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The rapid growth of Europes urban sprawl poses significant prob-

lems for NATO defense planners. Defense plans, tactical doctrine

and weapons sgstems designed far battle an open, rolling terrain
mag be hindered &g this urban growth. A stud~ of militarg opera-
tions on urban terrain (MOUT) as it occurred in Lebanon prouides
some insights into bOth problems we mag face and solutions to
those problems.

if!li Case Studv

dini and R. D. McLaurin

traditional military corridors were open

Introduction plains apd valfeys. For centuries, these
attack routes have been used by fighting

men, whether eastbound or westbound.
VIIR the last decade, increasing Fields of fire and mobility were excellent,
numbers of military analysts in the protection relatively dependent on
United States and Europe have come to organic firepower. But Europe bas
realize that the nature of the combat changed, and with the extraordinary
eqvironrnent in Europe has changed. The socioeconomic developments of the past


two decades that have so altered the ward, then to, then across lines of com-
behavior of Europeans has come a sig- munications such as roads. The result is
nificant change in the face of Europe. urbanization of much of what was the
Urbanization has spread spread well countryside of Europe,
; beyond Europe, in fact, to most of the The miIitary significance of the urban- .
countries of.the world. Concomitant with ization of European terrain can hardly be
the move to the cities has been that phe- overemphasized. We have not fought a

nomenon so familiar to Americans that war in Europe for over 30 years, yet
we might call suburbanization that is, American forces remain stationed in and
both the cities and the areas around cit- are fundamental to the defense of West.
ies have been built up enormously. More- ern Europe. These forces, even together
over, with the revolution in communi- with their European allies, confront a
cation and transportation of the last two Warsaw Pact force very substantially
decades, towns and villages previously larger. To fight outnumbered and win,
isohi ted or nearly isolated have grown to- the United States and its NATO aflies


must certainly optimize the use of their about the Soviets thinking on the sub-
resources, including planning. ject? The program wae successful in
It was in this connection that the terms of laying bare our knowledge
United Statee began to take note o i the . perhaps we should say ignorance-of the
changes in Europe since World War 11. subject 4and in terme of mobilizing some
First, many felt the United States had limited service interest in it.
had limi~ed experience in urban warfare Since the effective transfer of the pro-
and was not prepared for itwas not gram to the US Army Materiel Develop
planning on itin Europe. By contrast, ment and Readiness Command (DAR-


Lett, tripb 20mm automat!c antmrcratl gun, right. destruchon caused by ixplosmn 01106mm mortar (Ashrahyeh)

some thought the Soviet Unitm had ex- COM ) and the US Army Training and
tensive urban warfare experience, plan- Doctrine Command (TRADOC ), limited
ning and train ing. Second, recognizing research has continued in this area. An-
the advantages to the defenders in mili- nual DA RCOM-TRADOC conferences
tary operations (conducted ) on urbanized coordinated by the US Army Human En-
terrain (MOUT ), some began to feel the gineering Laboratory at Aberdeen Prov-
new, urbanized Europe might be, in ing Ground, Maryland;] semiannual
effect, a force multiplier for outmanned Military Operations Research Sympo-
Western armies. Consequent upon these sia; the concern and perseverance of
lines of thought, the Defense Advanced individuals who see MOUT as a critical
Research Projects Agency ( DAR PA) issue; and personal contact among these
undertook a research program in the individuals have provided the continuity
early 1970s designed to measure the in thinking and studying MOUT.
state of the artWhat do we know? It is cafe at this point to say that
How are we using it? What do we know DARPA and later supporters of the pro-


gram have not yet been successful in per- Recent American experience is largely
suading policy makers, planners and confined to Hu6 in 1968. i1 Apart from ,
weapons designers of the pervasive sig- the fact that the fighting in Hu6 is now .
nificance of MOUT to Western military over a decade old, it was also rather
forces and US security. One of the rea- brief. Yet this ie the sum and substance
sons is the well-known tendency to plan of new US MOUT experience.2 In an
the last war. Our last war in Europe was effort to increase the experience base for
fpught over 30 years ago. J$orea in the MOUT planning, we have recently un-
early 1950s and Vietnam in the Iate dertaken an extensive etudy of MOUT in

Ml13IIITel Zaatal M42aimaircralt gun, wldn!y used and highly pralaod kmg urban lighting

1960s were not principally urban wars the Lebanese Civil War. 13 This article
either. will discuss some of the findings and con-
Recognizing that a data and experi- clusions of that study. We shall first dis-
ence base is necessary to serious military cuss tbe approach used.
planning, MOUT analysts sought recent Following the discussion of.method, -
experience in fighting in builtup areas. we shall generally describe the back-
There were, for example, many World ground to and nature of the Lebanese
War 11 battles and much after-action Civil War, including certain anomalies
writing in US, European and Russian that affected the conduct of urban war-
Literature. In the Korean War, Seoul fare. Finally, we ehall note specific
experienced some extensive combat.1~ findings and conclusions.
Yet even the Korean War took place over I The approach taken to study Lebanese
20 years ago with very different weapons MOUT has incorporated two principal
systems and doctrine than would be em- steps. The first was to systematically
ployed today. catalog the questions that a study of ur-


ban operations in Beirut might reason- terial in this article reflects and is baeed
ably be expected to answer given com- almost wholly upon these interviews.
plete and perfect knowledge. 14 These
questions were both general (for exam-
. pie, Was smoke used? Which floors did The LebaneseCivil War: Background
,snipers prefer? To what extent did the
presence of people interfere with military
operations? ) and specific (for example, We do not wish to burden readers with
How were specific holes, once made, copious historical and sociological infor-

., ,
, }

and M42approaching
AMX13 Tel Zaatar Obstruction at Td Zaatar. Note trmchas.

use~? Which floor in which building was mation about the conflict. However, it is
preferred by snipers in a specific battle?). important in analyzing the war and in re-
Once the list of questions was com- viewing our findings and conclusions to
pleted, we sifted through the literature in take into account come of the unique as-
search of answers. To accomplish this pects of the war. Every war has its idlo-
step in data collection, we were forced syncracies, but it is a mistake to
first to the construction of a painfully de- disregard them or minimize their impact.
tailed chronology of the Lebanese CiviI Lebanon is a smell, predominantly
War. ) After we completed the literature Arab country located on the eastern
search in English, French and Arabic, Mediterranean shore. It is heavily West-
and turned up, it is safe to say, very ernized, and the capital, Beirut
little detailed information that was re- (population about 800,000 to 1,000,000),
liable, we set about collecting additional is very much a French city in many
data through interviews with a number ways, with expensive boutiquee of Yves
of participants and observers. Tbe ma- Saint-Laurent and sidewalk cafes.


IMI-U,. st,rudllr(xj are, ,(). the most, or biological elements used, Flame was
rt, similar to thoss of France, reflect- generally eschewed in the fighting for
I g the period of the French mandate cultural reasons, imd .TIOfighting took
( 1921-43) in architecture, city planning place in the sewer systems for the same
and meet aspects of civil engineering. reaeons.
The structures of this period tend to be The combatants alignments have been
four or five-story sandstone. Newer kaleidoscopic. A group generally
buildings show American design influ- though not with technical accuracy
ence, with many 30 to 40-story hotels described as an amalgam of Muslim left-

Panhard Hispano-Suiza
wih truck-mounted in background

and with exteneive use of reinforced ists and Palestinians confronted another
concrete with glaee or cinder block cur- group of Lebanese who were Christians,
tain walls. mostly Maronites, in the first and second
The war in Lebanon can be divided in- phases. Tbe third pbaee saw the Syrians
to three phases the domestic conflict intervene againet the leftiet-Palestinian
phase (spring to falI 1975), the pre-Syr- alliance, then turn to confront the Chris-
ian phase (fafl 1975-June 1976) and the tian side. In no case have the names
Syrian phase (June 1976-). The first applied to the sides been truly descrip-
phase was a true civil conffict, but tbe tive of the affiances. Yet it is important
latter two periods were, in many re- to note that three regular or near-regular
Apecte, a regional war fought in Lebanon. armies have fought in Lebanon the
Constraints on the nature of fighting Lebanese army, the Syrian army and the
derived from the Israelie willingness to Palestine Liberation Army. (We are not
intervene. Consequently, there was no dealing at all with the Israeli military
uee of air power at all, nor were chemical action in the epring of 1978. )


In addition, a number of relatively were approximately three weeks of in-

well-organized ,and very-well-equipped tensive artillery shelling. Yet, through.
C1-aietian militias, a similar number of out this period, 10 percent or fewer of the
organized and well-equipped Pa/eetinian buildings in the Ashrafiyeh district were
groups and ill-organized and inconsis- seriously damaged or destroyed. And, in
tently equipped Lebanese leftist groups those three weeks, as in the months of
also participated. , less intense ehelling, the Lebanese
Equipment employed by these forces Christian defenders of~shrafiyeh c&tin-
included relatively modern ( though not ued to both control their area and to re.

The AMX13 tank (105mm gun)

\ I
generally first-line ) materiel of ~France, eist Syrian demands and objectives.
the United States and the Soviet Union. Indeed, some measure of the strain on
It ranged from small weapons to tanks, mifitary logistics caused by attacking for-
armored personnel carriere (APCS), tified builtup areas may be evident in the
heavy artitlery and even mieeiles. Com- fact that 50 to 120 tru$ks carrying 250 to
munications gear included US and 500 metric tons of artillery ammunition
French equipment. (The Syrian army daily were required for what proved to be
used land line$ to a large extent. ) the futile Syrian siege. Equally revealing
In Beirut as in other recent examples is the Syrian estimate that the capture of
of urban warfare, the advantages that the6-square-kilometer area of Ashrafiyeh
accrue to the defense from the effective would entail at least 3,000 casualties.
use of urban characteristics were reaf- The logistics support necessary to sus-
firmed. Perhaps the best example was tain the offense in MOUT presents an at-
the Syrian siege of Ashrafi~eh. Apart from tractive target profile if the offense does
the months of intermittent conflict, there not have, or has only intermittent, con- I

trol of the air. The asymmetry of the tures exploded with devastating effect.
combatants and their tactical objectives Unfortunately, the 106mm RR is being
and guidelines in Beirut prevented Ash- widely replaced with the TOW, which is
rafiyehs defenders from disrupting Sy- widely believed to be less effective in
rian supply lines. breaching urban structures. While cur-
rent and future US infantry antitank/as- .
sault weapons have a substantial back-
Weapons blast, recent studies suggest they can
stilt be used in a MOUT environment. IS
By contrast with rockets and recoifless
In the Beirut fighting, both sides found rifles, mortars smaller than 120mm were
antiaircraft artillery (AAA ) a particu- generally ineffective instruments in the
larly effective weapon when used in di- Lebanese conffict. However, medium ar-
rect-fire roles. The systems most fre- tillery for example, 130mm and 155mm
quently commended were the US M42, howitzers were used to penetrate build-
the. Soviet ZU23 and ZU57, the Swiss ings to destroy equipment. Explosions
Oerlikon 37 and the Hispano-Suiza 30. following penetration generally demol-
Although all are towed except the M42, a ished pieces of the building. Eveh great-
self-propelled 40mm, they were mounted er cratering was seen on the streets. Both
on trucks. These weapons were employed the Ml 13 APC and the Panhard armored
against outside walls with devastating car operated effectively in Beirut. The
effect; they denuded structures with ease with which the Parzhard is dri~,en
their high volume of firepower. and repaired, and the absence of tracks,
In addition, used in a direct-fire capa- provide the mobility desirable in an ur-
city by firing the length of streets, AAA ban environment.
was a strong deterrent to assaults. It is
strange both because of the degree of
effectiveness and because of its ubiquity Communications
among modern armed forces that AAA
has been neglected as artillery in pre-
vious MOUT studies. The literature concerning commrmica-
The Soviet man-portable antitank tions in MOUT has focused on problems
rockets, RFG6 and RPG 7, were also of co-unicating in cities where build-
found to be extremely useful both ings interfere with line-of-eight transmis-
against armor, as they were designed to sions and where dead spots abound. Very
be employed, and against barricades and high frequencygenerally, tactical
walls where they served as portable artil- communications are seen in the literature
lery. Valued as multipurpose weapons, ae particularly susceptible to interference
the 106mm recoilless rifle ( RR) and its inherent in the cityscape.s
Soviet counterpart, the B1O, were used Our interviews and survey of available
extensively to make holes in walls. data dieclosed little concern over com-
High-explosive shells proved them- munic&tions problems in Lebanon.
selves against hewn rock or older sand- Christian forces had the best equipment
stone walls, while high-explosive anti- available to the Lebanese army, as well
tank rounds employed against first-floor as experienced signal personnel, and
level (generally reinforced concrete I struc- carefully deployed communications ae-


sets in advance with an eye to effective

netting. Tactical communications by the Conclusions
Christians utilized the AN/PRC77,
AN/\RC46 and AN/VRC47, citizen
band (CB) radios and General Electric The degree to which one can transfer
portables, as well as telephones, but de- lessons of the combat in Beirut to other
centralizatioti of command significantly environments is, as we have noted, limi-
reduced theneed for extensive contact. ted by the nature of the conflicts in-
Syrian forces, consistent with their volved. Yet some of the more important
practice, laid and relied heavily on land findings and implications of this study
lines as soon as possible. In addition to certainly could bear on other MOUT en-
eliminating radio reception problems, Sy- vironments such as Europe.
rian land lines were intended to preclude Until recently, toolittle attention has
Christian intercepts of Syrian communi- been devoted to weapon versatility and
cations. {Christian forces were active in backblast. Many of our most advanced
intercepting and even cooking Muslim weapons, and current generations of older
and Palestinian communications. ) The eysteme, have significant backblasts
fact we do not encounter statements of although they could, if necessary, be em-
problems in this area, even in response to ployedin MOUT warfare. Moreover, sig-
explicit questions, leads us to note that natures, minimum arming ranges and
communications did not present a major similar factors render others impractical
uroblem to the combatants in Beirut. for MOUT. They are often unable to
It should be noted, however, that Sy- shift from one type of ammunition to an-
rian communications over land lines were other. Ammunition versatility is an im-
frequently intercepted by tapping. Land po~tant asset in MOUT, and weapons
lines are more secure in most types of such as the 90mm RR, the old BIO and
warfare, but, as Beirut proved, singu- Bl(, and US jeep-mounted 106mm RRs
larly insecure in an urban environment. have potentially va}uable roles to play.
Similarly, Palestinians, whoused CB ra- Even apart from weapons, some tac-
dios extensively, were regularly inter tics and techniques employed in the Bei-
ceptedby Christian forces. ru~ fighting appear to merit further
Throughout much of the warfare in study as possible resources or dangers
Beirut, the telephone was a valuable for MOUT in other regions and circum-
military communications resource. Both sta~ces. For example, sniping was ex-
the commercial telephone system and the treinely effective. Used by Palestinians/
Lebaneee army phone system were used M@im leftists, Christians and the Sy-
for artillery forward observation, tactical rian army, sniping frequently tied down
communications and relay. large numbers of opposing troops. The
A wide variety of communications Le&Enfield was the preferred sniping
equipment was used, from the CB radio weapon, and the model A416 available to
to relatively low-level communications Beirut combatants was not well thought
intercept equipment. One of the most ef- of because of the tumbling effect many
fective units was the General Electric Lebanese officers believed it had.
hand (portable) radio. Light, it could be Weapons were sometimes sandbagged
carried by soldiers who were also man- carefully back from immediate window
ning and firing weapons. openings. While this technique reduced

fields of fire, it was an effective protec- (command, control, communications) ,

tion against sniping, reduced enemy de- nets must cm-ry. Wehave indicated some
tection possibility and diminished incom- particularly effective radio types in Bei-
ing fragment effecte on weapons rut. Light, man-portable radios are ideal,
operators. especially if they do not preclude carry-
Evacuation/retreat should be under- ing weapons. Communications should, of
taken with systematic destruction of course, be established on high ground,
transport and communications resources and communications points in buildings
specific to cities. In Beirut, for example, on the higher stories.
elevators were used to carry weapons to Medical kits should be made more $
upper floors of buildings and, generally, widely available. In MOUT situations;
formability within city structures. Tel& medical evacuation is often impossible so
phone, electricity and plumbingall that wounded personnel must be treated
these are building resourcee without by others in their units.
which military operations are complicated Finally, the Beirut fighting showed
inside structures. Thus, in retreat, these over and over again that indivi$rale who -
resources should be denied the enemy. were intimately familiar with ckies, who
Elevators should be destroyed, power had grown up or lived much of their lives
lines to-the building cut, and so forth. in cities, were far more able to optimize
Preplanning for MOUT requires con- urban warfare resources. Their mobility
sidering building resources differently was far greater, and their instincts more
from the past. Perhaps elevators should refined. By contrast, the less sophisti-
have a reserve power supply in order to cated, the rural, those unaccustomed to
safeguard this valuable troop and equip- city structures were unable to exploit
ment mover. Buildings might, similarly, these same city characteristics and were
have safe reserve water supplies. Tele- indeed often victimized by them. Ideally,
phone and power systems could be sector- this suggests the formation of MOUT
based so that these resources can be units from urban personnel. If this is not
denied to a district once it is evacuated. feasible, at least our findings reaffirm
Decentralization of command among the importance of exhaustive and realis-
MOUT units facilitates communications tic training for MOUT..
si;ce it reduces the volume of traffic CJ %


1 L,I,M Dz,, Konr.d Ke,,e. and Horst Me.aersna. sen 4 A woo Dt0!80graPhY ,$ Mw C S Delgrosso, Coceot, .1
M,l,t.,v Ooerat,om 8. Bum UP Areas Es$aYs o Some Pasr Pre. O!xrafr.ns for L3ncfwIg forces in urban Env,rommn!s m fhe M,d
wt. and F.t.,e Pmwects Rand GorDoratlon Santa Mo. Ica. flange, Heaowmters, US M.wne Corm W.wngmn, D C, 1977,
Cahf 1976, esDectally chapter IV volumes 1and 11,Annex A
2 80,0 Chapters II ana 111,C N Donnelly, S..,.1 Tech.wes 5 As we have mdtcated below, me US Army Mater,el Develw
for Combat m B.#lt. uP Areas. De fe. se Rev,eti. APr,l rnent ..0 Read, ness Comnm.a [DA RCOM1 ad me US Army
1977 m 23842 wprmtea m MC1!IW Re.,e., No.wnQer 1977. w Tratnq ma Docm.e Command IT RADOC) earned on the re
37 48), M.,or A E HemM1.Y, SO!el !.411!IWVOP.r.!,OnS ,. BUIII search p~ogram mat me Defense Aa.anceo Research Pro)ects
uo A.e. s, Delme inteltrgence Report DDI 110015577. Defense Agency IDARPA1, m effect, tra. sferrea to them
,n,ell,gece Agency, WashmgtO D C July 1977 ,0 COlOel 6 Compare Donald 0 Egner. MJl!farv Opemt!ons ,. B.,lt UP
John C Sctwfen and F. MchaelJ Deane. To F,ght Ru$sm.. ,. Areaa Stalu$ ad Prwosed Tasks, US Army Human Eng,neenng
Cttres, K..* T.e, r Tactrcs, Mann. CorQs Gazelle, January 1977, l.aboralo+, Aberdeen PrOvmg Grouna, Md, 1976, MOSA Team,
CID3842 Prweeamgs of me S....0 DARCOMITRADOC Co.rdmef,o.
3 SW George S~hec.teCs IwJer mesentea at !he 420 M!lllary - conference on Mclrtarv Operal#o.s t. BUM UP Areas (MOBA) 79
Owrat,.ns Reseamh Symposa (MORS). 20 July 1977, US Army Human E.g,.eer,ng Laboratory. Aberdeen


P,ovm$ G,oo, Md 1977, .0 Brenda K Them PrOCe.dm9S 0! Svra. use. N Y. 1979. Paul A Jure,a,w southern Lebanon Its
me Th,ra DA RCOM!TRADOC COO,O,W,. co. ?.,..., O. w), Internal ma Reg$o.a Imol,catl on.., Abbott Associates SR29,
lary Oper.t!o.s m B.,lt UP A,eas hVOBAl 7617 May 1978, US !977. Paul A,LIm ad Wtll(am E Haze.. LeDanon% D ). ..1.
Army Hum, Eg, neer,.g Laboratory AbeIL!ee. Prov,ng Gro. no 1!0 Futures and Co,eq.e, e., Abbott Asmwmtes 1.. , Ale,
Ma 1978 andr!a. VA 1976, Paul A Jureld!n! end R D McLa.r!n, ,, Exter.a!
7 WOrk,ng grouo A 701 t~: MORS R., bee $,holly Oeoted to I.tervent, o. ,. Inter..! Gonfllct Syr#a. Policy r. me Lebanese
MOUT km several year, Vortex, torthcom, ng .,,,.,,, James M P,, ce, F1OW01 Events ,
8 TDew ,w,,, dual, ,nclude ,,, ),.,3 aa m,l, tary Dersonnel. the Lebanese Co.ll, ct A Chronology of me Lebanese Cwl war. -
some of mom have been very helpful m CIar,fymg our thoughts Abbo,, Assoc,$tes SR35, August 1978, .0 FelwII, Saad. The
Thus *, SiTOUW,,,. to ackowleage 1., as$, stace 01 Gerald E,,!,? Front IIIIQI)c.l ,0, .1 the S,!a,P./eSt,,a!JorO.ra
S.l I, V.11.OUSDR&E George Schechter, A.. IY1,CS I.. Donald 0 Ente.le ..0 me Lebanese c,.,! War, Abbo!t Associates 1.. Alex
Lwe. w.,t.g J McJ, to.. EJ,s*.rt. Sfianh and nre.da~ The,.1 .Or#a, Va 1976
m. US Army !!.ma Enqme.rmg Latmra<my Aoerueen Pmvmg $4 m me fQrmuIa!con .f the!re, we recewed sub.
Ground and Colonel Ronald Becker US Army, c,urrelly .ss,0,0 stat Ial and ,nva..we ass, stmce from .ers. nm+ of m. s Armv
to the Wm. Wg.tie ..nm. EIIglneerl.g Laboratory, Aberdeen Prov,rIg Gin.. fJ, Alex:
9 Del. rosso. . . c,, .mdr,a .3
10 W,;DWIS [f),,,, ,. C,,,,,, IN TREC 1, .1 Pumshed. 15 James M Prtce, Mmlwy ODemt,o.s ,. Lebanon A
1974, and US Army .0 US h!,.,.. CO,D, 0,,,,,,, ,s!0,,,, ., ,, nolcqy .,5 ,cluded ,. tne 1,., cePorl to, ttte study noted r Pr,ce,
Korean w., COncemmg the Hbe!at, o..+ Seoul F,OW o, Events , the Lebanese CO fl,, t A C!mool. gy01 ,?3,
11 L(e!eat Gene,., V#llard Pear$on The War , ,he Pwrtl) Lebanese C,V,I War 00 c,!
e, Pro,,.. 19b6 7!368. Dewr!menl of ,, Army $@, ng, on 16 Comtwe Lebanon , Cr,sls Pmtrwanfs and Issues. OP cd,
D C 1915 Weaimn% Ellecfs ,. Crt!es 0. c!! ena Map, Rorj .0 John Bulloch Death of a Country, We, aenlela 8 N,, on,
Cbr, stma,, A Com Pw, Gomma saw Remembers the Batt,e ,., Lonoon, Eg 1978
. . . Mar,., COrD, G.>,!,. February 1977 CD 1926 17 The US Army Be,,, Br,qaw has been allowed !. ,.,., the
12 me . . . ...1 DeacekeeD,. g OWr.t, on m S..1. Dom, noo 90rnm reco,lles$ nlle for ,ts ulque, largely urban warfare role
(1965, ,, .o,merea l), some to mertt COn%,deratt.n es e MOiJT 18 Recent st.dies .! AbeJdeen Proww GrounO ..0 elsewhere
e,erc, se, a, n@lf See Delom,so . . ,>1 vo, ume 1 ?,e. t,on3 7 wggest mat. *h!le QackQlast Co.t, t. be a pronounced prob
13 Th,s $t.ti, M,,, Ia,yODe,a,, o, , B.,,, LID4!,,.s Study .0 tern hen f,r,g from eclos.,e, the ,.1,,,1 0( the bachblakl orob
A.d, s,, of M,!,,., OPerat, ons , ,he LeUaeSe C,,,l War lerr ,3s bee exaggerated Most neaPon$ otherwse su, table 10,
D4AKI! 78 C 0036 ..s,, ).,,$ a mlegr.a, D.,, 01 Abbott As..,, such .,, have or,agreeaDle but tolerable bachbla$t elfect,
ales 1.0 .onmwg. ,. depth study .0 a.a,ys Is of the nature an. 13 Delgro, so, op .,1, vorume 1,pp 7 laad 719
,mDI,c,a,Ions o, the . ..!.,., I. Lebanon 0,.,, Abbott Associates 20 Other st.a, es @ e.mnple, !0,01 and papem have made ttms
lnc Lwb[,cabo. s dealing w!h !he subject e+eral contr, Doml Recent research and e. Perlme. ts shorn tiwt some .1 me
C.t,on, to Lebanon ! C{),(S Parllc!wnts .0 15s..5 ,Orlea b, P strong and .wdely held vwvs about ?+s!em detwanc,es I. MOUT
Ed. a,o Haley .0 Lew. W Sn,der S,ra,.,C un,,e, w,y P,,., e(romets .!. .K.+ggerated, hOWeW

Photos court..> f..thnrs

Paul A Jureidiru u uice prewdent of Abbott Asso.

crates Inc , Akxandna, Virgnna He rectz~ed a B.A.
from the American Uru uewty of Beumt, an M,A. from
the University of Virgima and a Ph. D from Th~
American Urziuerszty, He has written extensively on
the Mtddle .?ast and is co-author of CoId Wsr in the
MiddleEast. ImpIicat]ons for the UnitedStatesand
Middle East Confkct Scenarios and United States , ~.<
p , -. Defense Options, publlshed m 1978 ~. ..
R L) McLaunn is a semor staff member, Abbott Q
Associates Inc., Alexandria, Virginia He received a
B A from the University of Southern California, an
A. M., and M A.L.D. and a Ph.D. from the Fletcher
~& !3
School, Tufts Umuersity. The author of many articles
and research studies, he is the author of The Middle 1
East in Soviet POIICV, and co-author of Foreum Policy
Making in the MiddleEast and ThePoMcal Roleof
Minontiesin theMiddleEast.