Law 114 Labor II
I. Introduction/Overview
A. Definitions/Classification
1. Labor Law - consists of statutes, regulations
and jurisprudence governing the relations
between capital and labor, by providing for
employment standards and a legal framework for
negotiating, adjusting and administering those
standards and other incidents of employment.
2. Labor Standards - is that which sets out the
minimum terms, conditions and benefits
of employment that employers must provide or
comply with and to which employees are entitled
as a matter of legal right.
3. Labor Relations - defines the status, rights and
duties, and the institutional mechanisms, that
govern the individual and collective interactions
of employers, employees or their representatives.
4. Welfare Legislation - include laws that provide
particular kinds of protection or benefits to society
or segments thereof in furtherance of social
justice.
B.
1. Justification: Social Justice
Const. Art II Sec 10 - The State shall promote social
justice in all phases of national development.
Art XIII Sec 1 - The Congress shall give highest
priority to the enactment of measures that protect
and enhance the right of all the people to human
dignity, reduce social, economic, and political
inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by
equitably diffusing wealth and political power for
the common good.
Sec 2 - The promotion of social justice shall include
the commitment to create economic opportunities
based on freedom of initiative and self-reliance.
Sec 3 - The State shall afford full protection to
labor, local and overseas, organized and
unorganized, and promote full employment and
equality of employment opportunities for all.
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-
organization, collective bargaining and
negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities,
including the right to strike in accordance with
law. They shall be entitled to security of tenure,
humane conditions of work, and a living wage.
They shall also participate in policy and decision-
making processes affecting their rights and
benefits as may be provided by law.
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The State shall promote the principle of shared
responsibility between workers and employers
and the preferential use of voluntary modes in
settling disputes, including conciliation, and shall
enforce their mutual compliance therewith to
foster industrial peace.
The State shall regulate the relations between
workers and employers, recognizing the right of
labor to its just share in the fruits of production
and the right of enterprises to reasonable returns
on investments, and to expansion and growth.
2. Foundation or basis: Police Power of the State
3. Ultimate goal: Industrial Peace
Const. Art XIII, Sec 3, Par 3. - The State shall
promote the principle of shared responsibility
between workers and employers and the
preferential use of voluntary modes in settling
disputes, including conciliation, and shall enforce
their mutual compliance therewith to foster
industrial peace.
C. 7 Cardinal Rights of Workers: Const. XIII Sec 3
Pars. 1-2
1. Right to Self-Organization
2. Right to Collective Bargaining and
Negotiations
3. Right to Peaceful and Lawful Collective Action
(Right to Strike)
4. Right to Security of Tenure
5. Right to Humane conditions of work
6. Right to a Living Wage
7. Right to participate in relevant Policy & Decision
Making Processes
1. Labor: a primary social economic force
Const. Art II Sec 18 - The State affirms labor as a
primary social economic force. It shall protect the
rights of workers and promote their welfare.
D. Management Prerogative: Rule
Const. Art XIII Sec 3 Pars. 3,4 - The State shall
promote the principle of shared responsibility
between workers and employers and the
preferential use of voluntary modes in settling
disputes, including conciliation, and shall enforce
their mutual compliance therewith to foster
industrial peace.
The State shall regulate the relations between
workers and employers, recognizing the right of
labor to its just share in the fruits of production
and the right of enterprises to reasonable returns
on investments, and to expansion and growth.
Law 114 Labor II
University of Immaculate Concepcion v. Sec.
of Labor (Jan 2005)
The University contends that the Secretary does
not have jurisdiction to decide over those
employees who were ruled by the voluntary
arbitrators as not part of the bargaining unit. The
court held that though it recognizes the exercise of
management prerogatives, this right is not
absolute, one of which is when the Secretary
assumes jurisdiction under LC 263 (g).
FACTS:
The Union submitted their collective
bargaining proposals to the University.
However, one item was left unresolved
and this was the inclusion or exclusion of
the following positions in the scope of the
bargaining unit: Secretaries; Registrars;
Accounting Personnel; Guidance
Counselors. This matter was submitted
for voluntary arbitration.
Voluntary Arbitrators: The above-
mentioned positions are excluded, except
for the accounting clerks and the
accounting staff member are hereby
ordered included in the bargaining unit.
The Union moved for the reconsideration
of the above decision. Pending resolution
of its motion, on December 9, 1994, it filed
a notice of strike with the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB)
of Davao City, on the grounds of
bargaining deadlock and unfair labor
practice. During the 30 day cooling-off
period, 2 union members were dismissed
by petitioner. Consequently, the UNION
went on strike on January 20, 1995. On
January 23, the Secretary of Labor,
assumed jurisdiction over the labor
dispute, pursuant to (old) LC 263 (g). The
workers were directed to return to work,
the parties were further directed to cease
from any act that may exacerbate the
situation.
gdreyes
The reconsideration was denied, and the
University furnished a copy of the
voluntary arbitrators denial to individual
respondents holding the positions above.
The University gave these individuals 2
choices: to resign from the Union and
remain employed as confidential
employees or resign from their
confidential positions and remain
members of the Union.
These employees remained steadfast on
their right to be part of the Union and still
hold their positions. Hence, on Feb 21, the
University sent them notices of
termination.
The Union filed another notice of strike,
due to the Universitys termination of the
individual respondents. The Union alleged
that the Universitys act is in violation of
the Order of the Secretary of Labor.
The Secretary ordered the suspension of
the effects of termination, pending
determination of its legality. The
University moved for reconsideration as it
claimed that this would render nugatory
the decision of the voluntary arbitrators.
This was denied as the Secretary ruled
that the decision of the arbitrators did not
authorize the termination of the
employees. On its third motion for
reconsideration, Acting Secretary
Brillantes modified the ruling to payroll
reinstatement until validity of termination
is resolved.
The University filed for certiorari with the
SC which was referred to the CA pursuant
to its ruling in St. Martin Funeral Homes v.
CA.
CA: Dismissed petition.
Law 114 Labor II
ISSUE:
WON the Secretary of Labor, after
assuming jurisdiction over a labor dispute
involving an employer and the certified
bargaining agent of a group of employees
in the workplace, may legally order said
employer to reinstate employees
terminated by the employer even if those
terminated employees are not part of the
bargaining unit. YES.
HELD:
The Secretary has the authority to order
the reinstatement of the terminated
employees.
The Secretary was explicitly granted by
Article 263(g) of the Labor Code the
authority to assume jurisdiction over a
labor dispute causing or likely to cause a
strike or lockout in an industry
indispensable to the national interest, and
decide the same accordingly. Necessarily,
the authority to assume jurisdiction
over the said labor dispute must
include and extend to all questions and
controversies arising therefrom,
including cases over which the Labor
Arbiter has exclusive jurisdiction.
The exercise of management
prerogative is recognized but this
privilege is not absolute, but subject to
exceptions
One of these exceptions is when the
Secretary of Labor assumes jurisdiction
over labor disputes involving industries
indispensable to the national interest
under Article 263(g) of the Labor Code.1
1 (g) When, in his opinion, there exists a labor dispute causing
or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry
indispensable to the national interest, the Secretary of Labor
and Employment may assume jurisdiction over the dispute and
decide it or certify the same to the Commission for compulsory
arbitration. Such assumption or certification shall have the
effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending
strike or lockout as specified in the assumption or certification
order. If one has already taken place at the time of assumption
or certification, all striking or locked out employees shall
immediately return to work and the employer shall
immediately resume operations and readmit all workers
gdreyes
The act of the University of dismissing the
individual respondents from their
employment was the reason for the Union
to declare a second notice of strike.
It is not a question anymore of whether or
not the terminated employees, the
individual respondents herein, are part of
the bargaining unit. Any act committed
during the pendency of the dispute that
tends to give rise to further contentious
issues or increase the tensions between
the parties should be considered an act of
exacerbation and should not be allowed.
The main reason or rationale for the
exercise of the Secretary of Labor and
Employments power under Article
263(g) of the Labor Code is the
maintenance and upholding of the status
quo while the dispute is being
adjudicated.
The directive to the parties to refrain from
performing acts that will exacerbate the
situation is intended to ensure that the
dispute does not get out of hand, thereby
negating the direct intervention of this
office.
Payroll reinstatement allowed in this case
due to the confidential nature of positions.
General rule is that reinstatement should
be actual. As an exception to the rule,
payroll reinstatement must rest on special
circumstances that render actual
reinstatement impracticable or otherwise
not conducive to attaining the purposes of
the law. The "superseding circumstances"
mentioned by the Acting Secretary of
Labor no doubt refer to the final decision
of the panel of arbitrators as to the
confidential nature of the positions of the
twelve private respondents, thereby
rendering their actual and physical
reinstatement impracticable and more
likely to exacerbate the situation.
under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the
strike or lockout. x x x
Law 114 Labor II
E. Balancing of Interests
Const. Art XIII Sec 3 Par 4 - The State shall regulate
the relations between workers and employers,
recognizing the right of labor to its just share in
the fruits of production and the right of
enterprises to reasonable returns on investments,
and to expansion and growth.
II. State Policy: Worker Empowerment Labor
Relations
A. Voluntary/Democratic Method of dispute
settlement
Const. Art XIII Sec 3 Par 3
Labor Code
Art 218 - Powers of the Commission. - The
Commission shall have the power and authority:
(a) To promulgate rules and regulations governing
the hearing and disposition of cases before it and
its regional branches, as well as those pertaining
to its internal functions and such rules and
regulations as may be necessary to carry out the
purposes of this Code; (As amended by Section 10,
Republic Act No. 6715, March 21, 1989).
(b) To administer oaths, summon the parties to a
controversy, issue subpoenas requiring the
attendance and testimony of witnesses or the
production of such books, papers, contracts,
records, statement of accounts, agreements, and
others as may be material to a just determination
of the matter under investigation, and to testify in
any investigation or hearing conducted in
pursuance of this Code;
Art 3 - Declaration of basic policy. - The State shall
afford protection to labor, promote full
employment, ensure equal work opportunities
regardless of sex, race or creed and regulate the
relations between workers and employers. The
State shall assure the rights of workers to self-
organization, collective bargaining, security of
tenure, and just and humane conditions of work.
Estate of Nelson R. Dulay v. Aboitiz Jebsen
Maritime, Inc. (June 2012)
It is settled that when the parties have validly
agreed on a procedure for resolving grievances
and to submit a dispute to voluntary arbitration
then that procedure should be strictly observed
In cases of claims and disputes arising from this
employment, the parties covered by a collective
bargaining agreement shall submit the claim or
dispute to the original and exclusive jurisdiction of
the voluntary arbitrator or panel of arbitrators.
gdreyes
FACTS:
Nelson Dulay was employed by GCI
(which is a subsidiary of Aboitiz) as an
ordinary seaman and bosun on a
contractual basis from September 3, 1999
to July 19, 2000 aboard the MV Kickapoo
Belle. 25 days after the completion of his
employment contract (August 13, 2000)
he died due to acute renal failure
secondary to septicemia. At the time of his
death, he was a member of the Associated
Marine Officers and Seamans Union of the
Philippines (AMOSUP), which was also
GCIs collective bargaining agent.
Following his death, his widow, Merridy
Jane, claimed for death benefits pursuant
to the terms of the CBA between AMOSUP
and GCI. The grievance procedure for the
claim of such benefits was, however,
declared to be in deadlock because the
company declined to grant the benefits
sought by Merridy.
On March 5, 2001, Merridy fuled a
complaint with the NLRC Sub-Regional
Arbitratiob Board in General Santos City
in order to compel GCI to pay her death
and medical benefits as well as damages.
On March 8, 2001, Joven, Nelsons brother
received 20k from GCI pursuant to Art 20
(A) 2 of the CBA and signed a certification
for the receipt of the same and for the
purpose of releasing AMOSUP from
further liability. Merridy, however,
continued to insist her entitlement to
$90,000 USD as per Article 20 (A) 1 of the
CBAthe 20k received should only be
considered as partial performance of their
obligation and not full compliance
therewith. GCI, however, argued that the
NLRC had no jurisdiction over the action
because no ER-EE existed between GCI
and Nelson at the time of his death. They
alleged that since the contract had
between them had expired, then they
could not be held liable by any of the
claims of the deceaseds widow.
Law 114 Labor II
LA = awarded $90,000.00 usd minus the
20k already paid to Joven. Also ruled that
the proximate cause of Nelsons death was
not work-related.
NLRC = affirmed the LA decision as
regards death benefits but held the cause
of death to be work-related.
CA = referred that petition to the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board for the
designation of the Voluntary Arbitrator or
the constitution of a panel of Voluntary
Arbitrators. Being that the petition
required the interpretation of the CBA,
then the Voluntary Arbitrator and not the
Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
WON the CA erred in ruling that the LA
did not have jurisdiction over the case
NO
HELD:
The issue in this case stems from the fact
that a seeming contradiction existed
between RA 8042 and the provisions of
the Labor Code. In summary, the
petitioner is of the position that Sec. 10 of
RA 8042 is what is controlling while the
respondents insist that what should apply
are Arts. 217 (c) and Art 261 of the Labor
Code.
In order to harmonize the different pieces
of law involved, the Court said that Sec. 10
of RA 8042 is a general term that refers
to claims arising out of an employer-
employee relationship or by virtue of any
law or contract involving Filipino workers
for overseas deployment including claims
for actual, moral, exemplary and other
forms of damages. On the other hand, the
articles of the labor code being cited by
the respondent are more specific and
contemplate the very situation that the
parties find themselves in; the resolution
of grievances arising from the
gdreyes
construction of CBAs. As such, the more
specific provisions should apply.
Also, in order to further justify its ruling,
the Court cited the provisions of the CBA
itself which provides that any dispute or
conflict in the interpretation of its
provisions is to be settled through
negotiation, conciliation or voluntary
arbitration. The CBA, being a contract
between the deceased and GCI, is the law
between the parties. It is settled that
when the parties have validly agreed on a
procedure for resolving grievances and to
submit a dispute to voluntary arbitration
then that procedure should be strictly
observed.
Further, even Sec. 29 of the Standard
Terms and Conditions Governing the
Employment of Filipino Seafarers on
Board Ocean Going Vessels provides that
when claims or disputes arise between
employers and employees who are bound
by a CBA, then voluntary arbitrator has
exclusive original jurisdiction. It is only
when the parties are not covered by s CBA
that they may submit their complaints to
the NLRC.
Lastly, such reasoning adheres to the
constitutional provision that states [t]o
promote and emphasize the primacy of
free collective bargaining and
negotiations, including voluntary
arbitration, mediation and conciliation, as
modes of settling labor or industrial
disputes. (third paragraph, Sec. 3, Article
XIII).
CA ruling is affirmed, the voluntary
arbitrator has jurisdiction and not the
Labor Arbiter.
Pertinent provisions:
Section 10 of R.A. 8042:
SEC. 10. Money Claims. - Notwithstanding
any provision of law to the contrary, the
Law 114 Labor II
Labor Arbiters of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have
the original and exclusive jurisdiction to
hear and decide, within ninety (90)
calendar days after filing of the complaint,
the claims arising out of an employer-
employee relationship or by virtue of any
law or contract involving Filipino workers
for overseas deployment including claims
for actual, moral, exemplary and other
forms of damages.
Article 217(c) of the Labor Code:
(c) Cases arising from the interpretation
or implementation of collective
bargaining agreements and those arising
from the interpretation or enforcement of
company personnel policies shall be
disposed by the Labor Arbiter by referring
the same to the grievance machinery and
voluntary arbitration as may be provided
in said agreements.
Article 261 of the Labor Code. Jurisdiction
of Voluntary Arbitrators or panel of
Voluntary Arbitrators:
The Voluntary Arbitrator or panel of
Voluntary Arbitrators shall have original
and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and
decide all unresolved grievances arising
from the interpretation or
implementation of the Collective
Bargaining Agreement and those arising
from the interpretation or enforcement of
company personnel policies referred to in
the immediately preceding article.
Accordingly, violations of a Collective
Bargaining Agreement, except those
which are gross in character, shall no
longer be treated as unfair labor practice
and shall be resolved as grievances under
the Collective Bargaining Agreement. For
purposes of this article, gross violations of
Collective Bargaining Agreement shall
mean flagrant and/or malicious refusal to
comply with the economic provisions of
such agreement.
gdreyes
The Commission, its Regional Offices and
the Regional Directors of the Department
of Labor and Employment shall not
entertain disputes, grievances or matters
under the exclusive and original
jurisdiction of the Voluntary Arbitrator or
panel of Voluntary Arbitrators and shall
immediately dispose and refer the same
to the Grievance Machinery or Voluntary
Arbitration provided in the Collective
Bargaining Agreement.
Section 29 of the POEA standard contract.
Dispute Settlement Procedures:
In cases of claims and disputes arising
from this employment, the parties
covered by a collective bargaining
agreement shall submit the claim or
dispute to the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrator or
panel of arbitrators. If the parties are not
covered by a collective bargaining
agreement, the parties may at their option
submit the claim or dispute to either the
original and exclusive jurisdiction of the
National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC), pursuant to Republic Act (RA)
8042, otherwise known as the Migrant
Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of
1995 or to the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrator or
panel of arbitrators. If there is no
provision as to the voluntary arbitrators
to be appointed by the parties, the same
shall be appointed from the accredited
voluntary arbitrators of the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board of the
Department of Labor and Employment.
Law 114 Labor II
III. Right to Self-Organization
A. Basis of Right to Self-Organization
Nueva Ecija Electric Coop (NEECOI)
Employees Asso. Pres. Rodolfo Jimenez v.
NLRC (Jan 24, 2000)
FACTS:
Petitioners Reynaldo Fajardo, Ernesto
Marin, Ever Guevarra, Petronilo Baguisa,
Victorino Carillo, and Erdie Javate were
permanent employees of respondent
Nueva Ecija I Electric Cooperative (NEECO
I). They were members of petitioner
NEECO I Employees Association, a labor
organization established for the mutual
aid and protection of its members.
Petitioner Rodolfo Jimenez was the
president of the association.
Respondent NEECO I is an electric
cooperative under the general supervision
and control of the National Electrification
Administration (NEA). The management
of NEECO I is vested on the Board of
Directors. Respondent Patricio dela Pea
was NEECO's general manager on detail
from NEA.
The Board of Directors adopted Policy No.
3-33, which set the guidelines for NEECO
I's retirement benefits. All regular
employees were ordered by NEECO I to
accomplish applications for either
retirement, resignation, or separation
from service.
The applications of Baguisa and Guevarra
were approved; they were paid the
appropriate separation pay. These
successive events, followed by the
promotion of certain union officers to
supervisory rank, caused apprehension in
the labor association. They were
considered as harassment threatening the
union members, and circumventing the
employees' security of tenure. To
strengthen and neutralize management's
gdreyes
arbitrary moves, the union held a "snap
election" of officers.
Petitioner labor association passed a
resolution withdrawing the applications
for retirement of all its members, but
petitioners Marin, Fajardo and Carillo
were compulsorily retired by
management. They received their
separation pay under protest. Javate was
terminated from employment allegedly
due to misappropriation of funds and
dishonesty. He was not paid separation or
retirement benefits.
Petitioners and Erdie Javate instituted a
complaint for illegal dismissal and
damages with the NLRC Regional
Arbitration Branch in San Fernando. They
alleged they were purposely singled out
for retirement from a listing of employees
who were made to submit retirement
forms, even if they were not on top of the
list because they were union officers, past
officers or active members of the
association. Further, petitioners claimed
that their acceptance of the money offered
by NEECO I did not constitute estoppel
nor waiver, since their acceptances were
with vehement objections and without
prejudice to all their rights resulting from
an illegal dismissal. Additionally, Javate
averred he was framed up and dismissed
without due process.
The labor arbiter rendered judgment
declaring the employer guilty of illegal
dismissal and unfair labor practice act, as
charged; ordering respondents to
reinstate individual complainants to their
former positions without loss of seniority
rights and other privileges, either
physically or in the payroll, at the option
of the respondents, with payment of full
backwages; and ordering respondents to
pay complainants moral and exemplary
damages, attorneys fees and the costs of
litigation.
Law 114 Labor II
Private respondents appealed to the NLRC
and posted a surety bond (P244,891.93).
But herein petitioners filed an omnibus
motion to dismiss on the ground of late
appeal, claiming that insufficient bond
was filed by NEECO I only on January 5,
1993. The bond excluded the award of
moral and exemplary damages, attorneys'
fees and costs of litigation. -Respondent
NLRC denied the motion and instead gave
due course to the appeal, and later
modified the decision, by deleting the
awards of moral and exemplary damages,
attorney's fees and cost of litigation; and
ruling that the amounts of retirement
benefits received by the individual
complainants are to be applied to the
backwages that may be due to them.
Meanwhile, petitioners were reinstated by
NEECO I pending appeal. Erdie Javate
withdrew his complaint and opted to
receive his retirement benefits
(P42,114.09).-Both parties filed MFRs,
which were both denied, Hence this
special civil action under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court, by the petitioners.
ISSUES:
1. WON the appeal taken by the NEECO I
from the NLRC-RAB- III DOLE to NLRC
Manila was perfected within the
reglementary period. NO
2. WON NLRC acted without or in excess
of jurisdiction when it resolved to delete
en toto moral damages, exemplary
damages, attorney's fees and costs of
litigation the factual basis of which were
ascertained by the labor arbiter below.
YES
3. WON the order to apply and deduct
receivable backwages from received
benefits is unrealistic and arbitrary. NO
HELD:
1. NO, but there was substantial
compliance.Indisputable is the legal
doctrine that the appeal of a decision
gdreyes
involving a monetary award in labor cases
may be perfected "only upon the posting
of a cash or surety bond. (see Art. 223 of
the Labor Code, as amended by RA 6715).
Also, the perfection of an appeal within
the reglementary period and in the
manner prescribed by law is
jurisdictional, and noncompliance with
such legal requirement is fatal and
effectively renders the judgment final and
executory.
However, in a number of cases, this Court
relaxed the rule to resolve controversies
on the merits, specifically, when there are
special meritorious circumstances and
issues, such as when there was substantial
compliance with the rule, so that on
balance, SC made technical considerations
to give way to equity and justice.
In this case, the decision of the labor
arbiter was issued on Dec 21, 1992.
Respondents filed their appeal on Dec
28,1992 barely seven days from receipt
thereof. The bonding company issued the
bond dated Jan 4,1993 the last day for
filing an appeal. However, it was
forwarded to NLRC only on the following
day, Jan 5,1993. Considering these and the
holiday season, SC finds it equitable to
ease the rules.
As to the amount of bond, we note that
there had been changes in the Rules
promulgated by the NLRC. Previously the
computation of the cash or surety bond to
be posted by an employer who wishes to
appeal contained in the original rules was
"exclusive of moral and exemplary
damages and attorney's fees". It was later
deleted sometime in 1991 and 1992, then
restored on Nov20,93. It may be noted
that while NLRC in its Resolution No. 11-
01-91 dated Nov7,91 deleted the phrase
"exclusive of moral and exemplary
damages as well as attorney's fees" in the
determination of the amount of the bond,
Law 114 Labor II
it provided a safeguard against the
imposition of excessive bonds providing
"(T)he Commission may, in meritorious
cases and upon Motion of the Appellant,
reduce the amount of the bond."
The unreasonable and excessive amount
of bond would be oppressive and unjust
and would have the effect of depriving a
party of his right to appeal. Besides,
private respondents stress that the
petitioners were paid their retirement
benefits and that the cooperative has
sufficient assets from which the other
claims for damages and attorney's fees
may be obtained.
2. YES. But the award given by the Labor
Arbiter, being excessive, is reduced.
To warrant an award of moral damages, it
must be shown that the dismissal of the
employee was attended to by bad faith, or
constituted an act oppressive to labor, or
was done in a manner contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy. The Labor
Arbiter ruled that there was unfair labor
practice.
Unfair labor practices violate the
constitutional rights of workers and
employees to self-organization, are
inimical to the legitimate interests of
both labor and management, including
their right to bargain collectively and
otherwise deal with each other in an
atmosphere of freedom and mutual
respect; and disrupt industrial peace
and hinder the promotion of healthy
and stable labor-management
relations. As the conscience of the
government, it is the Court's sworn
duty to ensure that none trifles with
labor rights.
For this reason, we find it proper in this
case to impose moral and exemplary
damages on private respondent. However,
gdreyes
the damages awarded by the labor arbiter,
to our mind, are excessive. In determining
the amount of damages recoverable, the
business, social and financial position of
the offended parties and the business and
financial position of the offender are
taken into account. It is our view that
herein private respondents had not fully
acted in good faith. However, we are
cognizant that a cooperative promotes the
welfare of its own members. The
economic benefits filter to the cooperative
members. Either equally or
proportionally, they are distributed
among members in correlation with the
resources of the association utilized.
Cooperatives help promote economic
democracy and support community
development. Under these circumstances,
we deem it proper to reduce the award for
moral and exemplary damages.
3. NO.-Having been illegally dismissed,
individual petitioners are entitled to
reinstatement from the time they were
illegally dismissed, until they were
reinstated on March 16, 1993. For that
period they are likewise entitled to
backwages minus the amount petitioners
were forced to receive as "retirement"
pay. A recomputation is therefore proper
and in the event that the amount of
"retirement" pay received by an
individual petitioner exceeds the amount
of his backwages, the excess should be
deemed as advances of salary which
should be refundable until fully repaid by
him.
Disposition Petition partially granted.
Law 114 Labor II
B. Extent and Scope of Right
Art 257 (246) - Non-abridgment of right to self-
organization. It shall be unlawful for any person to
restrain, coerce, discriminate against or unduly
interfere with employees and workers in their
exercise of the right to self-organization. Such
right shall include the right to form, join, or assist
labor organizations for the purpose of collective
bargaining through representatives of their own
choosing and to engage in lawful concerted
activities for the same purpose or for their mutual
aid and protection, subject to the provisions of
Article 264 of this Code. (As amended by Batas
Pambansa Bilang 70, May 1, 1980).
Alexander Reyes v. Hon. Trajano & Tri-
Union (92)
A certification election was held among the EEs of
TUIC, where the votes of 141 INK members were
challenged because they were not members of any
union. They then petitioned to cancel the elections,
asserting their right to not join any labor union.
Although the Med-Arbiter and the BLR did not
agree with them, the SC granted their petition,
stating that the right to not join in any labor
organization is part of their right to self-
organization, and that the law does not require
them to be part of any labor organization to
exercise such right.
FACTS:
Oct. 20, 1987 A certification election was
held among the employees of Tri-Union
Industries Corporation. Of the 348 EEs,
only 240 actually took part in the election
(141 of which are Iglesia Ni Kristo (INK)
members). Results are as follows:
TUPAS 1 makes it an ULP for a labor organization
TUEU OLALIA 95
No Union 1 exercise of their rights to self-
Spoiled 1 organization . . . Sec. 1 of Rule II, Book V
Challenged 141 Votes cast by INK
Members, who should not be allowed to
vote "because they are not members of
any union and refused to participate in
the previous certification elections."
The INK EEs protested to the exclusion of
their votes, stating that they want to
cancel the election alleging that it "was
not fair" and the result thereof did "not
gdreyes
reflect the true sentiments of the majority
of the employees."
Med-Arbiter: Petition had no merit. They
were using their religion to render
meaningless the rights of non-INK EEs.
Also, they did not possess any legal
personality to institute this present
action, as they were not parties to the
petition for certification election.
BLR: Denied the appeal. Similar reason +
petitioners did not participate in previous
certification elections for the reason that
their religious beliefs do not allow them to
form, join or assist labor orgs.
ISSUES:
WON the right to self-organization
includes the right not to join any union.
YES.
WON the INK EEs are disqualified to vote
because they are not constituted into a
duly organized labor union. NO
HELD:
Art. 243 of the Labor Code provides the
right of EEs to self-organization. Art. 248
(a) declares it to be an ULP for an
employer, among others, to "interfere
with, restrain or coerce employees in the
exercise of their right to self-
organization." Similarly, Article 249 (a)
to "restrain or coerce employees in the
of the Omnibus Rules also provides for
such right.
Logically, the right NOT to join from a
labor organization is subsumed in the
right to join, affiliate with and assist
any union, and to maintain
membership therein.
Historically, the original rules on
certification election by the CIR required
Law 114 Labor II
that the ballots to be used at a
certification election to determine which
labor union would represent the
employees in the appropriate bargaining
unit should contain, aside from the names
of each union, an alternative choice of the
employee voting, to the effect that he
desires not to which of two or more
competing labor unions would represent
the employees in the appropriate
bargaining unit should contain, aside from
the names of each union, an alternative
choice of the employee voting, to the
effect that he desires not to be
represented by any union. Now, the rules
do not expressly bar the inclusion of the
choice of "NO UNION" in the ballots. And
whether the prevailing "NO" votes are
inspired by considerations of religious
belief or discipline or not is beside the
point, and may not be inquired into at all.
The purpose of a certification election
is precisely the ascertainment of the
wishes of the majority of the employees in
the appropriate bargaining unit: to be or
not to be represented by a labor
organization, and in the affirmative case,
by which particular labor organization. If
the results of the election should disclose
that the majority of the workers do not
wish to be represented by any union, then
their wishes must be respected, and no
union may properly be certified as the
exclusive representative of the workers in
the bargaining unit in dealing with the
employer.
Therefore, it is beyond doubt that when
the INK EEs chose NO UNION, they were
in the exercise of their right of self-
organization, albeit in its negative aspect.
Neither law, administrative rule nor
jurisprudence requires that only
employees affiliated with any labor
organization may take part in a
certification election. On the contrary, the
plainly discernible intendment of the
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law is to grant the right to vote to all
bona fide employees in the bargaining
unit, whether they are members of a labor
organization or not. Neither does the law
forfeit such right because of their neglect
in their exercise of their right in past
certification election.
Petition for certiorari granted and the
decision of the BLR is annulled and set-
aside.
Kapatiran v. Hon. Calleja (88)
2 Rival labor unions- old TUPAS and the recently
registered NEW ULO (composed of INC members).
The latter filed a petition for a certification
election claiming that it has the majority of the
rank and file, which TUPAS opposed. SC said the
tenets of a sect should not infringe the right to self-
organization, regardless of religious affiliation.
Moreover, a certification election is the best forum
in ascertaining the majority status of the
contending unions wherein the workers
themselves can freely choose their bargaining
representative.
FACTS:
From 1984 to 1987, TUPAS was the sole
and exclusive collective bargaining
representative of URC Meat and Canning
Division, with a 3-yr CBA which was to
expire on Nov.15, 1987. On Oct.8, 1987,
NEW ULO, composed mostly of workers
belonging to the Iglesia Ni Cristo (INC)
sect, registered as a labor union. NEW
ULO claims that it has the majority of the
workers in the rank and file positions,
thus filed a petition for a certification
election at the BLR.
TUPAS moved to dismiss the petition for
being defective in form and that the
members of the NEW ULO were mostly
members of INC sect which 3 years
previous refused to affiliate with any
labor union. It also accused the company
of using the NEW ULO to defeat TUPAS'
bargaining rights.
Law 114 Labor II
The Med-Arbiter ordered the holding of a
certification election within 20 days.
TUPAS appealed to BLR. In the meantime,
it was able to negotiate a 3-year CBA with
URC. BLR Director Calleja dismissed the
appeal. MR was also denied.
ISSUE:
WON BLR Dir. Calleja acted with GAD in
affirming the Med-Arbiters order for a
certification election. NO.
HELD:
On covered employees: irrespective of
religion
SCs decision in Victoriano vs. Elizalde
Rope Workers' Union, upholding the right
of members of the INC sect not to join a
labor union for being contrary to their
religious beliefs, does not bar the
members of that sect from forming their
own union. Dir. Calleja correctly observed
that the "recognition of the tenets of
the sect ... should not infringe on the
basic right of self-organization granted
by the constitution to workers,
regardless of religious affiliation."
On extent and scope of right:
The fact that TUPAS was able to negotiate
a new CBA with ROBINA within the 60-
day freedom period of the existing CBA,
does not foreclose the right of the rival
union, NEW ULO, to challenge TUPAS'
claim to majority status, by filing a timely
petition for certification election before
TUPAS' old CBA expired and before it
signed a new CBA with URC.
As pointed out by Med-Arbiter Abdullah, a
"certification election is the best forum
in ascertaining the majority status of
the contending unions wherein the
workers themselves can freely choose
their bargaining representative thru
secret ballot." Since it has not been
gdreyes
shown that this order is tainted with
unfairness, this Court will not thwart the
holding of a certification election.
Pan-Am World Airways Inc. v. Pan-am
Employees Assn. (69)
The workers right to self-organization, the right to
form unions and take care of their interests vis-a-
vis their ERs, would be made meaningless if they
cannot choose their own leaders to speak on their
behalf and bargain for them. Pan Ams act of
showing unwarranted distrust towards the union
officers calls into question the integrity of the CB
process, even if there is no indication is present to
show that the officers return to work poses any
danger. Implicit in the process of industrial
democracy is the need for management to show
confidence in the responsibility of union officials
to sure that both elements in industry and
production can work side by side.
FACTS:
The Phils. certified the strike to the CIR as
being an industrial dispute affecting the
national interest.
Unions position: its members would not
resume work unless its officers were
included in the return-to-work order.
Pan Am: The workers may return to work,
but not the 5 officials of the Union. The
strike was illegal, being offensive to a no-
strike clause of an existing CBA the result
being that the officials could be liable for
dismissal as the responsible parties. They
also cannot return to their previous
positions, as they would not only be
lacking in incentive and motivation for
doing their work properly, but would
likewise have the opportunity to cause
grave and irreparable injury to Pan Am (3
of the 5 union officials were Passenger
Traffic Reps, and 1 reservation clerk, who
could cause mix-ups in the reservation
and accommodation of passengerscould
result to many suits for damages; and 1 in
the cargo dept., who could
underweigh/overweigh cargo to the great
Law 114 Labor II
detriment of the service or safety of the
aircraft). The best we can do is to deposit
their salaries even if they would not be
working, and they would not be required
to refund any amount should they be
terminated for the illegal strike.
Judge Bugayong of the CIR: issued order
requiring Pan Am to accept the 5 union
officers pending resolution on the merits
of the dispute involved in the strike.
Pan Ams MR was denied. Hence this
petition alleging grave abuse of discretion
in the failure of the CIR to grant Pan Ams
demand.
ISSUE:
WON the CIR committed grave abuse of
discretion. NO.
HELD:
1. Considering that this is a case certified
by the President, with respondent Court
exercising its broad authority of
compulsory arbitration, the discretion it
possesses cannot be so restricted and
emasculated that the mere failure to grant
a plea to exclude from the return-to-work
order the union officials could be
considered as tantamount to a grave
abuse thereof.
Upon certification by the President under
Section 10 of RA 875, the case comes
under the operation of CA 103, which
enforces compulsory arbitration in cases
of labor disputes in industries
indispensable to the national interest
when the President certifies the case to
the CIR. The evident intention of the law is
to empower the CIR to act in such cases,
not only in the manner prescribed under
CA 103, but with the same broad powers
and jurisdiction granted by that Act. If the
CIR is granted authority to find a solution
in an industrial dispute and such solution
consists in ordering of EEs to return back
gdreyes
to work, it cannot be contended that the
CIR does not have the power or
jurisdiction to carry that solution into
effect. And of what use is its power of
conciliation and arbitration if it does not
have the power and jurisdiction to carry
into effect the solution it has adopted.
Lastly, if the said court has the power to
fix the terms and conditions of
employment, it certainly can order the
return of the workers with or without
backpay as a term or condition of the
employment.
2. Pan Ams inexcusable lack of confidence
in the responsibility of union officials
attacks the validity of the CB itself. For it
is the basic premise under which a regime
of CB was instituted by the Industrial
Peace Act that through the process of
industrial democracy, with both union
and management equally deserving of
public trust, labor problems could be
susceptible of the just solution and
industrial peace attained. Implicit in such
a concept is the confidence that must
be displayed by management in the
sense of responsibility of union
officials to assure that the two
indispensable elements in industry
and production could-work side by
side, attending to the problems of each
without neglecting the common
welfare that binds them together.
The moment mgt displays what in this
case appears to be grave but unwarranted
distrust in union officials discharging
their functions just because a strike was
resorted to, then the integrity of the CB
process itself is called into question.
The greater offense is to the labor
movement itself, more specifically to the
right of self-organization. There is both a
constitutional and statutory recognition
that labourers have the right to form
unions to take care of their interests vis-a-
Law 114 Labor II
vis their employers. Their freedom
organizations would be rendered
nugatory if they could not choose their
own leaders to speak on their behalf and
to bargain for them.
If Pan Ams demand would be granted, the
laborers in this union would thus be
confronted with the sad spectacle of the
leaders of their choice condemned as
irresponsible, possible even constituting a
menace to the operations of the
enterprise. This would result in calling
into question their undeniable right to
choose their leaders, and in effectively
depriving the rank and file of their
freedom of choice as to who should
represent them, for what use are leaders
so undeserving of the minimum
confidence. To that extent, their
constitutional and statutory right to
freedom of association suffers an
impairment hardly to be characterized as
inconsequential.
Samahan ng Manggagawa sa Hanjin
Shipyard rep. by Pres. Alfie Alipio v. BLR &
Hanjin Heavy Ind. & Construction Co. (Oct
2015)
The right to self-organization is not limited to
unionism. Workers may also form or join an
association for mutual aid and protection and for
other legitimate purposes.
FACTS:
On February 16, 2010, Samahan, through
its authorized representative, Alfie F.
Alipio, filed an application for
registration5 of its name "Samahan ng
Mga Manggagawa sa Hanjin Shipyard"
with the DOLE. Attached to the
application were the list of names of the
association's officers and members,
signatures of the attendees of the
February 7, 2010 meeting, copies of their
Constitution and By-laws. The application
stated that the association had a total of
120 members.
gdreyes
On March 15, 2010, respondent Hanjin
Heavy Industries and Construction Co.,
Ltd. Philippines (Hanjin), with offices at
Greenbeach 1, Renondo Peninsula, Sitio
Agustin, Barangay Cawag, Subic Bay
Freeport Zone, filed a petition7 with
DOLE-Pampanga praying for the
cancellation of registration of Samahan's
association on the ground that its
members did not fall under any of the
types of workers enumerated in the
second sentence of Article 243 (now 249).
Hanjin opined that only ambulant,
intermittent, itinerant, rural workers, self-
employed, and those without definite
employers may form a workers'
association. It further posited that one
third (1/3) of the members of the
association had definite employers and
the continued existence and registration
of the association would prejudice the
company's goodwill.
On March 18, 2010, Hanjin filed a
supplemental petition, adding the
alternative ground that Samahan
committed a misrepresentation in
connection with the list of members
and/or voters who took part in the
ratification of their constitution and by-
laws in its application for registration.
Hanjin claimed that Samahan made it
appear that its members were all qualified
to become members of the workers'
association.
Aggrieved, Samahan filed an appeal before
the BLR, arguing that Hanjin had no right
to petition for the cancellation of its
registration. Samahan pointed out that the
words "Hanjin Shipyard," as used in its
application for registration, referred to a
workplace and not as employer or
company. It explained that when a
shipyard was put up in Subic, Zambales, it
became known as Hanjin Shipyard.
Further, the remaining 63 members
Law 114 Labor II
signed the Sama-Samang
Pagpapatunay which stated that they
were either working or had worked at
Hanjin. Thus, the alleged
misrepresentation committed by
Samahan had no leg to stand on.
On July 4, 2013, the CA rendered its
decision, holding that the registration of
Samahan as a legitimate workers'
association was contrary to the provisions
of Article 243 of the Labor Code.35 It
stressed that only 57 out of the 120
members were actually working in Hanjin
while the phrase in the preamble of
Samahan's Constitution and By-laws,
"KAMI, ang mga Manggagawa sa Hanjin
Shipyard" created an impression that all
its members were employees of HHIC.
Such unqualified manifestation which was
used in its application for registration,
was a clear proof of misrepresentation
which warranted the cancellation of
Samahan's registration.
It also stated that the members of
Samahan could not register it as a
legitimate worker's association because
the place where Hanjin's industry was
located was not a rural area. Neither was
there any evidence to show that the
members of the association were
ambulant, intermittent or itinerant
workers.
ISSUES:
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY
ERRED IN FINDING THAT SAMAHAN
CANNOT FORM A WORKERS'
ASSOCIATION OF EMPLOYEES IN HANJIN
AND INSTEAD SHOULD HAVE FORMED A
UNION, HENCE THEIR REGISTRATION AS
A WORKERS' ASSOCIATION SHOULD BE
CANCELLED.
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY
ERRED IN ORDERING THE
REMOVAL/DELETION OF THE WORD
gdreyes
"HANJIN" IN THE NAME OF THE UNION
BY REASON OF THE COMPANY'S
PROPERTY RIGHT OVER THE COMPANY
NAME "HANJIN."
HELD:
A labor organization has two broad rights:
(1) to bargain collectively and (2) to deal
with the employer concerning terms and
conditions of employment. To bargain
collectively is a right given to a union once
it registers itself with the DOLE. Dealing
with the employer, on the other hand, is a
generic description of interaction
between employer and employees
concerning grievances, wages, work hours
and other terms and conditions of
employment, even if the employees' group
is not registered with the DOLE.
Right to choose whether to form or join a
union or workers' association belongs to
workers themselves.
In the case at bench, the Court cannot
sanction the opinion of the CA that
Samahan should have formed a union for
purposes of collective bargaining instead
of a workers' association because the
choice belonged to it. The right to form or
join a labor organization necessarily
includes the right to refuse or refrain from
exercising the said right. It is self-evident
that just as no one should be denied the
exercise of a right granted by law, so also,
no one should be compelled to exercise
such a conferred right. Also inherent in
the right to self-organization is the right
to choose whether to form a union for
purposes of collective bargaining or a
workers' association for purposes of
providing mutual aid and protection.
Hanjin posits that the members of
Samahan have definite employers, hence,
they should have formed a union instead
of a workers' association. The Court
disagrees. There is no provision in the
Law 114 Labor II gdreyes

Labor Code that states that employees

with definite employers may form, join or
assist unions only.

Removal of the word "Hanjin Shipyard"

from the association's name, however,
does not infringe on Samahan's right to
self-organization.

Nevertheless, the Court agrees with the

BLR that "Hanjin Shipyard" must be
removed in the name of the association. A
legitimate workers' association refers to
an association of workers organized for
mutual aid and protection of its members
or for any legitimate purpose other than
collective bargaining registered with the
DOLE.59 Having been granted a certificate
of registration, Samahan's association is
now recognized by law as a legitimate
workers' association.

For the same reason, it would be

misleading for the members of Samahan
to use "Hanjin Shipyard" in its name as it
could give the wrong impression that all
of its members are employed by Hanjin.

Further, Section 9, Rule IV of D.O. No. 40-

03, Series of 2003 explicitly states:

The change of name of a labor

organization shall not affect its legal
personality. All the rights and obligations
of a labor organization under its old name
shall continue to be exercised by the labor
organization under its new name.
Thus, in the directive of the BLR removing
the words "Hanjin Shipyard," no
abridgement of Samahan's right to self-
organization was committed.