'Combined Operations' in Sicily, A.D.

1060-78
Author(s): D. P. Waley
Source: Papers of the British School at Rome, Vol. 22 (1954), pp. 118-125
Published by: British School at Rome
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40310517 .
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 'COMBINED OPERATIONS' IN SICILY, a.d. 1060-78 1
A recently published history ofnavalpowerandtradein theMediterranean inthe
2
earlymedievalperiod providesa reminder of thatvitalbut little-explored changein
the balanceof maritimepowerwhichprecededthe Crusadesand of the movement
whichwonbackfortheChristians of theWest,Sardinia,Sicily,andMalta,threatened
theshoresofAfricaand Albania,and wasbotha rehearsal and an essentialpreliminary
forthegreatDrangnachOstenwhichwas to follow. Littleis knownof theshipping
usedin theseoperations or of thetacticsemployed, but an attempthas beenmadeto
the
investigate scanty sources for the Norman navaloperations in the earlystagesof
theirconquestof southern Italy and Sicily,not merely because someof theseopera-
tionswereimportant in theirimmediate results,but also as an exampleof thenaval
techniqueof the Latin Christianmilitarycommanders in southernEurope. The
subject derivesadditional interest from the spectacleit affordsofVikingsfinding their
sea-legsagain aftermany decades as farmers and cavalrymen Normandy. also
in It
offers one explanation forthe conquestof the considerable areaof southern Italyand
a
Sicilyby comparatively small force,and once againdemonstrates theeclecticismand
adaptability of theNormans.
By 1060 theNormanshad begunto consolidate theirpositionon themainlandof
southern Italy. Over fortyyears of warfare and brigandage had culminated in 1059
in Pope NicholasII's investiture of RobertGuiscardde Hautevilleas Duke ofApulia,
Calabria,andSicily,andofRichardofAversaas PrinceofCapua. 1060sawGuiscard's
conquestof Reggio,and althoughhis positionin Apuliawas stillinsecure, he began
preparations for the invasion of Sicily.
The operations withwhichthispaperis concerned extendfromthefirst raidon the
port of Messina from the Calabrian mainland in 1060 to the abandonment of thesiege
of Naplesin 1078. Up to 1076 thereappearsto be no reference to theconstruction of
shipsby the Normans, but a description of the fleetwhich sailed to Trapani in that
3 thatnewshipshad beenbuiltfortheexpedition, and a fleetwas cer-
year suggests
tainlybuiltin theApulianportsfortheAlbanianlandingof 1081. AftertheNormans
setup as ship-builders in theSoutha newsituation arose,andthislaterperiodhasbeen
studiedby Cohnin hisbookon theNorman-Sicilian fleet.4
Withintheperiod1060-78 therewerefoursetsof operations involvingNorman
naval and militaryforces.The firstof thesecomprisedthe threelandingsin the
neighbourhood of Messinain theyears1060-61, whichled up to thecaptureof that
city. The firstof theselandingswas a reconnaissance to the walls of Messina,the
1 This
paperis based on a communication readto the SiciliaeComitis, ed. E. PontieriinRerumItalicarum
Scrip-
CambridgeHistoricalSocietyin November1951.I am tores, n.s.,v, 1],p. 58.
muchindebtedto Mr.T. C. Lethbridge forgivingmethe 4 W. Cohn,Die Geschichte derNormannisch-Si^ilischen
benefitofhis knowledgeof nauticalmatters. Flotte(Breslau,1910).This book is uselessfortheperiod
2 A. R. Naval Power and Trade in theMediter- before1076,becauseCohn startsfromtheunsupported
Lewis,
ranean^5oo-iioo (Princeton, N.J.,1951). assumption thatthe Normansmustfromthe starthave
8 G.
Malaterra,[De Rebus GestisRogeriiCalabriaeet builtall theshipstheyused.

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 'COMBINED OPERATIONS' IN SICILY, a.d. 1060-78 119
seconda raidin thenorth-eastern tip of Sicily(including an assaulton Messina),and
thethirda directand successful attackon thecity. Sincethecaptureof a bridgehead
on theisland,including theportandcityofMessina,wasthevitalstagein theeventual
conquest of the whole of Sicily,and since theseoperations most nearlyresembled
'combined operations' in themodern sense, they willbe considered at somelengthlater
in thispaper.
The otheroperations involvedco-operation betweenthe Normanarmyand fleet
in sieges,as well as navalbattles,and the transportation of troops,but not 'assault
landings'. The first
series of these,and the most important, tookplacebetween1068
and 107 1 andled up to thecaptureofBari,thelastByzantine baseon theItalianmain-
land.5 The Normanscompletely encircledBari by sea and land, linkingthe ships
nearesttheshoreto theland by meansof bridges;nevertheless, someshipswereable
to breakoutandaskforreinforcements, andgrainwassmuggled intoBaribyByzantine
ships,but in 107 1 thedefeatof a big relieving Byzantine fleetcompelledthegarrison
to submit.Apartfromthisdecisivesea-battle, in whichnineof thetwenty Byzantine
vesselstakingpartweresunk,therewereseveralminornavalengagements, in one of
whichtheByzantines losttwelveships.6The secondofthegreatcombined siegeopera-
tions,thatagainstPalermo, wasbegunas soonas thesiegeofBarihadbeentriumphantly
concluded.Againa majorcity,whichhad alreadybeenassaultedunsuccessfully from
thelandalone,wascaptured by means of a siege from land and sea, this time within a
fewmonths.7At Palermotherewasonenavalengagement, in whichtheNormanfleet
failedto prevent thearrivalofa relieving MoslemfleetfromAfrica.In general, how-
the
ever, siege was maintained successfully, and starvationseems to have been themain
causeofthedefenders' poorshowing when the city was assaulted from the land aftera
siegelasting some four months. Thus at Christmas 1071 the Normans had within a
few months the
captured provincial capitals of the two majorpowersopposingthem,
andin eachcasesea powerhadplayeda bigpartin thevictory.8 The lastoperations to
be considered arethe ofSalerno in and of in 9
amphibious sieges 1076 Naples 1077-78;
theformer, in
undertaken conjunction with the naval forces of was
Amalfi, successful,
thelatterseemsto havebeenabandoned.

The majorproblempresented by theseoperationsis theprovenanceand natureof

the shipsused by the Normans.The possibility of the Normansthemselves having
builttheseshipscan be discounted.Thereis no reasonto supposethatthe Norman
knights withthem,norarethereanyhaltsin theiroperations
in Italyhad shipwrights
whichcan be explainedby the needto build shipsbeforeproceeding further.More
conclusively,not a singlesourcesuggeststhat the Normans built theirown ships

6 The mainsourcesforthesiegeofBariare Malaterra, (readingaltosforalii).

pp. 48-51: Aim[of Montecassino, StoriadeiNormanni, 7 The mainsourcesforthesiegeof Palermoare Mala-
ed. V. De Bartholomaeis inFontiper Italia],pp. terra,pp. 52-3: Aim,pp. 275-82:andWilliamofApulia,
la Storiaa1*
248-55; Williamof Apulia [Gesta RobertiWiscardiin pp.8269-72.
Mon. Germ.Hist.,SS., ix],pp. 263-8; and Lupus Proto- The Normanshadalso capturedCataniaon theirway
spatarius,[ed. L. A. Muratori,RerumItaL Script.,v], to Palermo,buttheonlyweaponemployedseemsto have
beentreachery (F. Chalandon[Histoirede la Domination
rt
t ..
me passage

in TjuupusT">_._ _
rruiuspacanus
J 1_ _ ^1_*
uescruuugmis Normande enItalie\i, 206).
battleis obscure,but makessenseif it is read as multi 9 Malaterra,pp. 58-9: Aim,pp. 349, 354-^ 36<5-7
hominesnecati sunt et altos compraehenserunt Franci 372; WilliamofApulia,p. 274.

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i2o THE BRITISH SCHOOL AT ROME
before1076, whiletheiruse of thealreadyexisting shipsat Reggio(againstMessina)
is describedby a who
chronicler,10 also implies that theNormansdecidedto capture
BaribeforePalermosimplybecausethe shipstakenin the former portmightmake
the
possible capture ofthe latter(a siegeof Palermo by landonlyhavingfailedin 1064).
Therewas no shortage of shipsin Byzantine Italy at thistime, and it wasonlynatural
thatthe Normansshoulduse thosewhichtheyfoundratherthanbuild new ones,
especiallybecausetheirsailors(as we shall see) werelocal menaccustomed to these
ships. When operations beganagainst Messina in 1060 the Normans alreadyheld
Otranto,Taranto,Brindisi, Reggio, and a host of lesser in
ports Apulia and Calabria.
Whatsortof vesselsdid theyfindin theseports? For themostpart,no doubt,they
foundfishing and tradingvessels,but theyalso certainly foundshipswhich,if not
designedprimarily forwar, were at leastcapable beingadaptedfornavaluse. At a
of
ratherearlierperiodthe Greekauthorities had compelledportsto furnish a certain
numberofshipsforthedefenceof thelongand exposedcoastlineof Byzantine Italy,11
andit is noteworthy thattheApulianportofMonopolilosttwelvevesselsin oneof the
engagements whichtookplaceduringthesiegeof Bari.12The specifically navalforces
of Byzantium in theareahadprobably neverbeenverystrong andwereoftenreinforced
by Venetianassistance, but theywerecertainly not negligible, and together withthe
considerable merchant fleetsof Taranto,Brindisi,Otranto,and smallerportswould
havebeensufficient fortheneedsof the Normansin theperiodunderconsideration.
At leastthreetimesin thepreceding hundred years(in 964, 1025,and 1038) a Byzan-
tinefleetbasedon Italyhad takenpartin an invasionofSicily,and elements ofsucha
fleetwouldalmostcertainly havebeenavailableto theNormansfortheirinvasionin
1061.
Information aboutthetypesofvesselemployed bytheNormansis disappointingly
scarce,forthechroniclerscontentthemselvesin mostcontextswitha vaguereference to
naves.The shipsusedin 1061 in thelandingwhichled to thecaptureof Messinaare,
however,describedby Malaterraas 'galleys'and germundi, while Aim of Monte
CassinomentionsthatRobertGuiscardand his brotherRogerused two fastgalleys
to reconnoitrethe portof Messinabeforethisoperation.13Now the galleysof the
Byzantine fleet,whichwerelongopenshipsnormally usedforscouting and carryinga
complement of some are the
men,14 exactly type
seventy of naval that
vessel one would
expectto findavailableto theNormansin thecapturedportsof southern Italy. The
shipsprovidedby theseportswere presumably rather
galleys than dromons, or shipsof
theline,whichweremuchlargerandmoreelaborate affairs
andwereprobably basedon
Byzantium itselfor on
occasionally the of
majorports strategically important themes.
Malaterra'sgermundi presenta more difficult
problem. The word has been takenby
Amarifora corrupt formof 'dromon1, was a typeof roundshipin the
but thegertna
easternMediterranean and possiblygermundusderivesfromthis; if so, thegermundi
weretransports- but the evidenceis too inconclusive.
Afterthe captureof Barithe
10Aim,
pp. 234and246.
11For Rossano's helpforit frominlandtowns.
receivedfinancial
revoltin the tenthcenturyagainst 12LupusProtospatarius, p. 153.
thiscompulsory service,see Acta Sanctorum,Vita sancti 13Malaterra,pp. 31-2: Aim,p. 235.(For 'germundus',
Nili,pp. 295etseq. See nowalso E. Eickhoff, 'Byzantin- see M. Amari,Storiadei Musulmanidi Sicilia(ed. 2), iii,
ischeWachtflottillen in Unteritalien
im 10. Jahrhundert',68.)
xlv (1952), 340-4,whereit is shownthat 14R. H.
Byi, Zeitschrift Dolley, 'The Warshipsof the LaterRoman
Reggio,Tropea,and Amanteaalso owedthisserviceand Empire* inJournalofRomanStudies,xxxviii(1948),p. 53.

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 'COMBINED OPERATIONS1 IN SICILY, a.d. 1060-78 121
Normansalso had somegattior catti;thesewereapparently largerthangalleys,but
resembled themin build.15
Sinceit is clearthattheNormansemployedtheshippingthattheyfoundin the
portsthattheyhad overrun, it is not surprising to learnthattheirsailors,too,were
Byzantine subjects. No doubt in most casesthe same crewcontinued to manthesame
vessel,but now in the Norman interest.Whenever the chroniclers
givethenationality
of thesailorsfighting forthe Normanstheyare Italian. Calabriansare mentioned at
Bari;16 at Palermo in 1071 there are Calabrians, of Bari'are
Apulians('men specially
mentioned), and 'Greeks';17and againat Salernoin 1076 thesailorsare Calabrians.18
The decisivesea-battle offBariin 1071wasa victory foroneforceofByzantine shipsand
sailorsoveranotherforceof Byzantine ships and sailorsand,to round offthe paradox,
thesoldierswhofoughtfromtheshipswereNormanson eitherside- or,at least,the
Byzantine relieving armyincludeda considerable number ofNormanmercenaries. The
Normansfortheirpartcertainly reliedon Italiantroopsto a fargreater extentthanhas
normally beenrealised,and indeedChalandonsuggeststhatthe organisedmilitiaof
the Greektownsin southItalyprobablyplayeda big partin the Normandefeatof
Byzantine rule,thoughhe admitshis inabilityto finddocumentary supportforthis
theory.19 The Normans made considerable use of local troopsand soldiers,turning
themagainstbothByzantines and Mohammedans.To whatextentthesupportgiven
themwaswillingcanneverbe known,butmercenaries, ofcourse,tookemployment on
eitherside, and it wasprobably quite normal to find Normans and Byzantines on both
sides.

Despiteits use of local infantry as auxiliaries,theNormanarmywas in essencea

cavalry force,and the most interesting
problems connected withitscombined-operations
technique relate to the transportof horses by sea. The Vikings,whoused horsesfor
moving from one place to anotherbut not in battle, relieduponfinding
had themin
theland theywereraiding;the Normansof the eleventhcentury werefarmorefor-
midable,becausetheytooktheirowntrainedhorsesand foughtuponthem. The fact
thatit was possibleto conveywar horsesoverseaswas an important technological
factorin warfare up to the nineteenth century, and clearlyplayeda big partin the
strategicaldevelopments oftheeleventh.
As anyonewill realisewhohas seena horsebeingloadedintoa horse-box, horses
are veryfragile, and theirtransportation presents great Further, is not
difficulties. it
to
easy carry animals in a rough sea without their suffering injury.The Normansmay
owe theirmastery of this artto theirown ingenuity, but it is evenmore probablethat
theyacquired it from the Byzantines. The fleetof the Eastern Roman Empirewas
to
accustomed carrying cavalry,and such operations would have no novelty
presented
to theByzantine sailorsof southernItaly. Moreover, the Normans hadtheopportunity
15C. Manfroni,
StoriadeltaMarinaItaliana^Livorno, Apulia,p. 270.In no case does thecontextmakeitabso-
189% i, 456.
16Williamof Apulia,p. 263. I takereplet lutelyclearthatthe reference is to sailorsand not sol-
Calabrisad- diers,but Williamseemsto implythis.
vectisnavibusaequorto mean'ships laden with Calab- 18Aim,pp. 366-7.
rians',but thepointstillholdsif themeaningis 'laden 19
Chalandon,i, 37.Notealso thebigcall-upofItalians
Calabrianships'. bytheNormansbeforetheexpedition againsttheEastern
17Aim,pp. 275-6, and Malaterra, p. 52; Williamof Empirein 1081(AnnaComnena,Alexiad, i, 14).

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122 THE BRITISH SCHOOL AT ROME
of learningthistechniquefromthehorseman's stand-point at leastas earlyas 1038,
whena forceof severalhundredNormanknightswas shippedacrossthe Straitof
Messinato sharein an unsuccessful Byzantine attemptto reconquer Sicilyfromthe
Mohammedans.20 It is almostcertainly safeto ascribeto Byzantine expertness (and
thusultimately to the Byzantine inheritance fromthe ancientworld)the Normans'
abilityto movetheircavalry bysea,butit is muchlesscertain thattheypossessed in the
period under discussion shipsspecially designed for thispurpose, such as theByzantines
had. In 961 Nicephorus Phocashadusedin hisassaulton Cretea sortof'LandingShip
Horse';rampswhichwereletdownfromthesideofthesevesselsmadeitpossibleforthe
cavalryto ridestraight intoactionon thebeach,and theyovercame theMohammedan
forcewhichwas waitingforthem.21What seemsto be an earlyreference to special
horse-carrying ships in Italian ports occurs in an account of the Pisan expedition
22
againsttheBalearicIslandsin 1113; in thelatercrusading periodsuchvessels,known
as uscieriin Italyand huissiers in France,becamecommon.It does not seempossible
to ascertain whether theseuscieri werebasedon a Byzantine model,23 fortheeleventh
is
century gap a in our knowledge of such craft, and the description of Nicephorus
Phocas'landingshipsis in anycasetoovague. Thereareno references to theusebythe
Normansof specialhorse-carrying shipsin theeleventh century;probably theGreeks
possessedcomparatively few of them, and one would expect to find them held in a
central'pool' at Constantinople ratherthanscattered in the portsof a distantand
24
disintegrating province.A passagein Malaterra also suggeststhat the Normans
had in generalto makeuse of shipsnot speciallydesignedforhorses.He describes
how nearOtrantoin 1071 theydug out a rampin the cliffby the shoreso that
horsescould be embarkeddirectlyon to the ships thatwereto carrythem;this
expedientmayhave been due to inadequateportinstallations, but it also confirms
thatthe shipsin questionwerenot built speciallyforembarking and disembarking
cavalry.
The numberof horsescarriedon eachshipcan onlybe estimated fromone setof
figures,givenby Aim of Monte Cassino for the Messina landing of 1061.25 Thirteen
ships carried 270 chevalierswith their horses on this occasion, returning to the Calabrian
shoreforanother170. It seemslikelythatthesefigures referto thetotalnumberof
horsemen carriedand notmerely to knights, fortheNormancavalry at Messina,when
further reinforced, totalledone thousand, andan ArabicsourceputstheNormanhorse
engagedin thesubsequent campaign at 700.26 If thisis so, theshipscouldcarry on an
average a maximum of some twenty cavalrymen with their horses (the first'wave' was
evidently loaded to capacity, sincethe ships returned for a fresh load), and this would
20For thisexpeditionv. M. Amari,Storiadei Musul-
logyis fromtheItalianuscio(= door),as theseshipshad
manidi Sicilia(ed. 2), ii,439-53.The Byzantine troopsin sideswhichopenedforthehorsesto enterand leavethe
thiscampaignincludedmanyScandinavianmercenariesship. Prof.R. J. H. Jenkinskindlyinforms me thatan
headedby HaroldHardrada. oaa was nota typeofship(as Jalsupposed)buta naval
21Leo Diaconus(Bonn,ed. unit;he considersTal'sderivation
22Liber Matolichinus Hase), p. 7. 24Malaterra, veryimprobable.
(ed. C. Calisse in 'Fonti per la pp. 50-1.
Storia d'ltalia'), p. 10. A. Wiel, The Navy of Venice 25Aim,p. 235. Malaterra does notmentionthe num-
(London, 1910),claims(p. 40) thatthe Venetiansused ber of ships used, but gives the strengthof the two
vesselsof thistypeagainsttheNormansin 1081, but I 'waves' as 150 and 300 (p. 32), whichcomescompara-
havenotbeenableto traceanysourceforthisstatement. tivelyclose to Aim and veryclose to himin the total
28The 'huissiers'were not assaultvessels. numberof horsemen carried.
transports, 26Aim,pp. 237-8: Ibn HalduninM. Aman,Biblioteca
A. Jal,Archologie Navate (1840) i, 427-32,derivedthe
wordfromtheGreekoCraioc, buta moreprobableetymo- rabo-Sicula (Italianversion,1880),p. 196.

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 'COMBINED OPERATIONS' IN SICILY, a.d. 1060-78 123
furtherconfirmthattheshipsusedwerenotdesignedspeciallyas cavalrytransports.27
As to thetotalnumberof craftavailableto theNormansthereis againlittleinforma-
tion,but thethirteenshipsof 1061 maybe contrasted withthe fiftyor sixtywhich
sailedforthesiegeof Palermotenyearslater,28an increasewhichseemsto showthat
theplanofovercoming in orderto havemorevesselsfortheoperation
Barifirst against
Palermohad provedfruitful.

While thesources29 do not permitanyconfident generalisations aboutthe three

landingswhich the
preceded capture of Messina, a few tentative suggestions aboutthe
tacticsemployed and thelessonsof thecampaignmaybe hazarded.The firstlanding
in 1060 wasdefinitely a reconnaissance only. SixtyNormanknights landedat theport
ofMessina,whichwassomewayfromthecity,achievedsurprise, drewout someof the
defeatedthembymeansof a feigned 30
Mohammedan garrison, flight andpursuedthem
to thewallsof Messina.Theythenwithdrew withsomehorsesthattheyhadcaptured.
The nextoperation, in the springof 1061, was a muchmoreambitiousaffair.
Thistimesome160 knights wereinvolved.TheycrossedtheStrait,landingapparently
nearthenorth-eastern tip theisland;theysetoutbynightto loottheinlandtownof
of
Ramettaand theportof Milazzo. Whentheyreturned withtheirlootto theirvessels,
whichwerewaitingforthemby theFaro (theextreme north-easterly pointof Sicily)
they found the weather was too rough forthem to embark (it is not clearwhether the
was
difficulty only the horses,or whether not even men could have been embarked).
A Mohammedan forcecamefromMessinato attackthem,but wasdefeated, and in a
counter-attack the Normansevenattempted, unsuccessfully, an assault on the city.31
The Normanspassedthreemoreveryuncomfortable daysbeforethesea wassufficiently
calmforthemto embarkandcrosstheStrait.32Was thisexpedition plannedas a mere
raid and not withthe intention of achievinga permanent foothold?The Norman
writerstreatit as such,andin theabsenceofcontrary evidence we canonlyaccepttheir
word. Chalandon **thattheNormans, found Messina toostrong, were
suggests having
reconnoitringthe defences of Milazzo with a view to a
making landing there;but this
remains and the
unproved, certainly subsequent landing was made not at Milazzo but at
Messina.
The thirdlandingwas made,as has been said, by an initialforceof some two
hundred men,34 aftera reconnaissance of Messinafromthesea. Thesehorsemen were
landed by nightat Tremestrieri, which lies 4J miles south of Messina. In the
morning theyencountered a bodyofthirty troopsboundforMessina.This smallforce
27Mr.T. C. Lethbridge writeson thispoint:*Ido not ticityofthefeigned oftheNormansat Hastingssix
flight
thinkitwouldbe easyto transport horsesin an ordinary yearslater,whichhas recentlybeen assailedagain (R.
galley withoutputtingshiftingboards between the Glover, *EnglishWarfarein 1066', EnglishHistorical
rowingthwarts . . . The spacebetweenrowingportswas Review,lxvii, 1952).
31Aime(pp.
usuallyabout threefeetand withoutshifting boards it 232-3) putstheassaulton Messinabetore
seemsveryhardto imaginehorsesbeing persuadedto the troubleover embarkation, but I have followedthe
standinwhattheVikingscalled"rooms".. . . Somewould moreconvincing accountgivenbv Malaterra.
be almostcertainto breaktheirlegs kickingunlessthey 32 It is notclearwhethertheminornavalbattlein the
wereboxedin betweenthethwarts.' Straitdescribedby Aim(p. 234) was foughtduringthe
28Aimmentions51 ships(pp. 276-7), Lupus Proto- return ofthisforceor later.
83Chalandon,i, 194.
spatarius58 (in theversionof Mon. Germ.Hist.,SS., v, 34For theconflicting
60). figuresof Aim and Malaterra,
29Aime,pp. 2-11-8;Malaterra, pp. 20-33. see above p. 122 n. 25.
80This mayprovideevidencein favourof theauthen-

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124 THE BRITISH SCHOOL AT ROME
wasactingas escortto a civilofficial (Kaid) and a largetreasure; it wasroutedand the
Kaid and treasurecaptured.Laterin the morningthe Normans'shipsreturned to
thembearingreinforcements whichbroughttheirtotal strength up to about 450.
The garrison of Messinaoffered no resistance to thisformidable numberof horsemen,
butfledbylandandsea. The bloodlessvictory wasconsolidated bythearrival offurther
forcesfromthemainlandtilltheNormanshad abouta thousand cavalry thesame
and
numberof infantry at Messina. With thiscityas a base thelongcampaignforthe
conquestof theislandwasbegunin earnest.
One factwhichemerges froma consideration oftheseoperations is thatthelanding
was alwaysmade,and a bridgehead won,withgreatease. The Mohammedans (who
neversucceededin intercepting theNormanson thesea) did notattempt to defendthe
wholecoastline,nordid theyevenappearto possessan efficient systemof look-outs.
One is astonished to readthattheforcewhichlandedbynightat Tremestrieri in 1061
proceeded to 'bed down' for the rest of the nightand did notprepare itselfforbattle
till daybreak.35In thesecircumstances theefficiency of theNormansin disembarking
theircavalrywas neverfullytested. Secondly,thereseemsto have been no urgent
necessityto capturea portquickly,sincetheNormanscarried no veryheavyarmaments
andcouldlandeverything they needed on a beach. Nevertheless, Messinabothassured
communications withthe mainland(givingthe Normanscommandof the Strait,a
situationof greatstrategic importance forthewholeMediterranean) and actedas an
easily defensiblebase from which the assault on the Mohammedan defenders of the
islandcouldbe launched.Its captureat theverystartof thecampaign was therefore a
sound,perhapsevenan obvious,decision.The abandonment ofMessinabyitsMoham-
medangarrison remainsa mystery. It is impossible to tellwhether therewasa sudden
collapse of morale or whether we have here a 'retirement to preparedpositions'.
Rametta,a mountain-fortress someten mileswestof Messina,playedan important
partin thesubsequent fighting,and theMohammedan plansforthedefenceof north-
easternSicilywereperhapsbaseduponRamettaratherthanMessina. The fortuitous
captureof the Kaid withhis escortmayevenhavebeen the decisiveepisodein this
momentous victory.

At first
sighttheSicilianoperationsof 1060-61 mayseemto havelittleimportance
forscholarsprimarilyconcerned withthe historyof England,butI believethatthereis
probably a directand important connectionwith Englishaffairs.Five yearsafterthe
captureof Messina William of Normandy landed a largecavalryarmyon thecoastof
and the
England, among cosmopolitan force thataccompanied himwereknights from
southernItaly and Sicily.36These were the
probably only members of William's force
who had experience of the transportationof cavalryacrossthe sea, and he would
probablyhaveconsultedthemon theproblemsinvolvedin an operation of thissort.
The technical problems were the same in the North and South,and there havebeen
38This seemsto followfromAim'saccount 36
(p. 236) Carmen',ed.
Guy of Amiens,'De Bello Hastingensi
of how at daybreaktheNormansse leverent et se adorn- H. Petriein Monumento HistricaBritannic
a, London,
erentde lor armeset monterent
sur lor chevaux.Aim is 1848,p. 861. Guy refersto the presenceof Apuluset
to
unlikely havebeen an eye-witness, buthis description Calaber jaculafervet.This maybe poetical
ySiculusquibus
of thesecampaignsseemsto derivefromthosewho were hyperbole, butit showsthata certainnumberof knights
present. fromItalywereat Hastings.

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 'COMBINED OPERATIONS' IN SICILY, a.d. 1060-78 125

manyinstances of Mediterranean
influenceon shippingin theNorth.37If conditions
weresometimes we
different, have seen thattheStraitsofMessinacouldproducerough
seas. Historysometimes does comerathernearto repeating itself,and it is possible
thatlessonsin combinedoperations learnton the shoresof Sicilyin 1060-61 were
appliedbetweenNormandy and Englandin 1066, justas thoselearnton thesouthern
- thistimebetweenEnglandandNormandy
Siciliancoastin 1943wereapplied - to the
of
landings 1944.
D. P. Waley
87The masterof the Englishking'sshipin the early thetheoryof southerninfluence in the 1060s.Mr. T. C.
twelfthcentury was an Italian(C. H. Haskins,Norman Lethbridgewrites:*The Roman armyappearsto have
Institutions,
Cambridge, Mass.,1918,pp. 121-2),and the beenquiteat hometransporting cavalryand probablythe
twelfthcenturysaw the introduction of a numberof methodwas notforgotten in Italyor Gaul. The Normans
Mediterranean suchas 'castles',thebowspritand
features mighthave learntit in Normandybut certainly did not
theside-rudder(R. andR. C. Anderson,TheSailingShip, bringtheidea fromtheNorth.I do notthinkitnecessary
London,1926,pp. 80-4). to supposethattheNormansin Normandywouldhave
The Normansapparentlytook no horseswhen they beenincapableof transporting theirhorseswithoutout-
attempted an invasionof Englandc. 1040 (if we are to sidehelp;butitdoes seemprobablethattheymighthave
acceptWilliamofJumiges, vi,9-10) andthisalso favours got somegood ideasfromdie South.'

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