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IDEOLOGY, TECHNOLOGY AND
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT*
M.V. Naidu
Political Science, Brandon University
Brandon, Manitoba, Canada
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consumer products, an appeal to 'materialistic' and acquisitorial aspects of
human conduct, and an omission of rational, long range societal commit
ments."4 The doctrines of these models postulate that: "If every effort is
bent to developing an internally owned and controlled heavy industrial
base, the assumption is that development is within the reach of all." Thus
industrialization has come to be the one and only means of creating and
sustaining material abundance in terms of quantity. Quantitative change at
one point leads to qualitative change.
What is science-technology?5
In modern English the term techne has come to mean human skill in
general. Therefore, technology, in a general sense, is a set of skills,
knowledge and procedures for making, using and doing useful things. In
a specific sense, technology refers to the instruments and processes of
mechanization and manufacturing in modem industry. In this sense it is
'physical' or 'material' technology.
Material technology has four aspects: (1) tools, i.e., the machines of
manufacture; (2) skills, i.e., the capabilities acquired through education
and training to operate the tools and machines; (3) techniques, i.e., the
methods of using the tools for certain specific ends; and (4) science and
technology of technicology,6 i.e., the systematized study of principles
involved in mechanization, techniques, and fundamental sciences that are
relevant to research and development (R & D).
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The material/environmental conditions of the pre-industrial society
needed simple technology and simplified knowledge in natural sciences.
But new discoveries and inventions necessitated special tools, processes
and energy. Advancing technology needs new scientific knowledge in
physics, chemistry, mathematics and metallurgy. In short, advanced
sciences necessitate advanced technology, and vice versa. At their ad
vanced stages, science and technology become extremely interdependent
and mutually nourishing. As technology advanced further, it almost totally
absorbed pure sciences, both theoretical and applied. So today the term
technology should really mean science-technology.
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minimum. Socialism concedes certain rights to the state to correct in
fringements and injustices against individuals and groups. The Commu
nist system in the Soviet Union considered itself a dictatorship of the
proletariat; the Soviet state represented and exercised the authority of this
dictatorship. Fascism openly proclaims statism; in the name of the state,
fascism postulates the absolute authority of the leader supposed to have
been chosen by God, or nature or destiny.
In spite of the differences outlined above, all the four ideologies share
certain common goals and methods. All the Western ideologies seem to
agree on two fundamental economic goals:
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In pursuit of these main goals, the Western countries, irrespective of
their professed ideological commitments, have arrived at certain common
sub-goals:
In short, all the Western ideologies agree upon the goals of materialism
and economic affluence. They also concur on the methodology of
technologicalization. What the Western ideologies disagree about are
certain sub-goals and certain secondary methods that involve questions
like Who should own material wealth individuals, groups or state?
How should wealth be distributed by individuals or government? Who
should have political control over the state a particular race, religion,
class or party? What should be the rationalization for militarization
defending capitalist democracy, or proletarian democracy or the divinely
ordained dictatorship?
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guided missiles besides affecting military strategies have affected
political choices and policies. To this day the intimate interdependency
between industrialization and militarization, forged at the dawn of indus
trial progress, has continued without disentanglement or abatement. This
relationship was best described by Eisenhower in his phrase "the
military-industrial complex." Unfortunately, this phrase does not mention
technology as an entity in itself and thus, even at the time of its utterance
it was somewhat obsolete, because by the middle of the 20th century the
role of science-technology or simply technology had become too impor
tant not to be identified and specified as such. Since Eisenhower's time, the
part played by technology has been further enhanced through dramatic
developments of nuclear and space science-technology, besides the revo
lutions caused by cybernetics, computers and the silicone chip. So it would
be appropriate to make historically accurate and to update the Eisenhower
phrase to read "the technological-industrial-military complex," imply
ing that technology has resumed the role of master and guide for industry
and military in shaping and controlling the economic and political realms.
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(2) independent decision-making with reference to the relevant activi
ties where this mechanical decision-making is faster and more
accurate than human decision; and
(3) utilization of man-made energy, generated through indirect exploi
tation of natural resources, that produces more power than human
energy.
The main factors that lead to mass production are the following:
(2) No sooner are the machines invented, then they are utilized for
producing economic goods and military weapons. Thus science-technol
ogy leads to and boosts mass industrialization and mass militarization.
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(3) As mechanization advances, machines become bigger and better,
demanding more and more energy. Bigger machines and vast supplies of
energy mean mass production, i.e., a tremendous increase in society's
productive capacity in the economic sense and destructive capacity in the
military sense.
(6) For the rush towards mass production and massive profits, the
productive unit has to pay some costs in terms of capital, research, skills,
infrastructure, etc. The entrepreneur seeks compensation for these costs by
increasing his profit ratio in two specific ways either by increasing
prices for goods produced or by selling more products at a lower profit
margin (i.e., the so-called economy of scale) or by a combination of both
these methods. The economy of scale principle makes two contradictory
promises it promises lower prices to the consumer and higher profits to
the producer. While the expectation of profits was fulfilled by mass
production, the promise of decreased prices for the consumer was never
actually kept. The prices of food, clothing, housing, medicine and enter
tainment have constantly risen during the last 100 years of mass produc
tion. New variables appear (like packaging, advertising, monopolization,
etc.) that continually boost the costs higher and higher. However, mass
production in military industries has been the most profitable because in
this business the demand never subsides, while the purchasers least inhibit
price-boosting.
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(8) Mass production is impossible without mass consumption. Mass
consumption has been achieved in three ways. Firstly, by constantly
discovering new customers, i.e., more and more people within the society
must consume products. However, the biggest markets for European
industries were the millions of peoples in the empire who became captive
customers. Two-thirds of mankind in the colonies of Asia, Africa and the
Americas were forced to consume Western products at dictated prices.
Secondly, by persuading customers, both within and without the country,
of the need to buy a greater number as well as a greater variety of products,
e.g., not just one car, but two or three; and not just cars but trailers, campers,
motorcycles, etc. Humans are turned into consumers. Thirdly, by manu
facturing products with limited life-expectancy, consumers are obliged
constantly to purchase replacements and replacement parts. From the new
technology arises a system of "built-in obsolescence."
(9) The search for millions of customers in all parts of the country and
around the world necessitates the process of advertising on a mass scale.
Thus a new and enlarged media of communications had to be developed.
Printing, publishing, radio, television, telephone, telephoto, telegraph,
telex, fax, films, computers and satellites have been the products of
modern science-technology. Without these new media of mass communi
cation, mass production could not have been accomplished. The new
technology of mass communications has not only facilitated mass economy
and mass militarization, but also the manipulation of the attitudes, ideas,
aspirations, values and behaviour of masses, thereby leading to mass
indoctrination and the creation of mass culture, mass ideologies, mass
politics, mass control, mass coercion and massive conflicts.
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(11) The technology of mass economy could not be initiated, sup
ported, expanded, and managed without huge and powerful organizations.
Cartels and monopolies were set up to pool capital, technology and skill,
giving rise to so-called Big Capital, Big Business, Big Labour, Big
Science-Technology, Big Transportation and Communications etc. Thus
modem industrialization that leads to mass production, monopolization,
and mass management, constantly needs new technologies to work the
mass economy.
10
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The charter of radical individualism provided in the Soviet constitution
had no more value than that of the paper on which it was printed. Thanks
to technology, the Soviet Union became one of the two most industrialized
and militarized systems in the world. Soviet development had been greatly
facilitated by the colonial exploitations of the peoples of the regions within
the USSR and of those on its eastern and western borders. Far from
initiating the process of "the withering away" of the state, the Soviet
system had evolved into something quite the opposite a totalitarian
state. The evolution was a subtle one. On one side, in the name of the
revolutionary proletariat, the Communist Party, actually an organization
of functionaries and not revolutionaries, had taken over the power; in the
name of the Party, the Central Committee, made up of aged party and
government bureaucrats, had taken over the power; in the name of the
Central Committee, the Party Secretary General had taken over the power;
thus the Secretary General had become the proletariat. While on the other
side, in the name of the state, the federal cabinet had taken over the state
power; in the name of the cabinet, the Prime Minister had taken over all
state power; in the name of the proletariat, the Party Secretary General had
taken over the Prime Ministership. Thus the Party leader had become the
Party, the proletariat and the State. Dictatorship of the proletariat had come
to mean the dictatorship of the Party leader. In short, the Soviet communist
system was a totalitarian state under the personality cult of a dictator.
Compared to the modem totalitarian dictatorship, old dictatorship had
serious limitations because the tools, techniques and weapons of coercion
and control the old dictators had at their command had serious limita
tions.12
But more dramatic and unexpected has been the outcome of the
American individualism-capitalism ideology. America is not only the
world's most industrialized and militarized state, but also the most
powerful imperial state of history. Through its domestic colonialism it
exploited and absorbed all resources and peoples in its expanded territories
in the West, North and South; through its neocolonialism over Latin
America and many parts of Africa and Asia, the US has amassed great
economic, military and political power. However, individual freedoms in
capitalist America of today are seriously curtailed in certain aspects,
il
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instead of having been expanded, by the growth of monopolies and the
greatly enhanced role of the state. Free enterprise has now come to mean
monopoly controls by corporations that depend upon state laws and
subsidies; freedom of the press has come to mean freedom for the press
owners and media monopolies; citizens' freedom from government coer
cion has become freedom for the FBI, the CIA and the UnAmerican
Activities Committee under McCarthyism, to use coercion and terror in
the name of anti-subversion and anti-communism; freedom of the voters
has come to mean freedom for the rich to spend millions of dollars
manipulating voters' choices; the indirectly elected presidency that was to
be counterbalanced by the Congress has now become the directly elected
constitutional dictatorship that can overwhelm the Congress. In the US
today the role of the state has grown beyond all expectations of its
founding-fathers. The state regulates, controls and affects the life of its
citizens from birth to death, from morning to night, and from every angle
of human existence in every sphere of human activity. State intervention
comes in many forms and under many excusescultural encouragement,
moral improvement, social harmony, political safeguards, military secu
rity, protection against subversion and communism, economic stability,
and public interventions through government grants, subsidies, special
assistance, write-offs, tax-concessions, and welfare programmes. In short,
the nominal-minimal role of the state has become quasi-totalitarian control
by the state. The difference between the US and the USSR had become a
difference of degree, and not of kind. No two deadly enemies resembled
each other more than the American state and the Soviet state. Why?
Because not only do both capitalism and communism advocate material
ism and economic affluence, but both also use basically the same or similar
instruments of industry and science-technology. That is, technology has
corroded, de facto, all significant distinctions between the ideologies of
capitalism and communism. The features of state capitalism in the Soviet
Union and of the welfare capitalism in America had become similar, in
essence, to the features of democratic socialism that have evolved in
Britain and the Scandinavian states. But full scale industrialization has
been limited or curtailed out of choice in Scandinavia, and out of necessity
in Britain. In all these countries, however, militarization is still an
important sector of the economy, and autocratization is still an important
trend in state management.
12
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were the best and most blatant examples of totalitarian states that were the
products of nigh industrialization, technologicalization, militarization,
colonialization, and governmentalization, and that attempted to build
permanent great empires in the name of nation, race or religion. Thus,
fascist totalitarianism without technology is inconceivable.
What if the society does not want too many material goods or too much
economic affluence? Naturally, such a society should not resort to modern
technology. That is to say, economic aims of the society prescribe the ends,
and technology constitutes the means. In this context then, societal goals
and ideology should determine the choice of technology, its characteristics
and parameters. Historically speaking, that is what happened in the early
phase of technological evolution. Materialistic ideologies were motivat
ing Western societies to develop, build and use every means and method
available for increasing productivity; technology became the relevant
instrument of economic growth. Thus, a straight-forward and logical
equation would be that ideology should determine technology; the ends
should determine the means. This principle was applicable during the 19th
century when political doctrines were strongly "prescriptive and constitu
tive." But under the impact of 20th century technology, doctrines have
13
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become merely "explicative and justifying;" they no longer prescribe
ends.14 Why? Because the methodology and the technology that the
Western ideologies have evolved, have altered the role of ideology.
14
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popular feelings or democratic urges. The very processes of
technologicalization, industrialization and militarization necessi
tate centralization and monopolization rather than unitization of
interests and decentralization of decision-making; they lead to
autocratization of political power and not democratization.
In the light of the various devices and experiments carried out by the
Western countries at different states of their development, it can now be
stated that for the attainment of the above-mentioned goals and the
applications of the above-mentioned methods, the only appropriate tech
nology will be the one that is based on the following elements:
All the Western states have resorted to some or all of these technologies,
openly or secretly, whole-heartedly or half-heartedly, as a right or as an
15
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excuse, as an initiative or as a retaliation.
Ideologies may not only advocate economic growth, but they may also
proclaim non-materialistic goals like liberty, equality and fraternity, and
may institute democratic structures that would lead to or crystallize
freedom and fellowship. But the impact of economic goals has been so
profound and overwhelming that all other non-economic aims become
subordinated. In other words, the aims and interests related to industriali
zation supersede all other non-economic interests. According to Jacques
Ellul, technological civilization has come to mean civilization of technol
ogy, by technology and for technology.16
Karl Marx had proclaimed that technology would liberate the workers
from the oppression of capitalism, and technology remains central to the
Marxist theory of production.17 Firstly, by producing material abundance,
technology (when controlled by socialist state) would improve the stand
ard of living for the workers, thereby saving humanity from the scandalous
servitude to poverty and nature. Secondly, in a socialist society, over
production through advanced technology and automation would liberate
workers for creative work in all areas of culture science, sports, art,
music, literature, etc. This involvement in creative work is the best
guarantee to end workers' alienation.18 Thus technology can activate the
"Kingdom of Freedom" for mankind. In fact, one Marxist technologist
argues that capitalism and modern technology belong together.19 The
opposite view is taken by the neo-Marxist Herbert Marcuse. According to
Marcuse, "The liberating power of technology the instrumentalization
of things is perverted into a fetter of liberation; it becomes the
instrumentalization of man."20 While Marx viewed freedom as an inevita
ble consequence of economic development, economic realities of today
have become so wedded to science-technology that they render freedom an
impossibility. "Technology and freedom cannot coexist; they exist in a
permanent condition of dialectical tension."21 Scientific-technology, as
production power, has become an ideology of "Historical totality."
According to Fredrich G. Junger, Marx failed to understand the machine
and technological development because he approached technology from a
purely economic perspective. Technology is not governed by the laws of
economics.22 Pointing out Marx's error in understanding technology,
Jacques Ellul argues that technology has conquered economy and has
gradually made humanity subordinate to itself. And that is a logical
development, not a dialectical one.
16
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Some contend that technology is a neutral, value-free means to achieve
goals prescribed by humans and their ideologies. This is a mistaken view.
Modern technology has an absolute and imperialistic character. Heidegger
believes that we miss the essence of technology if we regard it as a neutral
(5) Monism, i.e., technology does not permit or tolerate other forces,
truths, or gods to prevail;
17
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has created its own "technical morality." (Marx himself made a distinction
between a machine and the use to which it is put, implying certain
neutrality for technology.)24 The notion of autonomy also includes the
principle that anything that is technically possible ought to be done, which
means that no other consideration or interest should prevail over, inhibit,
or stop technology.25
The critical issue now is: Is this the ideal or the desirable situation? If
it is not, then a number of other questions arise. Should this equation be
reversed before it is too late? Should ideology reassess the situation and
reassert itself? Should technology be reduced to its original status of being
the means? What is appropriate technology is it appropriateness that is
relevant to the ideology in general or to Western ideologies of develop
ment in particular?
According the Jacques Ellul, there are two ways through which the
dangers of technological domination may be met: (a) citizens' realization
that they are being robbed of their freedom by both the material technology
and the human technology; and (b) policies for "de-ideologization" and
"de-sacralization" of technology. "As long as man worships technique,"
says Ellul, "there is as good as no chance at all that he will ever succeed
in mastering it."28
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The Third World Development and Modern Technology
The historic decolonialism process began in the post war period, starting
with Indian independence. Becoming independent from Western domina
tion, some countries of the Third World chose blindly to adopt the Western
ideologies of communism and capitalism, e.g., China, Cuba, North Korea,
and North Vietnam chose the Communist ideology, while South Vietnam,
Pakistan, the Philippines, Liberia, Kenya, Venezuela, etc., proclaimed that
they would emulate the American capitalist model. But most of the newly
independent countries chose to follow the model set up by India "a
socialistic pattern of society,"29 an odd mixture of Gandhism and Nehruism,
that claimed to attempt a unique experiment of combining economic
revolution with democracy, an experiment never tried in history before.30
Though India and most other Third World countries started rejecting
Western models of development, the question to be asked now (after 3-4
decades) is have these countries been faithful to their original inten
tions? Have their latest economic policies and programmes remained
consistent with their original ideological pronouncements? I submit that
consciously or unconsciously, deliberately or thoughtlessly, most Third
World countries are drifting away from their original ideologies.31 They
seem to have accepted blindly and totally, the Western ideology of
unlimited materialism, industrialism and militarism. The Western experts
seem to have convinced leaders of the Third World that progress is
unilinear and that the Western models of development are, in some sense,
the products of evolutionary progress.32 The ruling elites in the developing
countries either do not realize or refuse to reveal to their peoples that the
Third World countries can never become materially rich like the developed
Western states, nor is it desirable to be so materialistic in values, a fact that
is now being realized in the industrialized West itself.
The most fundamental reason for the deviation of the Third World from
its own ideologies lies in the fact that the leaders of the Third World falsely
believe that Western technologies can help them attain their own ideologi
cal goals. So they have resorted to wholesale transfer of technology from
the West to the Third World. According to a UNESCO report, "At the
present time the transfer of technology to the developing countries is
unprecedented in its scope, rapidity and urgency, and implies such radical
changes that some countries regard it... a form of cultural aggression."33
Most of this transfer of technology has been through the instrumentality
of the so-called foreign aid. An important condition and component of
19
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foreign aid has been military aid. In the words of the 1980 Report of the
Brandt Commission: "Some Third World countries have substantially
boosted their armaments, encouraged by arms producing countries ... It
is terrible irony that the most dynamic and rapid transfer of highly
sophisticated equipment and technology from the rich to the poor countries
has been in the machinery of death."34 Western technologies have evolved
in different historical, cultural, economic and political circumstances; the
nature, the types, the qualities and the costs of Western technologies are
unsuitable to the Third World; more than that, the disastrous results of
Western technologies are threatening all mankind. For all these reasons, I
submit that contemporary Western technologies are either irrelevant, or
inappropriate, or undesirable for the Third World of today.
The Third World countries have not yet realized that by accepting,
inviting or copying Western technology, they are importing Western
ideologies as well, even while they deny or remain unconscious of such
importation. They are unaware of the impact of science and technology
upon their native philosophies, religions and cultures.35 The historical
evidence is that similarity of technology has been eliminating even the
secondary differences between Western ideologies of capitalism, social
ism, communism and fascism. If the Third World still insists on maintain
ing a separate identity for its ideologies, then the answer lies in the Third
World devising, selecting and adapting technologies most appropriate to
their ideologies. The West cannot and should not be expected to be so
unselfish and generous as to design, create and cater to the special needs,
economies and ideologies of the Third World, irrespective of the cost
involved for the West. Therefore, all attempts and pleas at Western
supplies of technologies appropriate to the Third World are unrealistic,
untrustworthy, inappropriate and unhelpful.36 What the Third World needs
is not an "appropriate" technology supplied by the West, but an "alternate"
technology created by the Third World on the principles of self-reliance,
self-sufficiency and self-management. The new ideologies of the Third
World demand a new approach to technologies, and not the 100 year old
technological approaches of the West.
20
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Gandhism proposes the ideology that is most appropriate to the Third
World. It is based upon non-materialistic humanism; a non-industrial and
non-technological economy; non-colonial, non-exploitative inter-group
relationships; decentralized and de-govermentalized political organiza
tions; and non-militaristic, non-violent social systems. Gandhism is also
the only ideology that sets up the most appropriate technology for the
attainment of egalitarianism based on material minimums and indigenous
self-sufficiency. Gandhian technology is built upon local socio-economic
resources, agriculture, cottage industries, labour-intensive productivity
and economic self-sufficiency. The indigenous technology is aimed to be
locally created, managed and regulated so as to produce local self
reliance.38
NOTES
1. The origin of the term ideology is attributed to a French scholar named Destutt d
T racy ( 1754-1836), and his followers, the Ideologues popularized the term. See Leon
Baradat, Political Ideologies: Their Origins and Impact (Englewood Cliffs, Prentice
Hall, 1979), pp. 30-32,33-34. Also, David Sills (ed.), International Encyclopedia o
the Social Sciences, Vol. 7 & 8 (New York: Macmillan, 1972), pp. 76-78.
Karl Marx and Frederick Engels developed the first theory of ideology. To them
ideology was simply a political illusion produced by the social experience of a class
See Lyman Sargent, Contemporary Political Ideologies (Illinois: The Dorsey Press
1981), p. 3.
2. Cf. Plano & Greenberg, The American Political Dictionary (Illinois: The Dryden
Press, 1972), p. 10.
3. Willy Brandt (Chairman), The Report of the Independent Commission on Interna
tional Development Issues, North-South: A Program for survival (Cambridge: MIT
Press, 1980), p. 24.
4. Irving L. Horowitz, "The Search for a Developmental Ideal: Models for their
Utopian Implications," in William Beling and George Totten, Developing Nations:
Quest for a Model (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1970), p. 91.
5. The word technology is derived from the Greek word "techne". Techne was also
related to "episteme" (scientific knowledge) and"poiesis" (creativity and artisanship).
Thus to the Greeks, techne had many meanings: all human activities including skills,
art and science. CfEgbert Schuurman, Technology and the Future: A Philosophical
Challenge (Toronto: Wedge Publishing Foundation, 1980), p. 5. Also, International
Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, op. cit., p. 675-77.
6. Schuurman, op. cit., p. 377.
7. Schuurman talks of five factors that limit technological development: 1. Individu
ality of the natural materials and energies employed; 2. the milieu consisting of
factors like temperature, pressure, etc; 3. the special characteristics of the techno
21
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logical "operators" (tools) employed; 4. the freedom ofthe laborers; and5. different
tastes and desires of consumers. Op. cit., p. 28-29.
8. Friedrich G. Juenger, The Failure of Technology (Chicago: Henry Regenery, 1956),
p. 136-37.
9. Roger BurYmgame Backgrounds of Power (New York: Charles Scribner's 1949),p.
15.
10. Jean Meynaud, Technocracy (New York: The Free Press, 1968), p. 193, 224-25.
11. Jacques Ellul, The Technological Society (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1967), p. 333.
12. Cf., Carl J. Friedrich & Abigniw Brzezinski, Totalitarian Dictatorship & Autocracy
(Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1956). Also Brzezinski, Ideology and
Power in Soviet Politics (New York: Praeger, 1967).
13. Herbert Marcuse, One Dimensional Man: The Ideology of Industrial Society
(Boston: Beacon, 1964).
14. Ellul, op. cit., p. 281-82.
17. Alvin Gouldner, The Two Marxisms (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), p.
267.
18. George Klaus, Kybernetik inphilosphischer Sicht (Berlin: VEB Deutscher Verlag,
1961).
19. Klaus, Kybernetikund Gessellschaft (Berlin: VEB Deutscher Verlag, 1964), p. 304.
20. Cited in Schuurman, op. cit., p. 254.
21. Ibid., p. 157.
22. Friedrick G. Juenger, Maschine und Eigentum (Frankfurt: Verlag Klostermann,
1953), p. 227.
23. Martin Heidegger, Die Technik un die Kehre (Pfullinger: Neske, 1962), p. 5. Cited
in Schuurman, op. cit., p. 87.
25. Erich Fromm, The Revolution of Hope: Toward a Humanized Technology (T oronto:
Bantam Books, 1969), p. 33.
26. Habermas, op. cit., p. 94.
27. A Scientific American Book, Technology and Economic Development (New York:
Alfred Knopf, 1963), p. 17.
29. The ideology was formally declared in a resolution at the Avadi session of the
Congress Party in January 1955. Also see Planning Commission, Government of
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India, Second Five Year Plan (New Delhi: 1956), p. 24.
30. Economic revolution came to the Soviet Union in 60 years but without democracy;
though limited, democracy in Britain and America took 100-200 years to bring about
economic development. Even in these two countries democracy was seriously
limited during the early phase of economic development. Thus rapid development
and full-fledged democracy have never been combined.
In recent years Gorbachev attempted introducing political freedom without eco
nomic freedom; Deng in China tried economic liberalization without political
liberalization. Both experiments are still in serious trouble. The moral seems to be
that in the contemporary world political and economic democratization should go
hand in hand, however slow or difficult the progress may be.
31. See Asa Briggs, "Technology and Economic Development", in Technology and
Economic Development, op. cit., p. 17.
32. See Richard Appelbaum, Theories of Social Change (Chicago: Markham Publish
ing, 1971), p. 15-17.
33. UNESCO, Moving Towards Change (Paris: UNESCO, 1976), p. 70.
34. Brandt Commission Report, op. cit.
35. Cf., Peter Bowler, "Will Science and Technology bring conflict within Third World
Cultures?" Science Forum (Ottawa), Vol. 10, No. 3, June 1977, p. 12-13.
36. Cf., M.V. Naidu, "The Western Model of Development Its relevancy, feasibility
and desirability for the Third World," paper presented at the XI World Congress of
IPSA, Moscow (USSR), August 1979.
37. Cf., M.K. Gandhi, Economic and Industrial Life and Relations, Vol. I, II, and III,
(Ahmedabad, India: Navajivan Publishing, 1957).
, Political and National Life and Affairs, Vol. I, II, and III,
(Ahmedabad: Navajivan, 1967).
, Industrialize and Perish? (Ahmedabad: Navajivan, 1966).
Gopinath Dhawan, The Political Philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi (Ahmedabad:
Navajivan, 1951).
Viswanath P. Varma, The Political Philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi and Sarvodaya
(Agra, India: Lakshmi Narain Agarwal Educational Publishers, 1959).
Shriman N. Agarwal, The Gandhian Plan of Economic Development (Bombay:
Padma Publications, 1944).
38. To remain relevant to the main thrusts of this paper, I have only touched upon the
Third World ideologies and their attempts at economic development, the elaboration
of which will require another paper.
Elsewhere I have applied Gandhian perspectives to analyze the modern industrial
state. See "Gandhian Perspectives on Modern Industrial State," Peace Research,
Vol. 18(3), Sept. 1986, p. 9-16,70-74; "Gandhian Perspectives on Modern Ideolo
gies on Industrialism," Peace Research, Vol. 19(2), May 1987, p. 33-45; "Gandhian
Vision of the Ideal Political Society," Peace Research, Vol. 19(3), Sept. 1987, p. 68
81 ; and "Gandhian Practical-Idealism and the Transitional State," Peace Research,
Vol. 20(1), Jan. 1988, p. 23-63.
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