CAN FILIPINOS DESTROY POLITICAL DYNASTIES?

ATTY. MICHAEL HENRY LL. YUSINGCO, LL.M

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE

I. Corrupting Local Governance

1. Of Political Dynasties and Local Term Limits MindaNews, March 5, 2015
2. The Toxic Brew of Federalism and Political Dynasties Mindanao Times,
December 9, 2014
3. Are Filipinos ready for federalism? Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 13,
2015
4. Are local leaders ready for federalism? The Daily Guardian, April 24, 2015
5. Incorporating bayanihan in local governance Politics for Peace, July 14,
2015
6. Commencing federalization even before Cha-Cha The Daily Guardian,
August 19, 2015
II. Fostering Centralization of Government
1. A culture of dependence Philippine Daily Inquirer, June 13, 2015
2. De-Centralizing Executive Power MindaNews, June 5, 2015
3. Should politicos stop 'pleasuring the president?' Rappler, June 7, 2015
4. Are we essentially electing a dictator? Mindanao Goldstar Daily, May 29,
2015
5. What we want to hear from Binay, Roxas, et al Edge Davao, December
23, 2014
6. Reject these 2016 presidential wannabes Rappler, June 16, 2015
III. Suppressing People Power
1. Diagnosing pathologies in the 1987 Charter Philippine Daily Inquirer, July
25, 2015
2. Pope Francis, Mamasapano and civic constitutionalism MindaNews,
February 14, 2015
3. Sure way to break up PH political dynasties Philippine Daily Inquirer, April
11, 2015
4. Political dynasties vs. Political rights MindaNews, August 11, 2015
5. Can Filipinos destroy political dynasties? Halalan 2016, June 4, 2015
6. Rethinking Political Dynasties Mindanao Law Journal Issue No. 5, 2013
PREFACE

Counterflowing drivers are no better than corrupt politicians who forgo the public good
and think only of what's good for themselves. This breakdown of respect for others or
at the very least "hiya" displayed by the jeepney and truck driver to the Mercedes Benz
owner just shows us how weak our sense of community and nationhood has become.
It has become so pervasive that no one even reacts anymore. Palampasin na lang.
Pagpasensyahan na lang. I do not know anymore who is worse -- the impunity of
counterflow and corruption, or the meekness of everyone just watching all these
wrongs happen.

- A Facebook post dated August 13, 2015 by Professor Ronald U. Mendoza,

Director of the Asian Institute of Management Policy Center

It is an accepted fact that political dynasties control the Philippine political system. I
have been studying and writing about this problem for the past two years. And one
thing is certain, majority of Filipinos concede the countrys political system is controlled
by traditional political families. A Sydney Morning Herald piece in 2012 fittingly called
the latter dynasty in steroids.

The novel feature of this compilation is that I have organized my published works here
in such a way that would narrate the underlying theme of my research on political
dynasties that its continued existence gravely undermines the Constitutional
mandate of establishing local autonomy in the country.

Political dynasties are actually proscribed in the Philippine Constitution. This is very
clear in Section 26 of Article II which reads as follows: The State shall guarantee
equal access to opportunities for public service and prohibit political dynasties as may
be defined by law.

However, the phrase as may be defined by law has sustained the prevailing belief
that actualizing this prohibition necessarily depends on an anti-political dynasty
legislation.

Unfortunately, the fact that as of the last reckoning at least 75% of legislators in the
Philippine Congress belong to political dynasties flatly prevents the enactment of this
law. (See Table 1 below)

The senator primarily responsible for this task is even quoted to have said that
although anti-political dynasty bills have been filed, all it got was lip service from
members of Congress, many of whom did not want to touch the measure with a ten-
foot pole for obvious self-preservation of family clan members who have occupied
various elective posts in government.
 Table 1
Share of Dynastic Legislators in Parliaments for Selected Countries

Philippines 75%

India 24%

Greece 10%

Thailand 42%

Mexico 40%

Japan 33%

Ireland 22%

Argentina 10%

United States 6%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80%

Notes: Data from Dal Bo et al. 2009 (United States); Rossi 2009 (Argentina); Asako et al. 2015 (Japan and Mexico); The Hindu
2014 (India); Thananithichote 2013 (Thailand); Patrikios and Chatzikonstantinou 2015 (Greece and Ireland); and AIM Policy
Center 2013 (Philippines). For India and the Philippines, dynastic relationship includes the legislators relatives who were also
incumbent officials. For Greece, dynastic relationship was determined by family ties to a previous or incumbent legislator. For the
rest, dynastic legislators were identified by their kinship to previous legislators.

While there is presently no enforceable legal definition of political dynasty, I believe

most Filipinos will concur with the way it was described by the prime mover behind the
inclusion of its prohibition in the 1987 Constitution, esteemed legal scholar Jose N.
Nolledo, to wit:

In the Philippines, I think it is known to everyone that a person runs for governor; he
becomes a governor for one term; he is allowed two re-elections under our concept.
Then he runs for re-election; he wins. The third time, he runs for re-election and he
wins and he is now prohibited from running again until a lapse of another election
period. What does he do? Because he is old already and decrepit, he asks his son to
run for governor.

In the meantime, he holds public office while the campaign is going on. He has control;
he has already institutionalized himself. His son will inherit the position of governor,
in effect, and then this will go to the grandson, et cetera. The others who do not have
the political advantage in the sense that they have no control of government facilities
will be denied the right to run for public office. Younger ones, perhaps more intelligent
ones, the poorer ones, can no longer climb the political ladder because of political
dynasty.
It seems to me that the public office becomes inherited. Our government becomes
monarchical in character and no longer constitutional. [Record of the Constitutional
Commission of 1986, Volume Four, p731 (September 17, 1986)]

In light of the Nolledo description above, it is immediately perceptible that political

dynasties adversely impact local governance. Indeed, in some cases dynastic families
have captured the local government structure itself. An anomaly aptly described as
clan-inclusive government.

The current make-up of the local government of the Dinagat Islands is a good
illustration of this odious governance scenario. Presently, the Governor and Vice-
Governor, three Mayors, and four local council members in this province all come from
one bloodline, the Ecleo clan.

The first part of this book is comprised of think-pieces which discuss how these
dynastic politicians undermine the decentralization effort in the country.

The vital role that local governance plays in nation-building is particularly well-
established. According to the International Guidelines on Decentralisation and
Strengthening of Local Authorities issued by UN-HABITAT Political decentralization
to the local level is an essential component of democratization, good governance and
citizen engagement.

However, the status quo in the Philippines paints the contrary picture. A respected
political commentator articulates the dire situation so poignantly this way In the
1970s, there was only one dictatorship in the country: the Marcos dictatorship. Today,
we have many small dictatorships in the form of political dynasties.

The concentration of local government authority in a single family has two notable
results. First, accountability in office is no longer a standard for public service for blood
relations would expectedly trump over the publics demand for checks-and-balance
amongst officials in local government.

Obviously, when this happens unabated graft and corruption infects local governance
itself. In fact, according to the latest report from the Office of the Ombudsman, the
most number of corruption indictments filed in 2014 were against officials of local
governments.

The second effect of dynastic dominance in local government is the steady

deterioration of the quality of leaders being elected to office. One political commentator
lamented that meritocracy in governance is actually dying at the hands of political
dynasties.

According to Colombian academic, Pablo Querubin, in Political Reform and Elite

Persistence: Term Limits and Political Dynasties in the Philippines, political elites in
the Philippines are so entrenched in their dominant position they have become
essentially insulated from political competition.

Sadly, being in this station of privilege and impunity for so long has led to the
inculturation of a myopic and parochial governance frame of mind. Clearly
demonstrated by the local politico who can only be bothered by short-term projects
that have an immediate and perceptible impact and most likely simply as a knee-jerk
response to the clamor of the day from his or her supporters.

And worse, as local communities continue to suffer inept and corrupt dynastic leaders,
those who can and are willing to push for reforms but do not have the inherited political
advantage are effectively denied the right to run for public office because of the
monarchical character of local government.

Indeed, Filipinos who are more qualified, passionate and patriotic, including many from
the youth ranks, are unfairly deprived of the opportunity to establish clean and effective
local governance.

Both these outcomes have become the bane to the socio-economic progress of local
communities in the country. According to a groundbreaking study on political dynasties
by the Asian Institute of Management (AIM) Policy Center in 2012lower standards
of living, lower human development, and higher levels of deprivation and inequality
persist in the districts governed by local leaders who are members of a political
dynasty.

The more alarming development is that the fattest dynastiesthose with the most
number of family members in elective officeare actually ensconced in the poorest
parts of the country. (See Table 2)

Table 2

Note: Data obtained from Philippine Statistics Authority.

Such a chokehold of local dynasties on local governance brings to bear serious doubts
on our countrys readiness to shift to a federal form of government. There is a very
real fear that enhancing local autonomy with political dynasties still having their way in
local government will prove disastrous for local communities.

Increasing local authority can further entrench these traditional families in their
positions of power thereby condemning many Filipinos in perpetual misery. The last
two articles in this section suggest reform measures to overcome this particular
trepidation.

The second part of the book takes off from this anxiety over the countrys federalism
aspirations. My articles here focus on how dynastic politics actually fosters the
centralization of government, in direct contravention to the constitutional command to
decentralize.

This section elaborates on the debilitating political umbilical cord to Malacaang,

which according to former Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. was already severed by
the Local Government Code in 1991. But actually kept pulsating with life by the very
lifeblood of political dynasties, patronage politics.

Unfortunately, this patently unbreakable conduit between Malacaang and local

dynasties from Batanes to Tawi-Tawi also facilitates the Presidents omnipresence in
all matters of government from agriculture to zoning. Indeed, this could be the very
reason why decentralization has not produced the level of development in the country
as envisioned by the esteemed former lawmaker.

With such an anomaly in mind, the last two articles in this section can function as a
handy guide for Filipinos in the forthcoming Presidential elections. In fact, I expect the
overall reform narrative expressed in this book to help voters to be more critical in
evaluating those aspiring for public office.

The theme of the final and third part of this book launches from this culture of
patronage pervading in Philippine politics. This section contains my written works
which shed light on how the reign of political dynasties actually suppresses the
Constitutional principle enshrined in Section 1 of Article II Sovereignty resides in the
people and all government authority emanates from them.

This people power tenet in the Constitution is an indispensable requirement for good
governance. Its veritable absence in the Filipinos civic consciousness is particularly
crippling to the current local autonomy regime and absolutely fatal to our nations
political culture.

The discussion here commences with the fact that while family dynasties were an
integral feature of pre-colonial society, powerful clans emerged in leadership roles
during this era underpinned by a social contract. They enjoyed the advantage of such
an elevated social status but also assumed the role of protectorate of the community.
And it was incumbent upon them to exercise good leadership for to do otherwise may
cause their removal from their privileged position.
However, a review of the countrys colonial past has unravelled the loss of two
extremely valuable indigenous political traditions. First, the fundamental belief that
rulers have the duty to exercise good leadership in order to keep their privileged
position in the community. Second, the core principle that it is the community that holds
the power to choose its ruler and no one else. These losses are critical because
modern political dynasties actually sprung out from this void in our political culture.

Indeed, the Filipino polity has for a very long time now neglected to wield the innate
power they possess over those who must lead them. A situation which has allowed
political clans to run rampant with abusing elected office.

Local communities have somehow been easily manipulated to leave its future in the
hands of a political dynasty, with the latter using the electoral process to legitimize
their hold on this power. For how else can authority be held by 55+ families for such a
long period within the democratic context, if not for the inaction and apathy of the
electorate? The painful truth is Filipinos have forgotten that sovereignty resides in
them. And most important of all, government authority emanates from within their
ranks.

Therefore, the answer to the query as to whether Filipinos can destroy political
dynasties must be WE HAVE TO! The alternative scenario is absolutely dire and
unthinkable.

The phenomenon of political dynasties is not unique to the Philippines. In fact, the
frontrunners in the forthcoming US presidential election are politicos with pedigree (i.e.
Hillary Clinton and Jeb Bush). And interestingly, neighboring Indonesia has recently
legalized the place of political dynasties in its electoral process.

But as demonstrated here, political dynasties in the Philippines have become a

debilitating hindrance to the countrys national development aspirations. The link
between dynastic politics and all the countrys problems (from Metro Manilas appalling
traffic woes to Mindanaos unconscionable power outages) is very easily established.

The unchallenged reign of these small dictatorships all these years has pushed the
Philippine political system down to rock bottom. With the vast majority of Filipinos
receiving the brunt of this severe and painful decline.

Moreover, it should be clear to all of us now that political dynasties actually flourish
because of this nationwide misfortune. According to respected political pundit, Lila
Ramos Shahani, herself a bona fide member of a political dynasty, dynastic politicians
thrive on inequality. To put it bluntly, political dynasties are fundamentally
predisposed to keep Filipinos poor and powerless on account of the inherent desire to
solidify and perpetuate their hold on power.

Hence, our first priority in the struggle to get out of this hellhole is to destroy political
dynasties. I must note however, that political reform entails a very long and arduous
process. The eradication of dynastic politicians from the socio-political landscape is
only the initial step.
However, given the high stakes involved now such as the overhaul of the current local
autonomy regime, with the end view of transitioning to a federal structure of
government, I must emphasize that our customary Palampasin na lang.
Pagpasensyahan na lang. attitude is no longer acceptable.

A positive development on this front is the categorical recognition by President

Benigno Aquino III in his valedictory State of the Nation Address of the urgency of
passing an Anti-Political Dynasty Law before his term ends in 2016.

In fact, last August 3, 2015, I attended a meeting of a group of political scholars and
commentators (some of whom are cited in my works) who were aiming to mobilize a
media strategy to consolidate efforts compelling Congress to enact such a legislation
before the present session adjourns on May next year.

Pertinently, the goal was not just to pressure lawmakers to enact an anti-political
dynasty law without delay but also to motivate the general public to actively participate
in the clamor for one.

In this regard, it is worthy to note that youth leaders all over the Philippines joined
forces last August 19, 2015 to announce the Youth Manifesto Urging Congress and
the President for the Immediate Passage of the Anti-Political Dynasty Law.

Ostensibly, this admirable act proves that the revolutionary spirit is still alive amongst
our young. I believe however, that even if all these efforts fail to motivate legislators to
enact an anti-political dynasty law sooner rather than later, it still would not be a total
waste.

At the very least, the extensive media activities can generate enough interest within
the electorate to parlay the anti-political dynasty advocacy as a major campaign issue
in the 2016 Presidential election.

So that even though the one elected to the top post in the land will most likely come
from a traditional political family, he or she will assume the office knowing fully well
that there is already brewing public disdain for political dynasties.

Atty. Michael Henry Ll. Yusingco, LL.M

Melbourne, Australia
September 2015

N.B.: All the tables used in this piece have the permission of the Asian Institute of
Management Policy Center.
PART I
CORRUPTING LOCAL GOVERNANCE
Of Political Dynasties and Local Term Limits
MindaNews, March 5, 2015

The rationale for the imposition of a specific time frame for elected office was best
expressed by a member of the Constitutional Commission (ConCom) which drafted
the 1987 Constitution. Mr. Edmundo G. Garcia made the following argument during
the debates on this very particular issue

I know that some of us here have been in politics for a long time and I do not wish to
offend them. But I simply think that there should be no special caste of professional
politicians. It should not be a life-time profession or a career, but rather an opportunity
for public service to be broadened to as great number of people and there should be
no effort to accumulate power. Accumulation of power, at one time, really brings about
the desire to accumulate more, and rather than providing a structure or a setup which
strengthens this trend, the alternative must be to provide structural safeguards for this
kind of practice. Therefore, I would not subscribe to more than one reelection for
Senators and more than two reelections for Representatives or local officials. [See
Journal Record of the Constitutional Commission of 1986, Volume Two, July 24, 1986,
p219.]

Obviously, the rule on term limits was conceived to be a safeguard against the
propensity of local elected officials to accumulate political power during (and even
beyond) their term in office. It was envisaged to be a mechanism to prevent the
creation of a special caste of professional politicians or in current parlance, political
dynasties.

I do not know where Mr. Garcia is today but I bet he would be very upset to know that
the rule on local term limits has actually failed to prevent these very contingencies.
Indeed, all of the ConCom members would be profoundly flabbergasted to see that
the imposition of term limits itself has motivated politicians to use members of their
family to circumvent this rule.

This ploy is impressively described with accuracy by the Colombian academic, Pablo
Querubin, in an article published in the Harvard Academy for International and Area
Studies last October 2011 entitled, Political Reform and Elite Persistence: Term Limits
and Political Dynasties in the Philippines

In the province of Bukidnon, Jose Zubiri Jr. served in congress between 1988 and
1998. Upon reaching his term limit, his son Juan Zubiri took his seat in congress. Jose
successfully ran for governor in the 2001 election. After his victory, two members of
the Zubiri family were in power in Bukidnon. In 2007, Juan reached his term-limit in
congress. However, unlike the Romualdo family (illustrated in Figure 2), Juan did not
switch offices with his father. Instead, his seat in congress was taken by his brother
Jose Zubiri III and Juan became a senator. With three members of the Zubiri family
involved in politics, the family had managed to increase its sphere of influence despite
term limits. In short, these examples underscore that the response and adaptation of
dynasties to term limits may enhance the political power of these families as their
scope of influence increases both in terms of the number of family members involved
in politics and in the number of elective offices controlled.

Indeed, traditional politicians have found a way to beat the three-term limit set forth in
Section 8 of Article X of the Constitution by employing the revolving door scheme
amongst family members. Concomitantly, they have also expanded the reach of their
political power by establishing a public governance syndicate described by respected
Mindanao civil society activist, Guiamel Alim, as a clan-inclusive government.

The said phenomenon is unequivocal proof that the three term limitation for local
elected officials has actually facilitated the least desirable result for our political
systemthe unabated reign of political dynasties. This is indeed a clear demonstration
of a dire pathology in the 1987 Constitution. Needless to say, local term limits must be
a major consideration in any projected constitutional reform project.

However, such a realization also brings with it a clarion call for immediate action.
Implicit in the Querubin article cited here is the reality that political dynasties have
stunted the development of Philippine democracy. It should be obvious now that
Filipinos are still held hostage by the culture of patronage that sustains traditional
political families.

And according to a groundbreaking study on political dynasties by the Asian Institute

of Management (AIM) Policy Center in 2012lower standards of living, lower human
development, and higher levels of deprivation and inequality persist in the
communities governed by local leaders who are members of a political dynasty.

Indeed, it would not be a huge leap to conclude that the continued dominance of
political dynasties is the very root cause of all our countrys problem. Hence, its
eradication should be the foremost concern of every Filipino wherever province, city,
municipality or barangay he or she may be found.

March 5, 2015 MindaNews

http://www.mindanews.com/mindaviews/2015/03/05/commentary-of-political-
dynasties-and-local-term-limits/

The Toxic Brew of Federalism and Political Dynasties

Mindanao Times, December 9, 2014

It appears that the Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL) has inspired a renewed vigor among
local leaders in Mindanao to push for the shift to a federal form of government. What
is interesting here is the call for the shift to be immediate as if this undertaking was as
simple as changing outfits. Obviously this is not the case.

For many of the states with the federal form of government, such as the United States,
Malaysia, Australia and Germany for instance, federalization was actually a state-
building effort. These countries each began as loose collections of disparate socio-
political entities but gradually transformed themselves into a unified nation-state
through the process of federalization. In our case, it would essentially be the reverse.
And thus we face a much harder and more complicated version of federalization. One
that entails a significant length of time and also demands the exertion of a tremendous
amount of effort from all of us.

However, I am most alarmed with the presumption of purported advocates of

federalism that our local leaders are fit and ready for this form of government. They
immediately harp on the perceived disparity in revenue-sharing with the central
government to justify the shift without even touching on the readiness of local
leadership in the country to assume the big responsibility of local governments under
federalism. Note that one of the most important lessons in the BBL discourse is the
realization about the ARMM as a failed experiment. The lesson beingincreasing the
autonomy of local levels of government ultimately amounts to nothing if local leaders
are incompetent and incapable to properly utilize the expanded powers and resources.

Indeed, with the exception of a notable few, it is difficult to be confident on the ability
of our local leaders to formulate and implement long-term and far-reaching
development objectives. In fact, the over dependence of local government executives
on the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) and the continued existence of central
government largess such as the PDAF and DAP point to the conclusion that the
development perspective of local leaders has not reached the level of sophistication
necessary to sustain federalism.

But the biggest indicator that the quality of local leadership in our country is still below
par as far as federalism is concerned is the prevalence of political dynasties. The
problem here was poignantly articulated by respected Mindanao civil society activist,
Guiamel Alim, in a speech delivered at the Consolidation for Peace for Mindanao
seminar-workshop in Hiroshima, Japan last June 23, 2014:

Political Dynasty and clannish social structure in the Bangsamoro is a big challenge
to democracy where the doctrine of check and balance is most often than not set aside.
Change politics will always be challenged by the business as usual norm. Political
dynasty, while it is true everywhere in the country, is more pronounced in the
Bangsamoro where you see practically the whole clan running the government in local
government unit. I call this clan political enterprise or clan-inclusive government. In
many instances, local politicians are the most resistance to change.

Now consider the key finding in the 2012 groundbreaking study on political dynasties
by the Asian Institute of Management (AIM) Policy Center that lower standards of
living, lower human development, and higher levels of deprivation and inequality
persist in the communities governed by local leaders who are members of a political
dynasty. One cannot help but conclude that federalizing under these conditions would
be tantamount to condemning these communities to perpetual poverty.

I still maintain though, that the change to a federal form of government is a

constitutional reform we can all rally behind. But we have to disabuse ourselves of the
idea that instituting federalism in our country is as easy as turning on a light switch.
Indeed, our foremost task right now in the pursuit of this goal is to lay the foundations
and we do that by improving the quality of local leadership. On this score, federalism
advocates can help the cause by actively pushing for the enactment these particular
pieces of legislation: the Anti-Political Dynasty Law, the Freedom of Information Act
and the Political Party Development Act of 2014.

Ostensibly, there are other ways of uplifting the standards we have for our governors
and mayors as well as enhance their capacities to be effective community
leaders. Nevertheless, these three laws are particularly vital because they impose
structural reforms that could instigate drastic improvements to the way local
governance is currently conceived and delivered.

However, I must emphasize too that the transition to federalism also requires the
elevation of the electorate to a higher level of political consciousness. The prevailing
culture of patronage, which is the lifeblood of political dynasties, must be addressed
head on. The best way to commence with this task is to abandon the populist approach
some sectors are wont to adopt. The obvious danger here is that rhetoric and sound-
bytes, while may be good for catching the attention of media, could caricaturize the
effort and thus diminish its potency to convince the vast majority in the polity.

I would instead suggest to proceed with a clinical and academic approach. The
advocates of federalism, whoever they may be, must create an environment that is
conducive to the integration of the polity rather than its fragmentation. Indeed, they
must oversee a process that facilitates the circumspect and level-headed discussion
and debate on federalization between all sectors of the community. Because
federalism is not just a political framework, it is also a frame of mind.

December 9, 2014 Mindanao Times

http://mindanaotimes.net/peacetalk-the-toxic-brew-of-federalism-and-political-
dynasties/

Are Filipinos ready for federalism?

Philippine Daily Inquirer, March 13, 2015

The campaign pushing Davao Mayor Rodrigo Duterte to run for president in 2016 rides
on the advocacy for the Philippines to shift to a federal form of government. But
supporters of the extremely popular mayor seem to think that the shift can happen
easily, as if it were as simple as changing outfits.

Unfortunately, this is not the case.

For many countries, such as the United States, Malaysia, Australia and Germany,
federalization was actually a state-building effort. Each began as a loose collection of
disparate political entities that gradually, and with painful upheavals, transformed
themselves into a unified nation-state through the process of federalization.
It would essentially be the reverse in our case. Consequently, we face a much harder,
more complicated, and possibly harsher version of federalization. It is thus
disconcerting that purported advocates of federalism seem oblivious to the gravity of
this sociopolitical reform. They quickly harp on the promise of enhanced local
autonomy without even considering the readiness of the local leadership to assume
the big responsibility of local governments under federalism, as if the fitness of the
current crop for this form of government were already a given.

Note that one of the most important lessons in the discourse on the proposed
Bangsamoro Basic Law is the recognition of the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao as a failed experiment. The lesson being: Increasing the autonomy of local
governments will ultimately amount to nothing if local leaders are incompetent and
incapable of properly utilizing expanded powers and resources.

In fact, the overdependence of local government executives on the Internal Revenue

Allotment and the continued existence of central-government largesse, or pork barrel
funds, signify the stark reality that the development perspective of local leaders has
not reached the level of sophistication necessary to sustain a federal government
structure.

Political dynasties constitute the unequivocal proof that the quality of our local leaders
is still below par as far as federalism is concerned. According to a groundbreaking
study by the Asian Institute of Management Policy Center in 2012 titled An Empirical
Analysis of Political Dynasties in the 15th Philippine Congress, lower standards of
living, lower human development, and higher levels of deprivation and inequality
persist in the communities governed by political dynasties.

It would thus not be unfounded to conclude that federalizing with political dynasties
still firmly entrenched in power would actually condemn the affected communities to
perpetual poverty. It would certainly be justified to be concerned that federalizing with
the quality of local leadership still at an untenable state would only make
socioeconomic development more inequitable than it is. With these trepidations in
mind, it is indeed very difficult to conceive of Filipinos as primed and ready for
federalism.

Still I maintain that the switch to a federal form of government is a constitutional reform
that we can all rally behind. But we have to disabuse ourselves of the idea that the
switch will be as effortless as turning on a light switch.

Indeed, the primary task in the pursuit of this goal is to improve the quality of local
leadership. Ardent believers of federalism can actively push for the enactment of these
pieces of legislation: the Anti-Political Dynasty Law, the Freedom of Information Act
and the Political Party Development Act of 2014.

There are other ways of uplifting leadership standards for our governors and mayors.
Nevertheless, these three laws are particularly vital because they impose structural
reforms that can instigate drastic improvements to the way local governance is
currently conceived and delivered.
However, I must emphasize, too, that the transition to federalism also requires the
elevation of the electorate to a higher level of political consciousness. First and
foremost, Filipinos must have a clear understanding of what this massive sociopolitical
undertaking entails. And the best way to commence with this task is to abandon the
populist approach that some supporters of federalism are taking.

The obvious danger here is that rhetoric and sound bytes, while good for catching the
medias attention, could make a caricature of the advocacy and thus diminish its
potency.

I suggest a clinical and academic approach that would facilitate a circumspect and
level-headed discussion on federalization among all sectors of Philippine society.
Accordingly, I envisage a community congregation organized for such a purpose
through the barangay-assembly apparatus and moderated by genuine promoters of
federalization.

Admittedly, dissecting the intricacies of federalism does not exactly fall within the
powers of the barangay assembly under the Local Government Code (LGC). But this
mechanism is still the most convenient way to gather ordinary citizens and give them
the opportunity to speak out and be heard. After all the LGC itself considers the
barangay a forum wherein the collective views of the people may be expressed,
crystallized and considered.

The desired result is for all Filipinos between Batanes and Tawi-Tawi to see
themselves not as passive observers in the sidelines but as continuing stakeholders
in the establishment of federalism in the country.

March 13, 2015 Philippine Daily Inquirer

http://opinion.inquirer.net/83276/are-filipinos-ready-for-federalism#ixzz3ijnmypfQ

Are local leaders ready for federalism?

The Daily Guardian, April 24, 2015

IF FREQUENCY of elections is the only benchmark for democracy, the Philippines

would have no parallel. The election for local officials in our country is held every three
years on account of the rule on term limits set forth in the Constitution.

However, this democratic mechanism has given rise to three major constraints on local
development planning which negatively impacts the aspiration to establish a federal
form of government.

First, the three important local planning bodies, namely the local chief executive, the
local development council, and the sanggunian, cannot establish administrative
continuity within the local government structure because of the frequent changes in
political leadership. The corresponding administration turn-over rate has made any
form of long term development planning practically impossible.
Second, local leaders have acquired the proclivity for quick-gestation projects.
Strategic development formulation is grossly limited by a benefits-now paradigm such
that undertakings that require an extended time frame, even if it will produce more
socio-economic benefits for the community, almost always never see the light of day.

Third, local officials very often yield to populist demands and avoid difficult but
necessary reforms. And in conjunction with the inclination to come up with
development ideas with instantaneous effect, these very same ideas are often dictated
by the need to be re-elected.

Meaning, local officials have selfishly linked the mandate for development to the
burden of pleasing their followers. This electoral arrangement has grown to the extent
that urgent and critical reforms that will benefit the public at large are ignored if they
will cause discomfort and displeasure to voters.

Indeed, the sad by-product of the triennial local electoral system is the local official
who only has a short-sighted development outlook and therefore can only be bothered
by projects that have an immediate and perceptible impact and most likely simply as
a knee-jerk response to the clamor of the day from his or her constituents. Or in other
words, most likely the one currently holding office in the kapitolyo and munisipyo.

Ostensibly, this incapacity to formulate a coherent, coordinated and comprehensive

local development plan is the unarticulated reason that justifies the discretionary funds
(DAP and PDAF) that Malacaang and Congress cling to so dearly.

And sadly, the continued existence of these pork barrel funds signifies the stark
reality that the development perspective of local leaders has not reached the level of
sophistication necessary to sustain a federal government structure.

Furthermore, this budgetary mechanism effectively underpins the unbreakable

attachment of local public officials to central government largess, or the political
relationship we all know as political patronage. This is the most abhorrent feature of
our political system because it is the life source of political dynasties.

Suffice to say, political dynasties constitute the unequivocal proof that the quality of
local leadership in our country is still below par as far as federalism is concerned. For
according to a groundbreaking study by the Asian Institute of Management (AIM)
Policy Center in 2012 entitled, An Empirical Analysis of Political Dynasties in the 15th
Philippine Congresslower standards of living, lower human development, and higher
levels of deprivation and inequality persist in the communities governed by local
leaders who are members of a political dynasty.

Of course, there is no skirting the most important realization in the discourse on the
Bangsamoro Basic Law; that the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao is a failed
experiment. The lesson beingincreasing the autonomy of local levels of government
ultimately amounts to nothing if local leaders are incompetent and incapable to
properly utilize the expanded powers and resources.
It is definitely unwise to proceed with federalization with the quality of local leadership
still at an untenable state. It is certainly justified to be concerned that federalizing with
political dynasties still comfortably lording it over local communities would make socio-
economic development more inequitable than it currently stands.

With the foregoing trepidations in mind, the approach to federalism ought to be

revisited. Indeed, the most urgent task right now should be the recalibration of the
development mindset of our local public officials with the view towards improving the
quality of local leadership in the country.

Accordingly, ardent promoters of federalism can help the cause by actively pushing
for the enactment these particular pieces of legislation: the Anti-Political Dynasty Law,
the Freedom of Information Act and the Political Party Development Act of 2014.

Note that these three laws are particularly vital because they impose structural reforms
that could instigate drastic improvements to the way local governance is currently
conceived and delivered. Unquestionably, this is a much better and surer way to
commence the federalization process.

April 24, 2015 The Daily Guardian

http://thedailyguardian.net/index.php/iloilo-opinion/52029-are-local-leaders-ready-for-
federalism

Incorporating bayanihan in local governance

Reposted at the website of Politics for Peace, July 14, 2015

Not all assertions of unconstitutionality against the Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL) can
be accepted as absolute truth. Actually, some claims really necessitate further
examination.

For instance, the contention of Senator Bongbong Marcos in his privilege speech on
the BBL last June 3, 2015 that, a parliamentary form of government within a
presidential form of government runs counter to the Constitution because, There is
no constitutional basis for this effort to change the form of government.

Acts are determined to be unconstitutional because they violate a specific provision in

the Constitution. Acts which are not sanctioned nor prohibited by the Constitution or
by specific legislation are generally considered permissible acts.

An act which is described as simply having no constitutional basis with no other

specific disqualification would likely fall under the latter category. Hence, Senator
Marcos view that creating the Bangsamoro Parliament is an unconstitutional act ought
to be reconsidered.

Furthermore, shifting to a parliamentary local government structure similar to the

leader-and-cabinet model used in the United Kingdom and Australia is actually a
positive reform measure that should be seriously considered. I have witnessed
firsthand how its underlying philosophy of collective governance can be an asset to
local development planning.

I attended a community meeting organized by the local council of a suburb in the State
of Victoria in Australia. The agenda of this gathering was a proposed development
plan for a Civic Precinct. One item in the draft master plan particularly caught my
attention:

The current community effectively holds public facilities in trust for the future. This
Civic Precinct should remain an important place for generations to come. To do this it
is important to identify the most valuable parts and ensure their continued relevance
to the community. It requires an investment in design quality consistent with the
investment made in the past and a long term outlook.

This effort from the said local government clearly manifests a development paradigm
that is underpinned by a sense of community stewardship. The words in trust for the
future and for generations to come cannot convey this point any clearer.

Sadly, this type of governance mindset is a rarity amongst our local executives.
Traditional political families have manipulated the current presidential-type model to
such an extent that the fate of the local government itself has become highly
dependent on the person holding the gubernatorial or mayoral office, who most likely
is always a member of their bloodline.

And according to the groundbreaking study by the Asian Institute of Management

Policy Center in 2012, An Empirical Analysis of Political Dynasties in the 15th
Philippine Congress, lower standards of living, lower human development, and higher
levels of deprivation and inequality persist in the communities governed by local
leaders who are members of a political dynasty.

The reason for such a grim outcome is the fact that dynastic politicians can only be
bothered by projects that have an immediate and perceptible impact and most likely
simply as a knee-jerk response to the clamor of the day from his or her own supporters.
It would be really hard to find local executives who hold office in trust for the future
or for generations to come.

I submit that an effective countermeasure against such a parochial and dynastic local
governance mindset is to incorporate that sense of community stewardship in the local
government structure itself. Interestingly, a parliamentary framework may not be that
foreign an idea given that collective governance is actually an indigenous tradition.

During the pre-colonial era, the notion of governance was premised on the
preservation of the community. The datu was expected to protect his people from their
enemies and safeguard their way of life. More importantly, a datus ability to retain his
position as chief of the barangay depended highly on his performance as a leader.
Notably however, there was always a council of elders beside the datu to help him
govern.
The alternative local governance structure can therefore be configured to reflect this
pre-colonial convention. So instead of a mayor governing in opposition to a legislative
council like the current model, he can be mandated to govern in collaboration with the
council.

There are two changes involved here. First, the position of vice-mayor must now be
removed. And second, local governance at the city and municipal level becomes a
collective and collaborative effort of the mayor and the council with executive and
legislative functions now merged.

This pre-colonial tradition of collective governance can also be applied at the provincial
level. According to esteemed historian Fr. Horacio de la Costa, S.J. in his book, Asia
and the Philippines, strong datus ruled with the collaboration of other chiefs who gave
support to one another. Indeed, important decisions were always made by consensus
amongst the datus.

So again instead of the governor governing the province in opposition to a provincial

legislative council and institutionally disconnected to the mayors of the component
municipalities and cities of the province, he can be mandated to govern in collaboration
with this latter group.

Two changes again in this regard. First, the position of vice-governor and provincial
board members are eliminated. And second, the governance of the province becomes
parliamentary in nature with the governor as head and the council of mayors as his
cabinet. Governance of the province also becomes a collective effort with executive
and legislative functions now merged.

As a corollary to this restructuring, the mechanism of sectoral representation can be

further enhanced in the local cabinet to widen and deepen community participation
in policy formulation and implementation. Indeed, according to the International
Guidelines on Decentralisation and Strengthening of Local Authorities issued by UN-
HABITAT, local governance should involve an appropriate combination of
representative and participatory democracy.

In sum, shifting to a parliamentary form of local government should not easily be

dismissed precisely for these foreseeable benefits. First, streamlining the available
political positions makes electoral competition tougher. This could potentially disturb
political dynasties in their comfortable status. Second, because local governance
would be underpinned by a sense of community collectivism, development planning
at the local level can be more coordinated and coherent.

Of course, the ultimate hope for institutionalizing a collective governance framework

in local government is to establish that sense of stewardship or the bayanihan spirit
as an enduring influence in local development. So that everyone in the community will
always believe that progress is not just for us now, but also for the generations to
come.

July 14, 2015 Reposted at the website of Politics for Peace

http://politicsforpeace.com/blog/174-incorporating-bayanihan-in-local-governance
Commencing federalization even before Cha-Cha
The Daily Guardian, August 19, 2015

THERE SEEMS to be a prevailing notion that a "super-politico" is needed to make

federalization a reality. Such a messianic outlook stems from the belief of proponents
and followers in this very popular reform movement that shifting to a federal structure
of government absolutely requires charter change.

I concede that restructuring the current form of government would require

Constitutional revision. But the process of federalizing can actually commence now
under the current Constitutional regime.

According to a noted expert on federalism, Professor Cheryl Saunders from the

Melbourne Law School, in a paper entitled, Options for Decentralizing Power:
Federalism to Decentralization, the functions of government can be decentralized in
various ways. And federalism is just one example of a decentralization arrangement
among a spectrum of arrangements establishing greater or lesser degrees of local
autonomy within a nation-state.

Pertinently, our Constitution does not actually mandate a specific decentralization

arrangement (See Section 3 of Article X) but actually authorizes Congress to define
the structural mechanics of local autonomy.

It is therefore only reasonable to expect that lawmakers can already start laying down
the foundations of a federal structure of government by incorporating federalist
principles in the current decentralized unitary structure.

Accordingly, as a staunch advocate of federalism, I believe the cause will be

strengthened further by pushing for the incorporation of these three fundamental
tenets of federalism in the Local Government Code (LGC) as building blocks to a
federal governance framework.

First, the allocation of responsibilities between the central and local governments must
be clear and coherent. This is not exactly a pioneering innovation given the work done
in the Bangsamoro Basic Law. Therefore, the only task required here is to come up
with a broader national arrangement that exhibits this streamlined division of
government labor.

The point to remember here is that the devolution of functions has to be re-formulated
in such a way that the assignment of accountability is unequivocal. We do not want a
distribution scheme that would also leave everybody clueless as to which government
office can be held answerable for our dissatisfaction. Neither do we want overlapping
designations that would also allow government agents to pass the blame for failure to
deliver public services to our satisfaction.

Second, the local government structure must reflect a collective approach to local
governance. The current model has to be replaced because local political families
have exploited the LGC to ensure the fate of the local government is highly dependent
on the person holding the gubernatorial or mayoral office.

This shameless manipulation of the current decentralization arrangement has actually

further entrenched the patronage relationship between the local executive and his
constituency. Thereby allowing local politicos to enjoy an unhealthy and corrupting
prominence in local governance.

An effective countermeasure against this pattern of patronage in local politics is to

integrate a sense of community in the administration of the kapitolyo and the
munisipyo. The local leadership structure itself must be configured to facilitate the
collective governance mindset among the local constituency. An example of such
would be a parliamentary type of configuration similar to the leader-and-cabinet
model used by local governments in the United Kingdom and in Australia.

As a corollary to this restructuring, the mechanism of sectoral representation can be

further enhanced in the local cabinet to widen and deepen community participation
in policy formulation and implementation.

Third, mechanisms must be established to foster cooperation and collaboration among

the local governments in addressing national concerns. One solid truth about the
process of federation is that it does not diminish the integrity of the state.

For example, the governing body of the current National Economic and Development
Authority could be re-organized to be comprised of provincial representatives
appointed by the governor for a fixed term. However, for this office to effectively
function as the national congregation of the various communities in the country, it
should not be a mere advisory council. It should be designed to have legitimate policy-
making functions as well.

Indeed, federalization is not just about the devolution of political and fiscal powers to
the sub-national level, but it is also about clearly defining a shared responsibility
between the two tiers of government for shaping the future of the whole country.

This idea is already reflected in Section 2 of LGC where it is explicitly expressed that
the territorial and political subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and
meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest development as self-
reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the attainment of
national goals.

It is truly unfortunate that the current local autonomy regime in the country is afflicted
with a slew of institutional defects. The overlapping and confusion of government
functions, the debilitating influence of local dynasties in the management of local
government, the myopic and parochial approach to development, just to name a few.
All of which have ultimately led to the failure of both levels of government to effectively
and efficiently deliver essential public services.

A determined federalist advocate would definitely be pushing for the necessary

reforms mentioned here. According to Professor Saunders, the designation of the
decentralized arrangement is of no consequence. Rather, what is important is that the
design meets the needs of people of the state and that there is a shared understanding
of the governance structure created and a shared commitment to making it work.

In other words, there can be no excuse for not initiating the federalization process now
because the more fundamental elements of the shift to a federal form of government
can be accomplished by simple legislation.

Indeed, the lesson to be emphasized here is that we should not be deterred by the
popular view of the Constitution as a seemingly immovable hindrance to federalization.

Moreover, the intransigence of those who blindly insist on the constitutional argument
against federalizing now can be interpreted as unwillingness to let go of advantages
gained from the current structure, which is still too centralized on Malacaang.

August 19, 2015 The Daily Guardian

http://www.thedailyguardian.net/index.php/iloilo-opinion/55150-commencing-with-
federalization-even-before-cha-cha
PART II
FOSTERING THE CENTRALIZATION OF GOVERNMENT

A culture of dependence
Philippine Daily Inquirer, June 13, 2015

It is a painful irony that the Local Government Code (LGC) has provided a legal
platform for a culture of dependence to persist among local executives.

According to noted legal scholar Romeo Raymond C. Santos, the Internal Revenue
Allotment (IRA) for local governments has bred a dole-out mentality among local
officials. Most, if not all, governors and mayors have in fact become extremely reliant
on the IRA as their primary source of funding for development initiatives despite other
means of raising revenue available under the LGC.

In a subtle way, the IRA has allowed the central government, through the Office of the
President, to maintain its dominance over the local governments. But the more
troubling corollary of this anomaly is that local leaders continue to accept the
convention to be constantly deferential to the president, thus allowing patronage
politics, the longtime scourge of our political system, to continue unabated.

Nowhere was this fact more evident than in a meeting called by then President Gloria
Arroyo on Oct. 11, 2007. This meeting with local executives in Malacaang was
ostensibly to discuss matters pertaining to development projects.

A few days after the meeting, however, two governors revealed that they were each
given a gift bag with half a million pesos in cash. A public uproar followed this
revelation, with the demand that Arroyo explain why her office was handing out cash
gifts to local officials. It was later admitted by a Cabinet official that the giving of cash
gifts to local executives was normal practice in the Arroyo administrationan apparent
standard operating procedure to keep her allies at the local level on a tight leash.

Sadly, this subservient relationship is sustained further by programs instituted in good

faith by current central-government officials who, by all accounts, truly believe in the
principle of local autonomy. The Performance Challenge Fund set up by President
Aquino, for instance, essentially allows him to give monetary rewards to local
executives who in his view have done a good job.

Whether by design or inadvertence, programs such as these create an environment

that, instead of fostering among local leaders an independent-governance frame of
mind, encourages them to be dependent on the good graces of Malacaang.

Political umbilical cord

It is not hard to see that the debilitating political umbilical cord to Malacaang
which, according to former senator Aquilino Pimentel Jr., was severed by the LGC
actually continues to pulsate with life. This is the reason decentralization has not
produced the level of development envisioned by the esteemed former lawmaker.

The challenge, therefore, is to find a way to reconfigure the relationship between the
president and local executives in order to minimize, if not remove, the undermining
influence of Malacaang in the implementation of decentralization under the LGC.

First and foremost, the prevailing view that local governments are mere agents of the
central government must be changed. The more appropriate civil-law analogy is that
the central government and local governments are partners in governance.

To institutionalize this new paradigm, Malacaang and Congress must work toward a
meaningful implementation of Section 14 of Article X of the Constitution:

The President shall provide for regional development councils or other similar bodies
composed of local government officials, regional heads of departments and other
government offices, and representatives from non-governmental organizations within
the regions for purposes of administrative decentralization to strengthen the autonomy
of the units therein and to accelerate the economic and social growth and development
of the units in the region.

The current Regional Development Plan (RDP) has essentially no imprimatur to

discipline local executives regarding their mandate for local development. This is
clearly implied in the plea of the National Economic and Development Authority
director for local governments to align their development initiatives (if any) with the
RDP drawn up by the pertinent regional development council (RDC).

To be a truly effective development mechanism, the RDC should be organized in such

a way that it functions as a continuing presence in the region which supports and
coordinates with the constituent local governments. Its task should not be limited to
occasional consultations with local executives. It should be given the clear mandate
and the right resources to bring all the relevant local officials in the region together and
come up with a viable RDP.

Economic framework

The outcome contemplated here is not simply a collection of suggested policies.

Rather, it is an economic framework for the region which the constituent local
governments are obliged to implement. This is the only way the RDC can truly fulfill its
constitutional function to accelerate the economic and social growth and development
of the units in the region.

But more critically, a genuinely robust regional development mechanism can provide
a modicum of cohesion in national development planning. It can result in the clear
identification and designation of development expenditures that can minimize, if not
eliminate, the need to allocate for discretionary funds (i.e., the Priority Development
Assistance Fund and the Disbursement Acceleration Program). Meaning, it can
destroy the very life-source of this culture of dependence.
Secondly, congressional oversight over local governments must be strengthened. A
strong oversight function can be a potent mechanism not just to monitor the
implementation of the LGC but also to serve as a public forum where local executives
are obliged to demonstrate their aptitude in the performance of their functions. Their
insufficiencies, whatever these may be, can be exposed and properly dealt with by
their constituencies.

More importantly, the oversight committee can also be a forum for local executives to
assert the prestige of their autonomy from central authority. This can be the platform
for governors and mayors to showcase their significant role as partners of the
president in national development. Either way, the constant grinding from Congress
will eventually churn out a generation of local leaders free of this pathological
dependence on Malacaang.

The culture of dependence still thriving among local leaders despite the LGC is a
serious hindrance to the Philippines development aspirations. After all, this is the virus
that allows political dynasties to flourish. The onus is now on the electorate to keep
this pathology in mind when evaluating Binay, Roxas, or whoever else in 2016.

June 13, 2015 Philippine Daily Inquirer

http://opinion.inquirer.net/85793/a-culture-of-dependence#ixzz3ijpmiTus

De-Centralizing Executive Power

MindaNews, June 5, 2015

As the electorate prepares for the 2016 elections, I propose that we rethink the
rationality as well as the practicality of a government framework wherein the delivery
of public services, from revenue collection to urban housing, all intersect at the Office
of the President.

We have known for years that Malacaangs strong influence in all matters of
government is the very life-source of political patronage. Indeed, many of us will have
a story to support this assertion. However, my clear favorite would be the meeting
called by then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on October 11, 2007.

This gathering with local executives inside the Palace was ostensibly to discuss
matters pertaining to development projects. A few days after the meeting however,
two provincial governors revealed that they were each given a gift bag with half a
million in cash.

There was a public uproar following this revelation, demanding the President to explain
why her office was handing out cash gifts to local officials. It was later on admitted by
one of her cabinet secretaries that the giving of cash gifts to local chief executives had
been a normal practice in the Arroyo administration. Probably, to keep her allies at the
local level on a tight leash.
This subservient attitude is not the exclusive domain of local officials. Indeed, we are
often witness to the medieval-esque tradition of cabinet officials treating their tenure
in government as serving at the pleasure of the President. A sad excuse commonly
used by embattled officials to fend off frenetic calls to resign. We heard these words
quite regularly during the term of President Macapagal-Arroyo.

It is certainly plausible that the debilitating political umbilical cord to Malacaang,

which according to former Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. was already severed by
the Local Government Code in 1991, still actually pulsate with life. For this could be
the reason why decentralization has not produced the level of development envisioned
by the esteemed lawmaker.

The challenge therefore is finding a way to re-configure executive authority in order to

minimize, if not remove, the hovering influence of Malacaang in the overall
administration of government. There are two ways to accomplish this and the first one
is constitutional reform.

South Koreas executive structure in its constitution is worth emulating here. Article 66
(4) of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea explicitly provides that Executive
power shall be vested in the Executive Branch headed by the President. The other
members of the Executive Branch are the Prime Minister (see Article 86) and the
Supreme Council (see Article 88).

The most notable difference in the South Korean model is that executive power is
given to an institution and not to a person. Moreover, under this framework, the
exercise of executive power is diffused because the same is technically held by three
persons. And therefore the responsibility to manage government is accordingly
distributed. The fate of the nations affairs does actually not revolve around a single
person.

The second way is structural reform through legislation. Congress can help relieve the
chokehold of Malacaang over government administration by institutionalizing the
involvement of the community in the various offices in the executive branch.

In other parts of the globe, non-government sectors of the polity now play an
increasingly important role in designing and executing policies and services. The fact
is some public goods are best delivered by decentralized specialist agencies that are
managed by public servants with the appropriate specialized skills set.

This kind of governance structure is actually reflected in the organization of the

Monetary Board (MB) where five of the seven members come from the private sector.
Here at the very least, the public can reasonably expect that five people in the MB will
not just have the proper expertise but will also be assuming the office without the usual
baggages accompanying a person officially attached to Malacaang.

It does make me wonder why this governance model has not been replicated at all. In
fact, the long hand of Malacaang model is still the standard governance structure
for government agencies and offices. Consider for instance Republic Act No. 9003
which created the National Solid Waste Management Commission (NSWMC).
Under Section 4 of this law the NSWMC shall be under the jurisdiction of the Office of
the President. Believe it or not, this commission is composed of 14 members from the
government sector and only 3 members from the private sector. Of the 14, seven are
officially considered the alter-ego of the President, three are under his supervision and
control and four are local government officials under his general supervision.

The private sector is represented by the following: (a) A representative from

nongovernment organizations whose principal purpose is to promote recycling and the
protection of air and water quality; (b) A representative from the recycling industry; and
(c) A representative from the manufacturing or packaging industry.

What is wrong with this set-up is self-evident. The people deeply involved in solid
waste management are far outnumbered by people who are politicians by profession.
How then can the public be assured that this office will function properly according to
its given mandate?

And I must point out that giving the community a direct line in managing the delivery
of services could significantly weaken the leverage of politicians (i.e. Malacaang
lackeys). This is a scenario which can disturb the culture of patronage in our political
system and hence, diminish the influence of dynastic politicians in the administration
of government.

The ever increasing dominance of the Chief Executive in all matters of government is
the bane in our political system that urgently needs to be remedied. It has stifled
political and economic development in the country. It has even undermined the
Constitutional mandate to promote local autonomy.

I believe voters would be very keen to hear how this challenge of de-centralizing
executive power is addressed by Binay, Roxas or whoever else is aspiring for
Malacaang in 2016.

June 5, 2015 MindaNews

http://www.mindanews.com/mindaviews/2015/06/05/commentary-de-centralizing-
executive-power/

Should politicos stop 'pleasuring the president?'

Rappler, June 7, 2015

The phrase I serve at the pleasure of the President is the common retort used by
embattled Cabinet officials to fend off frenetic calls to resign. We heard these words
quite regularly during the term of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.

A few years back former Customs Commissioner Ruffy Biazon was bombarded with
resignation demands after his name was dragged into a malversation indictment
arising from the PDAF scandal. Expectedly, he initially insisted that presidential
appointees serve at the pleasure of President Noynoy Aquino.
He later on relented saying, but I also believe that public officers serve with the trust
of the Filipino people and tendered his irrevocable resignation. Sadly, this lone act of
delicadeza did not portend a new governance frame of mind in the executive branch.
Indeed, most politicos that have passed through the halls of Malacaang do not
possess this organic sense of shame when their performance in office is challenged.

Notably, this pleasuring the President dogma has found its way in legislation. For
example, under the Department of the Interior and Local Government Act of 1990,
The authority and responsibility for the exercise of the Department's powers and
functions shall be vested in the Secretary, who shall hold office at the pleasure of the
President."

Correspondingly, creative legalists from the executive ranks have traditionally

asserted that this pleasuring the President principle fundamentally means that they
hold their posts at the complete sufferance of their boss. Thus transforming this legal
notion into a chronically abused excuse to cling on a little bit more to ones office. And
in most cases, much to the displeasure of the public.

Clashing principles

It can certainly be argued that this conventional view contradicts the republican and
democratic principles the Philippines ascribes to. Specifically, in Section 1 of Article II
of the Constitution which states that government authority emanates from the people.
Hence, once these officials assume their executive posts, the public expects full
devotion to the constituency of their mandate and no longer to the person who
extended their appointment.

Accordingly, it is only reasonable, for example, to expect from the Secretary of the
DILG that he will champion the autonomy of local governments. Unfortunately,
experience has instead shown that past DILG secretaries are more adept at devising
schemes to utilize local leaders to serve the interests of the president.

However, the most objectionable aspect of this privilege within the executive branch
is that it allows cabinet secretaries and other officials of similar stature, indeed the very
people tasked to manage public interest portfolios, to deflect demands of
accountability.

By allowing them to assert the prerogative of pleasuring the President first and
foremost, they are in effect relieved of the obligation to justify their actions (or inaction)
to the people. This is of course an absolute travesty because a public office is a public
trust. Meaning, all public officials, including the President, serve at our pleasure above
all else!

Furthermore, the delegation involved here certainly does not mean setting aside ethics
and common sense. Indeed, when public trust is breached, then the holder of the office
is morally and rationally obliged to relinquish the position.

This move should not be treated as an admission of guilt but plainly as heeding the
peoples lack of confidence on the public official concerned. Clearly, the pleasuring
the President dogma must lose its purchase when the peoples displeasure and
disapproval have been sufficiently articulated.

'Public trust'

Sadly, this idea of performing public duties to pleasure the president is firmly
entrenched in our political culture because it is actually anchored on how executive
power is defined here. According to the Supreme Court in the landmark case of Marcos
vs. Manglapus (G.R. No. 88211- October 27, 1989):

The powers of the President are not limited to what are expressly enumerated in the
article on the Executive Department and in scattered provisions of the Constitution.
This is so, notwithstanding the avowed intent of the members of the Constitutional
Commission of 1986 to limit the powers of the President as a reaction to the abuses
under the regime of Mr. Marcos, for the result was a limitation of specific power of the
President, particularly those relating to the commander-in-chief clause, but not a
diminution of the general grant of executive power.

The bitter irony is that those terrible years under the Marcos dictatorship should have
jolted our heads not to give too much power to a single person. And yet Sections 1
and 17 of Article VII still do exactly that.

Needless to say, the aforementioned characterization of Malacaang prestige by the

Supreme Court dispels any question at all on the sublime authority of the President
over the executive branch of government.

Indeed, the durability of the pleasuring the President mindset despite its blatant
dictatorial underpinnings is just one of the many pathologies in our Constitutional
begging for reform. At this juncture, South Koreas executive structure in its
constitution is worth noting.

Article 66 (4) of the Constitution of the Republic of Korea explicitly provides that
Executive power shall be vested in the Executive Branch headed by the President.
The other members of the Executive Branch are the Prime Minister (see Article 86)
and the Supreme Council (see Article 88).

The most notable difference in the South Korean model is that executive power is
given to an institution and not to a person. Moreover, under this framework, the
exercise of executive power is diffused because the same is technically held by 3
persons. And therefore the responsibility to manage government is accordingly
distributed. The fate of the nations affairs does actually not revolve around a single
person.

There is without doubt an urgent need to recalibrate attitudes about executive power.
Obviously, there is no denying that Malacaangs strong influence in all matters of
government is the very life-source of political patronage. Patronage of course, is the
very lifeblood of political dynasties. And the unabated reign of dynastic politicians is
the very evil that sustains graft and corruption in our political system. And every Filipino
knows from personal experience that graft and corruption in government is the biggest
bane in our countrys development.
Therefore, the unhealthy practice of politicos performing their public duties at the
pleasure of the President has to stop. But since constitutional reform remains to be
elusive, then the onus is now on the electorate to keep this anomaly in mind when
evaluating Binay, Roxas or whoever else is aspiring for Malacaang in 2016.

June 7, 2015 Rappler

http://www.rappler.com/views/imho/95141-should-politicos-stop-pleasuring-president

Are we essentially electing a dictator?

Mindanao Goldstar Daily, May 29, 2015

The fighting in the next presidential election has begun. In fact, an attempt is being
made to frame the campaign battle between these two sidesthe honest versus the
experienced. Hopefully, as the discourse on the qualification of Presidentiables rolls
along, the matter of membership in a political dynasty will be a hot issue for debate as
well.

But the sad fact is personality and patronage politics will still reign supreme in this
political exercise. This is a particularly perilous reality because executive power is
configured in our Constitution in such a way that the President practically functions
like a dictator.

Consider first Section 1 of Article VII on the Executive Department which states that,
The executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines. Then read
this in conjunction with Section 17 which provides that, The President shall have
control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the
laws be faithfully executed.

It is immediately noticeable in the very text of our Constitution how immensely powerful
the office of the President is. But the sublime authority of the Chief Executive over
virtually everything within the executive branch has been declared unequivocal by the
Supreme Court in the landmark case of Marcos vs. Manglapus (G.R. No. 88211-
October 27, 1989)

The powers of the President are not limited to what are expressly enumerated in the
article on the Executive Department and in scattered provisions of the Constitution.
This is so, notwithstanding the avowed intent of the members of the Constitutional
Commission of 1986 to limit the powers of the President as a reaction to the abuses
under the regime of Mr. Marcos, for the result was a limitation of specific power of the
President, particularly those relating to the commander-in-chief clause, but not a
diminution of the general grant of executive power.

An interesting contrast is the way the Constitutional Court of Korea described the office
of their President whose impeachment they overturned
However, the President is not an institution that implements the policies of the ruling
party, but instead, the President is the constitutional institution that is obligated to
serve and realize the public interest as the head of the executive branch. The
President is not the President merely for part of the population or a certain particular
political faction that supported him or her at the past election, but he or she is the
President of the entire community organized as the state and is the President for the
entire constituents. The President is obligated to unify the social community by serving
the entire population beyond that segment of the population supporting him or her.
[Impeachment of the President (Roh Moo-hyun) Case (16-1 KCCR 609, 2004Hun-
Na1, May 14, 2004)]

The characterization of our President is palpably tilted in favor of how powerful the
office is rather than on the responsibility it carries. The South Korean perception of
their President really goes the other way with its emphasis on the primacy of the duty
of this position to the people and even downplaying its prestige. Indeed, it is quite
possible that the difference in the way the office of the chief executive is
comprehended is the very reason why there is a huge disparity between the economic
developments of our two countries.

Malacaangs omnipresence in all matters of government is the bedrock of the culture

of political patronage. Patronage of course, is the very lifeblood of political dynasties.
And the unabated reign of dynastic politicians is the very evil that sustains graft and
corruption in our political system. And every Filipino knows from personal experience
that graft and corruption in government is the biggest bane in our countrys
development.

I must emphasize that there is no intention here to diminish the prestige or relevance
of the Office of the President in the overall political order. I merely want to propose
the diffusion of executive power with the purview of ensuring the efficient and effective
delivery of public goods.

I am only suggesting the re-designing, through simple legislation, of agencies and

offices within the executive branch which could minimize, if not remove, the hovering
influence of Malacaang in the delivery of public services.

One way Congress can achieve this objective is by institutionalizing the involvement
of the community in the governance structure of the office tasked to deliver a particular
public service. The fundamental advantage I foresee here is giving the public having
a direct line in managing the delivery of services to them could significantly weaken
the leverage of politicians (i.e. Malacaang lackeys) to barter the public good
concerned for favors or to gain votes.

This is a scenario which could potentially disturb the pattern of political patronage in
our political system. At the very least though, the involvement of the private sector and
civil society groups could de-politicize, and maybe even professionalize, the delivery
of public services thus making the process actually efficient and effective.

There is without doubt an urgent need to recalibrate attitudes about executive power.
But since the reforms contemplated here remains to be mere suggestions, then the
onus is now on the electorate to keep in mind the dictatorial underpinnings of the Office
of the President when evaluating Binay, Roxas or whoever else is aspiring for
Malacaang in 2016.

May 29, 2015 Mindanao Goldstar Daily

http://goldstardailynews.com.ph/are-we-essentially-electing-a-dictator/

What we want to hear from Binay, Roxas, et al

Edge Davao, December 23, 2014

It is almost guaranteed that 2015 will be a colorful year. One year removed from the
biggest spectacle in Philippine politics, we are bound to witness a lot of braggadocio
from those aspiring for residency in Malacaang. Certainly not beyond these folks to
fictionalize their importance to the country. Some of them will even pontificate about
Gods endorsement of their bid even as they tear each other down like ravenous dogs.

Therefore, it is incumbent upon us, the electorate, to filter through the dirty noise. It
would be good then, to remind ourselves of a passage from one of our national heros
works, The Indolence of the Filipino

The good curate, he says with reference to the rosy picture a friar had given him of
the Philippines, had not told me about the governor, the foremost official of the district,
who was too much taken up with the ideal of getting rich to have time to tyrannize over
his docile subjects; the governor, charged with ruling the country and collecting the
various taxes in the governments name, devoted himself almost wholly to trade; in his
hands the high and noble functions he performs are nothing more than instruments of
gain. He monopolizes all the business and instead of developing on his part the love
of work, instead of stimulating the too natural indolence of the natives, he with abuse
of his powers thinks only of destroying all competition that may trouble him or attempt
to participate in his profits. It matters little to him that the country is impoverished,
without cultivation, without commerce, without, industry, just so the governor is quickly
enriched!

The governor described above can be any one of those who have declared
themselves fit for the Presidency. Precisely why Filipinos should be discerning in
evaluating those aspiring for the countrys top job in 2016. We should reject the same
old spiels on uplifting the masses out of poverty or creating a strong republic or
paving a straight road. We should rebuff the rehashed story of being poor once or of
being one with the poor. We should definitely spurn soapbox pronouncements that
are only inspired by the news of the day and filled with spin and stop-gap measures.
These are all catchphrases that may rouse our politics but they project absolutely
nothing about our nations future.

Voters deserve to know from these presidential aspirants the specific public policies
they intend to translate into decisive action once they assume office. We want to hear
a narrative that actually addresses the paramount concerns of all Filipinos.
For instance, our population now stands at a 100 million. Given the pressing global
environmental concerns, food scarcity is a very distinct and frightening possibility.
Therefore, we must insist that presidential candidates present a comprehensive food
security plan. Food production and climate change is a curious mix. We expect our top
leader to know what needs to be done to find the balance.

Another fundamental concern with such a massive population is to decrease the

number of the uneducated and the unhealthy. Hence, we want a firm commitment to
establish a genuine comprehensive national public health management framework.
But we want to hear the specifics beforehand. Again, we will no longer accept slogans
or sound-bytes. And as far as improving our education system is concerned, promises
of more classrooms and textbooks will not be enough. We want to hear a specific
policy to uplift the quality of educators. We want to hear concrete ways to increase
their pay and definite steps to enhance their training.

Interestingly, while still on the topic of our massive population, recent economic reports
indicate that the country is now a huge consumer market. And if forecasts about our
economy are to be believed, market growth will still be on the upward trend.
Accordingly, we want entrepreneurship in the country to expand but we also want the
conduct of business to be socially responsible. Hence, we want to hear rational
proposals from Presidentiables on creating a genuine and modern consumer
protection framework without any of those burdensome regulations. We expect
industries to be established that will make us competitive in the global economy. But
we will never stand for exploitation of any form.

Finally, it has also been reported that remittances from overseas workers is the key
component of our growing economy. Past Presidents have hailed these fellow Filipinos
as modern-day heroes. The most responsible act any government could do for this
group is to make sure they can stay easily connected with their families back home.
And yet our government does not seem to be bothered at all that our country has one
of the slowest internet speeds in the world. It is disappointing as well that our airports
continue to be appalling given that our economy is reliant on people who rely on this
infrastructure. Hence, we also want to know of actual plans on putting our internet
connectivity and all our airports at a world-class level. Both of these demands are
imperative as matter of recognition to the contributions of overseas workers. But they
can also be a big boost to tourism and domestic trade.

Our politicians are truly an entertaining lot. But it is clear to us now that being good at
speaking carabao English or being cute like Nora Aunor does not cut it anymore. And
as we have recently learned, having a pedigree of honesty and nothing else, is simply
not enough. We need to know that our next President has a viable action plan to
implement for his term in office. Particularly regarding the socio-economic
cornerstones mentioned above. Therefore, this caveat for all votersa Presidentiable
who fails to unveil one next year will most likely be another governor in Malacaang
come 2016.

December 23, 2014 EDGE DAVAO

http://www.edgedavao.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=18845:w
hat-we-want-to-hear-from-binay-roxas-et-al&catid=36:vantage-points&Itemid=55
Reject these 2016 presidential wannabes
Rappler, June 16, 2015

Some presidential aspirants are now marketing their experience in local government
as a premium qualification for the Presidency. Before accepting this claim as gospel
truth, it would be good for the electorate to take a long pause and consider this fact.

Since our country's rebirth in 1986, we have had only one president with extensive
experience in local government. And we all know how utterly disastrous his short
tenure in office was for all Filipinos.

Actually, in principle being a mayor or a governor can be an on-the-job training of sorts

for the highest post in the land. But the reality does not align with this logic at all for
the sad truth is local government has always been a breeding ground for dynastic
politicians.

According to noted Colombian academic, Pablo Querubin, in an article published in

the Harvard Academy for International and Area Studies in October 2011, the three-
term limitation set forth in the Philippine Constitution for local elected officials has
actually facilitated the least desirable result for the nation's political system the
unabated reign of political dynasties.

Traditional politicians have found a way to beat the three-term limit by employing the
revolving door scheme amongst family members. Thus, establishing at the local level
a public governance syndicate described by respected Mindanao civil society activist,
Guiamel Alim, as clan-inclusive government."

Sadly, such an adverse outcome has also led to the inculturation of the myopic and
parochial governance frame of mind. Clearly demonstrated by the local politico who
can only be bothered by projects that have an immediate and perceptible impact and
most likely simply as a knee-jerk response to the clamor of the day from his or her
supporters. Of course, such is the prototypical dynastic politician and most likely the
one currently holding office in the kapitolyo and munisipyo.

Therefore, voters should be extremely wary of possible presidential contenders

propping up their local government credentials. In fact, in evaluating presidential
candidates, it would be good for the electorate to reflect on this particular passage
from one of our national heros works, The Indolence of the Filipino:

"The good curate," he says with reference to the rosy picture a friar had given him of
the Philippines, "had not told me about the governor, the foremost official of the district,
who was too much taken up with the ideal of getting rich to have time to tyrannize over
his docile subjects; the governor, charged with ruling the country and collecting the
various taxes in the government's name, devoted himself almost wholly to trade; in his
hands the high and noble functions he performs are nothing more than instruments of
gain. He monopolizes all the business and instead of developing on his part the love
of work, instead of stimulating the too natural indolence of the natives, he with abuse
of his powers thinks only of destroying all competition that may trouble him or attempt
to participate in his profits. It matters little to him that the country is impoverished,
without cultivation, without commerce, without, industry, just so the governor is quickly
enriched!"

The villainous "governor" described in the literary work can be any one of those who
have declared themselves fit for the Presidency. In fact, two of our most recent
Presidents have been perfect incarnations of this plunderer in Rizals opus. And sadly,
one of the two also boasted of his extensive background in local government.

Indeed, the only presidential candidate who deserves serious consideration from the
electorate is the one who does not fit the profile of a dynastic politician. And it is a safe
bet that he will display these two particular characteristics.

First, he has an acute appreciation of the challenges we face today. Our population
now stands at a little over a 100 million. And given the pressing global environmental
concerns, food scarcity is a very distinct and frightening possibility. Food production
and climate change is a curious mix. We should be able to rely on our most senior
leader to know what needs to be done to find the right balance.

Another fundamental concern with such a massive population is to decrease the

number of the uneducated and the unhealthy. Hence, there will be a firm commitment
to establish a genuine comprehensive national public health management framework
from this presidential standout. And as far as improving our education system is
concerned, promises of more classrooms and textbooks would no longer suffice for
him.

Additionally however, a worthy presidential candidate also has a keen eye on the
future. Meaning, he must have a discernible long-term development perspective.
Therefore, the same old spiels on uplifting the masses out of poverty or creating a
strong republic or paving a straight road will not be heard during his campaign.

His team would definitely spurn soapbox pronouncements that are only inspired by
the news of the day and filled with spin and stop-gap measures. Because a viable
presidential material is ready and willing to set economic building-blocks for future
generations no matter how unpopular these undertakings may be.

Second, a notable presidential aspirant would have the audacity and smarts to present
to the electorate a detailed plan of action for his term of office. This program shall
embody specific public policies which his administration will translate into decisive
action once he assumes office.

This documented action plan would demonstrate his acumen and determination to be
the chief executive of the republic. At the very least, having such an itemized and
comprehensive agenda for his tenure in the top job will distinguish him from
conventional candidates who can only present political party platforms replete with
slogans and sound bites that say absolutely nothing about genuine economic
development.

To conclude, the caveat that must be raised here is that a presidential candidate's
"pilgrimage to power" reveals a lot about him and about what he can do for the country.
And understanding how to proceed from this knowledge is the most profound civic
responsibility a Filipino will ever bear. However, recent experience has already taught
us that a presidential candidate who is found wanting of the two vital leadership
attributes mentioned above will most likely be another governor in Malacaang come
2016.

June 16, 2015 Rappler

http://www.rappler.com/views/imho/96494-reject-2016-presidential-wannabes
PART III
UNDERMINING PEOPLE POWER

Diagnosing pathologies in the 1987 Charter

Philippine Daily Inquirer, July 25, 2015

The 1987 Constitution is considered one of the most enduring constitutions in the
world because it has stood for 28 years without being amended. This is an odd quality
considering that most scholars will agree that a constitution is never infallible or
immortal even as they debate among themselves the ideal life span of a nation-states
charter.

But none of these experts will deny that pathologies in the constitution can emerge
during its reign. These pertain to provisions in the text itself that may have been
designed with good intentions for the polity but have eventually become debilitating to
the political system it purports to govern. Our own 1987 Constitution is no exception.

A very obvious one pertains to the quality of government that the republic should have.
The Preamble is explicit about the Filipinos desire to establish a Government that
shall embody our ideals and aspirations. Of course, a corollary of this goal is the intent
to prohibit political dynasties (Section 26 of Article II).

No need to elaborate here, but the current government framework certainly does not
embody our ideals and aspirations while traditional elites maintain their chokehold on
the political system. These two unfortunate realities clearly point to an anomalous area
in the Constitution that begs to be addressed.

Inquirer publisher Raul C. Pangalangan, a former dean of the University of the

Philippines College of Law and recently elected judge of the International Criminal
Court, proffered a more organic irregularity in an article published in the National
Taiwan University Law Review [Vol. 4: 3, 2009], where he wrote about a built-in
contradiction between the economic and the governance clauses of the constitution.

According to Pangalangan, the Constitutions passionately nationalist stand with

regard to socioeconomic matters and its avowed protectionism against foreign
interests seem to project a partiality for an expanded state. Yet in allocating
governmental powers, a maze of check-and-balance provisions has been instituted to
actually form a shriveled state. Essentially, the Constitution has established a
schizophrenic state which is once again a sad reality that yearns for remedial action.

Obviously, diagnosing pathologies in our Constitution is a huge task. And as House

Speaker Sonny Belmonte himself has learned from his economic amendments
debacle, mere determinations from politicians and interest groups, no matter how well-
thought and presented, will not be credible enough for the general public. In fact, in
order to produce an accurate and truly legitimate result, this process demands the
ardent participation of the polity itself.
Constitutional scholars have long theorized that the active engagement of citizens in
the constitution-writing process actually engenders a deep sense of investment for the
establishment of rules and principles in the community.

Furthermore, the peoples involvement in the drafting enterprise essentially lays the
groundwork for a political culture of consultation and cooperation. Indeed, according
to the United Nations Assistance to Constitution-making Processes (April 2009),
Constitution-making presents moments of great opportunity to create a common
vision of the future of a state, the results of which can have profound and lasting
impacts on peace and stability. This collective approach in the constitutional project
and its resulting benefits also holds true for constitutional reform.

Therefore, the task of identifying the aspects of the 1987 Constitution that require
remedial action has to be carried out via a widespread and substantial public
consultation process. Issues such as expanded regional autonomy for Mindanao and
the Cordillera, blanket prohibition on political dynasties, further economic
liberalization, consolidation of social safety nets, electoral reforms, etc. must all be
exhaustively threshed out by the people in this nationwide political exercise.

The scenario I envision for this comprehensive diagnostic process is not at all
complicated and implausible. I see members of a community congregating for this
purpose via the barangay assembly apparatus.

Admittedly, dissecting constitutional issues pertaining to good governance, economic

prosperity, liberal democracy and social justice does not exactly fall within the powers
of the barangay assembly under the Local Government Code (LGC). But this
mechanism is still the most convenient way to gather ordinary citizens and give them
the opportunity to speak out and be heard. After all, the LGC itself considers the
barangay a forum wherein the collective views of the people may be expressed,
crystallized and considered.

Moreover, I envision representatives of law schools in the area assuming the role of
moderator in these assemblies. I concede that this would be a daunting imposition on
these academic institutions. But it is warranted under Section 5(a) of the Volunteer Act
of 2007 which states:

Volunteerism in the academe includes, but is not limited to, provision of technical
assistance and sharing of technology within the academic circle, target communities
and other clienteles and the upgrading of the quality of education and curriculum
methodologies while providing career enhancement and exposure to the volunteers.

The fact is law schools are the only institutions in the country where constitutional
professionals, so to speak, are produced. Their knowledge in constitutional reform
forms part of legal technology which they can share with the communities where they
belong. Taking the helm in this task can only enhance the standing of participating law
schools and can certainly be a big boost to their faculty and students.

Ostensibly, the detailed mechanics of the sessions themselves shall be the

responsibility of each law school involved. But the targeted output for each barangay
should be a position paper outlining the pathologies in the 1987 Constitution and the
remedial action that must be undertaken.

Indeed, the entire endeavor can be a good precursor to constitutional revision. Those
position papers could all be formally endorsed to Congress and form the basis of a
working draft that can initiate the amendatory process under Article XVII.

But this undertaking can also function as a massive civic education campaign on
constitutional principles for local communities. It is highly possible that after
undergoing this cathartic political exercise, Filipinos from Batanes to Tawi-Tawi will
begin to see themselves not merely as passive observers in the sidelines but as
continuing stakeholders in the enforcement of constitutional rules and tenets.

July 25, 2015 Philippine Daily Inquirer,

http://opinion.inquirer.net/87017/diagnosing-pathologies-in-the-1987
charter#ixzz3jDE3uZPW

Pope Francis, Mamasapano and civic constitutionalism

MindaNews, February 14, 2015

February 2 came and went. Nothing special happened to commemorate Constitution

Day. I suppose for this year this oversight is to be expected. Between the grand elation
generated by the visit of Pope Francis and the deep sorrow caused by the loss of lives
in Mamasapano, Maguindanao it is understandably difficult to pencil in a day just to
contemplate the 1987 Constitution.

Pertinently, these very significant events themselves can be good precipitants for
reflecting on the countrys constitutional order. For going through this process involves
both the academic examination of constitutional text and pondering on momentous
events occurring within the polity itself. In fact, the ruminations of political
commentators on the impact of the Popes visit and on the ramifications of the most
recent tragedy in Maguindanao have unravelled valuable questions about the state of
Filipino constitutionalism.

Constitutionalism refers to the commitment to be governed by constitutional rules and

principles. Therefore, the term civic constitutionalism used here means the capacity of
citizens to live in the community according to constitutional tenets such as the rule of
law, respect for human rights, the democratic process, judicial independence, to name
a few.

In the context of the two recent events mentioned above, the constitutional principle
most profoundly tested is the one articulated by the first sentence of Section 1 of Article
XI on Accountability of Public OfficersPublic office is a public trust. Notably, the
second sentence of this provision provides a baseline meaning of this principle
Public officers and employees must, at all times, be accountable to the people, serve
them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency; act with patriotism and
justice, and lead modest lives.

A friend of mine who works for the Philippine Consulate in Sydney, Consul Marford
Angeles, has an interesting take on the scope of this constitutional principle. He said,
When a person holding a public office behaves in a certain manner that cannot be
justifiable, as the old folks say, in Plaza Miranda, or if they do something that will not
hold up in public scrutiny, then you disappoint the people you are indebted to. Indeed,
the message behind this constitutional standard is pretty straightforward and demands
no further explanation. Hence, the question to ask is thisIs this constitutional edict
discernible in the Filipinos socio-political conduct?

From some of the government actions we have witnessed during the visit of Pope
Francis and heard from the testimonies of those directly involved in the Mamasapano
tragedy, it would appear that by and large, those who hold public office have a very
low regard for the demands of public trust.

For instance, the move to give temporary shelter to street children and their families
in a holiday resort during Pope Francis visit is reminiscent of the Manila face-lift
ordered by then First Lady Imelda Marcos to hide the citys poor during the visit of
Pope John Paul II. So should we really consider this act as public service with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency?

Or how about the suspended police chief influencing operational matters on the sly?
Or how about the commander-in-chief tolerating such an irregularity on account of his
close relationship with the said police officer? Are these the acts of public officials who
fervently believe in being accountable to the people?

Sadly, the electorates comprehension of this constitutional principle also leaves a

whole lot to be desired. The people we put in Malacaang, the Senate and Congress,
and every kapitolyo and munispyo in the country are all painful reminders that Filipinos
have little to no regard to public office as a public trust.

In light of this disconcerting realization about the Filipinos political mentality, our
traditional lukewarm approach to Constitution Day now seems more detrimental to us
than we think. The fact that we do not celebrate our Constitution with the reverence it
deserves could be the reason why our civic constitutionalism is particularly at a
disappointing state. Unfortunately, this is precisely the condition that sustains many of
the political ills we are suffering today as proven by the observations we have
extrapolated from recent events.

Constitutional scholars would suggest that to reverse the untenable state of our civic
constitutionalism we must deliberately engage in a purposeful discussion about
constitutional principles. Because doing this actually generate the awareness and
attachment to constitutional rules and principles that are essential for self-
enforcement. Simply put, talking about the Constitution with the appropriate
seriousness and intent can help Filipinos become socially and politically responsible
citizens.
Section 1 of Article XI would certainly make the repartee over dinner tables more
interesting than usual. Obviously, it would be an exciting theme to debate on for our
youths in our high schools and universities. However, I believe the best venue to hold
the lively discourse on the notion of public office as a public trust, or any constitutional
principle for that matter, is the local government mechanism persistently championed
by the author behind The Worms Eyeviewthe barangay assembly. Just imagine
friends and neighbors exchanging views on what public trust means and together
gauging if public officials can still justify themselves in Plaza Miranda. This is
bayanihan at its best!

A town hall meeting is indeed the most plausible method to instill constitutional
principles in the frame of mind of Filipinos. And regularly engaging the barangay
assembly mechanism could eventually empower the polity to undertake the
fundamental reforms the political system badly needs. Come to think of it, organizing
a community gathering for such a purpose would be the most meaningful way to
celebrate people power on February 25.

February 14, 2015 - MindaNews

http://www.mindanews.com/mindaviews/2015/02/14/commentary-pope-francis-
mamasapano-and-civic-constitutionalism/

Sure way to break up PH political dynasties

Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 11, 2015

Political dynasty, while it is true everywhere in the country, is more pronounced in the
Bangsamoro where you see practically the whole clan running the local government
unit. I call this political enterprise or clan-inclusive government.

These words were spoken by respected Mindanao civil society activist Guiamel Alim
in a speech delivered at the Consolidation for Peace in Mindanao seminar-workshop
in Hiroshima, Japan, on June 23, 2014. Oddly, Alims concern about the reign of clan-
inclusive LGUs has been very rarely articulated in the congressional deliberations on
the proposed Bangsamoro Basic Law.

Nevertheless, the issue of political dynasties is undeniably a national concern. And

this problem is addressed by the 1987 Constitution in Section 26 of Article II: The
State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service and prohibit
political dynasties as may be defined by law.

Clearly, the scourge of political dynasties was not unknown to the framers of the
Constitution. In particular, Jose C. Colayco, during the debates on this subject, stated:
One of the worst effects of political dynasties is that [they breed] graft and corruption.
Corruption is defined by the United Nations Development Programme as abuse of
public power for private benefit through bribery, extortion, influence peddling,
nepotism, fraud, or embezzlementall hallmarks of a political dynasty in the
Philippines.

Interestingly, the prime mover of the inclusion of a provision on political dynasties,

Jose N. Nolledo, provided a simple summation of why this pathology in Philippine
politics needs to be eradicated: It seems to me that the public office becomes
inherited. Our government becomes monarchical in character and no longer
constitutional.

But this constitutional provision is viewed merely as a declaration of opposition to

dynastic politics and not actually an executable prohibition against politicians of this
pedigree. Correspondingly, Filipinos believe that for this constitutional proscription
against political dynasties to have any practical meaning at all, an implementing piece
of legislation is needed.

The basic theme of the anti-political dynasty bills now pending in Congress is pretty
straightforward: A candidate that is part of a political dynasty is disqualified to run for
office if a co-member of the dynasty is an incumbent.

Ironically, this approach may actually be in conflict with established democratic

principles. Two prominent legal minds in the 1986 Constitutional Commission
elucidated on this concern.

Blas F. Ople, now deceased, cautioned that any prohibition against running for public
office may impinge on the right of suffrage:

What I feel is an inner demand for logic and rationality so that this provision can be
actually attached to some principles of equity without doing violence to the freedom of
choice of the voters because they are entitled to as broad a freedom of choice as the
environment can provide. And if they want somebody to run for office even if he is
closely related to someone in office, do we have the right to curtail the freedom of the
voters? (Record of the Constitutional Commission of 1986, Volume Four, p. 762,
Sept. 18, 1986)

On the other hand, former Commission on Elections chair Christian S. Monsod argued
that adding another hurdle for those aspiring for elected office contradicts the very idea
of people power and can even be seen as unconstitutional:

I just want to say that here we are in this assembly, extolling people power and saying
that the people have a new consciousness, and yet not trusting that they will make the
right choice. We want to put a section on political dynasty on the assumption that there
will be violations of the Electoral Code, that people in power will use their office to elect
their children. We cannot assume that certain sections of this Constitution will be
violated and then try to cover and compensate for them in another section. (Record
of the Constitutional Commission of 1986, Volume Four, p. 939, Sept. 23, 1986)

Pertinently, the Supreme Court ruled in the case of Quinto vs Comelec (G.R. No.
189698, Feb. 22, 2010) that the right to seek public office, by itself, is not entitled to
constitutional protection. This doctrine is clear and succinct but it is very difficult to
reconcile with an earlier determination of the high court in the old case of Aurea vs
Comelec (G.R. No. L-24828, Sept. 7, 1965) that:

Freedom of the voters to exercise the elective franchise at a general election implies
the right to freely choose from all qualified candidates for public office. The imposition
of unwarranted restrictions and hindrances precluding qualified candidates from
running is, therefore, violative of the constitutional guaranty of freedom in the exercise
of elective franchise. It seriously interferes with the right of the electorate to choose
freely from among those eligible to office whomever they may desire.

On one end, the high court is clearly for the constitutional protection of the right to run
for public office because it is an integral component of the right of suffrage. But on the
other hand, the high court has implicitly ruled that the right to seek an elected office
can be divorced from the broader concept of elective franchise. And as a separate and
individual right, it does not actually enjoy any constitutional guarantees.

Whether these two sides contradict each other is subject to debate. But these two
rulings from the Supreme Court in conjunction with the critical objections of Ople and
Monsod just confirm that addressing the problem of political dynasties may prove to
be more intricate than simply enacting a direct prohibition law.

Some legal luminaries from Mindanao have suggested that the parliamentary form of
local government espoused in the Bangsamoro Basic Law is the best antidote to
political dynasties.

While there is some credence to this proposition, it is also a distinct possibility that the
projected Bangsamoro Parliament would just become the new and more lucrative
playground of the traditional political families in the region.

Indeed, the Constitution itself provides a clear hint that other remedial measures are
available within the confines of the democratic process. Section 1 of Article II states
quite emphatically that sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority
emanates from them.

Proceeding from this principle, it can be argued that the surest way to break the
political dynasties stranglehold on the Philippine political system is simply not to vote
their members into office. With the 2016 elections just around the corner, this is the
solution on which all Filipinos should now be focusing.

April 11, 2015 Philippine Daily Inquirer

http://opinion.inquirer.net/83992/sure-way-to-break-up-ph-political-
dynasties#ixzz3ijuidPDW
Political dynasties vs. Political rights
MindaNews, August 11, 2015

The main issue hindering the enactment of an anti-political dynasty law is the reality
that as of the last reckoning at least 70% of Congress members belong to political
dynasties.

The senator primarily responsible for this task is even quoted to have said that
although anti-political dynasty bills have been filed in Congress, all it got was lip
service from members of Congress, many of whom did not want to touch the measure
with a ten-foot pole for obvious self-preservation of family clan members who have
occupied various elective posts in government.

But the plain fact is the damaging effect of dynastic politicians is particularly well-
established. No one doubts anymore that the unabated reign of this grim lot is the very
life-source of graft and corruption in our political system. And every Filipino knows from
personal experience that graft and corruption in government is the biggest bane to our
countrys economic development.

However, the foremost damage caused by political dynasties was well-articulated by

the eminent economist, Professor Ronald U. Mendoza from the Asian Institute of
Management Policy Center, in a scalding rebuttal a couple of weeks ago to Senator
Nancy Binays preposterous claim that a family of politicians is no different from a
family of doctors.

According to the good professor, An Anti-Dynasty Law also opens much-needed

breathing room to resuscitate meritocracy in the Philippines, since the evidence
suggests that it is already dying at the hands of political dynasties.

Pertinently, apart from the observation that dynastic politicians have all but obliterated
meritocracy in governance, Professor Mendoza also highlights the need to enact an
Anti-Political Dynasty law. Indeed, it has become utterly reprehensible that lawmakers
continue to sit on this reform legislation.

I think our legislators fail to realize that the publics demand is not only about the
enactment of an anti-political dynasty law. Indeed, Filipinos are also clamouring for
an equal access guarantee piece of legislation. It must be noted here that Section
26 of Article II primarily protects a political right, specifically every Filipinos right to
equal access to opportunities for public service.

Furthermore, our lawmakers ought to be reminded that equal access is a political right
guaranteed by international law, particularly by the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (1948) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966).

Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states:

(1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country, directly or
through freely chosen representatives. (2) Everyone has the right of equal access to
public service in his country. (3) The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority
of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which
shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by
equivalent free voting procedures.

Article 25 of The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states that:

Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the distinctions
mentioned in article 2 and without unreasonable restrictions: 1. To take part in the
conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely chosen representatives; 2. to vote
and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by universal and equal
suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free expression of the will
of the electors; 3. To have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in
his country.

Clearly therefore, the campaign for the enactment of an Anti-Political Dynasty law is
profoundly more than just about targeting a special caste of politicians. Indeed, the
legislative agenda behind this advocacy can be understood as preserving and
promoting a political right guaranteed in our Constitution and in international law for
ALL Filipinos.

Hence, complaints by dynastic politicians that such a law infringes their right to run for
and be voted to public office seem pathetically self-serving. Specially given that the
Supreme Court has already ruled in the case of Quinto vs. COMELEC [G.R. No.
189698, February 22, 2010], that the right to seek public office, by itself, is not entitled
to constitutional protection.

Theoretically, our lawmakers should be proud to cast a vote for an anti-political

dynasty bill because to do so is simply about respecting a political or human right
guaranteed by the Constitution and international law. In fact, they can all take the high
road by claiming such a move is fundamentally championing real democracy in the
Philippines.

The reality of course is more nuanced than this. Being bona fide members of political
dynasties themselves, members of Congress and the Senate need to be cajoled
further in enacting an Anti-Political Dynasty law.

President Aquino has declared the urgency of passing such a law before his term ends
in his last State of the Nation Address. Malacaang has even released an official
statement reiterating our Chief Executives directive. Even a COMELEC
Commissioner has come out on a limb imploring legislators to enact the law without
any further delay.

I am beginning to suspect that Filipinos filling up the streets is the spark our lawmakers
need to finally pass the Anti-Political Dynasty law. Indeed, people shouting Sobra na!
Tama na! could jolt them from their stupor. These words took down a dictatorship
after all.

August 11, 2015 MindaNews

http://www.mindanews.com/mindaviews/2015/08/11/commentary-political-dynasties-
vs-political-rights/
Can Filipinos destroy political dynasties?
Reposted at the Halalan2016 website on June 4, 2015

The prevailing view is that the anti-political dynasty provision in the Constitution
(Section 26 of Article II) is merely a declared opposition to dynastic politics but it won't
be able to actually prohibit politicians with the same bloodline from running.

Filipinos have accepted that for this constitutional proscription against political
dynasties to have any practical meaning at all, it needs implementing legislation.

But it seems difficult to be optimistic about the fate of the anti-political dynasty bills
pending in the House of Representatives and in the Senate because as of the last
reckoning, at least 70% of members of Congress belong to political dynasties.

So can Filipinos still destroy political dynasties?

The answer is yes. But only if we take direct and primary responsibility for it. And we
begin with a simple recalibration of how we should perceive the constitutional provision
against political dynasties.

Exercising right to suffrage responsibly

Note that the ultimate aim of the Constitution in this particular instance is to establish
and maintain honest and efficient civil service. Certainly no Filipino will ever dispute
that the existence of political dynasties is the most obvious hindrance to achieving this
goal.

Accordingly, a deep and fervent belief that such high quality government bureaucracy
is what the people deserve should motivate Filipinos not to vote dynastic politicians
into public office. Indeed, each Filipino can give life to this constitutional proscription
by simply exercising his or her right of suffrage.

Degrading political dynasties need not be contingent on the enactment of an anti-

political dynasty law. However, the degradation process contemplated here only
commences when Filipinos commit to take a step further by passionately convincing
others to never cast a vote for a candidate who belongs to a political dynasty.

At a very modest level, this can be accomplished at a personal level by dissuading our
work colleagues or classmates from voting Vice President Jejomar Binay, Manuel
Roxas II, or whoever else in the coming 2016 presidential elections simply on the basis
of their political pedigree.

Indeed, this conversation can also be had with friends and family over merienda and
can also cover not voting for the same old political clans for the Senate or Congress.
This caveat can be applied to local politicos as well.
A more formal and organized discussion can be conducted in high schools and
universities using the groundbreaking study by the Asian Institute of Management
Policy Center in 2012 entitled, An Empirical Analysis of Political Dynasties in the 15th
Philippine Congress as a take-off point.

Let the main finding of this study that lower standards of living, lower human
development, and higher levels of deprivation and inequality persist in the
communities governed by local leaders who are members of a political dynasty
agitate students and teachers alike.

Creativity and artistry to fight dynasties

And if the ultimate goal of the degradation process is to inculcate in the minds of all
Filipinos a profound hatred for political dynasties, then it mandates Filipino artists to
use their craft to breed this fundamental disdain for dynastic politicians. Thus we need
more works like Pinatay si Mayor! by Mae Paner (aka Juana Change).

This mode of protest is not new. At the start of the American colonial period, nationalist
artists such as Juan Abad, Aurelio Tolentino, and Juan Matapang Cruz, produced
seditious dramas which upset the new colonizers so much that they were persecuted
as insurrectos.

Brocka, Bernal, Portes, and company all made films along these lines in the 1970s-
1980s against the dictatorship. The point here is that the writers, artists, and
filmmakers of today must produce more seditious works that challenge the political
establishment films, paintings, and books that not just jar the audience with the harsh
conditions of modern Filipino society, but also ridicule and attack the incompetence
and wrongdoings of those holding political power. No Filipino who grew up in the 1990s
will ever forget Congressman Manhik Manaog!

But to ensure the success of the degradation process, civil society must also do their
part. Groups such as ANDAYAMO (Anti-Dynasty Movement) and MAD (Movement
Against Dynasty) can follow the example of the Citizens Coalition for Economic
Justice in South Korea which published a voters guide that included a list of 167
politicians who should not be elected because of their involvement in corruption
scandals and opposition to reform policies during the 2000 elections.

This exercise has a dual purpose. First, to warn the voters of the calamity awaiting
them at the other end of the polling booth if they do not exercise their right of suffrage
wisely. And second, to clearly demonstrate how pathetic and abhorrent dynastic
politicians are.

Civil society organizations can then deliver the knock-out punch by running a
sustained, comprehensive and well-thought social media campaign to monitor the
movements of public officials, particularly those who belong to, or are allied with
political dynasties. This is essentially to always remind them that, People should not
be afraid of their governments. Governments should be afraid of their people.
The task of teaching Filipinos from Batanes to Tawi-Tawi to loathe political dynasties
will obviously take time. But the reality is that only the intense hatred for dynastic
politicians will empower communities to vote them out of office.

I must emphasize however that I am not diminishing the importance of enacting an

anti-political dynasty law. Indeed, the presence of such legislation will obviously play
a vital role in the degrading process. But we have to accept that the destruction of
political dynasties ultimately lies in the hands of Filipinos.

Indeed, we can all expect that once Filipinos have made family dynasties politically
irrelevant, their stranglehold over our countrys political system will be destroyed
completely. Genuine patriotic leaders can then finally emerge and be properly
recognized.

Reposted at the Halalan2016 website on June 4, 2015

http://halalan2016.com/2015/06/can-filipinos-destroy-political-dynasties/
Rethinking Political Dynasties
Mindanao Law Journal Issue No. 5, 2013

Rethinking Political Dynasties

by Atty. Michael Henry Ll. Yusingco1

Rationale for the Rethinking Process

Why do we need to rethink political dynasties? Is it not common knowledge now that
traditional political families are the most despised feature of Philippine politics? Was not this
sentiment passionately manifested in the Anti-Epal campaign that bombarded social media
in the months preceding the last elections?2 In fact, was not the result of the May 2013
elections an unequivocal illustration of the Filipinos revolt against family dynasties in public
office?3

I remember appearing before the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) during the

chairmanship of a political family patriarch (Benjamin Abalos). I was advocating for a client
who was publicly indicted in campaign attacks as guilty of being in a political dynasty. Our
contention was that since there was no provision under current election laws, which
criminalized the existence of political dynasties, campaign materials pronouncing guilt as if
there was such a proscription constitutes undue harassment on its target candidate. It was a
novel argument but sadly the petition was eventually mooted for as the general public now
knows, in the 2007 elections Senator Koko Pimentel had to face off with a more sinister
election adversary.

1
Atty. Michael Henry Ll. Yusingco recently released his book, Rethinking the Bangsamoro Perspective, published
by the Ateneo de Davao University Publication Office last November 22, 2013. He is a Volunteer presenter/news
reader, Radio Pilipino EBI Radio, Adelaide, SA; Student Exchange Program (Spring 2011), Chung Ang University,
Seoul, Korea; Masters in International Business (2010-present), University of South Australia; Bachelor of Laws
(2002), Arellano University School of Law; Bachelor of Arts in Philosophy (1995), Ateneo de Manila University;
published author, Lawyers Review (June, April 2010; August, April, February 2009; November, December 2008.)
2
Caroline J. Howard, Anti-'epal' campaign empowering netizens, ANC, September 13, 2012 http://www.abs-
cbnnews.com/anc/09/12/12/anti-epal-campaign-empowering-netizens accessed September 6, 2013.
3
See The PCIJ Blog for June 28, 2013, Many dynasties trimmed down after May 2013 elections,
http://pcij.org/blog/2013/06/28/many-dynasties-trimmed-down-after-2013-elections accessed September 6,
2013.
 I am relating this personal experience simply to demonstrate that there is something
objectively disagreeable with politicians who are part of political dynasties running (and
competing) for public office. Pertinently, the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism
(PCIJ) blog cited here reported that candidates belonging to 10 of the 20 well-entrenched
political families lost their grip on power in the last elections. Sadly, this result seems terribly
insignificant in the light of the overall political landscape of the nation as illustrated by the
current composition of the Senate with siblings and scions making up this formerly august
body. In fact, the reality after the election dust settled last May 2013 still shows that at least
55 political families will have each controlled an elective post for 20 to 40 years straight.4
Political clans are still a prominent feature of modern Philippine politics. Political power is
still concentrated on a select segment of the polity that is relatively unchanged. The family
names may have changed, but the quality of those who wield the power has not.

The diagnosis above may be grim. Nonetheless, I believe that Philippine polity is at a
crossroads with regard to political dynasties. We have been bitterly conscious of its evil for a
very long time but it is only now that our anger is nearing cataclysmic point. Yet even with
this disdain brewing in our hearts and minds, we are obviously at a loss on how to rid ourselves
of this colossal problem. In 1986, the supposedly wisest and most patriotic among us actually
had the chance to strike a swift and clean blow against political dynasties. The drafters of the
1987 Constitution were certainly fully aware of the trouble with political dynasties in the
country. In particular, Mr. Jose C. Colayco during the debates on this subject stated, One of
the worst effects of political dynasties is that it breeds graft and corruption. 5

Indeed, no Filipino today is ignorant of the connection of political dynasties to

corruption. The latter has been defined by United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
as an abuse of public power for private benefit through bribery, extortion, influence
peddling, nepotism, fraud, or embezzlement.6 All of these criminal acts are hallmarks of a
political dynasty in the Philippines.

4
KAREN TIONGSON-MAYRINA, 55 political families have unbreakable hold on power, one clan for 43 years,
GMA News Research, July 5, 2013, http://www.gmanetwork.com/ news/ story/ 316096/news/ specialreports/
55-political-families-have-unbreakable-hold-on-power-one-clan-for-43-years, accessed September 6, 2013.
5
Record of the Constitutional Commission of 1986, Volume Four, p940 (September 23, 1986).
6
Jon S. T. Quah (2006), Curbing Asian Corruption: An Impossible Dream?, Current History April 2006, p176.
 According to the historian Francia, the illness that vitiates the body politic above all
is that of corruption.7 And correspondingly, the virus lingering and infecting our socio-
political culture, as it were, is political dynasties. Indeed, the attachment to public office by
political families has been rendered almost unbreakable by the promise of government
largesse. Instead of being the vehicle for civil service, government has essentially become a
cash cow for political dynasties; thereby making the Constitutional declaration that public
office is a public trust, a big fat joke on the Filipino people. 8

But the ramification of government corruption is no joking matter. The World Bank
(WB) has estimated that between the years 1977-1997, the Philippines lost about USD48
billion to corruption.9 Setting aside the complicity of the WB in this unbelievable amount, this
lost money essentially covers only the Marcos10 era corruption. When the Erap11 and GMA12
eras are factored in, the amount would certainly balloon to unimaginable proportions.
Indeed, the scourge of political dynasties is not just about the restriction of political power by
the privileged elite but also of the theft of the peoples money by these select families.

Interestingly, the prime mover behind the inclusion of a provision in the 1987
Constitution on political dynasties, Jose N. Nolledo, provided a simple and practical
summation of why the existence of political dynasties in the Philippine politics needs to be
addressed, to wit:

MR. NOLLEDO. ...In the Philippines, I think it is known to everyone that a person
runs for governor; he becomes a governor for one term; he is allowed two re-
elections under our concept. Then he runs for re-election; he wins. The third
time, he runs for re-election and he wins and he is now prohibited from running
again until a lapse of another election period. What does he do? Because he is
old already and decrepit, he asks his son to run for governor.

In the meantime, he holds public office while the campaign is going on. He has
control; he has already institutionalized himself. His son will inherit the position
of governor, in effect, and then this will go to the grandson, et cetera. The
others who do not have the political advantage in the sense that they have no
control of government facilities will be denied the right to run for public office.

7
Luis H. Francia, A History of the Philippines From Indios Bravos to Filipinos (The Overlook Press, New York,
2010), p317.
8
See Section 1 of Article XI.
9
Above n6.
10
Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos.
11
Former President Joseph E. Estrada.
12
Former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo.
 Younger ones, perhaps more intelligent ones, the poorer ones, can no longer
climb the political ladder because of political dynasty.

It seems to me that the public office becomes inherited. Our government

becomes monarchical in character and no longer constitutional.13

Of course, we know now that this passing of the baton system is not limited to sons
and grandsons but it also includes all children, both legitimate and illegitimate, all spouses,
both the legal and the actual, and nephews, nieces, in-laws, and inaanaks. All are privy to this
exclusive succession process. Unfortunately, even the earnest efforts of Atty. Nolledo were
not enough to muster a decisive and surgical approach against this political ill. What we have
instead is Section 26 of Article II of the Constitution that reads as such:

Section 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public
service and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law.

Unfortunately, it is highly unlikely that Congress will enact a law that will expressly
remove family dynasties from our political system because the reality is, for these privileged
few, the inclination for the preservation of wealth and prestige is quite difficult to overcome.
In fact, I have encountered only one proposed piece of legislation that endeavors to
implement this Constitutional mandate, Senate Bill No. 2649 introduced by Senator Miriam
Defensor-Santiago in January 2011.14 According to Section 3 (a) of this bill, a "Political
Dynasty"

shall exist when a person who is the spouse of an incumbent elective official or
relative within the second civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of an
incumbent elective official holds or runs for an elective office simultaneously
with the incumbent elective official within the same province or occupies the
same office immediately after the term of office of the incumbent elective
official. It shall also be deemed to exist where two (2) or more persons who are
spouses or are related within the second civil degree of consanguinity or affinity
run simultaneously for elective public office within the same province, even if
neither is so related to an incumbent elective official.

Clearly, this definition of political dynasty is limited by territory. With this proposed
law, two brothers can actually run simultaneously in an election in two different territorial

13
Record of the Constitutional Commission of 1986, Volume Four, p731 (September 17, 1986).
14
Last November 22, 2013, the House of Representatives committee on suffrage and electoral reforms
unanimously approved the Anti-Political Dynasty Act of 2013. However, it is still a very long way for this bill to
become a law.
political subdivisions and they will not be considered a political dynasty. The case of the cities
of San Juan and Manila is an interesting demonstration of the insufficiency of this definition.
Whilst the personalities involved are neither bound by blood nor by law, the local executives
of these cities are generally accepted as the matriarch and patriarch of a political dynasty.
And yet even though Metro Manila is not technically a province, they still will not be legally
considered as such under the definition of the aforementioned bill.

However, the key feature of Senator Santiagos bill is the way it proposes to address
political dynasties through direct prohibition. This measure is spelled out in Section 4, to wit:

Section 4. Persons Covered; Prohibited Candidates. - No spouse, or person

related within the second degree of consanguinity or affinity whether
legitimate or illegitimate, to an incumbent elective official seeking re-election
shall be allowed to hold or run for any elective office in the same province in
the same election. In case the constituency of the incumbent elective official is
national in character, the above relatives shall be disqualified from running only
within the same province where the former is a registered voter.

In case where none of the candidates is related to an incumbent elective official

within the second degree of consanguinity or affinity, but are related to one
another within the said prohibited degree, they, including their spouses, shall
be disqualified from holding or running for any local elective office within the
same province in the same election.

In all cases, no person within the prohibited civil degree of relationship to the
incumbent shall immediately succeed to the position of the latter: Provided,
however, that this section shall not apply to Punong Barangays or members of
the Sangguniang Barangay.

This provision is pretty standard. A candidate who is part of a political dynasty as

defined in Section 3 is disqualified to run for office if a co-member in the dynasty is an
incumbent. However, this approach, whilst simple and straightforward, may run in conflict
with established democratic principles such as the right to run and be voted into office. Two
prominent legal minds in the 1986 Constitutional Commission can elucidate this concern.

The late Blas F. Ople cautioned that any prohibition against running for public office
might impinge on the right of suffrage, to wit:

MR. OPLE. What I feel is an inner demand for logic and rationality so that this
provision can be actually attached to some principles of equity without doing
violence to the freedom of choice of the voters because they are entitled to as
broad freedom of choice as the environment can provide and if they want
 somebody to run for office even if he is closely related to someone in office, do
we have the right to curtail the freedom of the voters?15

On the other hand, former COMELEC Chairman Christian S. Monsod argued that
adding another hurdle for those aspiring for elected office contradicts the very idea of people
power and can even be seen as unconstitutional:

MR. MONSOD. ...I just want to say that here we are in this assembly, extolling
people power and saying that the people have a new consciousness and yet not
trusting that they will make the right choice. We want to put a section on
political dynasty on the assumption that there will be violations of the Electoral
Code, that people in power will use their office to elect their children. We
cannot assume that certain sections of this Constitution will be violated and
then try to cover and compensate for them in another section.

We have in this Constitution qualifications of those who seek elective office.

We are adding in this section a disqualification to those who may aspire after
public office, and, in effect, amending the various provisions in this
Constitution, which enumerate the qualifications and disqualifications of the
law.16

Notably, these arguments were made years before Senator Santiago filed her bill. And
yet surprisingly, the good senator in her proposed piece of legislation did not take these into
account. Pertinently though, the Supreme Court has ruled in the case of Quinto vs. COMELEC,
that the right to seek public office, by itself, is not entitled to constitutional protection.17
This doctrine is succinctly clear but it is very difficult to reconcile this with an earlier
determination of the Court in the old case of Aurea vs. Comelec, to wit:

Freedom of the voters to exercise the elective franchise at a general election

implies the right to freely choose from all qualified candidates for public office.
The imposition of unwarranted restrictions and hindrances precluding qualified
candidates from running is, therefore, violative of the constitutional guaranty
of freedom in the exercise of elective franchise. It seriously interferes with the
right of the electorate to choose freely from among those eligible to office
whomever they may desire.18

15
Record of the Constitutional Commission of 1986, Volume Four, p762 (September 18, 1986).
16
Record of the Constitutional Commission of 1986, Volume Four, p939 (September 23, 1986).
17
ELEAZAR P. QUINTO and GERINO A. TOLENTINO, JR. vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. 189698,
February 22, 2010.
18
FELIPE N. AUREA and MELECIO MALABANAN vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, G.R. No. L-24828, September
7, 1965.
 On one end, the Court is clearly for the constitutional protection of the right to run for
public office because it is an integral component of the right of suffrage. Yet, the Court has
implicitly ruled that the right to seek an elected office can be divorced from the broader
concept of elective franchise. As a separate and individual right, it does not actually enjoy
any constitutional guarantees. Whether these two sides contradict each other is up for
debate. But these two rulings from the Supreme Court showed that addressing the problem
of political dynasties might prove to be more intricate than simply direct prohibition.
Before going any further in the discussion, it must be disclosed that the additional
requirement questioned in the Aurea case pertained to property ownership. Therefore, it is
easy to understand the objection against such an imposition, that it is

inconsistent with the nature and essence of the Republican system ordained in
our Constitution and the principle of social justice underlying the same, for said
political system is premised upon the tenet that sovereignty resides in the
people and all government authority emanates from them, and this, in turn,
implies necessarily that the right to vote and to be voted for shall not be
dependent upon the wealth of the individual concerned, whereas social justice
presupposes equal opportunity for all, rich and poor alike, and that, accordingly,
no person shall, by reason of poverty, be denied the chance to be elected to
public office.19

Nonetheless, following the arguments of the late Mr. Ople and Chairman Monsod, I
maintain that a direct and blanket restriction on political dynasties as envisaged by Senator
Santiagos bill could be argued as an unwarranted restriction against the right to run for
public office and by extension, an infringement on the right of suffrage. The principle of equal
opportunity in the abovementioned jurisprudence cannot sanction imposing an electoral
handicap on the poor or the wealthy. Corollary thereto, neither can it justify an encumbrance
on either candidates with political pedigree or those without.

Therefore, legislating against political dynasties has clearly proven to be very tricky.
In the light of the ambivalence relating to democratic rights, remedial action on this problem
can easily vacillate from absolute prohibition to rationalized inaction. Furthermore, merely
enacting a direct prohibition law is not only impossible given the political realities of the
country, but it may also fail to address the root problem of political dynasties.

19
Ibid.
 However, it is absolutely a mistake to think that a direct prohibition is the sole remedy
against this socio-political problem. The crusade against political dynasties certainly does not
end with the demise of Senator Santiagos bill. As a matter of fact, it is precisely the
inadequacy of Section 26 of Article II that justifies subjecting this political conundrum to the
rethinking process from whence practical and viable solutions can be determined. Indeed,
the principle enunciated in the Aurea case, that sovereignty resides in the Filipino people and
all government authority emanates from them, is a clear hint that other remedial measures
are available within the confines of the democratic process.

Historical Review of Political Dynasties

The first stage of the rethinking process springs from the Filipino adage, Ang hindi
marunong lumingon sa pinanggalingan ay hindi makakarating sa paroroonan. It is truly
unfortunate that traditional wisdom has often been dismissed as out-dated and irrelevant.
But I believe that some have a place in scholarly discourse as a potent analytical framework.
A robust examination of the past can certainly result to a better understanding of present
conditions. And a deeper perception of the situation-on-hand can certainly lay down the
correct path towards the attainment of desired results. Accordingly, the rethinking process
is commenced with a historical review of political dynasties.

Family dynasties have been a main feature in Philippine politics for a very long time.
This socio-political phenomenon can be traced to pre-colonial society for the power structure
of the communities of that period was built around blood relations. The leadership of a pre-
Hispanic community rested on the datu. According to the historian Scott, a datu was
expected to govern his people, settle disputes, protect them from their enemies, and lead
them into battle.20 And in return for these responsibilities and services, a datu received
labor and tribute from his people.21

The position of datu could be inherited but unlike the monarchs of feudal Europe, a
datu could make no claims to a divine imprimatur or special access to the heavens, nor

20
William Henry Scott, Barangay Sixteenth-Century Philippine Culture and Society (Ateneo De Manila University
Press, 2004), p130.
21
Ibid.
boasts about having a hotline to God.22 Indeed, community chiefs claim their leadership
position on the basis of their reputation as brave warriors, and not on mere noble lineage. 23
More importantly, a datus ability to retain his office as the ruler of the barangay depended
highly on his performance as a leader.24 Meaning, when warranted by the circumstances, he
could be replaced by the community with a challenger who is more able to deliver the needs
of the barangay.

It is a peculiar feature of our pre-colonial history that powerful clans emerged in

leadership roles during that era underpinned by a social contract. They enjoyed the
advantage of such an elevated social status but also assumed the role of protectorate of the
community. Additionally, it was incumbent upon them to exercise good leadership for to do
otherwise may cause their removal from their privileged position. In a sense, the community
retained the power to choose its ruler but recognized the office of the datu as necessary in
order to preserve peace and maintain order within the barangay. A socio-anthropological
leap, perhaps, but this pre-colonial leadership structure looks like a primitive manifestation
of the republican principle of sovereignty residing in the people and all government authority
emanating from them.

Unfortunately, this organic social democratic arrangement was completely destroyed

during the Spanish colonial period. With the encomienda system in place, the colonial
government utilized the tribal ruling class as their lackeys (i.e. tribute collectors). Those who
embraced their new role became the first among the indigenous population to be Hispanized;
they were rewarded for their loyal servitude with wealth and limited authority, thus
separating them from the rest of their countrymen and leading to a class structure more
pronounced than pre-colonial days.25 The datu class thereafter become the principales and
the barangay evolved into the generic appellation, indios.

This was a fundamental transformation because the principales, unlike their previous
incarnation as datu, functioned not as a community leader but as a servant of the towns

22
Above n6 p33.
23
Above n15 p267.
24
Laura Lee Junker, Raiding, Trading and Feasting: The Political Economy of Philippine Chiefdoms (Ateneo de
Manila Press, 2000), p139.
25
Above n6 p68.
parish priest and constabulary commanding officer. 26 The underpinning social contract was
now gone and the obligation to protect the community with it. More importantly, the power
of the community to choose its own ruler was now lost and has found its way into the hands
of a central authority. Indeed, from a mandate to be earned, authority to govern the
community has now become a commodity that can be bargained for. 27 Consequently, the
principales became a new type of privileged class in Filipino society. This was the point they
became a clique that has learned to see itself as different from the rest of the indio
population.

Not surprisingly, many from the Filipino ruling elite immediately and willingly
collaborated with the Americans when the United States of America replaced Spain as the
nations colonial master, as this was ostensibly the best way to preserve and expand their
local power.28 However, the eagerness of the principales to collaborate with the Americans
was a critical event in our political history. As luck would have it, their almost child-like
acceptance of the new colonizers ideas of modernity and statehood proved to be the seed
out of which grew the political dynasties we see today. According to the noted scholar
Cullinane, the structure and operation of Filipino national politics had its origins in the
municipal and provincial elections of 1901-1902 and in the proliferation of political networks
and alliances that came into being as local elites competed for political power through the
electoral process.29 Moreover, once democratically ensconced in office these new breed of
principales entrenched themselves further through intricate ties with other local elites.30
These words described the political system in the country at the onset of the American
colonial period; ironically, they still ring true for the political system we are enduring today.

It is a painful irony indeed that our nations introduction to the democratic way of life
was actually the point when public office became not just a commodity to barter with, but

26
Apolinario Mabini, The Philippine Revolution, translated into English from Spanish by Leon Ma. Guerrero
(National Historical Institute, 1969), p28.
27
Leon Ma. Guerrero, The First Filipino (Guerrero Publishing Inc., 2010) pp147-147.
28
Patricio N. Abinales, Orthodoxy and History in the Muslim-Mindanao Narrative (Ateneo de Manila University
Press, 2010), p5.
29
Michael Cullinane, Ilustrado Politics Filipino Elite Responses to American Rule, 1898-1908 (Ateneo De Manila
University Press, 2003) p3.
30
Above n23 p8.
also to profit from.31 More importantly, this was the moment when the authority to govern
the nation fell completely under the control of the privileged few. According to Abinales,
Local elites competed for control over local power via elections, and then extended their
power beyond the province into the national arena with the aid of American patrons and
allies.32 Alliances and loyalties gained municipal elites access to national government
largesse.33 This was the political mechanism that paved the way for Quezon, Osmea, and
Roxas to take full control of the nation in Malacaang, the very same method used by others
after them to ascend to power as well as for the 55+ political families to keep their hold on
their supposedly elective offices for the past half-century. Indeed, the Americans brought
with them democratic institutions that we enjoy and are proud of today. Sadly, they also
brought with them the politics of patronage, the bedrock of modern day political dynasties.
Abinales succinctly states, Decentralized patronage politics in the Philippines, begun in the
late Spanish period and routinized in the American ... 34

According to Francia, colonialism is in the Filipinos DNA.35 This is a bold statement

indeed and bears significantly in our rethinking of political dynasties. A review of the
countrys colonial past has unravelled the loss of two extremely valuable indigenous political
traditions. First, the fundamental belief that the rulers have the duty to exercise good
leadership in order to keep their privileged position in the community. Second, the core
principle that it is the community that holds the power to choose its ruler and no one else.
These losses are critical because modern political dynasties actually sprung out from this void
in our political culture. And if this socio-political abyss were now deeply embedded in our
peoples genetic make-up, then clearly enacting a simple direct prohibition law against
political dynasties would never be enough. Consequently, a deeper empirical analysis of this
problem is obviously needed in order to arrive at any meaningful remedial action.

Empirical Analysis of Political Dynasties

31
James Manor, The Political Economy of Democratic Decentralization (The World Bank, 1999) p35 and pp-58-
59.
32
Above n24 p8.
33
Above n23 p151.
34
Above n23 p12.
35
Above n6 p10.
 We know now that putting a definition after political dynasty does not make
formulating countermeasures any easier. Hence, the next stage of the rethinking process has
to do more with identifying the pathology of this socio-political disease than giving it a better
technical meaning. We have seen its evolution in the previous section, now we take a good
look at its inner workings.

For this purpose, I have referred largely on the ground-breaking work of the Asian
Institute of Management Policy Center, An Empirical Analysis of Political Dynasties in the 15 th
Philippine Congress.36 This paper is very significant because political dynasties were
measured by its authors and the results showed that political clans comprise 70 per cent
of jurisdiction-based legislators.37 Meaning, a full majority of the members of the House of
Representatives were found to be part of a political dynasty. Hence, Congress will never enact
a direct prohibition law despite a clear Constitutional fiat.

However, unlike Senator Santiago, the academics at the Asian Institute of

Management (AIM) did not exactly provide a technical definition for political dynasty. They
did agree with the lawmaker that the key feature of this socio-political reality is kinship among
political leaders. In fact, the AIM paper enumerated the extent of some of the more known
political dynasties in the country today.38

1. Former Congressman Ronald Singson and Congressman Ryan Luis Singson are the
children of Governor Chavit Singson; Congressman Ryan Singson was the 2010 Vice
Mayor of Vigan City then its district representative upon the removal of Ronald
Singson from office; Vigan City Mayor Eva Medina is the niece of Governor Chavit
Singson, who is the first cousin of Quezon City Congressman Vincent Crisologo;
Congressman Eric Singson, Jr. and Candon Mayor Allen Singson are the sons of former
Congressman Eric Singson, Sr.; and former Congressman Eric Singson, Sr. is the brother
of Vice Mayor Alfonso Singson and the cousin of Governor Chavit Singson.

2. Congressman Imelda Dimaporo is the mother of Congressman Fatima Dimaporo and

Governor Khalid Dimaporo; Congressman Imelda Dimaporo is the wife of former

36
Ronald U. Mendoza, et. Al, An Empirical Analysis of Political Dynasties in the 15th Philippine Congress (Asian
Institute of Management Working Paper 12-001, 2012).
37
Ibid p1.
38
Ibid p31-32.
 Congressman Abdullah Dimaporo, the son of the patriarch of the Dimaporo dynasty
Mohammad Dimaporo; Congressman Imelda Dimaporo is the sister of Tubod Mayor
Nenita Noval; Maminta Dimakuta is the cousin of former Congressman Abdullah
Dimaporo; Pantao-Ragat Mayor Eleanor Dimaporo Lantud is the cousin of former
Congressman Abdullah Dimaporo; Mayor Eleanor Dimaporos nephew Ulwan
Dimaporo is the Mayor of Sultan Naga Dimaporo; and Ulwan Dimaporos father
Motalib is the Vice Mayor of Sultan Naga Dimaporo.

Interestingly, the AIM paper prefaced its discussion with a salute to democracy,
Political democracies are important because they facilitate and sustain broader and more
inclusive processes of economic and human development.39 Corollary thereto, it is worth
repeating that a democratic political system does not necessarily preclude nor prevent the
existence of political dynasties. In fact, the most renowned and glamorous political family of
all, the Kennedys, thrives in the most liberal democratic nation in the world. Examples closer
to home are Lee Hsien Loong, the current Prime Minister of Singapore and the eldest son of
Singapore's first Prime Minister, Lee Kuan Yew; Yingluck Shinawatra, the first female Prime
Minister of Thailand and the younger sister of the deposed former Prime Minster, Thaksin
Shinawatra; and, Park Geun-hye, the first female President of South Korea and daughter of
the military dictator, General Park Chung-hee. Correspondingly, the paper also proffered the
caveat that underdeveloped democratic institutions could be associated with weak political
participation and thus produce, in some cases, political dynasties. 40
I must emphasize though that the realization that democracy and dynasty are not
mutually exclusive ideas is not the highlight of the AIM study. Indeed, a key finding of the
AIM paper pertains to the connection of poverty to political dynasties for the study shows the
prevalence of lower standards of living, lower human development, and higher levels of
deprivation and inequality in the communities governed by a political dynasty. There are
obvious exceptions to this rule (i.e. the Binays in Makati). And ostensibly, the lack of a family
dynasty does not necessarily lead to a poverty-free local government unit. Nevertheless, the
AIM study has revealed a very disturbing paradox that truly makes political dynasties a
gargantuan crisis to struggle with, to wit:

39
Ibid p2.
40
Ibid.
 a) provinces with lower aggregate levels of health, education, and income tend
to elect dynasties; and/or b) dynasties implement policies and programs
that may not necessarily improve (or possibly lower) aggregate levels of
income, health, and education.41

Following this finding of the AIM study, it appears that the poor Filipinos are the
lifeblood of political dynasties in the Philippines. This realization certainly explains the
simultaneous occurrences of 55+ families holding government authority for the past half-
century and the ever-increasing poverty threshold in the country. For sure, this observation
sheds light on why some public officials who are part of a family dynasty do not actually
implement the necessary programs to improve the lives of their respective constituents,
because to do so may mean eventual expulsion from power. This underhanded scheme
appears less objectionable because family dynasties have done this within the context of the
electoral process. Indeed, on face value, these political clans were democratically elected by
their impoverished parokyanos.

The depressing fact in this gloomy equation is that the people concerned have not
given any incentive at all for their leaders to change their ways. The communities of the 10
political families reported in the PCIJ blog have come to their senses. But those under the
spell of the 55+ have not. So does this unfortunate paradox mean the end of the road in the
battle against political dynasties? The answer of course is, absolutely not. Indeed, the key
phrase to ponder on is underdeveloped democratic institutions and its ramifications vis-a-
vis political dynasties. Therefore, the more appropriate question to ask is, how precisely do
these democratic failures, and by extension political dynasties, adversely impact the socio-
economic outcomes in the country? There are three ways according to the AIM paper, to wit:
First, if the prevalence of political dynasties prevents the majority of the
citizenry from effectively communicating their needs to the government, it
could also prevent the government from appropriately and adequately
responding to social and economic problems. The misrepresentation (or
inadequate representation) of the excluded groups could skew poverty
reduction policies and income redistribution mechanisms, worsen poverty and
income inequality, and ultimately compromise the capacity of the government
to provide the most necessary public goods. Second, democratic institutions
can be further compromised if dynastic officials use the powers of the state for
self-serving interests. Finally, dynasties could skew the selection of political

Ibid p28.
41
 leaders favouring those with influence and prevent the best and the brightest
from serving in government; thus, in turn, result in sub-optimal policy design
and ultimately weaker socio-economic development.42

With this concise explanation, it is immediately obvious that Senator Santiagos line of
attack is immensely inadequate to address the problem of political dynasties. First, the direct
prohibition approach certainly does nothing to encourage Filipinos to effectively
communicate their needs to those in government. Second, while it may prevent the election
of unsavoury characters, it does nothing specific against those already in power from using
the state for self-serving interests. And lastly, a direct prohibition law absolutely does nothing
to reverse the reality of duly elected scions of political clans governing with sub-optimal
policy design.

As previously mentioned, the true scourge of political dynasties is not the instance of
family members simultaneously holding government positions. To harp on this point would
probably be pointless. Moreover, lowering the nations poverty threshold alone may not be
enough to get rid of political dynasties because poverty in the country appears to be both the
result and the reason why political families continue to have practically unabated access to
public office. Indeed, the Philippines now enjoy unprecedented economic growth, but
political families and the concomitant government corruption still persist. Following the
observation of the AIM academics cited above, the root of this problem is definitely buried
much deeper than it seems.

I submit that the pathology of political dynasties lies squarely within a defect in our
political culture. Harkening to our lost indigenous political traditions, this systemic breakdown
is two-fold. First, political leaders who are members or are connected to a family dynasty
have no internal compulsion to exercise good leadership. They go about governance with
neither vision nor mission. At the very least, they hold office with absolutely no clear and
comprehensive development plan for their community. Ad hoc projects such as basketball
courts and medical missions comprise the highlight of their term of office. Worst, they
brazenly use the power of their office for their own benefit. Sadly, there is no need to cite

Ibid p16.
42
examples here. I daresay that most of the 55+ families, if not all, mentioned in the PCIJ blog,
would fall under both categories.

Secondly, the Filipino polity has forgotten how to wield the innate power they possess
over those who must lead them, a situation that has ironically allowed political clans to run
rampant with abusing elected office. Local communities have somehow been easily
manipulated to leave its future in the hands of the political dynasty, with the latter using the
electoral process to legitimize their hold on this power. For how else can authority be held
by 55+ families for such a long period within the democratic context, if not for the inaction
and apathy of the community itself? To be clear, I am not putting the blame for the continued
existence of political dynasties on the shoulders of the Filipino electorate. I am, however,
prepared to assert that Filipinos have rendered themselves powerless in holding their leaders
accountable, even if under the law they are not.

Therefore, I believe the greater challenge posed by political dynasties is the Filipino
politys inability to actualize the dictum, Sovereignty resides in the people and all
government authority emanates from them enshrined in Section 1 of Article II of the
Constitution. The focus of the discourse on political dynasties has been Section 26 and the
absence of its implementing law. I maintain, however, that a more effective way to address
the problem is to find ways to implement the fundamental tenets our pre-colonial forebears
held for centuries. The primordial belief that the ultimate power to rule always belongs to
the community and therefore rulers are continually beholden to them during their
incumbency. The task now is how to channel this indigenous mindset into modern democratic
institutions and to parley this organic principle into concrete political action.

Enforcing Section 1 of Article ll

The rethinking of political dynasties has now led to a return to pre-colonial attitudes.
Specifically, the call now is to recover that spirit of community solidarity or at the very least,
the awareness of it. The goal is now to re-ignite that ancient bayanihan spirit and use its
power to implant in the minds of public officials once more that the principal purpose of their
office is to exercise good leadership. To instil in their heads the constant reminder that those
who wield political power only hold it in trust for the people. Hence, they have to fulfil their
obligations in order to keep this trust.

The challenge with this theory is that its Constitutional imprimatur, Section 1 of Article
II, is a particular provision which public officials cannot be relied upon to enforce. The
principle expressed in this section is the exact opposite of the political reality. This truth is
best exemplified in this current brouhaha concerning the Priority Development Assistance
Fund (PDAF).

The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) has charged a slew of lawmakers and their
accomplices for plunder for using their respective PDAF for their own benefit. Unfortunately
for Senators Juan Ponce Enrile, Jinggoy Estrada, and Ramon Revilla, Jr., they have become the
face of this beleaguered motley crew.43

The filing of the plunder case was the culmination of an extensive investigation
process. Comments made by the principals and by people in their behalf to the media during
this period are most revealing. When asked if lawmakers have the duty of care, as custodians
of a public fund, to ensure that the recipient (typically a non-governmental organizations or
NGO) of their multi-million allocation is a rightful beneficiary, Senator Jinggoy Estrada replied,
"It is not up to the senators to determine whether an NGO is bogus or not.44 "Alangan naman
na kami pa ang magsasabi na, 'Uy, bogus 'yan.' How will we know?"45 The response of the
wife of Senator Ramon Revilla, Jr., Cavite 2nd district Representative Lani Mercado-Revilla, to
a similar line of questioning was crass and characteristic. Her words, "Basta 'wag lang
manghihingi sa amin ang mga tao!" is now a classic in the world-wide web.46

This cavalier attitude displayed by Senator Jinggoy Estrada and via spousal proxy,
Senator Ramon Revilla, Jr., could be either a reaction to the onslaught of disgust from the
general public or a public relations strategy in order to save as much credibility as they can
for the next elections. The nonchalance they have shown, however, is a clear manifestation

43
See GMA News Online, Three senators to be charged with plunder, September 16, 2013 at
http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/326608/news/nation/three-senators-to-be-charged-with-plunder.
44
Ryan Chua, ABS-CBN News, Jinggoy: We're not obliged to check NGOs getting pork, August, 15, 2013. See
http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/focus/08/15/13/jinggoy-were-not-obliged-check-ngos-getting-pork.
45
Ibid.
46
Camille Diola, philstar.com, 'Just don't ask from us!': Lani's defense of pork goes viral, August 21, 2013. See
http://www.philstar.com/headlines/2013/08/21/1116081/just-dont-ask-us-lanis-defense-pork-goes-viral.
of the sense of entitlement public officials now have in their heads. Senator Jinggoy Estradas
quip suggests that public office, or at least the office of the Senator, cannot be bothered to
determine the parameters of their discretion over public money. The people should simply
accept that public officials, like him, are patricians who are beyond reproach. On the other
hand, Congresswoman Lani Mercado-Revillas famous retort to defend both her Senator
husband and their use of the PDAF shows that for her, and maybe by extension for her spouse
as well, constituents are to be perceived as peasants because all they want to do is pester
public officials for dole-outs.

Interestingly, Senator Jinggoy Estrada delivered a fiery privilege speech last

September 25, 2013 wherein he publicly and officially confirmed a fact that all Filipinos know
already and that the PDAF scandal involves practically everyone in Congress. 47 Curiously,
whilst he was trigger-happy in implicating his fellow lawmakers, he did not directly deny his
participation in the unlawful scheme attached to the PDAF.48

Mr. President, I believe that we all here are victims of a flawed system which
is so ingrained that it has been institutionalized. However, the recent events
which unfolded before us have given us the chance to finally reform the system
and do away with the pork barrel mentality.49

Senator Jinggoy Estrada and his lot could hardly be classified as the victims in this
tragedy. And after benefiting for decades from this unjust system, it is utterly shameful of
him to even describe this travesty in our political history as the chance Filipinos have been
waiting for to undertake serious reforms. But he is correct to put on notice the prosecutors
of this plunder charge that they should not be selective in their quest for justice. 50 Indeed,
there are definitely more public officials that need to be held liable for this most grievous
crime.

These claims coming out of the mouths of long established public officials echo the
lament of Atty. Nolledo that political dynasties have transformed elected office into a
monarchy. Therefore, can Filipinos reasonably expect their elected officials to respect Section

47
See http://www.senjinggoyestrada.com/index.php/articles/view/609.html.
48
Ira Pedrasa, ABS-CBNnews.com, Jinggoy blasts 'selective justice'Jinggoy blasts 'selective justice', September
25, 2013. See at http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/nation/09/25/13/jinggoy-blasts-persecution.
49
Above n42.
50
Ibid.
1 of Article II? To carry on with their office guided by its principle? Seeing the leech-like
attachment of members of Congress to their PDAF, the answer isprobably not.

In fact, the PDAF itself is a regrettable progeny of political dynasties because it skews
the lawmakers appreciation of their office mandate. The power of Congress is outlined in
Article VI of the Constitution and none of the 32 sections therein can be interpreted to
sanction the PDAF. Notably, there is no law either that authorizes the existence of PDAF.
Essentially, this payout scheme has been sustained solely by the collusion of the powers-that-
be in the executive and legislative branches of government since 1990.

It is thus another painful irony for the Filipino that the PDAF could even be an
unconstitutional disbursement of public funds, expressed in Section 25 (6) and Section 29 (1)
of Article VI, to wit:

Section 25. (6) Discretionary funds appropriated for particular officials shall be
disbursed only for public purposes to be supported by appropriate vouchers
and subject to such guidelines as may be prescribed by law.

Section 29. (1) No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance
of an appropriation made by law.

It must be pointed out though that there are several petitions pending before the
Supreme Court seeking, among other reliefs, to have the PDAF declared unconstitutional. 51
Notably however, ever since this PDAF scandal broke out many months ago, no elected
member of Congress has ever provided a convincing argument that the PDAF is directly, or
even just remotely, related to their lawmaking duties. 52

With due respect to the principle of sub judice, it is worthy to note that as early as
1994, the relevance of this particular kind of fund afforded to members of Congress in relation
to their legislative duties under the Constitution has been questioned in the case of Philconsa
vs. Enriquez.53 Unfortunately, the Supreme Court failed to provide a direct and clear
disposition of this particular issue but merely provided a cautious and equivocal explanation.

51
See http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/microsite/pdaf/.
52
See Christian V. Esguerra, Philippine Daily Inquirer, 2 lawmakers ask SC to free up PDAF, September 17, 2013
at http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/489699/2-lawmakers-ask-sc-to-free-up-pdaf.
53
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION vs. HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, as Secretary of Budget and
Management, G.R. No. 113105, August 19, 1994.
 The authority given to the members of Congress is only to propose and identify
projects to be implemented by the President. Under Article XlI of the GAA of
1994, the President must perforce examine whether the proposals submitted
by the members of Congress fall within the specific items of expenditures for
which the Fund was set up, and if qualified, he next determines whether they
are in line with other projects planned for the locality. Thereafter, if the
proposed projects qualify for funding under the Funds, it is the President who
shall implement them. In short, the proposals and identifications made by the
members of Congress are merely recommendatory.....

The Countrywide Development Fund attempts to make equal the unequal. It is

also a recognition that individual members of Congress, far more than the
President and their congressional colleagues are likely to be knowledgeable
about the needs of their respective constituents and the priority to be given
each project.54

Pertinently, the question of this special funds bearing on lawmaking functions was
again raised in the case of LAMP vs. DBM55. And yet again, the Supreme Court failed to
provide a clear-cut resolution of this particular issue. It certainly appears that the Court is
deliberately trying to provide an acceptable rationalization for the existence of this special
fund to favor members of Congress, to wit:

..Although the possibility of this unscrupulous practice cannot be entirely

discounted, surmises and conjectures are not sufficient bases for the Court to
strike down the practice for being offensive to the Constitution. Moreover, the
authority granted the Members of Congress to propose and select projects was
already upheld in Philconsa. This remains as valid case law. The Court sees no
need to review or reverse the standing pronouncements in the said case. So
long as there is no showing of a direct participation of legislators in the actual
spending of the budget, the constitutional boundaries between the Executive
and the Legislative in the budgetary process remain intact.

While the Court is not unaware of the yoke caused by graft and corruption, the
evils propagated by a piece of valid legislation cannot be used as a tool to
overstep constitutional limits and arbitrarily annul acts of Congress

Ostensibly, even the imminent threat of graft and corruption contemporaneous with
this special fund would not move the Supreme Court to uphold clear Constitutional

Ibid.
54
55
LAWYERS AGAINST MONOPOLY AND POVERTY (LAMP) vs. THE SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT,
et al., G.R. No. 164987, April 24, 2012.
provisions to protect the public interest. Hopefully, the firm grasp of political dynasties would
no longer stifle the proper disposition of the current cases pending now in its docket.56

Therefore, I firmly believe that the task of giving relevance to Section 1 of Article II in
the Philippine political system belongs to the Filipino polity itself. Actually, I submit that the
responsibility must be borne by two specific institutions within the Philippine politymedia
and civil society.

The news media has to be unrelenting in holding public officials accountable to the
people. For the most part, the Philippine media has not been remiss at all with this
undertaking. The best example for their diligence would be the PCIJ as well as the other
sources of news feeds cited here. Needless to say, the difficulty in performing this mandate
is enormous. The Philippines is ranked as the world's third most dangerous country for
journalists behind Iraq and Somalia.

Of course, other forms of media such as art, literature, film and theater are likewise
called for this crusade. At the start of the American colonial period, nationalist artists
performed plays or seditious dramas to protest against US imperialism. Eight plays in
particular reverberated loudly among the Filipinos and caused such an alarm and grief to the
new colonizers that its authors were literally persecuted as insurrectos.57 Brocka, Bernal,
Portes, and company all made films along these lines in the 1970s-1980s against the
dictatorship. It would certainly help the cause if the writers, artists, and filmmakers of today
produce more seditious works that challenge the political establishment. Films, paintings,
books, among others not only just jar the audience with the harsh conditions of modern
Filipino society, but also exposes the incompetence and wrongdoings of those holding
political power.

At this juncture, social media is worth mentioning. The power of this medium to
influence the minds of public officials has been starkly illustrated in the Occupy Movement,

56
Last November 19, 2013, the Supreme Court issued a resolution declaring the PDAF unconstitutional.
However, as this journal goes to print, this ruling has yet to be final and executory.
57
Ang Tanikalang Guinto and Isang Punlo ng Kaaway by Juan Abad; Kahapon, Ngayon at Bukas by Aurelio
Tolentino; Hindi Aco Patay by Juan Matapang Cruz; Pulong Pinaglahuan by Mariano Martinez; Dahas ng Pilak by
Maximino de los Reyes; Malaya by Tomas Remigio; and, Walang Sugat by Severino Reyes. See Above n24 p117.
Arab Spring, and in our very own mass actions against the pork barrel fund. Even traditional
media outlets and personalities have now utilized this medium as part and parcel of their
work. Certainly, when employed by the right people and for the correct purpose, social media
can readily unravel incompetence and corruption among the ranks of government officials.

In conjunction with sustained efforts from the media industry, the mobilization of civil
society is also very crucial in putting Section 1 of Article II into action. In this regard, I would
like to quote a passage from a book I recently read, South Korea Since 1980, to wit:

Despite the regionalism that dominated voting patterns, a change occurred in

the 2000 elections concerning the role of civil society and its impact on election
outcomes. During the campaign period, the Citizens Coalition for Economic
Justice (CCEJ) published a voters guide that included a list of 167 politicians
who should not be elected because of their involvement in corruption scandals,
opposition to reform policies, or appeals to regionalism for political gain.
Moreover, 460 civil society groups organized Chongseon Yondai (The Citizens
Alliance for the 2000 National Assembly Election) and released a list of
politicians who should not be nominated. After candidates were nominated,
the Chongseon Yondai finalized a list of eighty-six candidates who should not
be elected and campaigned against twenty-two of them. The campaign against
select politicians by Chongseon Yondai significantly affected the election
results, and only seven of the twenty-two against whom Chongseon Yondai
campaigned were elected.58

I chose this specific section of the book because I am not entirely convinced that civil
society in the Philippines are as organized and as fierce as their South Korean counterparts. I
do not mean here the capacity to mobilize mass actions because Filipinos are particularly
sublime in this area. I am more concerned about their capacity to implement an advocacy
program that will run consistently for a sustained period. The political actions in the
Philippines are mostly ad hoc campaign projects such as the Team Patay versus Team Buhay
gimmick of the Catholic Church in the last elections and the Anti-Epal Movement.

I think Philippine civil society groups can also come out with a far-reaching program
that discourages voters from electing candidates who are involved in corruption scandals or
charged with criminal offenses. They certainly have the wherewithal to run a comprehensive
and well-thought campaign to dissuade the electorate from putting into office candidates
who have no long-term development plans for their constituencies; who have no definite

58
Uk Heo & Terence Roehrig, South Korea Since 1980 (Cambridge University Press, 2010) p58.
stand on urgent issues such as climate change, population control, urban development, etc.;
and who are obviously running for office simply to perpetuate their family in power. Filipino
civil society groups can certainly lift the standard of their political actions in scale and
sophistication. They can certainly do better than just hanging streamers and banners with
clever slogans.

CONCLUSION
The rethinking process ends with the recognition that the Filipino polity cannot wait
for public officials, elected and appointed, to act on the problem of political dynasties. Section
26 of Article II will remain dormant as long as the composition of Congress remains as is.
Unfortunately, even legislations that indirectly weaken the hold of political dynasties have so
little chance of ever coming into fruition.

In fact, there are two bills pending now in Congress that can strike a huge blow against
this political bane. The first one is the Freedom of Information Bill (FOI). Fortunately, this
proposed piece of legislation has been certified by the President as urgent. Therefore, its
passage in Congress has gained some traction. The other one is the Full Disclosure Bill filed by
Congresswoman Gerona-Robredo, a first term Representative of the 3rd District of Camarines
Sur. The fact that the said lawmaker is the widow of a political hero indeed bodes well for
the enactment of this bill. Nevertheless, the reality is these bills are still pending before a
Congress that is littered with political families. Quite literally, the fate of these proposed
measures is in the hands of the very people it is seeks to eradicate. In fact, unless civil society
groups and the media put their collective weight behind these bills, their odds of becoming
law are patently not good.

Indeed, the most viable remedial measure against political dynasties available for the
Filipino polity is reintegrating Section 1 of Article II in our political culture. Pursuant thereto,
I deeply believe that for our generation, this PDAF scandal as well as its other current and
future manifestations such as the DAP (disbursement acceleration plan), is the line drawn in
the sand against political dynasties. Accordingly, the polity must not let up in seeing the
petitions pending in the Supreme Court and the plunder cases against Senators Enrile,
Estrada, Revilla, and their cohorts through their proper conclusions.
 And therefore, news outlets, of all forms and sizes, must always have space for these
two legal actions in conjunction with a deeper and more sustained probe on the irregular and
potentially unlawful use of public funds by the current regiment of government officials.
Concomitantly, pundits and columnist of any persuasion must methodically breakdown this
well-entrenched patronage scheme and unmask more public officials who continue to profit
from it. Let the full extent of this syndicate be exposed and the principals placed on the docks
for proper disposal.

Furthermore, artists of all genres must author plays, poems, novels, songs, comedy
shticks, documentaries, and screenplays tackling this unfolding crisis in our political system
not only to record it for posterity but also to fuel the passion of the Filipinos for the crusade
against political dynasties. Correspondingly, civil society groups must likewise be relentless
in monitoring developments in these two cases as well as related events in the broader
political landscape. And with more innovative presentations vigorously keep the polity
involved and invested in this critical juncture of our nation-building efforts. Most important
of all, Pinoy Netizens all over the globe should Twit, FB, and blog as often as they can about
this crucial episode in our countrys history.59 No insight is mundane; no comment is
irrelevant. Those holding political power must feel the wrath of the Filipinos.

Essentially, the plan is to bombard all branches and agencies of government from
every angle and via all available legitimate means until both the legislature and executive
relent and first, scrap the PDAF, DAP or whatever form it may take without any conditions or
concessions attached; then, recognize that this was an unlawful pay-out scheme; and finally,
hold those who profited from it accountable down to the last centavo. In other words, let the
syndicate (a.k.a. political dynasties) unravel in the face of this intense community pressure.
For truly, this particular battle is the Filipinos Rubicon to cross where hopefully at the other
side, we shall regain the power over those who rule us. And from whence, genuine political
reform in the polity shall be undertaken under the dictate of this truismPeople should not
be afraid of their governments. Governments should be afraid of their people.60

59
See Arianne Munar, ABS-CBNnews.com, Netizens weigh in on plunder case vs lawmakers, September 17,
2013 at http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/nation/09/17/13/netizens-weigh-plunder-case-vs-lawmakers.
60
This is a quotation from the movie V for Vendetta.