Republic of the Philippines

Congress of the Philippines

Metro Manila

Twelfth Congress
Third Regular Session

Begun and held in Metro Manila, on Monday, the twenty-second day of July, two thousand three.

Republic Act No. 9255 February 24 2004

AN ACT ALLOWING ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN TO USE THE SURNAME OF THEIR FATHER,

AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE ARTICLE 176 OF EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 209, OTHERWISE
KNOWN AS THE "FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES"

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:

SECTION 1. Article 176 of Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the Family Code of the Philippines, is
hereby amended to read as follows:

"Article 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their
mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. However, illegitimate children may use
the surname of their father if their filiation has been expressly recognized by the father through the record of
birth appearing in the civil register, or when an admission in a public document or private handwritten
instrument is made by the father. Provided, the father has the right to institute an action before the regular
courts to prove non-filiation during his lifetime. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half
of the legitime of a legitimate child."

SECTION 2. Repealing Clause. All laws, presidential decrees, executive orders, proclamations, rules and
regulations, which are inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

SECTION 3. Effectivity Clause. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days from its publication in the Official
Gazette or in two (2) newspapers of general circulation.

Approved,

FRANKLIN DRILON JOSE DE VENECIA JR.

President of the Senate Speaker of the House of
Representatives

This Act which is a consolidation of House Bill No. 4437 and Senate Bill No. 2510 was finally passed by the House of
Representatives and the Senate on January 21, 2004 and February 4, 2004, respectively.

OSCAR G. YABES ROBERTO P. NAZARENO

Secretary of Senate Secretary General
House of Represenatives

Approved: February 24 2004

 GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
President of the Philippines

Republic of the Philippines

Congress of the Philippines
Metro Manila

Fourteenth Congress
Third Regular Session

Begun and held in Metro Manila, on Monday, the twenty-seventh day of July, two thousand nine.

REPUBLIC ACT. NO. 9858

AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE LEGITIMATION OF CHILDREN BORN TO PARENTS BELOW

MARRYING AGE, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, AS
AMENDED

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:

Section 1. Article 177 of Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the "Family Code of the Philippines", as
amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:

"Art. 177. Children conceived and born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of conception of the former,
were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other, or were so disqualified only because either or both of
them were below eighteen (18) years of age, may be legitimated."

"Art. 178. Legitimation shall take place by a subsequent valid marriage between parents. The annulment of a voidable
marriage shall not affect the legitimation."

Section 2. Implementing Rules. The civil Registrar General shall, in consultation with the chairpersons of the
Committee on Revision of Laws of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Youth, Women and Family
Relations of the Senate, the Council for the Welfare of Children, the Department of Justice (DOJ), the Department of
Foreign Affairs (DFA), the office of the Supreme Court Administrator, the Philippine Association of Civil Registrars
(PACR) and the UP Law Center, issue the necessary rules/regulations for the effective implementation of this Act not
later than one (1) month from its effectivity.

Section 3. Repealing Clause. All laws, presidential decrees, executive orders, proclamations and/or administrative
regulations which are inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby amended, modified, superseded or
repealed accordingly.

Section 4. Effectivity Clause. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its complete publication in the Official
Gazette or in at least two (2) newspapers of national circulation.

Approved,

JUAN PONCE ENRILE PROSPERO C. NOGRALES

President of the Senate Speaker of the House of Representatives
This Act which is a consolidation of House Bill No. 5279 and Senate Bill No. 3111 was finally passed by the House of
Representatives and the Senate on October 13, 2009.

EMMA LIRIO-REYES MARILYN B. BARUA-YAP

Secretary of the Senate Secretary General House of Representaives

Approved: DEC 20, 2009

GLORIA MACAPAGALARROYO
President of the Philippines

GRACE M. GRANDE, Petitioner, v. PATRICIO T. ANTONIO, Respondent.

DECISION

VELASCO JR., J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, assailing the July 24, 2012 Decision1
and March 5, 2013 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. CV No. 96406.

As culled from the records, the facts of this case are:

Petitioner Grace Grande (Grande) and respondent Patricio Antonio (Antonio) for a period of time lived
together as husband and wife, although Antonio was at that time already married to someone else. 3 Out of
this illicit relationship, two sons were born: Andre Lewis (on February 8, 1998) and Jerard Patrick (on
October 13, 1999).4 The children were not expressly recognized by respondent as his own in the Record of
Births of the children in the Civil Registry. The parties relationship, however, eventually turned sour, and
Grande left for the United States with her two children in May 2007. This prompted respondent Antonio to
file a Petition for Judicial Approval of Recognition with Prayer to take Parental Authority, Parental Physical
Custody, Correction/Change of Surname of Minors and for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction
before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8 of Aparri, Cagayan (RTC), appending a notarized Deed of
Voluntary Recognition of Paternity of the children.5

On September 28, 2010, the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of herein respondent Antonio, ruling that
[t]he evidence at hand is overwhelming that the best interest of the children can be promoted if they are
under the sole parental authority and physical custody of [respondent Antonio].6 Thus, the court a quo
decreed the following:

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Court hereby grants [Antonios] prayer for recognition
and the same is hereby judicially approved. x x x Consequently, the Court forthwith issues the following
Order granting the other reliefs sought in the Petition, to wit:

a. Ordering the Office of the City Registrar of the City of Makati to cause the entry of the name
of [Antonio] as the father of the aforementioned minors in their respective Certificate of Live
Birth and causing the correction/change and/or annotation of the surnames of said
minors in their Certificate of Live Birth from Grande to Antonio;
b. Granting [Antonio] the right to jointly exercise Parental Authority with [Grande] over the
persons of their minor children, Andre Lewis Grande and Jerard Patrick Grande;
 c. Granting [Antonio] primary right and immediate custody over the parties minor children
Andre Lewis Grandre and Jerard Patrick Grande who shall stay with [Antonios] residence in
the Philippines from Monday until Friday evening and to [Grandes] custody from Saturday to
Sunday evening;
d. Ordering [Grande] to immediately surrender the persons and custody of minors Andre Lewis
Grande and Jerard Patrick Grande unto [Antonio] for the days covered by the Order;
e. Ordering parties to cease and desist from bringing the aforenamed minors outside of the
country, without the written consent of the other and permission from the court.
f. Ordering parties to give and share the support of the minor children Andre Lewis Grande and
Jerard Patrick Grande in the amount of P30,000 per month at the rate of 70% for [Antonio]
and 30% for [Grande].7 (Emphasis supplied.)

Aggrieved, petitioner Grande moved for reconsideration. However, her motion was denied by the trial court
in its Resolution dated November 22, 20108 for being pro forma and for lack of merit.

Petitioner Grande then filed an appeal with the CA attributing grave error on the part of the RTC for
allegedly ruling contrary to the law and jurisprudence respecting the grant of sole custody to the mother over
her illegitimate children.9 In resolving the appeal, the appellate court modified in part the Decision of the
RTC. The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is partly GRANTED. Accordingly, the appealed Decision of the Regional Trial
Court Branch 8, Aparri Cagayan in SP Proc. Case No. 114492 is MODIFIED in part and shall hereinafter
read as follows:

a. The Offices of the Civil Registrar General and the City Civil Registrar of Makati City
are DIRECTED to enter the surname Antonio as the surname of Jerard Patrick and
Andre Lewis, in their respective certificates of live birth, and record the same in the
Register of Births;
b. [Antonio] is ORDERED to deliver the minor children Jerard Patrick and Andre Lewis to the
custody of their mother herein appellant, Grace Grande who by virtue hereof is hereby
awarded the full or sole custody of these minor children;
c. [Antonio] shall have visitorial rights at least twice a week, and may only take the children out
upon the written consent of [Grande]; and
d. The parties are DIRECTED to give and share in support of the minor children Jerard Patrick
and Andre Lewis in the amount of P30,000.00 per month at the rate of 70% for [Antonio] and
30% for [Grande]. (Emphasis supplied.)

In ruling thus, the appellate court ratiocinated that notwithstanding the fathers recognition of his children,
the mother cannot be deprived of her sole parental custody over them absent the most compelling of
reasons.10 Since respondent Antonio failed to prove that petitioner Grande committed any act that adversely
affected the welfare of the children or rendered her unsuitable to raise the minors, she cannot be deprived of
her sole parental custody over their children.

The appellate court, however, maintained that the legal consequence of the recognition made by
respondent Antonio that he is the father of the minors, taken in conjunction with the universally
protected bestinterestofthechild clause, compels the use by the children of the surname
ANTONIO.11

As to the issue of support, the CA held that the grant is legally in order considering that not only did Antonio
express his willingness to give support, it is also a consequence of his acknowledging the paternity of the
minor children.12 Lastly, the CA ruled that there is no reason to deprive respondent Antonio of his visitorial
right especially in view of the constitutionally inherent and natural right of parents over their children.13
Not satisfied with the CAs Decision, petitioner Grande interposed a partial motion for reconsideration,
particularly assailing the order of the CA insofar as it decreed the change of the minors surname to
Antonio. When her motion was denied, petitioner came to this Court via the present petition. In it, she
posits that Article 176 of the Family Codeas amended by Republic Act No. (RA) 9255, couched as it is in
permissive languagemay not be invoked by a father to compel the use by his illegitimate children of his
surname without the consent of their mother.

We find the present petition impressed with merit.

The sole issue at hand is the right of a father to compel the use of his surname by his illegitimate children
upon his recognition of their filiation. Central to the core issue is the application of Art. 176 of the Family
Code, originally phrased as follows:

Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall
be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of
onehalf of the legitime of a legitimate child. Except for this modification, all other provisions in the Civil
Code governing successional rights shall remain in force.

This provision was later amended on March 19, 2004 by RA 925514 which now reads:

Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the parental authority of their
mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity with this Code. However, illegitimate children may
use the surname of their father if their filiation has been expressly recognized by their father through
the record of birth appearing in the civil register, or when an admission in a public document or private
handwritten instrument is made by the father. Provided, the father has the right to institute an action before
the regular courts to prove nonfiliation during his lifetime. The legitime of each illegitimate child shall
consist of onehalf of the legitime of a legitimate child. (Emphasis supplied.)

From the foregoing provisions, it is clear that the general rule is that an illegitimate child shall use the
surname of his or her mother. The exception provided by RA 9255 is, in case his or her filiation is expressly
recognized by the father through the record of birth appearing in the civil register or when an admission in a
public document or private handwritten instrument is made by the father. In such a situation, the illegitimate
child may use the surname of the father.

In the case at bar, respondent filed a petition for judicial approval of recognition of the filiation of the two
children with the prayer for the correction or change of the surname of the minors from Grande to Antonio
when a public document acknowledged before a notary public under Sec. 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court15 is enough to establish the paternity of his children. But he wanted more: a judicial conferment of
parental authority, parental custody, and an official declaration of his childrens surname as Antonio.

Parental authority over minor children is lodged by Art. 176 on the mother; hence, respondents prayer has
no legal mooring. Since parental authority is given to the mother, then custody over the minor children also
goes to the mother, unless she is shown to be unfit.

Now comes the matter of the change of surname of the illegitimate children. Is there a legal basis for the
court a quo to order the change of the surname to that of respondent?

Clearly, there is none. Otherwise, the order or ruling will contravene the explicit and unequivocal provision
of Art. 176 of the Family Code, as amended by RA 9255.
Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the right to decide if they want to use the surname of their father or not. It
is not the father (herein respondent) or the mother (herein petitioner) who is granted by law the right to
dictate the surname of their illegitimate children.

Nothing is more settled than that when the law is clear and free from ambiguity, it must be taken to mean
what it says and it must be given its literal meaning free from any interpretation.16 Respondents position that
the court can order the minors to use his surname, therefore, has no legal basis.

On its face, Art. 176, as amended, is free from ambiguity. And where there is no ambiguity, one must abide
by its words. The use of the word may in the provision readily shows that an acknowledged illegitimate
child is under no compulsion to use the surname of his illegitimate father. The word may is permissive
and operates to confer discretion17 upon the illegitimate children.

It is best to emphasize once again that the yardstick by which policies affecting children are to be measured
is their best interest. On the matter of childrens surnames, this Court has, time and again, rebuffed the idea
that the use of the fathers surname serves the best interest of the minor child. In Alfon v. Republic,18 for
instance, this Court allowed even a legitimate child to continue using the surname of her mother rather than
that of her legitimate father as it serves her best interest and there is no legal obstacle to prevent her from
using the surname of her mother to which she is entitled. In fact, in Calderon v. Republic,19 this Court,
upholding the best interest of the child concerned, even allowed the use of a surname different from the
surnames of the childs father or mother. Indeed, the rule regarding the use of a childs surname is second
only to the rule requiring that the child be placed in the best possible situation considering his circumstances.

In Republic of the Philippines v. Capote,20 We gave due deference to the choice of an illegitimate minor to
use the surname of his mother as it would best serve his interest, thus:

The foregoing discussion establishes the significant connection of a persons name to his identity, his status
in relation to his parents and his successional rights as a legitimate or illegitimate child. For sure, these
matters should not be taken lightly as to deprive those who may, in any way, be affected by the right to
present evidence in favor of or against such change.

The law and facts obtaining here favor Giovannis petition. Giovanni availed of the proper remedy, a petition
for change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, and complied with all the procedural requirements.
After hearing, the trial court found (and the appellate court affirmed) that the evidence presented during the
hearing of Giovannis petition sufficiently established that, under Art. 176 of the Civil Code, Giovanni is
entitled to change his name as he was never recognized by his father while his mother has always recognized
him as her child. A change of name will erase the impression that he was ever recognized by his father. It is
also to his best interest as it will facilitate his mothers intended petition to have him join her in the
United States. This Court will not stand in the way of the reunification of mother and son. (Emphasis
supplied.)

An argument, however, may be advanced advocating the mandatory use of the fathers surname upon his
recognition of his illegitimate children, citing the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9255,21
which states:

Rule 7. Requirements for the Child to Use the Surname of the Father

7.1 For Births Not Yet Registered

7.1.1 The illegitimate child shall use the surname of the father if a public document is executed by the father,
either at the back of the Certificate of Live Birth or in a separate document.
7.1.2 If admission of paternity is made through a private instrument, the child shall use the surname of the
father, provided the registration is supported by the following documents:

xxxx

7.2. For Births Previously Registered under the Surname of the Mother

7.2.1 If filiation has been expressly recognized by the father, the child shall use the surname of the father
upon the submission of the accomplished AUSF [Affidavit of Use of the Surname of the Father].

7.2.2 If filiation has not been expressly recognized by the father, the child shall use the surname of the father
upon submission of a public document or a private handwritten instrument supported by the documents listed
in Rule 7.1.2.

7.3 Except in Item 7.2.1, the consent of the illegitimate child is required if he/she has reached the age of
majority. The consent may be contained in a separate instrument duly notarized.

xxxx

Rule 8. Effects of Recognition

8.1 For Births Not Yet Registered

8.1.1 The surname of the father shall be entered as the last name of the child in the Certificate of Live Birth.
The Certificate of Live Birth shall be recorded in the Register of Births.

xxxx

8.2 For Births Previously Registered under the Surname of the Mother

8.2.1 If admission of paternity was made either at the back of the Certificate of Live Birth or in a separate
public document or in a private handwritten document, the public document or AUSF shall be recorded in
the Register of Live Birth and the Register of Births as follows:

The surname of the child is hereby changed from (original surname) to (new surname) pursuant to RA
9255.

The original surname of the child appearing in the Certificate of Live Birth and Register of Births shall not
be changed or deleted.

8.2.2 If filiation was not expressly recognized at the time of registration, the public document or AUSF shall
be recorded in the Register of Legal Instruments. Proper annotation shall be made in the Certificate of Live
Birth and the Register of Births as follows:

Acknowledged by (name of father) on (date). The surname of the child is hereby changed from (original
surname) on (date) pursuant to RA 9255. (Emphasis supplied.)

Nonetheless, the hornbook rule is that an administrative issuance cannot amend a legislative act. In MCC
Industrial Sales Corp. v. Ssangyong Corporation,22 We held:
After all, the power of administrative officials to promulgate rules in the implementation of a statute is
necessarily limited to what is found in the legislative enactment itself. The implementing rules and
regulations of a law cannot extend the law or expand its coverage, as the power to amend or repeal a statute
is vested in the Legislature. Thus, if a discrepancy occurs between the basic law and an implementing rule or
regulation, it is the former that prevails, because the law cannot be broadened by a mere administrative
issuance an administrative agency certainly cannot amend an act of Congress.

Thus, We can disregard contemporaneous construction where there is no ambiguity in law and/or the
construction is clearly erroneous.23 What is more, this Court has the constitutional prerogative and authority
to strike down and declare as void the rules of procedure of special courts and quasijudicial bodies24 when
found contrary to statutes and/or the Constitution.25 Section 5(5), Art. VIII of the Constitution provides:

Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

xxxx

(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice
and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to
the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy
disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or
modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasijudicial bodies shall remain
effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court. (Emphasis supplied.)

Thus, We exercise this power in voiding the abovequoted provisions of the IRR of RA 9255 insofar as it
provides the mandatory use by illegitimate children of their fathers surname upon the latters recognition of
his paternity.

To conclude, the use of the word shall in the IRR of RA 9255 is of no moment. The clear, unambiguous,
and unequivocal use of may in Art. 176 rendering the use of an illegitimate fathers surname
discretionary controls, and illegitimate children are given the choice on the surnames by which they
will be known.

At this juncture, We take note of the letters submitted by the children, now aged thirteen (13) and fifteen (15)
years old, to this Court declaring their opposition to have their names changed to Antonio.26 However,
since these letters were not offered before and evaluated by the trial court, they do not provide any
evidentiary weight to sway this Court to rule for or against petitioner.27 A proper inquiry into, and evaluation
of the evidence of, the childrens choice of surname by the trial court is necessary.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The July 24, 2012 Decision of the Court
of Appeals in CAG.R. CV No. 96406 is MODIFIED, the dispositive portion of which shall read:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is partly GRANTED. Accordingly, the appealed Decision of the Regional Trial
Court Branch 8, Aparri Cagayan in SP Proc. Case No. 114492 is MODIFIED in part and shall hereinafter
read as follows:

a. [Antonio] is ORDERED to deliver the minor children Jerard Patrick and Andre Lewis to the
custody of their mother herein appellant, Grace Grande who by virtue hereof is hereby
awarded the full or sole custody of these minor children;
b. [Antonio] shall have visitation rights28 at least twice a week, and may only take the children
out upon the written consent of [Grande];
 c. The parties are DIRECTED to give and share in support of the minor children Jerard Patrick
and Andre Lewis in the amount of P30,000.00 per month at the rate of 70% for [Antonio] and
30% for [Grande]; and
d. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8 of Aparri, Cagayan for
the sole purpose of determining the surname to be chosen by the children Jerard Patrick
and Andre Lewis.

Rule 7 and Rule 8 of the Office of the Civil Registrar General Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 2004 are
DISAPPROVED and hereby declared NULL and VOID.

Jenie San Juan dela Cruz vs Ronald Paul S. Gracia, in his capacity as City Civil Registrar
G.R. No. 177728, July 31, 2009

FACTS:
Jenie was denied the registration of her child's birth because the document attached to the Affidavit to use the
Surname of the Father (AUSF) entitled "Autobiography," did not include the signature of the deceased father,
and because he was born out of wedlock and the father unfortunately died prior to his birth and has no more capacity
to acknowledge his paternity to the child.

Jenie and the child promptly filed a complaint for injunction/registration of name against Gracia. The trial court held that
even if Dominique, the father, was the author of the unsigned handwritten Autobiography, the same does not contain
any express recognition of paternity.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the unsigned handwritten instrument of the deceased father of minor Christian can be considered as a
recognition of paternity.

RULING:
Yes.
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by RA 9255, permits an illegitimate child to use the surname of his/her
father if the latter had previously recognized him/her as his offspring through an admission made in a pubic of private
handwritten instrument.

Article 176, as amended, does not explicitly state that there must be a signature by the putative father in the private
handwritten instrument.

The following rules respecting the requirement of affixing the signature of the acknowledging parent in any private
handwritten instrument wherein an admission of filiation of a legitimate or illegitimate child is made:

1) Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of evidence submitted to prove filiation, there should
be strict compliance with the requirement that the same must be signed by the acknowledging parent; and

2) Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by other relevant and competent evidence, it suffices
that the claim of filiation therein be shown to have been made and handwritten by the acknowledging parent as it is
merely corroborative of such other evidence.

Concepcion vs CA
Concepcion vs. CA
GR No. 123450, August 31, 2005
FACTS:

Gerardo Concepcion, the petitioner, and Ma. Theresa Almonte, private respondent, were married in December
1989, and begotten a child named Jose Gerardo in December 1990. The husband filed on December 1991, a
petition to have his marriage annulled on the ground of bigamy since the wife married a certain Mario Gopiao
sometime in December 1980, whom according to the husband was still alive and living in Loyola Heights, QC.
Trial court ruled that the son was an illegitimate child and the custody was awarded to the wife while Gerardo was
granted visitation rights. Theresa argued that there was nothing in the law granting visitation rights in favor of
the putative father of an illegitimate child. She further wanted to have the surname of the son changed from
Concepcion to Almonte, her maiden name, since an illegitimate child should use his mothers surname. After
the requested oral argument, trial court reversed its ruling and held the son to be not the son of Gerardo but of
Mario. Hence, the child was a legitimate child of Theresa and Mario.

HELD:

Considering that Theresas marriage with Gerardo was void ab initio, the latter never became the formers
husband and never acquired any right to impugn the legitimacy of the child. Theresas contention was to have his
son be declared as not the legitimate child of her and Mario but her illegitimate child with Gerardo. In this case,
the mother has no right to disavow a child because maternity is never uncertain. Hence, she is not permitted by
law to question the sons legitimacy. Under Article 167 of the Family Code, the child shall be considered
legitimate although the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an
adulteress. Having the best interest of the child in mind, the presumption of his legitimacy was upheld by the
Court. As a legitimate child, the son shall have the right to bear the surnames of Mario and Theresa, in
conformity with the provisions of Civil Code on surnames. Gerardo cannot then impose his surname to be used
by the child, since in the eyes of the law, the child is not related to him in any way.

DOLINA V. VALLECERA

GR No. 182367- [December 15, 2010]

DOCTRINE:

To be entitled to legal support, petitioner must, in proper action, first establish the filiation of the
child, if the same is not admitted or acknowledged. If filiation is beyond question, support follows
as matter of obligation.

FACTS:

In 2008, Cherryl Dolina filed a petition with aprayer for the issuance of a temporary protection
order against Glenn Vallecera before RTC for alleged woman and child abuse under RA 9262. In
the pro forma complaint cherryl added a prayer for support for their supposed child. She based
such prayer on the latters certificate of live birth which listed Vallecera s employer, to withhold
from his pay such amount of support as the RTC may deem appropriate.

Vallecera opposed petition and claimed that Dolinas petition was essentially one for financial
support rather than for protection against woman and child abuses, that he was not the childs
father and that the signature in the birth certificate was not here. He also added that the petition is
a harassment suit intended to for him to acknowledge the child as his and therefore give financial
support.

RTC dismissed petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the RTC correctly dismissed Dolinas action for temporary protection and denied
her application for temporary support for her child?

HELD:

Yes.

RATIO:

Dolina evidently filed the wrong action to obtain support for her child. The object of R.A. 9262
under which she filed the case is the protection and safety of women and children who are victims
of abuse or violence. Although the issuance of a protection order against the respondent in the case
can include the grant of legal support for the wife and the child, this assumes that both are entitled
to a protection order and to legal support. In this case neither her or her child lived with Vallecera.

To be entitled to legal support, petitioner must, in proper action, first establish the filiation of the
child, if the same is not admitted or acknowledged. Since Dolinas demand for support for her son
is based on her claim that he is Valleceras illegitimate child, the latter is not entitled to such
support if he had not acknowledged him, until Dolina shall have proved his relation to him. The
childs remedy is to file through her mother a judicial action against Vallecera for compulsory
recognition. If filiation is beyond question, support follows as matter of obligation. In short,
illegitimate children are entitled to support and successional rights but their filiation must be duly
proved.

Dolinas remedy is to file for the benefit of her child an action against Vallecera for compulsory
recognition in order to establish filiation and then demand support. Alternatively, she may
directly file an action for support, where the issue of compulsory recognition may be integrated and
resolved.
In Re Petition for Adoption of Michelle Lim and Michael
Lim
In Re Petition for Adoption of Michelle Lim and Michael Jude Lim
GR No. 168992-93, May 21, 2009

FACTS:

Monina Lim, petitioner, who was an optometrist was married with Primo Lim but were childless. Minor children,
were entrusted to them by Lucia, whose parents were unknown as shown by a certification of DSWD. The
spouses registered the children making it appears as if they were the parents. Unfortunately, in 1998, Primo died.
She then married an American Citizen, Angel Olario in December 2000. Petitioner decided to adopt the children
by availing of the amnesty given under RA 8552 to individuals who simulated the birth of a child. In 2002, she
filed separate petitions for adoption of Michelle and Michael before the trial court. Michelle was then 25 years
old and already married and Michael was 18 years and seven months old. Michelle and her husband including
Michael and Olario gave their consent to the adoption executed in an affidavit.

ISSUE: WON petitioner who has remarried can singly adopt.

HELD:
Petition was denied. The time the petitions were filed, petitioner had already remarried. Husband and wife shall
jointly adopt except in 3 instances which was not present in the case at bar. In case spouses jointly adopts, they
shall jointly exercised parental authority. The use of the word shall signifies that joint adoption of husband and
wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority since the child to be adopted
is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require spouses to adopt jointly. The affidavit of
consent given by Olario will not suffice since there are certain requirements that he must comply as an American
Citizen. He must meet the qualifications set forth in Sec7 of RA8552. The requirements on residency and
certification of the aliens qualification to adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Sec 7. Parental authority
is merely just one of the effects of legal adoption. It includes caring and rearing the children for civic
consciousness and efficiency and development of their moral mental and physical character and well-being.

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA

HONORATO B. CATINDIG, petitioner.
G.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005

FACTS:
Honorato Catindig filed a petition to adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He prayed that
the child's middle name Astorga be changed to Garcia, her mother's surname, and that her surname Garcia be
changed to Catindig, his surname.
Trial court granted the petition and declared Stephanie as his legitimate child and heir, and pursuant to Art. 189 of the
Family Code, she is now known as Stephanie Nathy Catindig.
Honorato filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration that Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname
Garcia as her middle name.
The Republic, through the OSG, agreed with Honorato for her relationship with her natural mother should be
maintained and preserved, to prevent any confusion and hardship in the future, and under Article 189 she remains to
be an intestate heir of her mother.

ISSUE:
Whether or not an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the surname of her natural mother as her
middle name.

RULING:
Yes. there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father, like Stephanie, to use, as middle
name her mothers surname, we find no reason why she should not be allowed to do so.
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255, (An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children To Use
The Surname Of Their Father) is silent as to what middle name a child may use. Article 365 of the CC merely provides
that an adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter. Article 189 of the Family Code, enumerating the legal
effects of adoption, is likewise silent on the matter.

Republic Act No. 8552, (Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) an legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, Stephanie is
entitled to all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind, including the right to
bear the surname of her father and her mother.

Landingin vs. Republic, GR No. 164948, June 27, 2006, digested

Posted by Pius Morados on March 17, 2012

(Special Proceedings Adoption: Consent and Abandonment)

Facts: Diwata Ramos Landingin, a US citizen of Filipino parentage filed a petition for the adoption of 3 minors, natural children of
Manuel Ramos, the formers brother, and Amelia Ramos. She alleged in her petition that when her brother died, the children were
left to their paternal grandmother for their biological mother went to Italy, re-married there and now has 2 children by her second
marriage and no longer communicates from the time she left up to the institution of the adoption. After the paternal grandmother
passed away, the minors were being supported by the petitioner and her children abroad and gave their written consent for their
adoption.
A Social Worker of the DSWD submitted a Report recommending for the adoption and narrated that Amelia, the biological mother
was consulted with the adoption plan and after weighing the benefits of adoption to her children, she voluntarily consented.

However, petitioner failed to present the said social worker as witness and offer in evidence the voluntary consent of Amelia Ramos
to the adoption. Petitioner also failed to present any documentary evidence to prove that Amelia assent to the adoption.

Issue: WON a petition for adoption be granted without the written consent of the adoptees biological mother.
Held: No. Section 9, par (b) of RA 8552, provides that the consent of the biological parent(s) of the child, if known is necessary to
the adoption. The written consent of the legal guardian will suffice if the written consent of the biological parents cannot be obtained.
The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is intended to protect the natural parental relationship from
unwarranted interference by interlopers, and to insure the opportunity to safeguard the best interests of the child in the manner of
the proposed adoption.

The written consent of the biological parents is indispensable for the validity of the decree of adoption. Indeed, the natural right of a
parent to his child requires that his consent must be obtained before his parental rights and duties may be terminated and re-
establish in adoptive parents. In this case, petitioner failed to submit the written consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption.

Moreover, abandonment means neglect and refusal to perform the filial and legal obligations of love and support. Merely permitting
the child to remain for a time undisturbed in the care of others is not such abandonment. To dispense with the requirements of
consent, the abandonment must be shown to have existed at the time of adoption.

LAHOM VS. SIBULO

G.R. No. 143989 July 14, 2003

FACTS:
A childless couple adopted the wife's nephew and brought him up as their own. In 1972, the trial court granted the petition for
adoption, and ordered the Civil Registrar to change the name Jose Melvin Sibulo to Jose Melvin Lahom. Mrs. Lahom commenced
a petition to rescind the decree of adoption, in which she averred, that, despite the her pleas and that of her husband, their adopted
son refused to use their surname Lahom and continue to use Sibulo in all his dealing and activities. Prior to the institution of the
case, in 1998, RA No. 8552 went into effect. The new statute deleted from the law the right of adopters to rescind a decree of
adoption (Section 19 of Article VI).
These turn of events revealing Jose's callous indifference, ingratitude and lack of care and concern prompted Lahom to file a
petition in Court in December 1999 to rescind the decree of adoption previously issued way back on May 5, 1972. When Lahom
filed said petition there was already a new law on adoption, specifically R.A. 8552 also known as the Domestic Adoption Act
passed on March 22,1998, wherein it was provided that: "Adoption, being in the interest of the child, shall not be subject to
rescission by the adopter(s). However the adopter(s) may disinherit the adoptee for causes provided in Article 919 of the Civil
Code" (Section 19).

ISSUE:
Whether or not the subject adoption still be revoked or rescinded by an adopter after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552, and if in the
affirmative, whether or not the adopters action prescribed.

RULING:
Jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action. The controversy
should be resolved in the light of the law governing at the time the petition was filed. In this case, it was months after the
effectivity of RA 8552 that Lahom filed an action to revoke the decree of adoption granted in 1972. By then the new law had
already abrogated and repealed the right of the adopter under the Civil Code and the family Code to rescind a decree of adoption.
So the rescission of the adoption decree, having been initiated by Lahom after RA 8552 had come into force, could no longer be
pursued.

Besides, even before the passage of RA8552, an action to set aside the adoption is subject to the five year bar rule under Rule 100
of the Rules of Court and that the adopter would lose the right to revoke the adoption decree after the lapse of that period. The
exercise of the right within a prescriptive period is a condition that could not fulfill the requirements of a vested right entitled to
protection. Rights are considered vested when the right to the enjoyment is a present interest, absolute, unconditional and perfect or
fixed and irrefutable. The concept of a "vested right" is a consequence of the constitutional guarantee of due process that expresses
a present fixed interest which in right reason and natural justice is protected against arbitrary state action. While adoption has often
been referred to in the context of a "right", it is not naturally innate or fundamental but rather a right merely created by statute. It is
more of a privilege that is governed by the state's determination on what it may deem to be for the best interest and welfare of the
child. Matters relating to adoption, including the withdrawal of the right of the adopter to nullify the adoption decree, are subject to
State regulation. Concomitantly, a right of action given by a statute may be taken away at any time before it has been exercised.

But an adopter, while barred from severing the legal ties of adoption, can always for valid reasons cause the forfeiture of certain
benefits otherwise accruing to an undeserving child, like denying him his legitime, and by will and testament, may expressly
exclude him from having a share in the disposable portion of his estate

SUPPORT CASES

EDWARD V. LACSON, G.R. No. 150644

Petitioner,
Present:
PUNO, J., Chairperson,
- versus - SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CORONA,
AZCUNA, and
GARCIA, JJ.
MAOWEE DABAN LACSON
and MAONAA DABAN Promulgated:
LACSON, represented by their
mother and guardian ad-litem,
LEA DABAN LACSON, August 28, 2006
Respondents.
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

GARCIA, J.:

Petitioner Edward V. Lacson, father of the respondent sisters Maowee Daban Lacson and
Maonaa Daban Lacson and husband of their mother and guardian ad-litem, Lea Daban
Lacson, has come to this Court via this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court to seek the reversal and setting aside of the Decision[1] dated July 13, 2001 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 60203, as reiterated in its Resolution[2] of October 18,
2001 denying his motion for reconsideration.

From the petition and its annexes, the respondents reply thereto, and other pleadings, the
Court gathers the following facts:

The sisters Maowee Daban Lacson and Maonaa Daban Lacson are legitimate daughters of
petitioner Edward V. Lacson and his wife, Lea Daban Lacson. Maowee was born
on December 4, 1974, while Maonaa, a little less than a year later. Not long after the birth of
Maonaa, petitioner left the conjugal home in Molo, Iloilo City, virtually forcing mother and
children to seek, apparently for financial reason, shelter somewhere else. For a month, they
stayed with Leas mother-in-law, Alicia Lacson, then with her (Leas) mother and then with
her brother Noel Daban. After some time, they rented an apartment only to return later to the
house of Leas mother. As the trial court aptly observed, the sisters and their mother, from
1976 to 1994, or for a period of eighteen (18) years, shuttled from one dwelling place to
another not their own.

It appears that from the start of their estrangement, Lea did not badger her husband
Edward for support, relying initially on his commitment memorialized in a note
dated December 10, 1975 to give support to his daughters. As things turned out, however,
Edward reneged on his promise of support, despite Leas efforts towards having him fulfill the
same. Lea would admit, though, that Edward occasionally gave their children meager
amounts for school expenses. Through the years and up to the middle part of 1992, Edwards
mother, Alicia Lacson, also gave small amounts to help in the schooling of Maowee and
Maonaa, both of whom eventually took up nursing at St. Pauls College in IloiloCity. In the
early part of 1995 when Lea, in behalf of her two daughters, filed a complaint against Edward
for support before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 33, Maowee was about to
graduate.

In that complaint dated January 30, 1995, as amended,[3] docketed as Civil Case No. 22185,
Maowee and Maonaa, thru their mother, averred that their father Edward, despite being
gainfully employed and owning several pieces of valuable lands, has not provided them
support since 1976. They also alleged that, owing to years of Edwards failure and neglect,
their mother had, from time to time, borrowed money from her brother Noel Daban. As she
would later testify, Lea had received from Noel, by way of a loan, as much
as P400,000.00 to P600,000.00.

In his Answer, Edward alleged giving to Maowee and Maonaa sufficient sum to meet their
needs. He explained, however, that his lack of regular income and the unproductivity of the
land he inherited, not his neglect, accounted for his failure at times to give regular support.
He also blamed financial constraint for his inability to provide the P12,000.00monthly
allowance prayed for in the complaint.

As applied for and after due hearing, the trial court granted the sisters Maowee and
Maonaa support pendente lite at P12,000.00 per month, subject to the schedule of payment
and other conditions set forth in the courts corresponding order of May 13, 1996.[4]

Following trial, the RTC rendered on June 26, 1997 judgment finding for the plaintiff sisters,
as represented by their mother. In that judgment, the trial court, following an elaborate
formula set forth therein, ordered their defendant father Edward to pay them a specific sum
which represented 216 months, or 18 years, of support in arrears. The falloof the trial courts
decision[5] reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

1) Ordering defendant to compensate plaintiffs support in arrears in the

amount of TWO MILLION FOUR HUNDRED NINETY-SIX
THOUSAND (P2, 496,000.00) PESOS from which amount shall be
deducted ONE HUNDRED TWENTY-FOUR (P124,000.00) PESOS
that which they received from defendant for two years and that which
they received by way of support pendent lite;

2) Ordering defendant to pay TWENTY THOUSAND (P20,000.00) PESOS

as attorneys fees; and

3) Pay costs.

SO ORDERED.

Therefrom, Edward appealed to the CA whereat his recourse was docketed as CA-G.R. CV.
No. 60203.

Eventually, the CA, in the herein assailed Decision dated July 13, 2001,[6] dismissed Edwards
appeal, disposing as follows;

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is hereby DISMISSED and the
appealed Decision in Civil Case No. 22185 is hereby AFFIRMED.

Double costs against the defendant appellant [Edward Lacson].

SO ORDERED. (Words in bracket added.)

In time, Edward moved for reconsideration, but his motion was denied by the appellate court
in its equally assailed Resolution of October 18, 2001.[7]

Hence, Edwards present recourse on his submission that the CA erred -

 I. XXX WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE GRANT OF SUPPORT IN ARREARS
FROM 1976 TO 1994.

II. XXX IN AFFIRMING THE ALLEGED ADVANCES OF SUPPORT BY

RESPONDENTS UNCLE NOEL DABAN.

III. XXX IN AFFIRMING THE AWARD OF SUPPORT EVEN IF PETITIONER IS

NOT FINANCIALLY CAPABLE OF PROVIDING THE SAME TO
RESPONDENTS.

IV. XXX WHEN IT ORDERED PETITIONER TO PROVIDE SUPPORT TO XXX

RESPONDENTS EVEN IF PETITIONERS OBLIGATION TO PROVIDE
SUPPORT HAD ALREADY BEEN COMPLETELY SATISFIED BY THE
PROCEEDS OF THE SALE OF HIS EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY WHICH WERE
ALL APPROPRIATED BY THE RESPONDENTS.

The petition lacks merit.

Petitioner admits being obliged, as father, to provide support to both respondents, Maowee
and Maonaa. It is his threshold submission, however, that he should not be made to pay
support in arrears, i.e., from 1976 to 1994, no previous extrajudicial, let alone judicial,
demand having been made by the respondents. He invokes the following provision of the
Family Code to complete his point:

Article 203 The obligation to give support shall be demandable from the time the
person who has a right to receive the same needs it for maintenance, but it shall not
be paid except from the date of judicial or extrajudicial demand.

To petitioner, his obligation to pay under the aforequoted provision starts from the filing of
Civil Case No. 22185 in 1995, since only from that moment can it be said that an effective
demand for support was made upon him.

Petitioners above posture has little to commend itself. For one, it conveniently glossed over
the fact that he veritably abandoned the respondent sisters even before the elder of the two
could celebrate her second birthday. To be sure, petitioner could not plausibly expect any of
the sisters during their tender years to go through the motion of demanding support from him,
what with the fact that even their mother (his wife) found it difficult during the period
material to get in touch with him. For another, the requisite demand for support appears to
have been made sometime in 1975. It may be that Lea made no extrajudicial demand in the
sense of a formal written demand in terms and in the imperious tenor commonly used by
legal advocates in a demand letter. Nonetheless, what would pass as a demand was, however,
definitely made. Asking one to comply with his obligation to support owing to the urgency of
the situation is no less a demand because it came by way of a request or a plea. As it were,
the trial court found that a demand to sustain an award of support in arrears had been made in
this case and said so in its decision, thus:

From 1976, [respondents] mother now and then went to their [paternal]
grandmothers house by their father and asked for support; this notwithstanding their
fathers commitment for this purpose which the latter embodied in a note
dated December 10, 1975. For twenty-one years that they needed support,
[petitioner] complied with his obligation for only two (2) years.

xxx xxx xxx

Last December 10, 1975, [petitioner] committed self for the support of his children,
the [respondents] herein but failing, plaintiffs mother asked extrajudicially for her
childrens support since 1976, when she went to her mothers house. .[8] (Words in
bracket and underscoring added.)
The appellate court made a parallel finding on the demand angle, formulating the same in the
following wise:

We could not confer judicial approval upon [petitioners] posture of trying to evade
his responsibility to give support to his daughters simply because their mother did
not make a formal demand therefor from him. [Petitioners] insistence on requiring a
formal demand from his wife is truly pointless, in the face of his acknowledgment
of and commitment to comply with such obligation through a note in his own
handwriting. Said note [stating that he will sustain his two daughters Maowee and
Maonaa] also stated as requested by their mother thus practically confirming the
fact of such demand having been made by [respondents] mother. The trial court
thus correctly ruled that [petitioners] obligation to pay support in arrears should
commence from 1976.[9] (Words in bracket added).

The Court finds no adequate reason to disturb the factual determination of the CA
confirmatory of that of the trial court respecting the demand Lea made on the petitioner to
secure support for the respondents. As a matter of long and sound appellate practice, factual
findings of the CA are accorded respect, if not finality, save for the most compelling and
cogent reasons.[10] Not one of the well-recognized exceptions to this rule on conclusiveness of
factual findings appear to obtain in this case. Accordingly, the Court cannot grant the
petitioners plea for a review of the CAs findings bearing on the actuality that, as basis for an
award of support in arrears, an extrajudicial demand for support had been made on the
petitioner as evidenced by the December 10, 1975 note adverted to. Lest it be overlooked, the
jurisdiction of the Court in a petition for review, as here, is generally limited to correction of
errors of law. Complementing that postulate is the rule that the Court is not bound to analyze
and weigh all over again the evidence already considered in the proceedings below, [11] except
when, as earlier indicated, compelling reasons demand a review of the factual conclusions
drawn from such evidence.

Petitioners second specification of error touches on the CAs affirmatory holding that
respondents uncle, Noel Daban, advanced the money for their support. Again, petitioners
lament on the matter is a veritable call for review of factual determinations of the two courts
below. It need not, accordingly, detain us long. Suffice it to state in that regard that, of their
close relatives, the respondents appeared to have stayed longest with their uncle, Noel
Daban. Noteworthy also is the fact that petitioner, from 1976 to 1994, only gave Maowee and
Maonaa token amounts for schooling when support comprises everything indispensable for
sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance and education,[12]or, in short, whatever is
necessary to keep a person alive. Logically, the sisters would, thru their mother, turn to their
uncle (Noel Daban) for their sustenance and education when petitioner failed to give the
same, a failing which stretched from their pre-schooling days to their college years. Since
such failure has been established, it is not amiss to deduce, as did the trial court and the CA,
that Noel Daban who, owing to consideration of kinship, had reasons to help, indeed lent his
sister Lea money to support her children.
Pursuant to Article 207 of the Family Code, Noel Daban can rightfully exact reimbursement
from the petitioner. The provision reads:

When the person obliged to support another unjustly refuses or fails to give support
when urgently needed by the latter, any third person may furnish support to the
needy individual, with right of reimbursement from the person obliged to give
support.

Mention may also be made that, contextually, the resulting juridical relationship between the
petitioner and Noel Daban is a quasi-contract,[13] an equitable principle enjoining one from
unjustly enriching himself at the expense of another.
As for the amount of support in arrears, there is also no reason to disturb the absolute figures
arrived at by the two courts below, appearing as they do to be reasonable and proper.
Arbitrariness respecting the determination of the final numbers cannot plausibly be laid on
the doorsteps of the CA, and the trial court before it, considering that they fixed such amount
based on the varying needs of the respondents during the years included in the computation
and to the financial resources of the petitioner, as proved by the evidence adduced below. As
a matter of law, the amount of support which those related by marriage and family
relationship is generally obliged to give each other shall be in proportion to the resources or
means of the giver and to the needs of the recipient.[14]
Petitioner closes his petition by urging the Court, as it did the CA earlier, to consider a
transaction that transpired after the trial court had rendered judgment. We refer to the sale by
Lea of half of what petitioner claims to be his exclusive or capital property. As the petitioner
would have this Court believe, Lea and the respondent sisters appropriated the P5 Million
proceeds of the sale for themselves. Pressing on, he alleged that the amount thus received
from the sale is more than enough to fully satisfy thus release him from complying with- the
underlying judgment for support, assuming ex gratia argumenti his obligation to pay support
in arrears.

Petitioners above submission is flawed by the premises holding it together. For firstly, it
assumes as a fact that what was sold for P5 Million was indeed his exclusive property.But, as
the CA aptly observed, there is no showing whether the property subject of the transaction
mentioned by [the petitioner] is a conjugal property or [his] exclusive property, as in fact
[respondents] mother asserts that she and [petitioner] had separately sold their respective
shares on said property.[15]

Secondly, the respondent sisters were not party to the sale aforementioned. Petitioners
suggestion, therefore, that part of the proceeds of the sale went to them and may be set off for
what petitioner owes them by way of support in arrears is unacceptable, being at best
gratuitous and self-serving.

Petitioner, unlike any good father of a family, has been remiss in his duty to provide
respondents with support practically all throughout their growing years. At bottom, the sisters
have been deprived by a neglectful father of the basic necessities in life as if it is their fault to
have been born. This disposition is thus nothing more than a belated measure to right a wrong
done the herein respondents who are no less petitioners daughters.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the appealed CA decision and
resolution are AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
 OBLIGATION OF A FOREIGN NATIONAL TO SUPPORT HIS MINOR
CHILD UNDER PHILIPPINE LAW

Petitioner Norma and respondent Ernst Johan contracted marriage in Holland. They
were blessed with a son named Roderigo, who at the time of the filing of the
instant petition was sixteen (16) years of age.

Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by

the appropriate Court of Holland. At that time, their son was only eighteen (18)
months old. Thereafter, petitioner and her son came home to the Philippines.

According to petitioner, respondent made a promise to provide monthly support to

their son in the amount of Two Hundred Fifty (250) Guildene (which is equivalent
to Php17,500.00 more or less). However, since the arrival of petitioner and her son
in the Philippines, respondent never gave support to the son, Roderigo.

Not long thereafter, respondent came to the Philippines and remarried in Cebu City,
and since then, have been residing thereat. Petitioner, through her counsel, sent a
letter demanding for support from respondent. However, respondent refused to
receive the letter.

Because of the foregoing circumstances, petitioner filed a complaint affidavit with

the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City against respondent for violation of Section 5,
paragraph E(2) of R.A. No. 9262 for the latters unjust refusal to support
his minor child with petitioner. Thereafter, the Provincial Prosecutor ofCebu
City issued a Resolution recommending the filing of an information for the crime
charged against herein respondent with the RTC -Cebu.

The RTC-Cebu issued the herein assailed Order, dismissing the instant criminal
case against respondent on the ground that the facts charged in the information do
not constitute an offense with respect to the respondent who is an alien ,

Thereafter, petitioner filed her Motion for Reconside ration thereto reiterating
respondents obligation to support their child under Article 195 of the Family Code,
thus, failure to do so makes him liable under R.A. No. 9262 which "equally applies
to all persons in the Philippines who are obliged to support
theirminor children regardless of the obligors nationality."
The RTC-Cebu issued an Order denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.

ISSUE:
Does a foreign national have an obligation to support his minor child under our
Philippine Law?

RULING:
A foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child. Petitioner cannot
rely on Article 195 of the New Civil Code in demanding support from respondent,
who is a foreign citizen, since Article 15 of the New Civil Code stresses the
principle of nationality. In other words, insofar as Philippine laws are concerned,
specifically the provisions of the Family Code on support, the same only applies
to Filipino citizens. By analogy, the same principle app lies to foreigners such that
they are governed by their national law with respect to family rights and duties.

The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under family rights
and duties. Since the respondent is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands he is
subject to the laws of his country, not to Philippine law , as to whether he is obliged
to give support to his child, as well as the consequences of his failure to do so.

It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that the respondent is not obl iged to support
petitioners son under Article 195 of the Family Code as a consequence of
theDivorce Covenant obtained in Holland. This does not, however, mean that
respondent is not obliged to support petitioners son altogether.

In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute
or case has the burden of proving the foreign law. In the present case, respondent
hastily concludes that being a national of the Netherlands, he is governed by such
laws on the matter of provision of and capacity to support. While respondent
pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing his position that he is not obliged
to support his son, he never proved the same.

It is incumbent upon respondent to plead and prove that the national law of th e
Netherlands does not impose upon the parents the obligation to support their child
(either before, during or after the issuance of a divorce decree). In view of
respondents failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands in his favor, the
doctrine of processual presumption shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the foreign
law involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that the
foreign law is the same as our local or domestic or internal law. Thus, since the
law of the Netherlands as regards the obligation to support has not been properly
pleaded and proved in the instant case, it is presumed to be the same with
Philippine law, which enforces the obligation of parents to support
their children and penalizing the non-compliance therewith. Such obligation is still
duly enforceable in the Philippines because it would be of great injustice to the
child to be denied of financial support when the latter is entitled thereto.

G.R. No. 193707, December 10, 2014

NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO, for and in behalf of her minor child RODERIGO
NORJO VAN WILSEM,Petitioner, vs. ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN
WILSEM, Respondent.

PERALTA, J.:

Lim vs Lim GR No 163209 30 October 2009

POSTED BY RACHEL CHAN IN CASE DIGESTS, REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW 2

LEAVE A COMMENT
Facts: Grandparents (Chua Giak and Mariano Lim), parents (Prudencio and Filomena Lim) and their son
Edward and his wife Cheryl and their 3 minor children (Lester Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano III)
all live in the same house. Edwards earning in the family business of 6k shouldered the family
expenses as Cheryl has no steady source of income. When Cheryl caught Edward with Chua Giaks
midwife, she left the house together with the 3 children. Cheryl sued Edward and his parents for
support. RTC ordered Edward to provide monthly support of 6k pendente lite.
RTC rendered judgment ordering Edward and his parents to jointly provide 40k monthly support to
respondents, with Edward shouldering 6k and petitioners the balance of 34k subject to his parents
subsidiary liability. His parents appealed to CA contending that while Edwards income is insufficient,
the law itself sanctions its effects by providing that legal support should be in keeping with the financial
capacity of the family under Article 194 of the Civil Code, as amended by Executive Order No. 209. CA
affirmed RTC ruling.
The law on support under Article 195 of the Family Code is clear on this matter. Parents and their
legitimate children are obliged to mutually support one another and this obligation extends down to the
legitimate grandchildren and great grandchildren.
In connection with this provision, Article 200 paragraph (3) of the Family Code clearly provides that
should the person obliged to give support does not have sufficient means to satisfy all claims, the other
persons enumerated in Article 199 in its order shall provide the necessary support. This is because the
closer the relationship of the relatives, the stronger the tie that binds them. Thus, the obligation to
support is imposed first upon the shoulders of the closer relatives and only in their default is the
obligation moved to the next nearer relatives and so on.
Issue: WON Edwards parents are concurrently liable with him to provide support.
Decision: SC affirmed decision. Modified the judgment by limiting the liability to the amount of
monthly support needed by the children. Edwards parents partial concurrent obligation extends only to
their descendants as this word is commonly understood to refer to relatives, by blood of lower degree.
The obligation to provide legal support passes on to ascendants not only upon default of the parents
but also for the latters inability to provide sufficient support. This inability of Edward and Cheryl to
sufficiently provide for their children shifts a portion of their obligation to the ascendants in the nearest
degree, both in the paternal (petitioners) and maternal lines, following the ordering in Article 199.

Beckett vs Sarmiento

Facts: Geoffrey Beckett, an Australian was previously married to Eltesa Densing Beckett, a
Filipina and out of marriage, Geoffrey Beckett Jr. was born.
In 2006, Eltesa filed a case against Beckett in violation of R.A 7160 followed by a suit for the
declaration of nullity of marriage. For his part, Beckett commenced criminal charges against Eltesa,
one was for adultery. Both ended in sala of Judge Olegario Sarmiento Jr.

The couples legal battle ended when Judge Sarmiento rendered judgment based on a
compromise agreement and categorically agreed that Beckett shall have full and permanent
custody over Geoffrey Jr, 5 years old, subject to visitation rights of Eltesa.

Eltesa failed to return the custody of Geoffrey Jr. to Beckett prompting him to file a case against
Eltesa in violation of R.A 7160 and for the turnover of Geoffrey Jr under his custody.

After going through proceedings, Judge Sarmiento rendered a judgment granting the custody of
Geoffrey Jr to Eltesa.

Issue: Whether or not Judge Sarmiento is guilty of gross ignorance of the law in granting the
custody of Geoffrey Jr. to Eltesa.
Ruling: No. In disputes concerning post-separation custody over a minor, the well-settled rule
is that no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds
compelling reasons to order otherwise. And if already 7 years of age, the childs choice as to which
parents he prefers shall be respected, unless the parent chosen proves to be unfit. Further, in all
actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social institutions, courts of
law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interest of the child shall be a primary
consideration.
A custody agreement can never be regarded as a permanent and unbending, such that
agreement would no longer be to the childs best interest.
The Matter Of Custody Is Not Permanent And Unalterable. If The Parent Who Was Given Custody
Suffers A Future Character Change And Becomes Unfit, The Matter Of Custody Can Always Be Re-
examined And Adjusted
A custody agreement can never be regarded as permanent and unbending, the simple reason being that
the situation of the parents and even of the child can change, such that sticking to the agreed arrangement
would no longer be to the latters best interest. In a very real sense, then, a judgment involving the custody of
a minor child cannot be accorded the force and effect of res judicata
Geoffrey, an Australian national, married Eltesa, a Filipina. Their union produced a child, Geoffrey
Jr. Their marriage, however, did not last long. Charges and counter-charges flew between the
parties. Eltesa filed a case against Geoffrey for violation of RA 7610, as well as a civil case for
declaration of nullity of marriage in Civil Case No. CEB-32254. Geoffrey, on the other hand, filed a
case for adultery against Eltesa. Their legal battle were settled in CEB-32254, before the sala of
Judge Olegario Sarmiento Jr., when he rendered a judgment based on compromise agreement;
their agreement provided that Geoffrey shall have custody of the child, subject to the visitation
rights of Eltesa. They agreed to withdraw the case they filed against each other. Geoffrey also
agreed to visit Eltesa every year in Cebu, bringing Geoffrey Jr. with him. Thus, Geoffrey brought
his junior to Australia, where all his other children live. They visited Altesa every year starting 2007.
During the 2010 visit, Geoffrey agreed to leave Geoff Jr with Eltesa, provided she return him to her
by January 9, 2011. Because Eltesa did not comply with her promise, Geoffrey filed a case against
her for violation of RA 7610. And a petition for issuance of writ of habeas corpus, which feel on the
sala of Judge Sarmiento.
Geoffrey later on filed a case against Judge Sarmiento. According to him Judge Sarmiento should
be held administratively liable for:
a) Gross ignorance of the law, when he gave provisional custody of Geoffrey Jr to Eltesa, despite
the fact that there is already a judgment based on compromise agreement wherein Geoffrey was
awarded custody over his son;
b.) Manifest Partiality, when he allowed a certain Helen Sy to enter his chambers, his habit of
covering with Eltesa in the local Cebuano dialect, and of adjourning the hearing when he was
conversing with his lawyer in private.
In his answer to the complaint against him, Judge Sarmiento denied all the allegations against him.
According to him, he deferred judgment on Geoffreys motion to await the report of the social
worker who conducted the case study report, and denied complainants motion for reconsideration
upon receipt of the report which recommended that Geoffrey Jr stay with his mother. The reports
noted that (1) complainant always leaves him (Geoffrey Jr) to the care of his older half-brother or
his fathers girlfriends; (2) he was at one time sent out of the house by one of complainants
girlfriends and he had to stay in the garage alone; and (3) he never wanted to stay with
complainant whom he feared and who once locked him in his room without food. In their respective
reports, Dr. Obra and Dr. Saycon, a psychiatrist, both strongly recommended that custody over
Geoffrey, Jr. be given to Eltesa.
He also denied being partial towards Eltesa. He does not know the Helen Sy alleged by
complainant, and in fact he already inhibited himself from the case.
The Office of the Court Administrator, after investigation, recommended that the charge for
Manifest Partiality be dismissed, but recommended that the judge be held liable for Gross
Ignorance of the Law when he disregarded the compromise agreement and granted custody of
Geoffrey Jr to Eltesa on a mere Motion for Reconsideration.
The Supreme Court:
The Court cannot go along with complainants above posture. Respondent judge, in granting
provisional custody over Geoffrey, Jr. in favor of his mother, Eltesa, did not disregard the res
judicata rule. The more appropriate description of the legal situation engendered by the March 15,
2011 Order issued amidst the persistent plea of the child not to be returned to his father, is that
respondent judge exhibited fidelity to jurisprudential command to accord primacy to the welfare and
interest of a minor child. As it were, the matter of custody, to borrow from Espiritu v. Court of
Appeals, is not permanent and unalterable [and] can always be re-examined and adjusted. And
as aptly observed in a separate opinion in Dacasin v. Dacasin, a custody agreement can never be
regarded as permanent and unbending, the simple reason being that the situation of the parents
and even of the child can change, such that sticking to the agreed arrangement would no longer be
to the latters best interest. In a very real sense, then, a judgment involving the custody of a minor
child cannot be accorded the force and effect of res judicata.
Now to another point. In disputes concerning post-separation custody over a minor, the well-
settled rule is that no child under seven (7) years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless
the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. And if already over 7 years of age, the
childs choice as to which of his parents he prefers to be under custody shall be respected, unless
the parent chosen proves to be unfit. Finally, in Perez v. Court of Appeals, We held that in custody
cases, the foremost consideration is always the welfare and best interest of the child, as reflected
in no less than the U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child which provides that [i]n all actions
concerning children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of
law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary
consideration.
In the light of the foregoing, respondent judge cannot be held guilty of the charges hurled by the
complainant against him for the reason that absent a finding of strong reasons to rule otherwise,
the preference of a child over 7 years of age as to whom he desired to live with shall be respected.
Moreover, custody, even if previously granted by a competent court in favor of a parent, is not, to
reiterate, permanent. In Espiritu, We ruled that:
x x x [T]he matter of custody is not permanent and unalterable. If the parent who was given
custody suffers a future character change and becomes unfit, the matter of custody can always be
re-examined and adjusted x x x. To be sure, the welfare, the best interests, the benefit, and the
good of the child must be determined as of the time that either parent is chosen to be the
custodian. x x x

SALIENTES v. ABANILLA Petitioner: Marie Antonette Abigail C. Salientes, Orlando B. Salientes, and Rosario C.
Salientes Respondent: Loran S.D. Abanilla, Honorable Judge Pedro Sabundayo, Jr., Regional Trial Court,
Branch 203, Muntinlupa City. Ponente: Quisumbing, J.

Short Facts and Doctrine/s: Loran and Marie are the parents of minor Lorenzo. They lived together with the
parents of Marie. Due to in-laws problems Loran suggested they move to their own house. Marie refused but
Loran left anyway. Marie and her parents prevented Loran from seeing his son. Loran filed this case for habeas
corpus. Marie contends that the petition for Habeas Corpus is not the appropriate remedy and that she is entitled,
under Art. 213 of the Family Code, to the custody of the minor. Habeas Corpus may be resorted to in cases
where rightful custody is withheld from a person entitled thereto. Under Article 211 of the Family Code,
respondent Loran and petitioner Marie have joint parental authority over their son and consequently joint custody.
In the present case, private respondents cause of action is the deprivation of his right to see his child as alleged
in his petition. Hence, the remedy of habeas corpus is available to him. Article 213 of the Family Code deals with
the judicial adjudication of the custody and serves as a guideline for the proper award of custody by the court. It
is not a basis for preventing the father to see his own child.

Facts: Loran Abanilla (Loran) and Marie Antonette Abigail Salientes (Marie) are the parents of the minor
Lorenzo Emmanuel Abanilla, who was at the time two years old. The couple lived together with Maries
parents, petitioners Orlando and Rosario Salientes. Due to in-laws problems, Loran suggested that they transfer
to their own house. Marie refused. Loran left anyway and was thereafter prevented from seeing his son. Loran
filed a petition for Habeas Corpus and Custody in the RTC of Muntinlupa City. The court ordered Marie and
her parents to produce and bring before the court the body of the minor Lorenzo in order to show cause why the
said child should not be discharged from restraint. Marie moved for a reconsideration of the above order which
was denied She then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA which was also dismissed. The CA held that the
order of the RTC did not award to anyone the custody of the Lorenzo, the order merely directs petitioners to
produce the Lorenzo in order for the trial court to conduct a full inquiry in the matter of his custody. This is a mere
interlocutory order which is not appealable. Hence this appeal by certiorari. Marie and her parents contend
that the order is contrary to Article 213 of the Family Code which provides that no child under seven years of age
shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. They maintain
that Loran has failed to present any evidence of any compelling reason. They also argue, that assuming that
there were compelling reasons, the proper remedy of Loran was not habeas corpus but a simple action for
custody. They assert that habeas corpus is unavailable against the mother who, under the law, has the right of
custody of the minor. Loran, on the other hand argues that Art. 213 applies only to the second part of his
petition regarding the custody of his son. It does not address the first part, which pertains to his right as the father
to see his son. He asserts that a writ of habeas corpus is available against any person who restrains the minors
right to see his father and vice versa. He also asserts that the complaints filed by Marie were merely for delay.
Loran also maintains that, under the law, both him and Marie share custody of Lorenzo and when Marie is out of
the country, as required by her job as an international flight stewardess, he should have the custody of Lorenzo
and not the maternal grandparents.

Issue: W/N Habeas Corpus was the appropriate remedy.

Ruling: Yes. Ratio: Habeas Corpus may be resorted to in cases where rightful custody is withheld from a person
entitled thereto. Under Article 211 of the Family Code, respondent Loran and petitioner Marie Antonette have
joint parental authority over their son and consequently joint custody. Although the couple is separated de
facto, the issue of custody has yet to be adjudicated by the court. In the absence of a juridical grant of custody to
one parent, both parents are still entitled to the custody of their child. In the present case, private respondents
cause of action is the deprivation of his right to see his child as alleged in his petition. Hence, the remedy of
habeas corpus is available to him. In a petition for habeas corpus, the childs welfare is the supreme
consideration. The Child and Youth Welfare Code unequivocally provides that in all questions regarding the care
and custody, among others, of the child, his welfare shall be the paramount consideration. The order of the
court to produce the body of the minor before the court was merely in line with the directive contained in Section
9 of A.M. 03-04-04-SC. Moreover, Article 213 of the Family Code deals with the judicial adjudication of the
custody and serves as a guideline for the proper award of custody by the court. It is not a basis for preventing the
father to see his own child. Disposition: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated November
10, 2003 and the Resolution dated March 19, 2004 of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 75680 are AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioners. SO ORDERED
G.R. No. 166682 November 27, 2009NOEL B. BAGTAS, Petitioner, vs.HON. RUTH C.
SANTOS, Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court, Branch 72, Antipolo City, and
ANTONIO and ROSITA GALLARDO, Respondents.

Maryl Joy is the love child of Maricel, who ran away from her parents Antonio and Rosita, and
lived with her boyfriend. After the birth of Maryl Joy, Maricels boyfriend ran away. Maricel
went back to her parents in 2002, but left on the same day, and went to the house of Noel Bagtas.
There, she entrusted to Noel the custody of Maryl, and left behind a note relinquishing her
parental rights over Maryl to Noel. When the parents of Maricel learned about this, they filed a
petition for habeas corpus before the Regional Trial Court to produce the body of the child
Marul.
At the Regional Trial Court, both parties agreed to a shared custody of Maryl, where the
grandparents took custody of her during weekends. The Regional Trial Court approved the
agreement.
Unfortunately, the grandparents took the child away and brought her to Samar, hence Noel filed
a motion to cite in contempt Rosita and Antonio. They also filed a motion to dismiss the petition
for habeas corpus based on Rule 17 of the Rules of Court, citing the plaintiffs refusal to comply
with a lawful order of the court.
Indeed, the RTC cited the grandparents in contempt, and dismissed the petition for habeas corpus
filed by them, but on a different ground, this one for being moot and academic, custody of Maryl
thereof having been awarded to the grandparents, holding that in habeas corpus cases involving
minors, it is not only illegal detention or confinement but rightful custody of the minor which
may be adjudicated.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the Regional Trial Court.
In petitions for custody involving minors, is award of custody to the rightful parents or guardian
automatic?
In determining who has the rightful custody over a child, the childs welfare is the most
important consideration. The court is not bound by any legal right of a person over the child. In
Sombong v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that:
The controversy does not involve the question of personal freedom, because an infant is
presumed to be in the custody of someone until he attains majority age. In passing on the writ in
a child custody case, the court deals with a matter of an equitable nature. Not bound by any mere
legal right of parent or guardian, the court gives his or her claim to the custody of the child due
weight as a claim founded on human nature and considered generally equitable and just.
Therefore, these cases are decided, not on the legal right of the petitioner to be relieved from
unlawful imprisonment or detention, as in the case of adults, but on the courts view of the best
interests of those whose welfare requires that they be in custody of one person or another. Hence,
the court is not bound to deliver a child into the custody of any claimant or of any person, but
should, in the consideration of the facts, leave it in such custody as its welfare at the time appears
to require. In short, the childs welfare is the supreme consideration.
Considering that the childs welfare is an all-important factor in custody cases, the Child and
Youth Welfare Code unequivocally provides that in all questions regarding the care and custody,
among others, of the child, his welfare shall be the paramount consideration. In the same vein,
the Family Code authorizes the courts to, if the welfare of the child so demands, deprive the
parents concerned of parental authority over the child or adopt such measures as may be proper
under the circumstances. (Emphasis supplied)
In Sombong, the Court laid down three requisites in petitions for habeas corpus involving
minors: (1) the petitioner has a right of custody over the minor, (2) the respondent is withholding
the rightful custody over the minor, and (3) the best interest of the minor demands that he or she
be in the custody of the petitioner. In the present case, these requisites are not clearly established
because the RTC hastily dismissed the action and awarded the custody of Maryl Joy to the
Spouses Gallardo without conducting any trial.
The proceedings before the RTC leave so much to be desired. While a remand of the case would
mean further delay, Maryl Joys best interest demands that proper proceedings be conducted to
determine the fitness of the Spouses Gallardo to take care of her.
.

VANCIL VS. BELMES

FACTS: The RTC appointed Bonifacia Vancil, an American citizen, as legal and judicial guardian over the persons and
estate of Valerie and Vincent, the children of her deceased son Reeder. Helen Belmes, the natural mother of the minor
children, instituted a motion for removal of Guardianship and Appointment of Vancil, asserting that she is the natural
mother in custody of and exercising parental authority over the subject minors. Trial court rejected Belmes'petition. The
CA reversed the RTC order. Since Valerie had reached the age of majority at the time the case reached the SC, the
Court resolves to determine who between the mother and grandmother of minor Vincent should be his guardian.

ISSUE: Whether Helen Belmes is the sole guardian of the minor Vincent.

RULING:
Belmes, being the natural mother of Vincent, has the preferential right to be his guardian. Art. 211 of the FC states:
"The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their common children. In case
of disagreement, the fathers decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the contrary. xxx."

Vancil, as the surviving grandparent, can exercise substitute parental authority only in case of death, absence or
unsuitability of Belmes. Considering that Belmes is still alive and has exercised continuously parental authority over
Vincent, Vancil has to prove Belmes'unsuitability. Assuming that Belmes is unfit as a guardian of Vincent, still Vancil
cannot qualify as a substitute guardian. She admitted in her petition that an expatriate like her will find difficulty of
discharging the duties of a guardian. As the Court held in Guerrero vs Teran, the courts should not appoint persons as
guardians who are not within the jurisdiction of the courts as they will find it difficult to protect the wards.

SPECIAL PARENTAL AUTHORITY OF SCHOOLS

When can the school be held liable for injury of students within the school premises?

Facts of the case:

On November 17, 1994, at around 1:30 in the afternoon inside St. Joseph Colleges (SJCs) premises, the class to which Jayson Val
Miranda belonged was conducting a science experiment about fusion of sulphur powder and iron fillings under the tutelage of
Rosalinda Tabugo, she being the subject teacher and employee of SJC.

Tabugo left her class while it was doing the experiment. In the middle of the experiment, Jayson, who was the assistant leader of
one of the class groups, checked the result of the experiment by looking into the test tube with magnifying glass. The test tube was
being held by one of his group mates who moved it close and towards the eye of Jayson. At that instance, the compound in the test
tube spurted out and several particles of which hit Jaysons eye and the different parts of the bodies of some of his group mates. As
a result thereof, Jaysons eyes were chemically burned, particularly his left eye, for which he had to undergo surgery and had to
spend for his medication.

On December 6, 1994, the parents of Jayson, through counsel, wrote SJC a letter demanding that it should shoulder all the medical
expenses of Jayson that had been incurred and will be incurred further arising from the accident caused by the science experiment.
In a letter dated December 14, 1994, the counsel for SJC, represented by Sr. Josephini Ambatali, SFIC, explained that the school
cannot accede to the demand because the accident occurred by reason of [Jaysons] failure to comply with the written procedure
for the experiment and his teachers repeated warnings and instruction that no student must face, much less look into, the opening
of the test tube until the heated compound has cooled.

Since SJC did not accede to the demand, Rodolfo Miranda, Jaysons father, sued for damages Jaysons behalf.
After trial, the Regional Trial Court rendered judgment awarding actual damages, moral damages and attorneys fees in favor of
Jayson.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the Regional Trial Court. Thus, SJC Sr. Josephini Ambatali, SFIC, and Rosalinda
Tabugo (petitioners) filed the instant case to the Supreme Court.

Findings and Decision of the Supreme Court:

The Supreme Court found no reason to depart from the uniform rulings of the lower courts that petitioners were negligent since they
all failed to exercise the required reasonable care, prudence, caution and foresight to prevent or avoid injuries to the students.

Petitioners claim that the proximate cause of Jaysons injury was his own negligence in disregarding the instructions given by
Tabugo prior to the experiment and peeking into the test tube did not convince the Supreme Court.

As found by both lower courts, the proximate cause of Jaysons injury was the concurrent failure of petitioners to prevent the
foreseeable mishap that occurred during the conduct of the science experiment. All of the petitioners are equally at fault and are
liable for negligence because all of them are responsible for exercising the required reasonable care, prudence, caution and
foresight to prevent or avoid injuries to the students. The individual petitioners are persons charged with the teaching and vigilance
over their students as well as the supervision and ensuring of their well-being. Sr. Josephini Ambatali is likewise culpable under the
doctrine of command responsibility because the other individual petitioners were under her direct control and supervision. The
negligent acts of the other individual petitioners were done within the scope of their assigned tasks.

Article 218 of the Family Code, in relation to Article 2180 of the Civil Code, bestows special parental authority on the following
persons with the corresponding obligation, thus:

Art. 218. The school, its administrators and teachers, or the individual, entity or institution engaged in child care shall have special
parental authority and responsibility over the minor child while under their supervision, instruction or custody.

Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or
institution.

Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or omissions, but also for those of
persons for whom one is responsible.

Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or
apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.

Petitioners negligence and failure to exercise the requisite degree of care and caution is demonstrated by the following:

1. Petitioner school did not take affirmative steps to avert damage and injury to its students although it had full information on the
nature of dangerous science experiments conducted by the students during class;

2. Petitioner school did not install safety measures to protect the students who conduct experiments in class;

3. Petitioner school did not provide protective gears and devices, specifically goggles, to shield students from expected risks and
dangers; and

4. Petitioner Tabugo was not inside the classroom the whole time her class conducted the experiment, specifically, when the
accident involving Jayson occurred. In any event, the size of the classfifty (50) students conducting the experiment is difficult to
monitor. (St. Josephs College, Sr., Josephini Ambatali, SFIC, and Rosalinda Tabugo vs. Jayson Miranda, represented by his father,
Rodolfo Miranda, G. R. No. 182353, June 29, 2010).

REPUBLIC V. GRANADA

G.R. No. 187512, [June 13, 2012]

DOCTRINE:

Even if the RTC erred in ruling that therespondent was able to prove her well-founded belief that
her absent spouse was already dead, such order already final and can no longer be modified or
reversed. Indeed, [n]othing is more settled in law than that when a judgment becomes final and
executory, it becomes immutable and unalterable. The same may no longer be modified in any
respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous
conclusion of fact or law.
FACTS:

Cyrus and Yolanda Granada, both employees of Sumida Electric Company, got married in 1993.

Sometime in May 1994, when Sumida Electric Philippines closed down, Cyrus went to Taiwan to
seek employment. Yolanda claimed that from that time, she did not receive any communication
from her husband, notwithstanding efforts to locate him. Her brother testified that he
had asked the relatives of Cyrus regarding the latters whereabouts, to no avail.

After nine (9) years of waiting, Yolanda filed a Petition to have Cyrus declared presumptively dead
with the RTC Lipa City. On 7 February 2005, the RTC rendered a Decision declaring Cyrus as
presumptively dead.

On 10 March 2005, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the OSG, filed a Motion
for Reconsideration of this Decision. Petitioner argued that Yolanda had failed to exert earnest
efforts to locate Cyrus and thus failed to prove her well-founded belief that he was already dead.
The motion was denied. The OSG then elevated the case on appeal to the Court of Appeals. Yolanda
filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the CA had no jurisdiction over the appeal. She argued
that her Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death, based on Article 41 of the Family Code, was
a summary judicial proceeding, in which the judgment is immediately final and executory and,
thus, not appealable.

The appellate court granted Yolandas Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
Citing Republic v. Bermudez-Lorino, the CA ruled that a petition for declaration of presumptive
death under Rule 41 of the Family Code is a summaryproceeding. Thus, judgment thereon is
immediately final and executory upon notice to the parties.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration, which was denied. Hence, the present petition under Rule
45.

ISSUES:

1. Whether the order of the RTC in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death
is immediately final and executory upon notice to the parties and, hence, is not subject to ordinary
appeal.

2. Whether the CA erred in affirming the RTCs grant of the petition for declaration of presumptive
death based on evidence that respondent had presented.

HELD:

Yes, the declaration of presumptive death is finaland immediately executory. Even if the RTC erred
in granting the petition, such order can no longer be assailed.

RATIO:

1. A petition for declaration of presumptive death of an absent spouse for the purpose of
contracting a subsequent marriage under Article 41 of the Family Code is a summary proceeding
as provided for under the Family Code. Taken together, Articles 41, 238, 247 and 253 of the
Family Code provide that since a petition for declaration of presumptive death is
a summary proceeding, the judgment of the court therein shall be immediately final and executory.
By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary proceeding shall be
immediately final and executory. As a matter of course, it follows that no appeal can be had of the
trial courts judgment in a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of an
absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. It goes without saying, however, that an
aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari to question abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction. Such petition should be filed in the Court of Appeals in accordance with the
Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts. To be sure, even if the Courts original jurisdiction to issue a writ
of certiorari is concurrent with the RTCs and the Court of Appeals in certain cases, such
concurrence does not sanction an unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. From the decision
of the Court of Appeals, the losing party may then file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court with the Supreme Court. This is because the errors which the court may
commit in the exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which are the proper subject of
an appeal.

In sum, under Article 41 of the Family Code, the losing party in a summaryproceeding for the
declaration of presumptive death may file a petition for certiorari with the CA on the ground that,
in rendering judgment thereon, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction. From the decision of the CA, the aggrieved party may elevate the matter to this
Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

2. Petitioner also assails the RTCs grant of the Petition for Declaration of Presumptive Death of the
absent spouse of respondent on the ground that she had not adduced the evidence required to
establish a well-founded belief that her absent spouse was already dead, as expressly required by
Article 41 of the Family Code.

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse
present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent
spouse.

The spouse present is, thus, burdened to prove that his spouse has been absent and that he has a
well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead before the present spouse may contract a
subsequent marriage. The law does not define what is meant by a well-grounded belief is a state of
the mind or condition prompting the doing of an overt act. It may be proved by direct evidence or
circumstantial evidence which may tend, even in a slight degree, to elucidate the inquiry or assist to
a determination probably founded in truth. Any fact or circumstance relating to the character,
habits, conditions, attachments, prosperity and objects of life which usually control the conduct of
men, and are the motives of their actions, was, so far as it tends to explain or characterize their
disappearance or throw light on their intentions, competence evidence on the ultimate question of
his death.

The belief of the present spouse must be the result of proper and honest to goodness inquiries and
efforts to ascertain the whereabouts of the absent spouse and whether the absent spouse is still
alive or is already dead. Whether or not the spouse present acted on a well-founded belief of death
of the absent spouse depends upon the inquiries to be drawn from a great many circumstances
occurring before and after the disappearance of the absent spouse and the nature and extent of the
inquiries made by present spouse. (Footnotes omitted, underscoring supplied.)

Applying the foregoing standards to the present case, petitioner points out that respondent Yolanda
did not initiate a diligent search to locate her absent husband. While her brother Diosdado Cadacio
testified to having inquired about the whereabouts of Cyrus from the latters relatives, these
relatives were not presented to corroborate Diosdados testimony. In short, respondent
was allegedly not diligent in her search for her husband. Petitioner argues

that if she were, she would have sought information from the Taiwanese Consular Office or
assistance from other government agencies in Taiwan or the Philippines. She could have also
utilized mass media for this end, but she did not. Worse, she failed to explain these omissions.

The Republics arguments are well-taken. Nevertheless, we are constrained to deny the Petition.

The RTC ruling on the issue of whether respondent was able to prove her well-founded belief that
her absent spouse was already dead prior to her filing of the Petition to declare him presumptively
dead is already final and can no longer be modified or reversed. Indeed, [n]othing is more settled
in law than that when a judgment becomes final and executory, it becomes immutable and
unalterable. The same may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant
to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law.