Magallona v.
Ermita Petitioner now assails the constitutionality of the law for three main
(Case Digest)
MAGALLONA v. ERMITA, G.R. 187167, August 16, 2011
Facts:
In 1961, Congress passed R.A. 3046 demarcating the maritime
baselines of the Philippines as an Archepelagic State pursuant to
UNCLOS I of 9158, codifying the sovereignty of State parties over
their territorial sea. Then in 1968, it was amended by R.A. 5446,
correcting some errors in R.A. 3046 reserving the drawing of
baselines around Sabah.
In 2009, it was again amended by R.A. 9522, to be compliant with
the UNCLOS III of 1984. The requirements complied with are: to
shorten one baseline, to optimize the location of some basepoints
and classify KIG and Scarborough Shoal as regime of islands.
reasons:
1. it reduces the Philippine maritime territory under Article 1;
2. it opens the countrys waters to innocent and sea lanes passages
hence undermining our sovereignty and security; and
3. treating KIG and Scarborough as regime of islands would
weaken our claim over those territories.
Issue: Whether R.A. 9522 is constitutional?
Ruling:
1. UNCLOS III has nothing to do with acquisition or loss of
territory. it is just a codified norm that regulates conduct of States.
On the other hand, RA 9522 is a baseline law to mark out basepoints
along coasts, serving as geographic starting points to measure. it
merely notices the international community of the scope of our
maritime space.
2. If passages is the issue, domestically, the legislature can enact
legislation designating routes within the archipelagic waters to
regulate innocent and sea lanes passages. but in the absence of such,
international law norms operate.
the fact that for archipelagic states, their waters are subject to both
passages does not place them in lesser footing vis a vis continental
coastal states. Moreover, RIOP is a customary international law, no
modern state can invoke its sovereignty to forbid such passage.
3. On the KIG issue, RA 9522 merely followed the basepoints
mapped by RA 3046 and in fact, it increased the Phils. total
maritime space. Moreover, the itself commits the Phils. continues
claim of sovereignty and jurisdiction over KIG.
If not, it would be a breach to 2 provisions of the UNCLOS III:
Art. 47 (3): drawing of basepoints shall not depart to any
appreciable extent from the general configuration of the
archipelago.
Art 47 (2): the length of baselines shall not exceed 100 mm.
KIG and SS are far from our baselines, if we draw to include them,
well breach the rules: that it should follow the natural configuration
of the archipelago.
Henares v LTFRB (Environmental Law)
Henares v LTFRB
GR No. 158290
October 23, 2006
FACTS:
Petitioners challenge this Court to issue a writ of mandamus commanding
respondents Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board
(LTFRB) and the Department of Transportation and Communications
(DOTC) to require public utility vehicles (PUVs) to use compressed natural
gas (CNG) as alternative fuel.
ISSUES:
(1) Do petitioners have legal personality to bring this petition before us?
(2) Should mandamus issue against respondents to compel PUVs to use
CNG as alternative fuel?
APPLICABLE LAWS:
Section 16,12 Article II of the 1987 Constitution
The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced
and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
Section 414 of Republic Act No. 8749 otherwise known as the "Philippine
Clean Air Act of 1999." SEC. 4. Recognition of Rights. Pursuant to the
above-declared principles, the following rights of citizens are hereby
sought to be recognized and the State shall seek to guarantee their
enjoyment:
a) The right to breathe clean air;
b) The right to utilize and enjoy all natural resources according to the
principle of sustainable development;
c) The right to participate in the formulation, planning, implementation and
monitoring of environmental policies and programs and in the decision-
making process;
d) The right to participate in the decision-making process concerning
development policies, plans and programs, projects or activities that may
have adverse impact on the environment and public health;
e) The right to be informed of the nature and extent of the potential hazard
of any activity, undertaking or project and to be served timely notice of any
significant rise in the level of pollution and the accidental or deliberate
release into the atmosphere of harmful or hazardous substances;
f) The right of access to public records which a citizen may need to
exercise his or her rights effectively under this Act;
g) The right to bring action in court or quasi-judicial bodies to enjoin all
activities in violation of environmental laws and regulations, to compel the
rehabilitation and cleanup of affected area, and to seek the imposition of
penal sanctions against violators of environmental laws; and
h) The right to bring action in court for compensation of personal damages
resulting from the adverse environmental and public health impact of a
project or activity.
RULING:
(1) YES. There is no dispute that petitioners have standing to bring their
case before this Court. Moreover, as held previously, a party's standing
before this Court is a procedural technicality which may, in the exercise of
the Court's discretion, be set aside in view of the importance of the issue
raised. We brush aside this issue of technicality under the principle of the
transcendental importance to the public, especially so if these cases
demand that they be settled promptly.
(2) NO. plain, speedy and adequate remedy herein sought by petitioners,
i.e., a writ of mandamus commanding the respondents to require PUVs to
use CNG, is unavailing. Mandamus is available only to compel the doing
of an act specifically enjoined by law as a duty. Here, there is no law that
mandates the respondents LTFRB and the DOTC to order owners of
motor vehicles to use CNG. Mandamus will not generally lie from one
branch of government to a coordinate branch, for the obvious reason that
neither is inferior to the other.
Plaintiffs prayed that judgement be rendered ordering the respondent, his
agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to cancel all
existing Timber License Agreement (TLA) in the country and to cease and
desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new
TLAs.

It appears that more properly, the legislature should provide first the Defendant, on the other hand, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that
specific statutory remedy to the complex environmental problems bared by the complaint had no cause of action against him and that it raises a political
herein petitioners before any judicial recourse by mandamus is taken. question.

The RTC Judge sustained the motion to dismiss, further ruling that granting
of the relief prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts which is
Oposa vs. Factoran Case Digest (G.R. prohibited by the Constitution.

No. 101083, July 30, 1993)

FACTS:
Plaintiffs (petitioners) thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari
and asked the court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the
The plaintiffs in this case are all minors duly represented and joined by their
ground that the respondent RTC Judge gravely abused his discretion in
parents. The first complaint was filed as a taxpayer's class suit at the Branch
dismissing the action.
66 (Makati, Metro Manila), of the Regional Trial Court, National capital
Judicial Region against defendant (respondent) Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Reasources (DENR). Plaintiffs
alleged that they are entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the ISSUES:
natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests. They
further asseverate that they represent their generation as well as
generations yet unborn and asserted that continued deforestation have (1) Whether or not the plaintiffs have a cause of action.
caused a distortion and disturbance of the ecological balance and have
(2) Whether or not the complaint raises a political issue.
resulted in a host of environmental tragedies.
(3) Whether or not the original prayer of the plaintiffs result in the impairment
of contracts.
 and healthful ecology. Hence, the full protection thereof requires that no
further TLAs should be renewed or granted.
RULING:

After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, the Court finds it to

First Issue: Cause of Action.
be adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their
rights.

Respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a

specific legal right violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief
is provided by law. The Court did not agree with this. The complaint focuses
on one fundamental legal right -- the right to a balanced and healthful Second Issue: Political Issue.
ecology which is incorporated in Section 16 Article II of the Constitution. The
said right carries with it the duty to refrain from impairing the environment
and implies, among many other things, the judicious management and Second paragraph, Section 1 of Article VIII of the constitution provides for
conservation of the country's forests. Section 4 of E.O. 192 expressly the expanded jurisdiction vested upon the Supreme Court. It allows the
mandates the DENR to be the primary government agency responsible for Court to rule upon even on the wisdom of the decision of the Executive and
the governing and supervising the exploration, utilization, development and Legislature and to declare their acts as invalid for lack or excess of
conservation of the country's natural resources. The policy declaration of jurisdiction because it is tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
E.O. 192 is also substantially re-stated in Title XIV Book IV of the
Administrative Code of 1987. Both E.O. 192 and Administrative Code of
1987 have set the objectives which will serve as the bases for policy
formation, and have defined the powers and functions of the DENR. Thus,
right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and Third Issue: Violation of the non-impairment clause.
healthful ecology is as clear as DENR's duty to protect and advance the said
right.
The Court held that the Timber License Agreement is an instrument by
which the state regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or to the end that public welfare is promoted. It is not a contract within the
obligation to respect or protect or respect the same gives rise to a cause of purview of the due process clause thus, the non-impairment clause cannot
action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLA, which they claim be invoked. It can be validly withdraw whenever dictated by public interest
was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balance or public welfare as in this case. The granting of license does not create
irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property rights.

Moreover, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of
contract is limit by the exercise by the police power of the State, in the
interest of public health, safety, moral and general welfare. In short, the non-
impairment clause must yield to the police power of the State.
For more than 50 years before the Treaty of Paris, April 11, 1899, he and
his ancestors had held the land as recognized owners by the Igorots.
(grandfather maintain fences for holding cattle>father had cultivated parts
and used parts for pasturing cattle>he used it for pasture)

1893-1894 & 1896-1897: he made an application but with no avail

The instant petition, being impressed with merit, is hereby GRANTED and
the RTC decision is SET ASIDE. 1901: petition alleging ownership under the mortgage law and the lands
were registered to him but process only established possessory title

Even if the applicant have title, he cannot have it registered, because the

Land Titles And Deeds Case

Philippine Commission's Act No. 926, of 1903, excepts the Province of
Benguet among others from its operation

Digest: Carino V. Insular ISSUE: W/N Carino has ownership and is entitled to registration.
Government (1909) HELD: YES. Petition Granted.

449 February 23, 1909 Land was not registered, and therefore became, if it was not always,
Lessons Applicable: (Land Titles and Deeds) public land.

Sec. 2 Art. XII 1987 Constitution Spanish Law: "Where such possessors shall not be able to produce title
deeds, it shall be sufficient if they shall show that ancient possession, as a
FACTS: valid title by prescription." For cultivated land, 20 years, uninterrupted, is
Carino is an Igorot of the Province of Benguet, where the land lies filed enough. For uncultivated, 30.
for writ of error because the CFI and SC dismissed his petition for
application Applicant's possession was not unlawful, and no attempt at any such
proceedings against him or his father ever was made.
 Every native who had not a paper title is not a trespasser.
There must be a presumption against the government when a private
individual claims property as his or her own. It went so far as to say that
the lands will be deemed private absent contrary proof.
Cruz vs Secretary of DENR
Natural Resources and Environmental Law; Constitutional
Law; IPRA; Regalian Doctrine
GR. No. 135385, Dec. 6, 2000
FACTS:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for
prohibition and mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing
the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No.
8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of
1997 (IPRA) and its implementing rules and regulations (IRR).
The petitioners assail certain provisions of the IPRA and its IRR
on the ground that these amount to an unlawful deprivation of
the States ownership over lands of the public domain as well as
minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the
regalian doctrine embodied in section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution.
ISSUE:
Do the provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution?
HELD:
No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution.
Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in the law that grants to
the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural resources within their
ancestral domain. Ownership over the natural resources in the
ancestral domains remains with the State and the rights granted
by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in their
ancestral domains merely gives them, as owners and occupants
of the land on which the resources are found, the right to the
small scale utilization of these resources, and at the same time, a
priority in their large scale development and exploitation.
Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part
of the lands of the public domain. They are private lands and
belong to the ICCs/IPs by native title, which is a concept of
private land title that existed irrespective of any royal grant from
the State. However, the right of ownership and possession by the
ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains is a limited form of
ownership and does not include the right to alienate the same.
PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO VS 2. Whether or not there is a violation of the people's right to information on
matters of public concern (Art 3 Sec. 7) under a state policy of full disclosure of
GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE all its transactions involving public interest (Art 2, Sec 28) including public
PHILIPPINES consultation under RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991)
Posted by kaye lee on 9:43 PM
3. Whether or not the signing of the MOA, the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines would be binding itself
a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate
G.R. No. 183591 October 14 2008 state, or a juridical, territorial or political subdivision not recognized by law;

Province of North Cotabato vs Government of the Republic of the Philippines b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA;

c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for
ancestral domain in violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS
FACTS: PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997),

particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION,

On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) were scheduled to sign a Memorandum of RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)
Agreement of the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP - MILF Tripoli
Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, the petitioners RULINGS:
seek to compel respondents to disclose and furnish them the complete and official
1. Yes, the petitions are ripe for adjudication. The failure of the respondents to
copies of the MA-AD and to prohibit the slated signing of the MOA-AD and the
consult the local government units or communities affected constitutes a departure
holding of public consultation thereon. They also pray that the MOA-AD be
by respondents from their mandate under EO No. 3. Moreover, the respondents
declared unconstitutional. The Court issued a TRO enjoining the GRP from
exceeded their authority by the mere act of guaranteeing amendments to the
signing the same.
Constitution. Any alleged violation of the Constitution by any branch of
government is a proper matter for judicial review.

ISSUES: As the petitions involve constitutional issues which are of paramount public
interest or of transcendental importance, the Court grants the petitioners,
1. Whether or not the constitutionality and the legality of the MOA is ripe for petitioners-in-intervention and intervening respondents the requisite locus standi
adjudication; in keeping with the liberal stance adopted in David v. Macapagal- Arroyo.
In Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre, this Court held:
x x x [B]y the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the
challenged action, the dispute is said to have ripened into a judicial
controversy even without any other overt act . Indeed, even a singular violation
of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty.x x x x
By the same token, when an act of the President, who in our constitutional scheme
is a coequal of Congress, is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution
and the laws x x x settling the dispute becomes the duty and the responsibility of
the courts.
That the law or act in question is not yet effective does not negate ripeness.
2. Yes. The Court finds that there is a grave violation of the Constitution involved
in the matters of public concern (Sec 7 Art III) under a state policy of full
disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest (Art 2, Sec 28) including
public consultation under RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991).
(Sec 7 ArtIII) The right to information guarantees the right of the people to
demand information, while Sec 28 recognizes the duty of officialdom to give
information even if nobody demands. The complete and effective exercise of the
right to information necessitates that its complementary provision on public
disclosure derive the same self-executory nature, subject only to reasonable
safeguards or limitations as may be provided by law.
The contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of paramount public concern involving
public interest in the highest order. In declaring that the right to information
contemplates steps and negotiations leading to the consummation of the contract,
jurisprudence finds no distinction as to the executory nature or commercial
character of the agreement.
E.O. No. 3 itself is replete with mechanics for continuing consultations on both
national and local levels and for a principal forum for consensus-building. In fact,
it is the duty of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process to conduct regular
dialogues to seek relevant information, comments, advice, and recommendations
from peace partners and concerned sectors of society.
3.
a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE) as a separate
state, or a juridical, territorial or political subdivision not recognized by law;
Yes. The provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things, that the Parties
aimed to vest in the BJE the status of an associated state or, at any rate, a
status closely approximating it.
The concept of association is not recognized under the present Constitution.
No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under our
laws as having an associative relationship with the national government. Indeed,
the concept implies powers that go beyond anything ever granted by the
Constitution to any local or regional government. It also implies the recognition
of the associated entity as a state. The Constitution, however, does not
contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less
does it provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare any part of Philippine
territory for independence.
The BJE is a far more powerful entity than the autonomous region
recognized in the Constitution. It is not merely an expanded version of the
ARMM, the status of its relationship with the national government being
fundamentally different from that of the ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a state in all
but name as it meets the criteria of a state laid down in the Montevideo
Convention, namely, a permanent population, a defined territory, a
government, and a capacity to enter into relations with other states.
Even assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD would not necessarily sever any
portion of Philippine territory, the spirit animating it which has betrayed itself
by its use of the concept of association runs counter to the national sovereignty
and territorial integrity of the Republic.
The defining concept underlying the relationship between the national government
and the BJE being itself contrary to the present Constitution, it is not surprising
that many of the specific provisions of the MOA-AD on the formation and powers
of the BJE are in conflict with the Constitution and the laws. The BJE is more of a
state than an autonomous region. But even assuming that it is covered by the term
autonomous region in the constitutional provision just quoted, the MOA-AD
would still be in conflict with it.
b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to conform to the MOA:
The MOA-AD provides that any provisions of the MOA-AD requiring
amendments to the existing legal framework shall come into force upon the
signing of a Comprehensive Compact and upon effecting the necessary changes to
the legal framework, implying an amendment of the Constitution to
accommodate the MOA-AD. This stipulation, in effect, guaranteed to the
MILF the amendment of the Constitution .
It will be observed that the President has authority, as stated in her oath of office,
only to preserve and defend the Constitution. Such presidential power does not,
however, extend to allowing her to change the Constitution, but simply to
recommend proposed amendments or revision. As long as she limits herself to
recommending these changes and submits to the proper procedure for
constitutional amendments and revision, her mere recommendation need not be
construed as an unconstitutional act.
The suspensive clause in the MOA-AD viewed in light of the above-discussed
standards.
Given the limited nature of the Presidents authority to propose
constitutional amendments, she cannot guarantee to any third party that the
required amendments will eventually be put in place, nor even be submitted
to a plebiscite. The most she could do is submit these proposals as
recommendations either to Congress or the people, in whom constituent powers
are vested.
c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for
ancestral domain in violation of Republic Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT OF 1997),
particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION,
RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)
This strand begins with the statement that it is the birthright of all Moros and all
Indigenous peoples of Mindanao to identify themselves and be accepted as
Bangsamoros. It defines Bangsamoro people as the natives or original
inhabitants of Mindanao and its adjacent islands including Palawan and the Sulu
archipelago at the time of conquest or colonization, and their descendants whether
mixed or of full blood, including their spouses.
Thus, the concept of Bangsamoro, as defined in this strand of the MOA-AD,
includes not only Moros as traditionally understood even by Muslims, but all
indigenous peoples of Mindanao and its adjacent islands. The MOA-AD adds that
the freedom of choice of indigenous peoples shall be respected. What this freedom
of choice consists in has not been specifically defined. The MOA-AD proceeds to
refer to the Bangsamoro homeland, the ownership of which is vested
exclusively in the Bangsamoro people by virtue of their prior rights of occupation.
Both parties to the MOA-AD acknowledge that ancestral domain does not form
part of the public domain.
Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 provides for
clear-cut procedure for the recognition and delineation of ancestral domain, which
entails, among other things, the observance of the free and prior informed consent
of the Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples. Notably, the statute
does not grant the Executive Department or any government agency the power to
delineate and recognize an ancestral domain claim by mere agreement or
compromise.
Two, Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 requires all
national offices to conduct consultations beforeany project or program critical to
the environment and human ecology including those that may call for the eviction
of a particular group of people residing in such locality, is implemented therein.
The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that unequivocally and unilaterally vests
ownership of a vast territory to the Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively
and drastically result to the diaspora or displacement of a great number of
inhabitants from their total environment.
PANDACAN OIL DEPOT MUST GO:
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY VS.
ATIENZA CASE DIGEST
By: Atty.Fred | February 15, 2008 in Elections and Constitutional
Law, Obiter/News
Leave a reply | Related posts at the bottom of article
(Just the other day, the Supreme Court affirmed the authority of Manila City to
issue and enforce an Ordinance reclassifying certain areas within the city.
The reclassification adversely affected the oil companies, which are now forced
to relocate their oil terminals in Pandacan. This is a digest of Social Justice
Society vs. Atienza, G.R. No. 156052, 13 February 2008. Other procedural
issues are not discussed.)
Facts:
The Social Justice Society sought to compel respondent Hon. Jose L. Atienza,
Jr., then mayor of the City of Manila, to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 that was
enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila in 2001. Ordinance No.
8027 reclassified the area described therein from industrial to commercial and
directed the owners and operators of businesses disallowed under the
reclassification to cease and desist from operating their businesses within six
months from the date of effectivity of the ordinance. Among the businesses
situated in the area are the so-called Pandacan Terminals of the oil
companies (the brief history of the Pandacan Oil Terminals is here).
In 2002, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy (DOE) entered into
a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the oil companies. They agreed
that the scaling down of the Pandacan Terminals [was] the most viable and
practicable option. The Sangguniang Panlungsod ratified the MOU in
Resolution No. 97. In the same resolution, the Sanggunian declared that the
MOU was effective only for a period of six months starting 25 July 2002, which
period was extended up to 30 April 2003.
This is the factual backdrop of the Supreme Courts 7 March 2007 Decision.
The SC ruled that respondent had the ministerial duty under the Local
Government Code (LGC) to enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the
governance of the city, including Ordinance No. 8027. After the SC
promulgated its Decision, Chevron Philippines Inc. (Chevron), Petron
Corporation (Petron) and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (Shell) (the
oil companies) and the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the
DOE, sought to intervene and ask for a reconsideration of the decision.
Intervention of the oil companies and the DOE allowed in the interest of
justice
Intervention is a remedy by which a third party, not originally impleaded in the
proceedings, becomes a litigant therein to enable him, her or it to protect or
preserve a right or interest which may be affected by such proceedings. The
allowance or disallowance of a motion to intervene is addressed to the sound
discretion of the court. While the motions to intervene respectively filed by the
oil companies and the DOE were filed out of time, these motions were granted
because they presented novel issues and arguments. DOEs intervention
was also allowed considering the transcendental importance of this case.
Ordinance No. 8119 did not impliedly repeal Ordinance No. 8027
Repeal by implication proceeds on the premise that where a statute of later date
clearly reveals the intention of the legislature to abrogate a prior act on the
subject, that intention must be given effect. Implied repeals are not favored and
will not be so declared unless the intent of the legislators is manifest.
There are two kinds of implied repeal. The first is: where the provisions in the
two acts on the same subject matter are irreconcilably contradictory, the latter
act, to the extent of the conflict, constitutes an implied repeal of the earlier one.
The second is: if the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is
clearly intended as a substitute, it will operate to repeal the earlier law. The oil
companies argue that the situation here falls under the first category.
For the first kind of implied repeal, there must be an irreconcilable conflict
between the two ordinances. However, there was no legislative purpose to
repeal Ordinance No. 8027. There is no conflict since both ordinances actually
have a common objective, i.e., to shift the zoning classification from industrial
to commercial (Ordinance No. 8027) or mixed residential/commercial
(Ordinance No. 8119). While it is true that both ordinances relate to the same
subject matter, i.e., classification of the land use of the area where Pandacan oil
depot is located, if there is no intent to repeal the earlier enactment, every effort
at reasonable construction must be made to reconcile the ordinances so that both
can be given effect.
Moreover, it is a well-settled rule in statutory construction that a subsequent
general law does not repeal a prior special law on the same subject unless it
clearly appears that the legislature has intended by the latter general act to
modify or repeal the earlier special law. The special law must be taken as
intended to constitute an exception to, or a qualification of, the general act or
provision. Ordinance No. 8027 is a special law since it deals specifically with a
certain area described therein (the Pandacan oil depot area) whereas Ordinance
No. 8119 can be considered a general law as it covers the entire city of Manila.
Mandamus lies to compel respondent Mayor to enforce Ordinance No.
8027
The oil companies insist that mandamus does not lie against respondent in
consideration of the separation of powers of the executive and judiciary.
However, while it is true that Courts will not interfere by mandamus
proceedings with the legislative or executive departments of the government in
the legitimate exercise of its powers, there is an exception to enforce mere
ministerial acts required by law to be performed by some officer thereof. A writ
of mandamus is the power to compel the performance of an act which the
law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from office, trust or station.
The oil companies also argue that petitioners had a plain, speedy and adequate
remedy to compel respondent to enforce Ordinance No. 8027, which was to
seek relief from the President of the Philippines through the Secretary of the
Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) by virtue of the
Presidents power of supervision over local government units. This
suggested process, however, would be unreasonably long, tedious and
consequently injurious to the interests of the local government unit (LGU) and
its constituents whose welfare is sought to be protected. A party need not go
first to the DILG in order to compel the enforcement of an ordinance. Besides,
the resort to an original action for mandamus before the SC is undeniably
allowed by the Constitution.
Ordinance No. 8027 is constitutional and valid
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. For an ordinance to be valid,
it must not only be within the corporate powers of the LGU to enact and be
passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to
the following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the
Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not
be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5)
must be general and consistent with public policy and (6) must not be
unreasonable. There is no showing that the Ordinance is unconstitutional.
The City of Manila has the power to enact Ordinance No. 8027
Ordinance No. 8027 was passed by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila in
the exercise of its police power. Police power is the plenary power vested in the
legislature to make statutes and ordinances to promote the health, morals, peace,
education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people. This power
flows from the recognition that salus populi est suprema lex (the welfare of the
people is the supreme law).
While police power rests primarily with the national legislature, such power
may be delegated. Section 16 of the LGC, known as the general welfare clause,
encapsulates the delegated police power to local governments. LGUs like the
City of Manila exercise police power through their respective legislative bodies,
in this case, the Sangguniang Panlungsod or the city council. Specifically, the
Sanggunian can enact ordinances for the general welfare of the city.
This police power was also provided for in RA 409 or the Revised Charter of
the City of Manila. Specifically, the Sanggunian has the power to reclassify
land within the jurisdiction of the city.
The enactment of Ordinance No. 8027 is a legitimate exercise of police
power
As with the State, local governments may be considered as having properly
exercised their police power only if the following requisites are met: (1) the
interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular
class, require its exercise; and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary
for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals. In short, there must be a concurrence of a lawful subject and a
lawful method.
Ordinance No. 8027 is a valid police power measure because there is a
concurrence of lawful subject and lawful method. It was enacted for the
purpose of promoting sound urban planning, ensuring health, public safety and
general welfare of the residents of Manila. The Sanggunian was impelled
to take measures to protect the residents of Manila from catastrophic
devastation in case of a terrorist attack on the Pandacan Terminals. Towards
this objective, the Sanggunian reclassified the area defined in the ordinance
from industrial to commercial.
The ordinance was intended to safeguard the rights to life, security and safety
of all the inhabitants of Manila and not just of a particular class. The depot is
perceived, rightly or wrongly, as a representation of western interests which
means that it is a terrorist target. As long as it there is such a target in their
midst, the residents of Manila are not safe. It therefore became necessary to
remove these terminals to dissipate the threat. Wide discretion is vested on the
legislative authority to determine not only what the interests of the public
require but also what measures are necessary for the protection of such interests.
Clearly, the Sanggunian was in the best position to determine the needs of its
constituents.
In the exercise of police power, property rights of individuals may be subjected
to restraints and burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of the government.
Otherwise stated, the government may enact legislation that may interfere with
personal liberty, property, lawful businesses and occupations to promote the
general welfare. However, the interference must be reasonable and not
arbitrary. And to forestall arbitrariness, the methods or means used to protect
public health, morals, safety or welfare must have a reasonable relation to the
end in view.
The means adopted by the Sanggunian was the enactment of a zoning ordinance
which reclassified the area where the depot is situated from industrial to
commercial. A zoning ordinance is defined as a local city or municipal
legislation which logically arranges, prescribes, defines and apportions a given
political subdivision into specific land uses as present and future projection of
needs. As a result of the zoning, the continued operation of the businesses of
the oil companies in their present location will no longer be permitted. The
power to establish zones for industrial, commercial and residential uses is
derived from the police power itself and is exercised for the protection and
benefit of the residents of a locality. Consequently, the enactment of Ordinance
No. 8027 is within the power of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City of
Manila and any resulting burden on those affected cannot be said to be unjust.
Ordinance No. 8027 is not unfair, oppressive or confiscatory which
amounts to taking without compensation
According to the oil companies, Ordinance No. 8027 is unfair and oppressive
as it does not only regulate but also absolutely prohibits them from conducting
operations in the City of Manila. However, the oil companies are not prohibited
from doing business in other appropriate zones in Manila. The City of Manila
merely exercised its power to regulate the businesses and industries in the zones
it established.
The oil companies also argue that the ordinance is unfair and oppressive
because they have invested billions of pesos in the depot, and the forced closure
will result in huge losses in income and tremendous costs in constructing new
facilities. This argument has no merit. In the exercise of police power, there is
a limitation on or restriction of property interests to promote public welfare
which involves no compensable taking. Compensation is necessary only when
the states power of eminent domain is exercised. In eminent domain,
property is appropriated and applied to some public purpose. Property
condemned under the exercise of police power, on the other hand, is noxious or
intended for a noxious or forbidden purpose and, consequently, is not
compensable. The restriction imposed to protect lives, public health and safety
from danger is not a taking. It is merely the prohibition or abatement of a
noxious use which interferes with paramount rights of the public. In the
regulation of the use of the property, nobody else acquires the use or interest
therein, hence there is no compensable taking.
In this case, the properties of the oil companies and other businesses situated in
the affected area remain theirs. Only their use is restricted although they can be
applied to other profitable uses permitted in the commercial zone.
Ordinance No. 8027 is not partial and discriminatory
The oil companies take the position that the ordinance has discriminated against
and singled out the Pandacan Terminals despite the fact that the Pandacan area
is congested with buildings and residences that do not comply with the National
Building Code, Fire Code and Health and Sanitation Code.
An ordinance based on reasonable classification does not violate the
constitutional guaranty of the equal protection of the law. The requirements for
a valid and reasonable classification are: (1) it must rest on substantial
distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it must not be
limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all members
of the same class. The law may treat and regulate one class differently from
another class provided there are real and substantial differences to distinguish
one class from another.
Here, there is a reasonable classification. What the ordinance seeks to prevent
is a catastrophic devastation that will result from a terrorist attack. Unlike the
depot, the surrounding community is not a high-value terrorist target. Any
damage caused by fire or explosion occurring in those areas would be nothing
compared to the damage caused by a fire or explosion in the depot itself.
Accordingly, there is a substantial distinction. The enactment of the ordinance
which provides for the cessation of the operations of these terminals removes
the threat they pose. Therefore it is germane to the purpose of the ordinance.
The classification is not limited to the conditions existing when the ordinance
was enacted but to future conditions as well. Finally, the ordinance is applicable
to all businesses and industries in the area it delineated.
Ordinance No. 8027 is not inconsistent with RA 7638 and RA 8479
The oil companies and the DOE assert that Ordinance No. 8027 is
unconstitutional because it contravenes RA 7638 (DOE Act of 1992) and RA
8479 (Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Law of 1998).
It is true that ordinances should not contravene existing statutes enacted by
Congress. However, a brief survey of decisions where the police power measure
of the LGU clashed with national laws shows that the common dominator is
that the national laws were clearly and expressly in conflict with the
ordinances/resolutions of the LGUs. The inconsistencies were so patent that
there was no room for doubt. This is not the case here. The laws cited merely
gave DOE general powers to establish and administer programs for the
exploration, transportation, marketing, distribution, utilization, conservation,
stockpiling, and storage of energy resources and to encourage certain
practices in the [oil] industry which serve the public interest and are intended
to achieve efficiency and cost reduction, ensure continuous supply of petroleum
products. These powers can be exercised without emasculating the LGUs
of the powers granted them. When these ambiguous powers are pitted against
the unequivocal power of the LGU to enact police power and zoning ordinances
for the general welfare of its constituents, it is not difficult to rule in favor of
the latter. Considering that the powers of the DOE regarding the Pandacan
Terminals are not categorical, the doubt must be resolved in favor of the City
of Manila.
The principle of local autonomy is enshrined in and zealously protected under
the Constitution. An entire article (Article X) of the Constitution has been
devoted to guaranteeing and promoting the autonomy of LGUs. The LGC was
specially promulgated by Congress to ensure the autonomy of local
governments as mandated by the Constitution. There is no showing how the
laws relied upon by the oil companies and DOE stripped the City of Manila of
its power to enact ordinances in the exercise of its police power and to reclassify
the land uses within its jurisdiction.
The DOE cannot exercise the power of control over LGUs
Another reason that militates against the DOEs assertions is that Section 4
of Article X of the Constitution confines the Presidents power over LGUs
to one of general supervision. Consequently, the Chief Executive or his or her
alter egos, cannot exercise the power of control over them. The President and
his or her alter egos, the department heads, cannot interfere with the activities
of local governments, so long as they act within the scope of their authority.
Accordingly, the DOE cannot substitute its own discretion for the discretion
exercised by the sanggunian of the City of Manila. In local affairs, the wisdom
of local officials must prevail as long as they are acting within the parameters
of the Constitution and the law.
Ordinance No. 8027 is not invalid for failure to comply with RA 7924 and
EO 72
The oil companies argue that zoning ordinances of LGUs are required to be
submitted to the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) for
review and if found to be in compliance with its metropolitan physical
framework plan and regulations, it shall endorse the same to the Housing and
Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). Their basis is Section 3 (e) of RA 7924
and Section 1 of E.O. 72. They argue that because Ordinance No. 8027 did not
go through this review process, it is invalid.
The argument is flawed. RA 7942 does not give MMDA the authority to review
land use plans and zoning ordinances of cities and municipalities. This was only
found in its implementing rules which made a reference to EO 72. EO 72
expressly refers to comprehensive land use plans (CLUPs) only. Ordinance No.
8027 is admittedly not a CLUP nor intended to be one. Instead, it is a very
specific ordinance which reclassified the land use of a defined area in order to
prevent the massive effects of a possible terrorist attack. It is Ordinance No.
8119 which was explicitly formulated as the Manila [CLUP] and Zoning
Ordinance of 2006. CLUPs are the ordinances which should be submitted
to the MMDA for integration in its metropolitan physical framework plan and
approved by the HLURB to ensure that they conform with national guidelines
and policies. Moreover, even assuming that the MMDA review and HLURB
ratification are necessary, the oil companies did not present any evidence to
show that these were not complied with. In accordance with the presumption of
validity in favor of an ordinance, its constitutionality or legality should be
upheld in the absence of proof showing that the procedure prescribed by law
was not observed.
Chavez v. Pea and Amari
24 SEP
Chavez v. Pea and Amari
Fact:
In 1973, the Comissioner on Public Highways entered into a contract to
reclaim areas of Manila Bay with the Construction and Development
Corportion of the Philippines (CDCP).
PEA (Public Estates Authority) was created by President Marcos under
P.D. 1084, tasked with developing and leasing reclaimed lands. These
lands were transferred to the care of PEA under P.D. 1085 as part of
the Manila Cavite Road and Reclamation Project (MCRRP). CDCP and
PEA entered into an agreement that all future projects under the
MCRRP would be funded and owned by PEA.
By 1988, President Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517 transferring
lands to PEA. It was followed by the transfer of three Titles (7309, 7311
and 7312) by the Register of Deeds of Paranaque to PEA covering the
three reclaimed islands known as the FREEDOM ISLANDS.
Subsquently, PEA entered into a joint venture agreement (JVA) with
AMARI, a Thai-Philippine corporation to develop the Freedom Islands.
Along with another 250 hectares, PEA and AMARI entered the JVA
which would later transfer said lands to AMARI. This caused a stir
especially when Sen. Maceda assailed the agreement, claiming that
such lands were part of public domain (famously known as the mother
of all scams).
Peitioner Frank J. Chavez filed case as a taxpayer praying for
mandamus, a writ of preliminary injunction and a TRO against the sale
of reclaimed lands by PEA to AMARI and from implementing the JVA.
Following these events, under President Estradas admin, PEA and
AMARI entered into an Amended JVA and Mr. Chaves claim that the
contract is null and void.
Issue:
w/n: the transfer to AMARI lands reclaimed or to be reclaimed as part
of the stipulations in the (Amended) JVA between AMARI and PEA
violate Sec. 3 Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution
w/n: the court is the proper forum for raising the issue of whether the
amended joint venture agreement is grossly disadvantageous to the 4. Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership
government. of 290.156 hectares111 of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such
transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Held: Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other
On the issue of Amended JVA as violating the constitution: than agricultural lands of the public domain.
1. The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom
Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter, the government
alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may lease these lands to can classify the reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable, and further
private corporations but may not sell or transfer ownership of these declare them no longer needed for public service. Still, the transfer of
lands to private corporations. PEA may only sell these lands to such reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain to AMARI will be
Philippine citizens, subject to the ownership limitations in the 1987 void in view of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987Constitution which
Constitution and existing laws. prohibits private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable
land of the public domain.
2. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain
inalienable natural resources of the public domain until classified as
alienable or disposable lands open to disposition and declared no
longer needed for public service. The government can make such
classification and declaration only after PEA has reclaimed these
submerged areas. Only then can these lands qualify as agricultural
lands of the public domain, which are the only natural resources the
Francisco Chavez vs
government can alienate. In their present state, the 592.15 hectares of
submerged areas are inalienable and outside the commerce of man.
Public Estates Authority
3. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private
corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares110 of the Freedom Islands,
(July 2002)
such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 384 SCRA 152 Civil Law Land Titles and Deeds Lands of
1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from acquiring the Public Domain
any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
The Public Estates Authority (PEA) is the central implementing
agency tasked to undertake reclamation projects nationwide. It
took over the leasing and selling functions of the DENR
(Department of Environmental and Natural Resources) insofar as
reclaimed or about to be reclaimed foreshore lands are
concerned.
PEA sought the transfer to the Amari Coastal Bay and
Development Corporation, a private corporation, of the ownership
of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands. PEA also sought to
have 290.156 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay to
Amari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the transfer is valid.
HELD: No. To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public
domain to be transferred to Amari as private lands will sanction a
gross violation of the constitutional ban on private corporations
from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
The Supreme Court affirmed that the 157.84 hectares of
reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by
certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the
public domain. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of
Manila Bay remain inalienable natural resources of the public
domain. The transfer (as embodied in a joint venture
agreement) to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of 77.34
hectares of the Freedom Islands, is void for being contrary to
Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits
private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of
the public domain. Furthermore, since the Amended JVA also
seeks to transfer to Amari ownership of 290.156 hectares of still
submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being
contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which
prohibits the alienation of natural resources other than agricultural
lands of the public domain.
Legaspi v CSC 150 SCRA 530 (1987)
Facts: The petitioner invokes his constitutional right to information
on matters of public concern in a special civil action for mandamus
against the CSC pertaining to the information of civil service
eligibilities of certain persons employed as sanitarians in the Health
Department of Cebu City. The standing of the petitioner was
challenged by the Solicitor General of being devoid of legal right to
be informed of the civil service eligibilities of government employees
for failure of petitioner to provide actual interest to secure the
information sought.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner may invoke his constitutional right
to information in the case at bar.
Held: The court held that when the question is one of public right and
the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public
duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest and the
relator at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not
show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being
sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the
execution of the laws. The Constitution provides the guarantee of
adopting policy of full public disclosure subject to reasonable
conditions prescribed by law as in regulation in the manner of
examining the public records by the government agency in custody
thereof. But the constitutional guarantee to information on matters of
public concern is not absolute. Under the Constitution, access to
official records, papers, etc., are "subject to limitations as may be
provided by law" (Art. III, Sec. 7, second sentence). The law may
therefore exempt certain types of information from public scrutiny,
such as those affecting national security.

The court delves into determining whether the information sought for
by the petitioner is of public interest. All appointments in the Civil
Service Commission are made according to merit and fitness while a
public office is a public trust. Public employees therefore are
accountable to the people even as to their eligibilities to their
positions in the government. The court also noted that the information
on the result of the CSC eligibility examination is released to the
public therefore the request of petitioner is one that is not unusual or
unreasonable. The public, through any citizen, has the right to verify
the civil eligibilities of any person occupying government positions.