) CAN VALIDLY AND LEGALLY PROCEED WITH THE HEARINGS
IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 02-2486.[13]
The petitioner asserts that he was illegally arrested by the NBI; hence, he was
entitled to a regular preliminary investigation, not merely to an inquest investigation. He
contends that since the Information charging him with kidnapping/serious illegal
detention was filed before the Regional Trial Court without affording him a preliminary
investigation, the Information is void.The RTC, the petitioner avers, should have granted
his motion to quash the Information and ordered the NBI to refile its complaint against
him with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Paraaque for the appropriate preliminary
investigation and that, in the meantime, the RTC should have ordered his release from
detention. The petitioner posits that the RTC committed a grave abuse of its discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in denying his motion to quash the
Information and directing the City Prosecutor to conduct a reinvestigation. On the other
hand, since the Assistant City Prosecutor did not conduct a regular preliminary
investigation before filing the Information for arbitrary detention against him with the
MeTC, the Information is void. Hence, the MeTC should be ordered to quash the
Information filed therein.
In its Comment to the petition, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contends
that the petition for certiorari of the petitioner in the Court of Appeals and in this Court
had become moot and academic by the withdrawal of the Information from the Regional
Trial Court and filing of the Information for arbitrary detention against the petitioner in
the MTC. The inquest investigation conducted by the State Prosecutor was valid
because the petitioner refused to execute a waiver under Article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code. The OSG asserts that the investigation conducted by the Assistant City
Prosecutor, as directed by the RTC, was valid. The petitioner is estopped from assailing
the Resolution of the Assistant City Prosecutor finding probable cause for arbitrary
detention because of his failure to submit his counter-affidavit.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the petitioner was unlawfully arrested; hence, he
was entitled to preliminary investigation and release from detention subject to his
appearance during the preliminary investigation. However, the Court of Appeals
declared that the lack of preliminary investigation did not impair the validity of the
Information filed with the RTC. Moreover, the Court of Appeals declared that the
petitioner had already been granted a reinvestigation after which the Information filed
with the RTC was withdrawn. Consequently, the appellate court further declared that the
petition had been mooted by the withdrawal of the Information from the RTC and the
filing of another Information in the MeTC for arbitrary detention. The appellate court also
held that the RTC did not commit grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or
lack of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed Order. It ruled that even if the reinvestigation
conducted by the City Prosecutor is defective, the Information filed with the MeTC is
valid because under the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, there is no need for a
preliminary investigation for crimes cognizable by the Metropolitan Trial Court.
The petition is partially granted.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the petitioner was unlawfully arrested
without a warrant of arrest against him for kidnapping/serious illegal detention. As
correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals:
Furthermore, warrantless arrest or the detention of petitioner in the instant case does
not fall within the provision of Section 5, Rule 113, Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure, as amended, which provides:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has been committed and he has probable cause to believe, based
on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances, that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a
warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be
proceeded against in accordance with Section 7 of Rule 112.
considering that petitioner only went to the Office of the NBI to answer
the subpoena it issued which was seven (7) days after the supposed turning over of the
custody of Ricardo Tan to petitioner who was then the Barangay Chairman of La
Huerta, Paraaque City, and his locking up in the barangay jail and, thereafter, he was
already arrested and detained. Certainly, the arresting officers were not present within
the meaning of Section 5(a) at the time when the supposed victim, Ricardo Tan, was
turned over to petitioner. Neither could the arrest which was effected seven (7) days
after the incident be seasonably regarded as when the turning over and locking up in
the Barangay jail had in fact just been committed within the meaning of Section 5(b).
Moreover, none of the arresting officers had any personal knowledge of facts
indicating that petitioner was the person to whom the custody of the victim Ricardo
Tan was turned over and who locked up the latter in the Barangay jail. The
information upon which the arresting officers acted upon had been derived from the
statements made by the alleged eyewitnesses to the incident which information did
not, however, constitute personal knowledge. [14]
SEC. 7. When accused lawfully arrested without warrant. When a person is lawfully
arrested without a warrant involving an offense which requires a preliminary
investigation, the complaint or information may be filed by a prosecutor without need
of such investigation provided an inquest investigation has been conducted in
accordance with existing rules. In the absence or unavailability of an inquest
prosecutor, the complaint may be filed by the offended party or a peace officer
directly with the proper court on the basis of the affidavit of the offended party or
arresting officer or person.[15]
We also agree with the Court of Appeals that the absence of a preliminary
investigation does not affect the jurisdiction of the trial court but merely the regularity of
the proceedings. It does not impair the validity of the Information or otherwise render it
defective.[16] Neither is it a ground to quash the Information or nullify the order of arrest
issued against him or justify the release of the accused from detention. [17] However, the
trial court should suspend proceedings and order a preliminary
investigation[18] considering that the inquest investigation conducted by the State
Prosecutor is null and void.[19] In sum, then, the RTC committed grave abuse of its
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in ordering the City Prosecutor to
conduct a reinvestigation which is merely a review by the Prosecutor of his records and
evidence instead of a preliminary investigation as provided for in Section 3, Rule 112 of
the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.
However, we do not agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that there was no
need for the City Prosecutor to conduct a preliminary investigation since the crime
charged under the Information filed with the MeTC was arbitrary detention under Article
124, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code punishable by arresto mayor in its
maximum period to prision correccionalin its minimum period, which has a range of four
months and one day to two years and four months. Whether or not there is a need for a
preliminary investigation under Section 1 in relation to Section 9 of Rule 112 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure depends upon the imposable penalty for the
crime charged in the complaint filed with the City or Provincial Prosecutors Office and
not upon the imposable penalty for the crime found to have been committed by the
respondent after a preliminary investigation. In this case, the crime charged in the
complaint of the NBI filed in the Department of Justice was kidnapping/serious illegal
detention, the imposable penalty for which is reclusion perpetua to death.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The
Order of the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque City, dated July 24, 2004, ordering the
City Prosecutor to conduct a reinvestigation is SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court is
directed to ORDER the City Prosecutor of Paraaque City to conduct a preliminary
investigation as provided for in Section 3, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure. In the meantime, the Metropolitan Trial Court of Paraaque City, Branch 77,
is ordered to suspend the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 02-2486 pending the
outcome of said preliminary investigation.
SO ORDERED.
Austria-Martinez, (Acting Chairman), Tinga, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
Puno, (Chairman), J., on official leave.
EN BANC
PUNO, J.:
This is an automatic review of the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Third Judicial Region,
Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 781 in Criminal Case No. 514-M-98 imposing on accused-appellant Alberto
Chua alias "Bert" the penalty of death.
In a criminal complaint dated April 13, 1998, accused-appellant was charged with the crime of rape
as follows:
"The undersigned complainant, assisted by her mother, Esterlita A. Chua, hereby accuses
Alberto Chua alias Bert of the crime of rape, penalized under the provisions of Art. 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659, committed as follows:
That on or about the 28th day of March 1998, in the municipality of Malolos, province of
Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, father of the offended party, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
by means of force, threats and intimidation and with lewd designs, have carnal knowledge of
the said offended party, Chenny A. Chua, a minor, against her will.
Contrary to law.
Assisted by:
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 13th day of April 1998 at Malolos, Bulacan.
I hereby certify that I have conducted proceedings in this case pursuant to the provisions of
Sec. 7, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, considering that the herein
accused, who is under custody of the law without warrant of arrest has refused to sign a
written waiver of his rights under Art. 125 of the Revised Penal Code, and finding a prima
facie against the accused, the undersigned is filing this information with the approval of the
Provincial Prosecutor.
On April 20, 1998, appellant was arraigned and he pleaded "not guilty."3 At the pretrial conference on
May 8, 1998, however, appellant, through counsel, manifested that he was withdrawing his plea and
changing it to "guilty" as charged. As prayed for by counsel for appellant, the trial court reset the
pretrial to May 13, 1998.
On May 13, 1998, the trial court propounded several questions on appellant inquiring into the
voluntariness of his change of plea and his comprehension of its consequences. Satisfied with
appellant's response, the court ordered his rearraignment. Appellant, with the assistance of counsel,
withdrew his plea of "not guilty" and entered a plea of "guilty" as charged.4 Thereafter, the court
ordered the prosecution to present its evidence.
The prosecution presented the testimony of private complainant, Chenny Chua. It also presented
Chenny's sworn statement before the Malolos police investigators5 and the medico-legal report of
the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory on the girl's physical condition.6 From these
evidence, the following facts were established: On March 28, 1998, at around 2:00 in the afternoon
in Canalate, Malolos, Bulacan, Chenny Chua, thirteen (13) years of age, and her father, herein
accused-appellant, were watching television in the house of her aunt, Salvacion Ardenio Niegas. At
about 2:15, Chenny stood up and went to her family's rented room adjacent to her aunt's house.
Chenny entered the room and laid down on the floor to sleep. Beside her slept two of her younger
sisters. Some fifteen (15) minutes later, Chenny woke up and saw her father, herein appellant,
shaking her and calling her name. Then, she saw him remove her short pants. Chenny stared at
him. She knew what her father was going to do but did not resist him because he had been sexually
molesting her since July 1996. She resisted the very first time it happened, but he forced himself on
her and told her not to say anything about the incident. He said that if her mother would find out, her
mother would surely kill him, and she would be imprisoned and no one would take care of Chenny
and her seven (7) little brothers and sisters. So Chenny bore everything in silence. And that fateful
day, Chenny just closed her eyes as he peeled off her short pants. Appellant went on top of the girl
and parted her thighs. He inserted his penis into her vagina and made a push and pull movement for
some five minutes. After he was through, appellant told Chenny not to report the incident to her
mother. Appellant got up and suddenly sensed that someone was watching them. He turned around
and saw the gaping hole in the wall divider. The hole was not covered by the wall calendar as it used
to be.
Earlier, when appellant was on top of Chenny, the girl saw someone peeping through the hole in the
divider. It was her aunt, Salvacion Ardenio Niegas, and Chenny heard her exclaim "Nakita ko! Nakita
ko!" Chenny did not cry out for help because she was afraid. She then saw another person peering
through hole. It was her little cousin. When appellant realized that someone was watching them, he
got up and said "O, Gene!" and pretended to fix something at the door. Softly, appellant again
warned Chenny not to tell her mother about what he did to her.
Five days later, on April 2, 1998, Chenny's mother, Esterlita, arrived. She had just come from work in
Taytay, Rizal. Chenny's aunt lost no time in reporting to Esterlita what she witnessed. Fuming mad,
Esterlita roused her daughter from sleep and asked her about the incident. Chenny denied it. By
Esterlita's persistent questioning, however, Chenny finally admitted her father's dastardly act.
Forthwith, Esterlita brought her daughter to the police station where Chenny executed a sworn
statement and submitted herself to a physical and medical examination.
Dr. Manuel C. Aves, the medico-legal officer at the Philippine National Police (PNP) Regional Crime
Laboratory Office found the following:
BREAST: conical
ABDOMEN: flat
GENITAL
CERVIX: smooth
On May 22, 1998, the trial court found appellant guilty of the offense and sentenced him to death.
The court held:
"WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, this Court hereby finds accused ALBERTO CHUA
alias Bert GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape defined and penalized
under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, and
sentences him to suffer the penalty of Death and to pay private complainant Chenny Chua
the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages and Twenty Thousand
Pesos (P20,000.00) as exemplary damages. With costs.
SO ORDERED."8
"I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN METING OUT THE DEATH PENALTY ON THE
ACCUSED DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF
MINORITY WAS NOT PROPERLY ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION. THE FACT THAT
COMPLAINANT DAUGHTER WAS DESCRIBED AS A "MINOR" IN THE INFORMATION IS
A CONCLUSION OF LAW AND NOT A STATEMENT OF FACT.
"II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ACCEPTING WITH ALACRITY ACCUSED'S PLEA OF
GUILTY TO THE OFFENSE. CHARGED."9
When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, Rule 116, Section 3 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure provides the following procedure:
"Sec. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence. When the accused pleads
guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness
and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and require the prosecution to prove
his guilt and the precise degree of culpability.
When the accused enters a plea of guilty to a capital offense, the trial court must do the following: (1)
conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness of the plea and the accused's full comprehension
of the consequences thereof; (2) require the prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt of the
accused and the precise degree of his culpability; and (3) ask the accused if he desires to present
evidence in his behalf and allow him to do so if he desires.11 This procedure is mandatory and a
judge who fails to observe it commits grave abuse of discretion.12
The essence of a plea of guilty is that the accused admits his guilt freely, voluntarily and with fill
knowledge of the consequences and meaning of his act and with a clear understanding of the
precise nature of the crime charged in the complaint or information.13 Thus, when the accused enters
a plea of guilt, the trial court must, first of all, determine the voluntariness of the said plea and
accused's comprehension of its consequences. In making such determination, the court must
conduct a searching inquiry. The inquiry is not a simple question and answer exercise; it must be
searching. To "search" means "to look into or over carefully or thoroughly in an effort to find
something."14 This looking into carefully and thoroughly, in the matter under consideration, must be
focused on: (1) the voluntariness of the plea; and (2) the full comprehension of the consequences of
said plea.15
There is no hard and fast rule as to the number and type of questions the judge may put to the
accused, or as to the earnestness with which he may conduct the inquiry. What is essential is that
the judge should, first of all, consider the age, personality, educational background, socio-economic
status and other personal circumstances of the accused confessing his guilt.16 The trial judge should
determine whether the accused had been coerced or placed under a state of duress either by actual
threats of physical harm coming from malevolent or avenging quarters, or by mistaken impressions
given, wittingly or unwittingly, by authorities or parties; whether the accused had the assistance of
competent counsel during the custodial and preliminary investigations; and whether he understood
the charges against him.17 The court should inquire if the accused knows the crime with which he is
charged and explain to him the elements of the crime and the corresponding penalty therefor. The
court may require the accused to fully narrate the incident that spawned the charges against him, or
make him reenact the manner in which he perpetrated the crime, or cause him to furnish and explain
missing details of significance18about his personal circumstances, about the commission of the crime
and events during the custodial and preliminary investigation. In doing so, all questions posed by the
judge to the accused should be in a language known and understood by the latter.19 Still, the inquiry
need not stop with the accused. The court may also propound questions to accused's counsel to
determine whether or not said counsel had conferred with, and completely explained to accused the
meaning of a plea and its consequences.20 In all cases, the bottom line is that the judge must fully
convince himself that: (1) the accused, in pleading guilty, is doing so voluntarily; and (2) he, in so
doing, is truly guilty, and that there exists a rational basis for a finding of guilt, based on his
testimony.21
In the case at bar, appellant claims that the trial court accepted his plea of guilt without following the
procedure laid down in the Rules of Court. He alleges that the court should have placed him on the
witness stand to find out if he actually understood the effect of his action and to hear his version of
the events.22
We agree.
"SECOND CALL
ATTY. LADERAS : Same appearance for the accused. Your honor, may I request for a five-
minute recess to confer with the accused because he is intending to change his plea.
COURT : Do you understand that by withdrawing your former plea and entering a plea of
guilty, you will be sentenced by this court to the penalty of death?
COURT : And despite that fact, you will still insist on withdrawing your former plea of NOT
GUILTY and change it to one GUILTY as charged?
ATTY. LADERAS : He will accept whatever will be the punishment of the court.
COURT : In other words, you are determined to admit that you are guilty as charged?
COURT : Despite the fact that the penalty of the charge carries with it the penalty of death?
ACCUSED : I cannot do anything, your honor. If that will be the verdict, your honor.
COURT : You are not being forced to admit the charge. But if you admit and enter the plea
of guilty to the charge, the court will impose the penalty of death.
COURT : When this case was called for pretrial conference, accused Alberto Chua, through
counsel, manifested that he is withdrawing his former plea of NOT GUILTY and he is
changing it to one of GUILTY as charged. Rearraigned, the accused, assisted by Atty. Ma.
Cristine Laderas of the Public Attorney's Office entered a plea of GUILTY as charged. After
conducting searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the
consequences of his plea, the accused voluntarily manifested to the Court that he
understood all the consequences of his change of plea and that he is willing to face the
verdict of death. Considering the accused's plea of guilty to a capital offense, the prosecution
was required to present evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of
his culpability. SO ORDERED.
From the foregoing, it is clear that the court a quo did not probe carefully and thoroughly into the
reasons for appellant's change of plea and his comprehension of the consequences of said plea.
First of all, there was no determination of appellant's age, personality, educational background and
socio-economic status. All questions the court propounded were couched in English and yet there is
nothing in the records to show that appellant had a good comprehension, or at least, a nodding
acquaintance with the English language. As to whether the judge translated and explained his
questions to appellant in a language or dialect known and understood by the latter is not likewise
borne by the records. It is not insignificant that appellant revealed to the trial judge that it was difficult
to go against his family. This statement should have led the trial judge to inquire into the family
background and the voluntariness of appellant's guilty plea. But no questions were asked. It would
have been well for the court to go over appellant's relationship with the victim and the other family
members, the specific reason why appellant decided to change his plea, the effect of his guilty plea
on his family, and the fact that despite said plea, if his family knew that he was still to be put to
death.
Further, the trial court did not bother to explain the essential elements of the crime with which
appellant was charged. Appellant was convicted by the court a quo of incestuous rape under the first
qualifying circumstance of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 7659. The
information charged him with "rape penalized under the provisions of Art. 335 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by R.A. 7659." It did not specify under what particular paragraph of Article 335
the charge was made. Nothing in the record shows that appellant was aware as to what specific
paragraph of the law he was being charged. As regards the penalty, the court may have repeatedly
informed appellant that his penalty was death, notwithstanding his guilty plea, but it did not disclose
the indemnity he was to pay the victim. The decision of the court ordered appellant to pay Chenny
the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages and P20,000.00 as exemplary damages. As a result of
the court's failure to fully explain the basis of appellant's indictment, appellant was not accorded his
fundamental right to be informed of the precise nature of the accusation against him, and was
therefore denied due process.24
The trial court did not only neglect to make the searching inquiry, it also failed to inquire from
appellant whether he desired to present evidence in his behalf. This is the third requirement under
Section 3, Rule 116. The prosecution presented the victim's testimony, her sworn statement and
medico-legal report as its evidence. But when cross-examination came, appellant's counsel declined
to do so. The court merely accepted this and did not inquire into the reason why they waived cross-
examination. Given this disinterest, the court should have, at least, informed appellant that he could
present his own evidence and ask him if he desired to do so. Courts must proceed with meticulous
care wherever the punishment for the crime is in its severest form. The execution of a death
sentence is irrevocable and experience has shown that innocent persons have, at times, pleaded
guilty.25In capital offenses, the essence of judicial review is anchored on the principle that while
society allows violent retribution for heinous crimes committed against it, it always must make certain
that the blood of the innocent is not spilled, or that the guilty are not made to suffer more than their
just measure of punishment and retribution.26The prudent course to follow is to take testimony not
only to satisfy the trial judge but also to aid the Supreme Court in determining whether the accused
understood the significance and consequences of his plea.27 This is to preclude any room for
reasonable doubt in the mind of the trial court, or this Court on review, as to the possibility that there
might have been some misunderstanding by the accused of the nature of the charge to which he
pleaded guilty, and to ascertain the circumstances attendant to the commission of the crime which
justify or require the exercise of a greater or lesser degree of severity in the imposition of the
prescribed penalties.28
There is also another element of the crime overlooked by the trial court. Chenny testified that on that
day subject of the complaint-information, when appellant started peeling off her short pants, she did
not resist him. She just stared at her father knowing what he was going to do to her. She fought back
the very first time he molested her, but he forced himself on her. Since then, she did not resist him;
and that day was like the rest. Appellant was able to satisfy his lust on the girl without exerting force
or intimidation on her.
In incestuous rape cases, the victim's lack of resistance has been explained as a product of the
moral ascendancy parents exercise over their children, viz:
"x x x A rape victim's actions are oftentimes overwhelmed by fear rather than by reason. It is
this fear, springing from the initial rape, that the perpetrator hopes to build a climate of
extreme psychological terror, which would, he hopes, numb his victim into silence and
submissiveness. Incestuous rape magnifies this terror, because the perpetrator is a person
normally expected to give solace and protection to the victim. Furthermore, in incest, access
to the victim is guaranteed by the blood relationship, proximity magnifying the sense of
helplessness and degree of fear.
x x x [T]he rapist perverts whatever moral ascendancy and influence he has over his victim in
order to intimidate and force the latter to submit to repeated acts of rape over a period of
time. In many instances, he succeeds and the crime is forever kept on a lid. In a few cases,
the victim suddenly finds the will to summon unknown sources of courage to cry out for help
and bring her depraved malefactor to justice.
x x x The perpetrator takes full advantage of his blood relationship, ascendancy and
influence over his victim, both to commit the sexual assault and to intimidate the victim into
silence. Unfortunately for some perpetrators of incestuous rape, their victims manage to
break out from the cycle of fear and terror. x x x. . . ."29
In Philippine society, the father is considered the head of the family, and the children are taught not
to defy the father's authority even when this is abused. They are taught to respect the sanctity of
manage and to value the family above everything else. Hence, when the abuse begins, the victim
sees no reason or need to question the righteousness of the father whom she had trusted right from
the start.30 The value of respect and obedience to parents instilled among Filipino children is
transferred into the very same value that exposes them to risks of exploitation by their own
parents.31 The sexual relationship could begin so subtly that the child does not realize that it is
abnormal. Physical force then becomes unnecessary. The perpetrator takes full advantage of this
blood relationship. Most daughters cooperate and this is one reason why they suffer tremendous
guilt later on. It is almost impossible for a daughter to reject her father's advances, for children
seldom question what grown-ups tell them to do.32
But incest, no matter how despicable, hateful and revolting it is both to the victim and society, is not
a crime in our statute books. There is no law that specifically defines and penalizes incest. The case
at bar involves rape. Rape, under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is committed
by having carnal knowledge of a woman: (1) by using force or intimidation; (2) when the woman is
deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or (3) when the woman is under twelve years of age or
is demented.33 In the instant case, the victim was not under twelve years of age or demented when
her father abused her. Neither was she deprived of reason or rendered unconscious. No force or
violence was used on her, she herself testified. As to whether there was intimidation, this element
must be viewed in the light of the victim's perception and judgment at the time of the commission of
the crime. It is addressed to the mind of the victim and is, therefore, subjective.34
There is nothing in Chenny's testimony that shows how appellant intimidated her into giving him her
body. Intimidation breaks down the victim's moral resistance and makes her submit to the evil in
order to escape what she conceives to be a greater evil.35 There is no proof of what greater evil
Chenny had to escape that made her submit to her father's carnal desires. The mere fact that
appellant is her father and therefore exercises moral ascendancy over his daughter cannot ipso
facto lead this Court to conclude that there was intimidation. There must be some evidence of the
intimidation employed on the victim as to indubitably show how vitiated the victim's consent was to
the violation of her womanhood. After all, rape is committed against or without the consent of the
victim.36 The very first time appellant violated Chenny, he did not use any weapon to threaten her
into submission. Neither did appellant threaten her with blackmail or words of terror. He warned her
not to tell her mother because if she did, her mother will surely kill him and she will land in jail and no
one will take care of Chenny and her younger brothers and sisters. These words of doom may give
the reason why Chenny did not report the incident or incidents to her mother, her aunt or other
people; but they do not show how they brainwashed her into giving in to appellant's lustful desires.
The doomsday scenario is not per se sufficient to establish the psychological terror that made the
girl submit to her father. The court cannot rely on presumptions of moral ascendancy,37 for in this
new century where mores change, it could well be that in certain cases, the traditional moral
ascendancy of a parent over children is a myth. Presumptions of moral ascendancy cannot and
should not prevail over the constitutional presumption of innocence. Force or intimidation is an
element of the crime of rape. There must, therefore, be proof beyond reasonable doubt that the
victim did not resist her defloration due to the moral ascendancy of the accused.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the judgment appealed from is set aside. The case is remanded to the trial
court for rearraignment and thereafter, should the accused appellant enter a plea of "guilty," for
reception of evidence for the prosecution, and should the accused-appellant so desire, for reception
likewise of evidence on his part, all in accord with the guidelines set forth in this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
Davide Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo,
Buena, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez and De Leon Jr., JJ., concur.
SYLLABI/SYNOPSIS
THIRD DIVISION
DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
This petition for certiorari seeks to nullify the Resolution of the Deputy Ombudsman for the
Military dated 19 January 1998[1] which recommended the dismissal of the criminal complaint
filed by petitioner against herein private respondents for violation of Article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code for delay in the delivery of detained persons, and the Order of April 13 1998 [2] which
denied his motion for reconsideration.
The pertinent facts leading to the filing of the petition at bar are as follows:
On September 7, 1997, petitioner, together with a certain Sherwin Jugalbot, was arrested and
detained at the Liloan Police Station, Metro Cebu for an alleged violation of R.A. 7610, the
Special Protection of Children Against Child abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act. [3] The
following day, or on September 8, 1997, a Complaint for violation of R.A. 7610 was filed
against petitioner and Jugalbot before the 7th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Liloan, Metro
Cebu by one Joan Gicaraya for and in behalf of her daughter Gayle[4] The complaint, insofar as
pertinent, reads as follows:
That on the 7th day of September 1997 at Sitio Bonbon, Brgy. Catarman, Liloan,
Metro Cebu, Philippines and within the Preliminary Jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, did then and there, willfully, feloniously and
unlawfully, conspiring, confederating, helping with one another, while accused
JASPER AGBAY manipulating to finger the vagina of GAYLE FATIMA
AMIGABLE GICAYARA, his companion block the sight of the Private Complainant,
Mrs. JOAN A. GICAYARA, while on board a tricycle going their destinations. Upon
initial investigation of the Bgy, Captain of Bgy. Catarman, accused SHERWIN
JUGALBOT was released and accused JASPER AGBAY is presently detain Liloan
Police Station Jail. Medical Certificate issued from Don Vicente Sotto Memorial
Medical Center, Cebu City is hereto attached.
On September 10, 1997, counsel for petitioner wrote the Chief of Police of Liloan
demanding the immediate release of petitioner considering that the latter had failed to deliver the
detained Jasper Agbay to the proper judicial authority within thirty-six (36) hours from
September 7, 1997.[5] Private respondents did not act on this letter and continued to detain petitioner. [6]
On September 12, 1997, the 7th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Liloan, Metro Cebu issued
an order, denominated as Detention During the Pendency of the Case, committing petitioner to
the jail warden of Cebu City.[7] Five (5) days later, or on September 17, 1997, petitioner was
ordered released by the said court after he had posted bond.[8]
On September 26, 1997, petitioner filed a complaint for delay in the delivery of detained
persons against herein private respondents SPO4 Nemesio Natividad, Jr., SPO2 Eleazar M.
Salomon and other unidentified police officers stationed at the Liloan Police Substation, before
the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas.[9]
Regarding the complaint for violation of R.A. 7610, it is alleged by petitioner that on
November 10, 1997, the 7th MCTC of Liloan, Metro Cebu issued a resolution containing the
following dispositive portion:
WHEREFORE, finding probable cause for the crime in Violation of Republic Act
7610, it is hereby recommended that an INFORMATION be filed against the two
aforenamed accused.
Forward the record of this case to the Provincial Fiscals Office for appropriate
action.[10]
By virtue of Memorandum Circular No. 14, Series of 1995, dated 10 October 1995 of the
Office of the Ombudsman,[11] the case for delay in delivery filed by petitioner against herein private
respondents before the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas was transferred to the Deputy Ombudsman for the
Military for its proper disposition. Thus, it was this office which acted on the complaint, now denominated as OMB-
VIS-CRIM-97-0786, and which issued the questioned Resolution dated January 19, 1998 recommending its
dismissal against herein private respondents. Petitioner moved for reconsideration of this Resolution but this motion
was denied in an Order dated April 13, 1998.
On the first issue, petitioner argues that due to the civilian character of the Philippine
National Police, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military, by virtue of the
description of the Office, has no competence or jurisdiction to act on his complaint against
private respondents who are members of the PNP. Petitioner also questions the constitutionality
of Memorandum Circular No. 14 insofar as it purports to vest the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Military Affairs with jurisdiction to investigate all cases against personnel of the
Philippine National Police.
There is no dispute as to the civilian character of our police force. The 1987 Constitution, in
Section 6, Article XVI, has mandated the establishment of one police force, which shall be
national in scope and civilian in character (underscoring supplied). Likewise, R.A. 6975[13] is
categorical in describing the civilian character of the police force.[14] The only question now is
whether Memorandum Circular No. 14, in vesting the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the
Military with jurisdiction to investigate complaints against members of the PNP, violates the
latters civilian character.
As opined by the Office of the Solicitor General in its Comment dated 7 December 1998 [15],
the issue as to whether the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military has the authority to investigate
civilian personnel of the government was resolved in the affirmative in the case of Acop v. Office
of the Ombudsman.[16] In that case, the petitioners, who were members of the Philippine National
Police questioned the jurisdiction of the Deputy Ombudsman to investigate the alleged shootout
of certain suspected members of the Kuratong Baleleng robbery gang; this Court held that:
The deliberations on the Deputy for the military establishment do not yield conclusive
evidence that such deputy is prohibited from performing other functions or duties
affecting non-military personnel. On the contrary, a review of the relevant
Constitutional provisions reveal otherwise.
SEC. 11. Structural Organization.- The authority and responsibility for the exercise of
the mandate of the Office of the Ombudsman and for the discharge of its powers and
functions shall be vested in the Ombudsman, who shall have supervision and control
of the said Office.
SEC, 31. Designation of Investigators and Prosecutors.- The Ombudsman may utilize
the personnel of his office and/or designate or deputize any fiscal, state prosecutor to
assist in the investigation and prosecution of certain cases. Those designated or
deputized to assist him herein shall be under his supervision and control.
Accordingly, the Ombudsman may refer cases involving non-military personnel for
investigation by the Deputy for Military Affairs. In these cases at bench, therefore, no
irregularity attended the referral by the Acting Ombudsman of the Kuratong
Baleleng case to respondent Casaclang who, in turn, created a panel of investigators.[17]
The cited case is determinative of the issue. However, petitioner, in his Reply to Comment
dated February 1, 1999, argues that the ruling in the Acop case is not on all fours with the case at
bar[18].Petitioner states that the doctrine laid down in the said case is simply that the Ombudsman
may refer cases involving non-military personnel for investigation by the Deputy for Military
Affairs. This doctrine, petitioner argues, applies only to isolated or individual cases involving
non-military personnel referred by the Ombudsman to the Deputy for Military Affairs and does
not apply when, as in this case, there is a wholesale or indiscriminate referral of such cases to the
Deputy Ombudsman for Military Affairs in the form of an Office Memorandum Circular.
Petitioners arguments do not convince as there is no basis for the distinction.
There is no basis in the above-cited decision to limit the referral of cases involving non-
military personnel to the Deputy Ombudsman for Military Affairs to isolated or individual cases.
The Office of the Ombudsman, in issuing Memorandum Circular No. 15, is simply
exercising the power vested in the Ombudsman to utilize the personnel of his office and/or
designate or deputize any fiscal, state prosecutor or lawyer in the government service to act as
special investigator or prosecutor to assist in the investigation and prosecution of certain cases.
This Court, absent any grave abuse of discretion, may not interfere with the exercise by the
Ombudsman of his power of supervision and control over the said Office.
Petitioner further argues that Memorandum Circular No. 14 violates the clear intent and
policy of the Constitution and of R.A. 6975 to maintain the civilian character of the police force
and would render nugatory and meaningless the distinction between cases involving civilian and
military personnel and the creation of separate divisions of the Ombudsman.[19]
Said contentions are misplaced.
The Deputy Ombudsman for the Military, despite his designation as such, is by no means a
member of the military establishment. The said Office was established to extend the Office of the
Ombudsman to the military establishment just as it champions the common people against
bureaucratic indifference. The Office was intended to help the ordinary foot soldiers to obtain
redress for their grievances against higher authorities and the drafters of the Constitution were
aware that the creation of the Office, which is seemingly independent of the President, to
perform functions which constitutionally should be performed by the President, might be in
derogation of the powers of the President as Commander-In-Chief of the Armed Forces[20]
It must be borne in mind that the Office of the Ombudsman was envisioned by the framers
of the 1987 Constitution as the eyes and ears of the people[21] and a champion of the
citizen.[22] Sec. 12, Art. XI of the 1987 Constitution describes the Ombudsman and his deputies as
protectors of the people. Thus, first and foremost, the Ombudsman and his deputies, including
the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military owe their allegiance to the people and ordinary citizens;
it is clearly not a part of the military. We fail to see how the assumption of jurisdiction by the
said office over the investigation of cases involving the PNP would detract from or violate the
civilian character of the police force when precisely the Office of the Ombudsman is a civilian
office.
The other issues raised by petitioner concerns the application of Art. 125 of the Revised
Penal Code which provides as follows:
Art. 125. Delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial authorities. -
The penalties provided in the next preceding article shall be imposed upon the public
officer or employee who shall detain any person for some legal ground and shall fail
to deliver such person to the proper judicial authorities within the period of: twelve
(12) hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by light penalties, or their equivalent;
eighteen (18) hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by correctional penalties, or
their equivalent; and thirty-six hours (36) hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by
afflictive or capital penalties, or their equivalent.
In every case, the person detained shall be informed of the cause of his detention and
shall be allowed, upon his request, to communicate and confer at any time with his
attorney or counsel.
In the case at bar, petitioner was arrested and detained at the Liloan Police Station on 7
September 1997 for an alleged violation of R.A. 7610, specifically section 5(b) thereof[23]. This
crime carries a penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua, an afflictive
penalty. Under these circumstances, a criminal complaint or information should be filed with the proper judicial
authorities within thirty six (36) hours of his arrest.
As borne by the records before us the mother of private complainant, Joan Gicaraya, filed a
complaint on 8 September 1997 against petitioner for violation of R.A. 7610 before the 7th
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Liloan, Metro Cebu.
Petitioner contends that the act of private complainant in filing the complaint before the
MCTC was for purposes of preliminary investigation as the MCTC has no jurisdiction to try the
offense. This act of private complainant petitioner argues, was unnecessary, a surplusage which
did not interrupt the period prescribed by Art. 125[24] considering that under the Rules it is the
Regional Trial Court which has jurisdiction to try the case against him. As such, upon the lapse
of the thirty-six hours given to the arresting officers to effect his delivery to the proper Regional
Trial Court, private respondents were already guilty of violating Art. 125. Thus, petitioner
argues, when the Judge-Designate of the 7th MCTC issued a Commitment Order on September
12, 1997, he was acting contrary to law since by then there was no basis for the continued
detention of petitioner.[25]
In addressing the issue, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Military in its 13 April
1998 Order, stated that the duty of filing the corresponding complaint in court was fulfilled by
respondent when the formal complaint was filed on September 8, 1997 with the 7th MCTC of
Liloan-Compostela, barely 20 hours after the arrest of herein complainant of September 7,
1997.[26] The Solicitor General, for his part, argues that while a municipal court judge may
conduct preliminary investigations as an exception to his normal judicial duties, he still retains
the authority to issue an order of release or commitment. As such, upon the filing of the
complaint with the MCTC, there was already compliance with the very purpose and intent of
Art. 125[27]
The core issue is whether the filing of the complaint with the Municipal Trial Court
constitutes delivery to a proper judicial authority as contemplated by Art. 125 of the Revised
Penal Code.
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code is intended to prevent any abuse resulting from
confining a person without informing him of his offense and without permitting him to go on
bail[28]. More specifically, it punishes public officials or employees who shall detain any person
for some legal ground and shall fail to deliver such person to the proper judicial authorities
within the periods prescribed by law. The continued detention of the accused becomes illegal
upon the expiration of the periods provided for by Art. 125 without such detainee having been
delivered to the corresponding judicial authorities[29]
The words judicial authority as contemplated by Art. 125 mean the courts of justices or
judges of said courts vested with judicial power to order the temporary detention or confinement
of a person charged with having committed a public offense, that is, the Supreme Court and other
such inferior courts as may be established by law.[30]
Petitioner takes great pains in arguing that when a municipal trial court judge, as in the
instant case, conducts a preliminary investigation, he is not acting as a judge but as a fiscal. In
support, petitioner cites the cases of Sangguniang Bayan ng Batac, Ilocos Norte vs. Albano, 260
SCRA 561, and Castillo vs. Villaluz, 171 SCRA 39, where it was held that when a preliminary
investigation is conducted by a judge, he performs a non-judicial function as an exception to his
usual duties. Thus, petitioner opines, the ruling in Sayo v. Chief of Police of Manila, 80 Phil. 862,
that the city fiscal is not the proper judicial authority referred to in Art. 125 is applicable.
Petitioners reliance on the cited cases is misplaced. The cited cases of Sangguniang
Bayan and Castillo dealt with the issue of whether or not the findings of the Municipal Court
Judge in a preliminary investigation are subject to review by provincial and city fiscals. There
was no pronouncement in these cases as to whether or not a municipal trial court, in the exercise
of its power to conduct preliminary investigations, is a proper judicial authority as contemplated
by Art. 125.
Neither can petitioner rely on the doctrine enunciated in Sayo vs. Chief of Police,
supra, since the facts of this case are different. In Sayo, the complaint was filed with the city
fiscal of Manila who could not issue an order of release or commitment while in the instant case,
the complaint was filed with a judge who had the power to issue such an order. Furthermore, in
the Resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration of the Sayo case[31], this Court even made
a pronouncement that the delivery of a detained person is a legal one and consists in making a
charge or filing a complaint against the prisoner with the proper justice of the peace or judge of
Court of First Instance in provinces, and in filing by the city fiscal of an information with the
corresponding city courts after an investigation if the evidence against said person warrants.
The power to order the release or confinement of an accused is determinative of the issue. In
contrast with a city fiscal, it is undisputed that a municipal court judge, even in the performance
of his function to conduct preliminary investigations, retains the power to issue an order of
release or commitment[32]. Furthermore, upon the filing of the complaint with the Municipal Trial
Court, the intent behind Art. 125 is satisfied considering that by such act, the detained person is
informed of the crime imputed against him and, upon his application with the court, he may be
released on bail[33]. Petitioner himself acknowledged this power of the MCTC to order his release
when he applied for and was granted his release upon posting bail[34]. Thus, the very purpose
underlying Article 125 has been duly served with the filing of the complaint with the MCTC. We
agree with the position of the Ombudsman that such filing of the complaint with the MCTC
interrupted the period prescribed in said Article.
Finally, we note that it was the mother of private complainant who filed the complaint
against petitioner with the 7th MCTC of Liloan, Metro Cebu. If there was any error in this
procedure, private respondents should not be held liable. In the same manner, petitioners
argument that the controversial orders issued by the MCTC are contrary to law does not give rise
to criminal liability on the part of the respondents. Respondent police officers may have rendered
themselves open to sanctions if they had released petitioners without the order of the court,
knowing fully well that a complaint was already filed with it.
WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of the assailed January
19, 1998 Resolution and the April 13, 1998 Order of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for
the Military, the Court resolves to DISMISS the petition. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, (Acting Chairman), Panganiban, and Purisima, JJ., concur.
Romero, J., abroad, on official business leave.
[1]
Rollo, pp. 42-43.
[2]
Rollo, pp. 34-36.
[3]
Rollo, p. 6.
[4]
Annex B of Petition; Rollo, p. 37.
[5]
Annex C of Petition; Rollo, p. 38
[6]
Rollo, p. 7.
[7]
Annex D of Petition: Rollo, p. 39.
[8]
Annex E of Petition; Rollo, p. 40.
[9]
Annex F of Petition; Rollo, p. 41.
[10]
Rollo, p. 8.
[11]
Which reads, in part, as follows:
In pursuance of the Offices mandate to promote efficient service to the people and conformably with the powers
vested in the Ombudsman under Section 15, par. 10 and Section 31 of RA 6770, the Deputy Ombudsman for the
Military shall continue to investigate all cases against personnel of the PNP, BFP, and BJMP.
[12]
Rollo, pp. 9-10.
[13]
Entitled, An Act Establishing the Philippine National Police Under a Reorganized Department of the Interior and
Local Government and For Other Purposes, otherwise known as the Department of the Interior and Local
Government Act of 1990.
[14]
R.A. 6975, Section 2. Declaration of Policy.--It is hereby declared that the policy of the State to promote peace
and order, ensure public safety and further strenghten local government capability aimed towards the effective
delivery of the basic services to the citizenry through the establishment of a highly efficient and competent police
force that is national in scope and civilian in character. xxx
The police force shall be organized, trained and equipped primarily for the performance of police functions. Its
national scope and civilian character shall be paramount. xxx
[15]
Rollo, pp. 79-81.
[16]
248 SCRA 566.
[17]
Id. pp. 587-588
[18]
Rollo, p. 92.
[19]
Reply; Rollo, pp. 95-96.
[20]
Record of the Constitutional Commission, vol. 2, p. 318-320 (hereinafter 2 Record).
[21]
2 Record, p. 267.
[22]
2 Record, p. 268.
[23]
Sec. 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse.-
xxx
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the following:
xxx
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or
subjected to other sexual abuse:xxx
[24]
Rollo, p. 98.
[25]
Rollo, p. 27.
[26]
Rollo, p. 35.
[27]
Comment, p. 83.
[28]
Laurel v. Misa, 76 Phil 372.
[29]
Lino v. Fugoso, 77 Phil. 933.
[30]
Sayo v. Chief of Police of Manila, 80 Phil 859 citing Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution.
[31]
80 Phil. 875.
[32]
Rule 112, Sec. 6 (b), Rules of Court. When warrant of arrest may issue.- (a) By the Regional Trial Court.-Upon
the filing of an information, the Regional Trial Court may issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused.
(b) By the Municipal Trial Court.- If the municipal trial judge conducting the preliminary investigation is satisfied
after an examination in writing and under oath of the complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching
questions and answers, that a probable cause exists and that there is a necessity of placing the respondent under
immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice, he shall issue a warrant of arrest.
[33]
Rule 112, Sec. 5, Rules of Court. Duty of investigating judge.- Within ten (10) days after the conclusion of the
preliminary investigation, the investigating judge shall transmit to the provincial or city fiscal, for appropriate
action, the resolution of the case, which shall include: (a) the warrant, if the arrest is by virtue of a warrant; (b) the
affidavits and other supporting evidence of the parties; (c) the undertaking or bail of the accused; (d) the order of
release of the accused and the cancellation of his bail bond, if the resolution is for the dismissal of the complaint.
xxx
Rule 114, Section 4, Rules of Court. Bail, a matter of right.- All persons in custody shall: (a) before or after
conviction by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities and Municipal
Circuit Trial Court; and (b) before conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, be admitted to bail as a matter of right, with sufficient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as prescribed by law or this Rule.
[34]
Rollo, p. 40.
SECOND DIVISION
DECISION
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
44768 which reversed and set aside the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bansalan, Davao del
Sur, Branch 21.2
The Antecedents
Sometime in September 1987, then seventeen-year-old Elenito Lariosa visited his aunt, his fathers
older sister, Paulina Lariosa Matillano, at Lily Street, Poblacion Bansalan, Davao del Sur. On May 2,
1988, Lariosawas employed as a laborer at the Davao United Products Enterprise store, with a
monthly salary of P800.00. The store was owned by Leong Shiu Ben and King Kiao and was located
at the corner of Monteverde and Gempesaw Streets, Davao City. Lariosa was tasked to close the
store during lunchtime and after store hours in the afternoon. Ben himself opened the store in the
mornings and after lunchtime. Adjacent to the said store was another store owned by Kiaos son, Eli
Lui, who also happened to be Bens nephew. Aside from Lariosa, Ben and Kiao employed Maximo
Pagsa and Rene Malang.
Lariosa chose to live in the house of Kiao. Lariosa fed the dogs of his employer every morning
before going to work and in the afternoon, in exchange for free meals and lodging. There were
occasions when Lariosa stayed in the house of Pagsa and Malang and left some of his things with
them. Lariosa deposited his savings with the Mindanao Savings Bank in Bansalan.
On October 17, 1988, Lariosa was taken ill and was permitted to take the day off. He went to the
house of his aunt, Paulina Matillano, and her husband Eulogio Matillano in Bansalan City, where he
rested until the next day, October 18, 1988. Lariosa reported for work the day after, or on October
19, 1988, but Kiao told him that his employment was terminated. Lariosa was not paid his salary for
the month of October. Kiao warned Lariosa not to report the matter to the Department of Labor.
Lariosa decided to return to Bansalan without retrieving his things from Kiaos house.
On October 27, 1988, Lariosa returned to Davao City and was able to collect his backwages from
Ben in the amount of P500.00. Lariosa withdrew his savings from the Mindanao Savings Bank in
Bansalan City and on November 1, 1988, applied for a job at his cousins place, at Quimpo
Boulevard, Davao City. He bought a radio cassette for P2,500.00 and a pair of Rayban sunglasses
for P900.00.
On November 3, 1988, Lariosa went to the house of his fiancee, Nancy, at New Matina, Davao City,
but returned to Bansalan on the same day. On November 4, 1988, he returned to Nancys house
and stayed there until the next day, November 5, 1988.
That day, Ben informed his nephew, Eli Lui, that he had lost P45,000.00 in cash at the store. Ben
reported the matter to NBI Senior Agent Ruperto Galvez, and forthwith executed an affidavit wherein
he alleged that after Lariosas employment was terminated on October 19, 1988, he discovered that
he had lost P45,000.00 in cash. He suspected that Lariosa was the culprit because the latter, as a
former employee, had a duplicate key to the side door of the United Products Enterprise Store.
At 9:00 a.m. on November 6, 1988, a Sunday, Lariosa went to the house of Pagsa and Malang to
retrieve his things. The two invited Lariosa to go with them to the beach, and when Lariosa agreed,
they borrowed Luis Ford Fierra for their transportation. The vehicle stopped at the Almendras Hall
where Pagsa alighted on the pretext that he was going to buy fish. Lariosa, Rene, and his wife
remained in the Fierra. Pagsa contacted Lui and informed the latter that Lariosa was with him.
After about an hour, Lui arrived on board a vehicle. With him were Pagsa and two others, Alan
Mendoza and Henry Tan. Lui told Lariosa that he wanted to talk, and asked the latter to go with him.
Pagsa urged Lariosa to go along with Lui. Lariosa agreed and boarded Luis vehicle. The car
stopped in front of Luis house, where the latter alighted and went inside, while his companions and
Lariosa remained in the car. When Lui returned, he was armed with a 9 mm. caliber gun and poked
Lariosa with the weapon. He warned Lariosa not to run, otherwise, he would be killed. The group
went to Bens house to get the keys to the store. Ben joined them as they drove towards the store.
Lui mauled Lariosa and tried to force the latter to admit that he had stolen Bens money. Lariosa
refused to do so. Lui then brought Lariosa to the comfort room of the store and pushed his face into
the toilet bowl, in an attempt to force him into confessing to the crime. Lariosa still refused to admit to
anything. Lui then made a telephone call to the Metrodiscom (PNP) based in Davao City.
Sgt. Alberto Genise of the Metrodiscom (PNP) issued Mission Order No. MRF-A-004-88 dated
November 6, 1988, directing Pat. Leo Rojas "to follow up a theft case committed in Davao City from
12:30 p.m. to 5:00 p.m." Rojas was directed to coordinate with the nearest PNP headquarters and/or
stations. He was authorized to carry his firearm for the mission. He then left the police station on
board a police car and proceeded to the corner of Magsaysay and Gempesaw Streets.
In the meantime, a police car arrived at the store with two policemen on board. One of them
handcuffed Lariosa at gunpoint and ordered him to open the store with the use of the keys. As
Lariosa opened the lock as ordered, one of Luis companions took his picture. Another picture was
taken as Lariosa held the door knob to open the door. Lariosa was then boarded in the police car
and brought to the corner of Magsaysay and Gemphesaw Streets where he was transferred to the
police car driven by Rojas. He was brought to the Metrodiscom headquarters. Lui once more mauled
Lariosa, still trying to force the latter to confess that he stole P45,000.00 from his uncle and to reveal
what he did with the money. When a policeman asked him where he slept the night before, Lariosa
replied that he spent the night in the house of his girlfriends parents at New Matina, Davao City. The
policemen brought Lariosa there, where they asked Nancy if Lariosa had left anything while he slept
thereat. Nancy replied that Lariosa had left a radio cassette and a pair of sunglasses. The policemen
took these and brought Lariosa back to the Metrodiscom headquarters where Lui and his two
companions were waiting.
Lui asked Lariosa where he stayed when he went to Bansalan, and Lariosa replied that he used to
stay in the house of his aunt and uncle, the Spouses Matillano, in Lily Street, Poblacion Bansalan.
Rojas and Lui then brought Lariosa, with his hands still handcuffed, to a car. Luis companions, Alan
Mendoza and Henry Tan boarded another car and proceeded to the Matillano residence.
Without prior coordination with the Bansalan PNP, Rojas, who was in civilian clothes, Lui, Tan and
Mendoza arrived at the house of the Spouses Matillano at about 3:00 p.m, with the handcuffed
Lariosa in tow. With handguns drawn, they kicked the door to the kitchen and gained entry into the
house. They then proceeded to the sala where they found Lariosas aunt, Paulina Matillano. In the
adjacent room were Julieta, Lariosas sister, Paulinas daughter-in-law, Virginia, the latters sister,
Erlinda, and a seven-month-old baby. Paulina was shocked. Rojas told Paulina, "Mrs., we are
authorities. We are here to get something." Paulina remonstrated, "Why are you meddling
(manghilabot)?"
Lui poked his gun at Paulina and warned her not to talk anymore because something might happen.
He then said, "All right, where is your aparador because we are getting something." Paulina told Lui
to wait for her husband Eulogio. Lui ignored her protest and told her that they were in a hurry.
Paulina was then impelled to bring Lui and his two companions, Mendoza and Tan, to the second
floor where her aparador was located. Rojas and the handcuffed Lariosa remained in the sala. Lui
and his two companions then took two mats and two pairs of ladies shoes belonging to Paulina and
Eulogio, two pairs of pants, leather shoes, two t-shirts and two polo shirts which belonged to the
latters children. They also ordered Paulina to open a chest and when she did, Lui and his
companions took her old Bulova wristwatch, necklace, ring and old coins. Lui and his two
companions then went down to the ground floor. When Julieta went out of the room, one of Luis
companions recognized her as Lariosas sister. Lui and his companions brought her along with them
as they left the house.
Paulina was so unnerved by the incident. Her vision blurred, her stomach ached and she was on the
verge of losing consciousness. Concerned, Erlinda massaged Paulinas stomach. However, Erlinda
had to leave because she was worried about her mother. Paulina then went to the kitchen, prepared
hot water and put a soothing ointment on her stomach to relieve the pain.
In the meantime, Lui and his companions proceeded to the Bansalan Police Station and caused an
entry in the police blotter at 3:20 p.m. that he had recovered the following items from the Matillano
residence -- one pair of colored blue pants valued at P89.00; one floor mat costing P290.00; a pair of
black ladies shoes worth P126.00; and another pair of ladies shoes worth P69.00.
At 4:30 p.m., Paulina reported to the barangay captain that persons identifying themselves as
policemen had gained entry into their house and took the following: two polo shirts; two t-shirts; two
pairs of pants; two floor mats; two pairs of ladies shoes; one Bulova wristwatch; one necklace; one
ring; and old coins.3
At 7:35 p.m., Eulogio Matillano made an entry in the Bansalan police blotter that earlier that day, at
4:00 p.m., Rojas took the following from his house: two polo shirts; two t-shirts; 2 pairs of pants; two
floor mats; two pairs of ladies shoes; 1 Bulova wristwatch; 1 necklace; one ring; and, old coins,
without his and his wifes consent and without a search warrant.4 In the meantime, Doroteo Barawan,
officer-in-charge of the Office of the Barangay Captain, filed a complaint against Kim Kiao, et al.,
based on the complaint of Paulina, docketed as Barangay Case No. 168.5
On November 8, 1988, Lariosa executed an uncounselled confession where he stated that he
stole P40,000.00 on October 15, 1988 from the Davao United Products, and that he used part of the
money to buy appliances, a Sony cassette tape-recorder, two pairs of ladies shoes, a Seiko
wristwatch, two pairs of maong pants, Rayban sunglasses and floor mats.6
On November 16, 1988, an Information was filed in the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, charging
Lariosa with robbery with force upon things. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No.
17,136,88.7 The trial court rendered judgment on June 14, 1989, acquitting Lariosa of the crime
charged on reasonable doubt. The trial court held that Lui procured Lariosas confession through
force and intimidation, in connivance with police authorities.8 The trial court, likewise, found that Lui
had an ulterior motive for charging Lariosa of robbery:
What would have been the possible motive of complainant in putting the burden of this
charged against the accused despite want of any appreciable evidence, can be gathered in
the record, as indicating the fear of complainant, that the accused will file a complaint against
him in the Department of Labor for illegally dismissing him in his employment, without any
sufficient legal grounds and basis. This unfounded complaint was intended to support
complainants ground against any possible complaint, the accused might file against him with
the Department of Labor by way of anticipation.9
On motion of Lariosa, the trial court ordered the return of the following exhibits:
Accordingly and conformably with the judgment of this court dated June 14, 1989, one
Eulogio Matillano, accuseds uncle, is hereby allowed to get or to retrieve exhibits "H," "I,"
"J," "K," "L," and "M," consisting of Sony Cassette with serial no. W3658; Rayban
sunglasses; two (2) bundles of floor mat; two (2) pairs of pants; two (2) pairs of ladies shoes;
and Seiko Actus wristwatch.10
Meanwhile, Paulina Matillano filed a criminal complaint for robbery against Lui, Peter Doe, John Doe
and Alan Mendoza. An Information was, thereafter, filed against them in the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court of Bansalan, Davao del Sur, and the case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 880-B. On
December 13, 1988, the court issued a warrant for the arrest of the accused therein. Upon
reinvestigation, however, the Provincial Prosecutor issued a Resolution dated March 31, 1989,
recommending that the case be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence, but that the charges be
forwarded to the Judge Advocate Generals Office for possible administrative sanctions against
Rojas.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that the complaint against
the respondents Eli Lui be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. Considering that Pat. Leo Rojas is
a member of the Integrated National Police, this office is without jurisdiction to entertain the
complaint against him pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1850. Therefore, let the complaint against
Pat. Leo Rojas, together with its annexes, including a copy of the resolution of the undersigned, be
forwarded to the Judge Advocate Generals Office at Camp Catitipan, Davao City, for whatever
action it may take.11
The complaint was docketed as Administrative Case No. 92-0020. The National Police Commission,
thereafter, rendered a decision exonerating Rojas of administrative liability for the complainants
failure to substantiate the charges.12 The Commission held that Rojas was merely complying with the
mission order issued to him when he accompanied Lui and the latters two companions to the
Matillano residence.
In a Resolution dated August 25, 1989, then Secretary of Justice Silvestre H. Bello III dismissed the
petition for review of the Provincial Prosecutors resolution filed by Paulina Matillano. The Secretary
of Justice, likewise, denied a motion for reconsideration thereon.
In a parallel development, Lariosas parents, as well as Paulina Matillano, filed a complaint for
robbery, violation of domicile, unlawful arrest and/or arbitrary detention against Leo Rojas, Eli Lui, et
al., with the Commission of Human Rights docketed as CHR Case No. RFO No. 88-0207-DS. In a
Resolution dated December 4, 1989, the Regional Office of the Commission recommended, thus:
1. to indict Eli Lui for unlawful arrest as defined under Art. 369 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended; and
2. to indict both Eli Lui and Pat. Leo Rojas liable for Violation of Domicile, as defined
under Art. 128 of the same code.13
On January 11, 1990, the spouses Eulogio and Paulina Matillano filed a civil complaint for damages
in the Regional Trial Court of Davao del Sur against Eli Lui, Leo Rojas, Alan Mendoza and Henry
Tan. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. G-XXI-47(90). The plaintiffs therein alleged the
following:
3. That plaintiffs are merchants by occupation and have been residing in Bansalan, Davao
del Sur, for several years now. They are law-abiding and peaceful citizens in the community;
4. That at about 3:00 oclock in the afternoon of November 6, 1988, while plaintiff husband
was away from his residential house at Lily St., Bansalan, Davao del Sur, and plaintiff wife
was there tending the house, defendants, without any lawful search warrant, arrived and thru
intimidation succeeded in searching the house owned by the plaintiff after which they brought
with them two floor mats, two pairs of ladies shoes, two pairs of pants, two polo shirts, two T-
shirts, one Relova wrist watch, one necklace (sinubong), one ring (sinubong) and several old
coins, without the consent of the plaintiffs and without even giving any receipt for the items
taken;
5. That the defendants allegedly wanted to recover the items taken by one Elinito Lariosa but
defendants thru the use of naked power and brute force, illegally searched the house of the
herein plaintiffs in gross violation of plaintiffs constitutional rights;
6. That what defendants did in conspiring and confederating to illegally search the house of
plaintiffs and then taking with them the items mentioned above without even the benefit of
any receipt is not only violative of Article 19 in relation to Article 21 of the Civil Code but also
of Article 32 of the Civil Code;
7. That because of what defendants did, plaintiffs suffered mental anguishes, wounded
feelings, deprivation of the properties taken, besmirched reputation, and fright for which
reason defendants should be made to jointly and severally pay moral damages in the
amount of P500,000.00;
8. That in order to deter others similarly bent and minded and by way of example or
correction for the public good, defendants should be made to pay jointly and severally
exemplary damages in the amount of P300,000.00;
9. That in the protection of their rights, plaintiffs engaged the services of counsel for an
agreed attorneys fees equivalent to 25% of the total award plus per diem of P1,000.00 per
court appearance;
10. That plaintiffs are bound to incur litigation expenses in an amount not less
than P10,000.00;14
They prayed that, after due proceedings, judgment be rendered in their favor, viz:
WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that after hearing judgment issue ordering the
defendants to jointly and severally pay plaintiffs:
In their Answer to the complaint, the defendants therein alleged, inter alia, that they did not conduct
a search in the house of the plaintiffs and that plaintiff Paulina Matillano allowed them to enter the
house and even brought out pairs of pants. They added that the other items were brought out by
Lariosas sister and that they took only one (1) floor mat, two (2) pairs of ladies shoes, and one (1)
pair of blue pants.16
The defendants adduced evidence that plaintiff Paulina Matillano allowed them to enter their house,
and with Lariosas sister, voluntarily turned over the items declared in the complaint. They testified
that no violence, threats or intimidation were even committed by them against Paulina Matillano.
Defendant Rojas further testified that he was merely complying with the Mission Order issued to him
when he entered the house of the plaintiffs in the company of the other defendants, and that he
remained in the ground floor while the other defendants retrieved the goods from plaintiff Matillano in
the second floor of the house.
On August 18, 1993, the RTC rendered judgment, ordering the dismissal of the complaint for
plaintiffs failure to prove their claims. The trial court also dismissed the defendants counterclaims.
The trial court gave credence to the collective testimonies of the defendants, that plaintiff Paulina
Matillano voluntarily allowed them to enter her house, and that the latter voluntarily turned over the
subject items to them. The trial court took into account the findings of the Provincial Prosecutor, the
Secretary of Justice, the National Police Commission, as well as the order of the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court of Bansalan, dismissing Criminal Case No. 880-B.
2. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT MRS. PAULINA MATILLANO WAS
THE ONE WHO REPORTED THE MATTER TO THE BANSALAN POLICE STATION.
On April 22, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment reversing the decision of the RTC. The
decretal portion of the decision reads:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE and a new one entered ordering defendants-appellees jointly and severally:
SO ORDERED.18
The appellate court denied the appellees motion for reconsideration of the said decision. The
appellees Mendoza and Tan no longer appealed the decision.
Petitioners Eli Lui and Leo Rojas now assail the decision of the Court of Appeals contending that:
The Issues
The issues in this case may be synthesized, thus: (a) whether or not respondent Paulina Matillano
consented to the petitioners entry into her house, as well as to the taking of the clothes, shoes and
pieces of jewelry owned by her and her family; (b) whether or not the petitioners are liable for
damages to the respondents; and, (c) if so, the extent of the petitioners liability to the respondents.
Considering that the assignments of errors are interrelated, this Court shall delve into and resolve
them simultaneously.
Admittedly, the issues in the case at bar are factual. Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only
questions of law may be raised in this Court in a petition for review on certiorari. However, the rule
admits of some exceptions, such as a case where the findings of facts of the trial court are
substantially different from those of the appellate court, and the resolution of such issues are
determinative of the outcome of the petition.20
The petitioners aver that the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in discarding the factual
findings of the trial court. Contrary to the disquisitions of the appellate court, the petitioners assert
that the inconsistencies between the testimonies of Rojas and Lui are peripheral. Lui did not conduct
any search in the second floor of the respondents house and even if he did so, respondent Paulina
Matillano waived her right against unreasonable search when she allowed the petitioners to enter.
According to the petitioners, the respondents failed to prove that they forced their way into the house
of the respondents, and that the facts and circumstances which the appellate court found the trial
court to have overlooked are not, in fact, substantial enough to warrant a reversal of the factual
findings of the court a quo. According to the petitioners, the appellate court failed to discern that the
action filed by the respondents with the trial court was merely a leverage to the charge of robbery
against Lariosa, the respondents nephew.
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals gave credence and full probative weight to the evidence of
the respondents. It stated in its decision that the trial court erred in giving credence and probative
weight to the testimonies of the petitioners (the appellants therein). Moreover, the appellate court
found that the trial court had overlooked facts and circumstances of substance, which, if considered,
would have altered the courts decision. The appellate court gave weight to the findings of the trial
court in Criminal Case No. 17,136,88.21
The evidence of the respondents show that the petitioners, Tan and Mendoza, guns drawn and with
the handcuffed Lariosa in tow, kicked the kitchen door and barged into the house of the
respondents. They proceeded to the sala where respondent Paulina Matillano was. Over her
vehement protests, and because of petitioner Luis warning that she might be harmed, respondent
Paulina Matillano was forced to accompany the petitioner and his cohorts to the second floor of their
house. The foregoing was testified to by respondent Paulina Matillano, thus:
ATTY. SUARIO:
A I know him.
Q At about 3:00 oclock in the afternoon of November 6, 1988, did you notice any unusual
incident that took place in your house?
A There was.
A There were five (5) persons who suddenly went inside our house.
Q Now, where were you when they entered suddenly in your house?
Q Now, what did you do when you saw these five (5) persons entered (sic) your house?
A I was afraid.
ATTY. TAN:
ATTY. SUARIO:
She is responding the question because my question is, "Aside from fear, what did you do?"
and according to this witness, she was not able to do anything because one of those who
entered(not continued)
COURT:
ATTY. SUARIO:
A One of them said, "Mrs., we are authorities. We are here to get something from your
house."
Q Do you know who this person was, this person who was talking that they were persons in
authority?
A That person when he first went to our house, I do not know him yet, but I know (sic) him
later to be Leo Rojas.
A When the case was already being tried, he introduced himself as Leo Rojas.
Q Aside from Leo Rojas, who were the other persons who entered your house?
A Aside from the two (2) persons whom I do not know, my nephew was also with them in the
name of Elinito Lariosa.
A Eli Lui.
ATTY. SUARIO:
At least, may we ask, Your Honor, that the word "manghilabot" be incorporated.
COURT:
So, the word is "interfering" or "meddling." You record the word "manghilabot."
ATTY. SUARIO:
A Yes, because they said that they are taking some of our things and I said why are they
doing that (manghilabot)?
A It was Eli Lui who answered, "Mrs., do not answer anymore because something might
happen." (Basig madisgrasya).
ATTY. SUARIO:
ATTY. SUARIO:
Q When you heard those words from Eli Lui, what else transpired?
A He said, "All right, where is your aparador because we are getting something." And I even
told him that we should wait for my husband but they did not agree because they said they
are in a hurry.
Q You accompanied him upstairs, who are you referring to that you accompanied upstairs.
Q These two (2) companions whom you said you do not know their names?
A Yes, sir.22
ATTY. TAN:
Q Now, you said on November 6, 1988, five (5) men suddenly entered your house. When
you said suddenly, will you please describe how did they enter the house?
A They passed through the kitchen and suddenly appeared inside the house.
Q You mean to say that they did not knock at the door?
A What I first saw was that they immediately converged in the sala and whom I recognized
was Eli Lui and my nephew who was in handcuffs.
A Yes, sir.
Q Now, you said that you were afraid, why were you afraid?
A I am very sure.23
Respondent Paulina Matillano, likewise, testified that petitioner Lui and his cohorts took her personal
things, and those of her familys, from the second floor of the house:
Q Now, while you and Eli Lui with two (2) other companions were upstairs, what happened
upstairs?
A Upon reaching upstairs, they immediately rolled the two (2) floor mats, the pair of leather
shoes, 2 pairs of pants, two (2) polo-shirts. They also let me open the chest and when it was
already open they rummaged through it and they got my old Bulova watch, my necklace, my
ring and a coinsita, old gold coins.
A Old coins.
Q Now, you mentioned in this affidavit that several properties were taken from your house,
do you confirm that there were two (2) polo-shirts that were taken?
A Yes.
A Yes.
A Yes.
A Yes.
A Yes.
A In Davao City.
A NCCC.
Q 1988?
A 1988.
A My children.
Q So, you mean to say, on November 6, 1988, he was no longer residing in Bansalan?
A No more.
A Yes.
Q How about these two (2) pairs of pants, who owns these pants?
A My children also.
A In our house.
Q How come that Allan has a polo-shirt in your house when you said he was then residing in
Tacloban?
ATTY. SUARIO:
COURT:
All right.
A They used to have a vacation during December and March and usually they left some of
their clothes inside our aparador.
A Already used.
Q How about the pants?
A The other one is already used and the other one is new.
A That is mine.
Q Now, you claimed that these clothes were taken from the cabinet or aparador, is that
correct?
Q Inside your aparador, how many pieces of clothes were stored therein?
A Many.
A It cannot be counted.
A More.
Q And these more than three (3) dozens consists of polo shirts, t-shirts and pants?
A Yes.
Q And inspite (sic) the fact that there were more than three (3) dozens of clothes, pants, polo
shirts and t-shirts only these two (2) pants, two (2) polo shirts and two (2) t-shirts w ere
taken?
A Only those things because they only selected the ones which were still usable the good
ones.
Q Now, you mentioned also in your affidavit that the group also searched your trunk?
A Eli Lui.25
The respondents immediately reported the matter to the Office of the Barangay Captain26 and filed a
complaint against petitioner Lui and his cohorts.27
The petitioners claim that respondent Paulina Matillano allowed them and their cohorts inside the
house and voluntarily gave their personal belongings is belied by the unshaken testimony of
respondent Paulina Matillano, corroborated by Erlinda Clarin.
The petitioners attempt to project themselves to have acted with civility and courtesy to respondent
Paulina Matillano is implausible, taking into account petitioner Luis state of mind before he and
petitioner Rojas and their cohorts left the Metrodiscom Headquarters in Davao City, and proceeded
to the house of the respondents in Bansalan. Before they left Davao City, Lui sadistically mauled
Lariosa with the acquiescence of the police authorities, and forced him to give an uncounselled
extrajudicial confession. This was the finding of the RTC in Criminal Case No. 17,136,88:
Despite being mauled by Eli Lui and drowned in a toilet bowl, accused denied having
anything to do with the lost money of the complainant. Later, he was turned over to the police
for investigation and there without affording accused with his right to counsel, he was
interrogated orally and was forced to admit that out of the money he stole, he bought items
which the police later recovered at Bansalan. They also returned the accused to the
complainants establishment and forced to do re-enactment of the act of robbery, without
accused again afforded the right to counsel. Pictures were taken during the re-enactment
while accused was handcuffed, as shown in the pictures taken by the police.
Finally, the accused was forced to admit and sign his extrajudicial statement (Exhibit A), no
longer able to bear the pain of the mauling to him by Eli Lui, who has the temerity of
maltreating the accused even in the presence of the guards in the jail and seriously
threatening accused to admit ownership of the recovered items at Bansalan and at New
Matina, SIR, Davao City, otherwise he will be salvaged, along with the serious threatening
words of accuseds companion in the jail, that if he will refuse to sign his alleged confession,
he will be salvaged as directed by Eli Lui with the police.
Indeed, in the records, it can be deduced with sufficient basis, that Eli Lui seems to have an
open hand in the prosecution of accused. He was the one who called the police to arrest
him, even without a warrant of arrest. Before his statement was obtained, policeman relied
on him in the investigation and the filing of proper charges against accused. They rode in a
car of Eli Lui, in taking accused from the Metrodiscom to the establishment of complainant
during the re-enactment in going to Bansalan, to recover the items allegedly bought by
accused out of the money allegedly stolen; all of these incidents shows (sic) [that] the police
despite justification, that they do not have enough facilities (sic), [had] gone astray in
conducting an impartial investigation, by submitting to any possible indiscretion of Eli Lui of
making the scale of justice bend in his favor, by manifesting control over the police power of
investigation highly and seriously pre-judicial to the rights, and interests of the accused.28
If petitioner Lui was so brazen as to have mauled Lariosa in the presence of police authorities, he
would not have cared a whit in barging into the respondents house with petitioner Rojas, a
policeman of Davao City, and his cohorts, and divesting the respondents of their belongings. The
petitioners and their cohorts wanted to insure that their caper would succeed. Hence, they did not
coordinate with the Bansalan Police Station when they went to the respondents house with their
intention to divest them of their belongings.
Petitioner Rojas reliance on Mission Order No. MRF-A-004-98 issued to him by Sergeant Alberto
Genise is misplaced. It bears stressing that the petitioner was merely tasked in the said order to
"follow up a theft case within the area of responsibility of the Metrodiscom, Davao City." The
petitioner was not authorized, under the said order, to commit or tolerate the commission of a crime,
such as violation of domicile as defined in Article 128 of the Revised Penal Code, viz:
ART. 128. Violation of domicile The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period
shall be imposed upon any public officer or employee who, not being authorized by judicial
order, shall enter any dwelling against the will of the owner thereof, search papers or other
effects found therein without the previous consent of such owner, or, having surreptitiously
entered said dwelling, and being required to leave the premises, shall refuse to do so.
If the offense be committed in the nighttime, or if any papers or effects not constituting evidence of a
crime be not returned immediately after the search made by the offender, the penalty shall be prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods.
Although petitioner Rojas did not follow petitioner Lui and his cohorts to the second floor of the
respondents house and himself conduct a search therein, he allowed them to search the premises
without a warrant. The petitioners and their cohorts were not authorized to conduct a search in the
house of the respondents, much less divest the latter of their personal belongings. As a police
officer, it was petitioner Rojas duty to prevent the commission of crimes in his presence, and to
arrest the persons committing such crimes.
The trial court rejected the testimony of respondent Paulina Matillano on the following grounds: (a)
she had known petitioner Lui for ten years as a businessman doing business in Bansalan; (b) the
occupants of the respondents house when the petitioners and their cohorts arrived were all women;
(c) the respondents failed to report the incident to the Bansalan police authorities; and, (d) the
provincial prosecutors resolution recommending the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 880-B for
robbery against the petitioners, which was sustained by the Secretary of Justice, and the ruling of
the National Police Commission exonerating petitioner Rojas from any liability.
We find that the Court of Appeals was correct in overruling the trial court.
First. Respondent Paulina Matillano testified that petitioner Lui did not stay permanently in Bansalan.
He went there only to collect money from a certain Matura and other businessmen.29 She also
testified that there were many cases against the petitioner, one of which was for arson. The case
was dismissed, but one of her neighbors was rendered missing.30 If the petitioner, a businessman for
ten years or so, had no qualms in torturing Lariosa under the very noses of police officers, he would,
likewise, have no qualms about intimidating respondent Paulina Matillano and divesting her of her
personal belongings. It must be stressed that petitioner Lui was in the company of petitioner Rojas, a
police officer from Davao City.
Second. The petitioners and their cohorts had no foreknowledge that the occupants of the
respondents house were all women. They must have believed that there were male occupants;
hence, barged into the house with drawn guns.
Third. As shown clearly in respondent Paulina Matillanos sworn statement before the Bansalan
Police Station, she declared that the petitioners were armed with guns. They threatened her life and,
without any search warrant therefor, divested her and her family of their personal belongings against
their will.31
Fourth. In her complaint before the Office of the Barangay Captain, respondent Paulina Matillano
declared that the petitioners entered their house, that petitioner Lui pointed a gun at her, and that the
petitioners and their cohorts searched the house and carted away their personal belongings.32 That
the report made before the Barangay Captain and petitioner Paulina Matillanos sworn statement are
not as complete as her testimony before the trial court is understandable. Affidavits are usually taken
ex parte and are almost always incomplete and inaccurate, but they do not detract from the
credibility of the witness.33 An entry in the police blotter is usually incomplete and inaccurate for want
of suggestions or inquiries, without the aid of which the victim may be unable to recall the connected
collateral circumstances necessary for the correction of the first suggestion of his memory, and for
his accurate recollection of all that pertain to the subject.34 The same principle applies to entries in
the barangay blotter.
Fifth. As correctly held by the trial court, the findings of administrative and quasi-administrative
agencies are not binding on the courts. In the present case, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor,
as affirmed by the Secretary of Justice,35 found no probable cause for robbery against the petitioners
because they had no intent to rob, but merely to recover the properties from the house of the
respondents which petitioner Lui perceived to have been acquired by Lariosa with money stolen
from his uncle, Ben.36 The decision of the National Police Commission absolving petitioner Rojas of
grave misconduct was anchored on its finding that the petitioner was merely performing his duty as
ordered by his superior officer.37 It was inevitable for the City Prosecutor to dismiss the complaint for
violation of domicile filed against petitioner Rojas in I.S. No. 91-1488 because the crime of violation
of domicile was committed in Bansalan and not in Davao City.38 In contrast, the Commission on
Human Rights recommended the indictment of petitioner Lui for unlawful arrest and of petitioner
Rojas for violation of domicile.39
Sixth. Under Articles 19 and 32, in relation to Article 21 of the New Civil Code, the dismissal of the
complaint against the petitioners by the Provincial and City Prosecutors, the Municipal Trial Court
and the National Police Commission are of no relevance to the civil complaint for damages filed by
the respondents against the petitioners. The action of the respondents against the petitioners may
still proceed despite the dismissal of the criminal and administrative actions against them.
The petitioners contention that respondent Paulina Matillano waived her right against unreasonable
search and seizure deserves scant consideration. Under Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution, "the
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable." This provision
protects not only those who appear to be innocent but also those who appear to be guilty, who must
nevertheless be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved.40 The general rule is that a search
and seizure must be carried through or with judicial warrant; otherwise, such a search and seizure
becomes unconstitutional within the context of the constitutional provision41because a warrantless
search is in derogation of a constitutional right. Peace officers who effect a warrantless search
cannot invoke regularity in the performance of official functions.42
The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right which may be waived
expressly or impliedly. But a waiver by implication cannot be presumed.43 There must be clear and
convincing evidence of an actual intention to relinquish the right to constitute a waiver of a
constitutional right. There must be proof of the following: (a) that the right exists; (b) that the person
involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; and, (c) that the
said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.44 The waiver must be made voluntarily,
knowingly and intelligently. The Court indulges every reasonable presumption against any waiver of
fundamental constitutional rights.45 The fact that the aggrieved person did not object to the entry into
her house by the police officers does not amount to a permission to make a search therein.46 A
peaceful submission to search and seizure is not a consent or an invitation thereto, but is merely a
demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law.47
In this case, the petitioners failed to prove, with clear and convincing evidence, that respondent
Paulina Matillano waived her right against unreasonable search and seizure by consenting thereto,
either expressly or impliedly. Admittedly, respondent Paulina Matillano did not object to the opening
of her wooden closet and the taking of their personal properties. However, such failure to object or
resist did not amount to an implied waiver of her right against unreasonable search and seizure. The
petitioners were armed with handguns; petitioner Lui threatened and intimidated her. Respondent
Eulogio Matillano, her husband, was out of the house when the petitioner and his cohorts conducted
the search and seizure. He could, thus, not have waived his constitutional right.
Furthermore, the petitioners claim that respondent Paulina Matillano voluntarily handed over the
articles to petitioner Lui is incredible. There is no evidence that there was foreknowledge on the part
of the petitioners of the articles they wanted to retrieve from the respondents house. Even if
respondent Paulina Matillano did hand over the articles to the petitioner, it was only because the
petitioner and his cohorts had earlier threatened and intimidated her into doing so.
We agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals that the petitioners are liable to the respondents for
moral and exemplary damages in the amounts respectively awarded by it. Petitioner Rojas, a
policeman of Davao City, conspired with petitioner Lui and, with drawn guns, gained entry into the
respondents house, and threatened and intimidated respondent Paulina Matillano. Although
petitioner Rojas did not himself conduct the search, he assented thereto by allowing petitioner Lui
and his cohorts to go up to the second floor and divest the respondents of their belongings. The
petitioners even left together after the incident.
In MHP Garments, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals,48 we had the occasion to state:
In the case of Lim vs. Ponce de Leon, we ruled for the recovery of damages for violation of
constitutional rights and liberties from public officer or private individual, thus:
"ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly
obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights
and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages.
"x x x
"(9) the rights to be secure in ones persons, house, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures.
"x x x
"The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be adjudged."
"ART 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:
"x x x
"(1) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.
"Pursuant to the foregoing provisions, a person whose constitutional rights have been
violated or impaired is entitled to actual and moral damages from the public officer or
employee responsible therefor. In addition, exemplary damages may also be awarded."
xxx
"The very nature of Article 32 is that the wrong may be civil or criminal. It is not necessary
therefore that there should be malice or bad faith. To make such a requisite would defeat the
main purpose of Article 32 which is the effective protection of individual rights. Public officials
in the past have abused their powers on the pretext of justifiable motives or good faith in the
performance of their duties. Precisely, the object of the Article is to put an end to official
abuse by plea of the good faith. In the United States this remedy is in the nature of a tort."
(emphasis supplied)
In the subsequent case of Aberca vs. Ver, the Court En Banc explained the liability of persons
indirectly responsible, viz:
"[T]he decisive factor in this case, in our view, is the language of Article 32. The law speaks
of an officer or employee or person directly or indirectly responsible for the violation of the
constitutional rights and liberties of another. Thus, it is not the actor alone (i.e., the one
directly responsible) who must answer for damages under Article 32; the person indirectly
responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury caused to the aggrieved party.
xxx
"While it would certainly be too nave to expect that violators of human rights would easily be
deterred by the prospect of facing damage suits, it should nonetheless be made clear in no
uncertain terms that Article 32 of the Civil Code makes the persons who are directly, as well
as indirectly, responsible for the transgression joint tortfeasors.
xxx
[N]either can it be said that only those shown to have participated directly should be held
liable. Article 32 of the Civil Code encompasses within the ambit of its provisions those
directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for its violations." (emphasis supplied)
Applying the aforecited provisions and leading cases, the respondent court correctly granted
damages to private respondents. Petitioners were indirectly involved in transgressing the right of
private respondents against unreasonable search and seizure. Firstly, they instigated the raid
pursuant to their covenant in the Memorandum Agreement to undertake the prosecution in court of
all illegal sources of scouting supplies. As correctly observed by respondent court:
The raid was conducted with the active participation of their employee. Larry de Guzman did not lift a
finger to stop the seizure of the boy and girl scout items. By standing by and apparently assenting
thereto, he was liable to the same extent as the officers themselves. So with the petitioner
corporation which even received for safekeeping the goods unreasonable seized by the PC raiding
team and de Guzman, and refused to surrender them for quite a time despite the dismissal of its
complaint for unfair competition.49
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
ARSENIO VERGARA VALDEZ, G.R. No. 170180
Petitioner,
Present:
QUISUMBING, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus - CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and
VELASCO, JJ.
Respondent. Promulgated:
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
The sacred right against an arrest, search or seizure without valid warrant is not
only ancient. It is also zealously safeguarded. The Constitution guarantees the
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures.[1] Any evidence obtained in violation
of said right shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. Indeed,
while the power to search and seize may at times be necessary to the public
welfare, still it must be exercised and the law implemented without contravening
the constitutional rights of the citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of
sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles of
government.[2]
On appeal is the Decision[3] of the Court of Appeals dated 28 July 2005, affirming
the Judgment[4] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 31, Agoo, La Union dated
31 March 2004 finding petitioner Arsenio Vergara Valdez guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9165 (R.A. No.
9165)[5] and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from
eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor medium as minimum to fifteen
(15) years of reclusion temporal medium as maximum and ordering him to pay a
fine of P350,000.00.[6]
I.
On 26 June 2003, petitioner was charged with violation of Section 11, par. 2(2) of
R.A. No. 9165 in an Information[7] which reads:
That on or about the 17th day of March 2003, in the Municipality of Aringay,
Province of La Union, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in
his possession, control and custody dried marijuana leaves wrapped in a cellophane and
newspaper page, weighing more or less twenty-five (25) grams, without first securing
the necessary permit, license or prescription from the proper government agency.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[8]
Bautista testified that at around 8:00 to 8:30 p.m. of 17 March 2003, he was
conducting the routine patrol along the National Highway in Barangay San Benito
Norte, Aringay, La Union together with Aratas and Ordoo when they noticed
petitioner, lugging a bag, alight from a mini-bus. The tanods observed that
petitioner, who appeared suspicious to them, seemed to be looking for
something. They thus approached him but the latter purportedly attempted to
run away. They chased him, put him under arrest and thereafter brought him to
the house of Barangay Captain Orencio Mercado (Mercado) where he, as averred
by Bautista, was ordered by Mercado to open his bag. Petitioners bag allegedly
contained a pair of denim pants, eighteen pieces of eggplant and dried marijuana
leaves wrapped in newspaper and cellophane. It was then that petitioner was
taken to the police station for further investigation.[9]
Aratas and Ordoo corroborated Bautistas testimony on most material points. On
cross-examination, however, Aratas admitted that he himself brought out the
contents of petitioners bag before petitioner was taken to the house of
Mercado.[10] Nonetheless, he claimed that at Mercados house, it was petitioner
himself who brought out the contents of his bag upon orders from Mercado. For
his part, Ordoo testified that it was he who was ordered by Mercado to open
petitioners bag and that it was then that they saw the purported contents
thereof.[11]
The prosecution likewise presented Police Inspector Valeriano Laya II (Laya), the
forensic chemist who conducted the examination of the marijuana allegedly
confiscated from petitioner. Laya maintained that the specimen submitted to him
for analysis, a sachet of the substance weighing 23.10 grams and contained in a
plastic bag, tested positive of marijuana. He disclosed on cross-examination,
however, that he had knowledge neither of how the marijuana was taken from
petitioner nor of how the said substance reached the police officers. Moreover,
he could not identify whose marking was on the inside of the cellophane
wrapping the marijuana leaves.[12]
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed the decision of the RTC to the Court of Appeals.
On 28 July 2005, the appellate court affirmed the challenged decision. The Court
of Appeals, finding no cogent reason to overturn the presumption of regularity in
favor of the barangay tanod in the absence of evidence of ill-motive on their part,
agreed with the trial court that there was probable cause to arrest petitioner. It
observed further:
That the prosecution failed to establish the chain of custody of the seized marijuana is of
no moment. Such circumstance finds prominence only when the existence of the seized
prohibited drugs is denied. In this case, accused-appellant himself testified that the
marijuana wrapped in a newspaper was taken from his bag. The corpus delicti of the
crime, i.e.[,] the existence of the marijuana and his possession thereof, was amply
proven by accused-appellant Valdezs own testimony.[16]
In this appeal, petitioner prays for his acquittal and asserts that his guilt of
the crime charged had not been proven beyond reasonable doubt. He argues,
albeit for the first time on appeal, that the warrantless arrest effected against him
by the barangay tanod was unlawful and that the warrantless search of his bag
that followed was likewise contrary to law. Consequently, he maintains, the
marijuana leaves purportedly seized from him are inadmissible in evidence for
being the fruit of a poisonous tree.
Well-settled is the rule that the findings of the trial court on the credibility
of witnesses and their testimonies are accorded great respect and weight, in the
absence of any clear showing that some facts and circumstances of weight or
substance which could have affected the result of the case have been overlooked,
misunderstood or misapplied.[17]
II.
At the outset, we observe that nowhere in the records can we find any
objection by petitioner to the irregularity of his arrest before his arraignment.
Considering this and his active participation in the trial of the case, jurisprudence
dictates that petitioner is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial
court, thereby curing any defect in his arrest. The legality of an arrest affects only
the jurisdiction of the court over his person.[18] Petitioners warrantless arrest
therefore cannot, in itself, be the basis of his acquittal.
However, to determine the admissibility of the seized drugs in evidence, it
is indispensable to ascertain whether or not the search which yielded the alleged
contraband was lawful. The search, conducted as it was without a warrant, is
justified only if it were incidental to a lawful arrest.[19] Evaluating the evidence on
record in its totality, as earlier intimated, the reasonable conclusion is that the
arrest of petitioner without a warrant is not lawful as well.
Even casting aside petitioners version and basing the resolution of this case
on the general thrust of the prosecution evidence, the unlawfulness of petitioners
arrest stands out just the same.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides the only
occasions on which a person may be arrested without a warrant, to wit:
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred
from one confinement to another.
xxx
For the exception in Section 5(a), Rule 113 to operate, this Court has ruled
that two (2) elements must be present: (1) the person to be arrested must
execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence
or within the view of the arresting officer.[21] Here, petitioners act of looking
around after getting off the bus was but natural as he was finding his way to his
destination. That he purportedly attempted to run away as the tanod approached
him is irrelevant and cannot by itself be construed as adequate to charge
the tanod with personal knowledge that petitioner had just engaged in, was
actually engaging in or was attempting to engage in criminal activity. More
importantly, petitioner testified that he did not run away but in fact spoke with
the barangay tanodwhen they approached him.
Even taking the prosecutions version generally as the truth, in line with our
assumption from the start, the conclusion will not be any different. It is not
unreasonable to expect that petitioner, walking the street at night, after being
closely observed and then later tailed by three unknown persons, would attempt
to flee at their approach. Flight per se is not synonymous with guilt and must not
always be attributed to ones consciousness of guilt.[22] Of persuasion was the
Michigan Supreme Court when it ruled in People v. Shabaz[23] that [f]light alone is
not a reliable indicator of guilt without other circumstances because flight alone is
inherently ambiguous. Alone, and under the circumstances of this case,
petitioners flight lends itself just as easily to an innocent explanation as it does to
a nefarious one.
Indeed, the supposed acts of petitioner, even assuming that they appeared
dubious, cannot be viewed as sufficient to incite suspicion of criminal activity
enough to validate his warrantless arrest.[26] If at all, the search most permissible
for the tanod to conduct under the prevailing backdrop of the case was a stop-
and-frisk to allay any suspicion they have been harboring based on petitioners
behavior. However, a stop-and-frisk situation, following Terry v. Ohio,[27] must
precede a warrantless arrest, be limited to the persons outer clothing, and should
be grounded upon a genuine reason, in light of the police officers experience and
surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has
weapons concealed about him.[28]
A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not also mean a waiver of the
inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest. The following
searches and seizures are deemed permissible by jurisprudence: (1) search of moving
vehicles (2) seizure in plain view (3) customs searches (4) waiver or consent searches (5)
stop and frisk situations (Terry Search) and (6) search incidental to a lawful arrest. The
last includes a valid warrantless search and seizure pursuant to an equally valid
warrantless arrest, for, while as a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate if effected with
a valid warrant of arrest, the Rules of Court recognize permissible warrantless arrests, to
wit: (1) arrests in flagrante delicto, (2) arrests effected in hot pursuit, and, (3) arrests of
escaped prisoners.[30]
In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General posits that apart from
the warrantless search being incidental to his lawful arrest, petitioner had
consented to the search. We are not convinced. As we explained in Caballes v.
Court of Appeals[31]
In the case at bar, following the theory of the prosecution albeit based on
conflicting testimonies on when petitioners bag was actually opened, it is
apparent that petitioner was already under the coercive control of the public
officials who had custody of him when the search of his bag was demanded.
Moreover, the prosecution failed to prove any specific statement as to how the
consent was asked and how it was given, nor the specific words spoken by
petitioner indicating his alleged "consent." Even granting that petitioner admitted
to opening his bag when Ordoo asked to see its contents, his implied
acquiescence, if at all, could not have been more than mere passive conformity
given under coercive or intimidating circumstances and hence, is considered no
consent at all within the contemplation of the constitutional guarantee.[33] As a
result, petitioners lack of objection to the search and seizure is not tantamount to
a waiver of his constitutional right or a voluntary submission to the warrantless
search and seizure.[34]
III.
In a line of cases, we have ruled as fatal to the prosecutions case its failure
to prove that the specimen submitted for laboratory examination was the same
one allegedly seized from the accused.[37] There can be no crime of illegal
possession of a prohibited drug when nagging doubts persist on whether the item
confiscated was the same specimen examined and established to be the
prohibited drug.[38] As we discussed in People v. Orteza[39], where we deemed the
prosecution to have failed in establishing all the elements necessary for
conviction of appellant for illegal sale of shabu
First, there appears nothing in the record showing that police officers complied
with the proper procedure in the custody of seized drugs as specified in People v. Lim,
i.e., any apprehending team having initial control of said drugs and/or paraphernalia
should, immediately after seizure or confiscation, have the same physically inventoried
and photographed in the presence of the accused, if there be any, and or his
representative, who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a
copy thereof. The failure of the agents to comply with the requirement raises doubt
whether what was submitted for laboratory examination and presented in court was
actually recovered from appellant. It negates the presumption that official duties have
been regularly performed by the police officers.
In People v. Laxa, where the buy-bust team failed to mark the confiscated
marijuana immediately after the apprehension of the accused, the Court held that the
deviation from the standard procedure in anti-narcotics operations produced doubts as
to the origins of the marijuana. Consequently, the Court concluded that the prosecution
failed to establish the identity of the corpus delicti.
The Court made a similar ruling in People v. Kimura, where the Narcom
operatives failed to place markings on the seized marijuana at the time the accused was
arrested and to observe the procedure and take custody of the drug.
More recently, in Zarraga v. People, the Court held that the material
inconsistencies with regard to when and where the markings on the shabu were made
and the lack of inventory on the seized drugs created reasonable doubt as to the identity
of the corpus delicti. The Court thus acquitted the accused due to the prosecutions
failure to indubitably show the identity of the shabu.
In the case at bar, after the arrest of petitioner by the barangay tanod, the
records only show that he was taken to the house of the barangay captain and
thereafter to the police station. The Joint Affidavit[40] executed by
the tanod merely states that they confiscated the marijuana leaves which they
brought to the police station together with petitioner. Likewise, the
Receipt[41] issued by the Aringay Police Station merely acknowledged receipt of
the suspected drugs supposedly confiscated from petitioner.
Not only did the three tanod contradict each other on the matter of when
petitioners bag was opened, they also gave conflicting testimony on who actually
opened the same. The prosecution, despite these material inconsistencies,
neglected to explain the discrepancies. Even more damning to its cause was the
admission by Laya, the forensic chemist, that he did not know how the specimen
was taken from petitioner, how it reached the police authorities or whose
marking was on the cellophane wrapping of the marijuana. The non-presentation,
without justifiable reason, of the police officers who conducted the inquest
proceedings and marked the seized drugs, if such was the case, is fatal to the
case. Plainly, the prosecution neglected to establish the crucial link in the chain of
custody of the seized marijuana leaves from the time they were first allegedly
discovered until they were brought for examination by Laya.
The Court of Appeals found as irrelevant the failure of the prosecution to
establish the chain of custody over the seized marijuana as such [f]inds
prominence only when the existence of the seized prohibited drug is
denied.[42] We cannot agree.
The onus of proving culpability in criminal indictment falls upon the State.
In conjunction with this, law enforcers and public officers alike have the corollary
duty to preserve the chain of custody over the seized drugs. The chain of evidence
is constructed by proper exhibit handling, storage, labeling and recording, and
must exist from the time the evidence is found until the time it is offered in
evidence. Each person who takes possession of the specimen is duty-bound to
detail how it was cared for, safeguarded and preserved while in his or her control
to prevent alteration or replacement while in custody. This guarantee of the
integrity of the evidence to be used against an accused goes to the very heart of
his fundamental rights.
In this case, the totality of the evidence presented utterly fails to overcome
the presumption of innocence which petitioner enjoys. The failure of the
prosecution to prove all the elements of the offense beyond reasonable doubt
must perforce result in petitioners exoneration from criminal liability.
IV.
A final word. We find it fitting to take this occasion to remind the courts to
exercise the highest degree of diligence and prudence in deliberating upon the
guilt of accused persons brought before them, especially in light of the
fundamental rights at stake. Here, we note that the courts a quo neglected to give
more serious consideration to certain material issues in the determination of the
merits of the case. We are not oblivious to the fact that in some instances, law
enforcers resort to the practice of planting evidence to extract information or
even harass civilians. Accordingly, courts are duty-bound to be [e]xtra vigilant in
trying drug cases lest an innocent person be made to suffer the unusually severe
penalties for drug offenses.[52] In the same vein, let this serve as an admonition to
police officers and public officials alike to perform their mandated duties with
commitment to the highest degree of diligence, righteousness and respect for the
law.
the date of his release, or the reasons for his continued confinement, within ten
(10) days from notice. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Promulgated:
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the
Decision[1] dated October 13, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR
No. 28846, which in turn affirmed in toto the Decision of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 120, Caloocan City, in Criminal Case No. C-66765 convicting
petitioner of Violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act (RA) No. 9165, or
the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:
Upon arraignment, petitioner, with the assistance of counsel pleaded not guilty to
the crime charged. Consequently, trial on the merits ensued.
On the other hand, the defense presented the petitioner as its sole
witness. The testimonies of Abraham Miclat, Sr. and Ma. Concepcion Miclat, the
father and sister, respectively, of the petitioner was dispensed with after the
prosecution agreed that their testimonies were corroborative in nature.
Evidence for the Prosecution
First to testify for the prosecution was P/Insp. Jessie Abadilla Dela Rosa,
Forensic Chemical Officer of the PNP Crime Laboratory, NPD-CLO, Caloocan
City Police Station who, on the witness stand, affirmed his own findings in
Physical Science Report No. D-1222-02 (Exhs. D, D-1, and D-2) that per
qualitative examination conducted on the specimen submitted, the white
crystalline substance weighing 0.05 gram, 0.06 gram, 0.07 gram, and 0.06 gram
then contained inside four (4) separate pieces of small heat-sealed transparent
plastic sachets (Exhs. D-4 to D-7) gave positive result to the test for
Methylamphetamine (sic) Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.
Also, thru the testimony of PO3 Rodrigo Antonio of the Caloocan Police
Station-Drug Enforcement Unit, Samson Road, Caloocan City, the prosecution
further endeavored to establish the following:
On the other hand, the [petitioner] has a different version of the incident
completely opposed to the theory of the prosecution. On the witness stand, he
alleged that at about 4:00 oclockin the afternoon of November 8, 2002, while he,
together with his sister and father, were at the upper level of their house watching
the television soap Cindy, they suddenly heard a commotion downstairs
prompting the three (3) of them to go down. There already inside were several
male individuals in civilian clothes who introduced themselves as raiding police
operatives from the SDEU out to effect his (Abe) arrest for alleged drug
pushing. [Petitioner] and his father tried to plead his case to these officers, but to
no avail. Instead, one of the operatives even kicked [petitioner] at the back when
he tried to resist the arrest. Immediately, [petitioner] was handcuffed and together
with his father, they were boarded inside the police vehicle. That on their way to
the Bagong Silang Police Station, PO3 Pagsolingan showed to [petitioner] a small
piece of plastic sachet containing white crystalline substances allegedly recovered
by the raiding police team from their house. At around 9:00 oclock in the evening,
[petitioner] was transferred to the Sangandaan Headquarters where he was finally
detained. That upon [petitioners] transfer and detention at the said headquarters,
his father was ordered to go home.[5]
On July 28, 2004, the RTC, after finding that the prosecution has established
all the elements of the offense charged, rendered a Decision [6] convicting petitioner
of Violation of Section 11, Article II of RA No. 9165, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
Let the 0.24 gram of shabu subject matter of this case be confiscated and
forfeited in favor of the Government and to be turned over to the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency for proper disposition.
In affirming the RTC, the CA ratiocinated that contrary to the contention of the
petitioner, the evidence presented by the prosecution were all admissible against
him. Moreover, it was established that he was informed of his constitutional rights
at the time of his arrest. Hence, the CA opined that the prosecution has proven
beyond reasonable doubt all of the elements necessary for the conviction of the
petitioner for the offense of illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
3. WHETHER OR NOT THE BELIEF OF PO3 ANTONIO THAT THE FOUR (4)
PIECES OF PLASTIC SACHETS ALLEGEDLY BEING ARRANGED BY
PETITIONER CONTAINED SHABU JUSTIFIED HIS ENTRY INTO THE
HOUSE AND ARREST PETITIONER WITHOUT ANY WARRANT.
Simply stated, petitioner is assailing the legality of his arrest and the
subsequent seizure of the arresting officer of the suspected sachets of dangerous
drugs from him.Petitioner insists that he was just watching television with his
father and sister when police operatives suddenly barged into their home and
arrested him for illegal possession of shabu.
Petitioner also posits that being seen in the act of arranging several plastic
sachets inside their house by one of the arresting officers who was peeping through
a window is not sufficient reason for the police authorities to enter his house
without a valid search warrant and/or warrant of arrest. Arguing that the act of
arranging several plastic sachets by and in itself is not a crime per se, petitioner
maintains that the entry of the police surveillance team into his house was illegal,
and no amount of incriminating evidence will take the place of a validly issued
search warrant. Moreover, peeping through a curtain-covered window cannot be
contemplated as within the meaning of the plain view doctrine, rendering the
warrantless arrest unlawful.
Petitioner also contends that the chain of custody of the alleged illegal drugs
was highly questionable, considering that the plastic sachets were not marked at
the place of the arrest and no acknowledgment receipt was issued for the said
evidence.
Finally, petitioner claims that the arresting officer did not inform him of his
constitutional rights at any time during or after his arrest and even during his
detention. Hence, for this infraction, the arresting officer should be punished
accordingly.
The petition is bereft of merit.
True, the Bill of Rights under the present Constitution provides in part:
For the exception in Section 5 (a), Rule 113 to operate, this Court has ruled
that two (2) elements must be present: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an
overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or
within the view of the arresting officer.[15]
As to the admissibility of the seized drugs in evidence, it too falls within the
established exceptions.
Verily, no less than the 1987 Constitution mandates that a search and
consequent seizure must be carried out with a judicial warrant; otherwise, it
becomes unreasonable, and any evidence obtained therefrom shall be inadmissible
for any purpose in any proceeding.[17] The right against warrantless searches and
seizure, however, is subject to legal and judicial exceptions, namely:
It is to be noted that petitioner was caught in the act of arranging the heat-
sealed plastic sachets in plain sight of PO3 Antonio and he voluntarily surrendered
them to him upon learning that he is a police officer. The seizure made by PO3
Antonio of the four plastic sachets from the petitioner was not only incidental to a
lawful arrest, but it also falls within the purview of the plain view doctrine.
x x x x.
(a) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs
shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom
such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any
elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory
and be given a copy thereof: Provided, further, that non-compliance with these
requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over
said items.
x x x x.[21]
From the foregoing, it is clear that the failure of the law enforcers to comply
strictly with the rule is not fatal. It does not render petitioners arrest illegal nor the
evidence adduced against him inadmissible.[22] What is essential is the preservation
of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be
utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.[23]
Here, the requirements of the law were substantially complied with and the
integrity of the drugs seized from the petitioner was preserved. More importantly,
an unbroken chain of custody of the prohibited drugs taken from the petitioner was
sufficiently established. The factual antecedents of the case reveal that the
petitioner voluntarily surrendered the plastic sachets to PO3 Antonio when he was
arrested. Together with petitioner, the evidence seized from him were immediately
brought to the police station and upon arriving thereat, were turned over to PO3
Moran, the investigating officer. There the evidence was marked. The turn-over of
the subject sachets and the person of the petitioner were then entered in the official
blotter. Thereafter, the Chief of the SDEU, Police Senior Inspector Jose
Ramirez Valencia, endorsed the evidence for laboratory examination to the
National Police District PNP Crime Laboratory. The evidence was delivered by
PO3 Moran and received by Police Inspector Jessie Dela Rosa.[24] After a
qualitative examination of the contents of the four (4) plastic sachets by the latter,
the same tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.[25]
An unbroken chain of custody of the seized drugs had, therefore, been
established by the prosecution from the arresting officer, to the investigating
officer, and finally to the forensic chemist. There is no doubt that the items seized
from the petitioner at his residence were also the same items marked by the
investigating officer, sent to the Crime Laboratory, and later on tested positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride.
x x x x.
x x x x.
From the foregoing, illegal possession of less than five (5) grams of
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu is penalized with imprisonment of
twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from
Three Hundred Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00) to Four Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P400,000.00). The evidence adduced by the prosecution established beyond
reasonable doubt that petitioner had in his possession 0.24 gram of shabu, or less
than five (5) grams of the dangerous drug, without any legal authority.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.
SECOND DIVISION
ARNOLD MARTINEZ Y
ANGELES, EDGAR DIZON
Y FERRER, REZIN MARTINEZ
Y CAROLINO, and RAFAEL
GONZALES Y CUNANAN, Promulgated:
Accused-Appellants. December 13, 2010
X ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------X
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
The Facts
As the police officers entered the gate of the house, they saw accused
Orlando Doria (Doria) coming out of the side door and immediately arrested
him. Inside the house, they saw accused Gonzales, Arnold Martinez (A. Martinez),
Edgar Dizon (Dizon), and Rezin Martinez (R. Martinez) in a room. The four were
surprised by the presence of the police. In front of them were open plastic sachets
(containing shabu residue), pieces of rolled used aluminum foil and pieces of used
aluminum foil.
The accused were arrested and brought to the police precinct. The items
found in the room were seized and turned over to the Pangasinan Provincial Police
Crime Laboratory Officer, P/Insp. Maranion. The latter conducted a laboratory
examination on the seized items and all 115 plastic sachets, 11 pieces of rolled
used aluminum foil, and 27 of the 49 pieces of used aluminum foil tested positive
for methamphetamine hydrochloride. The accused were subjected to a drug test
and, except for Doria, they were found to be positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride.
The defense, through its witnesses, accused A. Martinez, Dizon, and R. Martinez,
claimed that in the morning of September 2, 2006, the three of them were along
Arellano Street in Trinidad Subdivision, Dagupan City, to meet with a certain
Apper who bumped the passenger jeep of R. Martinez and who was to give the
materials for the painting of said jeep. As they were going around the subdivision
looking for Apper, they saw Gonzales in front of his house and asked him if he
noticed a person pass by. While they were talking, Doria arrived. It was then that
five to seven policemen emerged and apprehended them. They were handcuffed
and brought to the police station in Perez, Dagupan City, where they were
incarcerated and charged with sniffing shabu.
On February 13, 2008, the RTC rendered its decision, the dispositve portion of
which reads:
SO ORDERED.[4]
The RTC was of the view that the positive testimony of prosecution witness
PO1 Azardon, without any showing of ill-motive on his part, prevailed over the
defenses of denial and alibi put up by the accused. The accused were held to have
been in constructive possession of the subject items. A conspiracy was also found
present as there was a common purpose to possess the dangerous drug.
The CA ruled that there was sufficient evidence to support the findings of
the RTC as to the constructive possession of the dangerous drugs by the accused. It
further held that although the procedure regarding the custody and disposition of
evidence prescribed by Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 was not strictly complied
with, the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence were nonetheless
safeguarded. The CA was of the view that the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty was not sufficiently controverted by the accused.
Not in conformity, the accused now interposes this appeal before this Court
praying for the reversal of the subject decision, presenting the following
Assignment of Errors
2. The lower court erred in not seeing through the antics of the
police to plant the shabu paraphernalia to justify the arrest of
the accused-appellants without warrant;
3. The lower court erred in not finding that the corpus delicti has
not been sufficiently established;
II
Indeed, the accused is estopped from assailing the legality of his arrest if he
fails to raise such issue before arraignment.[5] However, this waiver is limited only
to the arrest. The legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over
the person of the accused. A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not carry
with it a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during the illegal
warrantless arrest.[6]
Although the admissibility of the evidence was not raised as in issue by the
accused, it has been held that this Court has the power to correct any error, even if
unassigned, if such is necessary in arriving at a just decision,[7] especially when the
transcendental matter of life and liberty is at stake.[8] While it is true that rules of
procedure are intended to promote rather than frustrate the ends of justice, they
nevertheless must not be met at the expense of substantial justice. Time and again,
this Court has reiterated the doctrine that the rules of procedure are mere tools
intended to facilitate the attainment of justice, rather than frustrate it. Technicalities
should never be used to defeat substantive rights.[9]Thus, despite the procedural
lapses of the accused, this Court shall rule on the admissibility of the evidence in
the case at bench. The clear infringement of the accuseds right to be protected
against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be ignored.
This case would appear to fall under either a warrantless search incidental to
a lawful arrest or a plain view search, both of which require a lawful arrest in order
to be considered valid exceptions to the constitutional guarantee. Rule 113 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides for the circumstances under which a
warrantless arrest is lawful. Thus:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has
probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person
arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest
police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with
section 7 of Rule 112.
A review of the facts reveal that the arrest of the accused was illegal and the
subject items were confiscated as an incident thereof. According to the testimony
of PO1 Azardon and his Joint Affidavit[13] with PO1 Dela Cruz, they proceeded to,
and entered, the house of accused Gonzales based solely on the report of a
concerned citizen that a pot session was going on in said house, to wit:
Q: When you went to the place of Rafael Gonzales, of course you were not
armed with a search warrant, correct?
A: None, sir.
Q: Before the information was given to you by your alleged informant, you
did not know personally Rafael Gonzales?
A: I have not met [him] yet but I heard his name, sir.
Q: When this informant told you that he was told that there was [an]
ongoing pot session in the house of Rafael Gonzales, was this report
to you placed in the police blotter before you proceeded to the house
of Rafael Gonzales?
A: I think it was no longer recorded, sir.
Q: In other words, you did not even bother to get the personal data or
identity of the person who told you that he was allegedly informed
that there was an ongoing pot session in the house of Rafael
Gonzales?
A: What I know is that he is a jeepney driver of a downtown jeepney but he
does not want to be identified because he was afraid, sir.
Q: And likewise, he did not inform you who told him that there was an
ongoing pot session in the house of Rafael Gonzales?
A: No more, sir.
Q: But upon receiving such report from that jeepney driver you
immediately formed a group and went to the place of Rafael
Gonzales?
A: Yes, sir.
xxx
Q: When you were at the open gate of the premises of Rafael Gonzales, you
could not see what is happening inside the house of Rafael
Gonzales?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You did not also see the alleged paraphernalia as well as the plastic
sachet of shabu on the table while you were outside the premises of
the property of Rafael Gonzales?
xxx
Q: Before they entered the premises they could not see the paraphernalia?
COURT: Answer.
A: Of course because they were inside the room, how could we see them,
sir.
Q: But still you entered the premises, only because a certain person who
told you that he was informed by another person that there was an
ongoing pot session going on inside the house of Rafael Gonzales?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And that is the only reason why you barged in inside the house of Rafael
Gonzales and you arrested the persons you saw?
A: Yes, sir.[14]
Paragraph (c) of Rule 113 is clearly inapplicable to this case. Paragraphs (a)
and (b), on the other hand, may be applicable and both require probable cause to be
present in order for a warrantless arrest to be valid. Probable cause has been held to
signify a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently
strong in themselves to warrant a cautious mans belief that the person accused is
guilty of the offense with which he is charged.[15]
Although this Court has ruled in several dangerous drugs cases [16] that tipped
information is sufficient probable cause to effect a warrantless search,[17] such
rulings cannot be applied in the case at bench because said cases involve either a
buy-bust operation or drugs in transit, basically, circumstances other than the sole
tip of an informer as basis for the arrest. None of these drug cases involve police
officers entering a house without warrant to effect arrest and seizure
based solely on an informers tip. The case ofPeople v. Bolasa[18] is informative on
this matter.
In People v. Bolasa, an anonymous caller tipped off the police that a man
and a woman were repacking prohibited drugs at a certain house. The police
immediately proceeded to the house of the suspects. They walked towards the
house accompanied by their informer. When they reached the house, they peeped
inside through a small window and saw a man and woman repacking marijuana.
They then entered the house, introduced themselves as police officers, confiscated
the drug paraphernalia, and arrested the suspects. This Court ruled:
It has been held that personal knowledge of facts in arrests without warrant
must be based upon probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable
grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when the suspicion,
that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing an offense, is based
on actual facts, that is, supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. [20]
Q: Mr. Witness, you claimed that the reason for apprehending all the
accused was based on a tip-off by an informant?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You mean to say that it was not the informant himself to whom the
information originated but from somebody else?
A: That was what he told me, sir.
Q: Because of that you proceeded to where the alleged pot session was
going on? [No Answer]
xxx
Q: Mr. Witness, did your informant named [sic] those included in the
alleged pot session?
A: No, sir.
Q: That was, because your informant dont [sic] know physically what was
really happening there?
A: He was told by another person that there was an ongoing pot session
there, sir.[21] [Emphasis supplied]
Neither can it be said that the subject items were seized in plain view. The
elements of plainview are: (a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless
arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties;
(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who have the right to
be where they are; (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent; and, (d) "plain
view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search.[22]
As has been noted previously by this Court, some lawmen, prosecutors and
judges have glossed over illegal searches and seizures in cases where law enforcers
are able to present the alleged evidence of the crime, regardless of the methods by
which they were obtained. This attitude tramples on constitutionally-guaranteed
rights in the name of law enforcement. It is ironic that such enforcement of the law
fosters the breakdown of our system of justice and the eventual denigration of
society. While this Court appreciates and encourages the efforts of law enforcers to
uphold the law and to preserve the peace and security of society, we nevertheless
admonish them to act with deliberate care and within the parameters set by the
Constitution and the law.[24]
Chain of Custody
Even granting that the seized items are admissible as evidence, the acquittal of the
accused would still be in order for failure of the apprehending officers to comply
with the chain of custody requirement in dangerous drugs cases.
The accused contend that the identity of the seized drug was not established
with moral certainty as the chain of custody appears to be questionable, the
authorities having failed to comply with Sections 21 and 86 of R.A. No. 9165, and
Dangerous Drug Board (DDB) Resolution No. 03, Series of 1979, as amended by
Board Regulation No. 2, Series of 1990. They argue that there was no prior
coordination with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), no inventory
of the confiscated items conducted at the crime scene, no photograph of the items
taken, no compliance with the rule requiring the accused to sign the inventory and
to give them copies thereof, and no showing of how the items were handled from
the time of confiscation up to the time of submission to the crime laboratory for
testing. Therefore, the corpus delicti was not proven, thereby producing reasonable
doubt as to their guilt. Thus, they assert that the presumption of innocence in their
favor was not overcome by the presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duty.
The essential requisites to establish illegal possession of dangerous drugs are: (i)
the accused was in possession of the dangerous drug, (ii) such possession is not
authorized by law, and (iii) the accused freely and consciously possessed the
dangerous drug.[25] Additionally, this being a case for violation of Section 13 of
R.A. No. 9165, an additional element of the crime is (iv) the possession of the
dangerous drug must have occurred during a party, or at a social gathering or
meeting, or in the proximate company of at least two (2) persons.
The existence of the drug is the very corpus delicti of the crime of illegal
possession of dangerous drugs and, thus, a condition sine qua non for conviction.
In order to establish the existence of the drug, its chain of custody must be
sufficiently established. The chain of custody requirement is essential to ensure
that doubts regarding the identity of the evidence are removed through the
monitoring and tracking of the movements of the seized drugs from the accused, to
the police, to the forensic chemist, and finally to the court.[26] Malillin v.
People was the first in a growing number of cases to explain the importance of
chain of custody in dangerous drugs cases, to wit:
Paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, provides for safeguards
for the protection of the identity and integrity of dangerous drugs seized, to wit:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs
shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from
whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative
or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice
(DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
People v. Habana thoroughly discusses the proper procedure for the custody
of seized or confiscated items in dangerous drugs cases in order to ensure their
identity and integrity, as follows:
Usually, the police officer who seizes the suspected substance turns
it over to a supervising officer, who would then send it by courier to the
police crime laboratory for testing. Since it is unavoidable that possession
of the substance changes hand a number of times, it is imperative for the
officer who seized the substance from the suspect to place his marking on
its plastic container and seal the same, preferably with adhesive tape that
cannot be removed without leaving a tear on the plastic container. At the
trial, the officer can then identify the seized substance and the procedure
he observed to preserve its integrity until it reaches the crime laboratory.
If the sealing of the seized substance has not been made, the
prosecution would have to present every police officer, messenger,
laboratory technician, and storage personnel, the entire chain of custody,
no matter how briefly ones possession has been. Each of them has to
testify that the substance, although unsealed, has not been tampered with
or substituted while in his care.[29]
Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No.
9165 further elaborates, and provides for, the possibility of non-compliance with
the prescribed procedure:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the
drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically
inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the
person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be
conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest
police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team,
whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further
that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as
long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid
such seizures of and custody over said items. [Emphasis supplied]
Accordingly, non-compliance with the prescribed procedural requirements will not
necessarily render the seizure and custody of the items void and invalid, provided
that (i) there is a justifiable ground for such non-compliance, and (ii) the integrity
and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved. In this case,
however, no justifiable ground is found availing, and it is apparent that there was a
failure to properly preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items
to ensure the identity of the corpus delictifrom the time of seizure to the time of
presentation in court. A review of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and
the documentary records of the case reveals irreparably broken links in the chain of
custody.
b) Eight used (8) disposable lighters ( two (2) pcs colored orange, two (2)
pcs colored yellow, one (1) pc colored green & one (1) pc colored white
).
At the police station, the case, the accused, and the above-mentioned items
were indorsed to Duty Investigator Senior Police Officer 1 Pedro Urbano, Jr.
(SPO1 Urbano) for proper disposition.[31] A letter-request for laboratory
examination was prepared by Police Superintendent Edgar Orduna Basbag for the
following items:
b) Pieces of used rolled and cut aluminum foil with suspected shabu
residues marked DC&A-2.
c) Pieces of used cut aluminum foil with suspected shabu residues
marked DC&A-3.[32]
[Emphases supplied]
B B1 to B11 Eleven (11) rolled used aluminum foil with tag each containing
suspected shabu residue without markings.
C C1 to C49 Forty-nine (49) used aluminum foil with tag each containing
suspected shabu residue without markings.[33]
[Emphases supplied]
Three days after the subject items were seized, or on September 5, 2006, a
Confiscation Receipt was issued by PO1 Azardon and PO1 Dela Cruz, which
reads:
CONFISCATION RECEIPT
Seizing Officer:
(sgd.) (sgd.)
PO1 Bernard B Azardon PO1 Alejandro Dela Cruz
Affiant Affiant
Remarks:
Refused to Signed
Refused to Signed
Refused to Signed
Refused to Signed
Refused to Signed[34]
[Emphases supplied]
The 115 open transparent plastic sachets, 11 pieces of rolled used aluminum foil,
and 27 (of the 49) pieces of used aluminum foil, all containing shabu residue, as
identified in the Final Chemistry Report, were presented in court and marked as
Exhibits H and series, I and series, and J and series, respectively. Said items were
identified by PO1 Azardon and P/Insp. Maranion at the witness stand.[35]
The CA ruled that the integrity and evidentiary value of the subject items were
properly preserved as there was sufficient evidence to prove that the items seized
from the accused were the same ones forwarded to the crime laboratory for
examination, as shown in the Confiscation Receipt and the letter-request for
laboratory examination.
First, the apprehending team failed to comply with Section 21 of R.A. No.
9165. After seizure and confiscation of the subject items, no physical inventory
was conducted in the presence of the accused, or their representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the DOJ, and any elected public official. Thus,
no inventory was prepared, signed, and provided to the accused in the manner
required by law. PO1 Azardon, in his testimony,[36] admitted that no photographs
were taken. The only discernable reason proffered by him for the failure to comply
with the prescribed procedure was that the situation happened so suddenly. Thus:
Q: But upon receiving such report from that jeepney driver you
immediately formed a group and went to the place of Rafael
Gonzales?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Such that you did not even inform the PDEA before you barged in that
place of Rafael Gonzales?
A: It was so suddenly, [sic] sir.
Q: And that explains the reason why you were not able to have pictures
taken, is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.[37]
[Emphasis supplied]
The Court does not find such to be a justifiable ground to excuse non-
compliance. The suddenness of the situation cannot justify non-compliance with
the requirements. The police officers were not prevented from preparing an
inventory and taking photographs. In fact, Section 21(a) of the IRR of R.A. No.
9165 provides specifically that in case of warrantless seizures, the inventory and
photographs shall be done at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the
apprehending officer/team. Whatever effect the suddenness of the situation may
have had should have dissipated by the time they reached the police station, as the
suspects had already been arrested and the items seized.Moreover, it has been held
that in case of warrantless seizures nothing prevents the apprehending officer from
immediately conducting the physical inventory and photography of the items at
their place of seizure, as it is more in keeping with the laws intent to preserve their
integrity and evidentiary value.[38]
This Court has repeatedly reversed conviction in drug cases for failure to comply
with Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, resulting in the failure to properly preserve the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items. Some cases are People v.
Garcia,[39] People v. Dela Cruz,[40] People v. Dela Cruz,[41] People v. Santos,
Jr.,[42] People v. Nazareno,[43]People v. Orteza,[44] Zarraga v.
[45] [46]
People, and People v. Kimura.
Second, the subject items were not properly marked. The case of People v.
Sanchez is instructive on the requirement of marking, to wit:
What Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 and its implementing rule do not
expressly specify is the matter of "marking" of the seized items in
warrantless seizures to ensure that the evidence seized upon apprehension
is the same evidence subjected to inventory and photography when these
activities are undertaken at the police station rather than at the place of
arrest. Consistency with the "chain of custody" rule requires that the
"marking" of the seized items - to truly ensure that they are the same items
that enter the chain and are eventually the ones offered in evidence -
should be done (1) in the presence of the apprehended
violator (2) immediately upon confiscation. This step initiates the process of
protecting innocent persons from dubious and concocted searches, and of
protecting as well the apprehending officers from harassment suits based
on planting of evidence under Section 29 and on allegations of robbery or
theft.
The markings appear to pertain to a group of items, that is, empty plastic
sachets, rolled and cut aluminium foil, and cut aluminium foil, but do not
specifically pertain to any individual item in each group. Furthermore, it was only
in the Chemistry Report[48] that the precise number of each type of item was
indicated and enumerated. The Court notes that in all documents prior to said
report, the subject items were never accurately quantified but only described as
pieces,[49] several pcs,[50] and shabu paraphernallas.[51]Strangely, the Chemistry
Report indicates that all the subject items had no markings, although each item was
reported to have been marked by P/Insp. Maranion in the course of processing the
subject items during laboratory examination and testing.[52] Doubt, therefore, arises
as to the identity of the subject items. It cannot be determined with moral certainty
that the subject items seized from the accused were the same ones subjected to the
laboratory examination and presented in court.
This Court has acquitted the accused for the failure and irregularity in the
marking of seized items in dangerous drugs cases, such as Zarraga v.
People,[53] People v. Kimura,[54] and People v. Laxa.[55]
Third, the Confiscation Receipt relied upon by the prosecution and the courts
below gives rise to more uncertainty. Instead of being prepared on the day of the
seizure of the items, it was prepared only three days after. More important, the
receipt did not even indicate exactly what items were confiscated and their
quantity. These are basic information that a confiscation receipt should provide.
The only information contained in the Confiscation Receipt was the fact of arrest
of the accused and the general description of the subject items as the sachet of
suspected Shabu paraphernallas were brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory. The
receipt is made even more dubious by PO1 Azardons admission in his
testimony[56] that he did not personally prepare the Confiscation Receipt and he did
not know exactly who did so.
Fourth, according to the Certification[57] issued by the Dagupan Police Station, the
subject items were indorsed by PO1 Dela Cruz to Duty Investigator SPO1 Urbano
for proper disposition. These were later turned over by SPO3 Esteban to P/Insp.
Maranion. There is, however, no showing of how and when the subject items were
transferred from SPO1 Urbano to SPO3 Esteban.
Fifth, P/Insp. Maranion appears to be the last person in the chain of custody. No
witness testified on how the subject items were kept after they were tested prior to
their presentation in court. This Court has highlighted similar shortcomings
in People v. Cervantes,[58] People v. Garcia,[59] People v. Sanchez,[60] and Malillin
v. People.[61]
In sum, numerous lapses and irregularities in the chain of custody belie the
prosecutions position that the integrity and evidentiary value of the subject items
were properly preserved. The two documents specifically relied on by the CA, the
Confiscation Receipt and the letter-request for laboratory examination, have been
shown to be grossly insufficient in proving the identity of the corpus delicti.
The corpus delicti in dangerous drugs cases constitutes the drug itself. This means
that proof beyond reasonable doubt of the identity of the prohibited drug is
essential before the accused can be found guilty.[64]
Regarding the lack of prior coordination with the PDEA provided in Section
86 of R.A. No. 9165, in People v. Sta. Maria,[65] this Court held that said section
was silent as to the consequences of such failure, and said silence could not be
interpreted as a legislative intent to make an arrest without the participation of
PDEA illegal, nor evidence obtained pursuant to such an arrest
inadmissible. Section 86 is explicit only in saying that the PDEA shall be the lead
agency in the investigation and prosecution of drug-related cases. Therefore, other
law enforcement bodies still possess authority to perform similar functions as the
PDEA as long as illegal drugs cases will eventually be transferred to the latter.
It may be true that where no ill motive can be attributed to the police
officers, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty should
prevail. However, such presumption obtains only when there is no deviation from
the regular performance of duty.[67] Where the official act in question is irregular
on its face, the presumption of regularity cannot stand.
In this case, the official acts of the law enforcers were clearly shown and
proven to be irregular. When challenged by the evidence of a flawed chain of
custody, the presumption of regularity cannot prevail over the presumption of
innocence of the accused.[68]
This Court once again takes note of the growing number of acquittals for
dangerous drugs cases due to the failure of law enforcers to observe the proper
arrest, search and seizure procedure under the law.[69] Some bona fide arrests and
seizures in dangerous drugs cases result in the acquittal of the accused because
drug enforcement operatives compromise the integrity and evidentiary worth of the
seized items. It behooves this Court to remind law enforcement agencies to exert
greater effort to apply the rules and procedures governing the custody, control, and
handling of seized drugs.
R.A. No. 9165, with regard to the charges that are filed by law enforcers. This
Court notes the practice of law enforcers of filing charges under Sec. 11 in cases
where the presence of dangerous drugs as basis for possession is only and solely in
the form of residue, being subsumed under the last paragraph of Sec. 11. Although
not incorrect, it would be more in keeping with the intent of the law to file charges
under Sec. 15 instead in order to rehabilitate first time offenders of drug use,
provided that there is a positive confirmatory test result as required under Sec. 15.
The minimum penalty under the last paragraph of Sec. 11 for the possession of
residue is imprisonment of twelve years and one day, while the penalty under Sec.
15 for first time offenders of drug use is a minimum of six months rehabilitation in
a government center. To file charges under Sec. 11 on the basis of residue alone
would frustrate the objective of the law to rehabilitate drug users and provide them
with an opportunity to recover for a second chance at life.
In the case at bench, the presence of dangerous drugs was only in the form of
residue on the drug paraphernalia, and the accused were found positive for use of
dangerous drugs. Granting that the arrest was legal, the evidence obtained
admissible, and the chain of custody intact, the law enforcers should have filed
charges under Sec. 15, R.A. No. 9165 or for use of dangerous drugs and, if there
was no residue at all, they should have been charged under Sec. 14[73] (Possession
of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for Dangerous
Drugs During Parties, Social Gatherings or Meetings). Sec. 14 provides that the
maximum penalty under Sec. 12[74] (Possession of Possession of Equipment,
Instrument, Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs) shall be
imposed on any person who shall possess any equipment, instrument, apparatus
and other paraphernalia for dangerous drugs. Under Sec. 12, the maximum penalty
is imprisonment of four years and a fine of P50,000.00. In fact, under the same
section, the possession of such equipment, apparatus or other paraphernalia
is prima facie evidence that the possessor has used a dangerous drug and shall be
presumed to have violated Sec. 15.
In order to effectively fulfill the intent of the law to rehabilitate drug users,
this Court thus calls on law enforcers and prosecutors in dangerous drugs cases to
exercise proper discretion in filing charges when the presence of dangerous drugs is
only and solely in the form of residue and the confirmatory test required under Sec.
15 is positive for use of dangerous drugs. In such cases, to afford the accused a
chance to be rehabilitated, the filing of charges for or involving possession of
dangerous drugs should only be done when another separate quantity of dangerous
drugs, other than mere residue, is found in the possession of the accused as
provided for in Sec. 15.
The Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, Dagupan City, is directed to turn over
the seized items to the Dangerous Drugs Board for destruction in accordance with
law.
SO ORDERED.
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
[1]
Rollo, pp. 2-14. Penned by Associate Justice Sixto C. Marella, Jr. with Associate Justice Magdangal M. De Leon
and Associate Justice Japar B. Dimaampao, concurring.
[2]
Records, pp. 140-145. Penned by Judge Emma M. Torio.
[3]
Id. at 1.
[4]
Id. at 145.
[5]
People v. Palma, G.R. No. 189279, March 9, 2010.
[6]
People v. Racho, G.R. No. 186529, August 3, 2010.
[7]
C.F. Sharp & Co., Inc. v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 431 Phil 11, 22 (2002).
[8]
People v. Bodoso, 446 Phil. 838, 849-850 (2003).
[9]
San Luis v. Rojas, G.R. No. 159127, March 3, 2008, 547 SCRA 345, 357-358.
[10]
People v. Siton, G.R. No. 169364, September 18, 2009, 600 SCRA 476, 493.
[11]
Rules of Court, Rule 126, Sec. 13.
[12]
People v. Bolasa, 378 Phil. 1073, 1078-1079 (1999).
[13]
Exhibit E, folder of exhibits, p. 11.
[14]
TSN, February 23, 2007, pp. 10-16.
[15]
People v. Ayangao, 471 Phil. 379, 388 (2004).
[16]
Id., People v. Valdez, 363 Phil. 481 (1999); People v. Montilla, 349 Phil. 640 (1998).
[17]
Id.
[18]
Supra note 13.
[19]
Supra note 13.
[20]
People v. Doria, 361 Phil. 595, 632 (1999).
[21]
TSN, February 23, 2007, pp. 3-5.
[22]
Supra note 13.
[23]
People v. Valdez, 395 Phil. 206, 218 (2000).
[24]
People v. Racho, G.R. No. 186529, August 3, 2010; citing People v. Nuevas, G.R. No. 170233, February 22,
2007, 516 SCRA 463, 484-485.
[25]
People v. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 177777, December 4, 2009, 607 SCRA 377, 390-391.
[26]
People v. Garcia, G.R. No. 173480, February 25, 2009, 580 SCRA 259, 274.
[27]
G.R. No. 172953, April 30, 2008, 553 SCRA 619, 632-633.
[28]
Guidelines on the Custody and Disposition of Seized Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals, and Laboratory Equipment.
[29]
G.R. No. 188900, March 5, 2010.
[30]
Exhibit E, folder of exhibits, p. 11.
[31]
Exhibit G, folder of exhibits, p. 13.
[32]
Exhibit A, folder of exhibits, p. 6.
[33]
Exhibit D, folder of exhibits, p. 10.
[34]
Exhibit F, folder of exhibits, p. 12.
[35]
TSN, February 9, 2007, p. 6; and TSN, January 22, 2007, pp. 10-12.
[36]
TSN, February 23, 2007, p. 7.
[37]
TSN, February 23, 2007, p. 12.
[38]
People v. Sanchez, G.R. No. 175832, October 15, 2008, 569 SCRA 194, 218.
[39]
Supra note 27.
[40]
G.R. No. 177222, October 29, 2008, 570 SCRA 273.
[41]
G.R. No. 181545, October 8, 2008, 568 SCRA 273.
[42]
G.R. No. 175593, October 17, 2007, 536 SCRA 489.
[43]
G.R. No. 174771, September 11, 2007, 532 SCRA 630.
[44]
G.R. No. 173051, July 31, 2007, 528 SCRA 750.
[45]
G.R. No. 162064, March 14, 2006, 484 SCRA 639.
[46]
471 Phil. 895 (2004).
[47]
Supra note 38.
[48]
Exhibit C, folder of exhibits, p. 9; Exhibit D, folder of exhibits, p. 10.
[49]
Exhibit A, folder of exhibits, p. 6.
[50]
Exhibit E, folder of exhibits, p. 11; Exhibit G, folder of exhibits, p. 13.
[51]
Exhibit B, folder of exhibits, p. 7; Exhibit F, folder of exhibits, p. 12.
[52]
TSN, January 22, 2007, pp. 10-12.
[53]
Supra note 46.
[54]
Supra note 47.
[55]
414 Phil. 156 (2001).
[56]
TSN, February 9, 2007, p. 7; TSN, February 23, 2007, pp. 6-7.
[57]
Exhibit G, folder of exhibits, p. 13.
[58]
G.R. No. 181494, March 17, 2009, 581 SCRA 762.
[59]
Supra note 27.
[60]
Supra note 39.
[61]
Supra note 28.
[62]
TSN, February 9, 2007, p. 4.
[63]
Exhibit B, folder of exhibits, p. 7.
[64]
People v. Cacao, G.R. No. 180870, January 22, 2010, 610 SCRA 636, 651.
[65]
G.R. No. 171019, February 23, 2007, 516 SCRA 621, 631-632.
[66]
People v. Del Monte, G.R. No. 179940, April 23, 2008, 552 SCRA 627, 637.
[67]
People v. Obmiranis, G.R. No. 181492, December 16, 2008, 574 SCRA 140, 156-157.
[68]
People v. Peralta, G.R. No. 173477, February 26, 2010.
[69]
People v. Cervantes, G.R. No. 181494, March 17, 2009, 581 SCRA 762, 784-785, citing People v. Garcia, G.R.
No. 173480, February 25, 2009, 580 SCRA 259, 277-278.
[70]
Id. at 785.
[71]
Section 11. Possession of Dangerous Drugs. - The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from
Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any
person, who, unless authorized by law, shall possess any dangerous drug in the following quantities, regardless of
the degree of purity thereof:
(1) 10 grams or more of opium;
(2) 10 grams or more of morphine;
(3) 10 grams or more of heroin;
(4) 10 grams or more of cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride;
(5) 50 grams or more of methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu";
(6) 10 grams or more of marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil;
(7) 500 grams or more of marijuana; and
(8) 10 grams or more of other dangerous drugs such as, but not limited to,
methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDA) or "ecstasy", paramethoxyamphetamine (PMA),
trimethoxyamphetamine (TMA), lysergic acid diethylamine (LSD), gamma hydroxyamphetamine (GHB),
and those similarly designed or newly introduced drugs and their derivatives, without having any
therapeutic value or if the quantity possessed is far beyond therapeutic requirements, as determined and
promulgated by the Board in accordance to Section 93, Article XI of this Act.
Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities, the penalties shall be graduated as follows:
(1) Life imprisonment and a fine ranging from Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00) to Five hundred
thousand pesos (P500,000.00), if the quantity of methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu" is ten (10)
grams or more but less than fifty (50) grams;
(2) Imprisonment of twenty (20) years and one (1) day to life imprisonment and a fine ranging from Four
hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00), if the quantities of
dangerous drugs are five (5) grams or more but less than ten (10) grams of opium, morphine, heroin,
cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride, marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil, methamphetamine hydrochloride
or "shabu", or other dangerous drugs such as, but not limited to, MDMA or "ecstasy", PMA, TMA, LSD,
GHB, and those similarly designed or newly introduced drugs and their derivatives, without having any
therapeutic value or if the quantity possessed is far beyond therapeutic requirements; or three hundred (300)
grams or more but less than five hundred (500) grams of marijuana; and
(3) Imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from Three
hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00) to Four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00), if the quantities of
dangerous drugs are less than five (5) grams of opium, morphine, heroin, cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride,
marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil, methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu", or other dangerous
drugs such as, but not limited to, MDMA or "ecstasy", PMA, TMA, LSD, GHB, and those similarly
designed or newly introduced drugs and their derivatives, without having any therapeutic value or if the
quantity possessed is far beyond therapeutic requirements; or less than three hundred (300) grams of
marijuana.
[72]
Section 15. Use of Dangerous Drugs. A person apprehended or arrested, who is found to be positive for use of
any dangerous drug, after a confirmatory test, shall be imposed a penalty of a minimum of six (6) months
rehabilitation in a government center for the first offense, subject to the provisions of Article VIII of this Act. If
apprehended using any dangerous drug for the second time, he/she shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging
from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years and a fine ranging from Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) to
Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00): Provided, That this Section shall not be applicable where the person
tested is also found to have in his/her possession such quantity of any dangerous drug provided for under Section 11
of this Act, in which case the provisions stated therein shall apply.
[73]
Section 14. Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs
During Parties, Social Gatherings or Meetings. - The maximum penalty provided for in Section 12 of this Act shall
be imposed upon any person, who shall possess or have under his/her control any equipment, instrument, apparatus
and other paraphernalia fit or intended for smoking, consuming, administering, injecting, ingesting, or introducing
any dangerous drug into the body, during parties, social gatherings or meetings, or in the proximate company of at
least two (2) persons.
[74]
Section 12. Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs. -
The penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and a fine ranging from
Ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) to Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who,
unless authorized by law, shall possess or have under his/her control any equipment, instrument, apparatus and other
paraphernalia fit or intended for smoking, consuming, administering, injecting, ingesting, or introducing any
dangerous drug into the body: Provided, That in the case of medical practitioners and various professionals who are
required to carry such equipment, instrument, apparatus and other paraphernalia in the practice of their profession,
the Board shall prescribe the necessary implementing guidelines thereof.
The possession of such equipment, instrument, apparatus and other paraphernalia fit or intended for any of the
purposes enumerated in the preceding paragraph shall be prima facie evidence that the possessor has smoked,
consumed, administered to himself/herself, injected, ingested or used a dangerous drug and shall be presumed to
have violated Section 15 of this Act.
SECOND DIVISION
Appellee,
Present:
CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus - NACHURA,
PERALTA,
ABAD, and
PEREZ,* JJ.
Appellant.
x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before this Court is an appeal from the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 02718, which affirmed the decision[2] of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 29, San Fernando City, La Union, in Criminal Case No. 7144,
finding appellant Belen Mariacos guilty of violating Article II, Section 5 of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
The facts of the case, as summarized by the CA, are as follows:
CONTRARY TO LAW.
When arraigned on December 13, 2005, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty. During the
pre-trial, the following were stipulated upon:
3. That at the time of the arrest of the accused, accused had just
alighted from a passenger jeepney;
6. That the drugs allegedly obtained from the accused contained (sic)
and submitted for examination weighed 7,030.3 grams;
On October 26, 2005, in the evening, the San Gabriel Police Station of San Gabriel, La
Union, conducted a checkpoint near the police station at the poblacion to intercept a
suspected transportation of marijuana from Barangay Balbalayang, San Gabriel, La
Union. The group at the checkpoint was composed of PO2 Lunes B. Pallayoc (PO2
Pallayoc), the Chief of Police, and other policemen. When the checkpoint did not yield
any suspect or marijuana, the Chief of Police instructed PO2 Pallayoc to proceed to
Barangay Balbalayang to conduct surveillance operation (sic).
At dawn on October 27, 2005, in Barangay Balbalayang, PO2 Pallayoc met with a secret
agent of the Barangay Intelligence Network who informed him that a baggage of
marijuana had been loaded on a passenger jeepney that was about to leave for
the poblacion. The agent mentioned three (3) bags and one (1) blue plastic bag. Further,
the agent described a backpack bag with an O.K. marking. PO2 Pallayoc then boarded
the said jeepney and positioned himself on top thereof. While the vehicle was in
motion, he found the black backpack with an O.K. marking and peeked inside its
contents. PO2 Pallayoc found bricks of marijuana wrapped in newspapers. He then
asked the other passengers on top of the jeepney about the owner of the bag, but no
one knew.
When the jeepney reached the poblacion, PO2 Pallayoc alighted together with the other
passengers. Unfortunately, he did not notice who took the black backpack from atop the
jeepney. He only realized a few moments later that the said bag and three (3) other
bags, including a blue plastic bag, were already being carried away by two (2) women.
He caught up with the women and introduced himself as a policeman. He told them that
they were under arrest, but one of the women got away.
PO2 Pallayoc brought the woman, who was later identified as herein accused-appellant
Belen Mariacos, and the bags to the police station. At the police station, the
investigators contacted the Mayor of San Gabriel to witness the opening of the bags.
When the Mayor arrived about fifteen (15) minutes later, the bags were opened and
three (3) bricks of marijuana wrapped in newspaper, two (2) round bundles of
marijuana, and two (2) bricks of marijuana fruiting tops, all wrapped in a newspaper,
were recovered.
On October 27, 2005, at around 7:00 in the morning, accused-appellant, together with
Lani Herbacio, was inside a passenger jeepney bound for the poblacion. While the
jeepney was still at the terminal waiting for passengers, one Bennie Lao-ang (Lao-ang),
her neighbor, requested her to carry a few bags which had been loaded on top of the
jeepney. At first, accused-appellant refused, but she was persuaded later when she was
told that she would only be carrying the bags. When they reached the poblacion, Lao-
ang handed accused-appellant and her companion, Lani Herbacio, the bags, and then
Lao-ang suddenly ran away. A few moments later, PO2 Pallayoc was upon them,
arresting them. Without explanation, they were brought to the police station. When
they were at the police station, Lani Herbacio disappeared. It was also at the police
station that accused-appellant discovered the true contents of the bags which she was
asked to carry. She maintained that she was not the owner of the bags and that she did
not know what were contained in the bags. At the police station (sic) she executed a
Counter-Affidavit.[3]
On January 31, 2007, the RTC promulgated a decision, the dispositive portion of
which states:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Belen Mariacos GUILTY as charged and
sentences here (sic) to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine
of P500,000.00.
The 7,030.3 grams of marijuana are ordered confiscated and turned over to the
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency for destruction in the presence of the Court
personnel and media.
SO ORDERED.[4]
Appellant appealed her conviction to the CA. She argued that the trial court erred
in considering the evidence of the prosecution despite its inadmissibility.[5] She
claimed that her right against an unreasonable search was flagrantly violated by
Police Officer (PO)2 Pallayoc when the latter searched the bag, assuming it was
hers, without a search warrant and with no permission from her. She averred that
PO2 Pallayocs purpose for apprehending her was to verify if the bag she was
carrying was the same one he had illegally searched earlier. Moreover, appellant
contended that there was no probable cause for her arrest.[6]
Further, appellant claimed that the prosecution failed to prove the corpus
delicti of the crime.[7] She alleged that the apprehending police officers violated
Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 3, Series of 1979, as amended by Board
Regulation No. 2, Series of 1990, which prescribes the procedure in the custody of
seized prohibited and regulated drugs, instruments, apparatuses, and articles. The
said regulation directs the apprehending team having initial custody and control
of the drugs and/or paraphernalia, immediately after seizure or confiscation, to
have the same physically inventoried and photographed in the presence of
appellant or her representative, who shall be required to sign copies of the
inventory. The failure to comply with this directive, appellant claimed, casts a
serious doubt on the identity of the items allegedly confiscated from her. She,
likewise, averred that the prosecution failed to prove that the items allegedly
confiscated were indeed prohibited drugs, and to establish the chain of custody
over the same.
On the other hand, the People, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
argued that the warrantless arrest of appellant and the warrantless seizure of
marijuana were valid and legal,[8] justified as a search of a moving vehicle. It
averred that PO2 Pallayoc had reasonable ground to believe that appellant had
committed the crime of delivering dangerous drugs based on reliable information
from their agent, which was confirmed when he peeked into the bags and smelled
the distinctive odor of marijuana.[9] The OSG also argued that appellant was now
estopped from questioning the illegality of her arrest since she voluntarily
entered a plea of not guilty upon arraignment and participated in the trial and
presented her evidence.[10] The OSG brushed aside appellants argument that the
bricks of marijuana were not photographed and inventoried in her presence or
that of her counsel immediately after confiscation, positing that physical
inventory may be done at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the
apprehending team, whichever was practicable.[11]
In a Decision dated January 19, 2009, the CA dismissed appellants appeal and
affirmed the RTC decision in toto.[12] It held that the prosecution had successfully
proven that appellant carried away from the jeepney a number of bags which,
when inspected by the police, contained dangerous drugs. The CA ruled that
appellant was caught in flagrante delicto of carrying and conveying the bag that
contained the illegal drugs, and thus held that appellants warrantless arrest was
valid. The appellate court ratiocinated:
It must be stressed that PO2 Pallayoc had earlier ascertained the contents of the bags
when he was aboard the jeep. He saw the bricks of marijuana wrapped in newspaper.
That said marijuana was on board the jeepney to be delivered to a specified destination
was already unlawful. PO2 Pallayoc needed only to see for himself to whom those bags
belonged. So, when he saw accused-appellant carrying the bags, PO2 Pallayoc was
within his lawful duty to make a warrantless arrest of accused-appellant.
xxxx
Firstly, this Court opines that the invocation of Section 2, Article III of the
Constitution is misplaced. At the time, when PO2 Pallayoc looked into the contents of
the suspicious bags, there was no identified owner. He asked the other passengers atop
the jeepney but no one knew who owned the bags. Thus, there could be no violation of
the right when no one was entitled thereto at that time.
Secondly, the facts of the case show the urgency of the situation. The local police has
been trying to intercept the transport of the illegal drugs for more than a day, to no
avail. Thus, when PO2 Pallayoc was tipped by the secret agent of the Barangay
Intelligence Network, PO2 Pallayoc had no other recourse than to verify as promptly as
possible the tip and check the contents of the bags.
Thirdly, x x x the search was conducted in a moving vehicle. Time and again, a search of
a moving vehicle has been justified on the ground that the mobility of motor vehicles
makes it possible for the vehicle to move out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the
warrant must be sought. Thus, under the facts, PO2 Pallayoc could not be expected to
secure a search warrant in order to check the contents of the bags which were loaded
on top of the moving jeepney. Otherwise, a search warrant would have been of no use
because the motor vehicle had already left the locality.[13]
Once again, we are asked to determine the limits of the powers of the States
agents to conduct searches and seizures. Over the years, this Court had laid down
the rules on searches and seizures, providing, more or less, clear parameters in
determining which are proper and which are not.
Thus, we must determine if the search was lawful. If it was, then there
would have been probable cause for the warrantless arrest of appellant.
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Law and jurisprudence have laid down the instances when a warrantless
search is valid. These are:
5. Customs search;
Both the trial court and the CA anchored their respective decisions on the fact that
the search was conducted on a moving vehicle to justify the validity of the search.
Over the years, the rules governing search and seizure have been steadily
liberalized whenever a moving vehicle is the object of the search on the basis of
practicality. This is so considering that before a warrant could be obtained, the
place, things and persons to be searched must be described to the satisfaction of the
issuing judge a requirement which borders on the impossible in instances where
moving vehicle is used to transport contraband from one place to another with
impunity.[21]
Given the discussion above, it is readily apparent that the search in this
case is valid. The vehicle that carried the contraband or prohibited drugs was
about to leave. PO2 Pallayoc had to make a quick decision and act fast. It would
be unreasonable to require him to procure a warrant before conducting the
search under the circumstances. Time was of the essence in this case. The
searching officer had no time to obtain a warrant. Indeed, he only had enough
time to board the vehicle before the same left for its destination.
This Court has also, time and again, upheld as valid a warrantless search
incident to a lawful arrest. Thus, Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court
provides:
SEC. 13. Search incident to lawful arrest.A person lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the
commission of an offense without a search warrant.[23]
SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
Given that the search was valid, appellants arrest based on that search is
also valid.
The penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty
(20) years and a fine ranging from One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) to Five
hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person who, unless
authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another,
distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any controlled precursor and essential
chemical, or shall act as a broker in such transactions.
In her defense, appellant averred that the packages she was carrying did not
belong to her but to a neighbor who had asked her to carry the same for him. This
contention, however, is of no consequence.
Appellants narration of facts deserves little credence. If it is true that Bennie Lao-
ang merely asked her and her companion to carry some baggages, it is but logical
to first ask what the packages contained and where these would be taken.
Likewise, if, as appellant said, Lao-ang ran away after they disembarked from
the jeepney, appellant and her companion should have ran after him to give him
the bags he had left with them, and not to continue on their journey without
knowing where they were taking the bags.
Next, appellant argues that the prosecution failed to prove the corpus delicti of
the crime. In particular, she alleged that the apprehending police officers failed to
follow the procedure in the custody of seized prohibited and regulated drugs,
instruments, apparatuses, and articles.
In all prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, the existence
of all dangerous drugs is a sine qua non for conviction. The dangerous drug is the
very corpus delicti of that crime.[35]
Thus, Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 prescribes the procedure for custody and
disposition of seized dangerous drugs, to wit:
The Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9165 further provides:
SECTION 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered
Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and
Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory Equipment. The
PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of
dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or
surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:
It is admitted that there were no photographs taken of the drugs seized, that
appellant was not accompanied by counsel, and that no representative from the
media and the DOJ were present. However, this Court has already previously held
that non-compliance with Section 21 is not fatal and will not render an accuseds
arrest illegal, or make the items seized inadmissible. What is of utmost
importance is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
items.[37]
Based on the testimony of PO2 Pallayoc, after appellants arrest, she was
immediately brought to the police station where she stayed while waiting for the
Mayor. It was the Mayor who opened the packages, revealing the illegal drugs,
which were thereafter marked and sent to the police crime laboratory the
following day. Contrary to appellants claim, the
prosecutions evidence establishes the chain of custody from the time of
appellants arrest until the prohibited drugs were tested at the police crime
laboratory.
While it is true that the arresting officer failed to state explicitly the
justifiable ground for non-compliance with Section 21, this does not necessarily
mean that appellants arrest was illegal or that the items seized are inadmissible.
The justifiable ground will remain unknown because appellant did not question
the custody and disposition of the items taken from her during the trial.[38] Even
assuming that the police officers failed to abide by Section 21, appellant should
have raised this issue before the trial court. She could have moved for the quashal
of the information at the first instance. But she did not. Hence, she is deemed to
have waived any objection on the matter.
Further, the actions of the police officers, in relation to the procedural rules
on the chain of custody, enjoyed the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official functions. Courts accord credence and full faith to the
testimonies of police authorities, as they are presumed to be performing their
duties regularly, absent any convincing proof to the contrary.[39]
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
SECOND DIVISION
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
1. The searching team entered the premises and conducted the search
without any witness in violation of the Rules of Court;
2. The raiding team planted evidence of 600 compact discs at the scene
while no witnesses were present;
SCEI filed an Opposition[5] to the motion, to which BFTI filed a Reply,[6] the
latter arguing that SCEI had no personality to represent the People of
the Philippines in the case and to file the opposition to the motion because SCEIs
agents were mere witnesses of the applicant for the issuance of the search
warrants.[7]
On April 11, 2005, acting on a Very Urgent Motion to Inhibit [8] filed by
SCEI to which BFTI interposed its objection, Judge Eugenio voluntarily inhibited
himself from the case.[9] The case was thereafter raffled to Branch 21 of the Manila
RTC, presided by Judge Amor A. Reyes.[10]
In the meantime or on April 14, 2005, SCEI, through counsel, filed with the
Department of Justice Task Force on Anti-Intellectual Property Piracy a complaint-
affidavit against the directors and officers of BFTI.[11]
By Order[12] dated April 18, 2005, the RTC denied BFTIs motion to quash
the warrants, it finding that they were regularly issued and implemented, and that a
bond is not required in the application for their issuance.
The RTC, however, found that the two-witness rule under Section 8 of Rule
126 which provides:
was violated and that the searching teams use of a bolt cutter to open the searched
premises was unnecessary, hence, it granted BFTIs Motion for Reconsideration of
its April 18, 2005 Order by Order of August 8, 2005.[18]
Hence, arose SCEIs present Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule
[23]
45 which assails the August 8 and August 10, 2005 Orders of the court a
quo, contending that the RTC erred
(a) . . . when it ruled that the use of the bolt cutter violated
Section 7 of Rule 126.
[3] . . . when it ordered the immediate release of the seized property prior to the
finality of the order quashing the search warrants.
The issue of whether a private complainant, like SCEI, has the right to
participate in search warrant proceedings was addressed in the affirmative
in United Laboratories, Inc. v. Isip:[25]
As for the use of a bolt cutter to gain access to the premises of BFTI, it was,
under the circumstances, reasonable, contrary to the RTCs finding that it was
unnecessary. For, as the RTC itself found, after the members of the searching team
introduced themselves to the security guards of BFTI and showed them the search
warrants, the guards refused to receive the warrants and to open the premises, they
claiming that they are not in control of the case.[27] The conditions required under
Section 7 of Rule 126 were thus complied with:
The RTCs finding that the two-witness rule governing the execution of
search warrant was not complied with, which rule is mandatory to ensure regularity
in the execution of the search warrant,[28] is in order, however.
xxxx
The RTC did not thus err in ordering the quashal of the search warrants.
SCEI insists, however, that the searching team waited for the arrival of the
barangay officials who were summoned to witness the search,[30] and that [e]ven
when the enforcing officers were moving towards the actual BFTI premises . . .
they were accompanied at all times by one of the security guards on duty until
the barangay officials arrived.[31] SCEIs position raises an issue of fact which is not
proper for consideration in a petition for review on certiorari before this Court
under Rule 45, which is supposed to cover only issues of law. [32] In any event, a
security guard may not be considered a lawful occupant or a member of [the lawful
occupants] family under the earlier quoted Section 8 of Rule 126.
As the two-witness rule was not complied with, the objects seized during
the April 1, 2005 search are inadmissible in evidence. Their return, on motion of
BFTI, was thus in order.[33]
A final word. The RTC order requiring BFTI to file a bond to ensure the
return of the seized items should the Department of Justice find probable cause
against it in I.S. No. 2005-315, SCEI v. Anthony Bryan B. Sy, et al., has no basis in
law. Besides, the seized items being inadmissible in evidence, it would serve no
purpose to ensure their return.
The August 8, 2005 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8
granting the Urgent Motion to Quash filed by respondent, Bright Future
Technologies, Inc., is AFFIRMED.
The August 10, 2005 Order granting the Ex Parte Motion to Return Seized
Articles filed by respondent is AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that the
portion requiring respondent to file a bond is SET ASIDE. Let the bond then filed
by respondent be CANCELLED.
SO ORDERED.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION