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Litehouse Foods: The Glass Dilemma
John J. Lawrence, University of Idaho

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Anubha Mishra, University of Idaho
Marie Pengilly, University of Idaho

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oug Hawkins Jr., Litehouse Foods senior business development manager,
stared at the wall of shelves in his office that contained a myriad of bottles

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and jars that Litehouse Foods had sold its products in over the years and
reflected on the possible packaging change he had been asked to investigate. For fifty
years, the Sandpoint, ID, based company that his grandfather, father, and uncle had
founded had sold creamy, refrigerated salad dressings (the companys core product that
accounted for approximately 60 percent of its revenues) to consumers in glass jars. But
two of its major competitors had switched to selling their dressings in plastic jars in the
last two years, allowing these competitors to open a $0.60/jar price advantage at retail.
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Initial estimates suggested that Litehouse could realize savings on the order of $1.5
million per year if it made a similar packaging switch and simultaneously changed to
a more industry standard 12 oz. jar. These savings would allow it to narrow the price
advantage that competitors had gained. It was the fall of 2011, and in the past year
the company had embarked on an aggressive growth campaign. Switching to plastic
packaging was also seen as a possible contributor to realizing the companys five year
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growth and performance goals.

But the decision was by no means straightforward. The 13 oz. glass jars contain-
ing its signature creamy dressings (see Figure 1) had become part of the companys
brand identity. Doug recalled the market research the company had done ten years ago
to understand how consumers perceived its dressings. At the time they had believed
that consumers knew Litehouse was a private, Northwest-based company that sold all
natural, premium dressings. What they found had surprised themconsumers knew
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that Litehouse dressings tasted good and came in glass jars, and that was pretty much
all the consumers knew. Even customers in Seattle, Portland, and Boise did not associ-
ate Litehouse with the Northwest. More recent studies conducted in 2005 found that
consumers associated the Litehouse brand with a premium, high quailty product that
tasted great. That study had asked consumers to consider all of the companys prod-
ucts, rather than focusing specifically on dressings as the earlier study had. As such, the
fact that glass had not emerged as a brand association from this study was not surpris-
ing given the variety of products and packaging types the company offered.
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Copyright 2014 by the Case Research Journal and by John J. Lawrence, Anubha Mishra, and Marie
Pengilly. The authors wish to thank Doug Hawkins Jr. and Stacey Miller for their assistance in preparing
this case and the CRJ editor and anonymous reviewers for their helpful suggestions on how to make this
a more effective case.

Litehouse Foods: The Glass Dilemma 1

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Figure 1: Litehouse Foods Signature Glass Jars for Creamy Dressings

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Source: Images courtesy of Litehouse Foods

Doug wondered just how important an attribute glass was to customers currently
and how much it influenced their perceptions of product quality. Glass was, as his
director of quality assurance had described it, the gold standard in packaging, and
probably would be for quite some time. Comments from some customers clearly indi-
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cated a perceived link between glass packaging and product quality. When Litehouse
had switched its family-sized containers to plastic a number of years ago, feedback
from the market had been mixed, despite the greater convenience provided by a lighter
weight, unbreakable, squeezable package to families with young children. And then
there was the environmental impact associated with the decision, both real and per-
ceived. About a third of the associated cost savings from switching to plastic came from
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fuel cost savings because plastic was so much lighter than glassa definite positive for
the environment. But plastic also conjured up images of islands of plastic floating in
the oceanthe environmental impact of the decision was not entirely clear.
Switching to plastic packaging would require more than $1 million in up-front
investment to support both changes in the manufacturing process and the introduc-
tion of the new package into retail channels. Recent acquisitions and new product
launches associated with its growth strategy, however, had left Litehouse short on cash.
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While Doug was confident the company could come up with this up-front invest-
ment, it was unclear whether a packaging switch was the best use of very limited com-
pany funds, at least in the short term.
Doug considered what he should recommend to the executive team. It was clear to
him that the executive team saw the company heading in the direction of plastic, but
wanted Doug to come back with an analysis and recommendation indicating whether
that was indeed the right direction to go at this time. Further, if his recommendation
was to switch to plastic, there were a number of supporting decisions that would need
to be made, including whether to change the jar design, how to introduce the change to
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retailers and consumers, how to manage the transition from glass to plastic, and if and
how to address the environmental side of the change with the companys stakeholders.

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 The Refrigerated Salad Dressings Market and Competition

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Retail salad dressing represented a $3 billion market in 2011 with a household penetra-
tion rate of approximately 95 percent and a growth rate on the order of 3 percent per
year. The market could be divided into two segmentsthe shelf stable segment usually
found in the middle aisles of a grocery store made up 85 percent of the market, and the
refrigerated salad dressings typically found in the produce section made up the remain-
ing 15 percent. The refrigerated dressings segment had experienced growth rates in the

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810 percent range in the years immediately prior to the sharp economic downturn in
the fall of 2008, but that growth had since slowed as the recession had made consumers
increasingly price conscious. Demand for more natural ingredients, reduced-calorie
and reduced fat content, and robust flavors were among the primary trends that were
recent drivers of new product innovation in the salad dressing category.
Litehouse had been an innovator in getting fresh, refrigerated dressings sold in the
produce sections of retail grocery stores. For a time, simply being fresh, refrigerated,

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and in the produce section differentiated Litehouse; in 2011 Litehouse had three sig-
nificant competitors in that market. In the U.S., Maries was the market leader with an
approximately 30 percent market share; Marzetti was second with a 25 percent market
share; and Litehouse was third with an approximately 21 percent market share. While
Litehouse was #3 nationally, it was the market share leader in the Northwest. In Canada,
Renees (a Heinz owned brand) was the market share leader and Litehouse was #2.
Litehouse positioned itself as the premium product in the refrigerated dressing
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category. The companys products were made fresh, from natural ingredients with no
preservatives. The company strived to use the best ingredients in its dressings to pro-
duce a better tasting product. For example, it made its own blue cheese because it was
not satisfied with what it could get from industrial suppliers, and used only canola
oil in its dressing because it felt it produced the best tasting dressing. The company
was constantly using consumer panels to test this belief that its dressings tasted better.
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These panels consistently rated Litehouse dressings superior in flavor to the competi-
tors dressings in blind taste tests. Litehouse salespeople also frequently used blind taste
tests with grocery chain buyers as a way to win new shelf space for the companys prod-
uct. Consistent with the market trends, Litehouse Foods promoted the healthy aspects
of its dressing as shown in the promotional messages in Figure 2, and had recently
launched a line of lower-fat yogurt-based dressings and a line of organic dressings.
Maries, the category leader, started with dressing recipes first served at Maries Caf
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in Seattle in the 1960s. Maries Dressings grew over time, and in 2005 was acquired by
Ventura Foods LLC. Ventura Foods competed in food service, industrial ingredients,
and retail markets, specializing in oils, shortenings, margarines, dressings, mayonnaise,
sauces, soup bases and flavor bases. Ventura Foods was co-owned by CHS, Inc. and
Mitsui and Co., Ltd., two global conglomerates, and had estimated net sales of $2.35
billion for the year ending August 31, 2011.1 Ventura Foods president and CEO Chris
Furman described the company as focused on providing good value and convenient,
healthy choices to its customers and as being well positioned for growth.2
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Litehouse Foods: The Glass Dilemma 3

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Figure 2: Examples from Recent Litehouse Advertisements

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Source: Courtesy of Litehouse Foods

In line with its parent companys mission, Maries promoted itself as using only
all-natural ingredients for a well-balanced diet. Brand claims included not using arti-
ficial preservatives, high fructose corn syrup, artificial colors or flavors, modified food
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starch, or MSG in its products. The companys website (Maries.com) highlighted its
dedication to using fresh and high quality ingredients in its productsHomemade
flavor, freshness, quality, variety [. . .] Maries uses only the highest quality, freshest
and best tasting ingredients possible with nothing artificial, no preservatives and no
trans fats. Our dressings are packed cold and kept refrigerated to lock in the unique
homemade flavor and freshness.3
The #2 brand, Marzetti, was founded by Teressa Marzetti, an Italian immigrant
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who opened a restaurant in Columbus, Ohio. Its dressings were very popular, and in
1955 the upstairs of the restaurant became a salad dressing factory. Lancaster Colony
acquired T. Marzetti in 1969, closed the restaurant and built the salad dressing busi-
ness. Lancaster Colony manufactured and marketed a variety of specialty foods for
both the food service and retail markets; Marzetti was its flagship brand. In its 2011
annual report, Lancaster Colony reported net income of $115 million on sales of
$1.06 billion for the year ending June 30, 2011. The company was debt free.
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In keeping with general industry and consumer trends, Marzetti too emphasized
delivering refrigerated salad dressings that were made with a minimal number of all-
natural, simple ingredients, and offered flavorful solutions to living a well-balanced
lifestyle. More recently, T. Marzetti Company expanded its line of Simply Dressed
refrigerated salad dressings by introducing new Marzetti Simply Dressed and Light
varieties. Marzettis had also recently released a line of organic dressings.
Founded in 1984, Renes was the market leader of refrigerated salad dressing in
Canada. In October 2006, Renes parent company, Intercorp Excelle Inc., became a
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subsidiary of Heinz Canada, itself a subsidiary of Heinz Corporationa $10.7 billion

global food company best known for its iconic Ketchup brand. Heinz Canada had
been very active in promoting sustainability and community welfare. The company
was striving to reduce solid waste, water consumption, energy usage, and greenhouse
gas emission by 20 percent by 2015. The Renes brand likewise positioned itself as

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 being socially and environmentally responsible, in part based on its use of fresh, pre-

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mium ingredients in its dressings.

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All four companies had been recognized for their innovativeness within the salad
dressing industry. For example, the Association for Dressing and Sauces (ADS) awarded
Litehouse with Dressing of the Year awards in 2009, 2011, and 2012 for innovative
dressing flavors such as Tangy Orange Citrus, Pear Gorgonzola and Fuji Apple. Simi-
larly, Maries Sesame Ginger dressing was recognized by ADS in 2008. And Marzettis
Asiago Peppercorn and Renes Extreme Cheese dressing had received the Dressing of

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the Year awards in 2006 and 2003, respectively. The four companies packaging, pric-
ing, and flavors of spoonable dressings are compared in Exhibit 1.

Company Background: From Restaurant to Food Company4

Litehouse Foods was built, according to the companys website, on a recipe, a prayer,
and a lot of hard work. In the early 1950s, Ed Hawkins Sr. was working as a chef in

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Spokane, WA when his boss complained about the poor quality of the blue cheese dress-
ing they served on salads. Ed responded to the challenge in an unorthodox manner: he
prayed about it. The answer to his prayer was the inspiration for a blend of mayon-
naise, spices, crumbled blue cheese, and buttermilk. To his knowledge, his original
recipe was the first creamy blue cheese dressing.
Ten years later, Ed and his wife Lorena bought a restaurant in the town of Hope,
Idaho on Pend Oreille Lake and called it The Litehouse Restaurant. They served Eds
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blue cheese dressing at the restaurant, and patrons started bringing empty jars so they
could take home some of the dressing. In 1963 the restaurant started selling its blue
cheese and Thousand Island dressings through a nearby grocery store in Sandpoint,
Idaho. The company struggled initially, and Eds sons, Doug and Edward Jr., used
their time off from their teaching jobs to pitch in to make and sell the dressings. By the
late 1970s, the business had outgrown the restaurants kitchen and the family acquired
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a plant in Sandpoint to focus on the dressing business.

The company grew steadily over the ensuing years, in part as regional retail grocers
like Albertsons and Safeway that carried its products grew. During the 1980s Litehouse
added flavors and packaging options to its salad dressing line and a food service divi-
sion was added. Growth continued in the 1990s as Litehouse became the exclusive
produce dressing in the newly created Sams Club produce department. Packaged salad
was introduced to retail stores, and the first salad kits included dressing packed by
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Litehouse. In 1997, Litehouse merged with Chadalee Farms, a Lowell, Michigan based
company with a strong background in food service dating back to 1893. This merger
gave Litehouse a Midwest manufacturing and distribution facility that provided an
efficient way to serve Midwest markets. By 2001 the company was using so much blue
cheese that it started making its own. The company hired a master cheese maker to
oversee production, and launched its own Idaho Bleu Cheese product line. As a result,
Litehouse became one of the largest suppliers of blue cheese in the U.S.
In 2006, owners Doug Hawkins, Edward Hawkins Jr., and Wendell Christoff (pre-
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viously the owner of Chadalee Farms) offered Litehouse employees the opportunity to
purchase the business through an Employee Stock Ownership Plan (or ESOP). Subse-
quently Litehouse received recognition for its innovative ESOP practices and training.
With sales exceeding $140 million, it had also been listed in the top 100 privately held
companies in the U.S. by Entrepreneur magazine. At the end of 2010, the Hawkins

Litehouse Foods: The Glass Dilemma 5

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 and Christoff families owned 70 percent of the company and an employee trust owned

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the remaining 30 percent. Starting with the prayer that helped Ed Hawkins Sr. first

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conceive the idea for the companys flagship blue cheese dressing back in the early
1950s, the company had been strongly influenced by the faith of its owners. The com-
panys guiding principles, shown in Figure 3, were clearly rooted in that faith.

Figure 3: Litehouse Guiding Principles

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Litehouse Guiding Principles

Our belief and devotion to Christ gave us the strength to persevere, the knowl-
edge to lead and the humility to serve. While we recognize that our relationship
with our Lord is personal, the virtues that guided us in the beginning forged the
foundation of this company. These same principles of perseverance, leadership
and service guide us today and it is in this spirit that we deliver these guiding
principles. Use them to lead, serve and to persevere for generations to come.

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Doug Hawkins, Edward Hawkins, Wendell Christoff
FaithOur faith is our guiding inspiration that binds us to what we believe and what
we know is possible.
StewardshipAs individuals we choose service over self interest. This is our willing-
ness to be accountable to each other, our families, the company and our communities.
IntegrityWe will conduct all endeavors with uncompromising truth, honesty and reli-
ability.
Commitment to ExcellenceWe arecommitted to building the company to last, to
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achieve the highest level of excellence and executing with the knowledge that excel-
lence is a journey, not a destination.
AccountabilityWe will take responsibility for our actions and the outcomes. We are
responsible for investing our resources for the long-term success of the company.

Source: Litehouse Foods Website, www.litehousefoods.com

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Doug Hawkins Jr. had grown up in and around the company. Vacations in the
Hawkins family, for example, always included trips to the local grocery store to see
how the companys products were displayed. Dougs first job in the company, as a teen-
ager, was in the print shopprinting product information on the companys signature
glass jars. He worked various jobs within the company during high school, including
in shipping and receiving, maintenance, and on the production line. During his col-
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lege years he worked in accounting and then in sales. After college he took a job with
another company for a few years before returning to Litehouse in 2005 as a marketing
associate. Over time, he worked his way up from having marketing responsibility for
some of the companys smaller lines to being responsible for the companys flagship
dressing line.

2010: A Year of Change

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The year 2010 brought significant change to Litehouse, as the company launched an
aggressive and multi-faceted growth strategy intended to increase sales by 78 percent
within five years and to make the company one of the top ten food producers in the
country. Its an aggressive goal, and were putting together the plans to do that,
President Jim Frank told the press in June, 2010. In describing the strategy to the

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 press, Frank and Vice President of Marketing and Innovations Paul Kusche communi-

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cated four elements of this growth strategy:5

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Expanding its product lineLitehouse was in the process of rapidly expanding
its product lines. In the fall of 2009, for example, the company had launched
a line of varietal apple ciders. It sold 500,000 gallons in 2009, and was expect-
ing to produce and sell 3.75 million gallons of apple cider nationally in 2010.
Litehouse planned to add lemonade and bottled teas to its line of ciders. The
company was making significant investment in its R&D capacity in both

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facilities and people to support this product line expansion. It had a team of
nine food developers working on new product development. As Kusche told
the press, Were looking at all avenues of growth, not just adding another
bottle of dressing.
Expanding beyond the supermarket produce sectionLitehouse products had
historically been sold in the produce sections of supermarkets, but the com-
pany was looking to expand the placement of its products to other depart-

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ments within supermarkets as well as to other types of stores. The company
was in the process of leveraging its cheese making capabilities by launching
a line of artisanal cheeses that would be sold in supermarket delis and also in
wine shops and other specialty stores. The line of cheeses included gorgonzola,
bleu, feta, and a three-cheese blend of asiago, Romano, and parmesan cheeses.
Increasing its marketing effortsLitehouse had recently added marketing staff
and was looking to expand its marketing efforts in selected markets to grow its
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market share. For example, the company had recently targeted the Sacramento
and Minneapolis markets, and by concentrating on advertising in those mar-
kets had gained market share for its signature refrigerated salad dressing line
in both markets.
Expanding into new sales territoriesWhile Litehouse remained strongest in
the Northwest, it was looking to expand into additional markets nationally.
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The company had recently begun expanding in the Chicago metropolitan

area. Litehouse was also looking beyond the U.S. and Canada. It had recently
launched a line of twenty of its products in Mexico, selling through large
retailers like Walmart and the Soriana and Futurama grocery chains. Lon-
ger term, it was eyeing Latin America, Asia, and Europe as potential future
markets.
Acquisitions were also part of the growth strategy. In June of 2010 Litehouse pur-
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chased the assets and brand of Green Garden Foods, a Washington based competitor
with forty employees that produced salad dressings, sauces, dips, salsa, and mayonnaise.
Litehouse moved Green Gardens manufacturing equipment to its Sandpoint and Low-
ell manufacturing plants and closed the companys Seattle operation. Litehouse VP
Paul Kusche was quoted as telling the Spokesman-Review, They have some manufac-
turing capacity that we dont, and that we need.6 Litehouse President Jim Frank told
the Spokesman-Review on the day of the acquisition that business has been a little
rough for them, and added, They have some really good customers.7 Litehouse
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described the acquisition as facilitating expanded growth and innovation through

new production capabilities and product knowledge.
In November 2010, Litehouse CEO Edward Hawkins announced that due to busi-
ness growth the company would build a new manufacturing facility in Hurricane,
Utah. The new $10 million facility opened in May 2011 and consisted of 89,000

Litehouse Foods: The Glass Dilemma 7

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 square feet of manufacturing capacity. The facility was initially fitted to produce por-

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tion packs of salad dressings for the value added market, but Litehouse expected to add

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other product lines over time. The new facilitys location was selected in part because of
its proximity to key customers who produced packaged salads and vegetable plates in
Salinas, CA, the largest vegetable producing region in the U.S. The location would also
provide a manufacturing and distribution platform to serve customers in the South-
western U.S. The plant employed 100 people when it opened. At full capacity, the
facility would employ approximately 160 people.

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In December, 2010 Litehouse closed out a year of change by announcing that it had
appointed Jim Frank as the companys CEO. Frank replaced Edward Hawkins who
had served as CEO since 1989. Franks appointment as CEO marked the first time in
company history that the CEO position was held by somebody outside the Hawkins
family. Frank had joined the company in 2006 as the director of sales after spending
the first thirty years of his career in the grocery industry, primarily with Albertsons. He
went on to become VP of sales and marketing prior to being appointed president of

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Litehouse Foods in 2008.

Packaging Impacts across the Supply Chain

Litehouse had always prided itself on using the highest quality, all natural ingredients
in its dressing. The costs of these ingredients had increased significantly over the last
couple of years, as had fuel costs, forcing Litehouse to increase its price to retail cus-
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tomers. Its competitors had generally experienced similar cost increases, and in the past
had tended to adjust their pricing around the same time Litehouse had. But the past
year had been different. Litehouse had increased its price twice, while competitors had
been able to hold the line on their pricingat least in part, Doug believed, because
two of them had switched to plastic packaging. While Litehouse had consistently sold
its product at a slight price premium compared to its competitors, that price premium
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in places now was in excess of $0.60. With Litehouse products currently priced at
$3.99 at retail, that $0.60 premium meant competitors now had about a 15 percent
price advantage over Litehouse, and there was evidence that some customers were
beginning to defect as a result.
At the same time, the internal push to accelerate growth at Litehouse had caused
what the company believed would be a temporary decline in profitability. That decline
in profitability combined with the investments in Green Garden and the new Hur-
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ricane, UT production facility had weakened the companys normally strong balance
sheet. As a result, the company was experiencing a cash crunch and there was signifi-
cant effort underway to reduce costs. It was the combination of the growing price gap
that was opening up at retail and the internal cash crunch that had driven the company
to seriously consider switching from glass to plastic. Internal estimates suggested that
the company could save $1.5 million per year by switching from its current 13 oz.
glass jar to a more industry standard 12 oz. plastic jar. About two thirds of this savings
would come from reduced ingredient costs due to the reduction in the size of the jar
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and about one third would be in savings in transportation due to the reduced weight
of plastic compared to glass. Changing the packaging, however, would have impacts
across the supply chain that Doug needed to factor into his recommendation. He also
wanted to consider the companys previous experience switching other product lines
from glass to plastic.

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 The Impact on Operations

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Switching from glass to plastic would have three major impacts on the production

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process. At the front end of the process, plastic jars were loaded into the filling line
differently than glass. Glass jars needed to be loaded manually to minimize breakage,
whereas plastic jars could simply be dumped out of boxes into a descrambler that
would automatically handle the jar until it was right side up and in the right position
to feed into the line. One of the two Sandpoint lines already had a descrambler to

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handle the value-sized plastic containers, but a second descrambler would need to be
purchased to support the second Sandpoint line that now mostly ran the glass jars, and
a descrambler would need to be added to the filling line in Lowell.
The manner in which the tamper resistant safety seal was applied at the end of
the process was the second major change in the process. With glass jars, plastic was
wrapped around the top of the jar and lid after the lid had been put on. The plastic was
then heated to shrink it around the lid to create a tamper resistant plastic sleeve around

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the top of the jar. In the case of the plastic jar, the tamper resistant safety seal consisted
of a foil seal that was secured to the top of the jar using an induction process before the
lid was put on. As in the case of the descrambler, only one of the two Sandpoint lines
had the equipment needed to apply the inner foil seal, so two additional induction
sealing systems would need to be acquired (i.e., one for Sandpoint and one for Lowell).
The third major change in the process occurred in the warehouse. Glass jars were
stronger and could be stacked five to six layers high, whereas plastic jars could only be
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stacked two to three layers high. As a result, additional shelving would be needed so
that Litehouse could continue to make use of the full vertical space of its warehouse.
This was important, as the company had limited warehouse space and no room to
easily expand the warehouse. Refrigerated warehouse space was also expensive to main-
tain so there were cost advantages to using that space as efficiently as possible. Adding
the descrambler, the induction seal process equipment, and the additional warehouse
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shelving in both Sandpoint and Lowell would cost about $750,000.

From an operating perspective, the exclusive use of plastic jars offered several
advantages. The most significant of these was the elimination of breakage risk in both
transport and production. While the percentage of jars that broke was quite small,
on the order of 0.25 percent, any breakage required careful cleanup. Depending on
where and how the glass broke, it might also require that nearby jars (with or with-
out product inside them) be disposed of to eliminate the chance of a product going
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out the door with a glass shard in it. Breakage also affected inventory accuracy as not
every broken jar and the product it contained was always recorded. In addition to the
elimination of this risk, the process of applying the tamper resistant foil seal to plastic
jars was more robust than the process of applying the plastic tamper resistant sleeve
to the glass jars, which was somewhat finicky and occasionally forced temporary stop-
page of the production line. Switching to all plastic packaging also had the potential
to reduce the time it took to switch from one size of jar to another by as much as ten
minutes, although this would depend on the final design of the plastic jar. All of these
factors suggested that there would be somewhat less downtime and waste associated
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with plastic jars compared to glass. Plastic was also quieter and lighter, making it
easier on the production staff. The primary disadvantage of plastic from an operating
standpoint was the fact that full plastic jars could only be stacked half as high as glass,
and this added to the time it took to move pallets of product in the warehouse. On
balance, Tony Butler, the operations manager, welcomed the possible move to plastic

Litehouse Foods: The Glass Dilemma 9

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 due primarily to the elimination of breakage risk, but didnt feel a switch would lead

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to significant savings in operating expenses.

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Tony had stressed to Doug that the transition needed to be well planned and exe-
cuted to minimize the cost of the changeover and to avoid any disruptions in supply.
Tony wanted to have a couple thousand jars in advance of the main changeover to do
trial runs and make sure everything worked as expected. The height, shape, flexibility,
and rigidity of a container all mattered and any or all of these could create a need
to fine tune the production process so that it ran efficiently with minimal defects.

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When the 20 oz. family sized plastic squeeze bottle was introduced, for example, the
cardboard tray that the product was placed on had to be modified to avoid difficulties
when multiple jars of product were polypacked together for transport. The inventory
of jars, lids, seals, and labels for both glass and plastic packaging would have to be care-
fully planned so that Litehouse would not run out of the current packaging before it
met any commitments to retailers for the old packaging and before sufficient inventory
of the new packaging material was available. At the same time, Doug didnt want to

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have too much of the glass packaging left over that would simply be scrapped. Tony
expected a significant increase in packaging inventory in the warehouse during the
transition and significant write-off of old packaging inventory when the change was
made. He estimated that these transition costs would be at least $100,000. Because
of the uncertainties associated with the transition, and the fact that production lines
would have to be taken down for about a week for the capital upgrades, Tony had a
strong preference for the transition to be carried out during one of the slower times at
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the planteither February or August.

The Impact in Quality Assurance

Broken glass was also the quality assurance managers foremost concern in the debate
over glass versus plastic packaging. Detecting broken glass and/or glass shards was very
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difficult, and a switch to plastic would eliminate that hazard. Doug recalled one con-
versation with his quality assurance manager who said:
You have to be aware that if you have glass you are always going to have broken glass. . . .
Glass is very brittle and it likes to break. It breaks all throughout the chainwe get it
in as broken, we break it, consumers break it while trying to take the jar and hit it on
the counter to open it, and then they dont realize that they have broken it.
The use of plastic raised two other issues in quality assurance. One was the poten-
No

tial that something in the plastic might impact the quality or safety of the product.
Litehouse relied on the work of its plastic suppliers and the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) standards and regulations for food grade plastic in choosing
plastic packaging that was believed to be safe. There was always the remote chance that
plastic packaging that had been determined to be safe would turn out to not be safe,
as for example had occurred with water bottles made with BPA. Doug had confidence
in the safety of the plastic packaging they were using and in the processes and stan-
dards the FDA had set up to insure this. The second issue, which was somewhat more
Do

of a concern in the QA department, was the permeability of plastic to oxygen which

might cause oxidation to occur more quickly than it would with glass. This could have
an impact on how the product tastedso it was a quality issue rather than a safety
issue. Refrigeration, however, tended to retard oxygen permeation and oxidation of the
product, and refrigerated products had significantly shorter shelf lives (120180 days)

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 than did shelf stable, non-refrigerated dressings. As such, Doug didnt believe that the

t
product quality would be impacted by a switch to plastic, even if customers kept the

os
product for its maximum shelf life, but his QA department was in the process of run-
ning tests to determine whether this was indeed the case.

The Impact on Inbound and Outbound Logistics

It was in logistics where the significant cost savings associated with a switch from glass

rP
to plastic was found. The glass jars were purchased from a supplier in Taiwan and
shipped by boat to Seattle. From there, Litehouse used either its own trucks or a com-
mon carrier to transport the jars to its Sandpoint, ID or Lowell, MI facilities. Most of
the jars that came to Sandpoint were backhauled on Litehouse trucks that had been
used to deliver product to the west coast. Litehouse owned a fleet of fifty refrigerated
trucks and was able to self-haul about 50 percent of its product, with the remaining
product being delivered by common carrier. Even when it was not bringing back a new

yo
shipment of empty glass jars, Litehouse was generally able to find other companies that
wanted their product hauled to locations near Litehouses facilities and was thus able
to avoid empty backhauls. In fact, it was sometimes more advantageous to backhaul
somebody elses product if that product required refrigeration.
The cost savings in logistics resulted because more product could be loaded onto
each truck before truck weight limits were reached. Litehouse could haul twenty-two
pallets of dressing in glass jars on a standard truck. Although this left plenty of physical
op
room in the truck, adding additional pallets would put the truck over its maximum
allowable weight. Three additional pallets of dressing could be hauled on the same
sized truck if the dressing was packaged in plastic because plastic packaging was lighter
than glass. Litehouse could not even fill its trucks with empty glass jars on the backhaul
to its facilities because of the weight of glass. With plastic jars, Litehouse would be able
to use the full volumetric capacity of its truck on the backhaul. The logistics depart-
tC

ment had given Doug an estimate that they could save about $500,000/year at current
production volumes and at current diesel prices (approximately $3.50/gallon). About
80 percent of this savings could be tied directly to the price of fuel, with the remainder
tied to other operating costs that would decrease if more pallets of product could be
hauled on each truck.
Litehouse sourced its glass jars from Taiwan because there were no major suppli-
ers in North America. At one time Litehouse had sourced glass jars from a supplier in
No

Mexico, but quality concerns had caused Litehouse to end its relationship with that
supplier. Plastic jars could be sourced within the U.S., and Doug had begun talking
with several U.S. suppliers about a possible switch. Initial estimates suggested that the
cost of the plastic jars FOB from the suppliers plants would be approximately the
same as the landed cost of the glass jars in the port of Seattle, although there would
be an upfront investment of $100,000 for the molds needed to produce the new jars.
Some plastic suppliers had multiple U.S. plants such that each Litehouse facility might
be able to source jars from a plant within its region.
Do

The Impact at Retail

Retailers were concerned less about whether the product was provided in glass or plas-
tic jars and more about how well the product turned over and the margins the product
provided relative to the shelf space used. All else being equal, Doug was sure that

Litehouse Foods: The Glass Dilemma 11

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 retailers would prefer plastic because of the reduced risk of breakage in the store. The

t
most significant impact at retail would be in the transition. Retailers would expect

os
Litehouse to manage the transition such that the retailer did not experience a stock-
out. This would probably require Litehouse to build up its inventory ahead of the
transition. Retailers would also want Litehouse to support the change well from a mar-
keting perspective so that customers were not confused or turned off by the change.
Doug expected a one-time addition of at least $250,000 in marketing costs to help
manage consumers perceptions of the change.

rP
One big question in Dougs mind was how many retailers would require Litehouse
to pay stocking fees and/or provide free sample product given that the products would
represent new stock keeping units (SKUs) for the retailer. Suppliers routinely paid
retailers stocking fees and/or provided free product when introducing a new product
on the shelf to facilitate the retailer bringing the product on board and introducing it
to its customers. New was defined as having a new Universal Product Code (UPC) as
new UPCs meant that stores had to set up new tags for these products. Since the plastic

yo
jars would have a new UPC compared to the glass jars, they would be considered new
products. Doug anticipated that a few of the chains with whom they had very strong
relationships would simply accept the new packaging as an inconsequential change
and not expect fees or free product. Other retailers would require one or the other or
both. Doug expected that these one-time costs would total on the order of $200,000.

Was Glass or Plastic Better for the Environment?

op
The switch from glass to plastic had environmental impacts as well, and Doug was very
interested in understanding what the impacts were, how his consumers perceived the
impacts, and how he should incorporate the impacts into his recommendations. To
understand the real environmental impact would require consideration of the change
across the entire life cycle of the jarsfrom the raw material inputs all the way through
tC

to what the consumer did with the jar after finishing the dressing inside. Doug knew
that a comprehensive life cycle analysis (LCA) could cost upwards of $200,000 if he
had somebody do it from scratch. Rather than investing in such a study, Doug had
obtained help from a local university student to pull together studies that had already
been conducted and were available in the public domain. The student had found a
number of such studies on the life cycle impacts of glass compared to plastic, although
these studies did not all point in the same direction.
No

Doug had found that LCA studies conducted or commissioned by those with an
interest in glass generally reported that glass provided superior environmental perfor-
mance. The two studies of this type that appeared to be the most rigorously conducted
were published by The Glass Packaging Institute (GPI) and by Owens-Illinois, Inc.
(O-I, the worlds leading glass packaging maker). The GPI study8 was conducted by
PE Americas, a leading global consulting firm and software supplier specializing in
sustainability, and focused on the carbon footprint of glass containers. It reported that
across its life cycle, glass had a primary energy demand (PED) of 16.6 MJ/kg of glass
Do

and a global warming potential of 1.25 kg CO2/kg of glass assuming the glass con-
tained 23 percent post consumer recycled input (the industry average in 2007). The
impacts decreased as use of post consumer recycled input increased. Owens-Illinois had
conducted its own study, but had supply chain and sustainability research firm AMR
Research review and validate its methodology and data sources. The O-I study9 found

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 that in North America, glass produced 0.171 kg CO2/ 355 ml container while PET

t
plastic produced 0.214 kg CO2/ 355 ml container. O-Is study assumed 25 percent

os
post consumer content in the glass and 2 percent post-consumer content in the plas-
tic. Our assessment shows that glass clearly has the most favorable carbon footprint,
reported O-Is vice president of sustainability, Jay Scripter, and O-Is study concluded
that, Food and beverage makers concerned about sustainability should choose glass.
On the other hand, the PET Resin Association (PETRA) and the National Asso-
ciation for PET Container Resources (NAPCOR) had commissioned LCA studies

rP
from the independent firm Franklin Associates in 1988, 1993, and 2009. These stud-
ies found that PET containers used less energy, created fewer greenhouse gas emis-
sions, and generated less solid waste than glass. As part of a NAPCOR study in 1993,
salad dressing bottles were specifically considered. The study compared 16-ounce salad
dressing containers and found that PET containers consumed about 45 percent less
energy and generated 35 percent less solid waste than glass. Glass containers were
found to generate more than three times as much atmospheric waste and nearly 70

yo
percent more waterborne emissions by weight than PET bottles (National Association
for PET Container Resources). Carbon emissions were not considered in this 1993
study. The 2009 study11 looked at three life cycle phasesmaterial production, fabri-
cation, and disposal/recycling. Doug noted that this study did not consider transporta-
tion from the fabrication site to the filling site or from the filling site to the customer.
Further, rather than determining the impact based on the weight of the containers or
on comparison of an equivalently sized container, this study assessed the environmen-
op
tal impact of containers necessary to convey 100,000 ounces of soft drink, assuming a
20 oz. PET bottle size and an 8 oz. glass bottle size. PET bottles required 11 million
Btus of energy, created 1,125 lbs. of greenhouse gases and generated 302 lbs. or 0.67
cubic yards of solid waste. Using glass jars to hold an equivalent 100,000 ounces of soft
drink required 26.6 million Btus of energy, created 4,848 lbs. of greenhouse gases and
generated 4,457 lbs. or 2.14 cubic yards of solid waste.
tC

Doug had also reviewed two recent studies comparing glass and plastic that didnt
appear to be commissioned by players in the packaging industry, although both of
these were done in Europe where Doug knew rates of recycling were significantly
higher than in the U.S. A 2009 study compared LCAs for glass jars and plastic (poly-
propylene) pots used by Nestle for baby food in Europe. When comparing equal trans-
portation distances, and depending on the country considered, the plastic packaging
required 1427 percent less primary energy; generated 2831 percent less greenhouse
No

gas emissions; produced 3134 percent fewer respiratory inorganics; and created
2831 percent less terrestrial acidification/nitrification for ecosystem quality.12 The
second study, conducted by the Institute for Energy and Environmental Research in
Germany, found that disposable PET beverage bottles were ecologically equivalent
to, or better than, multi-use glass bottles.13 The study concluded that recent improve-
ments in PET bottles such as increased use of recycled materials, bottle weight reduc-
tion, and reduced energy and process water consumption had allowed PET packaging
to environmentally surpass glass packaging.
Do

In addition to the LCA data, the recyclability of the two types of containers was of
interest internally because of the many stories of customers using Litehouses glass jars
for drinking glasses and storage containers. While glass was usually promoted for its
recyclability, less than one third of U.S. glass was recycled. Of that amount, 40 percent
was downcycled for use as road fill or landfill cap rather than to make new glass bottles

Litehouse Foods: The Glass Dilemma 13

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 because glass was expensive to recycle. Plastic, on the other hand, was usually criticized

t
for not being easily recycled, but Doug had found that PET could be recycled multiple

os
times before losing its integrity. Recycled PET had long been used for carpet, clothing,
and construction materials. Recently, technology developments had allowed recycling
facilities to begin closed loop recycling. Also known as bottle to bottle recycling, used
PET bottles could be turned into new, food-grade containers with up to 50 percent
post-consumer recyclates.14
While the LCAs generally indicated that plastic was probably overall the better envi-

rP
ronmental choice, Doug knew this was only half the story. Not only was he interested
in what the science said, he was interested in how customers perceived the environmen-
tal impact of glass and plastic. As in the case of the science, information on consumer
perceptions about glass and plastic depended on the source of the information. Accord-
ing to a survey by GPI, for example, 82 percent of consumers thought glass was the
healthiest packaging; 78 percent thought glass was the most pure; 75 percent thought
glass provided the best taste; and 73 percent perceived glass as being higher quality.15 In

yo
contrast, a plastics supplier had shown Doug data collected ahead of Renees switch to
plastic packaging that indicated that 95 percent of consumers were either indifferent to
whether the packaging was glass or plastic or preferred plastic packaging.
Doug was also aware that the predominant opinion in the blogosphere was that
glass was superior. The student helping him research the environmental impacts of
glass and plastic had produced a long list of examples (see Exhibit 2) illustrating that
the overwhelming majority of blogs that touched on this issue had a low opinion of
op
plastic compared to glass. There were a number of blogs that even focused on the
downsides of plasticsblogs with names like, Life Without Plastic, My Plastic Free
Life, and The Plastic Free Chef. No equivalent blogs focused on the downsides of
glass had been found. There just werent blogs with titles like, Life Without Glass, or
The Glass Free Chef. There was one blog called The Plastic Blog that spoke highly
of plastic, but the blogger described the blog as the official blog of the plastics indus-
tC

try. Doug wasnt sure whether the views expressed in these blogs were representative
of, or influenced the opinions of, any significant segment of his customers.
Further, Doug knew that consumers perceptions of plastic were somewhat age
related. Older consumers who grew up purchasing most of their jarred and bottled
foods and beverages in glass seemed to have very strong and positive perceptions of
glass. Younger consumers who were used to buying most of their food and beverages
in plasticthose who had always bought Coke and Pepsi in plastic bottlesperceived
No

glass and plastic similarly and in many cases with indifference. The exception to this was
that younger consumers who had a strong affinity to organic foods tended to have much
more positive perceptions of glass and/or much more negative perceptions of plastic.
The salad dressing industry, however, seemed inclined toward increased use of plas-
tic packaging, and there seemed to be minimal backlash on the part of consumers.
Renees and Marzetti had both switched with seemingly little adverse impact. In the
shelf stable segment, Newmans Own switched from glass to plastic in 2005 with little
apparent impact. Newmans Own switching was notable given its social and environ-
Do

mental positioning of its products. The Frequently Asked Questions section of the
Newmans Own website16 explained that it made the packaging change because a large
number of its customers believed plastic to be easier to use, lightweight, and safer. The
site emphasized that the PET-1 plastic used was fully recyclable and had no possibility
of the plastic leaching into the product. The site reported that the change would enable

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617.783.7860
 Newmans Own to reduce 16 million pounds of solid waste and realize significant fuel

t
savings in transportation. Along similar lines, the Association of Dressings and Sauces

os
gave Krafts Pourable Salad Dressing Bottle with Side Curves the Package of the Year
Award in 2008. In his acceptance speech, David Ervin, marketing director of Kraft
Salad Dressing, commented, Our optimized bottle design has also delivered addi-
tional sustainability benefits, including improved inbound transportation in efficiency
by 18 percent by allowing a greater number of bottles per truckload, and implementa-
tion of reusable totes for inbound closures eliminating the need for nearly 4,000 cor-

rP
rugated totes annually.17

Litehouse Foods Experience with Plastic to Date

Litehouse itself had experience offering some of its products in plastic packaging. The
company had long sold its super value sized dressings in 32 oz. plastic containers to
members clubs like Sams Club and Costco. About four years ago the company had

yo
also switched its 25 oz. value sized jars of dressing that it sold through traditional gro-
cery chains like Albertsons and Safeway to 20 oz. squeezable plastic bottles it referred
to as family favorites. Litehouse had purchased the 25 oz. jars for that market in
much lower volumes than it did its standard 13 oz. jars, and when its supplier raised its
prices for the large glass jars significantly, Litehouse was looking at having to pass on a
price increase that would have increased the retail price of the value sized jars of dress-
ing by almost $2.00. As a result, Litehouse decided to look into plastic as a lower cost
op
alternative. In addition, feedback from purchasers of the 25 oz. glass jars indicated they
were nervous about having their young children carrying so heavy a glass jar full of
dressing across the kitchen. Litehouse concluded that plastic was not only the cheaper
alternative, but for the typical purchaser of the value sized jars, plastic provided the
added benefits of safety and convenience in the form of a lighter weight, unbreakable
squeeze bottle.
tC

The results of the change to plastic in the value sized jars, however, had been mixed.
The sales volume of the large value sized glass jars had been declining by 23 percent
a year leading up to the switch as the absolute price of the value sized packaging had
inched upward. After the switch to plastic and a corresponding adjustment to price,
sales of the value sized packaging leveled out at the traditional retailers, while sales
began to grow again at value retailers like Walmart. The company also received some
complaints from customers about the switch to plastic. Doug wasnt sure if the com-
No

plaints stemmed more from the actual packaging change, or were due to the imple-
mentation. Retailers had both glass and plastic value sized units on the shelf for about
three months during the transition. Some of the value retailers reported that customers
found the new 20 oz. squeeze bottles too small, and some even switched to carrying the
32 oz. plastic jars that had previously only been sold through the club channel. The for-
mulations of some of the products, including the companys flagship blue cheese dress-
ing, had to be changed as well so they would come out of the squeeze bottles acceptably.
Do

Was it Time for the Glass Jars to Go?

Doug reflected back on the last two years at Litehouse and all the changes that had
occurred. The organization had been through a lot. It had launched an aggressive effort
to grow and expand its markets. Some of these efforts were working quite well, while

Litehouse Foods: The Glass Dilemma 15

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 others had not gone as well as hoped, at least not yet. All of them had taken a lot of

t
employee time and energy as well as a significant amount of cash. The acquisition

os
of Green Garden Foods and the opening of the Hurricane, UT facility had likewise
taken a lot of time, energy, and capital. All of these efforts had caused short term
profitability to decline and had taken a toll on Litehouse Foods balance sheet as well.
The company was experiencing a real cash crunch. Litehouse had historically taken a
more conservative approach to growth and had strived to maintain a strong balance
sheet. The situation in the fall of 2011 had created a lot of stress within the organiza-

rP
tion and everybody felt the pressure to find ways to address the decline in profitability
and the weakness in the balance sheet. It was this cash crunch combined with com-
petitors moves toward plastic and their resulting ability to open up a more significant
price advantage at retail that had put the question of whether or not Litehouse should
switch to plastic on the table.
For a company the size of Litehouse, the $1.5 million in potential annual savings
was significant. Savings would be even greater if the company was successful at grow-

yo
ing its sales as it hoped or if fuel costs continued to escalate. Further, at least some of
this savings would be passed on to consumers in the form of lower prices to close the
price gap that competitors had opened. Doug wondered whether he would be able
to reach growth goals for the companys core dressing products if retail prices for its
products remained $0.60 higher than those of its competitors. Litehouse had histori-
cally been able to price at a premium compared to its competitors, but not this much
of a premium.
op
Even more significantly, Doug worried about how consumers would respond if the
company switched to plastic and how this would impact the value of the Litehouse
brand. Just how important was the glass jar to the retail customers perceptions of the
quality of the product and of the Litehouse name? Consumers had clearly mixed reac-
tions when Litehouse had switched its family sized packaging to plastic four years ago,
although Doug recognized that the company had not managed that transition as well
tC

as it might have. Doug did not want what he perceived to be a short term decline in
profitability to cause the company to make a move that would harm the brands long
term value. It was also possible that over time, consumer perceptions of glass and plas-
tic had changed. His uncle Edward had been a longtime proponent of glass jars, but
had now come to the conclusion that plastic was the way to go. The decision by Best
Foods to sell its mayonnaise in plastic jars a couple years back seemed to be the tipping
point for his uncle. Other long term employees at Litehouse had strong and positive
No

associations with the glass jars, and he wondered what message employees might read
into such a change given all the other changes the organization had gone through.
Doug also pondered the environmental implications of the decision, and won-
dered how these should be factored into the decision. Litehouse had never positioned
itself as a green company, but stewardship was one of its guiding principles and
the company had long cared about making the best use of resources and eliminating
waste where it could. The resource and environmental implications of the change,
however, were surprisingly complex. It was clear that switching to plastic would save
Do

a lot of fuel in transport and that this would reduce the carbon footprint associated
with distributing Litehouse product. But there were other impacts as well, and most
people who expressed concern about environmental issues perceived plastic as a greater
environmental concern than glass, even if the reality appeared to be different. If the
decision was made to switch to plastic, Doug knew that the executive team would

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617.783.7860
 want a recommendation on if and how to communicate the change in environmental

t
impact to customers.

os
As he looked at the bottles and jars on his office wall that reflected fifty years
of company history, Doug could not help but think back to the companys humble
beginnings, when his grandfather had simply gone to a local store and bought stan-
dard Mason canning jars in which to sell his creamy blue cheese dressing. Little did his
grandfather know how complicated the packaging decision would become.

rP
Exhibit 1: Comparison of Competitor Products

Company Competing Packaging Price (dependent Popular Flavors (Lite versions of a num-
Line on store) ber of these dressings were also available)

yo
Litehouse Creamy 13 oz. glass $3.99$4.99 Original Bleu Cheese, Chunky Bleu
Spoonables Cheese, Bacon Bleu Cheese, Ranch,
Homestyle Ranch, Buttermilk Ranch,
Gorgonzola, Coleslaw, Ceasar, Honey
Mustard
Maries Classic 12 oz. glass $3.99$4.49 Chunky Blue Cheese, Blue Cheese with
Bacon, Creamy Ranch, Caesar, Cole
Slaw, Creamy Italian Garlic, Thousand
op
Island, Honey Mustard
Marzetti Classic 15 oz. glass $3.79$4.49 Classic Ranch, Creamy Blue Cheese,
Original Slaw, Thousand Island, Poppy-
seed, Honey Dijon, Ceasar
Simply 12 oz. plastic $3.29$4.29 Blue Cheese, Ranch, Ceasar, Balsamic,
Dressed Pomegranate, Greek Feta, Ginger
tC

Sesame
Renees Originals 355 ml. (12 oz.) C$3.29C$4.491 Buttermilk Ranch, Ceasar, Chunky Blue
plastic Cheese, Coleslaw, Cucumber and Dill,
Greek Feta, Mighty Ceasar, Poppy Seed,
Ranch

Source: Packaging and pricing details provided by Litehouse Foods; popular flavors obtained from each respective com-
panys website.
No

Note:
1. In the fall of 2011 the Canadian dollar and the U.S. dollar were approximately equal in value.
Do

Litehouse Foods: The Glass Dilemma 17

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 t
Exhibit 2: Sampling of Sentiments on the Glass-Plastic Debate from the
Blogosphere

os
Whats wrong with plastic anyway? Good question. Here are some answers:
Plastic is made from oil, health hazards of BPA and PVC . . .
Cant we just recycle all of our plastic? We should recycle whatever plastic we can
before throwing it away. But recycling plastic is actually downcycling. It degrades as

rP
its recycled so we still keep needing to create new virgin plastic.
Beth Terry, My Plastic-free Life
http://plasticfreeguide.com/

Plastic is all around us. It forms much of the packaging for our food and drink. For
many of us, it is throughout our home, our workplace, our car, the bus we take to
and from work. It can be in our clothing, eyeglasses, teeth, toothbrush, computers,

yo
phones, dishes, utensils, toys. The list goes on. You may wish to seriously consider
yourand especially your childrensuse of plastics numbered 1, 3, 6, and 7 (poly-
carbonate), all of which have been shown to leach dangerous chemicals. This does
not necessarily mean the others are completely safe, just that they have been studied
less to date.
Chantal Plamondon and Jay Singha, Life Without Plastic
http://lifewithoutplastic.com/en/about-plastic
op
So why should you try and cut down on plastic anyway? There are lots of reasons to
ditch disposable plastic, but these are the two that I think are the most important. 1)
Plastic is a non-renewable resource that never breaks down. 2) Plastic contains chem-
icals harmful to human health. Buy things in glass containers instead of plastic ones.
The Plastic Free Chef
tC

http://theplasticfreechef.com/why-disposable-plastic-is-bad/

We love glass. Why? Because its good for you, your family, and the environment.
Blog in a Bottle
http://bloginabottle.com/health/glass-is-better-for-you-and-the-environment.html

The chemicals in plastics are no joke.I avoid buying high-fat food items in plasticfor
No

me that means mostly oils and dairy. Paper-based containers and glass are a better bet.
Alissa Glenn, Eat Happy
http://www.eathappynow.com/?p=95

When shopping, make glass packaging a criteriayouve been there. Youre at the
store, youve studied the label. You are trying to figure out which product is the best
choiceall things being equalpick glass.
Pure Natural Diva
Do

http://www.purenaturaldiva.com/2010/02/
diva-guide-ways-to-reduce-plastic-use-in-your-home/

18 Case Research Journal Volume 34 Issue 2 Spring 2014

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617.783.7860
 t
Exhibit 2: continued

os
What more can we say other thanplastic sucks! It is virtually unavoidable and
is laced with toxic chemicals that leach into the liquids and foods they contain.
Once its made it is here forever, only breaking down to smaller and smaller bits
of plastic.
Non Toxic Revolution

rP
http://www.kabntr.org/plastic-sucks/revolution/

Im not sure if something like applesauce keeps better in a glass jar as opposed to
a plastic jar, but I do know that the glass jar is a better choice environmentally if
its recycled properly.
Robin Shreeves
http://www.mnn.com/food/healthy-eating/blogs/glass-vs-plastic

yo
Glass vs. Plastic: Which is Better? Glass right? Its been around for centuries, is safe
(unless you cut yourself ), non toxic, and easy to recycle. Plastic is mainly derived
from fossil fuels, can have nasty additives that can leach into our bodies, and is less
recyclable in many cases.
Joe Laur
http://greenopolis.com/goblog/joe-laur/glass-vs-plastic-which-better
op
Switch back to glass.When possible, choose glass, recycled paper, or other biode-
gradable packaging options.
Gluten Free or Die
http://glutenfreeordie.com/products/gluten-free-products/save-your-glass-jars
tC

Here we go again! Now its polycarbonate bottles that are being banned. First in
Canada, then in California (isnt it usually the other way around?). And, again, the
ban is declared way before the facts are all in. There is NO proof that PC bottles
contain anything that can cause problems in the future lives of babies. But, that is
the claim. What problems? Well, were not sure. When will they occur? Well, were
not sure. What will cause the problems? Well, were not sure.
Douglas Bryce, The Plastic Blog
http://www.plasticblog.com/pblog/
No
Do

Litehouse Foods: The Glass Dilemma 19

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 Notes

t
os
1. CHS Annual Report. (2011). Retrieved from http://annualreport.chsinc.com/
FY2011/pdf/CHS_AnnualReport_2011.pdf.
2. Company posted video press release, 12/17/10. Retrieved from http://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=Mdh3TcRDQYE.
3. http://www.maries.com/maries-difference.aspx.

rP
4. This section, with the exception of the final paragraph, is a condensed version
of the company history as described on the company website at www.litehouse-
foods.com.
5. States News Service (2010, June 4). Litehouse Foods Inc. of Sandpoint is
Poised for Aggressive Growth. Information released by the Idaho Department
of Commerce. Retrieved from http://commerce.idaho.gov/news/2010/06/lite-
house-foods-inc.-of-sandpoint-is-poised-for-agressive-growth.aspx.

yo
6. Bert, C. (2010, June 22). Litehouse Buys Green Garden.
The Spokesman-Review. Retrieved from http://www.spokes-
man.com/blogs/officehours/2010/jun/21/litehouse-buys-
green-garden/.
7. Ibid.
8. Glass Packaging Institute. (2010). Complete Life Cycle Assessment of North
op
American Container Glass. Retrieved from http://www.gpi.org/downloads/
lca/N-American_Glass_Container_LCA.pdf.
9. O-I. (2013, January 22). Packaging: The Complete LCL. Retrieved from http://
www.o-i.com/uploadedFiles/Content/Stacked_Content/OI_LCA_031010.
pdf.
10. NAPCOR. (1995). The Environmental Impact of Soft Drink Delivery Sys-
tC

tems. Retrieved from http://www.napcor.com/pdf/Env_Impact.pdf.

11. Franklin Associates, a Division of ERG. (2009, August). Life Cycle Inventory
of Three Single-Serving Soft Drink Containers. Retrieved from http://www.
petresin.org/pdf/FranklinLCISodaContainers2009.pdf.
12. Humbert, S., Rossi, V., Margni, M., Jolliet, O., and Loerncik, Y. (2009) Life
cycle assessment of two baby food packaging alternatives: glass jars vs. plastic
pots International Journal of Life Cycle Assessment, 14: 95106.
No

13. FoodProductionDaily.com (2010, April 29). Single use PET may be as green
as multi use glass. Retrieved from http://www.foodproductiondaily.com/
Packaging/Single-use-PET-may-be-as-green-as-multi-use-glass.
14. Welle, Frank. (2011) Twenty years of PET bottle to bottle recycling-An over-
view. Resources, Conservation and Recycling 55: 865875.
15. Glass Packaging Institute (2011) Consumers Choose Glass Brochure.
Retrieved from http://www.gpi.org/media/downloads-1/.
Do

16. http://www.newmansown.com/prodQA.aspx#q11a.
17. The association for dressings and sauces. (2008, October). Package of the Year.
Retrieved from http://www.dressings-sauces.org/pressroom_poty_2008.html.

20 Case Research Journal Volume 34 Issue 2 Spring 2014

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