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G.R. No. 78178 April 15, 1988 5.

Ordering the defendant to pay the following:


DELIA BAILON-CASILAO, LUZ PAULINO-ANG, EMMA PAULINO-YBANEZ, NILDA PAULINO- a. P5,000.00 as damages;
TOLENTINO, and SABINA BAILON, petitioners,
vs. b. P2,000.00 as attorney's fees and;
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and CELESTINO AFABLE, respondents. c. to pay the costs.
CORTES, J.: [Decision of the Trial Court, Rollo, p. 37-38].
The fate of petitioners' claim over a parcel of land rests ultimately on a determination of whether or not On appeal, the respondent Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court insofar as it held that
said petitioners are chargeable with such laches as may effectively bar their present action. prescription does not he against plaintiffs-appellees because they are co-owners of the original vendors.
The petitioners herein filed a case for recovery of property and damages with notice of lis pendens on However, the appellate court declared that, although registered property cannot be lost by prescription,
March 13, 1981 against the defendant and herein private respondent, Celestino Afable. The parcel of nevertheless, an action to recover it may be barred by laches, citing the ruling in Mejia de Lucaz v.
land involved in this case, with an area of 48,849 square meters, is covered by Original Certificate of Title Gamponia [100 Phil. 277 (1956)]. Accordingly, it held the petitioners guilty of laches and dismissed their
No. 1771 issued on June 12, 1931, in the names of Rosalia, Gaudencio, Sabina Bernabe, Nenita and complaint. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Delia, all surnamed Bailon, as co-owners, each with a 1/6 share. Gaudencio and Nenita are now dead, The principal issue to be resolved in this case concerns the applicability of the equitable doctrine of
the latter being represented in this case by her children. Luz, Emma and Nilda. Bernabe went to China in laches. Initially though, a determination of the effect of a sale by one or more co-owners of the entire
1931 and had not been heard from since then [Decision of the Court of Appeals, Rollo, p. 39]. property held in common without the consent of all the co-owners and of the appropriate remedy of the
It appears that on August 23, 1948, Rosalia Bailon and Gaudencio Bailon sold a portion of the said land aggrieved co-owners is required.
consisting of 16,283 square meters to Donato Delgado. On May 13, 1949, Rosalia Bailon alone sold the The rights of a co-owner of a certain property are clearly specified in Article 493 of the Civil Code.Thus:
remainder of the land consisting of 32,566 square meters to Ponciana V. Aresgado de Lanuza. On the
same date, Lanuza acquired from Delgado the 16,283 square meters of land which the latter had earlier Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the acts and
acquired from Rosalia and Gaudencio. On December 3, 1975, John Lanuza, acting under a special power benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate assign or mortgage it and
of attorney given by his wife, Ponciana V. Aresgado de Lanuza, sold the two parcels of land to Celestino even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are
Afable, Sr. involved. But the effect of the alienation or mortgage, with respect to the co-owners,
shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the
In all these transfers, it was stated in the deeds of sale that the land was not registered under the termination of the co-ownership. [Emphasis supplied.]
provisions of Act No. 496 when the fact is that it is. It appears that said land had been successively
declared for taxation first, in the name of Ciriaca Dellamas, mother of the registered co-owners, then in As early as 1923, this Court has ruled that even if a co-owner sells the whole property as his, the sale will
the name of Rosalia Bailon in 1924, then in that of Donato Delgado in 1936, then in Ponciana de Lanuza's affect only his own share but not those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the sale [Punsalan
name in 1962 and finally in the name of Celestino Afable, Sr. in 1983. v. Boon Liat 44 Phil. 320 (1923)]. This is because under the aforementioned codal provision, the sale or
other disposition affects only his undivided share and the transferee gets only what would correspond to
In his answer to the complaint filed by the herein petitioners, Afable claimed that he had acquired the land his grantor in the partition of the thing owned in common.[Ramirez v. Bautista, 14 Phil. 528 (1909)].
in question through prescription and contended that the petitioners were guilty of laches.He later filed a Consequently, by virtue of the sales made by Rosalia and Gaudencio Bailon which are valid with respect
third-party complaint against Rosalia Bailon for damages allegedly suffered as a result of the sale to him to their proportionate shares, and the subsequent transfers which culminated in the sale to private
of the land. respondent Celestino Afable, the said Afable thereby became a co-owner of the disputed parcel of land
After trial, the lower court rendered a decision: as correctly held by the lower court since the sales produced the effect of substituting the buyers in the
enjoyment thereof [Mainit v. Bandoy, 14 Phil. 730 (1910)].
1. Finding and declaring Celestino Afable, a co-owner of the land described in
paragraph III of the complaint having validly bought the two-sixth (2/6) respective From the foregoing, it may be deduced that since a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale
undivided shares of Rosalia Bailon and Gaudencio Bailon; of the entire property by one co-owner without the consent of the other co-owners is not null and void.
However, only the rights of the co-owner-seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of
2. Finding and declaring the following as pro-indiviso co-owners, having 1/6 share the property.
each, of the property described in paragraph III of the complaint, to wit:
The proper action in cases like this is not for the nullification of the sale or for the recovery of possession
a. Sabina Bailon of the thing owned in common from the third person who substituted the co-owner or co-owners who
alienated their shares, but the DIVISION of the common property as if it continued to remain in the
b. Bernabe Bailon possession of the co-owners who possessed and administered it [Mainit v. Bandoy, supra.]
c. Heirs of Nenita Bailon-Paulino Thus, it is now settled that the appropriate recourse of co-owners in cases where their consent were not
d. Delia Bailon-Casilao; secured in a sale of the entire property as well as in a sale merely of the undivided shares of some of the
co-owners is an action. for PARTITION under Rule 69 of the Revised Rules of Court. Neither recovery of
3. Ordering the segregation of the undivided interests in the property in order to possession nor restitution can be granted since the defendant buyers are legitimate proprietors and
terminate co-ownership to be conducted by any Geodetic Engineer selected by the possessors in joint ownership of the common property claimed [Ramirez v. Bautista, supra].
parties to delineate the specific part of each of the co-owners.
As to the action for petition, neither prescription nor laches can be invoked.
4. Ordering the defendant to restore the possession of the plaintiffs respective shares
as well as all attributes of absolute dominion;
In the light of the attendant circumstances, defendant-appellee's defense of prescription is a vain it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time warranting a
proposition. Pursuant to Article 494 of the Civil Code, '(n)o co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co- presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to
ownership. Such co-owner may demand at anytime the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar assert it. Tijam, et al., v. Sibonghanoy, G.R. No. L-21450, April 25, 1968, 23 SCRA
as his share is concerned.' [Emphasis supplied.] In Budiong v. Bondoc [G.R. No. L-27702, September 9, 29,35; Tendo v. Zamacoma, G.R. No. L-63048, August 7, 1985, 138 SCRA 78, 90].
1977, 79 SCRA 241, this Court has interpreted said provision of law to mean that the action for partition
is imprescriptible or cannot be barred by prescription. For Article 494 of the Civil Code explicitly declares: The doctrine of "laches" or of "stale demands" is based upon grounds of public policy
"No prescription shall lie in favor of a co-owner or co- heir so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes which requires for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and
the co-ownership." unlike the statute of limitations, is not a mere question of time but is principally a
question of inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or
Furthermore, the disputed parcel of land being registered under the Torrens System, the express asserted," [Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, supra, p. 35]. [Emphasis supplied.]
provision of Act No. 496 that '(n)o title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall
be acquired by prescription or adverse possession' is squarely applicable. Consequently, prescription will It must be noted that while there was delay in asserting petitioners' rights, such delay was not attended
not lie in favor of Afable as against the petitioners who remain the registered owners of the disputed with any knowledge of the sale nor with any opportunity to bring suit. In the first place, petitioners had no
parcel of land. notice of the sale made by their eldest sister. It is undisputed that the petitioner co-owners had entrusted
the care and management of the parcel of land to Rosalia Bailon who was the oldest among them [TSN,
It is argued however, that as to the petitioners Emma, Luz and Nelda who are not the registered co- July 27, 1983, p. 14]. In fact, Nicanor Lee, a son of Rosalia, who was presented as a witness by the
owners but merely represented their deceased mother, the late Nenita Bailon, prescription plaintiffs-petitioners, testified on cross-examination that his mother was only the administrator of the land
lies.Respondents bolster their argument by citing a decision of this Court in Pasion v. Pasion [G.R.No. L- as she is the eldest and her brothers and sisters were away [TSN, October 5, 1983, p. 15]. Indeed, when
15757, May 31, 1961, 2 SCRA 486, 489] holding that "the imprescriptibility of a Torrens title can only be Delia Bailon-Casilao left Sorsogon in 1942 after she got married, it was only in 1983 that she returned.
invoked by the person in whose name the title is registered" and that 'one who is not the registered owner Sabina on the other hand, is said to be living in Zamboanga while Bernabe who left for China in 1931 has
of a parcel of land cannot invoke imprescriptibility of action to claim the same.' not been heard from since then. Consequently, when Rosalia, from whom the private respondent derived
his title, made the disputed sales covering the entire property, the herein petitioners were unaware
Reliance on the aforesaid Pasion case is futile. The ruling therein applies only against transferees other thereof.
than direct issues or heirs or to complete strangers. The rational is clear:
In the second place, they were not afforded an opportunity to bring suit inasmuch as until 1981, they were
If prescription is unavailing against the registered owner, it must be equally kept in the dark about the transactions entered into by their sister. It was only when Delia Bailon-Casilao
unavailing against the latter's hereditary successors, because they merely step into returned to Sorsogon in 1981 that she found out about the sales and immediately, she and her co-
the shoes of the decedent by operation of law (New Civil Code, Article 777; Old Civil petitioners filed the present action for recovery of property. The appellate court thus erred in holding that
Code, Article 657), the title or right undergoing no change by its transmission mortis 'the petitioners did nothing to show interest in the land." For the administration of the parcel of land was
causa [Atus, et al., v. Nunez, et al., 97 Phil. 762, 764]. entrusted to the oldest co-owner who was then in possession thereof precisely because the other co-
The latest pronouncement of this Court in Umbay v. Alecha [G. R. No. 67284, March 18, 1985, 135 SCRA owners cannot attend to such a task as they reside outside of Sorsogon where the land is situated. Her
427, 429], which was promulgated subsequent to the Pasion case reiterated the Atus doctrine. Thus: co-owners also allowed her to appropriate the entire produce for herself because it was not even enough
for her daily consumption [TSN, October 5, 1983, pp. 17-18]. And since petitioner was the one receiving
Prescription is unavailing not only against the registered owner but also against his the produce, it is but natural that she was the one to take charge of paying the real estate taxes. Now, if
hereditary successors, because they merely step into the shoes of the decedent by knowledge of the sale by Rosalia was conveyed to the petitioners only later, they cannot be faulted for
operation of law and are merely the continuation of the personality of their the acts of their co-owner who failed to live up to the trust and confidence expected of her. In view of the
predecessor-in-interest. [Barcelona v. Barcelona, 100 Phil. 251, 257]. lack of knowledge by the petitioners of the conduct of Rosalia in selling the land without their consent in
1975 and the absence of any opportunity to institute the proper action until 1981, laches may not be
Laches is likewise unavailing as a shield against the action of herein petitioners. asserted against the petitioners.
Well-stated in this jurisdiction are the four basic elements of laches, namely: (1) conduct on the part of The third element of laches is likewise absent. There was no lack of knowledge or notice on the part of
the defendant or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation of which complaint is made the defendant that the complainants would assert the right on which they base the suit. On the contrary,
and for which the complainant seeks a remedy; (2) delay in asserting the corporations complainant's private respondent is guilty of bad faith in purchasing the property as he knew that the property was co-
rights, the complainant having had knowledge or notice of the defendant's conduct and having been owned by six persons and yet, there were only two signatories to the deeds of sale and no special
afforded an opportunity to institute suit; (3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that authorization to self was granted to the two sellers by the other co-owners.
the complainant would assert the right on which he bases his suit; and, (4) injury or prejudice to the
defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant, or the suit is not held to be barred [Go China Even as the land here was misrepresented in the deeds of sale as "unregistered," the truth was that
Gun, et al. v. Co Cho et al., 96 Phil. 622 (1955)]. Afable already had notice that the land was titled in the name of six persons by virtue of the Certificate of
Title which was already in his possession even before the sale. Such fact is apparent from his testimony
While the first and last elements are present in this case, the second and third elements are missing. before the court a quo:
The second element speaks of delay in asserting the complainant's rights. However, the mere fact of COURT:
delay is insufficient to constitute, laches. It is required that (1) complainant must have had knowledge of
the conduct of defendant or of one under whom he claims and (2) he must have been afforded Q: From whom did you get the certificate of Title?
an opportunity to institute suit. This court has pointed out that laches is not concerned with the mere lapse
of time. Thus: A: When it was mortgaged by Ponciana Aresgado.

Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable length of time Q: It was mortgaged to you before you bought it?
to do that which by exercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier; A: Yes, Your Honor. (TSN, March 5, 1984, p. 12) When cross-examined, he stated:
Q: Mr. Witness, the original Certificate of Title was given to you in the year 1974, was it not?
A: 1975.
Q: In 1975, you already discovered that the title was in the name of several persons, is it not?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: When you discovered that it is in the name of several persons, you filed a case in court for
authority to cancel the title to be transferred in your name, is it not?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And that was denied by the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon because there was ordinary
one signatory to the deed of sale instead of six, was it not?
A: Not one but two signatories.
[Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Sorsogon, Rollo, p. 35]
Such actual knowledge of the existence of other co-owners in whose names the lot subject of the sale
was registered should have prompted a searching inquiry by Afable considering the well- known rule in
this jurisdiction that:
... a person dealing with a registered land has a right to rely upon the face of the
Torrens certificate of title and to dispense with the need of inquiring further, except
when the party concerned has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that
would impel a reasonably cautions man to make such inquiry. [Gonzales v. IAC and
Rural Bank of Pavia, Inc., G.R. No. 69622, January 29, 1988).
Moreover, the undisputed fact is that petitioners are relatives of his wife. As a genuine gesture of good
faith, he should have contacted the petitioners who were still listed as co-owners in the certificate of title
which was already in his possession even before the sale. In failing to exercise even a minimum degree
of ordinary prudence required by the situation, he is deemed to have bought the lot at his own risk. Hence
any prejudice or injury that may be occasioned to him by such sale must be borne by him.
Indeed, aware of the flaws impairing his title, Afable went to the herein petitioner Delia Bailon-Casilao,
asking the latter to sign a document obviously to cure the flaw [TSN, July 27, 1983, p.6]. Later, he even
filed a petition in the Court of First Instance to register the title in his name which was denied as aforesaid.
It may be gleaned from the foregoing examination of the facts that Celestino Afable is not a buyer in good
faith. Laches being an equitable defense, he who invokes it must come to the court with clean hands.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED, the challenged decision of the Court of
Appeals is SET ASIDE, and the decision of the trial court is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-33187 March 31, 1980 From 1956 to 1960, the spouses Geminiano Pamplona and Apolonio Onte enlarged their house and they
even constructed a piggery corral at the back of their said house about one and one-half meters from the
CORNELIO PAMPLONA alias GEMINIANO PAMPLONA and APOLONIA ONTE, petitioners, eastern boundary of lot 1496.
vs.
VIVENCIO MORETO, VICTOR MORETO, ELIGIO MORETO, MARCELO MORETO, PAULINA On August 12, 1956, Flaviano Moreto died intestate. In 1961, the plaintiffs demanded on the defendants
MORETO, ROSARIO MORETO, MARTA MORETO, SEVERINA MENDOZA, PABLO MENDOZA, to vacate the premises where they had their house and piggery on the ground that Flaviano Moreto had
LAZARO MENDOZA, VICTORIA TUIZA, JOSEFINA MORETO, LEANDRO MORETO and LORENZO no right to sell the lot which he sold to Geminiano Pamplona as the same belongs to the conjugal
MENDOZA, respondents. partnership of Flaviano and his deceased wife and the latter was already dead when the sale was
executed without the consent of the plaintiffs who are the heirs of Monica. The spouses Geminiano
GUERRERO, J.: Pamplona and Apolonia Onte refused to vacate the premises occupied by them and hence, this suit was
This is a petition for certiorari by way of appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals 1 in CA-G.R. instituted by the heirs of Monica Maniega seeking for the declaration of the nullity of the deed of sale of
No. 35962-R, entitled "Vivencio Moreto, et al., Plaintiff-Appellees vs. Cornelio Pamplona, et al., July 30, 1952 above-mentioned as regards one-half of the property subject matter of said deed; to declare
Defendants-Appellants," affirming the decision of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, Branch I at Bian. the plaintiffs as the rightful owners of the other half of said lot; to allow the plaintiffs to redeem the one-
half portion thereof sold to the defendants. "After payment of the other half of the purchase price"; to order
The facts, as stated in the decision appealed from, show that: the defendants to vacate the portions occupied by them; to order the defendants to pay actual and moral
damages and attorney's fees to the plaintiffs; to order the defendants to pay plaintiffs P120.00 a year
Flaviano Moreto and Monica Maniega were husband and wife. During their marriage, they acquired from August 1958 until they have vacated the premises occupied by them for the use and occupancy of
adjacent lots Nos. 1495, 4545, and 1496 of the Calamba Friar Land Estate, situated in Calamba, Laguna, the same.
containing 781-544 and 1,021 square meters respectively and covered by certificates of title issued in the
name of "Flaviano Moreto, married to Monica Maniega." The defendants claim that the sale made by Flaviano Moreto in their favor is valid as the lot sold is
registered in the name of Flaviano Moreto and they are purchasers believing in good faith that the vendor
The spouses Flaviano Moreto and Monica Maniega begot during their marriage six (6) children, namely, was the sole owner of the lot sold.
Ursulo, Marta, La Paz, Alipio, Pablo, and Leandro, all surnamed Moreto.
After a relocation of lots 1495, 1496 and 4545 made by agreement of the parties, it was found out that
Ursulo Moreto died intestate on May 24, 1959 leaving as his heirs herein plaintiffs Vivencio, Marcelo, there was mutual error between Flaviano Moreto and the defendants in the execution of the deed of sale
Rosario, Victor, Paulina, Marta and Eligio, all surnamed Moreto. because while the said deed recited that the lot sold is lot No. 1495, the real intention of the parties is
Marta Moreto died also intestate on April 30, 1938 leaving as her heir plaintiff Victoria Tuiza. that it was a portion consisting of 781 square meters of lot No. 1496 which was the subject matter of their
sale transaction.
La Paz Moreto died intestate on July 17, 1954 leaving the following heirs, namely, herein plaintiffs Pablo,
Severina, Lazaro, and Lorenzo, all surnamed Mendoza. After trial, the lower court rendered judgment, the dispositive part thereof being as follows:

Alipio Moreto died intestate on June 30, 1943 leaving as his heir herein plaintiff Josefina Moreto. WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered for the plaintiffs declaring the deed of
absolute sale dated July 30, 1952 pertaining to the eastern portion of Lot 1496
Pablo Moreto died intestate on April 25, 1942 leaving no issue and as his heirs his brother plaintiff Leandro covering an area of 781 square meters null and void as regards the 390.5 square
Moreto and the other plaintiffs herein. meters of which plaintiffs are hereby declared the rightful owners and entitled to its
possession.
On May 6, 1946, Monica Maniega died intestate in Calamba, Laguna.
The sale is ordered valid with respect to the eastern one-half (1/2) of 1781 square
On July 30, 1952, or more than six (6) years after the death of his wife Monica Maniega, Flaviano Moreto, meters of Lot 1496 measuring 390.5 square meters of which defendants are
without the consent of the heirs of his said deceased wife Monica, and before any liquidation of the
declared lawful owners and entitled to its possession.
conjugal partnership of Monica and Flaviano could be effected, executed in favor of Geminiano
Pamplona, married to defendant Apolonia Onte, the deed of absolute sale (Exh. "1") covering lot No. After proper survey segregating the eastern one-half portion with an area of 390.5
1495 for P900.00. The deed of sale (Exh. "1") contained a description of lot No. 1495 as having an area square meters of Lot 1496, the defendants shall be entitled to a certificate of title
of 781 square meters and covered by transfer certificate of title No. 14570 issued in the name of Flaviano covering said portion and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 9843 of the office of the
Moreto, married to Monica Maniega, although the lot was acquired during their marriage. As a result of Register of Deeds of Laguna shall be cancelled accordingly and new titles issued to
the sale, the said certificate of title was cancelled and a new transfer certificate of title No. T-5671 was the plaintiffs and to the defendants covering their respective portions.
issued in the name of Geminiano Pamplona married to Apolonia Onte (Exh. "A").
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 5671 of the office of the Register of Deeds of Laguna
After the execution of the above-mentioned deed of sale (Exh. "1"), the spouses Geminiano Pamplona covering Lot No. 1495 and registered in the name of Cornelio Pamplona, married to
and Apolonia Onte constructed their house on the eastern part of lot 1496 as Flaviano Moreto, at the time Apolonia Onte, is by virtue of this decision ordered cancelled. The defendants are
of the sale, pointed to it as the land which he sold to Geminiano Pamplona. Shortly thereafter, Rafael ordered to surrender to the office of the Register of Deeds of Laguna the owner's
Pamplona, son of the spouses Geminiano Pamplona and Apolonia Onte, also built his house within lot duplicate of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 5671 within thirty (30) days after this
1496 about one meter from its boundary with the adjoining lot. The vendor Flaviano Moreto and the decision shall have become final for cancellation in accordance with this decision.
vendee Geminiano Pamplona thought all the time that the portion of 781 square meters which was the
subject matter of their sale transaction was No. 1495 and so lot No. 1495 appears to be the subject matter Let copy of this decision be furnished the Register of Deeds for the province of
in the deed of sale (Exh. "1") although the fact is that the said portion sold thought of by the parties to be Laguna for his information and guidance.
lot No. 1495 is a part of lot No. 1496. With costs against the defendants. 2
The defendants-appellants, not being satisfied with said judgment, appealed to the Court of Appeals, land purchased by the Pamplonas, so that We are persuaded and convinced to rule that private
which affirmed the judgment, hence they now come to this Court. respondents are in estoppel by laches to claim half of the property, in dispute as null and void. Estoppel
by laches is a rule of equity which bars a claimant from presenting his claim when, by reason of
The fundamental and crucial issue in the case at bar is whether under the facts and circumstances duly abandonment and negligence, he allowed a long time to elapse without presenting the same.
established by the evidence, petitioners are entitled to the full ownership of the property in litigation, or (International Banking Corporation vs. Yared, 59 Phil. 92)
only one-half of the same.
We have ruled that at the time of the sale in 1952, the conjugal partnership was already dissolved six
There is no question that when the petitioners purchased the property on July 30, 1952 from Flaviano years before and therefore, the estate became a co-ownership between Flaviano Moreto, the surviving
Moreto for the price of P900.00, his wife Monica Maniega had already been dead six years before, Monica husband, and the heirs of his deceased wife, Monica Maniega. Article 493 of the New Civil Code is
having died on May 6, 1946. Hence, the conjugal partnership of the spouses Flaviano Moreto and Monica applicable and it provides a follows:
Maniega had already been dissolved. (Article 175, (1) New Civil Code; Article 1417, Old Civil Code). The
records show that the conjugal estate had not been inventoried, liquidated, settled and divided by the Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and
heirs thereto in accordance with law. The necessary proceedings for the liquidation of the conjugal benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and
partnership were not instituted by the heirs either in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are
spouse pursuant to Act 3176 amending Section 685 of Act 190. Neither was there an extra-judicial involve. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-
partition between the surviving spouse and the heirs of the deceased spouse nor was an ordinary action owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division
for partition brought for the purpose. Accordingly, the estate became the property of a community between upon the termination of the co-ownership.
the surviving husband, Flaviano Moreto, and his children with the deceased Monica Maniega in the
concept of a co-ownership. We agree with the petitioner that there was a partial partition of the co-ownership when at the time of the
sale Flaviano Moreto pointed out the area and location of the 781 sq. meters sold by him to the petitioners-
The community property of the marriage, at the dissolution of this bond by the death vendees on which the latter built their house and also that whereon Rafael, the son of petitioners likewise
of one of the spouses, ceases to belong to the legal partnership and becomes the erected his house and an adjacent coral for piggery.
property of a community, by operation of law, between the surviving spouse and the
heirs of the deceased spouse, or the exclusive property of the widower or the widow, Petitioners point to the fact that spouses Flaviano Moreto and Monica Maniega owned three parcels of
it he or she be the heir of the deceased spouse. Every co-owner shall have full land denominated as Lot 1495 having an area of 781 sq. meters, Lot 1496 with an area of 1,021 sq.
ownership of his part and in the fruits and benefits derived therefrom, and he meters, and Lot 4545 with an area of 544 sq. meters. The three lots have a total area of 2,346 sq. meters.
therefore may alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in These three parcels of lots are contiguous with one another as each is bounded on one side by the other,
its enjoyment, unless personal rights are in question. (Marigsa vs. Macabuntoc, 17 thus: Lot 4545 is bounded on the northeast by Lot 1495 and on the southeast by Lot 1496. Lot 1495 is
Phil. 107) bounded on the west by Lot 4545. Lot 1496 is bounded on the west by Lot 4545. It is therefore, clear that
the three lots constitute one big land. They are not separate properties located in different places but they
In Borja vs. Addision, 44 Phil. 895, 906, the Supreme Court said that "(t)here is no reason in law why the abut each other. This is not disputed by private respondents. Hence, at the time of the sale, the co-
heirs of the deceased wife may not form a partnership with the surviving husband for the management ownership constituted or covered these three lots adjacent to each other. And since Flaviano Moreto was
and control of the community property of the marriage and conceivably such a partnership, or rather entitled to one-half pro-indiviso of the entire land area or 1,173 sq. meters as his share, he had a perfect
community of property, between the heirs and the surviving husband might be formed without a written legal and lawful right to dispose of 781 sq. meters of his share to the Pamplona spouses. Indeed, there
agreement." In Prades vs. Tecson, 49 Phil. 230, the Supreme Court held that "(a)lthough, when the wife was still a remainder of some 392 sq. meters belonging to him at the time of the sale.
dies, the surviving husband, as administrator of the community property, has authority to sell the property
withut the concurrence of the children of the marriage, nevertheless this power can be waived in favor We reject respondent Court's ruling that the sale was valid as to one-half and invalid as to the other half
of the children, with the result of bringing about a conventional ownership in common between the father for the very simple reason that Flaviano Moreto, the vendor, had the legal right to more than 781 sq.
and children as to such property; and any one purchasing with knowledge of the changed status of the meters of the communal estate, a title which he could dispose, alienate in favor of the vendees-petitioners.
property will acquire only the undivided interest of those members of the family who join in the act of The title may be pro-indiviso or inchoate but the moment the co-owner as vendor pointed out its location
conveyance. and even indicated the boundaries over which the fences were to be erectd without objection, protest or
complaint by the other co-owners, on the contrary they acquiesced and tolerated such alienation,
It is also not disputed that immediately after the execution of the sale in 1952, the vendees constructed occupation and possession, We rule that a factual partition or termination of the co-ownership, although
their house on the eastern part of Lot 1496 which the vendor pointed out to them as the area sold, and partial, was created, and barred not only the vendor, Flaviano Moreto, but also his heirs, the private
two weeks thereafter, Rafael who is a son of the vendees, also built his house within Lot 1496. respondents herein from asserting as against the vendees-petitioners any right or title in derogation of
Subsequently, a cemented piggery coral was constructed by the vendees at the back of their house about the deed of sale executed by said vendor Flaiano Moreto.
one and one-half meters from the eastern boundary of Lot 1496. Both vendor and vendees believed all
the time that the area of 781 sq. meters subject of the sale was Lot No. 1495 which according to its title Equity commands that the private respondents, the successors of both the deceased spouses, Flaviano
(T.C.T. No. 14570) contains an area of 781 sq. meters so that the deed of sale between the parties Moreto and Monica Maniega be not allowed to impugn the sale executed by Flaviano Moreto who
Identified and described the land sold as Lot 1495. But actually, as verified later by a surveyor upon indisputably received the consideration of P900.00 and which he, including his children, benefitted from
agreement of the parties during the proceedings of the case below, the area sold was within Lot 1496. the same. Moreover, as the heirs of both Monica Maniega and Flaviano Moreto, private respondents are
duty-bound to comply with the provisions of Articles 1458 and 1495, Civil Code, which is the obligation of
Again, there is no dispute that the houses of the spouses Cornelio Pamplona and Apolonia Onte as well the vendor of the property of delivering and transfering the ownership of the whole property sold, which
as that of their son Rafael Pamplona, including the concrete piggery coral adjacent thereto, stood on the is transmitted on his death to his heirs, the herein private respondents. The articles cited provide, thus:
land from 1952 up to the filing of the complaint by the private respondents on July 25, 1961, or a period
of over nine (9) years. And during said period, the private respondents who are the heirs of Monica Art. 1458. By the contract of sale one of the contracting parties obligates himself to
Maniega as well as of Flaviano Moreto who also died intestate on August 12, 1956, lived as neighbors to transfer the ownership of and to deliver a determinate thing, and the other part to
the petitioner-vendees, yet lifted no finger to question the occupation, possession and ownership of the pay therefore a price certain in money or its equivalent.
A contract of sale may be absolute or conditionial.
Art. 1495. The vendor is bound to transfer the ownership of and deliver, as well as
warrant the thing which is the object of the sale.
Under Article 776, New Civil Code, the inheritance which private respondents received from their
deceased parents and/or predecessors-in-interest included all the property rights and obligations which
were not extinguished by their parents' death. And under Art. 1311, paragraph 1, New Civil Code, the
contract of sale executed by the deceased Flaviano Moreto took effect between the parties, their assigns
and heirs, who are the private respondents herein. Accordingly, to the private respondents is transmitted
the obligation to deliver in full ownership the whole area of 781 sq. meters to the petitioners (which was
the original obligation of their predecessor Flaviano Moreto) and not only one-half thereof. Private
respondents must comply with said obligation.
The records reveal that the area of 781 sq. meters sold to and occupied by petitioners for more than 9
years already as of the filing of the complaint in 1961 had been re-surveyed by private land surveyor
Daniel Aranas. Petitioners are entitled to a segregation of the area from Transfer Certificate of Title No.
T-9843 covering Lot 1496 and they are also entitled to the issuance of a new Transfer Certificate of Title
in their name based on the relocation survey.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with
modification in the sense that the sale made and executed by Flaviano Moreto in favor of the petitioners-
vendees is hereby declared legal and valid in its entirely.
Petitioners are hereby declared owners in full ownership of the 781 sq. meters at the eastern portion of
Lot 1496 now occupied by said petitioners and whereon their houses and piggery coral stand.
The Register of Deeds of Laguna is hereby ordered to segregate the area of 781 sq. meters from
Certificate of Title No. 9843 and to issue a new Transfer Certificate of Title to the petitioners covering the
segregated area of 781 sq. meters.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 108228 February 1, 2001 In 1987, petitioners Manuel and Salvacion del Campo brought this complaint for "repartition, resurvey
and reconveyance" against the heirs of the now deceased Jose Regalado, Sr. Petitioners claimed that
SPOUSES MANUEL and SALVACION DEL CAMPO, petitioners, they owned an area of 1,544 square meters located within Lot 162-C-6 which was erroneously included
vs. in TCT No. 14566 in the name of Regalado. Petitioners alleged that they occupied the disputed area as
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and HEIRS OF JOSE REGALADO, SR., respondents. residential dwelling ever since they purchased the property from the Distajos way back in 1951. They
QUISUMBING, J.: also declared the land for taxation purposes and paid the corresponding taxes.

This is a petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the judgment On April 1, 1987, summons were served on Regalados widow, Josefina Buenvenida, and two of her
of the Regional Trial Court of Roxas City, Branch 15 in Civil Case No. V-5369, ordering the dismissal of children, Rosemarie and Antonio. Josefina and Rosemarie were declared in default on May 10, 1989
the action for repartition, resurvey and reconveyance filed by petitioners. because only Antonio filed an answer to the complaint.

Pure questions of law are raised in this appeal as the following factual antecedents are undisputed: During trial, petitioners presented the Deed of Absolute Sale4 executed between Soledad Daynolo and
Salome Bornales as well as the Deed of Mortgage5 and Deed of Discharge6 signed by Jose Regalado,
Salome, Consorcia, Alfredo, Maria, Rosalia, Jose, Quirico and Julita, all surnamed Bornales, were the Sr. The Deed of Absolute Sale7 showing the purchase by the Del Campos of the property from the
original co-owners of Lot 162 of the Cadastral Survey of Pontevedra, Capiz under Original Certificate of Distajos was likewise given in evidence.
Title No. 18047. As appearing therein, the lot, which consisted of a total area of 27,179 square meters
was divided in aliquot shares among the eight (8) co-owners as follows: Despite the filing of an answer, Antonio failed to present any evidence to refute the claim of petitioners.
Thus, after considering Antonio to have waived his opportunity to present evidence, the trial court deemed
Salome Bornales 4/16 the case submitted for decision.
Consorcia Bornales 4/16 On November 20, 1990, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the complaint. It held that while
Salome could alienate her pro-indiviso share in Lot 162, she could not validly sell an undivided part
Alfredo Bornales 2/16 thereof by meters and bounds to Soledad, from whom petitioners derived their title. The trial court also
Maria Bornales 2/16 reasoned that petitioners could not have a better right to the property even if they were in physical
possession of the same and declared the property for taxation purposes, because mere possession
Jose Bornales 1/16 cannot defeat the right of the Regalados who had a Torrens title over the land.
Quirico Bornales 1/16 On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts judgment, with no pronouncement as to costs. 8
Rosalia Bornales 1/16 Petitioners now seek relief from this Court and maintain that:
Julita Bornales 1/16 I.
On July 14, 1940, Salome sold part of her 4/16 share in Lot 162 for P200.00 to Soledad Daynolo. In the THE FACT THAT THE SALE OF THE SUBJECT PORTION CONSTITUTES A SALE OF A
Deed of Absolute Sale signed by Salome and two other co-owners, Consorcia and Alfredo, the portion of CONCRETE OR DEFINITE PORTION OF LAND OWNED IN COMMON DOES NOT
Lot 162 sold to Soledad was described as having more or less the following measurements: ABSOLUTELY DEPRIVE HEREIN PETITIONERS OF ANY RIGHT OR TITLE THERETO;
63-1/2 meters from point "9" to "10", 35 meters from point "10" to point "11", 30 meters from II.
point "11" to a certain point parallel to a line drawn from points "9" to "10"; and then from this
"Certain Point" to point "9" and as shown in the accompanying sketch, and made an integral IN ANY EVENT, HEREIN PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ARE ALL ESTOPPED FROM DENYING
part of this deed, to SOLEDAD DAYNOLO, her heirs and assigns. 1 THE RIGHT AND TITLE OF HEREIN PETITIONERS.9

Thereafter, Soledad Daynolo immediately took possession of the land described above and built a house In resolving petitioners appeal, we must answer the following questions: Would the sale by a co-owner
thereon. A few years later, Soledad and her husband, Simplicio Distajo, mortgaged the subject portion of of a physical portion of an undivided property held in common be valid? Is respondent estopped from
Lot 162 as security for a P400.00 debt to Jose Regalado, Sr. This transaction was evidenced by a Deed denying petitioners right and title over the disputed area? Under the facts and circumstances duly
of Mortgage2 dated May 1, 1947. established by the evidence, are petitioners entitled to repartition, resurvey and reconveyance of the
property in question?
On April 14, 1948, three of the eight co-owners of Lot 162, specifically, Salome, Consorcia and Alfredo,
sold 24,993 square meters of said lot to Jose Regalado, Sr. On the first issue, it seems plain to us that the trial court concluded that petitioners could not have
acquired ownership of the subject land which originally formed part of Lot 162, on the ground that their
On May 4, 1951, Simplicio Distajo, heir of Soledad Daynolo who had since died, paid the mortgage debt alleged right springs from a void sale transaction between Salome and Soledad. The mere fact that
and redeemed the mortgaged portion of Lot 162 from Jose Regalado, Sr. The latter, in turn, executed a Salome purportedly transferred a definite portion of the co-owned lot by metes and bounds to Soledad,
Deed of Discharge of Mortgage3 in favor of Soledads heirs, namely: Simplicio Distajo, Rafael Distajo and however, does not per se render the sale a nullity. This much is evident under Article 493 10 of the Civil
Teresita Distajo-Regalado. On same date, the said heirs sold the redeemed portion of Lot 162 for Code and pertinent jurisprudence on the matter. More particularly in Lopez vs. Vda. De Cuaycong, et.
P1,500.00 to herein petitioners, the spouses Manuel Del Campo and Salvacion Quiachon.1wphi1.nt al.11 which we find relevant, the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Bocobo, held that:
Meanwhile, Jose Regalado, Sr. caused the reconstitution of Original Certificate of Title No. 18047. The The fact that the agreement in question purported to sell a concrete portion of the
reconstituted OCT No. RO-4541 initially reflected the shares of the original co-owners in Lot 162. hacienda does not render the sale void, for it is a well-established principle that the binding
However, title was transferred later to Jose Regalado, Sr. who subdivided the entire property into smaller force of a contract must be recognized as far as it is legally possible to do so. "Quando res non
lots, each covered by a respective title in his name. One of these small lots is Lot No. 162-C-6 with an valet ut ago, valeat quantum valere potest." (When a thing is of no force as I do it, it shall have
area of 11,732 square meters which was registered on February 24, 1977 under TCT No. 14566. as much force as it can have.)12
Applying this principle to the instant case, there can be no doubt that the transaction entered into by registration proceedings constitutes actual fraud. Likewise, it is fraud to knowingly omit or conceal a fact,
Salome and Soledad could be legally recognized in its entirety since the object of the sale did not even upon which benefit is obtained to the prejudice of a third person. 17 In this case, we are convinced that
exceed the ideal shares held by the former in the co-ownership. As a matter of fact, the deed of sale Regalado knew of the fact that he did not have a title to the entire lot and could not, therefore, have validly
executed between the parties expressly stipulated that the portion of Lot 162 sold to Soledad would be registered the same in his name alone because he was aware of petitioners possession of the subject
taken from Salomes 4/16 undivided interest in said lot, which the latter could validly transfer in whole or portion as well as the sale between Salome and Soledad.
in part even without the consent of the other co-owners. Salomes right to sell part of her undivided interest
in the co-owned property is absolute in accordance with the well-settled doctrine that a co-owner has full That Regalado had notice of the fact that the disputed portion of Lot 162 was under claim of ownership
ownership of his pro-indiviso share and has the right to alienate, assign or mortgage it, and substitute by petitioners and the latters predecessor is beyond question. Records show that the particular area
another person in its enjoyment13 Since Salomes clear intention was to sell merely part of her aliquot subject of this case was mortgaged by Soledad and her husband to Jose Regalado, Sr. as early as May
share in Lot 162, in our view no valid objection can be made against it and the sale can be given effect 1, 1947 or one year prior to the alienation of the whole lot in favor of the latter. Regalado never questioned
to the full extent. the ownership of the lot given by Soledad as security for the P400.00 debt and he must have at least
known that Soledad bought the subject portion from Salome since he could not have reasonably accepted
We are not unaware of the principle that a co-owner cannot rightfully dispose of a particular portion of a the lot as security for the mortgage debt if such were not the case. By accepting the said portion of Lot
co-owned property prior to partition among all the co-owners. However, this should not signify that the 162 as security for the mortgage obligation, Regalado had in fact recognized Soledads ownership of this
vendee does not acquire anything at all in case a physically segregated area of the co-owned lot is in fact definite portion of Lot 162. Regalado could not have been ignorant of the fact that the disputed portion is
sold to him. Since the co-owner/vendors undivided interest could properly be the object of the contract being claimed by Soledad and subsequently, by petitioners, since Regalado even executed a Release of
of sale between the parties, what the vendee obtains by virtue of such a sale are the same rights as the Mortgage on May 4, 1951, three years after the entire property was supposedly sold to him. It would
vendor had as co-owner, in an ideal share equivalent to the consideration given under their transaction. certainly be illogical for any mortgagee to accept property as security, purchase the mortgaged property
In other words, the vendee steps into the shoes of the vendor as co-owner and acquires a proportionate and, thereafter, claim the very same property as his own while the mortgage was still subsisting.
abstract share in the property held in common.
Consequently, respondents are estopped from asserting that they own the subject land in view of the
Resultantly, Soledad became a co-owner of Lot 162 as of the year 1940 when the sale was made in her Deed of Mortgage and Discharge of Mortgage executed between Regalado and petitioners predecessor-
favor. It follows that Salome, Consorcia and Alfredo could not have sold the entire Lot 162 to Jose in-interest. As petitioners correctly contend, respondents are barred from making this assertion under the
Regalado, Sr. on April 14, 1948 because at that time, the ideal shares held by the three co- equitable principle of estoppel by deed, whereby a party to a deed and his privies are precluded from
owners/vendors were equivalent to only 10/16 of the undivided property less the aliquot share previously asserting as against the other and his privies any right or title in derogation of the deed, or from denying
sold by Salome to Soledad. Based on the principle that "no one can give what he does not the truth of any material fact asserted in it.18 A perusal of the documents evidencing the mortgage would
have,"14 Salome, Consorcia and Alfredo could not legally sell the shares pertaining to Soledad since a readily reveal that Soledad, as mortgagor, had declared herself absolute owner of the piece of land now
co-owner cannot alienate more than his share in the co-ownership. We have ruled many times that even being litigated. This declaration of fact was accepted by Regalado as mortgagee and accordingly, his
if a co-owner sells the whole property as his, the sale will affect only his own share but not those of the heirs cannot now be permitted to deny it.
other co-owners who did not consent to the sale. Since a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share,
a sale of the entire property by one co-owner will only transfer the rights of said co-owner to the buyer, Although Regalados certificate of title became indefeasible after the lapse of one year from the date of
thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the property.15 the decree of registration, the attendance of fraud in its issuance created an implied trust in favor of
petitioners and gave them the right to seek reconveyance of the parcel wrongfully obtained by the former.
In this case, Regalado merely became a new co-owner of Lot 162 to the extent of the shares which An action for reconveyance based on an implied trust ordinarily prescribes in ten years. But when the
Salome, Consorcia and Alfredo could validly convey. Soledad retained her rights as co-owner and could right of the true and real owner is recognized, expressly or implicitly such as when he remains undisturbed
validly transfer her share to petitioners in 1951. The logical effect on the second disposition is to substitute in his possession, the said action is imprescriptible, it being in the nature of a suit for quieting of
petitioners in the rights of Soledad as co-owner of the land. Needless to say, these rights are preserved title.19 Having established by clear and convincing evidence that they are the legal owners of the litigated
notwithstanding the issuance of TCT No. 14566 in Regalados name in 1977. portion included in TCT NO. 14566, it is only proper that reconveyance of the property be ordered in favor
of petitioners. The alleged incontrovertibility of Regalados title cannot be successfully invoked by
Be that as it may, we find that the area subject matter of this petition had already been effectively respondents because certificates of title merely confirm or record title already existing and cannot be
segregated from the mother lot even before title was issued in favor of Regalado. It must be noted that used to protect a usurper from the true owner or be used as a shield for the commission of fraud. 20
26 years had lapsed from the time petitioners bought and took possession of the property in 1951 until
Regalado procured the issuance of TCT No. 14566. Additionally, the intervening years between the date WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
of petitioners purchase of the property and 1987 when petitioners filed the instant complaint, comprise No. 30438 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The parties are directed to cause a SURVEY for exact
all of 36 years. However, at no instance during this time did respondents or Regalado, for that matter, determination of their respective portions in Lot 162-C-6. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 14566 is
question petitioners right over the land in dispute. In the case of Vda. De Cabrera vs. Court of declared CANCELLED and the Register of Deeds of Capiz is ordered to ISSUE a new title in accordance
Appeals,16 we had occasion to hold that where the transferees of an undivided portion of the land allowed with said survey, upon finality of this decision.
a co-owner of the property to occupy a definite portion thereof and had not disturbed the same for a
period too long to be ignored, the possessor is in a better condition or right than said transferees. (Potior Costs against respondents.1wphi1.nt
est condition possidentis). Such undisturbed possession had the effect of a partial partition of the co- SO ORDERED.
owner property which entitles the possessor to the definite portion which he occupies. Conformably,
petitioners are entitled to the disputed land, having enjoyed uninterrupted possession thereof for a total
of 49 years up to the present.
The lower courts reliance on the doctrine that mere possession cannot defeat the right of a holder of a
registered Torrens title over property is misplaced, considering that petitioners were deprived of their G.R. No. 140422 August 7, 2006
dominical rights over the said lot through fraud and with evident bad faith on the part of Regalado. Failure MERCEDES CRISTOBAL CRUZ, ANSELMO A. CRISTOBAL and ELISA CRISTOBAL
and intentional omission to disclose the fact of actual physical possession by another person during SIKAT, Petitioners,
vs. Witness testified that she is now residing at No. 194 P. Parada St., Sta. Lucia, San Juan, Metro Manila,
EUFROSINA CRISTOBAL, FLORENCIO CRISTOBAL, JOSE CRISTOBAL, HEIRS OF NORBERTO the property subject of the present litigation. She has been living in the said property since 1948. She
CRISTOBAL and THE COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents. claimed that there are other houses in the area particularly those which belong to her half brothers and
sisters which were now converted into factories.
She claimed that out of the five hundred thirty-five (535) square meters she occupies only thirty-six (36)
DECISION square meters of the subject lot.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: She testified that the [private respondents] divided the property among themselves without giving the
This Petition assails the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals dated 22 July 1999 in CA-G.R. CV No. 56402, [petitioners] their share. She said that she was offered by [private respondent] Eufrosina to choose
affirming in toto the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 156, in Civil Case between a portion of the land in question or money because one of the children of defendant Jose
No. 65035 entitled, "Mercedes Cristobal, Anselmo A. Cristobal and Elisa Cristobal Sikat vs. Eufrosina Cristobal wanted to construct an apartment on the lot. She said that she will have to ask the opinion of
Cristobal, Florencio Cristobal, Jose Cristobal, Heirs of Norberto Cristobal and The Register of Deeds, her other brothers and sisters.
San Juan, M.M." Thereafter witness testified that she made an inquiry regarding the land and she found out that the
Facts of the case are as follows: property belonging to their father Buenaventura Cristobal had been transferred to the defendants as
evidenced by transfer certificates of title issued under the names of Florencio Cristobal (Exhibit "E"),
Petitioners (Mercedes Cristobal, Anselmo Cristobal, the heirs of the deceased Socorro Cristobal, and Norberto Cristobal (Exhibit "F"), Eufrosina Cristobal (Exhibit "G") and Jose Cristobal (Exhibit "H").
Elisa Cristobal-Sikat) claim that they are the legitimate children of Buenaventura Cristobal during his first
marriage to Ignacia Cristobal. On the other hand, private respondents (Norberto, Florencio, Eufrosina She declared that she felt bad when she learned that the title to the property belonging to her father had
and Jose, all surnamed Cristobal) are also the children of Buenaventura Cristobal resulting from his been transferred to her half brothers and sisters with the exclusion of herself and the other children from
second marriage to Donata Enriquez. the first marriage.

On 18 June 1926, Buenaventura Cristobal purchased a parcel of land with an area of 535 square meters She filed a petition in the barangay to settle the issue among themselves, however, no settlement was
located at 194 P. Parada St., Sta. Lucia, San Juan, Metro Manila, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title reached therein. This prompted the [petitioners] to file the present case.
(TCT) No. 10878-2 (the subject property). On cross-examination, [petitioner] Elisa Cristobal Sikat admitted that she was aware that the subject
Sometime in the year 1930, Buenaventura Cristobal died intestate. property was owned by her father Buenaventura Cristobal even before the latter died. She likewise stated
that the [private respondents] are the ones paying the real estate tax due on the lot.
More than six decades later, petitioners learned that private respondents had executed an extrajudicial
partition of the subject property and transferred its title to their names. Ester Santos testified for the [petitioners]. In her "Sinumpaang Salaysay" she claimed that she was a
neighbor of Mercedes, Anselmo, Socorro, Elisa, Norberto, Florencio, Eufrosina and Jose Cristobal in San
Petitioners filed a petition in their barangay to attempt to settle the case between them and private Juan, Metro Manila. She said that she knows that Mercedes, Anselmo, Socorro and Elisa are the children
respondents, but no settlement was reached. Thus, a Complaint 2 for Annulment of Title and Damages of Buenaventura Cristobal from the latters first marriage and the Norberto, Florencio, Eufrosina, and Jose
was filed before the RTC by petitioners against private respondents to recover their alleged pro-indiviso are the children of Buenaventura Cristobal from the latters second marriage.
shares in the subject property. In their prayer, they sought the annulment of the Deed of Partition executed
by respondents on 24 February 1948; the cancellation of TCTs No. 165132, No. 165133, No. 165134 The said witness testified that Buenaventura Cristobal and his first family lived right across where she
and No. 165135 issued in the individual names of private respondents; re-partitioning of the subject stayed.
property in accordance with the law of succession and the payment of P1,000,000.00 as actual or Witness corroborated the testimony of Elisa Cristobal Sikat regarding that the fact that Martina Cristobal
compensatory damages; P300,000.00 as moral damages; P50,000.00 as attorneys fees is the sister of Buenaventura Cristobal. The said sister of Buenaventura Cristobal allegedly took care of
and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages. Elisa. Anselmo and Socorro were taken care of by Buenaventura Cristobal and the latters second wife,
To prove their filiation with the deceased Buenaventura Cristobal, the baptismal certificates of Donata Enriquez, at P. Parada St., San Juan, Metro Manila.
Elisa, 3 Anselmo, 4and the late Socorro 5 were presented. In the case of Mercedes who was born on 31 When Buenaventura Cristobal died Anselmo was taken care of by Martina Cristobal together with Elisa.
January 1909, she produced a certification 6 issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Socorro on the other hand lived with Mercedes who was then married.
Metro Manila, attesting to the fact that records of birth for the years 1901, 1909, 1932 to 1939, 1940,
1943, and 1948 were all destroyed due to ordinary wear and tear. Witness testified that she and Elisa were classmates from Grade I until they finished high school at the
Philippine School of Commerce in Manila.
The testimonies of the parties as summarized by the trial court are as follows:
When the second wife of Buenaventura Cristobal died, Martina Cristobal took care of Norberto, Florencio,
Witness [petitioner Elisa] further testified that her mother died when she was only one year and seven Eufrosina and Jose Cristobal.
months old. She lived with the sister of her father because the latter married his second wife, Donata
Enriquez. Her brother Anselmo and sister Socorro lived with their father and the latters family in the Witness said that the brothers and sisters from the first and second marriages lived together with their
subject property at P. Parada St., San Juan, Metro Manila. aunt Martina Cristobal for a long time.
She claimed that when their father died on February 12, 1930, his brother Anselmo stayed with her and When Elisa got married, she and her husband built their house on the lot located at 194 P. Parada St.,
her auntie while Socorro stayed with their eldest sister, Mercedes, who was then married. San Juan, Metro Manila. Until at present, Elisa and her family lives in the said vicinity.
Meanwhile, when her stepmother Donata Enriquez died, the children from the second marriage lived with Witness Ester Santos declared that the children from the second marriage namely Norberto, Eufrosina,
them and her aunt Martina Cristobal. Florencio and Jose built their houses and factory at 194 P. Parada St., San Juan, Metro Manila.
She said that the children from the first and second marriages of Buenaventura Cristobal had a The petition is impressed with merit. We agree with petitioners that the Court of Appeals committed
harmonious relationship until sometime in 1994 when [petitioners] and Elisa Cristobals grandchildren reversible error in upholding the claim of private respondents that they acquired ownership of the entire
were called "squatters" by the [private respondents] and their grandchildren for residing in the subject subject property and that the claim of petitioners to the subject property was barred by laches.
parcel of land.
Before anything else, it must be noted that the title of the original complaint filed by petitioners before the
On cross-examination, witness Ester Santos said she cannot recall the name of the first wife of RTC was denominated as "Annulment of Title and Damages"; nevertheless, the complaint prayed for the
Buenaventura Cristobal and that she only knew them to be married although she is not aware of the date following:
when they were married.
1. Declaring the Extrajudicial Partition executed by the defendants NORBERTO CRISTOBAL,
[Petitioners] presented Jose Cristobal to bolster the claim that they are brothers and sisters of the [private FLORENCIO CRISTOBAL, EUFROCINA CRISTOBAL and JOSE CRISTOBAL on February 24, 1948 as
respondents]. null and void for being fraudulent contrary to law on succession.
He claimed that the only time when he became aware that [petitioners] are his brothers and sisters was 2. Canceling the following Transfer Certificates of Titles issued by the Register of Deeds for the Province
when he lived with their aunt Martina. of Rizal to wit:
He said that the reason why they were giving a portion of the lot in question to Elisa Cristobal Sikat was (a) TCT No. 165132 issued in the name of FLORENCIO CRISTOBAL married to MAURA RUBIO;
because the [private respondents] want her to have a piece of property of her own and is not an admission
that she is their sister. (b) TCT No. 165133 issued in the name of NORBERTO CRISTOBAL, married to PAULINA IBANEZ;

[Private respondents] on the other hand presented Eufrosina Cristobal as their first witness. She testified (c) TCT No. 165134 issued in the name of EUFROCINA CRISTOBAL married to FORTUNATO DELA
that her parents, Buenaventura Cristobal and Donata Enriquez were married on March 24, 1919 at San GUERRA; and
Felipe Neri, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. Out of the said union, Norberto, Florentino, Eufrosina and Jose (d) TCT No. 165135 issued in the name of JOSE CRISTOBAL married to ADELAIDA IBANEZ and/or
Cristobal were born. TCT No. 3993- ( if TCT No. 165035 was cancelled and in lieu thereof to ISABELITA/MA. VICTORIA,
The witness professed that on June 18, 1926, her parents were able to buy a certain property containing EMMA, MA. CRISTINA, JOSELITO and NELIA, all surnamed CRISTOBAL and children of JOSE
five hundred thirty-five (535) square meters. CRISTOBAL, one of the defendants.)

Said witness claimed that her brother Norberto died on September 20, 1980 leaving his wife Marcelina 3. Re-partitioning the subject property left by deceased BUENAVENTURA CRISTOBAL according to the
and children Buenaflor and Norberto, Jr. law on succession applicable at the time of his death.

The witness presented marked as Exhibit "33" for Norberto, Exhibit "34" for Florencio, Exhibit "35" for 4. Awarding ONE-HALF of the subject property to herein plaintiffs as their lawful portions in the
Eufrosina and Exhibit "36 for Jose the birth certificates of her brothers and sisters. inheritance.

On February 24, 1948, Eufrosina admitted having executed an Extrajudicial Partition (Exhibit "D-4") with 5. Ordering the defendants to pay to the plaintiffs the following sums of money, to wit:
her brothers and sisters of the property left by their parents. a. P1,000,000.00 as actual or compensatory damages
She declared that since her father died in 1930, Elisa, Mercedes, and Anselmo never asserted their b. P300,000.00 as moral damages
alleged right over the property subject of the present litigation.
c. P50,000.00 as attorneys fees
She claimed that the [private respondents] have been paying all the taxes due on the parcel of land and
11
that title to the property has been subdivided under their respective names. d. P100,000.0 as exemplary damages
On cross-examination, she said that when their parents passed away they were taken care of by their While the title of the complaint alone implies that the action involves property rights to a piece of land, the
aunt Martina who was the sister of her father. She testified that she addressed Elisa Cristobal as "Kaka" afore-quoted prayer in the complaint reveals that, more than property rights, the action involves hereditary
and that since the time they were kids, she had known that the [petitioners] are their brothers and sisters. 7 or successional rights of petitioners to their deceased fathers estate solely, composed of the subject
property.
After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a judgment 8 on 11 July 1997, dismissing the case, ruling
that petitioners failed to prove their filiation with the deceased Buenaventura Cristobal as the baptismal Thus, even if the original complaint filed by petitioners before the RTC is denominated as "Annulment of
and birth certificates presented have scant evidentiary value and that petitioners inaction for a long period Title and Damages," we find it practicable to rule on the division of the subject property based on the
of time amounts to laches. rules of succession as prayed for in the complaint, considering that the averments in the complaint, not
the title are controlling. 12
Not satisfied, petitioners sought recourse in the Court of Appeals which, in its Decision 9 dated 22 July
1999, ruled that they were able to prove their filiation with the deceased Buenaventura Cristobal thru To arrive at the final resolution of the instant Petition and the lone assignment of error therein, the
"other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws," but affirmed the ruling of the trial court following need to be resolved first: (1) whether or not petitioners were able to prove their filiation with the
barring their right to recover their share of the subject property because of laches. deceased Buenaventura Cristobal; (2) whether or not the petitioners are bound by the Deed of Partition
of the subject property executed by the private respondents; (3) whether or not petitioners right to
Hence, this Petition anchored on the sole ground that: question the Deed of Partition had prescribed; and (4) whether or not petitioners right to recover their
RESPONDENT COURT GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN APPLYING THE PRINCIPLE OF LACHES TO THE share of the subject property is barred by laches.
CASE AT BAR RESULTING AS IT DOES TO GROSS INJUSTICE AND INEQUITY WHICH ARE Undeniably, the foregoing issues can be resolved only after certain facts have been established. Although
EXACTLY THE VERY EVILS SOUGHT TO BE PREVENTED BY SUCH PRINCIPLE 10 it is settled that in the exercise of the Supreme Courts power of review, the findings of facts of the Court
of Appeals are conclusive and binding on the Supreme Court, there are recognized exceptions to this
rule, namely: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) Under the said provision, without the participation of all persons involved in the proceedings, the
when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of extrajudicial settlement is not binding on said persons. 20 In the case at bar, since the estate of the
discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts deceased Buenaventura Cristobal is composed solely of the subject property, the partition thereof by the
are conflicting; (6) when in making the findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, private respondents already amounts to an extrajudicial settlement of Buenaventura Cristobals estate.
or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellee and the appellant; (7) when the findings The partition of the subject property by the private respondents shall not bind the petitioners since
are contrary to the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence petitioners were excluded therefrom. Petitioners were not aware of the Deed of Partition executed by
on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and private respondents among themselves in 1948. Petitioner Elisa became aware of the transfer and
reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of facts are premised on the registration of the subject property in the names of private respondents only in 1994 when she was offered
supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the Court of by private respondent Eufrocina to choose between a portion of the subject property or money, as one of
Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which if properly the children of private respondent Jose wanted to construct an apartment on the subject property. 21 This
considered, would justify a different conclusion. 13 Since exceptions (4) and (11) are present in the case led petitioner Elisa to inquire as to the status of the subject property. She learned afterwards that the title
at bar, this Court shall make its own determination of the facts relevant for the resolution of the case. to the subject property had been transferred to the names of private respondents, her half brothers and
sisters, to the exclusion of herself and her siblings from the first marriage of Buenaventura Cristobal. The
The initial fact that needs to be established is the filiation of petitioners with the deceased Buenaventura Deed of Partition excluded four of the eight heirs of Buenaventura Cristobal who were also entitled to
Cristobal. their respective shares in the subject property. Since petitioners were not able to participate in the
Article 172 of the Family Code provides: execution of the Deed of Partition, which constitutes as an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of the
late Buenaventura Cristobal by private respondents, such settlement is not binding on them. 22 As the
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following: extrajudicial settlement executed by the private respondents in February 1948 did not affect the right of
petitioners to also inherit from the estate of their deceased father, it was incorrect for the trial and appellate
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or court to hold that petitioners right to challenge the said settlement had prescribed. Respondents defense
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed of prescription against an action for partition is a vain proposition. Pursuant to Article 494 of the Civil
by the parent concerned. Code, "no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Such co-owner may demand at
anytime the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned." In Budlong v.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by: Bondoc, 23 this Court has interpreted said provision of law to mean that the action for partition is
imprescriptible. It cannot be barred by prescription. For Article 494 of the Civil Code explicitly declares:
(1) the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
"No prescription shall lie in favor of a co-owner or co-heirs as long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. the co-ownership." 24

"Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and Special Laws," may consist of the childs baptismal Considering that the Deed of Partition of the subject property does not affect the right of petitioners to
certificate, a judicial admission, a family bible in which the childs name has been entered, common inherit from their deceased father, this Court shall then proceed to divide the subject property between
reputation respecting the childs pedigree, admission by silence, the testimony of witnesses, and other petitioners and private respondents, as the rule on succession prescribes.
kinds of proof of admission under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. 14 It appears that the 535 square meters subject property was a conjugal property of Buenaventura Cristobal
In the present case, the baptismal certificates of Elisa, 15 Anselmo, 16 and the late Socorro 17 were and Donata Enriquez, the second wife, as the property was purchased in 1926, during the time of their
presented. Baptismal certificate is one of the acceptable documentary evidence to prove filiation in marriage. 25Upon the deaths of Buenaventura in 1930 and Donata in 1936, both deaths occurring before
accordance with the Rules of Court and jurisprudence. In the case of Mercedes, who was born on 31 the enactment of the New Civil Code in 1950, all the four children of the first marriage and the four children
January 1909, she produced a certification 18 issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, of the second marriage shall share equally in the subject property in accordance with the Old Civil Code.
Metro Manila, attesting to the fact that records of birth for the years 1901, 1909, 1932 to 1939, 1940, Absent any allegation showing that Buenaventura Cristobal left any will and testament, the subject
1943, and 1948 were all destroyed due to ordinary wear and tear. property shall be divided into eight equal parts pursuant to Articles 921 26 and 931 27 of the Old Civil Code
on intestate succession, each receiving 66.875 square meters thereof.
Petitioners likewise presented Ester Santos as witness who testified that petitioners enjoyed that common
reputation in the community where they reside as being the children of Buevaventura Cristobal with his At the time of death of Buenaventura Cristobal in 1930, Donata was only entitled to the usufruct of the
first wife. Testimonies of witnesses were also presented to prove filiation by continuous possession of the land pursuant to Article 834 of the Old Civil Code, which provides:
status as a legitimate child. 19 ART. 834. A widower or widow who, on the death of his or her spouse, is not divorced, or should be so
In contrast, it bears to point out that private respondents were unable to present any proof to refute the by the fault of the deceased, shall be entitled to a portion in usufruct equal to that corresponding by way
petitioners claim and evidences of filiation to Buenaventura Cristobal. of legitime to each of the legitimate children or descendants who has not received any betterment.

The foregoing evidence thus suffice to convince this Court that petitioners are, indeed, children of the late If only one legitimate child or descendant survives, the widow or widower shall have the usufruct of the
Buenaventura Cristobal during the first marriage. third availment for betterment, such child or descendant to have the naked ownership until, on the death
of the surviving spouse, the whole title is merged in him.
As to the validity of the Deed of Partition of the subject property executed by the private respondents
among themselves to the exclusion of petitioners, the applicable rule is Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules Donatas right to usufruct of the subject property terminated upon her death in 1936.
of Court, which states: Accordingly, the pro-indiviso shares of Buenaventura Cristobals eight children and their heirs, by right of
The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be published in a newspaper of general representation, upon his death in 1930, are as follows:
circulation in the manner provided in the next succeeding section; but no extrajudicial settlement shall be (1) Mercedes Cristobal- 66.875 square meters
binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof. (Underscoring
supplied) (2) Amselmo Crostobal- 66.875 square meters
(3) Socorrro Crostobal- 66.875 square meters distributed in accordance with this Decision and appropriate certificates of title be issued in favor of each
of the recognized heirs of the late Cristobal Buenaventura, and
(4) Elisa Crostobal-Sikat- 66.875 square meters
(5) Petitioners are AWARDED the amount of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P100,000.00) PESOS as
(5) Norberto Cristobal-66.875 square meters damages, to be paid by private respondents.
(6) Florencio Cristobal-66.875 square meters Costs against private respondents.
(7) Eufrocina Cristobal-66.875 square meters SO ORDERED.
(8) Jose Cristobal - 66.875 square meters
The Court will now determine whether petitioners right to their shares in the subject property can be
barred by laches.
Respondents defense of laches is less than convincing. Laches is the negligence or omission to assert
a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it has
abandoned it or declined to assert it. It does not involve mere lapse or passage of time, but is principally
an impediment to the assertion or enforcement of a right, which has become under the circumstances
inequitable or unfair to permit. 28
In our view, the doctrine of laches does not apply in the instant case. Note that upon petitioner Elisas
knowledge in 1994 that the title to the subject property had been transferred to the private respondents
to the exclusion of herself and her siblings from the first marriage of Buenaventura Cristobal, petitioners
filed in 1995 a petition with their barangay to settle the case among themselves and private respondents,
but since no settlement was had, they lodged a complaint before the RTC on 27 March 1995, to annul
private respondents title over the land. There is no evidence showing failure or neglect on their part, for
an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or
should have been done earlier. The doctrine of stale demands would apply only where for the reason of
the lapse of time, it would be inequitable to allow a party to enforce his legal rights.
Moreover, absence any strong or compelling reason, this Court is not disposed to apply the doctrine of
laches to prejudice or defeat the rights of an owner. 29 Laches is a creation of equity and its application is
controlled by equitable considerations. Laches cannot be used to defeat justice or perpetuate an injustice.
Neither should its application be used to prevent the rightful owners of a property from recovering what
has been fraudulently registered in the name of another. 30
Considering that (1) petitioners were unlawfully deprived of their legal participation in the partition of the
subject property; (2) this case has dragged on for more than a decade, and (3) undoubtedly, petitioners
sustained injury but the exact amount of which, unfortunately, was not proved, we find it reasonable to
grant in petitioners favor nominal damages. Nominal damages is adjudicated in order that a right of the
plaintiff, which has been violated and invaded by defendant, may be vindicated and recognized, and not
for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered. 31 Where these are allowed, they are
not treated as an equivalent of a wrong but simply in recognition of the existence of a technical injury.
The amount to be awarded as such damages should at least be commensurate to the injury sustained
by the petitioners considering the concept and purpose of said damages. 32 Such award is given in view
of the peculiar circumstances cited and the special reasons extant in the present case; 33
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court rules as follows:
(1) The Petition is GRANTED, and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE;
(2) Petitioners are RECOGNIZED and DECLARED as children of the late Buenaventura Cristobal from
his first marriage to Ignacia Cristobal;
(3) The Deed of Partition executed by private respondents is DECLARED not binding upon petitioners
who were not notified or did not participate in the execution thereof;
(4) The subject property, covered by TCTs No. 165132, No. 165133, 165134, and No. 165135, in the
name of private respondents consisting of 535 square meters is ORDERED to be partitioned and
G.R. No. 105608 April 30, 2008 Subsequently, a Mocion5 (Motion) was filed for the delivery to Soledad D. Monterosos four children, her
legal heirs, their respective shares in her intestate estate, as adjudicated among them under the duly
TIRSO D. MONTEROSO, petitioner, CFI-approved Project of Partition.
vs. In the meantime, the children of Don Fabian from his first marriage married accordingly: The eldest,
COURT OF APPEALS, SOLEDAD TINGA, MONTEROSO-CAGAMPANG, REYGULA MONTEROSO- Soledad to Atty. Perfecto Cagampang, Sr.; Reygula to Jose Bayan; Benjamin to Mauricia Nakila; and
BAYAN, PERFECTO L. CAGAMPANG, SR., SOFIA PENDEJITO VDA. DE MONTEROSO, Tirso to Melecia Taa. Benjamin died on February 1, 1947 leaving behind four children with wife Nakila,
FLORENDA MONTEROSO, ALBERTO MONTEROSO, HEIRS OF FABIAN MONTEROSO, JR., namely: Ruby, Marlene, Adelita, and Henrieto. A year and a half later, or on October 26, 1948, Don
REYNATO MONTEROSO, RUBY MONTEROSO, MARLENE MONTEROSO-POSPOS, ADELITA Fabian also passed away.
MONTEROSO-BERENGUEL, and HENRIETO MONTEROSO, respondents. Before and shortly after Don Fabians demise, conveyances involving certain of parcels thus mentioned
x-----------------------------------------------x were purportedly made.

G.R. No. 113199 April 30, 2008 The following is an illustration of the lineal relation of the parties or the family tree of the direct
descendants of Don Fabian from his two marriages:
SOFIA PENDEJITO VDA. DE MONTEROSO, SOLEDAD MONTEROSO-CAGAMPANG, PERFECTO
L. CAGAMPANG, SR., REYGULA MONTEROSO-BAYAN, FLORENDA MONTEROSO, ALBERTO
MONTEROSO, RUBY MONTEROSO, MARLENE MONTEROSO-POSPOS, HENRIETO
MONTEROSO, ADELITA MONTEROSO-BERENGUEL, and REYNATO MONTEROSO, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and TIRSO D. MONTEROSO, respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
Before us are two petitions for review under Rule 45, the first docketed as G.R. No. 105608, and the
second docketed as G.R. No. 113199, both assailing the Decision1 dated March 31, 1992 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 15805 which modified the June 9, 1987 Decision2 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 4 in Butuan City in Civil Case Nos. 1292 and 1332.
The Facts
It is not unusual. Acrimonious litigation between and among siblings and immediate relatives over
inheritance does occur. It is unfortunate when the decedent had, while still alive, taken steps to precisely
avoid a bruising squabble over inheritance.
In a sense, Don Fabian B. Monteroso, Sr., a former justice of the peace and municipal mayor of
Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte, started it all. During his lifetime, Don Fabian married twice and sired eight
children, four from each union.
In 1906, Don Fabian married Soledad Doldol. Out of this marriage were born Soledad, Reygula,
Benjamin, and Tirso. On April 8, 1927, Soledad Doldol Monteroso passed away.
A little over a year later, Don Fabian contracted a second marriage with Sofia Pendejito. From this union
were born Florenda, Reynato, Alberto, and Fabian, Jr.
After the death of his first wife, but during the early part of his second marriage, Don Fabian filed before
the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Agusan an intestate proceeding for the estate of his deceased first
wife, Soledad D. Monteroso, docketed as Special Proceeding (SP) No. 309, apparently to obviate any
dispute over the inheritance of his children from his first marriage. Subsequently, the CFI receivedand
later approved per an Orden3 (Order) dated March 11, 1936a Proyecto de Particion4 (Project of This brings us to the objects of the squabble: the conjugal patrimonies of Don Fabian from his two
Partition) dated February 21, 1935. successive marriages.
The partition in SP No. 309 covered Parcels F-1 to F-5, and adjudicated to Don Fabian the whole of During the lifetime of Don Fabian, the following properties were acquired, viz:
Parcels F-1, F-2, and F-3, and one-half of Parcel F-5, while the intestate estate of Soledad D. Monteroso
comprised the whole of Parcel F-4 and one-half of Parcel F-5. The intestate estate of Soledad D. PARCEL F-ONE
Monteroso was partitioned and distributed to her four children in equal shares.
A parcel of coconut plantation on sitio Pandanon, Cabadbaran, Agusan described as follows: North by
the property of Telesforo Ago and Gregorio Cupay; East by Miguel Y Climaco Cabonce, Isidro Maamo Recovery of Property with Damages against their uncle, Tirso D. Monteroso. Docketed as Civil Case No.
and Buenaventura Sandigan and Pandanon River, and West by Gregorio Axamin, Alex Fores and 1292, and later raffled to Branch 4 of the court, the complaint involved a portion of Parcel F-4, described
Ventura Sandigan with a superficial extension of 10 has. 62 ares and 42 centares. in the Project of Partition, as follows:
PARCEL F-TWO (1) One parcel of coconut land with the improvements thereon existing, Tax No. 14600 with a superficial
extension of 6 hectares, 99 ares and 32 centares, bounded as follows: on the North, Regula Monteroso;
A parcel of coconut land situated on sitio Pandanon, Cabadbaran, Agusan, with a superficial extension on the East by the Provincial Road Butuan-Cabadbaran; on the Sourth Tirso Monteroso and on the West
of 6 hectares, 50 ares bearing Tax No. 14801 of the Municipality of Cabadbaran, Agusan, x x x. Diego Calo.8
PARCEL F-THREE As the heirs of Benjamin alleged in their complaint, their uncle, Tirso, was entrusted with the above-
A parcel of coconut land under Tax No. 17167 situated on sitio Calibunan, Cabadbaran, Agusan with described one-fourth portion of Parcel F-4 as part of the share from the estate of Soledad D. Monteroso
superficial extension of 8 hectares and 34 centares x x x. allotted to their father per SP No. 309. However, their uncle refused to surrender and deliver the same
when they demanded such delivery upon their reaching the majority age.
PARCEL F-FOUR
Tirso countered that the portion pertaining to Benjamin was never entrusted to him; it was in the
A parcel of coconut land under Tax No. 14600 situated on sitio Pandanon, Cabadbaran, Agusan, with a possession of their sister, Soledad Monteroso-Cagampang, who was not entitled to any share in Parcel
superficial extension of 27 hectares, 96 ares and 28 centares x x x. F-4, having previously opted to exchange her share in said property for another parcel of land, i.e., Parcel
F-7, then being occupied by her.
PARCEL F-FIVE
On April 14, 1970, Tirso, in turn, filed a Complaint for Partition and Damages with Receivership docketed
A parcel of residential lot under Tax No. 18477 situated within the Poblacion of the Municipality of as Civil Case No. 1332, involving 12 parcels of land (i.e., Parcels F-1 to F-8 and Parcels S-1 to S-4,
Cabadbaran, Agusan, with a house of strong materials found on the same lot with a superficial extension mentioned above) against his stepmother, Pendejito, and all his full and half-siblings and/or their
of 660 square meters x x x. representatives. The complaint in Civil Case No. 1332 was subsequently amended to include Perfecto,
PARCEL F-SIX as co-defendant, and Pendejito, as guardian ad litem for the minor children of Fabian P. Monteroso, Jr.,
who died in 1970 after the filing of the complaint.
A parcel of residential lot under Tax No. 5374 situated within the Poblacion of the Municipality of
Cabadbaran, Agusan, with a superficial extension of 3,890 square meters x x x. In Civil Case No. 1332, Tirso, inter alia, alleged the following: (1) the aforementioned 12 parcels of land
belong to the conjugal partnerships of the first and second marriages contracted by Don Fabian; (2) SP
PARCEL F-SEVEN No. 309, which purportedly judicially settled the intestate estate of his mother, is null and void for the
reason that the project of partition failed to comprehend the entire estate of the decedent as Parcels F-6,
A parcel of coconut and corn land under Tax No. 1769 situated at Ambahan, Tubay, Agusan, with a
F-7, and F-8 were excluded, thereby depriving Tirso of his one-fourth share or legitime over the said three
superficial extension of 8 hectares x x x. parcels of land; and (3) Parcels S-1 to S-4, having been acquired during the second marriage of Don
PARCEL F-EIGHT Fabian, are not paraphernal properties of Sofia Pendejito Vda. de Monteroso.

A parcel of coconut land situated at Ambahan, Tubay, Agusan, under Tax No. 2944, with a superficial Answering, the defendants in Civil Case No. 1332 contended that Don Fabian acquired Parcel F-6 during
extension of 7 hectares, 59 ares and 96 centares x x x.6 the second marriage, while Parcels F-7 and F-8 were Don Fabians exclusive properties having been
acquired through a donation from the heirs of one Benito Tinosa. They further maintained the validity of
PARCEL S-ONE the judicial partition under SP No. 309 which operates as res judicata insofar as Parcels F-1 to F-5 are
concerned. In particular, they asserted that Parcels F-1, F-2, F-3, and one-half of F-5 were adjudicated
A parcel of land situated at Tagbongabong, Cabadbaran, Agusan under Tax Dec. No. 5396 with an area
to Don Fabian as his share in the conjugal partnership of the first marriage, while Parcel F-4 and the other
of 24 hectares more or less x x x.
half of Parcel F-5 were equally divided among the four children of the first marriage; that during his
PARCEL S-TWO lifetime, Don Fabian sold Parcels F-1, F-2, F-3, F-7, and F-8 to Soledad Monteroso-Cagampang; that
Soledad Monteroso-Cagampang, Tirso D. Monteroso, and Mauricia Nakila Vda. de Benjamin Monteroso
A parcel of coconut land situated at Dal-as, Bay-ang, Cabadbaran, Agusan under Tax No. 69 with an donated Parcel F-6 to Reygula Monteroso-Bayan; and that Parcels S-1 to S-4 are truly paraphernal
area of 24 hectares more or less x x x. properties of Sofia Pendejito Vda. de Monteroso as Parcel S-1 was acquired by her through a homestead
patent, Parcel S-2 through adverse possession, and Parcels S-3 and S-4 by purchase.
PARCEL S-THREE
The Initial Ruling of the RTC
A parcel of coconut land situated at Pandanon, Mabini, Cabadbaran, Agusan, under Tax No. 21639 with
an area of 1.4080 hectares more or less x x x. Involving practically the same properties and parties, Civil Case Nos. 1292 and 1332 were consolidated
and jointly heard. After a long drawn-out trial spanning almost 15 years, with six different judges
PARCEL S-FOUR
successively hearing the case, the RTC, presided by Judge Miguel Rallos, rendered on July 22, 1985 a
A parcel of land situated at Mabini, Cabadbaran, Agusan under Tax No. 3367 with an area of 1,000 sq. Decision,9 dismissing Civil Case No. 1292 on the ground of failure to state a cause of action, but finding,
m. bounded x x x.7 in Civil Case No. 1332, for Tirso.

The "F" designation signified that the covered properties were acquired during the first marriage, to What appears to be a victory for Tirso was, however, short-lived. Acting on four separate motions for
distinguish them from those acquired during the second marriage which are designated as "S" properties. reconsideration duly filed by the various defendants in Civil Case No. 1332, a new judge, who took over
the case from Judge Rallos who inhibited himself from the case, rendered a new decision.
On July 28, 1969, the children of the late Benjamin D. Monteroso, namely: Ruby Monteroso, Marlene M.
Pospos, Henrieto Monteroso, and Adelita Monteroso-Berenguel, filed with the RTC a Complaint for The Subsequent Ruling of the RTC
Dated June 9, 1987, the new Decision set aside the July 22, 1985 RTC Decision of Judge Rallos and hereby ordered to cancel as the same are cancelled and nullified, all transfer of certificates and tax
gave due course to both Civil Case Nos. 1292 and 1332. In full, the fallo of the new decision reads: declarations now in the name of Soledad Monteroso de Cagampang and Atty. Perfecto L. Cagampang,
Sr. which parcels of land originally were registered and declared in the name of Don Fabian B. Monteroso,
WHEREFORE, premises considered, both complaints in Civil Cases No. 1292 and 1332 are hereby given Sr., and to register and declare again in the name of Heirs of Don Fabian B. Monteroso, Sr., more
due course and judgment is hereby rendered as follows: particularly the following:
1. Declaring, confirming and ordering that Lot 380, Pls-736 located at Pandanon, Cabadbaran, belongs (a.) [TCT No. RT-203] (420) for Lot 432, Cad. 121, with an area of 10.0242 hectares under Tax Dec. No.
to the children of first marriage and partitioned as per subdivision survey map made by Geodetic Engineer 02-018-0224, Series of 1980, PIN-02-019-05-050 known as Parcel F-1;
Antonio Libarios, Exh. 7, page 72 of the records as follows:
(b.) TCT No. RT-205 (424) for Lot 100, Cad. 121, with an area of 1.9083 hectares under Tax Dec. No.
(a.) Lot 380-A, Share of Soledad Monteroso Cagampang with an area of 5.3376 hectares, with technical 02-019-0488, Series of 1980, PIN-02-019-08-002 known as F-2;
description therein;
(c.) TCT No. RT-204 (423) for Lot 103, Cad. 121, with an area of 2.8438 hectares under Tax Declaration
(b.) Lot 380-B, Share of Reygula Monteroso Bayan with an area of 5.3376 hectares, with technical No. 02-019-0335, Series of 1980, PIN-02-019-08-017 known as F-2;
description therein;
(d.) Parcel of coconut land located at Poblacion, Cabadbaran, known as F-3 with area of 6.3100 hectares
(c.) Lot 380-C, Share of the Heirs of Benjamin D. Monteroso with an area of 5.3376 hectares with technical under Tax Dec. No. 02-001-1810, Series of 1980 and PIN-02-001-30-027;
description therein;
(e.) Residential Lot, known as F-5 located at Poblacion, Cabadbaran under Tax Dec. No. 18447 then
(d.) Lot 380-D, Share of Tirso D. Monteroso with an area of 5.3376 hectares and Lot 351, Pls-736 with under Tax Dec. No. 1922, containing an area of 660 sq. meters bounded on the North by Washington
an area of 6,099 sq. meters, with both technical description therein; Street; on the East by Progresso Street; on the South by Rizal Street; and on the West by Ramon
2. It is hereby ordered that Tirso D. Monteroso must deliver, return, relinquish, cede, waive and/or quit Cabrera.
claim immediately the area of 3.7815 hectares being portion of Lot 380-C, Pls-736 indicated in the (f.) Residential Lot known as F-6 located at Poblacion under Tax Dec. No. 5374, Series of 1949 and Tax
subdivision survey plan by Engr. Libarios, page 72, Records, Civil Case No. 1292, Folio 2, Exh. "V", to Dec. No. 499, Series of 1954, consisting of 3,890 sq. meters bounded as follows:
the Heirs of Benjamin D. Monteroso who are absolute owners of Lot 380-C, Pls-736 and to pay, return
and deliver immediately to the said Heirs of Benjamin D. Monteroso the net income in arrears from 1948 North Andres Atega
to 1983, the total sum of Two Hundred Sixty Thousand Eight Hundred Forty Four and 70/100
(P260,844.70) Pesos with interest of 12% per annum compounded annually from January 1, 1984 up to South Rill
the present and until fully paid; East Luis Jamboy now Celestino Udarbe,
3. It is hereby ordered that Reygula Monteroso Bayan must deliver, return, relinquish, cede, waive and/or Sixto Ferrer and New Road
quit claim immediately the area of 1.6128 hectares which is part of Lot 380-C, Pls-736, indicated in the
subdivision survey plan by Engr. Libarios, page 72, Records (Civil Case No. 1292, Folio 2), Exh. V, to West Atega Street;
the Heirs of Benjamin D. Monteroso who are the absolute owners of Lot 380-C, Pls-736 and to pay, return
and deliver immediately to the said Heirs of Benjamin D. Monteroso the net income in arrears from 1948 (g.) Coconut land known as F-7, located at Ambajan, Tubay, Agusan del Norte under Tax Dec. No. 1769,
to 1983 the total sum of One Hundred Six Thousand Nine Hundred Sixty and 40/100 (P106,960.40) Series of 1955 and Tax Dec. No. 10-03-0273, Series of 1980 with an area of [8.000] hectares;
Pesos with interest of 12% per annum compounded annually from January 1, 1984 up to the present and (h.) Parcel of coconut land known as F-8, located at Ambajan, Tubay, Agusan del Norte with an area of
until fully paid; 7.5996 hectares under Tax Dec. No. 2944 and Tax Dec. No. 10-03-0273, Series of 1980;
4. It is hereby ordered that Soledad Monteroso Cagampang must deliver, return, relinquish, cede, waive (i.) Parcel of S-1, located at Tagbongabong, Cabadbaran under Tax Dec. No. 11506, Series of 1963 with
and/or quit claim immediately the area of 1.0929 hectares being portion of Lot 380-C, Pls-736, indicated an area of 24 hectares in the name of Sofia Vda. de Monteroso;
in the subdivision survey plan by Engr. Libarios, page 72, Records (Civil Case No. 1292, Folio 2), Exh.
V, to her sister Reygula Monteroso Bayan who is the absolute owner of Lot 380-C, Pls-736 and to pay, (j.) Parcel of S-2, located at Dal-as, Bay-ang, Cabadbaran, under Tax Dec. No. 1888, Series of 1948,
return and deliver immediately to the said Reygula Monteroso Bayan the net income in arrears from 1948 Tax Dec. No. 669, Series of 1952, and subsequently transferred in fraud of other heirs, in the name of
to 1983, the total sum of Seventy Seven Thousand Six Hundred Twenty Five and 96/100 (P77,625.96) Florenda P. Monteroso under Tax Dec. No. 11507, Series of 1964, Tax Dec. No. 3381, Series of 1972,
Pesos with interest of 12% per annum compounded annually from January 1, 1984 up to the present and Tax Dec. No. 5036, Series of 1974, Tax Dec. No. 02-006-0047, Series of 1980;
until fully paid, subject to deduction of whatever cash advances, if any, was ever received by Reygula M.
(k.) Parcel of S-3, located at Pandanon, Mabini, Cabadbaran, under Tax Dec. No. 5373, Series of 1949
Bayan.
with an area of 1.4080 hectares and bounded as follows:
5. The three alleged Absolute Sale, Exh. C, D and E with all its submarkings are declared fictitious,
simulated and no consideration. It can never be considered a donation because aside from being North Pandanon River
inofficious and impairing the legitime of other heirs, the vendee had not signed therein which could be South Crisanto Dolleroso
considered acceptance and above all, these documents were prepared and acknowledged by Notary
Public squarely disqualified and highly prohibited. Therefore, all are declared null and void and of no legal East Pandanon River
effect.
West Pandanon River and Peregrino Aznar;
So, parcels F-1, F-2, F-3, F-6, F-7 and F-8 [remain] as part of the intestate estate of Don Fabian B.
(L.) Parcel S-4, located at Mabini, Cabadbaran, under Tax Dec. No. 3367 with an area of 1.6500 hectares
Monteroso, Sr.
and bounded as follows:
6. The Register of Deeds and the Provincial Assessor, both in the Province of Agusan del Norte are
North Hrs. of G. Corvera ninth (1/9) share shall be held in usufruct by the widow, Sofia P. Monteroso, during her lifetime.
South C. Vda. de Alburo Soledad Monteroso Cagampang and Atty. Perfecto L. Cagampang, Sr. are ordered to deliver to [their]
co-heirs their shares in these parcels of land, F-2, free from any lien and encumbrances whatsoever, and
East Ellodoro Delleroso to pay each of them the net income in arrears from 1948 to 1983, namely:
West A. Ventura (a.) To Reygula Monteroso Bayan P34,976.85
7. It is hereby declared that upon the death of Don Fabian B. Monteroso, Sr. on March 26, 1948, the (b.) To Hrs. of Benjamin D. Monteroso P34,976.85
following are the properties belonging to his intestate estate:
(c.) To Tirso D. Monteroso P34,976.85
(a.) Whole parcel Lot 432, F-1;
(d.) To Florenda P. Monteroso P34,976.85
(b.) Whole parcels Lot 100 and 103, F-2;
(e.) To Reynato P. Monteroso P34,976.85
(c.) Whole parcel cocoland, Calibunan, F-3;
(f.) To Alberto P. Monteroso P34,976.85
(d.) One-half (1/2) parcel F-5;
(g.) To Hrs. of Fabian P. Monteroso, Jr. P34,976.85
(e.) One-half (1/2) parcel F-6;
(h.) To Sofia P. Monteroso (usufruct) P34,976.85
(f.) One-half (1/2) parcel F-7;
The above-mentioned [amounts] shall be subjected to deduction of whatever amount any heir may have
(g.) One-half (1/2) parcel F-8; received by way of cash advances.
(h.) One-half (1/2) parcel S-1; The net amount shall be subjected to an interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum
(i.) One-half (1/2) parcel S-2; compounded annually from January 1, 1984 to the present or until fully paid.

(j.) One-half (1/2) parcel S-3; 10. Soledad Monteroso Cagampang and Atty. Perfecto L. Cagampang, Sr. being in possession and
enjoying the fruits and income of Parcel F-3, are hereby ordered to pay to the following heirs, the net
(k.) One-half (1/2) parcel S-4. income in arrears from 1948 to 1983:
8. It is hereby ordered that Lot 432 under TCT [No.] RT-203 (420) with an area of 10.0242 hectares under (a.) To Reygula Monteroso Bayan P49,727.35
Tax Dec. No. 02-018-0224 (1980) is hereby divided into nine (9) equal shares for the eight (8) children of
Don Fabian B. Monteroso and the one-ninth (1/9) share be held in usufruct by the widow Sofia Pendejito (b.) To Hrs. of Benjamin D. Monteroso P49,727.35
Monteroso during her lifetime. (c.) To Tirso D. Monteroso P49,727.35
Sofia Pendejito Monteroso being in possession and enjoying the fruits or income of F-1 is hereby ordered (d.) To Florenda P. Monteroso P49,727.35
to pay and deliver immediately to the following heirs the corresponding amount of net income of F-1, Lot
432, from 1948 to 1983: (e.) To Reynato P. Monteroso P49,727.35
(a.) To Soledad Monteroso Cagampang P78,521.32 (f.) To Alberto P. Monteroso P49,727.35
(b.) To Reygula Monteroso Bayan P78,521.32 (g.) To Hrs. of Fabian P. Monteroso, Jr. P49,727.35
(c.) To Hrs. of Benjamin D. Monteroso P78,521.32 (h.) To Sofia P. Monteroso (usufruct) P49,727.35
(d.) To Tirso D. Monteroso P78,521.32 The above-mentioned [amounts] shall be subject to deduction for whatever cash advance, if any, such
heir may have received. Then the net [amounts] shall be subject to interest at the rate of twelve percent
(e.) To Florenda P. Monteroso P78,521.32 (12%) per annum compounded annually from January 1, 1984 to the present until fully paid.
(f.) To Reynato P. Monteroso P78,521.32 Soledad Monteroso Cagampang and Atty. Perfecto L. Cagampang, Sr. are both ordered to deliver to the
(g.) To Alberto P. Monteroso P78,521.32 above-mentioned co-heirs their respective shares free from any lien and encumbrances whatsoever.

(h.) To Hrs. of Fabian P. Monteroso, Jr. P78,521.32 11. Parcels F-5, F-6, F-7 and F-8 are declared real properties belonging to the first marriage. Hence one-
half (1/2) of each of these four parcels shall equally be divided by the four (4) children of the first marriage
The above-mentioned [amounts] shall be subject to deduction for whatever cash advance any heir may and the other half must be divided into nine (9) equal shares for the eight (8) children of Fabian B.
have received. Then the net balance of said [amounts] shall be subject to interest at the rate of twelve Monteroso, Sr., and one-ninth (1/9) shall be held in usufruct by the widow, Sofia Pendejito Vda. de
percent (12%) per annum compounded annually from January 1, 1984 to the present until fully paid. Monteroso.
9. It is hereby ordered that Lot 100 under [TCT No. RT-205] (424) with an area of 1.9083 hectares under Therefore, it is hereby ordered that F-6 is divided as follows:
Tax Dec. No. 02-019-0488, Series of 1980 and Lot No. 103 under [TCT No. RT-204] (423) with an area
of 2.8438 hectares and under Tax Dec. No. 02-019-0335, Series of 1980, [both known as Parcel F-2,] (a.) To Soledad Monteroso Cagampang - - - - 702 sq. m.
shall be divided into nine (9) equal shares for the eight (8) children of Fabian B. Monteroso, Sr. and one-
(b.) To Reygula Monteroso Bayan - - - - - - - 702 sq. m. (f.) To Reynato P. Monteroso - - - - - - - - P93,998.12
(c.) To Hrs. of Benjamin D. Monteroso - - - - 702 sq. m. (g.) To Alberto P. Monteroso - - - - - - - - - P93,998.12
(d.) To Tirso D. Monteroso - - - - - - - - - - - - 702 sq. m. (h.) To Hrs. of Fabian P. Monteroso, Jr. - - P93,998.12
(e.) To Florenda P. Monteroso - - - - - - - - - - 216 sq. m. However, all these amounts shall be subject to deduction, if any cash advance was ever made or received
by any heir.
(f.) To Reynato P. Monteroso - - - - - - - - - - - 216 sq. m.
The above-mentioned [amounts are] subject to an interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%)
(g.) To Alberto P. Monteroso - - - - - - - - - - - 216 sq. m. compounded annually from January 1, 1948 to the present until fully paid.
(h.) To Hrs. of Fabian Monteroso, Jr. - - - - - - 216 sq. m. 16. The alleged Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Sofia P. Monteroso in favor of Florenda P. Monteroso
(i.) To Sofia P. Monteroso - - - - - - - - - - - - - 216 sq. m. over a coconut land located at Dal-as, Bay-ang, Cabadbaran, consisting of 24 hectares is hereby declared
null and void being in fraud of other heirs. It is clearly inofficious and impairs the legitime of her brothers,
12. It is hereby ordered, that Soledad Monteroso Cagampang and Atty. Perfecto L. Cagampang, Sr. must sisters and nephews and nieces. Therefore, the tax declaration in the name of Florenda P. Monteroso
deliver to all heirs their respective shares on F-7 and F-8 including usufruct of Sofia P. Monteroso as under Tax Dec. No. 11507, Series of 1964, Tax Dec. No. 3381, Series of 1972, Tax Dec. No. 5036, Series
declared in paragraph five (5) and in addition, must pay and deliver the net income in arrears from 1948 of 1974 and Tax Dec. No. 02-006-0047, PIN-02-006-02-002 are hereby ordered cancelled and the said
to 1983, summarized as follows: land shall be declared again in the name of Heirs of Fabian B. Monteroso.
(a.) To Reygula Monteroso Bayan - - - - - P189,665.88 Sofia Pendejito Monteroso is not required to render accounting as to the income of S-2 because the
coconut trees therein were planted by her while being already a widow. One-half (1/2) of the land where
(b.) To Hrs. of Benjamin D. Monteroso - - P189,665.88 the coconut trees are planted shall be her share and the other one-half (1/2) shall be divided into nine (9)
(c.) To Tirso D. Monteroso - - - - - - - - - - P189,665.88 shares for the eight (8) children of Fabian B. Monteroso including her 1/9 usufruct thereon.

(d.) To Florenda P. Monteroso - - - - - - - - P 58,358.73 17. Sofia Pendejito Monteroso is hereby ordered to pay and deliver immediately the net income in arrears
of parcel S-3 located at Pandanon to the following heirs with the corresponding amount:
(e.) To Reynato P. Monteroso - - - - - - - - - P 58,358.73
(a.) To Soledad Monteroso Cagampang - - P49,349.02
(f.) To Alberto P. Monteroso - - - - - - - - - P 58,358.73
(b.) To Reygula Monteroso Bayan - - - - - P49,349.02
(g.) To Hrs. of Fabian Monteroso, Jr. - - - - P 58,358.73
(c.) To Hrs. of Benjamin D. Monteroso - - P49,349.02
(h.) To Sofia P. Monteroso (usufruct) - - - - P 58,358.73
(d.) To Tirso D. Monteroso - - - - - - - - - - P49,349.02
all with interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum compounded annually from January 1,
1984 to the present until fully paid. However, it is subject to deduction of whatever cash advances, if ever (e.) To Florenda P. Monteroso - - - - - - - - P49,349.02
any heir, may have received. (f.) To Reynato P. Monteroso - - - - - - - - P49,349.02
13. The Deed of Donation in 1948, Exh. "F", over parcel known as F-5, is declared null and void because (g.) To Alberto P. Monteroso - - - - - - - - - P49,349.02
the same was prepared and acknowledged before a Notary Public disqualified and prohibited to do so
under Notarial Law (Barretto vs. Cabreza, 33 Phil. Reports 112). Hence, the transfer of tax declaration is (h.) To Hrs. of Fabian P. Monteroso, Jr. - - P49,349.02
hereby ordered cancelled and the same must be declared again in the name of the Heirs of Fabian B.
Monteroso, Sr. and ordered partitioned in the proportion stated in paragraph eleven (11) hereof. However, [the] above-mentioned [amounts] shall be subject to deductions, if any cash advance was ever
made or received by any heir.
14. Parcels of land known as S-1, S-2, S-3 and S-4 are declared conjugal properties of the second
marriage. Hence, one-half (1/2) thereof belongs to Sofia Pendejito Monteroso and one-half (1/2) shall be Then the net amount receivable shall be subject to an interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%)
equally divided into nine (9) shares for the eight (8) children of Don Fabian B. Monteroso, Sr. where the compounded annually from January 1, 1984 to the present until fully paid.
one-ninth (1/9) shall be held in usufruct by Sofia P. Monteroso during her lifetime. 18. For the net income in arrears of parcel S-4, located at Mabini, Cabadbaran, from 1948 to 1983, Sofia
15. For the net income in arrears of S-1 located at Tagbongabong, Cabadbaran, from 1948 to 1983, Sofia P. Monteroso is hereby ordered to pay and deliver to the following heirs their corresponding shares:
Pendejito Monteroso is hereby ordered to pay and deliver to the following heirs the corresponding share: (a.) To Soledad Monteroso Cagampang - - P6,477.54
(a.) To Soledad Monteroso Cagampang - - P93,998.12 (b.) To Reygula Monteroso Bayan - - - - - P6,477.54
(b.) To Reygula Monteroso Bayan - - - - - P93,998.12 (c.) To Hrs. of Benjamin D. Monteroso - - P6,477.54
(c.) To Hrs. of Benjamin D. Monteroso - - P93,998.12 (d.) To Tirso D. Monteroso - - - - - - - - - - P6,477.54
(d.) To Tirso D. Monteroso - - - - - - - - - - P93,998.12 (e.) To Florenda P. Monteroso - - - - - - - - P6,477.54
(e.) To Florenda P. Monteroso - - - - - - - - P93,998.12 (f.) To Reynato P. Monteroso - - - - - - - - P6,477.54
(g.) To Alberto P. Monteroso - - - - - - - - - P6,477.54 Court at its discretion may appoint an administrator, unless none of the parties appeal this decision and
this judgment is complied with by all the parties and/or so executed in accordance with the provisions of
(h.) To Hrs. of Fabian P. Monteroso, Jr. - - P6,477.54 the New Rules of Court.
However, all these amounts shall be subject to deductions, if any cash advance was ever made or SO ORDERED.10
received by any heir.
As regards Civil Case No. 1292, the RTC found that the heirs of Benjamin have indeed been deprived of
The above-mentioned amount is subject to an interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) compounded their inheritance which corresponds to one-fourth share due their father from the intestate estate of their
annually from January 1, 1984 to the present until fully paid. grandmother, Soledad D. Monteroso. Thus, the court ordered the equal distribution of Parcel F-4, i.e., Lot
Sofia Pendejito Monteroso is ordered to deliver to the above-mentioned heirs their respective shares free 380, Pls-736 located in Pandanon, Cabadbaran, Agusan del Norte, among the children of the first
from any lien and encumbrances whatsoever. marriage of Don Fabian, and partitioned it based on the subdivision survey map prepared by a geodetic
engineer.
19. These cases involved inheritance, hence the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) of Agusan del Norte
at Butuan City is hereby notified for prompt, proper and appropriate action. Likewise, the Provincial Turning on the alleged sale of Parcels F-1, F-2, F-3, F-7, and F-8 by Don Fabian to Soledad Monteroso-
Treasurer of Agusan del Norte and the Municipal Treasurers of Cabadbaran and Tubay are hereby Cagampang, the RTC found the covering three deeds of absolute sale11 to be null and void for the reason
informed and reminded for their prompt, proper and appropriate action in the assessment and collection that the alleged conveyances were fictitious, simulated, and/or without sufficient consideration.
of real estate taxes including transfers tax. Alternatively, the RTC ruled that the conveyances, even if considered as donation, would be inofficious
for impairing the legitime of the other compulsory heirs, not to mention the lack of due acceptance of the
20. That all the heirs are hereby directed, and ordered to pay all taxes due in favor of the Government of donation by Soledad Monteroso-Cagampang. Adding a vitiating element to the conveyances, as the RTC
the Republic of the Philippines within thirty (30) days from the finality of judgment hereof, otherwise, upon noted, was the fact that the corresponding documents were prepared by and acknowledged before
proper application or manifestation by appropriate or concerned government agency, a portion of the Perfecto, who happened to be the husband of the alleged vendee, Soledad Monteroso-Cagampang.
intestate estate of Don Fabian B. Monteroso, Sr., shall be sold at public auction for such purpose.
The RTC also declared as null and void the donation of Parcel F-5 to Reygula Monteroso-Bayan owing
21. Under Civil Case No. 1292, Tirso D. Monteroso or his heirs, assigns and successors-in-interest, is to clear legal infirmities attaching to the covering deed of donation.12 For one, the parcel in question, while
hereby ordered to pay Ruby Monteroso, Marlene Monteroso-Pospos, Adelita Monteroso-Berenguel and purportedly donated free from any liens or encumbrance, was in fact the subject of a deed of absolute
Henrieto Monteroso the following sums of money: sale between Don Fabian and the Cagampang spouses. For another, one of the signatory-donors,
Mauricia Nakila, Benjamins widow, did not have the right to effect a donation because she was not a
(a.) P10,000.00 for moral damages; compulsory heir of her husband by representation. The RTC added that the real owners of the rights and
(b.) P10,000.00 for exemplary damages; interests of Benjamin over Parcel F-5 are her children as representative heirs.

(c.) P3,000.00 for costs of suit; and Finally, the RTC declared the Order dated March 11, 1936 issued in SP No. 309 approving the Project of
Partition to be valid, and that it constitutes res judicata on the affected properties, i.e., Parcel F-4 and
(d.) P10,000.00 for attorneys fees. one-half of Parcel F-5, which were equally distributed to the heirs of Soledad D. Monteroso. Pursuing this
point and on the finding that Parcels F-1 to F-8 were acquired during the first marriage and Parcels S-1
22. Under Civil Case No. 1292, Soledad Monteroso de Cagampang and Reygula Monteroso Bayan are to S-4 during the second, the RTC thus held that Don Fabians intestate estate consisted of the whole of
hereby ordered jointly and severally to pay Ruby Monteroso, Marlene Monteroso-Pospos, Adelita Parcels F-1, F-2, and F-3; and half of Parcels F-5 to F-8 and half of Parcels S-1 to S-4, to be distributed
Monteroso-Berenguel and Henrieto Monteroso the following sums of money: in accordance with the law on intestate succession. This means, the RTC concluded, that the estate shall
(a.) P10,000.00 for moral damages; descend to Don Fabians compulsory heirs and their representatives, as in the case of the late Benjamin
and Fabian, Jr., subject to accounting of the income or produce of the subject properties for the applicable
(b.) P10,000.00 for exemplary damages; period, less advances made or received by any heir, if any.
(c.) P2,000.00 for costs of suit; and The Ruling of the CA
(d.) P10,000.00 for attorneys fees. From the above June 9, 1987 Decision, Tirso, defendant in Civil Case No. 1292, appealed to the CA, so
did the Cagampang spouses, defendants in Civil Case No. 1332. The other defendants in Civil Case No.
23. Under Civil Case No. 1332, Soledad Monteroso Cagampang, Atty. Perfecto L. Cagampang, Sr. and
1332, namely: Sofia Pendejito Vda. de Monteroso, Florenda Monteroso, Alberto Monteroso, Heirs of
Sofia Pendejito Vda. de Monteroso or their heirs, assigns and successors-in-interest, are hereby ordered
Fabian Monteroso, Jr., Reynato Monteroso, and Reygula Monteroso-Bayan, also interposed their own
to pay jointly and severally, unto and in favor of Tirso D. Monteroso or his heirs, assigns and successors-
appeal. The separate appeals were consolidated and docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 15805.
in-interest, the following sums of money:
On March 31, 1992, the CA rendered the assailed decision, affirming with modification the June 9, 1987
(a.) P20,000.00 for moral damages;
RTC Decision, disposing as follows:
(b.) P20,000.00 for exemplary damages;
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby modified, as follows:
(c.) P5,000.00 for costs of suit; and
a) In the event that a homestead patent over Parcel S-1 is issued by the Bureau of Lands pursuant to the
(d.) P10,000.00 for attorneys fees. patent application of Sofia Pendejito Vda. de Monteroso, said patent shall issue not in the name of the
applicant but in favor of the eight heirs of Fabian Monteroso, Sr. who thereafter shall be declared absolute
24. It is hereby ordered that a judicial administrator of the intestate estate of Don Fabian B. Monteroso, owners of the said parcel of land in the proportion stated in this decision but who nevertheless shall allow
Sr. shall be appointed by this Court upon written recommendation by all the parties within thirty (30) days Sofia Pendejito Vda. de Monteroso to exercise during her lifetime usufructuary rights over a portion of the
from promulgation of this decision. Should the parties fail to submit unanimously a recommendee, the said parcel of land equivalent to the share therein of each of the heirs of her deceased husband;
b) The said heirs of Fabian Monteroso, Sr. are hereby declared absolute owners of Parcel F-6 to the CA further modified the RTC on this point.
extent of their respective shares therein as presently individually possessed by them pursuant to an
extrajudicial partition of the said parcel of land which the Court hereby declares as a valid contract among On the third and last issues, the CA set aside all awards of actual damages made by the RTC premised
the said heirs; and on the income generating capacity of the subject properties, except that of Parcel F-4, as an order of
accounting of the fruits of the other subject properties unjustly appropriated by them would address the
c) With the exception of those pertaining to Parcel F-4 as stated in this decision, the parties thus found issue of damages.
to have unjustly misappropriated the fruits of the subject parcels of land are hereby directed to render an
accounting thereof consistent with our findings in the case at bar. It bears to stress at this juncture that, save for the grant of damages and the disposition of Parcels F-6
and S-1, the CA affirmed the questioned RTC Decision on all other points. On June 15, 1992, Tirso D.
With the exception of the foregoing modifications, the decision under review is hereby AFFIRMED in all Monteroso thereafter filed before the Court his partial petition for review under Rule 45, docketed as G.R.
other respects. No. 105608.
No pronouncement as to costs. On the other hand, Pendejito, together with the other defendants in Civil Case No. 1332, first interposed
a joint motion for partial reconsideration, which the CA denied per its equally assailed December 16, 1993
SO ORDERED.13 Resolution,15 before elevating the case via a petition for review under Rule 45, docketed as G.R. No.
The CA summarized into three issues the multifarious assignments of errors raised by the parties, to wit: 113199.
first, whether or not the intestate estate of Soledad Doldol Monteroso was settled in SP No. 309, thus G.R. No. 105608 Denied with Finality
according the Project of Partition approved therein the effect of res judicata; second, whether or not it
was appropriate to partition Parcels F-1, F-2, and F-3, and half of Parcels F-5, F-6, F-7, F-8, S-1, S-2, S- Per its Resolution16 dated June 29, 1992, the Court denied Tirso D. Monterosos petition under G.R. No.
3, and S-4; and third, whether or not Tirso D. Monteroso is entitled to damages. 105608 for late payment of fees and non-compliance with the requirements of the Rules of Court and
Circular Nos. 1-88 and 28-91 on the submission of a certified copy of the assailed decision/order and a
The CA resolved the first issue in the affirmative, SP No. 309 being a valid and binding proceedings certification of non-forum shopping. Another Resolution17 of August 12, 1992 followed, this time denying
insofar as the properties subject thereof are concerned, i.e., Parcels F-1 to F-5 of which the whole of with finality Tirso D. Monterosos motion for reconsideration filed on July 29, 1992. On August 31, 1992,
Parcel F-4 and one-half of Parcel F-5, as Soledad D. Monterosos intestate estate, were distributed to an Entry of Judgment18 was issued.
her heirs. This is not to mention that the authenticity and due execution of the documents filed or issued
in relation therewithreferring to the Proyecto de Particion dated February 12, 1935 which is a carbon In net effect, the March 31, 1992 CA Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 15805 is final and executory as to Tirso
copy of the original, the Orden issued by the CFI on March 11, 1936, and the Mocion dated March 18, D. Monteroso, and the Court need not pass upon the issues he raised in his petition under G.R. No.
1936having duly been established. Affirming the RTC, the CA rejected Tirsos claim that SP No. 309 105608, albeit we shall take stock of his Comment19 and Memorandum20 in G.R. No. 113199.
is void for settling only a part of the estate of Soledad D. Monteroso. The CA held that partial settlement
is not a ground for the nullification of the judicial partition under either the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 or The Issues
the present Civil Code. The appellate court added that the proper remedy in such a situation is to ask for Petitioners in G.R. No. 113199 raise the following issues for our consideration:
the partition and the subsequent distribution of the property omitted.
1. Whether the finding that the Deeds of Sale (Exhibits "C", "D" and "E") were not supported by valuable
The CA likewise disposed of the second issue in the affirmative, dismissing the opposition of the consideration and sham, fictitious and simulated is supported by the evidence.
Cagampang spouses and Reygulo Monteroso-Bayan who all claimed ownership over some of the parcels
of land on the strength of the deeds of conveyance executed in their favor. The CA upheld the RTCs 2. Whether the finding or conclusion that petitioners Spouses Atty. Perfecto and Soledad Cagampang
finding that the three deeds of absolute sale in which Don Fabian purportedly sold Parcels F-1, F-2, F-3, did not dispute the finding of the trial Court that the Deeds of Sale in question are sham, fictitious and
F-7, and F-8 to Soledad Monteroso-Cagampang were infirm. The CA noted that even the Cagampang simulated is supported by evidence.
spouses recognized these infirmities, and instead of denying their existence, they tried to justify the same
and seek an exception therefrom. 3. Whether the [CA] committed reversible error in concluding that, "By invoking the benefits of prescription
in their favor, the Cagampang spouses are deemed to have admitted the existence of a co-ownership."
On the alleged donation of Parcel F-5 by Don Fabian to Reygula Monteroso-Bayan, the CA likewise
agreed with the RTCs finding on the nullity thereof. The CA pointed out that Reygula Monteroso-Bayan 4. Whether the [CA] committed reversible error in upholding partition as the proper remedy of private
did not controvert the RTCs finding, except to gratuitously say that the trial courts declaration of nullity respondent Tirso Monteroso to recover the properties sold by Fabian Monteroso, Sr. to Soledad D.
was wrong since nobody questioned the authenticity of the donation in the first place. Monteroso de Cagampang when co-ownership is not pleaded as theory in the Complaint.

Apropos Parcel S-1, a disposable agricultural land of the public domain which is the subject of a 5. Whether the [CA] committed reversible error in holding that the cause of action of private respondent
homestead patent application by Don Fabian, the CA, as opposed to the RTCs disposition, held that a Tirso Monteroso is not barred by extinctive prescription and laches.
patent, if eventually issued, ought to be in the name of the legal heirs of Don Fabian, not of his surviving 6. Whether the [CA] committed reversible error in granting reliefs not prayed for in the Complaint in favor
spouse, Pendejito. This conclusion, so the CA explained, is in line with the provision of Section 105 of of parties who did not assert or claim such relief, such as partition and accounting among the parties and
the Public Land Act or Commonwealth Act No. 141 (CA 141), as amended. the nullification of the donation in favor of petitioner Reygula Bayan when x x x Tirso Monteroso and the
As to Parcel S-2, the CA agreed with the RTC that it is a conjugal property acquired during the second petitioners herein who are signatories to the Deed of Donation did not question or ask for the nullification
marriage through a deed of sale14 executed on August 15, 1947 by Marcelo Morancel. Likewise, the CA of the donation in favor of Reygula Bayan.
said that Parcels S-3 and S-4 are conjugal properties as no evidence was adduced supporting the alleged 7. Whether the [CA] committed reversible error in ordering the partition of parcels S-1, S-2, S-3 and S-4
purchase by Pendejito of said properties with her own funds. which are admitted in the Complaint to be in the exclusive, adverse possession of petitioners Sofia vda.
Anent the RTCs order partitioning Parcel F-6, the CA agreed with the defendants in Civil Case No. 1332 de Monteroso, Florenda, Alberto and Reynato and the Heirs of Fabian Monteroso, Jr. since the death of
that Parcel F-6 has long been partitioned equitably among all the eight children of Don Fabian. Thus, the Fabian Monteroso, Sr. in 1948, appropriating the harvests unto themselves, to the exclusion of plaintiff
(private respondent Tirso Monteroso) who was deprived of his share continuously up to the present. 21
The Courts Ruling when the deeds were executed in 1939, Soledad and Perfecto Cagampang, the notarizing officer, were
already married.
After a circumspect consideration of the arguments earnestly pressed by the parties and in the light of
the practically parallel findings of the RTC and CA, we find the petition under G.R. No. 113199 to be A property acquired during the existence of a marriage is presumed conjugal. This postulate
devoid of merit. notwithstanding, Perfecto Cagampang went out of his way to make it appear that the subject parcels of
land were effectively his wifes paraphernal properties. No explanation was given for this unusual move.
It is a rule of long standing that:
Hence, we agree with the trial and appellate courts that the unexplained situations described above
[T]he jurisdiction of the Court in cases brought before it from the Court of Appeals via Rule 45 of the Rules sufficiently show that the purported conveyances were simulated. We also accord credence to Tirsos
of Court is limited to reviewing errors of law. Findings of fact of the latter are conclusive, except in the allegation that the Cagampang spouses tricked Don Fabian into believing that his creditors were after the
following instances: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures; properties which have to be "hidden" by means of simulated conveyances to Soledad Monteroso-
(2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse Cagampang. The fact that only one of the subject lots was used as collateral for a PhP 600 loan which
of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact the Cagampang spouses took out does not weaken the conclusion on the simulated character of the
are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, contracts, as logically drawn from the twin circumstances adverted to.
or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings
are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific The Court can allow that petitioners indeed attempted to traverse, before the CA, the RTCs findings on
evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners the area of simulated sale and that they only raised the matter of acquisitive prescription as an alternative
main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; and (10) when the findings of fact are premised defense. However, as we shall explain shortly, the fact of petitioners having made the attempt aforestated
on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record. 22 will not carry the day for them.
None of the above exceptions, however, obtains in the instant case. Third Issue: Recognition of Co-ownership in Acquisitive Prescription
First and Second Issues: Simulated Sale In its assailed decision, the CA declared, "By invoking the benefits of prescription in their favor, the
Cagampang spouses are deemed to have admitted the existence of a co-ownership x x x." The petitioners
In connection with the first two related issues, petitioners maintain that the CA erred when it affirmed the tag this declaration as flawed since the benefit of prescription may be availed of without necessarily
RTCs conclusion on the fictitious or simulated nature, for lack or inadequate consideration, of the Deeds recognizing co-ownership. Prescription and co-ownership, they maintain, are so diametrically opposed
of Sale (Exhibits "C," "D," and "E"), noting that Tirso failed to present substantial evidence to support the legal concepts, such that one who invokes prescription is never deemed to admit the existence of co-
alleged infirmity of the underlying sale. The fact that one of the lots sold under Exhibit "C" on May 10, ownership.
1939 for PhP 2,500 was used as collateral for a PhP 600 loan is not, so petitioners claim, proof that the
amount of PhP 600 represents the maximum loan value of the property or that the sale in question is not Petitioners are mistaken; their error flows from compartmentalizing what the CA wrote. The aforecited
supported by valuable consideration. portion of the CAs decision should not have been taken in isolation. It should have been read in the
context of the appellate courts disquisition on the matter of Tirso being a co-owner of the subject
Moreover, petitioners belabored to explain that the trial court erred in concluding that the property undivided properties whose rights thereto, as a compulsory heir, accrued at the moment of death of Don
conveyed under Exhibit "C" and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT-203 (420) in the Fabian, vis--vis the defense of acquisitive prescription foisted by the Cagampang spouses. For clarity,
name of Soledad Monteroso-Cagampang, married to Perfecto, was fictitious on the ground that the we reproduce the pertinent portion of the assailed decision:
certificate did not indicate that it was a conjugal property. Petitioners assert that the registration of a
property only in the name of one of the spouses is not proof that no consideration was paid therefor. As Nor do we find any merit in the third. From the allegation in the Complaint in Civil Case No. 1332 as well
petitioners would stress, what determines whether a given property is conjugal or separate is the law as from the arguments advanced by the parties on the issues raised therein, this Court is convinced that
itself, not what appears in the certificate of title. therein plaintiff Tirso Monterosos principal cause of action is unmistakably one for partition which by its
very nature is imprescriptible and cannot be barred by laches x x x. The only exception to the rule on the
Lastly, petitioners take exception from the appellate courts posture that the Cagampang spouses did not imprescriptibility of an action for partition is provided in a case where the co-ownership of the properties
dispute the trial courts finding that the deeds of sale (Exhibits "C," "D," and "E") were simulated and sought to be partitioned had been properly repudiated by a co-owner at which instance the remedy
fictitious for lack of consideration. Petitioners insist that they in fact contested such conclusion of the RTC available to the aggrieved heirs lies not in action for partition but for reconveyance which is subject to the
in their brief before the CA, adding they only raised the issue of prescription as an alternative defense rules on extinctive prescription. By invoking the benefits of prescription in their favor, the
without conceding the RTCs findings on contract infirmity. Cagampang spouses are deemed to have admitted the existence of a co-ownership among the
We are not persuaded. heirs of Fabian Monteroso, Sr. over the properties forming the decedents estate.23 (Emphasis
ours.)
The antecedent facts, as borne by the records, strongly indicate the simulated character of the sale
covered by the deeds of absolute sale over Parcels F-1 (Exhibit "C"), F-2 (Exhibit "D"), F-3, F-5, F-7, and From the foregoing disquisition, what the appellate court tried to convey is clear and simple: partition is
F-8 (Exhibit "E"). As found below, Don Fabian never relinquished possession of the covered properties the proper remedy available to Tirso who is a co-owner of the subject properties by virtue of his being a
during his lifetime. The first deed, Exhibit "E," was executed on May 1, 1939; the second, Exhibit "C," on compulsory heir, like siblings Soledad, Reygula, and Benjamin, of Don Fabian. The right to seek partition
May 10, 1939; and the third, Exhibit "D," on September 24, 1939. Soledad Monteroso-Cagampang, is imprescriptible and cannot be barred by laches. Consequently, acquisitive prescription or laches does
however, only took possession of the subject properties after Don Fabians death in 1948 or nine years not lie in favor of the Cagampang spouses and against Tirso, the general rule being that prescription
after contract execution. The gap, unexplained as it were, makes for a strong case that the parties to the does not run against a co-owner or co-heir. The only exception to the imprescriptibility of an action for
sale never intended to be bound thereby. partition against a co-owner is when a co-owner repudiates the co-ownership. Thus, the appellate court
ruled that by invoking extinctive prescription as a defense, the lone exception against imprescriptibility of
The more telling circumstance, however, is the fact that Perfecto had judicially sought the amendment of action by a co-owner, the Cagampang spouses are deemed to have contextually recognized the co-
the corresponding TCTs so that only the name of his wife, Soledad, shall be inscribed as real party-in- ownership of Tirso and must have repudiated such co-ownership in order for acquisitive prescription to
interest on the Memorandum of Encumbrances at the back portion of the titles. If only to stress the point, set in. Taking off from that premise, the appellate court then proceeded to tackle the issue of repudiation
by the Cagampang spouses. Therefore, we hold that the appellate court did not err in finding that the of the inheritance covers all the properties comprising the intestate estate of Don Fabian at the moment
Cagampang spouses are effectively barred from invoking prescription, given that the subject properties of his death,28 i.e., on October 26, 1948. Before partition and eventual distribution of Don Fabians
are conjugal properties of the decedent, Don Fabian, which cannot be subjected to acquisitive intestate estate, a regime of co-ownership among the compulsory heirs existed over the undivided estate
prescription, the necessary consequence of recognizing the co-ownership stake of other legal heirs. of Don Fabian. Being a co-owner of that intestate estate, Tirsos right over a share thereof is
imprescriptible.29 As a matter of law, acquisitive prescription does not apply nor set in against compulsory
Fourth and Fifth Issues: Partition Proper, not Barred by Laches nor by Acquisitive Prescription heirs insofar as their pro-indiviso share or legitime is concerned, unless said heirs repudiate their share.30
Contrary to petitioners stance, reconveyance is not the proper remedy available to Tirso. Be it
Being inextricably intertwined, we tackle both issues together. Petitioners, citing Article 494 of the Civil remembered in this regard that Tirso is not asserting total ownership rights over the subject properties,
Code24 and Art. 1965 of the Spanish Civil Code, aver that the right to ask partition is proper only where but only insofar as his legitime from the intestate estate of his father, Don Fabian, is concerned.
co-ownership is recognized. They also suggest that no co-ownership obtains in this case considering that
no less than Tirso avers in his complaint in Civil Case No. 1332 that from the time of Don Fabians death Acquisitive prescription, however, may still set in in favor of a co-owner, "where there exists a clear
in 1948, the lots in question have been in the exclusive, adverse, and public possession of the repudiation of the co-ownership, and the co-owners are apprised of the claim of adverse and exclusive
Cagampang spouses. Assayed against this perspective, petitioners submit that partition is not proper, ownership."31 In the instant case, however, no extinctive or acquisitive prescription has set in against
ergo unavailing, but an action for reconveyance which is subject to the rules on extinctive prescription. Tirso and other compulsory heirs in favor of the Cagampang spouses because effective repudiation had
not timely been made against the former. As aptly put by the appellate court, the repudiation which must
Corollary to the posture above taken, petitioners assert that there being no co-ownership over the be clear and open as to amount to an express disavowal of the co-ownership relation happened not when
properties sold by Don Fabian to Soledad Monteroso-Cagampang, Tirsos cause of action, under the the deeds of absolute sale were executed in 1939, as these could not have amounted to a clear notice
Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190) in relation to Art. 1116 of the Civil Code,25 had already prescribed, to the other heirs, but in 1961 when the Cagampang spouses refused upon written demand by Tirso for
either in 1949, i.e., 10 years after the subject properties were registered in Soledad Monteroso- the partition and distribution of the intestate estate of Don Fabian. Since then, Tirso was deemed apprised
Cagampangs name, or in 1958, i.e., 10 years after the cause of action accrued in 1948 (death of Don of the repudiation by the Cagampang spouses.
Fabian), citing Osorio v. Tan.26 Tirsos complaint in Civil Case No. 1332 was commenced in 1970.
However, considering that the new Civil Code was already then in effect, Art. 1141 of said Code32 applies;
Petitioners contend that the evidence adduced clearly demonstrates that Soledad Monteroso- thus, Tirso has at the very least 10 years and at the most 30 years to file the appropriate action in court.
Cagampang acquired ownership of the subject properties by virtue of the deeds of sale executed in 1939 The records show that Tirsos cause of action has not prescribed as he instituted an action for partition
by Don Fabian. After the sale, she registered them under her name and then took exclusive, adverse, in 1970 or only nine years after the considered express repudiation. Besides, acquisitive prescription also
and public possession over them. Thus, they submit that the prescriptive period applicable to the instant does not lie against Tirso even if we consider that a valid express repudiation was indeed made in 1961
case under Act No. 190 had long expired, adding that the CA erred in finding that Soledad Monteroso- by the Cagampang spouses since in the presence of evident bad faith, the required extraordinary
Cagampang repudiated the co-ownership only in 1961 when she and the other heirs ignored the demand prescription period33 of 30 years has not yet lapsed, counted from said considered repudiation. Such
of Tirso for partition. would still be true even if the period is counted from the time of the death of Don Fabian when the
Cagampang spouses took exclusive possession of the subject properties.
As a final point, petitioners alleged that the exclusion of Tirso from the enjoyment of the fruits of the
subject properties since after the death of Don Fabian in 1948 is consistent with Soledad Monteroso-
Sixth Issue: Partition Proper for Conjugal Properties of Second Marriage
Cagampangs claim of exclusive ownership and dominion.
We cannot subscribe to petitioners theory. On the ground of prescription under Act No. 190, petitioners assert that Tirso lost the right to seek the
partition of Parcels S-1, S-2, S-3, and S-4, he having admitted, as early as 1948, the adverse, exclusive,
The fact that Tirso and the other compulsory heirs of Don Fabian were excluded from the possession of and public possession thereof by Pendejito and her children. This type of possession, they maintain,
their legitime and the enjoyment of the fruits thereof does not per se argue against the existence of a co- works as a repudiation by Pendejito and her children of the co-ownership claim of Tirso. They further
ownership. While Tirso may not have expressly pleaded the theory of co-ownership, his demand from, argue that Parcel S-1 pertains to Pendejito as her paraphernal property since the homestead application
and act of initiating Civil Case No. 1332 against, the Cagampang spouses for his share necessarily therefor was under her name.
implies that he was asserting his right as co-owner or co-heir of the properties unjustly withheld by the
Cagampang spouses through the instrumentality of simulated deeds of sale covering some of the We are not persuaded.
hereditary properties. By asserting his right as a compulsory heir, Tirso has effectively brought into the Tirsos acknowledgment of Pendejito and her childrens possession of Parcels S-1, S-2, S-3, and S-4
open the reality that the Cagampang spouses were holding some of the subject properties in trust and cannot be viewed as the required repudiation to bar Tirso from pursuing his right to seek partition. Under
that he is a co-owner of all of them to the extent of his legal share or legitime thereon. the law on co-ownership, it behooves on the person desiring to exclude another from the co-ownership
Consequently, we are one with the trial and appellate courts that partition is the proper remedy for to do the repudiating. Verily, the records do not show that Pendejito and her children performed acts
compulsory or legal heirs to get their legitime or share of the inheritance from the decedent. An action for clearly indicating an intention to repudiate the co-ownership and then apprising Tirso and other co-owners
partition is at once an action for declaration of co-ownership and for segregation and conveyance of a or co-compulsory heirs of such intention.
determinate portion of the properties involved.27 Also, Sec. 1, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court pertinently To be sure, Tirso and his siblings from the first marriage have a stake on Parcels S-2, S-3, and S-4, even
provides: if these parcels of land formed part of the conjugal partnership of gains of the second marriage. There
SECTION 1. Complaint in action for partition of real estate. A person having the right to compel the can be no serious dispute that the children of the first marriage have a hereditary right over the share of
partition of real estate may do so as provided in this Rule, setting forth in his complaint the nature and Don Fabian in the partnership assets of the first marriage.
extent of his title and an adequate description of the real estate of which partition is demanded and joining Anent Parcel S-1, we join the CA in its holding that it belongs to the heirs of Don Fabian under Sec. 105
as defendants all other persons interested in the property. (Emphasis ours.) of CA 141, which pertinently provides:
Being a compulsory heir of Don Fabian, Tirso has the right to compel partition of the properties comprising Sec. 105. If at any time the applicant or grantee shall die before the issuance of the patent or the final
the intestate estate of Don Fabian as a measure to get his hereditary share. His right as an heir to a share grant of the land, or during the life of the lease, or while the applicant or grantee still has obligations
pending towards the Government, in accordance with this Act, he shall be succeeded in his rights and courts have the discretion to apply equity in the absence or insufficiency of the law. Equity has been
obligations with respect to the land applied for or granted or issued under this Act by his heirs in defined as justice outside law, being ethical rather than jural and belonging to the sphere of morals than
law, who shall be entitled to have issued to them the patent or final concession if they show that of law. It is grounded on the precepts of conscience and not on any sanction of positive law, for equity
they have complied with the requirements therefor, and who shall be subrogated in all his rights and finds no room for application where there is law.36
obligations for the purposes of this Act. (Emphasis ours.)
In the instant case, a disposition only ordering partial partition and without accounting, as petitioners
It is undisputed that Don Fabian was the homestead patent applicant who was subrogated to the rights presently urge, would be most impractical and against what we articulated in Samala v. Court of
of the original applicants, spouses Simeon Cagaanan and Severina Naranjo, by purchasing from the Appeals.37 There, we cautioned courts against being dogmatic in rendering decisions, it being preferable
latter Parcel S-1 on May 8, 1943. Don Fabian cultivated the applied area and declared it for taxation if they take a complete view of the case and in the process come up with a just and equitable judgment,
purposes. The application, however, would be rejected because death supervened. In 1963, Pendejito eschewing rules tending to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice.
filed her own homestead application for Parcel S-1.
Surely, the assailed path taken by the CA on the grant of relief not specifically sought is not without
Assayed against the foregoing undisputed facts in the light of the aforequoted Sec. 105 of CA 141, the precedent. In National Housing Authority v. Court of Appeals, where the petitioner questioned the
heirs of Don Fabian are entitled to Parcel S-1. Said Sec. 105 has been interpreted in Soliman v. Icdang34 competence of the courts a quo to resolve issues not raised in the pleadings, and to order the disposition
as having abrogated the right of the widow of a deceased homestead applicant to secure under Sec. 3 of the subject property when what was raised was the issue of right to possession, this Court in dismissing
of Act No. 926, otherwise known as the Public Land Act of 1903, a patent in her own name, thus: the challenge stated that "a case should be decided in its totality, resolving all interlocking issues in order
to render justice to all concerned and to end the litigation once and for all."38 Verily, courts should always
[W]e should bear in mind that, although Adolfo Icdang was married to plaintiff when he filed the strive to settle the entire controversy in a single proceeding leaving no root or branch to bear the seed of
homestead application, "an applicant may be said to have acquired a vested right over a homestead only future litigation.39
by the presentation of the final proof and its approval by the Director of Lands". (Ingara vs. Ramelo, 107
Phil., 498; Balboa vs. Farrales, 51 Phil., 498; Republic vs. Diamon, 97 Phil., 838.) In the case at bar, the Eighth Issue: Deed of Donation Null and Void
final proof appears to have been presented to, and approved by the Director of Lands, in 1954, or several
years after the death of Adolfo Icdang and the dissolution of his conjugal partnership with plaintiff herein. Finally, as an incidental issue, petitioners asseverate that the deed of donation (Exhibit "F") executed on
Hence, the land in question could not have formed part of the assets of said partnership. It belonged to September 19, 1948, or after the death of Don Fabian, in favor of Reygula M. Bayan, is valid, particularly
the heirs of Adolfo Icdang, pursuant to section 105 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, reading: so since Tirso and the heirs of Benjamin, as represented by their mother, Nakila, do not question the
validity of said deed as they in fact signed the same. That the donated property was the same property
xxxx described and included in the deed of sale (Exhibit "E") in favor of Soledad Monteroso-Cagampang is
not, they contend, an invalidating factor since what Don Fabian sold under Exhibit "E" did not extend
It is worthy of notice that, under the Public Land Act of 1903 (Act No. 926, section 3), "in the event of the beyond his conjugal share thereon.
death of an applicant prior to the issuance of a patent, his widow shall be entitled to have a patent for the
land applied for issue to her upon showing that she has consummated the requirements of law for Just like the issue of the nullity of the three deeds of absolute sale (Exhibits "C," "D," and "E") heretofore
homesteading the lands", and that only in case the deceased applicant leaves no widow shall his interest discussed, we agree with the determination of the RTC and CA as to the invalidity of the donation of
in the land descend and the patent issue to his legal heirs. Incorporated substantially in section 103 of Parcel F-5 to Reygula M. Bayan. We need not repeat the reasons for such determination, except the
the Public Land Act of 1919 (Act No. 2874), this policy was changed by Act No. 3517, pursuant to which most basic. We refer to the authority of the person who executed the deed of donation. As it were, the
the deceased shall be succeeded no longer by his widow, but "by his heirs in law, who shall be entitled widow of Benjamin, Nakila, signed the deed of donation. She, however, cannot give consent to the
to have issued to them the patentif they show that they have complied with the requirements therefor". donation as she has no disposable right thereto. The legal maxim nemo dat quod non habet40 applies to
And this is, in effect, the rule maintained in the above quoted section 105 of Commonwealth Act No. this instance as Nakila only has usufructuary right equal to the share of her children under Art. 834 of the
141.35 (Emphasis added.) Spanish Civil Code of 1889. Besides, Nakila signed the deed of donation in her name and not in the name
of her children who are the heirs in representation of their father, Benjamin. Lest it be overlooked, the
It appearing that Don Fabian was responsible for meeting the requirements of law for homesteading then minor children were not under the legal guardianship of Nakila, a situation which thus disqualifies
Parcel S-1, said property, following Soliman, cannot be categorized as the paraphernal property of her from signing on their behalf.
Pendejito. Thus, the homestead patent thereto, if eventually issued, must be made in the name of the
compulsory heirs of Don Fabian. Over it, Pendejito shall be entitled, pursuant to Art. 834 of the Spanish The fact that nobody objected to the donation is of little consequence, for as the CA aptly observed, "The
Civil Code of 1889, only to a usufructuary right over the property equal to the corresponding share of circumstance that parties to a void contract choose to ignore its nullity can in no way enhance the invalid
each of Don Fabians compulsory heirs, i.e., his eight children. character of such contract. It is axiomatic that void contracts cannot be the subject of ratification, either
express or implied."41
Seventh Issue: Judgment Must not Only be Clear but Must Also be Complete
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 113199 is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision and
Petitioners bemoan the fact that both the trial and appellate courts granted relief and remedies not prayed Resolution dated March 31, 1992 and December 16, 1993, respectively, of the CA in CA-G.R. CV No.
for by the parties. As argued, Civil Case No. 1292, initiated by the heirs of Benjamin against Tirso, 15805 are hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO. Costs against the petitioners.
basically sought recovery of real properties; while Civil Case No. 1332, a countersuit filed by Tirso, was
SO ORDERED.
for partition and damages, the main thrust of which is to recover his alleged share from properties in the
exclusive possession and enjoyment of other heirs since the death of Don Fabian in 1948. Thus,
petitioners take issue against both decisions of the trial and appellate courts which ordered partition not
only in favor of Tirso but also in favor of the other petitioners he sued. What is particularly appalling,
according to them, is the order for accounting which no one requested.
Petitioners lament, while understandable, is specious. Our judicial system requires courts to apply the
law and grant remedies when appropriately called for by law and justice. In the exercise of this mandate,
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-29759 May 18, 1989 Private respondent, not satisfied with the decision, appealed to respondent Court, and in a Decision
promulgated on August 31, 1968 (Ibid, pp. 61-75), respondent Court reversed the decision of the trial
NATIVIDAD DEL ROSARIO VDA. DE ALBERTO, in her individual capacity and as judicial guardian court. The dispositive portion of the said Decision, reads:
of the minors ANTONIO ALBERTO, JR. and LOURDES ALBERTO, petitioners,
vs. Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and set aside and another
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and ANTONIO J. ALBERTO, JR., assisted by his mother as his rendered declaring plaintiff Antonio J. Alberto, Jr., an acknowledged Natural Child of
natural guardian, ANDREA JONGCO, respondents. the deceased Antonio C. Alberto; declaring said plaintiff the owner pro indiviso of
one-fifth (1/5) of the hereditary estate of Antonio C. Alberto; and ordering the
BIDIN, J.: defendants to deliver to plaintiff Antonio J. Alberto, Jr., his one-fifth (1/5) share in
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the August 31, 1968 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA- said estate, subject to the usufructuary rights of defendants Natividad del Rosario
G.R. No. 34750-R'* entitled "Antonio J. Alberto, Jr., thru his mother as his natural guardian, Andrea Vda. de Alberto pursuant to Articles 834 of the Old Civil Code, and to pay the costs
Jongco, plaintiff-appellant, vs. Natividad del Rosario Vda. de Alberto, in her individual capacity and as of suit.
judicial guardian of the minors, Lourdes Alberto and Antonio Alberto, Jr., defendants-appellees", SO ORDERED.
reversing the August 10, 1964. Decision of the then Court of First Instance of Manila.
On September 24, 1968, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the same was denied in a
The case originated from a complaint for acknowledgment and partition filed on September 8, 1960 with Resolution dated October 14, 1968 (Rollo, p. 77). Hence, the instant petition.
the then Court of First Instance of Manila by the herein private respondent, a minor, 18 years of age,
assisted by his mother, Andrea Jongco, as his natural guardian, against the herein petitioners (Record This Court, in a resolution dated November 27,1968, resolved to give due course to the petition (Rollo,
on Appeal, pp. 2-8). In the said Complaint, private respondent alleged, in substance, that in 1941 his p. 91).
alleged father, Antonio C. Alberto, and his mother, Andrea Jongco, lived together as husband and wife
and as a result of which, he was born on September 10, 1942; that during the time that his alleged father Petitioners assigned the following errors:
and mother lived together as husband and wife and up to the time of his birth, both were single and had I
no legal impediment to marry each other; that after his birth, his father and mother continued living
together as husband and wife, his father supporting them and introducing him to the public as his natural THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE COURT OF FIRST
child; that even the family of his father recognized him as such; that on or about the year 1944, his father INSTANCE OF MANILA (TRIAL COURT) HAD NO JURISDICTION TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF THE
and mother separated, and subsequently, his father married herein petitioner Natividad del Rosario; that INSTANT CASE.
as a result of the marriage, two (2) children were born herein petitioners Lourdes Alberto and Antonio
Alberto, Jr.; that although his father was separated from his mother, he continued to support him and II
recognized him as his own child; that on July 3, 1949, his father died, and without notice to him, petitioner ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO TAKE COGNIZANCE
Natividad del Rosario Vda. de Alberto, on July 17, 1949, instituted before the then Court of First Instance OF THE INSTANT CASE, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
of Manila an intestate proceedings for the estate of his deceased father, docketed therein as Special RESPONDENT ALBERTO JR.'S CAUSE OF ACTION WAS NOT BARRED BY PRIOR JUDGMENT.
Proceedings No. 9092; that in the said intestate proceedings, petitioners deliberately omitted him as one
of the heirs and for this reason they succeeded in having the properties of his deceased father adjudicated III
and partitioned among themselves; that the said intestate proceedings were terminated on November 9,
1953; that his father left properties valued at P74,963.81, and accordingly, as a natural child of his father, ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO TAKE COGNIZANCE
OF THE INSTANT CASE, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
he is entitles to at least P18,000.00; and that he had absolutely no previous knowledge of the intestate
proceedings and came to know about it only recently and thereupon made a demand from the petitioners RESPONDENT ALBERTO JR.'S CAUSE OF ACTION HAD NOT YET PRESCRIBED.
who refused to give him his share. Accordingly, he prays that the petitioners be ordered to acknowledge IV
him as the natural child of Antonio C. Alberto; that his one-fourth share be turned over to him; and that
petitioners be sentenced to pay him the sum of P5,000.00 as attorney's fee and the cost of suit (Record ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO TAKE COGNIZANCE
on Appeals, pp. 2-9). OF THE INSTANT CASE, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT
RESPONDENT ALBERTO, JR., IN NOT BRINGING THE INSTANT ACTION FOR AN UNREASONABLE
On September 21, 1960, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that (1) the cause of action LENGTH OF TIME, WAS GUILTY OF LACHES.
is barred by prior judgment; and (2) that the cause of action is also barred by the statute of limitation (Ibid,
pp. 9-19). To this motion, private respondents filed an opposition on October 22, 1960 (Ibid, pp. 20-58). V

On November 11, 1960, the trial court issued an Order denying the Motion to Dismiss (Ibid, pp. 97-98). ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO TAKE COGNIZANCE
OF THE INSTANT CASE, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GROSSLY ERRED IN
On November 18, 1964, petitioners filed their Answer to the Complaint (Ibid, pp. 98-102). REVERSING THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT BY BASING ITS JUDGMENT ON A
On November 23, 1964, private respondent filed his Answer to Defendants' counterclaim (Ibid, pp. 102- MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS, GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF ANDREA JONGCO
AND OTHER WITNESSES OF RESPONDENT ALBERTO, JR., DESPITE THE SERIOUS
104). On August 10, 1964, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of the petitioners (Ibid, pp. 104-
123). The dispositive portion of the Decision reads: CONTRADICTIONS, INCONSISTENCIES AND IMPROBABILITIES IN THEIR TESTIMONIES AS
FOUND BY THE TRIAL COURT AND CATEGORICALLY STATED IN ITS DECISION.
Considering all the foregoing, the Court orders the dismissal of the complaint without
VI
pronouncement as to the costs. The counterclaim is also dismissed.
ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO TAKE COGNIZANCE or judge to throw out a decision or order already final and executed and reshuffle properties long ago
OF THE INSTANT CASE, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GROSS ERROR distributed and disposed of (Ramon vs. Ortuzar, supra; Santos vs. Roman Catholic Bishop of Nueva
OF LAW AND A GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT ARBITRARILY AND CAPRICIOUSLY Caceres 45 Phil. 895).
DISREGARDED PETITIONERS' EVIDENCE.
III.
VII
As to the issue of prescription, the Civil Code of the Philippines clearly provides:
ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION TO TAKE COGNIZANCE
OF THE INSTANT CASE, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT Art. 1100. The action for rescission on account of lesion shall prescribe after four
RESPONDENT ALBERTO, JR., WAS AN ACKNOWLEDGED NATURAL CHILD OF THE DECEASED years from the time the partition was made.
ALBERTO AND IN DECLARING HIM OWNER PRO-INDIVISO OF ONE-FIFTH OF THE HEREDITARY Intestate proceedings were terminated as alleged in the complaint itself on November 9, 1953 so that
ESTATE OF THE DECEASED. said four years prescriptive period expired on November 9,1957. Hence, the present action filed on
I. September 8, 1960 and which has for one of its objects the rescission of the agreement of partition among
the petitioners, as approved by the intestate court, is already barred by prescription.
It is the contention of petitioners that inasmuch as the instant case was filed on September 8, 1960,
almost five (5) years after the enactment of R.A. No. 1401 creating the Juvenile and Domestic That an action for rescission is also the proper action in case of an alleged preterition of a compulsory
Relations Court, the questions of paternity and acknowledgment fall beyond the jurisdictional pale of the heir by reason of alleged bad faith or fraud of the other persons interested, which is what the complaint
Court of First Instance of Manila and instead comes within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Juvenile in this case alleges in substance, is indicated in Article 1104 of the Civil Code as follows:
and Domestic Relations Court. While petitioners admitted that this objection to lack of jurisdiction by the Art. 1104. A partition made with preterition of any of the compulsory heirs shall not
Court of First Instance of Manila over the subject matter of the present action had not been raised either be rescinded, unless it be proved that there was bad faith or fraud on the part of the
in the said court or in the Court of Appeals and is brought to this Court for resolution for the first time on other persons interested; ...
appeal, they contend that a party may object to the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter of the
action at any stage of the proceedings, even for the first time on appeal since lack of jurisdiction of the It has also been ruled by this Court that the four years period provided in Article 1100 of the Civil Code
court over the subject matter cannot be waived. Such contention is untenable. (formerly Art. 1076 of the old Civil Code) should commence to run from the approval of the agreement of
partition by the Court (Samson vs. Araneta, 60 Phil. 27, 36). Thus, in the case at bar, it is evident that the
This Court has already ruled that the question of jurisdiction not raised in the trial court cannot be raised action to rescind the Agreement of Partition which was approved by the Court on November 9, 1953, had
on appeal (Dalman vs. City Court of Dipolog City, Branch II, 134 SCRA 243 [1985]). Besides, a party who already prescribed when respondent filed the complaint in the case at bar on September 8, 1960.
had voluntarily participated in the trial, like the herein petitioners, cannot later on raise the issue of the
court's lack of jurisdiction (Philippine National Bank vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 143 SCRA 299 While as a general rule the action for partition among co-owners does not prescribe so long as the co-
[1986]; Royales vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 143 SCRA 470 [1984]; Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, 23 ownership is expressly or impliedly recognized (Art. 494, Civil Code), petitioners herein had never
SCRA 29 [1968]). Moreover, there are no more Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts today. Under recognized respondent as a co-owner or co-heir either expressly or impliedly. Consequently, the rule on
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the functions of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court have been non-prescription of action for partition of property owned in common (Art. 494) does not apply to the case
transferred to the Regional Trial Courts (Divinagracia vs. Bellosillo, 143 SCRA 356 [1986]). at bar.
II. Moreover, private respondent cannot claim exemption from the effects of prescription on the plea of
minority under the New Civil Code which provides:
Petitioners alleged that the intestate proceedings for the settlement of estate of the deceased Antonio C.
Alberto (Special Proceedings No. 9092) had already been terminated on November 9, 1953 by the order Art. 1108. Prescription, both acquisitive and extinctive, runs against: (1) Minors and
of distribution directing the delivery of the residue of the estate to the persons entitled thereto and that in other incapacitated persons who have parents, guardians or other legal
said proceedings the court also declared who are the heirs of the deceased. Consequently, the instant representatives:
case which seeks to secure the recognition of Antonio J. Alberto, Jr. as an acknowledged natural child of
the deceased in order to establish his rights to the inheritance is already barred by prior judgment xxxxxxxxx
(Petitioners' Brief, p. 47) despite private respondent's insistence that he had no knowledge or notice of Respondent Alberto, Jr. who has a living parent, his mother, Andrea Jongco, who in fact filed the
the intestate proceedings of his alleged natural father (Record on Appeal, p. 21). complaint in the case at bar for him, falls squarely under the above-cited provision.
Petitioners' submission is impressed with merit. Granting arguendo that respondent is a natural child of the deceased Antonio Alberto, Sr., the action for
This Court has invariably ruled that insolvency proceedings and settlement of a decedent's estate are recognition of natural child may be brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parent. And if the
both proceedings in rem which are binding against the whole world. All persons having interest in the presumed father or mother died during the minority of the child, the latter may file the action within four
subject matter involved, whether they were notified or not, are equally bound (Philippine Savings Bank (4) years from the attainment of majority (Art. 285 [1]). However, if the minor has a guardian as in this
vs. Lantin, 124 SCRA 483 [1983]). The court acquires jurisdiction over all persons interested, through the case, prescription runs against him even during minority (Wenzel etc., et al. vs. Surigao Consolidated
publication of the notice prescribed ... and any order that may be entered therein is binding against all of Mining, Inc., 108 Phil. 530 [1960]). In such case, the action for recognition must be instituted within four
them (Ramon vs. Ortuzar, 89 Phil. 741 [1951] citing in re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156). It was ruled (4) years after the death of the natural father (Magallanes, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 95 Phil. 795
further that a final order of distribution of the estate of a deceased person vests the title to the land of the [1954]). Antonio C. Alberto, Sr., the alleged father, died on July 3, 1949. The complaint for
estate in the distributees; and that the only instance where a party interested in a probate proceeding acknowledgment and partition was filed eleven (11) years later, on September 8, 1960. Hence,
may have a final liquidation set aside is when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control prescription had set in.
or through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence. Even then, the better practice to secure Neither can it be claimed that the present action is in substance one for recovery of property in order to
relief is reopening of the same case by proper motion within the reglementary period, instead of an avoid the consequences of prescription, for as correctly stated by the petitioners, to be entitled to the
independent action, the effect of which, if successful, would be, as in the instant case, for another court
recovery of the property from the estate, Alberto, Jr. must first rescind the partition and distribution of the doctrine long familiar in equity jurisprudence to the effect that laches or
approved by the intestate proceedings, otherwise, the recovery of any property from the petitioners is not unreasonable delay on the part of a plaintiff in seeking to enforce a right is not only
possible. Be that as it may, such partition can no longer be rescinded having been already barred by the persuasive of a want of merit but may, according to the circumstances, be destructive
Statute of Limitations. of the right itself. Vigilantibus non dormientibus equites subvenit (Buenaventura vs.
David, 37 Phil. 435, reiterated in Edralin vs. Edralin, 1 SCRA 227 [1961]).
Furthermore, even granting that Article 1104 of the Civil Code does not apply and there is an injury to the
rights of plaintiff, tills action would still not prosper under Articles 1146 and 1149 of the same Code which The other explanation might have been the minority of Antonio Alberto, Jr. at the time of his supposed
provide that the action must be brought within four and five years, respectively, from the time the right of father's death. But such explanation as discussed earlier is unavailing even in case of prescription under
action accrues. Article 1108 of the Civil Code where minority does not stop the running of the prescriptive period for
minors who have parents, guardians or legal representatives.
IV
Thus, it is well established that "The law serves those who are vigilant and diligent and not those who
Petitioners' claim of laches is likewise tenable. The trial court in its findings clearly and unmistakably sleep when the law requires them to act (Cui and Joven vs. Henson, 51 Phil. 606, 610; Bacolod-Murcia
declared that respondent Alberto, Jr. is guilty of laches as follows: Milling Co. vs. Villaluz, Sept. 29, 1951, 90 Phil. 154)." The law does not encourage laches, indifference,
About 1944, Andrea Jongco said she learned of Antonio Alberto's marriage to negligence or ignorance. On the contrary, for a party to deserve the considerations of the courts, he...
Natividad del Rosario. Yet, she took no steps to protect the interests of her child, must show that he is not guilty of any of the aforesaid failings (Samson vs. Yateo, August 28,1958; 104
Antonio, although she was already confronted with the incontrovertible proof of PMI. 378).
Antonio's infidelity and the hallowness of his promises. V.
It might be that Andrea Jongco was then relying on Antonio Alberto's not denying Finally on the merits of this case, petitioners would have this Court review and reverse the conclusions
that Alberto, Jr. was his child, if such was the case. If this was so, however, how can of fact of the Court of Appeals. As a general rule, this is a function this Court does not undertake. The
we explain her inaction even after the death of Antonio Alberto in 1949, or until established principle is that the factual findings of the Court of Appeals are final and may not be reviewed
September 8, 1960, when she filed this action, Andrea kept silent, took no action to on appeal to this Court; except: (1) when the conclusion is grounded entirely on speculation, surmises
have her child recognized as the son of the alleged father. Her laches, as well as the and conjectures; (2) when the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd and impossible; (3) where there
inherent improbabilities in her testimony rendered it unworthy of belief. is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the
... It is evident that the plaintiff's case is adversely affected by his long delay in Court in making its findings went beyond the issues of the case, and the same are contrary to the
bringing this action. 'Undue delay in the separate enforcement of a right is strongly admissions of both the apellant and the appellee; (6) when the findings of the Appellate Court are contrary
persuasive of lack of merit in this claim, since it is human nature for a person to to those of the trial court; (7) when the findings are without citation of specific evidence on which they are
assert his rights most strongly when they are threatened or invaded. (Buenaventura based (Manlapaz vs. C.A., 147 SCRA 238-239 [1987]; Guita vs. C.A., 139 SCRA 576 [1985]; Sacay vs.
vs. David, 37 Phil. 435-440). (Record on Appeal, pp. 108-109). Sandiganbayan, 147 SCRA 593 [1986]).

This Court has consistently declared that laches is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and It is readily evident that this case falls within one of the recognized exceptions to the rule, specifically that
unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done the findings of the Appellate Court are contrary to those of the trial court.
earlier. The negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warrants a presumption At the trial, the lower court in evaluating the evidence presented by the complainants is of the view that
that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it (Corro vs. Lising, 137 the testimony alone of Andrea Jongco is sufficient to totally discredit not only her testimony but also her
SCRA 541 [1985]; Tendo vs. Zamacoma, 138 SCRA 78 [1985]; De Castro vs. Tan, 129 SCRA 85 [1984]; entire case. Aside from being inherently improbable and the merit of her claim being adversely affected
Medija vs. Patcho, 132 SCRA 540 [1984]; Burgos, Sr. vs. Chief of Staff, Armed Forces of the Phil., 133 by her testimony and her long delay in bringing action, her testimony is contradicted by the testimonies
SCRA 800 [1984]; Gumonpin vs. CA, 120 SCRA 687 [1983]). of Jose, Zoilo and Pilar who are brothers and sister of the deceased Antonio Alberto and who have no
As pointed out by the trial court, there appears to be no explanation for the surprising delay in the filing pecuniary interest whatsoever in the outcome of the controversy. They testified that during the period
of the complaint in the case at bar except perhaps, the fact that during the lifetime of the deceased Antonio Andrea Jongco claimed that Antonio Alberto, Sr. lived with her, the deceased in fact lived with his mother
Alberto, private respondents were receiving support until the latter died in 1949; but thereafter, they and brothers at the family residence except for his brief stint with the army (Decision, Civil Case No.
allowed more than ten years to elapse or until September 8, 1960 before they filed the present action to 44164; Record on appeal, pp. 111-112).
assert their rights despite Andrea Jongco's allegation that they stopped receiving support after Alberto, More than that, the trial court found among others, that Andrea Jongco has had five children (aside from
Sr.'s death. her son Antonio) with four different men. The assumption, therefore, is that she lived with at least four
On the other hand, there is merit in petitioners' allegations that such delay is prejudicial to them. Private different men without being married to any of them. Thus, the trial court aptly ruled that his propensity to
respondents could have filed the action in 1944 when Andrea Jongco learned of the marriage of the promiscuous relationship with different men, render it unjust to state with definiteness that any particular
deceased with petitioner Natividad del Rosario instead of waiting for 16 years when the supposed father's person is the father of any one of her children." (Ibid, p. 121).
lips had been sealed by death and possible witnesses like Antonio Alberto, Sr.'s mother had become too Other witnesses are Eufracia Cailan who allegedly took care of Antonio, the father, since the latter was
old to give coherent testimony. a child and then of Antonio, the alleged son, and Encarnacion Peralta, an alleged former lessor of Andrea
On this point, the Supreme Court ruled: Jongco and Antonio Alberto. Their testimonies were, however, found by the trial court to be inherently
improbable, inconsistent with human experience and deliberately invented to conform with the testimony
The assertion of doubtful claims, after long delay, cannot be favored by the courts. of Andrea Jongco (Ibid, pp. 109-117).
Time inevitably tends to obliterate occurrences from the memory of witnesses, and
even where the recollection appears to be entirely clear, the true clue to the solution On the other hand, the Court of Appeals in its decision gave more credence to the testimonies of Eufracia
of a case may be hopelessly lost. These considerations constitute one of the pillars Cailan and Encarnacion Peralta and declared that their testimonies have sufficiently established the fact
that Antonio J. Alberto, Jr. is the son of the late Antonio C. Alberto and Andrea Jongco which finds further
proof in the birth certificate and the baptismal certificate of Alberto, Jr. (Rollo, pp. 6-11).
In this connection, it must be stated that in the case of Reyes vs. Court of Appeals, 135 SCRA 439 (1985),
this Court, citing the cases of Bercilles vs. GSIS, 128 SCRA 53; People vs. Villeza, 127 SCRA 349; Cid
vs. Burnaman, 24 SCRA 434; Vudaurrazaga vs. C.A., 91 Phil. 492; and Capistrano vs. Gabino, 8 Phil.
135, ruled that a birth certificate not signed by the alleged father therein indicated, like in the instant case,
is not competent evidence of paternity.
In casting doubt upon the credibility of petitioner Natividad's testimony, the Court of Appeals pointed out
her serious inconsistency on material points such as her claim that she was married to the deceased in
1941 and her later admission in the answer that they were married in 1944.
The record shows, however, that both admissions were correct, the first marriage was a secret civil
marriage celebrated in Pililla, Rizal while the second was a religious ratification of the former. The lack of
marriage certificate as evidence was also considered by the Court of Appeals as an impairment of
credibility despite a certification to the effect that all pre-war records in the Municipality of Pililla, Rizal
were destroyed during the last war. Said Appellate Court is of the view that if they did plan to marry
secretly at that time, they could have chosen a city or municipality near Manila and that Pililla must have
been chosen as the place of the supposed marriage so that petitioners could have an apparent good
reason for the non-presentation of the marriage certificate.
As aptly argued by the petitioners, such conclusion is purely conjectural. Besides petitioners' reasons for
the choice of that place, the celebration of the marriage was positively confirmed by Damaso Herrera,
one of the sponsors thereof.
In any event, it is a fundamental rule that conclusions and findings of fact by the trial court are entitled to
great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed unless for strong and cogent reasons because the
trial court is in a better position to examine real evidence, as well as to observe the demeanor of the
witnesses while testifying in the case (People vs. Pimentel, 147 SCRA 29, 30 [19871; People vs. Grefiel,
125 SCRA 108 [1983]; Chase vs. Buencamino, 136 SCRA 381 [1985]; People vs. Fernandez, 124 SCRA
248 (1983]; Olangco vs. C.F.I. of Misamis Oriental, 121 SCRA 338 [1983]; Minuchechi vs. C.A., 129
SCRA 479 [1984]).
After a careful review of the records and the evidence presented by the contending parties, no cogent
reasons could be found to justify the reversal of the findings of the trial court.
In view of the foregoing, there appears to be no need to discuss the last two assignments of errors.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby Reversed and the decision of the
trial court is Reinstated. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-51914 June 6, 1990 Cristina claims that upon the death of her grandparents, Sps. Juan and Florencia, her mother Victorina
and her aunt, Maria, became co-owners or co-heirs of the litigated parcels of land. Upon the death of her
MARIA BICARME assisted by her husband JOSE BALUBAR, petitioner, mother, Victorina, Cristina became co-heirs with Maria, having inherited the share and interest of her
vs. mother corresponding to one-half of the two parcels of land.
COURT OF APPEALS and CRISTINA BICARME, respondents.
Cristina instituted this action for partition, because her aunt, Maria, refused to share with her the yearly
MEDIALDEA, J.: fruits of the disputed parcels of land. Maria, however, maintains that "she acquired these two parcels of
This petition seeks to set aside the appealed decision of the lower court 1 as affirmed by the appellate land in 1925 (cornland) and 1926 (riceland) from the deceased spouses Placido Bidaya and Margarita
court on August 28, 1979, directing the amicable partition of two parcels of land between Cristina Bicarme Bose and since then until the present, had been in open, public, peaceful, continuous, adverse
(private respondent) and her aunt Maria Bicarme (petitioner), as well as the Resolution, dated October 5, possession and enjoyment and in the concept of absolute owner thereof Maria further claims that Cristina,
1979, denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration. her niece, never shared or contributed to the payment of taxes of said two parcels of land; and, finally,
that Cristina Bicarme was presumed already dead" (p. 35, Record on Appeal).
The affirmed decision of the lower court, rendered on December 22, 1975, disposes as follows:
In ruling Maria and Cristina to be co-heirs, the trial court relied on a provision separately stated in three
(a) That Maria Bicarme and Cristina Bicarme are the only surviving co-heirs and co-owners and deeds of sale executed by Maria as follows:
entitled in equal shares over the parcel of land in litigation and described under paragraph 3 of
the complaint; That I am the sole and absolute owner over the above described cornland having acquired the
same by inheritance from my late father Juan Bicarme;" (See Exhibits '4', '5', '6', and '7' or Exhibits
(b) That the alleged deeds of Sale executed by Maria Bicarme covering and affecting the two 'A-1,' 'B-1,' 'C-1', and 'D-1'; (p. 37, Record on Appeal, emphasis supplied)
parcels of land in suit are declared null and void in so far (sic) as they affect and/or cover the one-
half undivided share and inheritance of plaintiff Cristina Bicarme; The trial court stated that the provision was in the nature of a trust provision in favor of Cristina as a co-
owner/co-heir.
(c) Maria Bicarme is ordered to account and/or pay the value corresponding to the one-half ()
undivided shares of Cristina Bicarme in the yearly fruits of the land and to commence from the We agree. By admitting that the cornland is inherited property, Maria, in effect, recognized Cristina's lights
filing of this complaint; that is seventy five bundles of palay valued at P375.00 with legal interest thereto as a co-heir/co-owner. As the trial court theorized:
fully paid; xxx xxx xxx
(d) That the parties are hereby ordered within (15) days from receipt of this decision to amicably (6) That Victorina Bicarme and Maria Bicarme never partitioned even orally the two parcels of
agree upon a written partition and to submit the same for approval, parties shall appoint a lands which were then owned in common by them;
Commissioner to effect and carry out effectively the partition of the 2 parcels of land in equal
parts between the plaintiff and the defendant; (7) . That even after the death of Victorina Bicarme, the land in suit remained undivided and were
therefore in the possession of Maria Bicarme because her niece Cristina Bicarme went to Manila
(e) Defendant and her hirelings and representatives are forever ordered to refrain from molesting and now married and presently residing at No. 22, 11th Avenue, Grace Park, Caloocan City.
the Commissioner in the discharge of his duty to partition said two (2) parcels of land in suit;
(8) That without the knowledge and consent of Cristina Bicarme who was then of legal age, her
(f) And, Defendant to pay Attorney's fee and cost of this suit. aunt Maria Bicarme executed on April 27, 1973 a Deed of absolute Sale (Exhibit 'A') in favor of
SO ORDERED. (pp. 40-41, Record on Appeal) Marina Pizarro who acquired portion No. 3 of the cornland; on the same date she also executed
another Deed of Sale (Exhibit 'B') in favor of Saturnino Pacopia, who acquired portion No. 2 of
Petitioner-defendant Maria Bicarme appealed. the cornland; and, in June 16, 1965 again Maria Bicarme executed a third Deed of Sale (Exhibit
'C') in favor of Casimira Pacopia, who acquired portion No. 1 of the cornland;
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision; hence, this petition.
(9) That these three (3) separated (sic) Deeds of Sale all executed by Maria Bicarme over the
The main issue in this case dwells on ownership rights over the litigated parcels of land. cornland have a respective total area of 740 square meters, more or less, for portion No. 3; 1,836
As established by the trial court, Sps. Juan Bicarme and Florencia Bidaya were the original co-owners of square meters, more or less for portion No. 2; and 1,265 square meters, more or less for portion
two parcels of land described as follows: No. 1, or a total area of 3,481 square meters more or less;

1. Cornland in Palao, Bangued, Abra, bounded on the North-Hill, on the East-Brono Barbers, on (10) That in these three separate Deeds of Sale, Maria Bicarme expressly provided the aforesaid
the South-Casimiro Palos, and on the West-Clemente Baldozan, of about 8,721 sq. m., assessed trust provision. (pp. 36-37, Record on Appeal, emphasis ours)
at P400.00 under Tax Dee. No. 7764; Despite admission during the hearing on the Identity of the land in question (see p. 21, Record on Appeal),
2. Riceland in Palao, Bangued, Abra, bounded on the North-Macario Bolos, East- Roberto Maria's counsel, on appeal, re-emphasized her original claim that the two parcels of land in her
Bicarme, South-Juliana Baldozan, and West-Telesporo, about 1,539 sq. m., assessed at P 60.00, possession were acquired from the Sps. Placido Biduya and Margarita Bose. However, the private
under Tax Dec. No. 7765; document relative to the purchase, was not produced at the trial, allegedly because "they were placed in
a trunk in their house which were burned during the Japanese Occupation." In 1945, Maria sold the
.... (P. 10, Record on Appeal) riceland. No written evidence was submitted. For all legal intents therefore, the riceland remained
inherited property. The Identity of the cornland as inherited property can no longer be disputed, in view
The spouses died intestate and were survived by three children-Victorina Bicarme, Sebastian Bicarme
of Maria's admission in the deeds of sale she had executed, containing the trust provisions.
and Maria Bicarme. Sebastian Bicarme died when he was a little boy and without any issue. Later,
Victorina Bicarme died intestate, survived by her only daughter, Cristina Bicarme. Having established Cristina's co-ownership rights, Maria nonetheless insists that Cristina's rights are
barred by prescription under Secs. 40 and 41 of Act 190 (Code of Civil Procedure, Article 1116, Civil
Code) then the applicable law, where the longest period of both acquisitive and extinctive prescription evidence thereon must be clear and convincing. (A. Tolentino, Civil Code of the
was only ten years (Diaz v. Garricho, 103 Phil. 261, 266). In the present case, Cristina, it is alleged, Phils., Ann., Vol. 11, p. 193)
asserted her claims 34 years after her right of action accrued, as follows:
In the present case, Maria Bicarme disclaims the co-ownership by denying that subject properties are the
... After Cristina left barrio Palao at the age of eleven (11), she never returned until inherited properties. Other than the tax declarations in her name, there is no written evidence that these
she was twenty two (22) years old and married (pp. 32-34, tsn., Nov. 4, 1974). Upon were acquired/purchased from Sps. Placido Biduya and Margarita Bose. Payment of land taxes does not
her return her grandmother Florencia Bidaya was already dead (p. 33, Id). At that constitute sufficient repudiation of the co-ownership, as it is not an act adverse to Cristina's rights.
time, Cristina claimed her hereditary share in the lands in question but her demands Moreover, Cristina, being a minor, until she claimed her rights, was not even aware thereof. Neither did
were ignored and repudiated by her aunt Maria, Cristina admitted that ever since the Maria make known her repudiation to Cristina, because all along, Maria presumed her to be dead. Her
Japanese occupation when she was already of age, her aunt Maria refused to refusal to share with Cristina the yearly profits stemmed from Cristina's failure to share in the yearly taxes.
recognize her rights to said lands (pp. 41-42, Id.). From that moment when Maria Acquisitive prescription cannot therefore apply in this case:
ignored and repudiated Cristina's hereditary rights, Cristina's right of action already
accrued and the period of prescription began to run. Acts which are adverse to strangers may not be sufficiently adverse to the co-
owners. A mere silent possession by a co-owner, his receipt of rents, fruits or profits
The instant action was filed only in 1974 (p. 1, Record on Appeal), or some 34 years from the property, the erection of buildings and fences and the planting of trees
after it accrued. If she had any rights at all, Cristina slept on her rights. The present thereon, and the payment of land taxes, cannot serve as proof of exclusive
action is unquestionably barred by prescription. (pp. 27-28, Appellants' Brief) ownership, if it is not borne out by clear, complete and conclusive evidence that he
exercised acts of possession which unequivocally constituted an ouster or
Against Maria's claims of acquisitive prescription, the lower court ruled that Maria was as trustee with deprivation of the rights of the other co-owners. (Mangyan v. Ilan, 28 O.G. 62;
respect to Cristina's share. As such, prescription, as a mode of acquiring title, could not apply: Laguna v. Levantino, 40 O.G. (14th Suppl.) 136, cited in A. Tolentino, Civil Code of
A co-owner is a trustee for the other co-owner. No one of the co-owners may acquire the Philippines, Ann., Vol. II, pp. 193- 194)
exclusive ownership of the common property thru prescription for possession by one Additionally, it follows that neither can the doctrine on laches apply, for absent acquisitive prescription,
trustee alone is not deemed adverse to the rest (Castrillo vs. Court of Appeals, 10 (i.e., where it has not been shown that the possession of the claimant has been adverse and exclusive
SCRA 549; Custodio vs. Casiano, 9 SCRA 841 and, Pascual vs. Meneses, 20 SCRA and opposed to the right of the others) the case is not one of ownership, in which case, the doctrine on
219). (p. 6, Rollo) imprescriptibility of an action for partition will apply. Cristina's right to partition wig therefore prosper.
While We agree with the trial court that Maria and Cristina are co-heirs, and that with respect to them Finally, We eliminate the award on attorney's fees in the absence of any specific allegation thereon in her
prescription, as a mode of acquisition, cannot apply, We hasten to elaborate on certain aspects, which complaint, or that the same is covered by any of the eleven (11) exceptions enumerated in Art. 2208 of
need clarification. the New Civil Code. Even if We were to concede exercise of judicial discretion in the award of attorney's
It is correct to say that possession by one co-owner (trustee) is not deemed adverse to the others. In this fees under Art. 2208, par. 11, this provision "demands a factual, legal or equitable justification. Without
sense, an action to compel partition will lie at any time and does not prescribe. It is, however, not legally such justification, the award is a conclusion without a premise, its basis being improperly left to
correct to say that by virtue of the imprescriptibility of an action for partition, prescription as a mode of speculation and conjecture." (Mirasol v. De la Cruz, G.R. L-32552, July 31, 1978; 84 SCRA 337.)
acquiring title, can never be invoked, or in the present case, that Maria, as a co-owner can never acquire Likewise, "the matter of attorney's fees cannot be touched once and only in the dispositive portion of the
the property by prescription. decision. The text itself must expressly state the reason why attorney's fees are being awarded" (ibid). In
the present case, the matter of such fees was touched but once and appears only in the dispositive
An action for partition implies that the thing is still owned in common. If a co-owner or co-heir holds the portion of the decision.
property in exclusive adverse possession as owner, asserting sole and exclusive dominion for the
required period, he can acquire sole title to it as against the co-heirs or co-owners. The imprescriptibility ACCORDINGLY, the petition for review is DENIED and the appealed decision as affirmed by the Court
of an action for partition cannot thus be invoked when one of the co-owners has possessed the property of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED with the modification that the award on attorney's fees is eliminated.
as exclusive owner, and for a period sufficient to acquire it by prescription. From the moment one of the Costs against petitioner. This decision is immediately executory.
co-owners claims that he is the absolute and exclusive owner of the properties and denies the others any SO ORDERED.
share therein, the question involved is no longer one of partition, but of ownership. (A. Tolentino, Civil
Code of the Phil., Ann., Vol. II, pp. 192-193; Bargayo v. Comumot, 40 Phil. 856, at p. 870). In this sense,
the trial court erred in saying that there can be no prescription (as a mode of acquiring title) in favor of a
co-owner/trustee.
Having clarified this issue, the main question to be resolved is whether or not Maria has been in
possession of the lands in question under the conditions required by Section 41 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, as to uphold acquisitive prescription in her favor.
One of the conditions imposed by said section is that the possession must be adverse against the whole
world. In order that a possession may be deemed adverse to the cestui que trust, or the other co-owner
the following must concur:
... (1) that he has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster
of the cestui que trust or other co-owner, (2) that such positive acts of repudiation
have been made known to the cestui que trust or other co-owners, and (3) that the
G.R. No. L-39299 October 18, 1988 the petitioners who were in possession of the land, and Teodora Garcia, their aunt and co-heir, that too,
as we see it, is not an arbitrary assumption.
ISAAC, SEVERINO, MARIA, TELESFORA, FELISA, SERAPIO, SIMEON and MACARIA all
surnamed PANGAN, petitioners, In fact, the Court feels this is the more plausible relationship between the parties, compared to the version
vs. offered by the petitioners, who claim they acquired the property from their grandfather through their father,
COURT OF APPEALS and TEODORA GARCIA, respondents. who apparently acquired it from his mother, Leon Hilario's daughter. It does not appear that they have
pre-empted the other heirs to the property through any other mode of acquisition, like sale or some similar
CRUZ, J.: exclusive transaction. They have not submitted any evidence of how they acquired the land from their
The property in question is a parcel of land with an area of 635 square meters and situated in San great grandfather, confining themselves to the assertion that they have continued his original possession,
Pascual, Obando, Bulacan. 1 It was originally owned by Leon Hilario and is now being disputed between presumably as heirs of their father, who inherited from his mother Silvestra, who was the daughter of
the herein petitioners, who are his great grandchildren by his daughter Silvestra, and the private Hilario. If this be their theory, then they unavoidably must recognize Teodora Garcia's own claim to the
respondent, Teodora Garcia, who is his granddaughter by his daughter Catalina. 2 subject property as she too was an heir, being the daughter of Catalina, who was also a daughter of
Hilario.
In 1964, the petitioners filed an application for the registration of the land in their names by virtue of their
continuous and exclusive possession thereof since 1895, by themselves and their father and grandfather The trial court said, however, that assuming Teodora had the right to the disputed property, the same
before them. After proper notices by publication and posting as required, the trial court issued an order was forfeited by her through extinctive prescription by failure to assert it in time. In its original decision, it
of general default, there being no opposition to the application, and proceeded to hear the evidence of affirmed the petitioners' claim that they had acquired ownership over the whole property by their adverse
the applicants ex-parte. On the basis thereof, the application was approved on March 31, 1966. possession thereof for more than thirty years in concept of owner. Teodora Garcia apparently did not
challenge such ownership and so by her inaction forever lost the right to do so.
On June 8, 1966, the herein private respondent filed a petition to set aside the said decision, which the
trial Court granted, 3 admitting at the same time her opposition to the application and setting the case for The respondent court, rejecting this contention, held that the petitioners' possession was not for their
reception of her evidence. This evidence sought to show that the land was inherited by Leon Hilario's benefit alone but also in favor of Teodora, who was a co-heir with them and therefore also a co-owner of
three children, but the son, Felicisimo, waived his right thereto and thereby made his two sisters, Silvestra the property. In other words, their possession, while adverse to the rest of the world, was not against
and Catalina, its exclusive co-owners. As Catalina's daughter, she was entitled to one-half of the property, Teodora herself, whose share they held in implied trust for her as a co-owner of the land, and whose
the other half going to Silvestra's heirs, the petitioners herein and the latter's fruits their father shared with her occasionally, or at least promised her she would get eventually. The
grandchildren. 4 Court believes that this, too, is not an arbitrary conclusion.

On September 13, 1968, the trial judge issued an order dismissing the opposition and reinstating his To support their claim of exclusive ownership of the entire land, the petitioners stress that the property
original order of March 31,1966. 5 His reason was that whatever rights Teodora might have had over the was declared for taxation purposes in the name of Tomas Pangan, their father, in 1948 and another tax
property had been forfeited by extinctive prescription because she had left the land in 1942 and had not declaration was issued, also in his name, in 1965. Moreover, real estate taxes were paid by them from
since then asserted any claim thereto until 1966. 1908 to 1914, 1930 to 1932, 1956 to 1957, and 1960 to 1965, whereas Teodora Garcia, by her own
admission, never paid any tax at all on the disputed land. 7
On appeal to the respondent court, 6 this decision was reversed on the ground that the appellees had not
clearly proved that they had acquired the property by prescription. Hence, the appellant was entitled to Tax declarations are indicia but not conclusive proof of ownership. 8 If the property was declared in the
one-half of the property as heir, conformably to her opposition in the court a quo. Their motion for name of To as Pangan only, it could be that this was done only for reasons of convenience, more so if it
reconsideration having been denied, they have now come to this Court in a petition for review by certiorari was understood, as the private respondent did, that he was declaring the property not only for himself but
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. for herself also as the other co-owner. As for the admitted fact that Teodora Garcia never actually paid
the real estate taxes, the explanation she gave was that she assumed her share of such taxes was being
The petitioners' position is that the respondent court erred in holding that the private respondent was paid from her share in the fruits of her portion of the land, which she said she was not getting regularly,
entitled to one-half of the land, which she had not lost by extinctive prescription because it was held by much less in full. We hold that this explanation is also plausible enough.
them in trust for her. They also insist that the appealed decision completely disregarded the factual
findings of the trial court that they had acquired the whole land by virtue of their long, continued and But for all this, there is still the question of whether or not Teodora Garcia, by her failure to assert her
adverse possession thereof, which should bar any claim by Teodora to her supposed part ownership. right, allowed the statutory period to lapse, thus enabling the petitioners to perfect their claim of ownership
by acquisitive prescription and so exclude her from her share in the subject property.
It is stressed at the outset that the appellate court is not necessarily bound by the factual findings of the
trial court simply because the latter had the opportunity to observe the witnesses directly and assess their It is a settled rule that possession by one co-owner will not be regarded as adverse to the other co-owners
credibility by their deportment. While this may be a conceded advantage of the trial judge, the appellate but in fact as beneficial to all of them. 9 Hence, as long as his co-ownership is recognized, an action to
court may still reverse his findings of fact if they are not based on the evidence submitted or have been compel partition will not prescribe and may be filed at any time against the actual possessor by any of
reached without considering the other matters of record that might have dictated a different conclusion. the other co-owners. 10 However, if the co-owner actually holding the property asserts exclusive dominion
The Court of Appeals precisely is vested with jurisdiction to review questions of fact as decided by the over it against the other co-owners, the corollary of the rule is that he can acquire sole title to it after the
lower court. It would be evading this responsibility if it should merely adopt the findings in the decision lapse of the prescribed prescriptive period. From that moment, the question involved will be one of
under review on the convenient justification that the trial judge had the opportunity, which it did not have, ownership and no longer mere partition. 11
of gauging the reliability of the witnesses first-hand. According to the petitioners, there was such repudiation which was admitted by the private respondent
When, therefore, the respondent court accepted the private respondent's allegation that the land was herself Testifying for herself at the hearing on her opposition in the registration proceedings, she
inherited by the parties from their common ancestor, Leon Hilario, such a finding, based on the record declared:
and not rejected but even assumed by the trial court, did not, in our view, constitute grave abuse of ATTY. CANLAS:
discretion. And when, on the strength of this finding, it then held that an implied trust was created between
Q: After the death of Tomas Pangan, did you ask the heirs of There is clear repudiation of a trust when one who is an apparent administrator of
Tomas Pangan of your alleged share in the property in property causes the cancellation of the title thereto in the name of the apparent
question? beneficiaries and gets a new certificate of title in his own name. 19
A: Yes, sir. It is only when the defendants, alleged co-owners of the property in
question, executed a deed of partition and on the strength thereof obtained the
Q: What did they tell you? cancellation of the title in the name of their predecessor and the issuance of a new
A: They said that I have no right to a share and they won't give me my share. one wherein they appear as the new owners of a definite area each, thereby in effect
denying or repudiating the ownership of one of the plaintiffs over his alleged share
Q: How many years ago did you ask from them? in the entire lot, that the statute of limitations started to run for the purposes of the
action instituted by the latter seeking a declaration of the existence of the co-
A: Immediately after the death of their father. ownership and of their rights thereunder. 20
Q: That was some 20 years ago? The established evidence clearly shows that the subject land was inherited by the petitioners and the
A: I do not know how many years ago. private respondent as co-heirs of their common ancestor, Leon Hilario, whose possession they continued
to acquire prescriptive title over the property. That possession was originally in the name of all the heirs,
Q: And during all that span of more than 20 years ago you did including Teodora Garcia, who in fact had been assured by Tomas Pangan, the petitioners' father, that
not file any action to recover your share on the land in question? she would get the share to which she was entitled. The petitioners have not proved that their possession
excluded their co-owner and aunt or that they derived their title from a separate conveyance to them of
A: No sir, it was only this time . 12 the property by Leon Hilario. Parenthetically, such a conveyance, if it existed, would be questionable as
For title to prescribe in favor of the co-owner, however, there must be a clear showing that he has it might have deprived Leon's other children of their legitime. In any case, the petitioners appear to have
repudiated the claims of the other co-owners and that they have been categorically advised of the arrogated the entire property to themselves upon their father's death sometime in 1942 or at the latest in
exclusive claim he is making to the property in question. It is only when such unequivocal notice has been 1965 when they sought to register the land in their names to the exclusion of Teodora Garcia. The
given that the period of prescription will begin to run against the other co-owners and ultimately divest question is, Did such an act begin the period of extinctive prescription against the private respondent?
them of their own title if they do not seasonably defend it. 13
Manifestly, the petitioners have acted in bad faith in denying their aunt and co-heir her legal share to the
Adverse possession requires the concurrence of the following circumstances: property they had all inherited from Leon Hilario through their respective parents. This is regrettable as
Teodora Garcia is their father's first cousin who apparently trusted him and, indeed, relied on his promise
1. That the trustee has performed unequivocal acts amounting to an ouster of the cestui que trust; that her share would be protected. Tomas Pangan presumably was sincere in this assurance, but it was
unfortunately not honored by his children upon his death for they soon dismissed out of hand Teodora
2. That such positive acts of repudiation had been made known to the cestui que trust; and
Garcia's claim to the subject property.
3. That the evidence thereon should be clear and conclusive. 14
In cases where there is a clear showing of imposition and improper motives, the courts must be vigilant
On the basis of the evidence presented by the parties, the Court is not convinced that the above in the protection of the rights of the exploited. 21 So said the respondent court, and we agree, We note
requirements have been satisfied. Although there are admittedly some precedents to the contrary, it that the private respondent "is a poor and ignorant 62-year old widow" * whose misplaced trust in her
would appear that the weight of authority requires a categorical and final rejection of the co-owners' claim, nephews and nieces is being used now precisely to defeat her claim to the share that she believes is
usually manifested by a formal legal action, to make the prescriptive period start to run against the rightfully hers. It is a sorry spectacle, indeed, to see her own close kin longing up on her, so to speak, to
claimant. Thus deprive her of her small heritage, and in her old age at that.

Filing by a trustee of an action in court against the trustor to quiet title to property, or With all this in mind, we affirm the finding of the respondent court that there was no adequate notice by
for recovery of ownership thereof, held in possession by the former, may constitute the petitioners to the private respondent of the rejection of her claim to her share in the subject property.
an act of repudiation of the trust reposed on him by the latter. 15 Noticeably absent here is a categorical assertion by the petitioners of their exclusive right to the entire
property that barred her own claim of ownership of one-half thereof nor is there any explanation as to
The issuance of the certificate of title would constitute an open and clear repudiation why they said she had no right to a share. If this trusting woman did not immediately take legal action to
of any trust, and the lapse of more than 20 years, open and adverse possession as protect her rights, it was simply because of forbearance toward her nephews and nieces, let alone the
owner would certainly suffice to vest title by prescription. 16 fact that there was really no cases belli as yet that required her to act decisively. That legal provocation
arose only when the petitioners commenced the registration proceedings in 1965, and it was from that
An action for the reconveyance of land based on implied or constructive trust
time she was required to act, as she did, to protect her interests.
prescribes within 10 years. And it is from the date of the issuance of such title that
the effective assertion of adverse title for purposes of the statute of limitation is In an earlier case 22 we stressed that this Court is not only a court of law but also of justice. Faced with a
counted. 17 choice between a decision that will serve justice and another that will deny it because of a too strict
interpretation of the law, we must resolve in favor of the former, for the ultimate end of the law is
The prescriptive period may only be counted from the time petitioners repudiated the
justice. Bonus judex secundum aequum at bonum judicat stricto juri praefert. 23 This is a wise maxim we
trust relation in 1956 upon the filing of the complaint for recovery of
will follow here in ruling for the deprived and ignorant old widow.
possession against private respondents so that the counterclaim of the private
respondents contained in their amended answer wherein they asserted absolute WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the challenged decision AFFIRMED in full, with costs against
ownership of the disputed realty by reason of the continuous and adverse the petitioners. It is so ordered.
possession of the same is well within the 10-year prescriptive period. 18
G.R. No. 169356 August 28, 2007 Fangonil, obtained a loan secured by a mortgage over a 15,364 square meter middle portion of the sixth
parcel of land for 1,450.00, executed under a Deed of Mortgage 6 in favor of Francisca Saguitan on 20
CARMEN FANGONIL - HERRERA, Petitioner, April 1949. A portion of the sixth parcel, with an area of 4,375 square meters, was sold with a right to
vs. repurchase to a certain Constantino Oribello for 1,450.00 on 15 December 1953. The transaction was
TOMAS FANGONIL, PURA FANGONIL TINO, MARINA FANGONIL, MARIANO FANGONIL, under an agreement designated as a Deed of Pacto de Retro Sale7 between Maria Lloren Fangonil, who
MILAGROS FANGONIL-LAYUG and VICTORIA FANGONIL ESTOQUE,1 Respondents. was a widow by then, and Constantino Oribello. On the other hand, the seventh parcel of land was sold,
DECISION with a right to repurchase, by Fabian Fangonil to Quirino Estacio under an agreement denominated as
Deed of Sale with Pacto de Retro8 on 12 December 1949 for 2,600.00. The total amount received by
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.: the Fangonil spouses for the properties was 5,500.00.
In this instant Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, petitioner assails the (a) The parcels above-mentioned were never repurchased or redeemed by the Fangonil spouses. Prior to
Decision issued by the Court of Appeals dated 30 January 2004 in CA-G.R. CV No. 61990, and (b) the foreclosure, the portion of the sixth parcel covered by a Deed of Mortgage was released from the
Resolution of the same Court dated 15 July 2005 denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. mortgage on 20 April 1956 upon petitioners payment of 1,950.00 to Francisca Suguitan. The portion of
Petitioner urges this Court to modify the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the the sixth parcel covered by the Deed of Pacto de Retro Sale was repurchased on 16 October 1956 upon
Decision dated 9 October 1998 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Agoo, La Union, Branch 31 in Special petitioners payment of 1,550.00 to Constantino Oribello. On the other hand, the seventh parcel subject
Proceedings Case No. A-806 for Judicial Partition. The petition prays that the two parcels of land, one of the Deed of Sale with Pacto de Retro was repurchased by petitioner on 13 November 1959 upon the
located in Magsaysay, Tubao, La Union, more particularly described as: payment of 2,600.00 to Quirino Estacio. Petitioner paid the total amount of 6,100.00 for the redemption
of parcels 6 and 7.
A parcel of rice land which the middle portion (15,364 sq. m) has been included and situated in Barrio
Lloren, Tubao, La Union, declared under Tax Dec. Number 2889. Bounded on the North, by the property On 14 November 1983, the parties executed an Extrajudicial Settlement and Partial Partition of the estate
of Manuel Ordoa; on the East, by the property of Severino Padilla, Nicolas Caniero, and Heirs of V. of the Fangonil spouses covering the seven parcels of land. Although petitioner signed the extrajudicial
Selga; on the South, by the properties of Manuel Ordoa and Francisco Padilla; and on the West, by a settlement, she refused to accede to the proposed manner of partition of parcel 1. Thereafter, all the heirs
river; containing an area of more than two hectares; x x x.2 concerned, except petitioner, executed a joint affidavit dated 19 December 1994, stipulating on the
partition of parcel 1. On 2 February 1995 or 11 years after the execution of the extrajudicial settlement,
and the other in San Nicholas East, Agoo, La Union, designated as: petitioner executed an affidavit9 refuting the portions pertaining to parcels 6 and 7, on the ground that her
A parcel of unirrigated rice land without permanent improvements, situated in Barrio San Nicolas, Agoo, late brother Sinforoso Fangonil who was a Regional Trial Court (RTC) Judge then, committed
La Union with an area of 10,777 sq. m. (1 Ha. 1,777 sq. m.) more or less, visible by signs of pilapiles misrepresentation and convinced her to sign the said settlement.
around its perimeter, assessed at 400.00, declared for tax purposes in my name under Tax Declaration On 1 March 1995, six of the seven children of the Fangonil spouses, excluding herein petitioner,
Number 6373, and bounded-on the North, by Donato Eslao; on the East, by the Heirs of Flaviano filed with the RTC a petition for judicial partition of the seven parcels of land, with prayer for
Fangonil, and others; on the South, by Eulalio Fangonil; and on the West, by the heirs of Remgio Boado; appointment of Marina Fangonil as administratrix. The case was docketed as Special
x x x.3 Proceedings Case No. A-806. Petitioner intervened before the trial court to oppose the petition.
be adjudged solely to petitioner to the exclusion of respondents. In addition, petitioner requests that She likewise prayed that she be appointed administratrix, claiming exclusive ownership over
another parcel of land located in Poblacion, Tubao, La Union, be divided in accordance with the manner parcels 6 and 7.
she proposes. The parties agreed to submit the case for decision based on the pleadings, considering there
The following are the antecedent facts: was no disagreement as to the manner of sharing Parcels 2, 3, 4, and 5 of the estate. In
addition, on 16 September 1996, the respondent heirs deposited in court 7,453.00 10 as
Petitioner and respondents4 are children of the late Fabian Fangonil and Maria Lloren Fangonil5 of Tubao, payment to petitioner and her brother Tomas Fangonil as the only outstanding debtors of the
La Union. The Fangonil spouses had 7 children: Tomas, Pura, Marina, Mariano, Milagros, Sinforoso, and estate as specified in the 14 November 1983 extrajudicial settlement. On 2 September 1998,
Carmen. Fabian died on 1 June 1953, while Maria Lloren died on February 1976. The spouses died respondents, through counsel, submitted a Manifestation/Motion dated 31 August 1998,
intestate, leaving an estate consisting of 7 parcels of land herein specified: proposing a manner of computation for repayment to petitioner, the pertinent portions of which
read:
Parcel 1 a 1,800 square meter residential land located at Poblacion, Tubao, La Union, which is facing
the Town Plaza; 3. That the currency rate of the Philippine Peso to the U.S. Dollar on November 13, 1959 is
3.90 to U.S. $1.00;
Parcel 2 a 922 square meter residential lot located at Barangay Sta. Barbara, Agoo, La Union;
4. That the currency rate of the Philippine Peso to the U.S. Dollar as of this date August 31,
Parcel 3 a 54,759 square meter agricultural land located at Francia West, Tubao, La Union;
1998 is 42.00 to U.S. $1.00;
Parcel 4 an 84,737 square meter agricultural land located at Francia West, Tubao, La Union; 5. So that the amount of indebtedness of 6,100.00 on November 13, 1959 has now the
Parcel 5 a 5,821 square meter parcel of agricultural land located at Francia Sur, Tubao, La Union; equivalent of 65,790.00 as of 31 August 1998;

Parcel 6 a 17,958 square meter parcel of agricultural land located at Magsaysay, Tubao, La Union; 5.1 The equivalent amount of 65,790.00 shall be proportionately paid by all the heirs with
each and every heir having a share in said indebtedness in the amount of 9,398.57;11
Parcel 7 9,127 square meter parcel of agricultural land located at San Nicolas East, Agoo, La Union.
On 7 October 1998, the RTC issued an Order generally approving the manifestation/motion except for
The only remaining heirs are the 7 children. Prior to an extrajudicial settlement executed by the heirs in the computation, modifying the amount to 138,100.00 as the present equivalent of the amount of
1983, there was never any settlement of the estate. The parties do not dispute that the succeeding 6,100.00 previously paid by petitioner to redeem parcels 6 and 7. In its Decision12 dated 9 October 1998,
transactions involving parcels 6 and 7 took place. Fabian Fangonil, with the consent of Maria Lloren the RTC ruled in favor of respondents herein and declared parcels 6 and 7 as part of the estate of the
spouses Fangonil to be partitioned and ordered the partition of parcel 1 based on the manner proposed Lot 2 Sinforoso Fangonil
by respondents. It ordered the payment of the estate debt to petitioner and her brother in the amount of Lot 3 Tomas Fangonil
138,100.00, the money equivalent of the 6,100.00 paid by her at the time of redemption of parcels 6 Lot 4 Marina Fangonil
and 7. The dispositive portion of the decision reads: Lot 5 Carmen F. Herrera (boycotted the draw)
Lot 6 Mariano Fangonil
WHEREFORE, upon the foregoing premises, this court hereby adjudicates and partitions the inherited Lot 7 Milagros F. Layug
properties, including the controversial parcels 6 and 7, in accordance with the following: xxxx
FIRST PARCEL SEVENTH PARCEL
xxxx xxxx
This is divided into two (2) segments, the Eastern Portion and Western Portion. The draw was made on the same day, August 27, 1998. Just like in the drawing of lots for the Sixth
The Eastern Portion shall belong to three (3) heirs, namely Tomas Fangonil, Sinforoso Fangonil Parcel, Carmen F. Herrera boycotted the draw. Hence, the Court ruled that since there are seven rolled
represented by Victoria Estoque and Marina Fangonil. The Western Portion shall belong to two (2) heirs, papers for the seven heirs to draw, the last undrawn rolled-paper containing the lot number shall be for
the Southwestern part belongs to Pura F. Tino and the Northwestern part belongs to Carmen Fangonil Carmen Herrera. The result for the draw for the seventh parcel was as follows:
Herrera x x x. Lot 1 Carmen Herrera
SECOND PARCEL Lot 2 Tomas Fangonil
xxxx Lot 3 Milagros F. Layug
This parcel goes to Mariano Fangonil and Milagros Fangonil Layug. Lot 4 Marina Fangonil
THIRD PARCEL Lot 5 Sinforoso Fangonil
xxxx Lot 6 Mariano Fangonil
A drawing of lots was conducted on April 25, 1997 with respect to parcel 3. Parcel 3 was divided into Lot 7 Pura F. Tino
seven by Geodetic Engineer Gerardo Dacayanan. The result was the following (see also, Order dated
April 25, 1997, page 166, Record of the case): It should be noted that after the draws on August 27, 1998, Atty. Baltazar, counsel for [respondents],
Lot 1 (A) Milagros F. Layug manifested that he will file a motion as regards the accounting of the produce of the sixth and seventh
Lot 2 (B) Tomas Fangonil parcels. However, what he filed was the Manifestation/Motion dated August 31, 1998.
Lot 3 (C) Mariano Fangonil The six heirs (excluding Carmen F. Herrera) shall reimburse the amount of 138,100.00, each one
Lot 4 (D) Pura F. Tino contributing the amount of 19,728.57, to Carmen F. Herrera. Since the other six heirs did not insist on
Lot 5 (E) Sinforoso Fangonil the accounting of the produce with respect to parcels 6 and 7, Carmen F. Herrera does not have to render
Lot 6 (F) Carmen F. Herrera an accounting. As a matter of fact, this Court, in its Order dated October 7, 1998, considered the produce
Lot 7 (G) Marina Fangonil of the said two (2) parcels, which she appropriated from the 50s to the present as interest on her money.13
xxxx
FOURTH PARCEL Petitioner appealed the above RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals, alleging the unfair and prejudicial
xxxx manner of partition of parcel 1 and claiming exclusive ownership over parcels 6 and 7. The Court of
The same thing happened. There was a drawing of lots. The result was the following: Appeals denied the appeal in its Decision promulgated 30 January 2004, the dispositive portion of which
Lot 1 (A) Marina Fangonil reads:
Lot 2 (B) Carmen F. Herrera
Lot 3 (C) Tomas Fangonil WHEREFORE, the October 9, 1998 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Agoo, La Union, Branch 31,
Lot 4 (D) Sinforoso Fangonil in Special Proceeding Case No. A-806, is AFFIRMED in toto."14
Lot 5 (E) Milagros F. Layug Under said decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the findings of the trial court, pronouncing that
Lot 6 (F) Pura F. Tino petitioner failed to adduce any evidence that would support her claim that the distribution was not equal
Lot 7 (G) Mariano Fangonil and prejudicial to her interest. It concurred with the trial court in concluding that, at the most, she is only
xxxx entitled to the reimbursement of the amount she spent for redemption of the questioned lots in an amount
FIFTH PARCEL equivalent to what her money commanded then, stating that petitioner is simply holding the said property
xxxx in trust for the other co-heirs. At the same time, it upheld the trial courts finding on the equivalent of the
On May 2, 1997, the drawing of lots on Parcel 5 was conducted. The result was as follows: money which petitioner paid to redeem and repurchase parcels 6 and 7, but the dispositive portion merely
Lot 1 Pura F. Tino indicated the amount of 130,100.00.
Lot 2 Marina Fangonil
Lot 3 Milagros F. Layug Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the 30 January 2004 Decision which the Court of Appeals
Lot 4 Sinforoso Fangonil denied in a Resolution dated 15 July 2005. Dissatisfied with the final resolution of the Court of Appeals
Lot 5 Carmen F. Herrera on the matter, petitioner now comes before this Court via a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the
Lot 6 Mariano Fangonil Revised Rules of Court. Petitioner insists she is the exclusive owner of parcels 6 and 7 and rejects the
Lot 7 Tomas Fangonil partition of parcel 1 as being unequal and prejudicial, raising the following issues:
SIXTH PARCEL
xxxx I.
On August 27, 1998, the drawing of lots was conducted with respect to the controversial parcels, the sixth THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE MANNER IN WHICH PARCEL
parcel and the seventh parcel. The result on the sixth parcel was as follows: 1 IS TO BE PARTITIONED BASED ON THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS POSITION WHICH IS
Lot 1 Pura F. Tino
CLEARLY UNEVEN AND UNFAIR TO THE PETITIONER WHOSE SHARE WILL THEN BE FOUND AT (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the
THE REAR PORTION OF THE SAID LOT. inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion;
(4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting;
II. (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT PARCELS 6 are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary
AND 7 SHALL BE OWNED SOLELY AND EXCLUSIVELY BY THE PETITIONER BEING THE ONLY to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on
ONE WHO REDEEMED AND REPURCHASED SAID PARCELS IN THE 1950S EVEN WHILE THE which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and
PARENTS OF THE PARTIES WERE STILL ALIVE. reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; and (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the
supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.
III.
In this particular instance, we are clearly faced with issues of fact. A question of fact is involved when the
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE PRIVATE doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of alleged facts or when the query necessarily
RESPONDENTS RIGHT TO CLAIM A SHARE IN PARCELS 6 AND 7 HAD LONG PRESCRIBED AS A invites calibration of the whole evidence, considering mainly the credibility of witnesses, existence and
RESULT OF THEIR INACTION FOR MORE THAN FORTY (40) YEARS WHERE THEY ALLOWED THE relevance of specific surrounding circumstances, their relation to each other and to the whole, and the
PETITIONER TO EXERCISE FULL OWNERSHIP OVER SAID PARCELS, EVEN ASSUMING probabilities of the situation.22 We find that the only questions to be resolved are the following: (a) whether
WITHOUT ADMITTING THAT AT FIRST, THEY HAVE THE RIGHT TO REDEEM THE SAID PARCELS. or not the respondent court gravely erred in affirming the partition of parcel 1 in accordance with the
findings of the trial court; and (b) whether or not the respondent court gravely erred in not finding that
IV. exclusive ownership of the properties in question has been vested in petitioner.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE PRIVATE In the exercise of the Supreme Courts power of review, this Court is not a trier of facts, and unless there
RESPONDENTS RIGHT TO CLAIM A SHARE IN PARCELS 6 AND 7 HAD LONG BEEN BARRED BY are excepting circumstances, it does not routinely undertake the re-examination of the evidence
LACHES AS A RESULT OF THEIR INACTION FOR MORE THAN FORTY (40) YEARS WHERE THEY presented by the contending parties during the trial of the case.23 Factual matters are beyond the
ALLOWED THE PETITIONER [TO] EXERCISE FULL OWNERSHIP OVER SAID PARCELS, EVEN jurisdiction of this Court.24 In petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court,
ASSUMING WITHOUT ADMITTING THAT AT FIRST, THEY HAVE THE RIGHT TO REDEEM THE SAID this Court is limited to reviewing only errors of law, not of fact, unless the factual findings complained of
PARCELS. are devoid of support by the evidence on record or the assailed judgment is based on a misapprehension
V. of facts. As held in Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,25 factual findings of the Court of Appeals
are conclusive26 on the parties and carry even more weight when the said court affirms the factual findings
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE MONEY EQUIVALENT OF THE of the trial court.27 Absent any palpable error or arbitrariness, the findings of fact of the lower court are
MONEY OF THE OPPOSITOR-APPELLANT WHICH SHE USED TO REPURCHASE AND REDEEM conclusive. On this ground alone, the appeal warrants a dismissal.
PARCELS 6 AND 7 IN THE 1950S WOULD ONLY BE P138,100.00 IN TODAYS MONEY, EVEN
ASSUMING WITHOUT ADMITTING THAT THE SAID PARCELS COULD BE REDEEMED BY THE Setting aside the procedural defects, the appeal must fail based on the merits. Upon perusal of the
ESTATE OF FABIAN AND MARIA LLOREN.15 records of the case, it is evident to this Court that no cogent reason exists to disturb the decision of the
Court of Appeals.
Petitioners arguments are fallacious.
Petitioner contends that the manner of partition of parcel 1 by the RTC, as affirmed by the Court of
With respect to procedural matters, respondents argue that the petition is a combination of an appeal via Appeals, is unfair and prejudicial to her interest. However, she was not able to adduce substantial
a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 and an independent civil action of certiorari under Rule evidence aliunde to support her allegations. Respondents stress that the Fangonil spouses appropriated
65 of the Revised Rules of Court. This is based on the observation that petitioner impleaded the Court of portions of Parcel 1 to Carmen, Pura, Tomas, Marina, and Sinforoso, by pointing out specific areas
Appeals as one of the respondents while at the same time raising issues of fact alone. Respondents posit pertaining to each. Carmen, Tomas, and Marina built their houses on parcel 1. Prior to the order of
that these are indicative of an "intention to categorize the petition to be under both Rules 65 and 45 of partition, an ocular inspection of parcel 1 was conducted by the RTC to determine which manner of
the Rules of Court" and should be dismissed outright. Although petitioner erroneously impleaded the partition it would approve. During said ocular inspection, however, the RTC saw existing structures upon
Court of Appeals as one of the respondents, petitioner clearly and rightly invoked Rule 45 of the Revised which the homes of Carmen, Tomas, Marina, and a store of Carmen were situated. The arrangement
Rules of Court as the remedy availed of. As we held in National Irrigation Administration v. Court of was allegedly based on their oral agreement. This same arrangement allotting an equal area of 362
Appeals,16 the appeal from a final disposition of the Court of Appeals is a petition for review under Rule square meters to each of the heirs was made the basis of the manner of partition proposed by
45 and not a special civil action under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court. Under Rule 45 of the respondents and later on approved by both the RTC and Court of Appeals.
Revised Rules of Court, decisions, final orders or resolutions of the Court of Appeals, regardless of the
nature of the action or proceedings involved, may be appealed to us by filing a petition for review, which Anent the rights of the parties pertaining to parcels 6 and 7, petitioner insists that her act of paying for the
would be but a continuation of the appellate process over the original case. 17 The correct procedure is repurchase and release from mortgage of parcels 6 and 7 was on the understanding with her parents
not to implead the Court of Appeals. This Court has ruled in several instances that where the Court of that she would thereafter be the owner thereof. She asserts that her exercise of acts of ownership over
Appeals is impleaded as respondent in the Petition for Review, and the petition clearly invokes Rule 45, parcels 6 and 7, to the exclusion of her parents and siblings, reveals she is the exclusive owner of these
the Court of Appeals is merely omitted from the title of the case pursuant to Sec. 4(a) of Rule 45 of the lots. She cites several circumstances in support of her contention that respondents never considered
Revised Rules of Court.18 The Court of Appeals is herein omitted from the title of the case, as a liberal parcels 6 and 7 part of the estate of their parents and are not co-owners thereof. First, petitioner presented
interpretation of the rules on technicality, in pursuit of the ends of justice and equity.19 real estate tax receipts indicating that she had been the one paying for the realty taxes of the property.
Secondly, petitioner asserts she has been the only one hiring tenants for and benefiting from the produce
We now discuss respondents contention that only factual issues have been brought to this Court. of parcels 6 and 7. Lastly, the non-attempt of respondents to partition parcels 6 and 7 within 10 years
from the death of the Fangonil spouses, as well as to reimburse her if indeed such was the agreement,
Under Section 1, Rule 45, providing for appeals by certiorari before the Supreme Court, it is clearly
demonstrates that they never considered the said parcels part of the estate of their parents.
enunciated that only questions of law may be set forth.20 Questions of fact may not be raised unless the
case falls under any of the following exceptions21 :
After a thorough examination of the cases cited by petitioner and a painstaking review of the case records, property.37 Thus, as a rule, prescription does not run in favor of a co-heir or co-owner as long as he
this Court cannot give credence to petitioners stance. The scales of justice overwhelmingly tilt in favor of expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership; and he cannot acquire by prescription the share of
respondents and against petitioners assertion that exclusive ownership of parcels 6 and 7 has vested in the other co-owners, absent a clear repudiation of the co-ownership.38 An action to demand partition
her. The fact that it was petitioners money that was used for the repurchase of the properties does not among co-owners is imprescriptible, and each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the
make her the owner thereof, in the absence of convincing proof that would indicate such. This is more so common property.39
if other evidence was adduced to show such is not the case. Neither will petitioners exercise of acts of
ownership over the properties bring us to that conclusion. It is evident that petitioner was allowed to On the matter of laches, we find no sufficient cause to apply the principle of laches, it being a principle
maintain possession and enjoy the fruits of the property only by the mere tolerance of the other co- grounded on equity. Laches is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time,
owners.28 Moreover, although we recognize that real estate tax receipts indicating payment of realty tax to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or
and possession of the parcels are indicia of ownership, such are not conclusive proof of ownership, in omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting the presumption that the party entitled to
the presence of other circumstances and evidence showing otherwise. 29 As a matter of fact, although the assert it either has abandoned or declined to assert it.40 Several circumstances must be present. First,
receipts indicate that the real estate tax payments for parcels 6 and 7 for the years following their there should exist conduct on the part of the defendant or one under whom he claims, giving rise to the
repurchase and release were made by petitioner, the receipts also state that the declared owner of the situation of which complaint is made and for which the complainant seeks a remedy. Second, there is
properties is still the decedent Fabian Fangonil. delay in asserting the complainants right, the complainant having had knowledge or notice of defendants
conduct and having been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit. Third, defendant had no knowledge
Petitioner and respondents executed an extrajudicial settlement dated 14 November 1983, wherein it was or notice that the complainant would assert the right on which he bases his claim. Fourth, the defendant
stipulated that the Fangonil spouses died intestate, leaving 7 parcels of land in their names. Parcels 6 will suffer injury or prejudice in the event relief is accorded the complainant, or the suit is not held barred.
and 7 were included. It further stipulated that petitioner and her brother Tomas (now deceased) are the Petitioner failed to prove the presence of all four established requisites of laches. Moreover, there is no
only creditors of the estate, categorically stating petitioner is a creditor of the estate in the amount of absolute rule as to what constitutes laches or staleness of demand; each case is to be determined
8,700.00. This amount represents what was paid for by her for the repurchase and release from the according to its particular circumstances, with the question of laches addressed to the sound discretion
mortgage lien of parcels 6 and 7 in the 1950s. Pertinent records of the case reveal that the amount of the court.41 Because laches is an equitable doctrine, its application is controlled by equitable
actually advanced for the repurchase was 6,100.00. The aforementioned extrajudicial settlement, which considerations and should not be used to defeat justice or to perpetuate fraud or injustice. 42
was later on submitted to the RTC for consideration in the judicial partition, taken together with petitioners
comment30 in the same proceedings, are clear and categorical evidences that the transaction between Regarding the issue on the computation of the money to be paid to petitioner as reimbursement for the
petitioner and her parents was a mere loan. Under this extrajudicial settlement, respondents and amount she advanced to repurchase and release parcels 6 and 7 from the mortgage debt, the Court of
petitioner included parcels 6 and 7 as part of the estate of their deceased parents. It is particularly stated Appeals adopted the amount as computed by the RTC based on the present peso money
therein that petitioner and her brother Tomas are the only creditors of the estate. Although petitioners equivalent.43 There is a discrepancy between the amount of indebtedness as quoted by the Court of
comment allegedly maintained her claims on parcels 6 and 7, she categorically admitted therein that the Appeals from the RTC decision and the amount cited by the Court of Appeals in the latter part of its
amount totaling 8,700.00 referred to in the extrajudicial settlement represents the personal money she decision. However, the amount stated in the paragraph before the dispositive portion was 130,100.00,
used for the redemption of parcels 6 and 7. without any other indication that it intended to modify the amount determined by the RTC while the body
of the Court of Appeals decision quoting the RTC decision indicated the amount of indebtedness as
Thus, petitioner is a mere creditor of the estate and not an owner of parcels 6 and 7. An admission, verbal 138,100.00. There was obviously a typographical error, with the body of the decision stating that the
or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. Court of Appeals was affirming the RTCs manner of computation totaling 138,100.00. Moreover, in the
The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake, or that body and dispositive portion, the Court of Appeals upheld the RTCs decision in toto. Even then, the
no such admission was made.31We find that petitioners affidavit retracting her acquiescence to the amount found by the RTC on the basis of the formula it used in the Order dated 7 October 1998 was
stipulation on parcels 6 and 7 in the extrajudicial settlement deserves scant consideration for being self- erroneous.44
serving. Absent positive proof that the earlier statements made by petitioner resulted from palpable
mistake, retractions thereof, especially if unsupported by evidence, lack credence. 32 Still applying the present peso-dollar exchange rate, a slight modification in the computation is hereby
ordered. The present peso equivalent of the 6,100.00 indebtedness incurred on 13 November 1959 by
As to the issue of prescription, petitioners possession of parcels 6 and 7 did not ripen into sole and the Fangonil spouses and payable to petitioner should be computed based on the following figures:
exclusive ownership thereof. First, prescription applies to adverse, open, continuous, and exclusive
possession. In order that a co-owners possession may be deemed adverse to the other co-owners, the The currency exchange rate of the Philippine Peso to the United States Dollar in the 1950s, which is
following elements33 must concur: (1) that he has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting 2.00:$1.00;
to an ouster of the other co-owners; (2) that such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to Currency exchange rate of the Philippine Peso to the United States Dollar as of the date of finality of this
the other co-owners; and (3) that the evidence thereon must be clear and convincing. Clearly, petitioner judgment.
cannot claim adverse possession in the concept of an owner where she voluntarily executed documents
stating that she was a mere creditor and/or co-owner. Mere silent possession by a co-owner; his receipt Therefore, the present peso money equivalent of the 6,100.00 should be derived from the succeeding
of rents, fruits or profits from the property; his erection of buildings and fences and the planting of trees formula:
thereon; and the payment of land taxes cannot serve as proofs of exclusive ownership, if it is not borne
out by clear and convincing evidence that he exercised acts of possession which unequivocably [(Current exchange rate of the Philippine Peso to the United States Dollar as of the date of finality of this
constituted an ouster or deprivation of the rights of the other co-owners.34 In this case, we find that judgment divided by the exchange rate in the 1950s)] multiplied by 6,100.001avvphi1
petitioner effected no clear and evident repudiation of the co-ownership. Petitioners only act of WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review is DENIED. The (a) Decision issued
repudiation of the co-ownership was when she refused to honor the extrajudicial settlement in 1994. by the Court of Appeals dated 30 January 2004 and (b) its Resolution dated 15 July 2005 denying
Alternatively, possession by a co-owner is like that of a trustee and shall not be regarded as adverse to petitioners Motion for Reconsideration dated 23 February 2004 are hereby affirmed, with
the other co-owners, but in fact as beneficial to all of them.35 A co-ownership is a form of trust, with each MODIFICATION as to the amount to be reimbursed to petitioner. The present peso equivalent of the
owner being a trustee for each other.36 Mere actual possession by one will not give rise to the inference 6,100.00 indebtedness is hereby ordered reimbursed to petitioner which amount shall be computed
that the possession was adverse because a co-owner is, after all, entitled to possession of the
based on current peso-dollar exchange rates at the time of finality of judgment, applying the formula In their comment, Pedro, Lorenzo, Antonio, and Sotera contend that the cadastral court had the
below: jurisdiction to decide questions of ownership of property; that the issue of prescription was never
ventilated below; and that exhibit "J" had been validly rescinded by exhibit "1".
[(Current exchange rate of the Philippine Peso to the United States Dollar as of the date of finality of this
judgment divided by the exchange rate in the 1950s)] multiplied by 6,100.00 The parties do not quarrel over the genuineness of all three exhibits but rather, over the dates thereof.
Pedro, et al. alleged that exhibit "J" was executed on September 27, 1941, and not October 27, 1941,
The equivalent amount shall be proportionately paid by all the heirs with each and every heir having a and that exhibit "l", the instrument that revoked it, came later, or on October 3, 1941. Virginia et al.
share in the said indebtedness. No Costs. SO ORDERED. maintain on the other hand that exhibit "J' was actually made on October 27, 1941, twenty-four days after
G.R. No. 81401 May 18, 1990 the execution of exhibit "1", and that assuming exhibit "1" came earlier, it was notarized, and took effect,
only on November 3, 1944, after the death of Escolastica, one of the donors.
VIRGINIA FRANCO VDA. DE ARCEO, CARMELITA ARCEO, ZENAIDA ARCEO, ROMEO ARCEO,
RODOLFO ARCEO and MANUEL ARCEO, petitioners, Although the parties wrangle over dates, the Court observes that there is no real question of fact to be
vs. resolved in this case. The important question, so we find, is, based on existing facts, legal in character:
HON. COURT OF APPEALS (Former 16th Division), PEDRO M. ARCEO, SOTERA ARCEO, Who has the right over lots Nos. 2582, 2595, 3054, and 8131?
LORENZO ARCEO, and ANTONIO ARCEO, respondents. As we indicated, we find merit in this petition.
SARMIENTO, J.: The first question must, however, be resolved against the petitioners. We have held that under Section 2
The Court grants this petition on a successful demonstration of error committed by the Court of Appeals. 1 of the Property Registration Decree, the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, sitting as a land
registration court, is no longer as circumscribed as it was under Act No. 496, the former land registration
It appears that the spouses Abdon Arceo and Escolastica Geronimo were the owners of four parcels of law. 11 We said that the Decree "has eliminated the distinction between the general jurisdiction vested in
unregistered land (six were involved but only four were disputed) located in Pulilan, Bulacan, identified the regional trial court and the limited jurisdiction conferred upon it by the former law when acting merely
as lots nos. 2582, 2595, 3054, and 8131. Escolastica died on September 16, 1942 while Abdon passed as a cadastral court." The amendment was "aimed at avoiding multiplicity of suits, the change has
away in 1953. They had one son, Esteban, who died on September 2, 1941. Esteban had five children, simplified registration proceedings by conferring upon the required trial courts the authority to act not only
Jose, Pedro, Lorenzo, Antonio, and Sotera. Jose married Virginia Franco, with whom he fathered six on applications for 'original registration' 'but also 'over all petitions filed after original registration of title,
children, Carmelita, Zenaida, Rodolfo, Manuel, Cesar, and Romeo. 2 Pedro, Lorenzo, Antonio, and with power to hear and determine all questions arising from such applications or petitions.'" 12 At any rate,
Sotera are the private respondents herein while Jose's widow, Virginia (Jose died on March 8, 1970), and we have also stated that the limited jurisdiction rule governing land registration courts is subject to
their children are the petitioners. recognized exceptions, to wit, (1) where the parties mutually agreed or have acquiesced in submitting
controversial issues for determination; (2) where they have been given full opportunity to present their
It also appears that on October (or September) 27, 1941, the Arceos executed a deed of donation inter evidence; and (3) where the court has considered the evidence already of record and is convinced that
vivos, marked as Exhibit "J", in which the spouses bestowed the properties in favor of Jose. 3 Since 1942, the same is sufficient for rendering a decision upon such controversial issues. 13 By the same token, it
Jose had been paying taxes thereon. 4 In 1949, he took personal possession thereof, worked thereon, has been held that the rule is not, in reality, one of jurisdiction, but rather, of mere procedure, which may
and claimed them as owner thereof 5 be waived. 14 It is not amiss to state likewise that where the issue, say, of ownership, is ineluctably tied
It furthermore appears that on August 2, 1950, the spouses executed another deed of donation inter up with the question of right of registration, the cadastral court commits no error in assuming jurisdiction
vivos, marked as exhibit "T" disposing of the properties further in favor of Jose. 6 over it, as, for instance, in this case, where both parties rely on their respective exhibits to defeat one
another's claims over the parcels sought to be registered, in which case, registration would not be
On October 3 (or 30), 1941, the Arceos supposedly signed a deed of donation mortis causa, marked as possible or would be unduly prolonged unless the court first decided it.
exhibit "1" revoking exhibit "J" and giving away the properties in question in favor of all his grandchildren
including Jose. It seems however that it was notarized only on November 3, 1944, after Escolastica had The next question refers to acquisitive prescription. In support of their claims, Virginia, et al. cite four
died. events: (1) In 1941, Jose entered upon the properties and until his death in 1970, worked thereon; (2)
Upon his death, they, Virginia, et al., divided the same by virtue of an extrajudicial partition; (3) Ever since,
On January 12, 1972, Virginia, together with her children, filed with the cadastral court 7 an application Jose had paid taxes thereon until he died; (4) Pedro, et al., have not lifted a finger to oust him, Jose, in
for registration in their names of lots Nos. 2582, 2595, 3054, and 8131 on the strength of exhibits "J" and possession, or otherwise, to impugn his right. Virginia, et al. now say that barring the above exhibits, they
"T". Pedro, Antonio, Lorenzo, and Sotera opposed the application on the basis of exhibit "1". Pedro and have anyway acquired the parcels by prescription.
Lorenzo specifically contested the application on lots Nos. 3054 and 8131 on claims that each of them
were entitled to one-third thereof. 8 We also regret that one can not agree with this proposition. The petitioners suppose that the parcels '
had come under the category of a co-ownership, following the death of their grandparents, but in that
The cadastral court rejected all three documents and distributed the properties according to the law on case, it has been held that in order for prescription to set in, the following requisites must concur: (1) there
intestate succession. 9 is a clear showing that the claimant has repudiated the co-ownership; (2) he has made known to the rest
of the co-owners that he is assuming exclusive ownership over the property; (3) there is clear and
Virginia and her children shortly went to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the cadastral convincing evidence thereof; and (4) his possession is open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious. 15
court and dismissed the appeal.
The evidence for Virginia et al. do not persuade us that they (through Jose) have acquired the lots by
On February 15, 1988, Virginia, et al. petitioned this Court. lapse of time. The fact that in 1941, Jose wrested possession thereof, so we hold, does not amount to
The petitioners argue that the cadastral court was bereft of the power to determine conflicting claims of adverse possession because as a co-owner, he had the right of enjoyment, and his use thereof can not
ownership, and that its authority was solely to confirm an existing title, and that anyway, all the lots should by itself prejudice the right of his fellow co-owners. The fact that he paid taxes thereon is not controlling
have been awarded to them by virtue of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession since either because payment of real estate taxes does not necessarily confer title upon a claimant. 16 The fact
1941 (1942, when Jose took possession of the parcels) or otherwise, by acquisitive prescription. 10 They finally that Virginia, et al. had sought to extrajudicially divide the property is nothing conclusive because
also assert that exhibits "J" and "T" had validly transferred the subject lands to them. there is no showing that they, Virginia, et al. had made this known to Pedro, et al. Under these
circumstances, we can not validly say that the lands had devolved on Virginia., et al., by way of
prescription.
We are granting the petition nonetheless on the finding that the lots had been conferred to Jose by a valid
donation inter vivos, that is, exhibit "J".
Other than the claims by Pedro, et al., that exhibit "J" had been revoked by exhibit "1", exhibit "J" appears
to have been executed in compliance with legal requirements, i.e., as to form and acceptance. 17 It is true
that the cadastral court was supposed to have attributed fraud on the part of Jose in making Abdon sign
the exhibit, 18 (according to Pedro, Abdon affixed his signature thereon upon "the belief that it was a deed
of sale of the land purchased from one Marciano Santos" 19) but as found by the Court of Appeals, It is a
theory that "must be received with a 'grain of salt', 20 because, for one thing, Jose is dead, and for another,
the petitioners have adduced evidence that exhibit "J" was genuine. We are bound by the factual finding
of the Appellate Court and as we averred, we are disposing of this question on pure questions of law.
As to exhibit "T", the finding of the Court of Appeals that it was defective is just as controlling on this
Court, that is, that "it was signed by Abdon Arceo after the death of his wife on September 16, 1942 and
does not contain the acceptance ... by Jose Arceo." 21
We can not say that exhibit "1" had validly revoked exhibit "J". The weight of authority is that a valid
donation, once accepted, becomes
irrevocable, 22 except on account of officiousness, 23 failure by the donee to comply with charges imposed
in the donation, 24 or by reason of ingratitude. 25 There is simply no proof that Abdon when he executed
exhibit "1", was in possession of a legal ground for annulment.
We can not thus accept the Court of Appeals' holding that exhibit "1" had "neutralized the force and
effect" 26 of exhibit "J".
It is therefore this Court's ruling that the disposition under exhibit "J" in favor of Jose (whose rights were
transmitted to Virginia, et al.) should be respected.
We find no need in settling the issue of true dates of the parties' exhibits, because first, it is an issue of
fact and second, because whatever their true dates, there is no obstacle to the validity of the claims of
Virginia, et al.
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is SET ASIDE. The court a quo is ORDERED to distribute
the properties covered by the donation inter vivos, dated October (or September) 27, 1941, exhibit "J",
according to the terms and conditions set forth therein, and in the proportions indicated thereby. No costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 158377 August 13, 2010 Subsequently, Tax Declaration 1228,11 under the name of Alejandro, was issued effective 1980. All of
Leoncia's sons eventually died intestate, survived by their respective heirs, namely:
HEIRS OF JOSE REYES, JR., namely: MAGDALENA C. REYES, OSCAR C. REYES, GAMALIEL C.
REYES, NENITA R. DELA CRUZ, RODOLFO C. REYES, and RODRIGO C. REYES, Petitioners,
vs. Name of Surviving Heirs
AMANDA S. REYES, CONSOLACION S. REYES, EUGENIA R. ELVAMBUENA, LUCINA R. Decedent
MENDOZA, PEDRITO S. REYES, MERLINDA R. FAMODULAN, EDUARDO S. REYES, and JUNE S.
REYES, Respondents.
Teofilo Romeo Reyes, Leonardo Reyes, and Leonora C. Reyes Rodrigo Reyes,
DECISION Jose, Sr. Nenita Reyes- dela Cruz, Rodolfo Reyes, Oscar Reyes, Gamaliel Reyes,
Magdalena Reyes (petitioners herein), Efren Reyes and Amado Reyes dela
BERSAMIN, J.: Cruz
The petitioners1 assail the decision dated July 31, 2002 rendered in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 53039,2 by which
the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision dated May 21, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Jose, Sr. Alejandro Reyes (respondents' predecessor)12
Branch 9, in Malolos, Bulacan.3
Antecedents On September 2, 1993, Alejandro also died intestate.13 Surviving him were his wife, Amanda Reyes, and
Antonio Reyes and his wife, Leoncia Mag-isa Reyes (Leoncia), were owners of a parcel of residential their children, namely: Consolacion Reyes, Eugenia Reyes-Elvambuena, Luciana Reyes-Mendoza,
land with an area of 442 square meters, more or less, located in Pulilan, Bulacan and covered by Tax Pedrito S. Reyes, Merlinda Reyes-Famodulan, Eduardo Reyes and June S. Reyes (respondents herein).
Declaration No. 7590. On that land they constructed their dwelling. The couple had four children, namely: In 1994, respondent Amanda Reyes asked the heirs of Teofilo and Jose, Jr., to vacate the property
Jose Reyes, Sr. (Jose, Sr.), Teofilo Reyes (Teofilo), Jose Reyes, Jr. (Jose, Jr.) and Potenciana Reyes- because she and her children already needed it. After the petitioners refused to comply, she filed a
Valenzuela (Potenciana). Antonio Reyes died intestate, and was survived by Leoncia and their three complaint against the petitioners in the barangay, seeking their eviction from the property. When no
sons, Potenciana having predeceased her father. Potenciana also died intestate, survived by her amicable settlement was reached, the Barangay Lupon issued a certification to file action to the
children, namely: Gloria ReyesValenzuela, Maria Reyes Valenzuela, and Alfredo Reyes Valenzuela. respondents on September 26, 1994.14
Jose, Jr., and his family resided in the house of the parents, but Teofilo constructed on the property his
own house, where he and his family resided. In the interim, petitioner Nenita R. de la Cruz and her brother Romeo Reyes also constructed their
respective houses on the property.15
On July 9, 1955, Leoncia and her three sons executed a deed denominated Kasulatan ng Biling
Mabibiling Muli,4whereby they sold the land and its existing improvements to the Spouses Benedicto RTC Proceedings and Ruling
Francia and Monica Ajoco (Spouses Francia) for 500.00, subject to the vendors' right to repurchase for
On September 28, 1994, the respondents initiated this suit for quieting of title and reconveyance in the
the same amount sa oras na sila'y makinabang. Potenciana's heirs did not assent to that deed.
Nonetheless, Teofilo and Jose, Jr. and their respective families remained in possession of the property RTC.16 The complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 817-M-94 and entitled Amanda Reyes, et al. v. Heirs
and paid the realty taxes thereon. of Jose Reyes, Jr., et al., was later amended.17 They alleged that their predecessor Alejandro had
acquired ownership of the property by virtue of the deed Pagsasa-ayos ng Pag-aari at
Leoncia and her children did not repay the amount of 500.00. Pagsasalin executed on August 11, 1970 by the heirs of the Spouses Francia; that on the basis of such
deed of assignment, Alejandro had consolidated his ownership of the property via his Kasulatan ng
The Spouses Francia both died intestate (i.e., Monica Ajoco on September 16, 1963, and Benedicto Pagmeme-ari; and that under the Magkasanib na Salaysay, Alejandro had granted to Leoncia, his father
Francia on January 13, 1964). Jose, Sr., and his uncles, Teofilo and Jose, Jr. the right to repurchase the property, but they had failed to
Alejandro Reyes (Alejandro), the son of Jose, Sr., first partially paid to the Spouses Francia the amount do so.
of 265.00 for the obligation of Leoncia, his uncles and his father. Alejandro later paid the balance of The respondents prayed for judgment in their favor, as follows:
235.00. Thus, on August 11, 1970, the heirs of Spouses Francia executed a deed entitled Pagsasa-
ayos ng Pag-aari at Pagsasalin,5whereby they transferred and conveyed to Alejandro all their rights and WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that judgment be rendered:
interests in the property for 500.00.
1. Quieting the title to the property by declaring the plaintiffs (respondents herein) as the rightful
On August 21, 1970, Alejandro executed a Kasulatan ng Pagmeme-ari,6 wherein he declared that he had and lawful owners thereof;
acquired all the rights and interests of the heirs of the Spouses Francia, including the ownership of the
property, after the vendors had failed to repurchase within the given period. On the basis of the Kasulatan 2. Ordering the defendants (petitioners herein) to vacate subject premises and reconvey and
or surrender possession thereof to the plaintiffs;
ng Pagmeme-ari, Tax Declaration No. 3703 covering the property7 was canceled by Tax Declaration No.
8715,8 effective 1971, issued to Alejandro. From then on, he had paid the realty taxes for the property. 3. Ordering the defendants to recognize the right of the plaintiffs as the lawful owners of subject
Nevertheless, on October 17, 1970, Alejandro, his grandmother (Leoncia), and his father (Jose, Sr.) property;
executed a Magkakalakip na Salaysay,9 by which Alejandro acknowledged the right of Leoncia, Jose, Jr., 4. Ordering the defendants to pay plaintiffs the following:
and Jose, Sr. to repurchase the property at any time for the same amount of 500.00.
a. Moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00;
On October 22, 1970, Leoncia died intestate.10 She was survived by Jose, Sr., Teofilo, Jose, Jr. and the
heirs of Potenciana. Even after Leonica's death, Teofilo and Jose, Jr., with their respective families, b. Exemplary damages in the amount of P20,000.00;
continued to reside in the property.
c. Attorney's fees of P20,000.00, acceptance fee of P10,000.00 and P500.00 per No pronouncement as to costs.
recorded Court appearance of counsel;
SO ORDERED. 20
d. The costs of this suit.
Aggrieved, the petitioners appealed to the CA.
Plaintiffs further pray for such other relief which the Honorable Court may deem just and equitable under
the premises.18 CA Ruling

In their answer,19 the petitioners averred that the Kasulatan ng Biling Mabibiling Muli was an equitable In the CA, the petitioners assailed the RTC's dispositions, except the dismissal of the complaint as against
mortgage, not a pacto de retro sale; that the mortgagors had retained ownership of the property; that the Potenciana's heirs.
heirs of the Spouses Francia could not have validly sold the property to Alejandro through In its decision dated July 31, 2002, the CA ruled that the transaction covered by the Kasulatan ng Biling
the Pagsasaayos ng Pag-aari at Pagsasalin; that Alejandro's right was only to seek reimbursement of the Mabibiling Muli was not a pacto de retro sale but an equitable mortgage under Article 1602 of the Civil
500.00 he had paid from the co-owners, namely: Leoncia, Teofilo, Jose, Jr. and Jose, Sr. and the heirs Code; that even after the deed's execution, Leoncia, Teofilo, Jose, Jr. and their families had remained in
of Potenciana; and that Alejandro could not have also validly consolidated ownership through possession of the property and continued paying realty taxes for the property; that the purported vendees
the Kasulatan ng Pagmeme-ari, because a consolidation of ownership could only be effected via a court had not declared the property for taxation purposes under their own names; and that such circumstances
order. proved that the parties envisaged an equitable mortgage in the Kasulatan ng Biling Mabibiling Muli.
The petitioners interposed a counterclaim for the declaration of the transaction as an equitable mortgage, The CA observed that the heirs of the Spouses Francia had themselves admitted in paragraph 5 of
and of their property as owned in common by all the heirs of Leoncia, Teofilo, Jose, Jr. and Jose, Sr. the Pagsasa-ayos ng Pag-aari at Pagsasalin that the property had been mortgaged to their
On May 21, 1996, the RTC ruled in favor of the respondents, declaring that Alejandro had acquired predecessors-in-interest, viz:
ownership of the property in 1965 by operation of law upon the failure of the petitioners' predecessors to Na, sa oras ng kamatayan ay nakaiwan sila ng isang lagay na lupang nakasanla sa kanila na makikilala
repurchase the property; that the joint affidavit executed by Alejandro, Leoncia and Jose, Jr. and Jose, sa kasulatang kalakip nito sa halagang LIMANG DAANG PISO (P500.00). Ngunit nuong nabubuhay pa
Sr., to extend the period of redemption was inefficacious, because there was no more period to extend ang magasawang Benedicto Francia at Monica Ajoco ay nakatanggap na ng halagang P265.00 kay
due to the redemption period having long lapsed by the time of its execution; and that the action should Alejandro Reyes - Filipino, kasal kay Amanda Salonga, may sapat na gulang at naninirahan sa Pulilan,
be dismissed insofar as the heirs of Potenciana were concerned, considering that Potenciana, who had Bulacan.21
predeceased her parents, had no successional rights in the property.
However, the CA held that the appellants' (petitioners herein) failure to file an action for the reformation
Accordingly, the RTC decreed as follows: of the Kasulatan ng Biling Mabibiling Muli to reflect the true intention of the parties within ten years from
WHEREFORE, on the basis of the evidence adduced and the law/jurisprudence applicable thereon, the deed's execution on July 9, 1955, pursuant to Article 1144 of the Civil Code,22 already barred them
judgment is hereby rendered: from claiming that the transaction executed between Leoncia and her children, on one hand, and the
Spouses Francia, on the other hand, was an equitable mortgage. The CA agreed with the RTC that
a) sustaining the validity of the "Kasulatan ng Biling Mabibiling Muli" (Exh. B/Exh. 1) executed on July the Magkakalakip na Salaysay did not effectively extend the period for Leoncia and her children to
9, 1955 by Leoncia Mag-isa and her sons Teofilo, Jose, Sr. and Jose, Jr., all surnamed Reyes, in repurchase the property, considering that the period to repurchase had long lapsed by the time the
favor of Spouses Benedicto Francia and Monica Ajoco as well as the "Pagsasa-ayos ng Pag-aari at agreement to extend it was executed on October 17, 1970.
Pagsasalin" (Settlement of Estate and Assignment) [Exh. C/Exh. 4] executed on August 11, 1970 by
the heirs of spouses Benedicto Francia and Monica Ajoco in favor of the spouses Alejandro Reyes Issues
and Amanda Salonga; In this appeal, therefore, the petitioners insist that:23
b) declaring the aforementioned "Kasulatan Ng Biling Mabibili Muli" (Exh. B/ Exh. 1) to be a contract I.The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in finding that respondents (were) already barred from claiming
of sale with right to repurchase and not an equitable mortgage; that the transaction entered into by their predecessors-in-interest was an equitable mortgage and not
c) confirming the consolidation of ownership, by operation of law, of spouses Alejandro M. Reyes and a pacto de retro sale;
Amanda Salonga over the residential lot mentioned and referred to in Exhibit B/Exhibit 1 and Exhibit II.The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in affirming the findings of the court a quo that the Magkasanib
C/Exhibit 4; na Salaysay (Joint Affidavit), executed by Alejandro, Leoncia and Jose, Jr., wherein Leoncia and her
d) allowing the registration with the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Bulacan of the "Kasulatan children were granted by Alejandro the right to repurchase the property at anytime for the amount of
ng Pagmeme-ari" (Document of Ownership) [Exh. E/Exh. 5] executed by Alejandro M. Reyes on P500.00, was of no legal significance.
August 21, 1970 or of any appropriate deed of consolidation of ownership over the residential lot Ruling of the Court
covered by Exhibit E/Exhibit 5 which the plaintiffs, as eventual owners by succession of the
aforementioned proeprty, may deem proper to execute; The petition is meritorious.
e) ordering the defendants and all persons claiming rights under them to vacate the residential lot A.
subject of the above-entitled case and to restore possession thereof unto the plaintiffs;
The CA correctly concluded that the true agreement of the parties vis--vis the Kasulatan ng
f) directing the defendants (except the heirs of Potenciana Reyes-Valenzuela) to pay unto the Biling Mabibiling Muli was an equitable mortgage, not a pacto de retro sale. There was no dispute
plaintiffs the amount of P20,000.00 as attorney's fees; and that the purported vendors had continued in the possession of the property even after the
execution of the agreement; and that the property had remained declared for taxation purposes
g) dismissing the complaint in so far as the defendant heirs of Potenciana Reyes-Valenzuela are under Leoncia's name, with the realty taxes due being paid by Leoncia, despite the execution of
concerned as well as their counterclaim for damages and attorney's fees.1avvphi1
the agreement. Such established circumstances are among the badges of an equitable mortgage assignee of the mortgage, and the property continued to be co-owned by Leoncia and her sons
enumerated in Article 1602, paragraphs 2 and 5 of the Civil Code, to wit: Jose, Sr., Jose Jr., and Teofilo. As an assignee of the mortgage and the mortgage credit,
Alejandro acquired only the rights of his assignors, nothing more. He himself confirmed so in
Art. 1602. The contract shall be presumed to be an equitable mortgage, in any of the following the Magkasanib na Salaysay, whereby he acknowledged the co-owners' right to redeem the
cases: property from him at any time (sa ano mang oras) for the same redemption price of 500.00.
xxx It is worthy to note that Alejandro's confirmation in the Magkasanib na Salaysay of the co-owners'
(2) When the vendor remains in possession as lessee or otherwise; right to redeem was made despite 15 years having meanwhile elapsed from the execution of the
original Kasulatan ng Biling Mabibiling Muli (July 9, 1955) until the execution of the Magkasanib
xxx na Salaysay (August 21, 1970).
(5) When the vendor binds himself to pay the taxes on the thing sold; D.
xxx Neither did the petitioners' failure to initiate an action for reformation within ten years from the
execution of the Kasulatan ng Biling Mabibiling Muli bar them from insisting on their rights in the
The existence of any one of the conditions enumerated under Article 1602 of the Civil Code, not
property. The records show that the parties in the Kasulatan ng Biling Mabibiling Muli had abided
a concurrence of all or of a majority thereof, suffices to give rise to the presumption that the
by their true agreement under the deed, to the extent that they and their successors-in-interest
contract is an equitable mortgage.24 Consequently, the contract between the vendors and
still deemed the agreement as an equitable mortgage despite the lapse of 15 years from the
vendees (Spouses Francia) was an equitable mortgage.
execution of the purported pacto de retro sale. Hence, an action for reformation of the Kasulatan
B. ng Biling Mabibiling Muli was unnecessary, if not superfluous, considering that the reason
underlying the requirement for an action for reformation of instrument has been to ensure that
Are the petitioners now barred from claiming that the transaction under the Kasulatan ng Biling the parties to a contract abide by their true intended agreement.
Mabibiling Muli was an equitable mortgage by their failure to redeem the property for a long period
of time? The Kasulatan ng Pagmeme-ari executed by Alejandro on August 21, 1970 was ineffectual to
predicate the exclusion of the petitioners and their predecessors in interest from insisting on their
The petitioners contend that prescription, if it must apply to them, should as well be applied to the claim to the property. Alejandro's being an assignee of the mortgage did not authorize him or his
respondents, who had similarly failed to enforce their right under the equitable mortgage within heirs to appropriate the mortgaged property for himself without violating the prohibition
ten years from its execution on July 9, 1955. Consequently, they urge the upholding of the original against pactum commissorium contained in Article 2088 of the Civil Code, to the effect that "[t]he
intention of the parties to the Kasulatan ng Biling Mabibiling Muli, without taking prescription into creditor cannot appropriate the things given by way of pledge or mortgage, or dispose of them[;]
account, because both parties did not enforce their respective rights within the ten-year [a]ny stipulation to the contrary is null and void." Aptly did the Court hold in Montevirgen v. Court
prescriptive period, is more in keeping with fairness and equity. of Appeals:27
We agree with the petitioners. The declaration, therefore, in the decision of July 1, 1971 to the effect that absolute ownership
Considering that sa oras na sila'y makinabang, the period of redemption stated in the Kasulatan over the subject premises has become consolidated in the respondents upon failure of the
ng Biling Mabibiling Muli, signified that no definite period had been stated, the period to redeem petitioners to pay their obligation within the specified period, is a nullity, for consolidation of
should be ten years from the execution of the contract, pursuant to Articles 1142 and 1144 of the ownership is an improper and inappropriate remedy to enforce a transaction declared to be one
Civil Code.25 Thus, the full redemption price should have been paid by July 9, 1955; and upon of mortgage. It is the duty of respondents, as mortgagees, to foreclose the mortgage if he wishes
the expiration of said 10-year period, mortgagees Spouses Francia or their heirs should have to secure a perfect title to the mortgaged property if he buys it in the foreclosure sale.
foreclosed the mortgage, but they did not do so. Instead, they accepted Alejandro's payments, Moreover, the respondents, as Alejandro's heirs, were entirely bound by his previous acts as their
until the debt was fully satisfied by August 11, 1970. predecessors-in-interest. Thus, Alejandro's acknowledgment of the effectivity of the equitable
The acceptance of the payments even beyond the 10-year period of redemption estopped the mortgage agreement precluded the respondents from claiming that the property had been sold
mortgagees' heirs from insisting that the period to redeem the property had already expired. Their to him with right to repurchase.28
actions impliedly recognized the continued existence of the equitable mortgage. The conduct of E.
the original parties as well as of their successors-in-interest manifested that the parties to
the Kasulatan ng Biling Mabibiling Muli really intended their transaction to be an equitable What was the effect of the Magkasanib na Salaysay?
mortgage, not a pacto de retro sale.
Both the trial court and the CA declared that the Magkasanib na Salaysay, which extended the
In Cuyugan v. Santos,26 the purported buyer under a so-called contract to sell with right to redemption period of the mortgaged property, was inefficacious, because the period to redeem could no
repurchase also accepted partial payments from the purported seller. We held that the longer be extended after the original redemption period had already expired.
acceptance of partial payments was absolutely incompatible with the idea of irrevocability of the
In contrast, the petitioners submit that disregarding the Magkasanib na Salaysay made no
title of ownership of the purchaser upon the expiration of the term stipulated in the original
sense,considering that the respondents' predecessors-in-interest admitted therein that the petitioners had
contract for the exercise of the right of redemption. Thereby, the conduct of the parties manifested
a right to redeem the property.
that they had intended the contract to be a mortgage, not a pacto de retro sale.
The respondents counter, however, that the Magkasanib na Salaysay, which acknowledged the other co-
C.
owners' right to redeem the property, was void; that the petitioners could no longer claim to be co-owners
When Alejandro redeemed the property on August 11, 1970, he did not thereby become a co- entitled to redeem the property, because the co-ownership had come to an end by Alejandro having
owner thereof, because his father Jose, Sr. was then still alive. Alejandro merely became the openly repudiated the co-ownership; that Alejandro's acts of repudiation had consisted of: (a) redeeming
the property from the Spouses Francia; (b) acquiring the property from the heirs of Spouses Francia by possess it, with Alejandro and his heirs occupying only a portion of it. Neither did the cancellation of the
virtue of a deed of assignment denominated as Pag-aayos ng Pag-aari at Pagsasalin; (c) executing an previous tax declarations in the name of Leoncia, the previous co-owner, and the issuance of a new one
affidavit of consolidation of ownership over the property (Kasulatan ng Pagmeme-ari); (d) applying for the in Alejandro's name, and Alejandro's payment of the realty taxes constitute repudiation of the co-
cancellation of the tax declaration of property in the name of Leoncia, and the subsequent issuance of a ownership. The sole fact of a co-owner declaring the land in question in his name for taxation purposes
new tax declaration in his name; (e) his continuous possession of the property from 1955, which and paying the land taxes did not constitute an unequivocal act of repudiation amounting to an ouster of
possession the respondents as his heirs had continued up to the present time, or for a period of almost the other co-owner and could not constitute adverse possession as basis for title by
50 years already; and (f) the payment of the taxes by Alejandro and the respondents for more than 30 prescription.34Moreover, according to Blatero v. Intermediate Appellate Court,35 if a sale a retro is
years without any contribution from the petitioners; and that such repudiation established that Alejandro construed as an equitable mortgage, then the execution of an affidavit of consolidation by the purported
and his successors-in-interest had already acquired sole title over the property through acquisitive buyer to consolidate ownership of the parcel of land is of no consequence and the "constructive
prescription. possession" of the parcel of land will not ripen into ownership, because only possession acquired and
enjoyed in the concept of owner can serve as title for acquiring dominion. 36
The respondents' and the lower courts' positions cannot be sustained.
In fine, the respondents did not present proof showing that Alejandro had effectively repudiated the co-
The provisions of the Civil Code governing equitable mortgages disguised as sale contracts, like the one ownership. Their bare claim that Alejandro had made oral demands to vacate to his co-owners was self-
herein, are primarily designed to curtail the evils brought about by contracts of sale with right to serving and insufficient. Alejandro's execution of the affidavit of consolidation of ownership on August 21,
repurchase, particularly the circumvention of the usury law and pactum commissorium.29 Courts have 197037 and his subsequent execution on October 17, 1970 of the joint affidavit38 were really equivocal
taken judicial notice of the well-known fact that contracts of sale with right to repurchase have been and ambivalent acts that did not manifest his desire to repudiate the co-ownership.
frequently resorted to in order to conceal the true nature of a contract, that is, a loan secured by a
mortgage. It is a reality that grave financial distress renders persons hard-pressed to meet even their The only unequivocal act of repudiation was done by the respondents when they filed the instant action
basic needs or to respond to an emergency, leaving no choice to them but to sign deeds of absolute sale for quieting of title on September 28, 1994, nearly a year after Alejandro's death on September 2, 1993.
of property or deeds of sale with pacto de retro if only to obtain the much-needed loan from unscrupulous However, their possession could not ripen into ownership considering that their act of repudiation was
money lenders.30 This reality precisely explains why the pertinent provision of the Civil Code includes a not coupled with their exclusive possession of the property.
peculiar rule concerning the period of redemption, to wit:
G.
Art. 1602. The contract shall be presumed to be an equitable mortgage, in any of the following cases:
The respondents can only demand from the petitioners the partition of the co-owned property and the
(3)When upon or after the expiration of the right to repurchase another instrument extending the period reimbursement from their co-owners of the amount advanced by Alejandro to repay the obligation. They
of redemption or granting a new period is executed; may also seek from their co-owners the proportional reimbursement of the realty taxes paid for the
property, pursuant to Article 488 of the Civil Code. 39 In the alternative, they may opt to foreclose the
Ostensibly, the law allows a new period of redemption to be agreed upon or granted even after the equitable mortgage, considering that the petitioners' period to redeem the mortgaged property, which was
expiration of the equitable mortgagor's right to repurchase, and treats such extension as one of the ten years from the execution on October 17, 1970 of the Magkakasanib na Salaysay, had already long
indicators that the true agreement between the parties is an equitable mortgage, not a sale with right to lapsed. We clarify, however, that the respondents may take these recourses only through the appropriate
repurchase. It was indubitable, therefore, that the Magkasanib na Salaysay effectively afforded to actions commenced in court.
Leoncia, Teofilo, Jose, Sr. and Jose, Jr. a fresh period within which to pay to Alejandro the redemption
price of 500.00. H.
F. The petitioners' counterclaim for damages is dismissed for their failure to prove their entitlement to it.40
Did Alejandro and his heirs (respondents herein) acquire the mortgaged property through prescription? WHEREFORE, we grant the petition for review on certiorari.
It is true that Alejandro became a co-owner of the property by right of representation upon the death of The decision dated July 31, 2002 rendered by the Court of Appeals is reversed and set aside, and another
his father, Jose Sr.31 As a co-owner, however, his possession was like that of a trustee and was not judgment is rendered:
regarded as adverse to his co-owners but in fact beneficial to all of them.32
a) Upholding the validity of the Kasulatan ng Biling Mabibiling Muli (Deed of Sale with Right of
Yet, the respondents except to the general rule, asserting that Alejandro, having earlier repudiated the Repurchase) executed on July 9, 1955 by Leoncia Mag-isa Reyes and her sons Teofilo, Jose, Sr.
co-ownership, acquired ownership of the property through prescription. and Jose, Jr., all surnamed Reyes, in favor of the late Spouses Benedicto Francia and Monica Ajoco
as well as the Pagsasa-ayos ng Pag-aari at Pagsasalin (Settlement of Estate and Assignment)
The Court cannot accept the respondents' posture. executed on August 11, 1970 by the heirs of the late Spouses Benedicto Francia and Monica Ajoco
In order that a co-owner's possession may be deemed adverse to that of the cestui que trust or the other in favor of the spouses Alejandro Reyes and Amanda Salonga;
co-owners, the following elements must concur: b) Declaring the Kasulatan ng Biling Mabibili Muli to be an equitable mortgage, not a contract of sale
1. The co-owner has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation of the co-ownership amounting with right to repurchase;1avvphi1
to an ouster of the cestui que trust or the other co-owners; c) Finding the Magkakalakip na Salaysay executed on October 17, 1970 by and among Leoncia Mag-
2. Such positive acts of repudiation have been made known to the cestui que trust or the other isa Reyes, Jose Reyes, Sr. and Alejandro Reyes valid and effective;
co-owners;
3. The evidence on the repudiation is clear and conclusive; and c) Nullifying the Kasulatan ng Pagmeme-ari executed by Alejandro M. Reyes on August 21, 1970;
4. His possession is open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious. 33 and

The concurrence of the foregoing elements was not established herein. For one, Alejandro did not have d) Dismissing the petitioners' counterclaim. Costs of suit to be paid by the respondents. SO
adverse and exclusive possession of the property, as, in fact, the other co-owners had continued to ORDERED.
G.R. No. 161720 November 22, 2005 had performed acts sufficient to constitute repudiation of the co-ownership, concluded that they had
acquired the lot by prescription.14
HEIRS OF FLORES RESTAR vs. HEIRS OF DOLORES R. CICHON,
Respecting the defendant Policarpios claim that a portion of the lot was sold to him, the trial court
DECISION discredited the same upon noting that Flores signature in the purported Deed of Sale differed from those
CARPIO MORALES, J.: appearing in other documents submitted by the parties; in 1981, when the said Deed of Sale was alleged
to have been executed, Flores was admittedly paralyzed and bedridden and could not have written his
In 1935, Emilio Restar (Restar) died intestate, leaving eight (8) children-compulsory heirs, namely: Flores name in a "straight" manner, as in fact his signature appearing in at least two documents dated 1980 was
Restar, Dolores Restar-Cichon, Perpetua Restar-Sta. Maria, Paciencia Restar-Manares, Dominica "crooked," and there existed discrepancies in the spelling of Flores wifes signature which read "Esmea"
Restar-Relojero, Policarpio Restar, Maria Restar-Rose and Adolfo Restar. in the deed, and not as "Esmenia."15
In 1960, Restars eldest child, Flores, on the basis of a July 12, 1959 Joint Affidavit1 he executed with The trial court thus dismissed the complaint by Decision of June 30, 1999. 16
one Helen Restar, caused the cancellation of Tax Declaration No. 6696 2 in Restars name covering a
5,9183 square meter parcel of land, Lot 3177 (the lot), located at Barangay Carugdog, Lezo, Aklan which On appeal by the defendants Heirs of Flores and Policarpio Restar, the appellate court, by Decision of
was among the properties left by Restar, and the issuance of Tax Declaration No. 11134 in his name. October 29, 2002.17 reversed the decision of the trial court, it finding that the defendants Heirs of Flores
failed to prove that their possession of the lot excluded their co-owners or that they derived title to it from
Flores died on June 10, 1989. a separate conveyance to them by Restar.
On November 5, 1998, the co-heirs of Flores discovered the cancellation of Restars Tax Declaration No. The appellate court further found that there was no adequate notice by Flores to his other co-heirs/co-
6696 and the issuance in lieu thereof of Tax Declaration No. 111344 in his name. owners of the repudiation of the co-ownership and neither was there a categorical assertion by the
defendants of their exclusive right to the entire lot that barred the
On January 21, 1999, the heirs of Flores sisters Dolores R. Cichon, Perpetua Sta. Maria, and Maria Rose
who had in the meantime died, together with Flores surviving sisters Dominica Restar-Relojero and plaintiffs claim of ownership.18
Paciencia Restar-Manares, filed a Complaint5 against Flores heirs for "partition [of the lot], declaration of
nullity of documents, ownership with damages and preliminary injunction" before the Regional Trial Court And the appellate court found it credible for the plaintiffs to have failed to immediately take legal action to
(RTC) of Aklan. protect their rights on account of forbearance towards their eldest brother who had asked them to continue
cultivating the lot to support his childrens education.19
Flores brothers Policarpio and Adolfo were impleaded also as defendants, they being unwilling co-
plaintiffs. Respecting the defendant Policarpios claim that part of the lot had been sold to him by Flores, the
appellate court sustained the trial courts rejection thereof.
The plaintiffs, herein respondents, alleged that, inter alia, during the lifetime of Flores, they were given
their shares of palay from the lot and even after Flores death up to 1991; after Flores death in 1989, his Accordingly, the appellate court disposed:
widow Esmenia appealed to them to allow her to hold on to the lot to finance the education of her children, WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the appeal is hereby GRANTED in so far as plaintiffs-
to which they (the plaintiffs) agreed on the condition that after the children had finished their education, it appellants Heirs of Dolores Cichon, et al., are concerned and DENIED in so far as defendant-appellant
would be divided into eight (8) equal parts; and upon their demand for partition of the lot, the defendants Policarpio Restar. The decision of the Regional Trial Court of Kalibo, Aklan, Branch 3, dated June 30,
Heirs of Flores refused, they claiming that they were the lawful owners thereof as they had inherited it 1999 is MODIFIED. The ruling of the said court that the heirs of Flores Restar have acquired ownership
from Flores. by adverse possession of the land in question, Cadastral Lot No. 6686, is hereby REVERSED.
By Answer6 filed February 23, 1999, the defendants-herein petitioners Heirs of Flores claimed that they SO ORDERED. (Emphasis in the original)
had been in possession of the lot in the concept of owner for more than thirty (30) years and have been
paying realty taxes since time immemorial. And they denied having shared with the plaintiffs the produce The appellate court having denied reconsideration of its decision, only the defendants Heirs of Flores
of the lot or that upon Flores death in 1989, Esmenia requested the plaintiffs to allow her to hold on to it filed the present petition, assigning the following errors:
to finance her childrens education, they contending that by 1977, the children had already finished their
respective courses.7 A. THE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN REVERSING THE RULING OF THE LOWER
COURT THAT THE PETITIONERS AS HEIRS OF FLORES RESTAR HAVE ACQUIRED OWNERSHIP
The defendants Heirs of Flores further claimed that after World War II and under the "new Tax Declaration BY ADVERSE POSSESSION OF THE LAND IN QUESTION.
in 1945," Flores caused the transfer of parcels of ricelands situated in Carugdog, Lezo, Aklan to his
siblings as their shares from the estate of their father Restar; 8 and an extra-judicial partition was B. THE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THERE WAS ACQUISITIVE
subsequently executed on September 28, 1973 by Restars heirs, which was notarized by one Atty. Jose PRESCRIPTION ON THE LAND IN QUESTION NOTWITHSTANDING THAT THE LAND IN QUESTION
Igtanloc, dividing and apportioning among themselves four (4) parcels of land. 9 HAS BEEN DECLARED IN THE NAME OF FLORES RESTAR, FATHER OF PETITIONERS, AS EARLY
AS 1960 AND THAT PETITIONERS AND THEIR PREDECESSOR-IN-INTEREST HAVE BEEN IN
The defendant Adolfo Restar, by separate Answer,10 alleged that the complaint did not state a cause of OPEN, CONTINUOUS, EXCLUSIVE AND NOTORIOUS POSSESSION OF THE LAND IN QUESTION
action as against him for he interposed no objection to the partition of the lot among the heirs of Restar. IN THE CONCEPT OF OWNER FOR MORE THAN THIRTY (30) YEARS.20
As for the defendant Policarpio Restar, he in his Amended Answer11 acknowledged Flores as the owner The petition is impressed with merit.
of the lot but claimed that a portion of it, 1,315 square meters, was sold to him as shown by a Deed of
Absolute Sale dated May 14, 1981.12 He thus prayed that, among other things, an order for the partition Article 494 of the New Civil Code expressly provides:
of the lot among Restars heirs be issued excluding, however, that portion sold to him by Flores. 13 ART. 494. No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Each co-owner may demand at
After trial, Branch 3 of the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan held that Flores share in Restars estate was not the lot any time the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned.
but that covered by Cadastral Lot No. 3183. Nevertheless, the trial court, holding that Flores and his heirs
xxx Plaintiffs did not deny that aside from the verbal partition of one parcel of land in Carugdog, Lezo, Aklan
way back in 1945, they also had an amicable partition of the lands of Emilio Restar in Cerrudo and Palale,
No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he Banga Aklan on September 28, 1973 (exhibit "20"). If they were able to demand the partition, why then
expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership. did they not demand the inclusion of the land in question in order to settle once and for all the inheritance
While the action to demand partition of a co-owned property does not prescribe, a co-owner may acquire from their father Emilio Restar, considering that at that time all of the brothers and sisters, the eight heirs
ownership thereof by prescription21 where there exists a clear repudiation of the co-ownership, and the of Emilio Restar, were still alive and participated in the signing of the extra-judicial partition?
co-owners are apprised of the claim of adverse and exclusive ownership.22 Also it was admitted that Flores died only in 1989. Plaintiffs had all the chances (sic) to file a case against
Acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real rights may be ordinary or extraordinary. Ordinary him from 1960, or a period of 29 years when he was still alive, yet they failed to do so. They filed the
acquisitive prescription requires possession of things in good faith and with just title for a period of ten instant case only on January 22, 1999, almost ten (10) years after Flores death.
years. Without good faith and just title, acquisitive prescription can only be extraordinary in character From the foregoing evidence, it can be seen that the adverse possession of Flores started in 1960, the
which requires uninterrupted adverse possession for thirty years. time when the tax declaration was transferred in his name. The period of acquisitive prescription started
Thus, the New Civil Code provides: to run from this date. Hence, the adverse possession of Flores Restar from 1960 vested in him exclusive
ownership of the land considering the lapse of more than 38 years. Acquisitive prescription of ownership,
ART. 1117. Acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real rights may be ordinary or extraordinary. laches and prescription of the action for partition should be considered in favor of Flores Restar and his
heirs. 25
Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession of things in good faith and with just title for the time
fixed by law. While tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership and do not prove title to the
land, nevertheless, when coupled with actual possession, they constitute evidence of great weight 26 and
ART. 1134. Ownership and other real rights over immovable property are acquired by ordinary can be the basis of a claim of ownership through prescription. 27
prescription through possession of ten years.
As for respondents claim that they have been receiving shares from the produce of the land, it was
ART. 1137. Ownership and other real rights over immovables also prescribe through uninterrupted correctly discredited by the trial court.
adverse possession thereof for thirty years, without need of title or of good faith.
[P]laintiffs claim that Flores Restar gave them five to eight gantas each as their shares in the produce
Resolving the main issue of whether petitioners acquired ownership over the lot by extraordinary cannot be sustained. A few gantas cannot be considered one-eight share of sixty (60) cavans of palay
prescription, the appellate court held in the negative. produced per cropping. One eight of sixty cavans would be at least six cavans, not merely gantas after
While this Court is not a trier of facts, if the inference drawn by the appellate court from the facts is excluding expenses for cultivation and production. If plaintiffs were to be believed, their whole 7/8 share
manifestly mistaken, it may, in the interest of justice, review the evidence in order to arrive at the correct of the produce would total two cavans, six gantas only at the usual rate of 25 gantas per cavan. 28
factual conclusions based on the record.23 Unless there are strong and impelling reasons to disturb the trial courts findings of facts which must, as
Contrary to the findings of the appellate court, the records of the case amply support petitioners claim a matter of judicial policy, be accorded with the highest respect, they must remain. Respondents have
that the requirements for extraordinary prescription had been duly met. not, however, proffered any reason warranting the disturbance of the trial courts findings of facts.

When Restar died in 1935, his eight children became pro indiviso co-owners of the lot by intestate Indeed, the following acts of Flores show possession adverse to his co-heirs: the cancellation of the tax
succession. Respondents never possessed the lot, however, much less asserted their claim thereto until declaration certificate in the name of Restar and securing another in his name; the execution of a Joint
January 21, 1999 when they filed the complaint for partition subject of the present petition. Affidavit stating that he is the owner and possessor thereof to the exclusion of respondents; payment of
real estate tax and irrigation fees without respondents having ever contributed any share therein; and
In contrast, Flores took possession of the lot after Restars death and exercised acts of dominion thereon continued enjoyment of the property and its produce to the exclusion of respondents. And Flores adverse
tilling and cultivating the land, introducing improvements, and enjoying the produce thereof. possession was continued by his heirs.
The statutory period of prescription, however, commenced not in 1935 but in 1960 when Flores, who had The appellate courts crediting of respondents justification for failing to immediately take legal action to
neither title nor good faith, secured a tax declaration in his name and may, therefore, be said to have protect their rights forbearance toward Flores and/or his wife who asked to be allowed to cultivate the
adversely claimed ownership of the lot. And respondents were also deemed to have been on said date land to support their childrens education does not impress. For assuming such justification to be true,
become aware of the adverse claim.24 why did not any of respondents assail Flores continuous possession after his children completed their
college education in 1977?
Flores possession thus ripened into ownership through acquisitive prescription after the lapse of thirty
years in accordance with the earlier quoted Article 1137 of the New Civil Code. The trial courts finding and conclusion that Flores and his heirs had for more than 38 years possessed
the land in open, adverse and continuous possession in the concept of owner which length of
The following observations of the trial court thus merit this Courts approval. possession had never been questioned, rebutted or disputed by any of respondents, being thus duly
The evidence proved that as far back as 1959, Flores Restar adjudicated unto himself the whole land in supported by substantial evidence, he and his heirs have become owner of the lot by extraordinary
question as his share from his father by means of a joint affidavit which he executed with one Helen prescription. It is unfortunate that respondents slept on their rights. Dura lex sed lex.
Restar, and he requested the Provincial Treasurer/Assessor to have the land declared in his name. It WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET
was admitted by the parties during the pre-trial that this affidavit was the basis of the transfer of Tax ASIDE and the June 30, 1999 decision of the trial court is REINSTATED.
Declaration No. 6686 from Emilio Restar to Flores Restar. So that from 1960 the land was declared in
the name of Flores Restar (Exhibit 10). This was the first concrete act of repudiation made by Flores of No pronouncement as to costs.
the co-ownership over the land in question. x x x
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-46296 September 24, 1991 Within sixty (60) days from receipt of this decision the parties are ordered to petition the lot in
question and the defendants are directed to immediately turn over possession of the shares
EPITACIO DELIMA, PACLANO DELIMA, FIDEL DELIMA, VIRGILIO DELIMA, GALILEO DELIMA, JR., here awarded to the respective heirs.
BIBIANO BACUS, OLIMPIO BACUS and PURIFICACION BACUS, petitioners,
vs. Defendants are condemned to pay the costs of the suit.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, GALILEO DELIMA (deceased), substituted by his legal heirs, namely:
FLAVIANA VDA. DE DELIMA, LILY D. ARIAS, HELEN NIADAS, ANTONIO DELIMA, DIONISIO The counterclaim is dismissed.
DELIMA, IRENEA DELIMA, ESTER DELIMA AND FELY DELIMA, respondents. SO ORDERED. (pp. 54-55, Rollo)
MEDIALDEA, J.: Not satisfied with the decision, respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals. On May 19, 1977,
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals reversing the trial court's respondent appellate court reversed the trial court's decision and upheld the claim of Galileo Delima that
judgment which declared as null and void the certificate of title in the name of respondents' predecessor all the other brothers and sister of Lino Delima, namely Eulalio, Juanita and Vicente, had already
and which ordered the partition of the disputed lot among the parties as co-owners. relinquished and waived their rights to the property in his favor, considering that he (Galileo Delima) alone
paid the remaining balance of the purchase price of the lot and the realty taxes thereon (p. 26, Rollo).
The antecedent facts of the case as found both by the respondent appellate court and by the trial court
are as follows: Hence, this petition was filed with the petitioners alleging that the Court of Appeals erred:

During his lifetime, Lino Delima acquired Lot No. 7758 of the Talisay-Minglanilla Friar Lands Estate in 1) In not holding that the right of a co-heir to demand partition of inheritance is imprescriptible.
Cebu by sale on installments from the government. Lino Delima later died in 1921 leaving as his only If it does, the defenses of prescription and laches have already been waived.
heirs three brothers and a sister namely: Eulalio Delima, Juanita Delima, Galileo Delima and Vicente 2) In disregarding the evidence of the petitioners.(p.13, Rollo)
Delima. After his death, TCT No. 2744 of the property in question was issued on August 3, 1953 in the
name of the Legal Heirs of Lino Delima, deceased, represented by Galileo Delima. The issue to be resolved in the instant case is whether or not petitioners' action for partition is already
barred by the statutory period provided by law which shall enable Galileo Delima to perfect his claim of
On September 22, 1953, Galileo Delima, now substituted by respondents, executed an affidavit of "Extra- ownership by acquisitive prescription to the exclusion of petitioners from their shares in the disputed
judicial Declaration of Heirs." Based on this affidavit, TCT No. 2744 was cancelled and TCT No. 3009 property. Article 494 of the Civil Code expressly provides:
was issued on February 4,1954 in the name of Galileo Delima alone to the exclusion of the other heirs.
Art. 494. No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. Each co-owner may
Galileo Delima declared the lot in his name for taxation purposes and paid the taxes thereon from 1954 demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is
to 1965. concerned.
On February 29, 1968, petitioners, who are the surviving heirs of Eulalio and Juanita Delima, filed with Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the thing undivided for a certain period of time, not
the Court of First Instance of Cebu (now Regional Trial Court) an action for reconveyance and/or partition exceeding ten years, shall be valid. This term may be extended by a new agreement.
of property and for the annulment of TCT No. 3009 with damages against their uncles Galileo Delima and
Vicente Delima,. Vicente Delima was joined as party defendant by the petitioners for his refusal to join A donor or testator may prohibit partition for a period which shall not exceed twenty years.
the latter in their action.
Neither shall there be any partition when it is prohibited by law.
On January 16, 1970, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioners, the dispositive portion of
which states: No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so
long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the following are the declared owners of
Lot No. 7758 of the Talisay-Minglanilla Friar Lands Estate presently covered by transfer As a rule, possession by a co-owner will not be presumed to be adverse to the others, but will be held to
Certificate of Title No. 3009, each sharing a pro-indiviso share of one-fourth; benefit all. It is understood that the co-owner or co-heir who is in possession of an inheritance pro-indiviso
for himself and in representation of his co-owners or co-heirs, if, as such owner, he administers or takes
1) Vicente Delima (one-fourth) care of the rest thereof with the obligation of delivering it to his co-owners or co-heirs, is under the same
situation as a depository, a lessee or a trustee (Bargayo v. Camumot, 40 Phil, 857; Segura v. Segura,
2) Heirs of Juanita Delima, namely: Bibiano Bacus, Olimpio Bacus and Purificacion Bacus (on- No. L-29320, September 19, 1988, 165 SCRA 368). Thus, an action to compel partition may be filed at
fourth); any time by any of the co-owners against the actual possessor. In other words, no prescription shall run
3) Heirs of Eulalio Delima, namely Epitacio, Pagano, Fidel, Virgilio and Galileo Jr., all surnamed in favor of a co-owner against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes
Delima (one-fourth); and the co-ownership (Del Blanco v. Intermediate Appellate Court, No. 72694, December 1, 1987, 156 SCRA
55).
4) The Heirs of Galileo Delima, namely Flaviana Vda. de Delima, Lily D. Arias, Helen Niadas
and Dionisio, Antonio, Eotu Irenea, and Fely, all surnamed Delima (one-fourth). However, from the moment one of the co-owners claims that he is the absolute and exclusive owner of
the properties and denies the others any share therein, the question involved is no longer one of partition
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3009 is declared null and void and the Register of Deeds of but of ownership (De Castro v. Echarri, 20 Phil. 23; Bargayo v. Camumot, supra; De los Santos v. Santa
Cebu is ordered to cancel the same and issue in lieu thereof another title with the above heirs Teresa, 44 Phil. 811). In such case, the imprescriptibility of the action for partition can no longer be
as pro-indiviso owners. invoked or applied when one of the co-owners has adversely possessed the property as exclusive owner
for a period sufficient to vest ownership by prescription.
After the payment of taxes paid by Galileo Delima since 1958, the heirs of Galileo Delima are
ordered to turn a over to the other heirs their respective shares of the fruits of the lot in question It is settled that possession by a co-owner or co-heir is that of a trustee. In order that such possession is
computed at P170.00 per year up to the present time with legal (interest). considered adverse to the cestui que trust amounting to a repudiation of the co-ownership, the following
elements must concur: 1) that the trustee has performed unequivocal acts amounting to an ouster of
the cestui que trust; 2) that such positive acts of repudiation had been made known to the cestui que
trust; and 3) that the evidence thereon should be clear and conclusive (Valdez v. Olorga, No. L-22571,
May 25, 1973, 51 SCRA 71; Pangan v. Court of Appeals, No. L-39299, October 18, 1988, 166 SCRA
375).
We have held that when a co-owner of the property in question executed a deed of partition and on the
strength thereof obtained the cancellation of the title in the name of their predecessor and the issuance
of a new one wherein he appears as the new owner of the property, thereby in effect denying or
repudiating the ownership of the other co-owners over their shares, the statute of limitations started to
run for the purposes of the action instituted by the latter seeking a declaration of the existence of the co-
ownership and of their rights thereunder (Castillo v. Court of Appeals, No. L-18046, March 31, 1964, 10
SCRA 549). Since an action for reconveyance of land based on implied or constructive trust prescribes
after ten (10) years, it is from the date of the issuance of such title that the effective assertion of adverse
title for purposes of the statute of limitations is counted (Jaramil v. Court of Appeals, No. L-31858, August
31, 1977, 78 SCRA 420).
Evidence shows that TCT No. 2744 in the name of the legal heirs of Lino Delima, represented by Galileo
Delima, was cancelled by virtue of an affidavit executed by Galileo Delima and that on February 4, 1954,
Galileo Delima obtained the issuance of a new title in Ms name numbered TCT No. 3009 to the exclusion
of his co-heirs. The issuance of this new title constituted an open and clear repudiation of the trust or co-
ownership, and the lapse of ten (10) years of adverse possession by Galileo Delima from February 4,
1954 was sufficient to vest title in him by prescription. As the certificate of title was notice to the whole
world of his exclusive title to the land, such rejection was binding on the other heirs and started as against
them the period of prescription. Hence, when petitioners filed their action for reconveyance and/or to
compel partition on February 29, 1968, such action was already barred by prescription. Whatever claims
the other co-heirs could have validly asserted before can no longer be invoked by them at this time.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated
May 19, 1977 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 150707 April 14, 2004 2. The plaintiffs are ordered to pay as their joint and several obligation, to
defendants Fidela Ll. Ocampo, Belen Ocampo-Barrito and Vicente Barrito,
APOLONIA LL. OCAMPO Now Substituted by MARIANO O. QUIEN, AMELITA Q. TAN, MILOVAN the total sum of 15,000.00 for attorneys fees and other expenses of
O. QUIEN, LUISA OCAMPO-LLORIN, MELITA F. OCAMPO, FELIX OCAMPO JR., RAMON OCAMPO, litigation and 50,000.00 for moral damages;
MIGUEL OCAMPO, JUANA OCAMPO, ANDRES OCAMPO SR., VIOLETA OCAMPO, MERCEDITA
OCAMPO, ANTONIA OCAMPO, ELISA OCAMPO, BEATRIZ OCAMPO, JUAN JOHNNY OCAMPO, 3. The plaintiffs jointly and severally pay the cost of this suit.
JONAS OCAMPO, MARIA DOLORES OCAMPO, REBECCA OCAMPO, FIDELA OCAMPO, LUIS
OCAMPO JR. and ERNESTO O. FORTUNO,petitioners, 4. Upon the finality of this decision, the notice of lis pendens annotated at
vs. plaintiffs behest in the Certificates of Title covering the properties in
FIDELA LL. OCAMPO, FELICIDAD LL. OCAMPO, BELEN OCAMPO-BARRITO, VICENTE BARRITO, question, of defendants be cancelled; and the plaintiffs, their agents and
NEMESIO LL. OCAMPO, IMELDA OCAMPO and JOSE OCAMPO, respondents. representatives as well as successors-in-interest are ordered to respect
the right of ownership of said defendants thereto, and to vacate and
DECISION restore the lawful possession of all portions of said properties to herein
defendants, their agents, representatives and successors-in-interest."5
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The Facts
Basic is the rule that the party making an allegation in a civil case has the burden of proving it by a
preponderance of evidence. In an action involving property, petitioners should rely on the strength of their The CA adopted the RTCs summation of facts as follows:
own title and not on the alleged weakness of respondents claim.
"Notwithstanding its somewhat deficient grammar and syntax, the following summation of the
The Case relevant and material antecedents of the case by the court a quo, is substantially correct --
Before this Court is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the October 31, This is a civil suit for partition and damages filed by plaintiffs against the defendants.
2001 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 56941. The decretal portion of the Decision
reads as follows: The complaint alleges that during the lifetime of the spouses Jose Ocampo and
Juana Llander-Ocampo, they begot ten (10) children, namely: Fidela, Felix, Andres,
"WHEREFORE, with the sole modification that the awards for damages and attorneys fees are Nemesio, Jose, Apolonia, Felicidad, Luisa, Rosario, and Luis. Of the aforementioned
hereby deleted, the judgment appealed from is, in all other respects, AFFIRMED. Without children, the following are already dead, namely: Felix, who is survived by his widow,
costs."3 Melita F. Ocampo and children Felix, Jr., Ramon and Miguel; Andres, who is survived
by Juana Ocampo and children Jose, Andres, Imelda, Violeta and Mercedita; Jose,
The CA affirmed the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Decision,4 rendered on October 30, 1996, which decreed who is survived by his children Antonia, Elias and Juan (Johnny); Rosario, who is
thus: survived by Ernesto O. Fortuno; Luis, who is survived by his children Rose, Ricardo,
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds, holds and declares that defendant Belen Jonas, Maria Dolores, Rebecca, Fidela and Luis, Jr.; and Luisa, who is survived by
Ocampo-Barrito, married to Vicente Barrito, are the true and lawful exclusive owners of the Carlos Llorin and children Mecita, Manuel, Carlos, Jr., Carmelita and Marilou L.
following properties, namely: Arellano.

(a) A parcel of residential/commercial land situated in the poblacion of Nabua, The complaint further alleges that during the lifetime of the spouses Jose Ocampo
Camarines Sur, bounded on the NE by Carmen Ocampo and Alberto Espiritu, on the and Luisa Llander-Ocampo, they acquired several parcels of land and, upon their
SE by the Burgos Street, on the SW by a street, and on the NW by Julian Ocampo death, left the following properties, namely:
and Carmen Ocampo, containing an area of 1,119 square meters, more or less, (a) A parcel of residential/ commercial land situated in the poblacion of
presently covered by TCT No. 13654 in the name of Belen Ocampo-Barrito, married Nabua, Camarines Sur, bounded on the NE by Carmen Ocampo and
to Vicente Barrito and previously covered by TCT No. RT-4389(983) in the name of Alberto Espiritu, on the SE by the Burgos Street, on the SW by a Street,
Fidela Ocampo, declared under TD No. 18856 and assessed at 17,240.00. and on the NW by Julian Ocampo and Carmen Ocampo, containing an
(b) A parcel of residential land situated at San Luis, Nabua, Camarines Sur, bounded area of 1,119 square meters, more or less, presently covered by TCT No.
on the North and East by a barrio road, on the South by a creek, and on the West by RT-4389(983) in the name of Fidela Ocampo, declared under TD No.
Lot 237, with an area of about 300 square meters, declared under TD No. 19639 18856 and assessed at 17,240.00;
with an assessed value of 6,240.00. (b) A parcel of residential land situated at San Luis, Nabua, Camarines
(c) A parcel of land situated at Sto. Domingo, Nabua, Camarines Sur, bounded on Sur, bounded on the North and East by a barrio road, on the South by a
the North by Lot 10323, on the East by Lot 9543, on the South by Lot 10325, and on creek, and on the West by Lot 237, with an area of about 300 square
the West by Lot 10322, with an area of about 4884 square meters, declared under meters, declared under TD No. 19639 with an assessed value of
TD No. 35122 and assessed at 6780.00 6,240.00; and

as described and referred to in paragraph 9, sub-paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of the (c) A parcel of land situated at Sto. Domingo, Nabua, Camarines Sur,
original complaint and it is hereby ordered that: bounded on the North by Lot 10323, on the East by Lot 9543, on the South
by Lot 10325, and on the West by Lot 10322, with an area of about 4,884
1. The complaint and supplemental complaint are dismissed for failure of square meters, declared under TD No. 35122 and assessed at 6,780.00.
the plaintiffs to prove their cause/causes of action by preponderance of
evidence and on the added ground of prescription; that all the above named parcels of land are actually owned in common by the
children of the late spouses Jose Ocampo and Juana Llander Ocampo although the
land denominated as parcel (a) of the complaint is ostensibly registered in the name dubious and illegal means that the defendant spouses Belen Ocampo-Barrito and
of Fidela Ocampo alone but acknowledged by her as a property owned in common Vicente Barrito, through dubious means and undue influence over Fidela Ll.
by all of them, brothers and sisters; that plaintiffs desire to partition said properties Ocampo, a very old spinster whom they have lately taken into their custody,
but defendants Fidela Ocampo and Felicidad unlawfully and unreasonably refuse to succeeded in having the latter execute this supposed deed of donation inter vivos;
do so and moved by a common purpose, both of them mortgaged to the PNB the that defendants have not acted with justice, honesty and good faith, causing injury
land denominated as parcel (a) of the complaint to secure the payment of a to plaintiffs rights in a manner inconsistent with morals and good customs, hence,
110,000.00 loan, the proceeds of which were x x x exclusively to the benefit of said are liable for moral damages of not less than 50,000.00; and that to set an example
defendants only; that the same defendants Fidela Ocampo and Felicidad Ocampo for the public good and to deter others similarly minded from doing so, defendants
have been receiving the fruits of the properties to the exclusion of their co-heirs should be assessed exemplary damages of not less than 50,000.00.
amounting to not less than 2,000.00 a year; and, that because of their relationship,
they undertook earnest efforts to amicably settle this controversy but because of Plaintiffs pray that judgment be rendered (a) declaring the Deed of Donation Inter
defendants Fidela Ocampo and Felicidad Ocampo[s] utterly unreasonable and Vivos allegedly executed by Fidela Ll. Ocampo in favor of Belen Ocampo-Barrito and
unjustified actuations, the same failed. Vicente Barrito be declare[d] null and void, (b) ordering defendants Belen Ocampo-
Barrito and Vicente Barrito to reconvey so much of the property subject thereof as
xxx xxx xxx pertain to the plaintiffs, (c) directing defendants, jointly and severally, to indemnify
plaintiffs such amounts as this Honorable Court may consider fair and reasonable by
In their complaint, plaintiffs pray that judgment be rendered ordering the partition of way of actual, moral and exemplary damages, inclusive of attorneys fees and related
the properties described in paragraph 9 of the complaint; ordering defendants Fidela expenses of litigation, and (d) granting plaintiffs such other remedies as may be just
Ocampo and Felicidad Ocampo, to release or otherwise cancel any and all and equitable in the premises.
encumbrances on TCT No. RT-4389(983) which they had caused to be annotated
thereon, particularly, the mortgage in favor of the PNB; requiring Fidela Ocampo and xxx xxx xxx
Felicidad Ocampo to refrain from further encumbering said properties or otherwise
subjecting the same to any lien and for that purpose, a writ of preliminary injunction As Special Defenses, defendant Belen Ocampo-Barrito allege that the original
to be issued against them to enjoin the commission of such acts; ordering defendants defendant Fidela Ll. Ocampo, her predecessor-in-interest, since 1949 has been the
Fidela Ocampo and Felicidad Ocampo to submit an accounting of the fruits and other absolute owner in fee simple of the property by virtue of the issuance of the certificate
produce they had received from said properties; further ordering Fidela Ocampo and of title in her name; that her predecessor-in-interest held the same certificate of title
Felicidad Ocampo to indemnify plaintiffs the sum of not less than 15,000.00 by way to the same parcel of land (TCT No. RT-4389(983) free of all encumbrances and
of attorneys fees and related expenses of litigation, plus the costs of the suit; and, adverse claims and was in notorious, public, and actual possession of the property
further granting plaintiffs such other remedies as may be just and equitable in the in concept of absolute owner from 1949 until 13 January 1984, when said
premises. predecessor-in-interest validly conveyed the property by donation inter vivos which
she accepted in the same public instrument; that TCT No. 1364 was issued to
xxx xxx xxx defendant Belen Ocampo-Barrito on the strength of the donation inter vivos executed
in her favor by her predecessor-in-interest and has since 30 September 1987, been
On 17 December 1987, counsel for plaintiffs filed a Motion to Admit Supplemental the absolute owner thereof; that since 1949 none of the plaintiffs ever questioned the
Complaint dated 2 December 1987 which was granted by the Court as there was no absolute ownership and title of defendant Belen Ocampo-Barritos predecessor-in-
opposition to it. interest over the property making the decree of registration incontrovertible; that it is
The Supplemental Complaint alleges that defendants Helen Ocampo-Barrito and fatal for plaintiffs cause of action to allege that defendants exerted undue influence
Vicente Barrito are spouses; that on 30 September 1987, TCT No. RT-4389(983) in over Fidela Ll. Ocampo for the latter to execute the deed of donation while clearly
the name of defendant Fidela Ocampo and covering the lot described as parcel (a) admitting in both the original and supplemental complaints that defendants are
in paragraph 9 of the original complaint was cancelled and, in lieu thereof, TCT No. residents of Mindoro Occidental a far away place from Nabua, Camarines Sur, the
1364 was issued to defendant Belen Ocampo-Barrito, married to defendant Vicente place where the same predecessor-in-interest admittedly resides; and, that Belen
Barrito, on the strength of an allege[d] Deed of Donation Inter Vivos ostensibly Ocampo-Barritos title cannot be collaterally attacked in these supposed partition
executed by defendant Fidela Ll. Ocampo in their favor on 13 January 1984; that at proceedings.
the time the Deed of Donation Inter Vivos was presented for registration and when xxx xxx xxx
TCT No. 1364, Registry of Camarines Sur, was issued to defendant Belen Ocampo-
Barrito, both the donor and donees were notoriously aware that said parcel of land Defendants pray that the case be dismissed for utter lack of merit and plaintiffs be
was among the lots subject of this Civil Case No. IR-1867 of which the donor Fidela ordered to pay defendants the sum of 200,000.00 for moral damages, 50,000.00
Ll. Ocampo and the mother of the donees, Felicidad Ll. Ocampo, are defendants, for exemplary damages, 100,000.00 as compensatory damages, to pay attorneys
that said properties were owned by the Ocampo brothers and sisters, and that the fees in the amount of 15,000.00, and for other just and equitable remedies.
donor Fidela Ll. Ocampo was not the exclusive owner thereof; that the transfer of
defendants Fidela Ll. Ocampo and Belen Ocampo-Barrito of the ownership over said xxx xxx xxx
property now subject of this partition is tainted with fraud, actual and deliberate, to As the Special and/or Affirmative Defenses, defendant Fidela Ll. Ocampo alleges
deprive plaintiffs of their legitimate share therein, knowing as they do that the same that she is the true and absolute owner of the real properties described in paragraph
are a co-ownership of the original parties plaintiffs and defendants herein; that 9 of the original complaint having acquired the same by lucrative title and has, since
defendants Fidela Ll. Ocampo and the spouses Belen Ocampo-Barrito and Vicente becoming owner thereof, been in actual possession thereof excepting the portion of
Barrito have not acted in good faith, deliberately causing damage and injury to the the lot described in paragraph 9 (a) of the complaint and covered by Torrens title
plaintiffs by their avaricious desire to obtain sole ownership of said properties through which was and is still being unlawfully occupied by plaintiffs Quiens; that the
properties have been declared for assessment in defendants name as exclusive "4. Where a deed of donation intervivos entered in bad faith deprives the heirs of their
owner thereof and since her acquisition of said properties, has paid the taxes hereditary shares, is said deed valid?
thereon; that defendant had exercised continuously all the legal incidents of
ownership on said lands to the exclusion of and adversely to the public, plaintiffs "5. Where a declaration against interest has not been opposed, assailed, rebutted or
herein included; that the [D]eed of Donation Inter Vivos and the subsequent transfer impeached, did the courts commit grave abuse of discretion in holding there is no such
of the property mentioned in paragraph 9 of the complaint to other defendants Belen declaration?"9
Ocamp[o]-Barrito is valid conveyance which binds the said property; and, that At bottom, the question to be resolved in this case is who owns the disputed property?
assuming that plaintiffs have a cause of action, the same is barred by laches.
The Court's Ruling
xxx xxx xxx
The Petition has no merit.
Defendant Fidela Ll. Ocampo prays that judgment be rendered dismissing the
complaint and ordering plaintiffs to indemnify such sum as will be proved as well as Main Issue:
[s]uch amount as this Court may assess by way of moral and exemplary damages
and costs, including necessary expenses for litigation, and for just and equitable Ownership of the Subject Property
reliefs."6 At the outset, we clarify that although there were three (3) properties originally involved in the litigation
Ruling of the Court of Appeals brought before the RTC, petitioners appeal dealt only with the first one, referred to in the Statement of
Facts above -- a parcel of residential/commercial land situated in the poblacion of Nabua, Camarines Sur.
According to the appellate court, other than the Acknowledgment of Co-ownership7 executed by In their CA appeal, petitioners declared that "the focus of this case is on the first [property] which is located
Respondent Fidela Ocampo, no documentary evidence was offered to establish petitioners claim of co- at downtown Poblacion of Nabua and therefore a valuable piece of property, 1,119 square meters in
ownership. The CA held that this piece of documentary evidence could not prevail over the array of all."10 Because petitioners had not questioned the RTC Decision with regard to the other properties, then
testimonial and documentary evidence that had been adduced by respondents to prove their defenses. the adjudication of these matters became final. Thus, only one property is left for resolution in the present
Communal ownership of the property in question was supposedly not proven, either, by the ancient proceedings.11
photograph showing Spouses Chino Jose and Juana Llander Ocampo with their ten children in front of
the disputed property; or by another picture showing the name "Oniang Ocampo -- 1-15-61" engraved on Since the original Complaint was an action for partition, this Court cannot order a division of the property,
the said house or building. unless it first makes a determination as to the existence of a co-ownership.12 The settlement of the issue
of ownership is the first stage in an action for partition. 13 This action will not lie if the claimant has no
The court a quo rejected the argument of petitioners that the title to the subject property had been placed rightful interest in the subject property. Parties filing the action are in fact required by the Rules of
in the name of Fidela, because their parents followed the Chinese custom of placing properties in the Court14 to set forth in their complaint the nature and the extent of their title to the property. It would be
name of the eldest son or daughter who was single. Petitioners explained that upon the death of the premature to effect a partition thereof until and unless the question of ownership is first definitely
eldest sibling, the properties would revert to the younger brothers and sisters. According to the CA, resolved.15
however, not a shred of evidence was adduced to prove that such a Chinese custom existed or was
observed in that place. Basic is the rule that the party making an allegation in a civil case has the burden of proving it by a
preponderance of evidence.16 Petitioners chief evidence of co-ownership of the property in question is
The CA also dismissed petitioners contention that common ownership was indicated by the fact that simply the Acknowledgement of Co-ownership executed by Fidela. As mentioned earlier, both the trial
some of the children of Spouses Ocampo stayed and lived on the subject property. It ruled that fraternal and the appellate courts were correct in finding that this piece of documentary evidence could not prevail
affection could have been the motive that impelled respondents to allow their relatives to use it. over the array of testimonial and documentary evidence that were adduced by respondents, as will be
expounded below.
In contrast to the arguments of petitioners, the CA said that respondents were able to give clear proof of
their ownership of the property: the Transfer Certificate of Title and the corresponding Tax Declaration in Petitioners failed to trace the successive transfers of ownership of the questioned property that eventually
the name of Fidela, and later of Belen Ocampo-Barrito. led to them. Allegedly, it was originally owned by their parents -- Spouses Ocampo -- whose deaths
passed it on to the children. Petitioners, however, presented absolutely no proof of ownership of their
Nevertheless, the CA eliminated the awards for damages and attorneys fees, because the trial court had predecessors-in-interest. In insisting that it was so transferred and thus co-owned, the former rely on the
failed to cite the factual, the legal and the equitable bases therefor. Acknowledgement of Co-ownership executed by Fidela, their eldest sibling.
Hence, this Petition.8 On the other hand, Belen clearly traced the basis of her alleged sole ownership of the property and
The Issues presented preponderant proof of her claim.

Petitioners raise the following issues for our consideration: First, she presented a Deed of Absolute Sale of Residential Land,17 referring to the subject property,
executed between Adolfo Ocampo as seller and Felix Ocampo as buyer. The document dated July 6,
"1. Where the evidence presented, oral and documentary, on the question of co-ownership, is 1948, was signed in the presence of two witnesses and acknowledged before Juan B. Ballecer, a notary
overwhelming as it is unopposed, unrebutted and unimpeached, has co-ownership been public.
proved?
The theory of petitioners is completely demolished by this document, which they never contested.
"2. Where co-ownership is confirmed by long, public possession by co-owners, did the courts According to them, the land in question was the conjugal property of their parents; and that upon the
commit grave abuse of discretion in holding that there is no co-ownership? latters deaths, the former inherited it in common. If indeed the land was the conjugal property of Spouses
Ocampo, then petitioners should have presented evidence to prove such ownership by their alleged
"3. Where the evidence of respondents is weak, puerile and inconsistent, did the courts commit predecessors-in-interest. Since the former failed to do so, how then can they prove the transfer to them
a grave misapprehension of facts when they gave credence to it? of ownership that has not been established in the first place? It is axiomatic that no one can transfer to
another a right greater than that which one has;18 thus, the legal truism that the spring cannot rise higher Finally, Belen presented Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1365431 as proof of her ownership of the
than its source.19 property. To be sure, the best proof of ownership of the land is the Certificate of Title (TCT). Hence, more
than a bare allegation is required to defeat the face value of respondents TCT, which enjoys a legal
Likewise, in this Deed of Absolute Sale, Adolfo Ocampo declared his "exclusive ownership" of the presumption of regularity of issuance.32It is quite surprising that despite the process of transfers and titling
property, "having been acquired by purchase[;] and [having] been in [his] continuous, public, peaceful, of the subject property -- commencing in 1948 and eventually leading to the sole ownership of Belen in
adverse and material possession for more than 50 years together with [his] predecessors in rights and 198433 -- it was only after 1984 that petitioners started asserting their claim of co-ownership thereof.
interest, in [the] concept of owner without any claim of other persons."20
We are not unmindful of our ruling that the mere issuance of a certificate of title does not foreclose the
Second, Respondent Belen proved that on February 10, 1953, this property had been sold to Fidela by possibility that the real property may be under co-ownership with persons not named therein.34 But given
Felix Ocampo for a valuable consideration; and that Fidela had entered the property, actually occupied the circumstances of this case, the claim of co-ownership by petitioners has no leg to stand on. Again,
it, and exercised all powers of dominion over it to the exclusion of petitioners. we stress, Belen clearly traced the source of her sole ownership of the property in question and thereby
As proofs of ownership of the property by Fidela, Belen presented Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT- foreclosed the unproven and unsubstantiated allegation of co-ownership thereof.
4389 (983),21which named the former as owner in fee simple; and a Declaration of Real In addition to the TCT presented, Belen offered as evidence the Tax Declaration35 indicating that she, as
Property,22 evidencing payment of real property taxes, also by Fidela as owner. owner, had been paying real estate taxes on the property, all to the exclusion of petitioners.
To prove further that Fidela had exercised dominion over the property, Belen also presented a Real Estate On the other hand, petitioners could not show any title, tax receipt or document to prove their ownership.
Mortgage23 executed by the former as absolute owner. Fidela had executed it in favor of her sister Having filed an action involving property, they should have relied on the strength of their own title and not
Apolonia Ocampo, one of the original petitioners in this case, who is now represented by her heirs. Belen on the alleged weakness of respondents claim.36
correctly argues that in agreeing to be a mortgagee, Apolonia admitted and recognized Fidela as the true
owner of the land in question. Petitioners assert that their claim of co-ownership of the property was sufficiently proved by their
witnesses -- Luisa Ocampo-Llorin and Melita Ocampo. We disagree. Their testimonies cannot prevail
The Civil Code provides that an essential requisite of a contract of mortgage is that the mortgagor be the over the array of documents presented by Belen. A claim of ownership cannot be based simply on the
absolute owner of the thing mortgaged.24 Co-ownership cannot be presumed even if only a portion of the testimonies of witnesses; much less on those of interested parties, self-serving as they are.
property was mortgaged to Apolonia, because a co-owner may dispose only of ones interest in
the ideal or abstract part of the undivided thing co-owned with others.25 The effect of a mortgage by a co- As to the photographs presented by petitioners to bolster their claim of co-ownership, we affirm the CAs
owner shall be limited to the portion that may be allotted to that person upon the termination of the co- disposition showing the flimsiness of their claim as follows:
ownership.26 In this case, Fidela mortgaged a definiteportion of the property and thus negated any
acknowledgement of co-ownership. "The other piece of documentary evidence presented by appellants really proved nothing. The
ancient photograph showing the spouses Chino Jose and Juana Llander Ocampo together with
Third, Belen then presented a Deed of Donation Inter Vivos 27 executed on January 13, 1984, between their ten children, simply proved that there was such a picture taking of the spouses with their
herself as donee and Fidela as donor. This act shows the immediate source of the formers claim of sole children. But the photograph does not prove communal ownership by appellants over the
ownership of the property. disputed parcels of land; neither does it prove that the said properties were indeed owned by
the spouses Chino Jose and Juana Ocampo, and then later on transferred to and commonly
A donation as a mode of acquiring ownership results in an effective transfer of title to the property from owned by their children. By the same token, the picture exhibited by appellant showing the
the donor to the donee.28 Petitioners stubbornly rely on the Acknowledgement of Co-ownership allegedly name Oniang Ocampo -- 1-15-61 (or Apolonia Ocampo, one of the children of the spouses
executed by Fidela in favor of her siblings. What they overlook is the fact that at the time of the execution Chino Jose and Juana) engraved in the house or building, does not prove communal ownership
of the Acknowledgement -- assuming that its authenticity and due execution were proven -- the property of the properties in question. At best, it is susceptible of various meanings, like: that of Oniang
had already been donated to Belen. The Deed of Donation, which is the prior document, is clearly Ocampo was born on 1-15-61, or that she got married on that date, or that she was celebrating
inconsistent with the document relied upon by petitioners. We agree with the RTCs ratiocination: a special event on the date mentioned, or that she even died on the date mentioned. And even
"On the claim of plaintiffs that defendant Fidela Ll. Ocampo herself made a written assuming ex gratia argumenti, that the said engraving proved ownership over the disputed
acknowledgement for her co-ownership over all the properties disputed with plaintiffs in this building, some such fact can only work to the prejudice of herein appellants. Why? Because it
case, the same cannot be considered as a declaration against Fidelas interest since the would mean that only Oniang (or Apolonia) was the owner of the building and that the building
alleged acknowledgement was written and executed on 24 December 1985 when she was no is not, therefore, a communal property of the children of the late spouses Chino Jose and
longer the owner of the property as the year previous, on 13 January 1984, she had already Juana. Adverting to this piece of evidence, the Trial Court postulated --
donated all her properties to defendant Belen Ocampo-Barrito, so that, in effect, she had no The engravings on the house ONIANG OCAMPO BLDG. -- 1-15-61 cannot serve
more properties with which she can have an interest to declare against." 29 as evidence that the property is of common ownership. At most, this can only
Petitioners argue that the Acknowledgement of Co-ownership may be considered as a declaration against establish the fact that said building was constructed for a certain Oniang on 15
interest. A statement may be admissible as such a declaration if it complies with the following requisites: January 1961. If, indeed, the property is of common ownership, there could not have
1) the declarant is dead or unable to testify; 2) it relates to a fact against the interest of the declarant; 3) been any difficulty to engrave thereon HEIRS OF JOSE OCAMPO and JUANA
at the time of the declaration, the declarant was aware that it was contrary to his or her interest; and 4) LLANDER-OCAMPO -- 1-15-61 instead of ONIANG OCAMPO BLDG. -- 1-15-
the declarant had no motive to falsify and believed the declaration to be true. 30 61."37

As correctly found by the trial court, however, the Acknowledgement of Co-ownership could not be a fact Neither can we accept petitioners contention that co-ownership is shown by the fact that some of the
against the interest of the declarant, since her right over the property had already been extinguished by children of Spouses Ocampo stayed, lived, and even put up businesses on the property. The appellate
the prior act of donation. Thus, at the time of the declaration, Fidela could not have acknowledged co- court correctly found that since the litigants in this case were blood relatives, fraternal affection could
ownership, as she had no more property against which she had an interest to declare. have been a good motive that impelled either Belen or Fidela to allow petitioners to use the property.
Without any proof, however, co-ownership among the parties cannot be presumed.
Neither are we persuaded by the contention that Spouses Ocampo placed the subject property in the "This Court from the outset had the opportunity to see and hear the tell-tale [signs] of
name of only one person in accordance with a Chinese custom. As mentioned earlier, that custom truthfulness or perjury like the flush of face, or the tone of voice, or the dart of eyes, or the
consisted of placing properties of parents in the name of the eldest unmarried son or daughter, with the fearful pause [--] and finds that credibility is with the defendants [herein respondents].
implicit understanding that ownership thereof would later revert to the siblings. Moreover, the preponderance of evidence is with defendants whose testimonial evidences are
buttressed by their documentary evidences."48
In contrast to the failure of petitioners to prove that such custom existed and was practiced in that
place,38 Belen presented evidence that clearly negated any claim of ownership by the formers Finally, we agree with the CA in eliminating the awards for damages and attorneys fees for respondents
predecessors-in-interest. Having shown that the property in question was originally owned by one Adolfo failure to show any factual, legal or equitable bases therefor.49
Ocampo -- not by Spouses Ocampo, from whom petitioners derive their right -- the claim of custom
becomes immaterial. WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED, and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioners.
The fact that Fidela was not presented in court will not necessarily favor petitioners and prove that the
property in question is indeed co-owned. If they felt that her testimony would prove their cause, then they SO ORDERED.
could have easily called her as an adverse or a hostile witness. 39 But since respondents were confident
in the documents they presented in court, they did not see any need to call her as a witness.
Petitioners also question the motives of Fidela for donating her properties, when she is still alive and
needs money in her old age. They clearly overlook the nature of a donation.
Donation is an act of liberality whereby a person gratuitously disposes of a thing or a right in favor of
another who accepts it.40 Once perfected, a donation is final; its revocation or rescission cannot be
effected, absent any legal ground therefor.41 A donation may in fact comprehend the entire property of
the donor.42 At any rate, the law provides that donors should reserve, in full ownership or in usufruct,
sufficient means for their own support and that of all their relatives who, at the time of the acceptance of
the donation, are by law entitled to be supported by them.43
In questioning the motives of Fidela for donating the subject property, petitioners are contradicting even
themselves. On the one hand, they assert that she would not have disposed of her property, since she
would need it in her old age; on the other, they argue that it was not hers alone anyway. It should be clear
that the law protects donors by providing that, without any reservation of sufficient means for themselves,
the donation shall be reduced upon the petition of any person affected. 44
To be sure, petitioners arguments all pertain to circumstances extraneous to the Deed of Donation itself.
The law is clear that when its terms have been reduced to writing, an agreement must be presumed to
contain all the terms agreed upon; and there can be, between the parties and their successors in interest,
no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement. 45
Petitioners did not question the consent of Fidela to the donation. Never was there any intimation that
she had either been coerced or defrauded into entering into it. As all the essential elements of a donation
-- consent, subject matter and cause46 -- have been satisfied, we see no reason to entertain any doubt
about the Deed pertaining thereto.
The question of why the land was registered several years after the donation is purely speculative. What
is important is that there was a duly proven Deed of Donation, which formed the basis of Belens claim
and led to the registration of the property in her name.
Petitioners also question Fidelas filing of an unlawful detainer suit after the date of the Deed of Donation.
Again, we remind petitioners that because this action involves property, they should rely on the strength
of their own title, not on the alleged weakness of the claim of respondents. At any rate, the burden of
proof of the claim of co-ownership rests on the former.
Moreover, the final resolution of this case entails the review of factual findings of the courts below. It is a
settled doctrine that in a civil case, final and conclusive are the factual findings of the trial court, if
supported by clear and convincing evidence on record. Usually, the Supreme Court does not review those
findings -- especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, as in this case. 47 From the records of the
present case, no cogent evidence appears that would impel us to apply the above doctrine differently.
The courts below have not overlooked essential facts that, if considered, may produce a different
outcome. The trial court correctly explained thus:
G.R. No. 152862 July 26, 2004 instant case includes the properties subject of Civil Case No. CEB-24896 there is merit in
movants motion to suspend this case."12
TERESITA S. REYES-DE LEON, petitioner,
vs. Meanwhile, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss13 petitioners Complaint, alleging that, having failed to
VICENTE B. DEL ROSARIO, respondent. raise the issue of nullity as a compulsory counterclaim in her Answer in the partition case, petitioner is
barred from filing the action for declaration of nullity following Section 2, Rule 9 of the Rules of
DECISION Court.14 Furthermore, he alleged that petitioner is guilty of forum-shopping since the same transactions
and essential facts and circumstances are involved in the action for declaration of nullity and in the
TINGA, J.: partition case.15

This is a petition for review seeking to set aside the 15 August 2000 Order1 of the Regional Trial Court, In the interim, the partition case was raffled to Branch 5, RTC Cebu which was then presided by Judge
Branch 6, Cebu City, 7th Judicial Region as well as its 19 February 2002 Order,2 denying Ireneo Lee Gako, Jr. In an Order dated 14 July 2000,16 the new partition court set the preliminary
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. conference for the case, and in fact held a preliminary conference on 29 July 2000. In its Order dated 15
August 2000,17 the partition court ordered the parties to submit to the court a list of uncontested properties.
The instant case traces its origin to an action for Partition filed by Pantaleon U. del Rosario and his son, As a result of the preliminary conference, the parties agreed to partition an uncontested portion of the
respondent Vicente B. del Rosario, before the Regional Trial Court, 7th Judicial Region, Branch 11 of estate.18
Cebu City. In the Amended Complaint,3 petitioner Teresita Reyes-de Leon was impleaded as a
defendant, being one of the heirs of the late spouses Pantaleon S. del Rosario and Ceferina Llamas. Likewise on 15 August 2000, the Complaint for declaration of nullity was eventually dismissed by Branch
Plaintiffs therein, Pantaleon U. del Rosario and Vicente B. del Rosario, are cousin and nephew, 6, RTC Cebu, this time presided by Judge Ireneo Lee Gako, Jr. The trial court ratiocinated that the issue
respectively, of the petitioner. The case involved several parcels of land collectively grouped as follows: of ownership should be determined and resolved in the partition case. 19 It also noted that the filing of a
"Tupas Properties," "Asinan Properties," "Figueroa Property," "Barili Properties," "Mambaling Properties," separate action to determine the real owner of the properties in issue and sought to be partitioned would
"Negros Properties," and "Other Properties."4 Plaintiffs therein claimed that petitioner executed a deed of result in multiplicity of suits.20 Petitioner sought the reconsideration of the Order dated 15 August 2000,
absolute sale in favor of Vicente B. del Rosario covering all of her shares in the properties sought to be but the same was denied in the trial courts 19 February 2002 Order, issued this time by Judge Anacleto
partitioned.5 L. Caminade.21 Hence, the instant petition.

In her Answer dated 10 November 1998, petitioner claimed that she did not execute any deed of sale in While the petition was pending, petitioner died and was substituted by her heirs, namely: Michael Alain
favor of Vicente B. del Rosario.6 She further averred that the only portions of her inheritance she ever Reyes De Leon and Isidro de Leon.22
sold were her shares in the Asinan and Negros properties, which she sold in favor of Pantaleon U. del Petitioner raises the following issues:23
Rosario, and the late Vicente S. del Rosario.7
I. Whether or not a party raising the defense of inexistence or nullity of deed of sale in a partition
In December 1999, petitioner filed a Complaint for declaration of nullity of deed of sale with damages case (which deed is made as one of the bases of the plaintiffs prayer for partition therein) is
before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City.8 She stated that on 14 December 1983, she sold her one- barred from filing an entirely separate action for declaration of nullity of the same deed on the
half (1/2) share in the Asinan Properties to Pantaleon U. del Rosario, respondents father. 9 However, ground of multiplicity of suits and forum-shopping.
petitioner was shocked when, sometime in August 1996, she learned from her cousins, who were
defendants in the initial partition case filed by the respondent, that respondent Vicente B. del Rosario was II. Whether or not the final January 19, 2000 Order of the trial court in the partition case
claiming all of her shares in the estate of Ceferina Llamas, her maternal grandmother. The claim is based (suspending the proceeding therein on the ground that the Declaration of Nullity of Deed of
on a deed of absolute sale purportedly signed by petitioner on 20 January 1985,10 which according to her, Sale cannot be incorporated in the partition case) will be adversely affected by the dismissal of
covers the same Asinan properties sold to respondents father and for the same consideration. However, the instant case.
the deed, she further alleged, fraudulently added the phrase "including any and all of her shares, rights
and interests on all other real estate properties together with their improvements which she acquired by On the other hand, respondent submits a lone issue, to wit:
inheritance from the estate of the late Ceferina Llamas Vda. De Del Rosario." 11 In addition, petitioner III. Whether or not this petition should be dismissed on the ground of litis pendentia and forum-
sought to recover P500,000.00, as moral damages for respondents refusal to admit the nullity of the shopping because of the pendency of the partition case.
deed, and for his continued and unjust claim over her properties.
The parties are agreed that the issues of forum-shopping and litis pendentia are determinative of this
Upon the filing of the Complaint for declaration of nullity, petitioner moved for the suspension of the case. Essentially, however, the two issues are two sides of a coin.
partition proceedings. On 19 January 2000, Judge Victorino U. Montecillo, presiding judge of the partition
court, granted the motion with the following order, to wit: The petition which raises only questions of law is devoid of merit.
"In her motion dated December 20, 1999 defendant Teresita de Leon prayed for the suspension Forum-shopping consists of filing multiple suits in different courts, either simultaneously or successively,
of the trial of this case on the ground that plaintiff Vicente B. del Rosario would have no cause involving the same parties, to ask the courts to rule on the same or related causes and/or to grant the
of action in the instant case should she prevail in Civil Case No. CEB-24698 wherein she same or substantially same reliefs,24 on the supposition that one or the other court would make a favorable
sought to declare as null and void the deed of sale she allegedly issued in favor of Vicente B. disposition.25
del Rosario. Plaintiffs filed an opposition stating that by filing Civil Case No. CEB-24698 movant
is guilty of forum shopping and splitting a cause of action. In the case of Ayala Land, Inc., v. Valisno,26 we held that:

.... "Forum shopping exists when the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final
judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other. Litis pendentia requires the
Movants cause of action in Civil Case No. CEB-24698 is entirely different which cannot and concurrence of the following requisites:
should not be incorporated in the instant case. Since the partition sought by plaintiffs in the
1. Identity of parties, or at least such parties as those representing the same interests in both appellate court did not exceed the limits of its jurisdiction when it ruled on the validity of the
actions; 1965 sale."31
2. Identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on the same facts; The trial court pursued the same tack in this case. It held that as the partition court, it should determine
and and resolve the issue of ownership of the properties subject of the disputed deed of absolute sale. As it
pointed out, petitioner had already raised the allegation of nullity as a defense. It also agreed with the
3. Identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two cases, such that any judgment respondent that petitioner raised in the partition case the issue of "whether or not defendant Teresita de
that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would Leon validly sold all her shares in the inheritance to plaintiff Vicente B. del Rosario." 32
amount to res adjudicata in the other case."27
Moreover, in the Verification33 for the Complaint for declaration of nullity, petitioner claimed that "I have
As can be clearly seen from the records of the case, the parties in Civil Case CEB-17236, or the partition not commenced any other action or court proceeding involving the same issues in the Supreme Court,
case, are likewise the parties in Civil Case CEB-24698, the action for declaration of nullity. In the latter the Court of Appeals, or in any other Tribunals or Agency," and that "to the best of my knowledge, no
case, they filed the complaint or were impleaded, as the case may be, on account of their purported such action or proceeding is pending in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or in any other Tribunals
shares in the very estate sought to be partitioned in the former. In both cases, petitioner asserted that or Agency." The veracity of these statements is belied by petitioner herself. In her Complaint, petitioner
she did not sell to respondent any of her shares in the estate except in two properties and on that basis alleged that herein respondent is claiming all of her shares in the estate of Ceferina Llamas, based on a
sought the declaration of nullity of the disputed deed of absolute sale relied upon by the respondent. deed of absolute sale purportedly signed by her,34 and that she was informed of the existence of the said
Consequently, the determination of ownership in either case would amount to res judicata in regard to instrument by her cousins when the same was alleged in the partition case. 35 She even filed her Answer to
the other. the Amended Complaint and claimed therein that she did not sell any share, much more all of her shares
The question of validity or nullity of the deed of sale, as well as the claim for damages, is necessarily and to respondent. It is thus clear that she was aware of the partition case and that she even participated
logically intertwined with the partition case. Only the shares in the lots which are determined to have been therein when she filed her Complaint.
validly sold to the respondent may be included in the action for partition. Conversely, shares in the lots Doubtlessly, petitioner made a false or untrue certification of non-forum shopping.
which were not validly disposed of by the petitioner shall have to be excluded in the order of partition.
Indeed, only properties owned in common may be the object of an action for partition. Put elsewise, an To split the proceedings into declaration of nullity of the deed of sale and trial for the partition case, or to
order of partition presupposes a state of co-ownership as the status quo ante. This is implicit from Rule hold in abeyance the partition case pending resolution of the nullity case would result in multiplicity of
6928 on Partition which provides in Section 2 thereof that if after trial the court finds that the plaintiff is suits, duplicitous procedure and unnecessary delay, as the lower court observed. 36 The conduct of
entitled to the partition sought, "it shall order the partition of the real estate among all the parties in separate trials of the parties respective claims would entail a substantial duplication of effort and time not
interest." Of course, this rule of procedure carries out the substantial right conferred by the Civil Code on only of the parties but also of the courts concerned. On the other hand, it would be in the interest of justice
co-owners. Article 494 of the Code provides that "(e)ach co-owner may demand at any time the partition if the partition court hears all the actions and incidents concerning the properties subject of the partition
of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned." in a single and complete proceeding.
The issue of ownership or co-ownership, to be more precise, must first be resolved in order to effect a After all, the issue of nullity can be properly ventilated before the partition court. Thus, even with the
partition of properties. This should be done in the action for partition itself. As held in the case dismissal of the action for nullity, petitioner is not without recourse. She can still dispute the execution of
of Catapusan v. Court of Appeals:29 the deed of absolute sale and assert her rights to the properties subject of the said instrument in the
partition case. There is no need for a separate case to resolve the matter.
"In actions for partition, the court cannot properly issue an order to divide the property, unless
it first makes a determination as to the existence of co-ownership. The court must initially settle In light of the foregoing, it is obvious that petitioner resorted to forum-shopping.
the issue of ownership, the first stage in an action for partition. Needless to state, an action for
partition will not lie if the claimant has no rightful interest over the subject property. In fact, Also present here is litis pendentia.
Section 1 of Rule 69 requires the party filing the action to state in his complaint the "nature and Petitioner asserts that the action for partition and the declaration of nullity involve distinct and separate
extent of his title" to the real estate. Until and unless the issue of ownership is definitely causes of action. While the first calls for the determination of their respective rights to the inheritance, the
resolved, it would be premature to effect a partition of the properties. xxx." second is a redress for relief for the fraudulent act committed by one party on the property rights of the
In the case of Viloria v. Court of Appeals,30 the heirs of deceased co-owners of a parcel of land sought other.
the partition thereof. The surviving co-owner opposed the action, contending that the deceased co- At first glance, the second case for declaration of nullity appears to have a different cause of action.
owners had sold and conveyed their shares to him prior to their demise. The trial court ruled that the However, a closer examination reveals that the second case partakes the nature of a compulsory
decedents remained co-owners of the lot as there was no effective conveyance of their shares which counterclaim.
upon their demise were inherited by their heirs. On appeal, the Court Appeals affirmed the ruling of the
trial court, with the modification that the deed of sale which defendant therein relied upon was not valid A compulsory counterclaim, as held in the case of Ponciano v. Parentela,37 is any claim for money or
as such since it merely constituted an express trust. Before this Court, petitioner ascribed to the appellate other relief which a defending party may have against an opposing party, which at the time of suit arises
court grave error in assuming jurisdiction over the validity of the deed of sale as it was never raised as out of, or is necessarily connected with, the same transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of
an issue in the partition case. We held that: plaintiffs complaint. It is compulsory in the sense that if it is within the jurisdiction of the court, and does
not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties over whom the court cannot acquire
"xxx. In the action for partition private respondents claimed that they were co-owners of the jurisdiction, it must be set up therein, and will be barred in the future if not set up. 38
property subject thereof hence entitled to their share, while petitioner denied their claim by
asserting that their rights were supplanted by him by virtue of the deed of absolute sale. As a For this reason, a compulsory counterclaim cannot be the subject of a separate action but should instead
result, the issue of co-ownership and the legality of the 1965 sale have to be resolved in the be asserted in the same suit involving the same transaction or occurrence which gave rise to it. 39 To
partition case. As enunciated in Catapusan v. CA, until and unless the issue of ownership is determine whether a counterclaim is compulsory or not, the Court has devised the following tests: (1) Are
definitely resolved, it would be premature to effect a partition of the properties. Thus, the the issues of fact or law raised by the claim and the counterclaim largely the same? (2) Would res
judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendant's claim absent the compulsory counterclaim rule? (3) Will earlier. That respondent did not resort to other remedies to set aside the said orders is of no moment, as
substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiffs claim as well as the defendant's counterclaim? the resumption of proceedings and the issuance of said orders by the new Judge presiding over the
and (4) Is there any logical relation between the claim and the counterclaim?40 The instant case reveals partition court have rendered the 19 January 2000 Order of Judge Montecillo functus oficio. As such, we
affirmative answers to all the foregoing questions. see no reason why the dismissal of the nullity case should adversely affect the proceedings in the partition
case.
Clearly, petitioners action for declaration of nullity and respondents claim anent his share in the partition
case stemmed from the same disputed deed of sale. An adjudication of validity or nullity of the deed of WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari dated 30 April 2002 is DENIED. The 15 August 2000
sale in any of the two cases would constitute res judicata. It is beyond doubt that the same evidence and the 19 February 2002 Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 6 dismissing
would be utilized by the parties to prove their sides in both cases. The issue of nullity of the deed of the Complaint in Civil Case No. CEB-24698 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
absolute sale is necessarily connected with the partition case since the resolution thereof will determine
the proper shares of the parties in the estate sought to be partitioned. SO ORDERED.

Petitioner raised the claim of nullity of the deed of absolute sale merely as a defense in her Answer to
the Amended Complaint, thus:
"6. xxx paragraphs 12, 13,14,15,19, and 21 are all denied because herein defendant never
sold her shares to plaintiff Vicente B. del Rosario. The only portions of the inheritance she ever
sold were the Asinan Properties in favor of plaintiff Pantaleon U. del Rosario and Negros
Properties in favor of the late Vicente S. Del Rosario;"41
That is sufficient to contest the validity of the deed of sale for the purpose of excluding her shares from
the coverage of the partition case. But her failure to set up the corresponding claim for damages in the
partition case precludes her from filing a separate case or pursuing it, as she did with her institution of
the action for declaration of nullity. As a compulsory counterclaim, the same is now barred.42
Additionally, petitioners action for damages pertains to the alleged moral damages she suffered because
of "defendants refusal to admit the nullity of the deed of absolute sale, and because of his continued and
unjust claim over plaintiffs properties despite his knowledge of its baselessness, plaintiff suffered
wounded feelings, sleepless nights, serious anxiety, and the like."43 These are allegations which are
proper subjects of a compulsory counterclaim, which should have been raised in the partition case, which
unfortunately, she did not.
Now, the second issue raised by the petitioner.
What sets this case apart from the usual is the fact that the partition court itself initially suspended the
proceedings therein after making a pronouncement that petitioners cause of action in the second case
being different, it ordained that the second case should not be "incorporated" in the partition case. 44 This
is the thrust of the second issue.
Petitioner claims that the suspension order of the partition court would be affected by or run counter to
the dismissal of the partition case itself. She makes issue of the fact that respondent did not make any
move to set aside the pertinent order by any mode of relief. She further argues that the order, along with
the partition courts denial of respondents motion for reconsideration, is now final and cannot be affected
or disturbed by the dismissal of the instant case.
We are not convinced.
To begin with, the partition court was not in a position to determine the issue of whether or not petitioners
action for declaration of nullity involves a cause of action separate or distinct from the cause of action in
the partition case pending before it. The issue was appropriately within the competency of the other RTC
branch before which the action for nullity claim was pending. Out of deference and respect to its co-equal
branch, the partition court could have merely suspended the proceedings, as it did, in view of the pending
action for declaration of nullity.
Nonetheless, the suspension order issued by Judge Victorino U. Montecillo presiding over the partition
court, as well as his order denying the motion for reconsideration,45 are provisional in nature. Both orders
have no bearing on the final outcome of the issues of ownership and nullity of the deed of sale and,
eventually, the decision in the partition case. The partition court could resume hearing the case, as in fact
it did when it called for a preliminary conference on 29 July 2000. 46 Actually, the partition court started to
partition the uncontested portions of the estate, even virtually disregarding the suspension order it issued
G.R. No. 132518 March 28, 2000 its absence could not be used by Tomas Maglucot, or respondents as his successors-in-interest, to deny
the existence of an approved partitioned against the other co-owners who claim that there was one. 7 Said
GAVINA MAGLUCOT-AW, CATALINA ORCULLO, RICHARD ESTANO, NIDA MAGLUCOT, court, likewise, ruled that the tax declarations 8 over the houses of respondents, expressly stating that the
MELANIA MAGLUCOT-CATUBIG, EMILIANO CATUBIG, LADISLAO SALMA, petitioners, same are constructed on the lots of Roberto Maglucot, constitute a conclusive admission by them of the
vs. ownership of the subject lot by the latter. 9
LEOPOLDO MAGLUCOT, SEVERO MAGLUCOT, WILFREDA MAGLUCOT-ALEJO and
CONSTANCIO ALEJO,respondents. The dispositive portion of the lower court's decision reads as follows:
KAPUNAN, J.: WHEREFORE, on the basis of the foregoing discussion, judgment is hereby rendered in favor
of the plaintiffs against the defendants ordering the latter:
This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision, dated 11 November 1997, of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 48816 which reversed and set aside the Decision, dated 13 December 1994, 1. To demolish their houses inside lot 1639-D, vacate the premises thereof
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 30 of Dumaguete City, Negros Oriental in an action for recovery of and deliver the possession of the same to Plaintiffs;
possession and damages.
2. To jointly and solidarily pay plaintiffs the sum of P15,000.00 for
The core issue in this case is whether a partition of Lot No. 1639 had been effected in 1952. Petitioners attorney's fees:
contend that there was already a partition of said lot; hence, they are entitled to exclusive possession
and ownership of Lot No. 1639-D which originally formed part of Lot No. 1639 until its partition. Private 3. To each pay plaintiffs the sum of P100.00 every year from 1993 for
respondents, upon the other hand, claim that there was no partition; hence, they are co-owners of Lot actual damages representing the amount of unpaid rentals up to the time
No. 1639-D. Notably, this case presents a unique situation where there is an order for partition but there they actually vacate the premises in question;
is no showing that the sketch/subdivision plan was submitted to the then Court of First Instance for its 4. To pay the costs. 10
approval or that a decree or order was registered in the Register of Deeds.
On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC. The appellate court ruled that the sketch plan and
The antecedent facts of the case are as follows: tax declarations relied upon by petitioners are not conclusive evidence of partition. 11 The CA likewise
Petitioners filed with the RTC a complaint for recovery of possession and damages alleging, inter alia, found that the prescribed procedure under Rule 69 of the Rules of Court was not followed. It thus declared
that they are the owners of Lot No. 1639-D. Said lot was originally part of Lot No. 1639 which was covered that there was no partition of Lot No. 1639.
by Original Certificate Title No. 6775 issued in the names of Hermogenes Olis, Bartolome Maglucot. Petitioners filed this petition for review on certiorari alleging that the CA committed the following reversible
Pascual Olis, Roberto Maglucot, Anselmo Lara and Tomas Maglucot on 16 August 1927. 1 On 19 April errors:
1952, Tomas Maglucot, one of the registered owners and respondents predecessors-in-interest, filed a
petition to subdivide lot No. 1639. 2 Consequently, on 13 May 1952, then CFI of Negros Oriental issued I
an order 3 directing the parties to subdivide said lot into six portions as follows:
IN VIOLATING THE LAW ON ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION PLAINTIFFS HAVING
a) Hermogenes Olis lot 1639-A POSSESSED LOT 1639-D SINCE 1946;
b) Pascual Olis lot 1639-B II
c) Bartolome Maglucot lot 1639-C IN VIOLATING THE LAW ON ESTOPPEL, THE FACT OF PAYMENT OF RENTALS AND
OFFER TO BUY THE DEFENDANTS IS ADMISSION THAT THE AREA IN LOT 1639-D. HAD
d) Roberto (Alberto) Maglucot lot 1639-D LONG BEEN ADJUDICATED TO PLAINTIFFS;
e) Anselmo Lara lot 1639-E III
f) Tomas Maglucot lot 1639-F. 4 IN DECLARING THAT THERE WAS NO PRIOR PARTITION, CONTRARY TO THE
Sometime in 1963, Guillermo Maglucot rented a portion of Lot No. 1639-D (subject lot). Subsequently, FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT, AND AGAINST THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD, OF
Leopoldo and Severo, both surnamed Maglucot, rented portions of subject lot in 1964 and 1969, WHICH IF PROPERLY CONSIDERED WOULD CHANGE THE OUTCOME OF THE CASE;
respectively, and each paying rentals therefor. Said respondents built houses on their corresponding IV
leased lots. They paid the rental amount of P100.00 per annum to Mrs. Ruperta Salma, who represented
the heirs of Roberto Maglucot, petitioners predecessors-in-interest. In December 1992, however, said IN DECLARING THAT THERE IS NO LAW OR JURISPRUDENCE APPLICABLE UNDER
respondents stopped paying rentals claiming ownership over the subject lot. Petitioners thus filed the THE PREMISES; THIS WOULD ONLY SHOW THAT THE RECORD OF THE CASE WAS
complaint a quo. NOT PROPERLY SCRUTINIZED, AND THE LAW WAS NOT PROPERLY STUDIED;
ESPECIALLY IN THE CASE AT BENCH THAT THE ORAL AND MUTUAL PARTITION
After trail, the lower court rendered judgment in favor of petitioners. The RTC found the existence of tax HAPPENED DURING THE REGIME OF THE OLD RULES OF PROCEDURE; 12
declarations in the names of Hermogenes Olis and Pascual Oils (purported owners of Lot Nos. 1639-A
and 1639-B, respectively) 5 as indubitable proof that there was a subdivision of Lot No. 1639. It likewise Petitioners maintain that Lot No. 1639 was mutually partitioned and physically subdivided among the co-
found that Tomas Maglucot, respondents' predecessors-in-interest, took active part in the partition as it owners and that majority of them participated in the actual execution of the subdivision. Further, the co-
was he, in fact, who commenced the action for partition. 6 The court a quo cited Article 1431 of the Civil owners accepted their designated shares in 1946 as averred by Tomas Maglucot in his petition for
Code which states that "[t]hrough estoppel an admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon partition. 13 Petitioners opine that in 1952, Tomas Maglucot himself initiated a court proceeding for a
the person making it, and cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon." Applying formal subdivision of Lot No. 1639. In said petition, he averred that only Hermogenes Olis and the heirs
said provision of law, it held that while there was no court order showing that Lot No. 1639 was partitioned, of Pascual Olis were not agreeable to the partition. 14 Petitioners further contend that respondents
admitted in their tax declarations covering their respective houses that they are "constructed on the land applied, the order not having been appealed or questioned by any of the parties to the case, it has become
of Roberto Maglucot." 15 Simply put, petitioners vigorously assert that respondents are estopped from final and executory and cannot be disturbed.
claiming to be co-owners of the subject lot in view of the mutual agreement in 1946, judicial confirmation
in 1952, and respondents' acquiescence because they themselves exclusively exercised ownership over The true test to ascertain whether or not an order or a judgment is interlocutory or final is: Does it leave
Lot No. 1639-A beginning 1952 up to the present. 16 something to be done in the trial court with respect to the merits of the case? If it does, it is interlocutory;
if it does not, it is final. The key test to what is interlocutory is when there is something more to be done
For their part, respondents posit three points in support of their position. First, they emphasize that on the merits of the case. 24 An order for partition is final and not interlocutory and, hence, appealable
petitioners failed to show that the interested parties were apprised, or notified of the tentative subdivision because it decides the rights of the parties upon the issue submitted. 25
contained in the sketch and that the CFI subsequently confirmed the same. 17 Second, they point to the
fact that petitioners were unable to show any court approval of any partition. 18 Third, they maintain that However, this Court notes that the order of partition was issued when the ruling in Fuentebella
Lot No. 1639 remain undivided since to date, OCT No. 6275 is still an existing and perfectly valid title, vs. Carrascoso, 26 which held that the order of partition is interlocutory, was controlling. In addition, the
containing no annotation of any encumbrance or partition whatsoever. 19 reports of the commissioners not having been confirmed by the trial court are not binding. 27 In this case,
both the order of partition and the unconfirmed sketch plan are, thus, interlocutory. Nevertheless, where
After a careful consideration of the pleadings filed by the parties and the evidence on record, we find that parties do not object to the interlocutory decree, but show by their conduct that they have assented
the petition is meritorious. As stated earlier, the core issue in this case is whether there was a valid thereto, they cannot thereafter question the decree, 28 especially, where, by reason of their conduct,
partition in 1952. considerable expense has been incurred in the execution of the commission. 29 Respondents in this case
have occupied their respective lots in accordance with the sketch/subdivision plan. They cannot after
Preliminary, this Court recognizes that "the jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought before it from the acquiescing to the order for more than forty (40) years be allowed to question the binding effect thereof.
Court of Appeals via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is limited to reviewing errors of law. Findings of fact of
the latter are conclusive, except in the following instances: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely This case is to be distinguished from the order in the action for partition in Arcenas vs. Cinco. 30 In that
on speculation, surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or case, the order was clearly interlocutory since it required the parties "to submit the corresponding deed
impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a of partition to the Court for its approval." Here, the order appointed two commissioners and directed them
misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the merely to approve the sketch plan already existing and tentatively followed by the parties.
Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of
both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when Under the present rule, the proceedings of the commissioners without being confirmed by the court are
the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the not binding upon the parties. 31 However, this rule does not apply in case where the parties themselves
facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the actualized the supposedly unconfirmed sketch/subdivision plan. The purpose of the court approval is to
respondent; and (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and give effect to the sketch/subdivision plan. In this case, the parties themselves or through their
contradicted by the evidence on record." 20 This case falls under exceptions (7), (8) and (10) in that the predecessors-in-interest implemented the sketch plan made pursuant to a court order for partition by
findings of facts of the CA are in conflict with that of the RTC, are mere conclusions without citation of actually occupying specific portions of Lot No. 1639 in 1952 and continue to do so until the present until
specific evidence on which they are based and are premised on absence of evidence but are contradicted this case was filed, clearly, the purpose of the court approval has been met. This statement is not to be
by the evidence on record. For these reasons, we shall consider the evidence on record to determine taken to mean that confirmation of the commissioners may be dispensed with but only that the parties
whether indeed there was partition. herein are estopped from raising this question by their own acts of ratification of the supposedly non-
binding sketch/subdivision plan.
In this jurisdiction, an action for partition is comprised of two phases: first, an order for partition which
determines whether a co-ownership in fact exists, and whether partition is proper, and, second, a decision The records of the case show that sometime in 1946 there was a prior oral agreement to tentatively
confirming the sketch or subdivision submitted by the parties or the commissioners appointed by the partition Lot No. 1639. 32 By virtue of this agreement, the original co-owners occupied specific portions of
court, as the case may be. 21 The first phase of a partition and/or accounting suit is taken up with the Lot No. 1639.33 It was only in 1952 when the petition to subdivide Lot No. 1639 was filed because two of
determination of whether or not a co-ownership in fact exists, (i.e., not otherwise legally proscribed) and the co-owners, namely Hermogenes Olis and heirs of Pascual Olis, refused to have said lot subdivided
may be made by voluntary agreement of all the parties interested in the property. This phase may end and have separate certificates of title. Significantly, after the 1952 proceedings, the parties in this case
with a declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to have a partition either because a co-ownership does not by themselves and/or through their predecessors-in-interest occupied specific portions of Lot No. 1639
exist, or partition is legally prohibited. It may end, upon the other hand, with an adjudgment that a co- in accordance with the sketch plan. Such possession remained so until this case arose, or about forty
ownership does in truth exist, partition is proper in the premises and an accounting of rents and profits (40) years later.
received by the defendant from the real estate in question is in order. In the latter case, "the parties may, From its order in 1952, it can be gleaned that the CFI took notice of the tentative subdivision plan by oral
if they are able to agree, make partition among themselves by proper instruments of conveyance, and partition of the parties therein. Further, it appears that the court was aware that the parties therein actually
the court shall confirm the partition so agreed upon. In either case i.e., either the action is dismissed took possession of the portions in accordance with the sketch/subdivision plan. With the factual backdrop,
or partition and/or accounting is decreed the order is a final one, and may be appealed by any party said court ordered the partition and appointed two (2) commissioners to approve the tentative
aggrieved thereby. 22 The second phase commences when it appears that "the parties are unable to agree sketch/subdivision plan. It would not be unreasonable to presume that the parties therein, having
upon the partition" directed by the court. In that event, partition shall be done for the parties by the court occupied specific portions of Lot No. 1639 in accordance with the sketch/subdivision plan, were aware
with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners. This second stage may well also deal with that it was that same sketch/subdivision plan which would be considered by the commissioners for
the rendition of the accounting itself and its approval by the court after the parties have been accorded approval. There is no showing that respondents by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest
opportunity to be heard thereon, and an award for the recovery by the party or parties thereto entitled of raised any objections. On the contrary, the records show that the parties continued their possession of
their just share in the rents and profits of the real estate in question." Such an order is, to be sure, final the specific portions of Lot No. 1639 pursuant to the sketch/subdivision plan.
and appealable. 23
It has been previously held that a co-owner, who, though not a party to a partition accepts the partition
The present rule on the question of finality and appealability of a decision or order decreeing partition is allotted to him, and holds and conveys the same in severalty, will not be subsequently permitted to avoid
that it is final and appealable. 23 The order of partition is a final determination of the co-ownership over partition. 34 It follows that a party to a partition is also barred from avoiding partition when he has received
Lot No. 1639 by the parties and the propriety of the partition thereof. Hence, if the present rule were
and held a portion of the subdivided land especially in this case where respondents have enjoyed Again, we are not persuaded. The purpose of registration is to notify and protect the interests of strangers
ownership rights over their share for a long time. to a given transaction, who may be ignorant thereof, but the non-registration of the deed evidencing such
transaction does not relieve the parties thereto of their obligations thereunder. 46 As originally conceived,
Parties to a partition proceeding, who elected to take under partition, and who took possession of the registration is merely a species of notice. The act of registering a document is never necessary in order
portion allotted to them, are estopped to question title to portion allotted to another party. 35 A person to give it legal effect as between the parties. 47 Requirements for the recording of the instruments are
cannot claim both under and against the same instrument. 36 In other words, they accepted the lands designed to prevent frauds and to permit and require the public to act with the presumption that recorded
awarded them by its provisions, and they cannot accept the decree in part, and repudiate it in part. They instrument exist and are genuine. 48
must accept all or none. 37 Parties who had received the property assigned to them are precluded from
subsequently attacking its validity of any part of it. 38 Here, respondents, by themselves and/or through It must be noted that there was a prior oral partition in 1946. Although the oral agreement was merely
their predecessors-in-interest, already occupied of the lots in accordance with the sketch plan. This tentative, the facts subsequent thereto all point to the confirmation of said oral partition. By virtue of that
occupation continued until this action was filed. They cannot now be heard to question the possession agreement, the parties took possession of specific portions of the subject lot. The action for partition was
and ownership of the other co-owners who took exclusive possession of Lot 1639-D also in accordance instituted because some of the co-owners refused to have separate titles issued in lieu of the original title.
with the sketch plan. In 1952, an order for partition was issued by the cadastral court. There is no evidence that there has been
any change in the possession of the parties. The only significant fact subsequent to the issuance of the
In technical estoppel, the party to be estopped must knowingly have acted so as to mislead his adversary, order of partition in 1952 is that respondents rented portions of Lot No. 1639-D. It would be safe to
and the adversary must have placed reliance on the action and acted as he would otherwise not have conclude, therefore, that the oral partition as well as the order of partition in 1952 were the bases for the
done. Some authorities, however, hold that what is tantamount to estoppel may arise without this reliance finding of actual partition among the parties. The legal consequences of the order of partition in 1952
on the part of the adversary, and this is called, ratification or election by acceptance or benefits, which having been discussed separately, we now deal with oral partition in 1946. Given that the oral partition
arises when a party, knowing that he is not bound by a defective proceeding, and is free to repudiate it if was initially tentative, the actual possession of specific portions of Lot No. 1639 in accordance with the
he will, upon knowledge, and while under no disability, chooses to adopt such defective proceeding as oral partition and the continuation of such possession for a very long period indicate the permanency and
his own. 39 Ratification means that one under no disability voluntarily adopts and gives sanction to some ratification of such oral partition. The validity of an oral partition is already well-settled. In Espina
unauthorized act or defective proceeding, which without his sanction would not be binding on him. It is vs. Abaya, 49 we declared that an oral partition is valid. In Hernandez vs. Andal, 50 reiterated in Tan
this voluntary choice, knowingly made, which amounts to ratification of what was therefore unauthorized, vs. Lim, 51 this Court has ruled, thus:
and becomes the authorized act of the party so making the ratification. 40
On general principle, independent and in spite of the statute of frauds, courts of equity have
The records show that respondents were paying rent for the use of a portion of Lot No. 1639-D. Had they enforce oral partition when it has been completely or partly performed.
been of the belief that they were co-owners of the entire Lot No. 1639 they would not have paid rent.
Respondents attempted to counter this point by presenting an uncorroborated testimony of their sole Regardless of whether a parol partition or agreement to partition is valid and enforceable at
witness to the effect that the amount so paid to Roberto Maglucot and, subsequently, to Ruperta Salma law, equity will proper cases where the parol partition has actually been consummated by the
was for the payment of real property taxes. We are not persuaded. In its quite improbable that the parties taking of possession in severalty and the exercise of ownership by the parties of the respective
would be unaware of the difference in their treatment of their transactions for so long a time. Moreover, portions set off to each, recognize and enforce such parol partition and the rights of the parties
no evidence was ever presented to show that a tax declaration for the entire Lot No. 1639 has ever been thereunder. Thus, it has been held or stated in a number of cases involving an oral partition
made. Replete in the records are tax declarations for specific portions of Lot 1639. It is inconceivable that under which the parties went into possession, exercised acts of ownership, or otherwise partly
respondents would not be aware of this. With due diligence on their part, they could have easily verified performed the partition agreement, that equity will confirm such partition and in a proper case
this fact. This they did not do for a period spanning more than four decades. decree title in accordance with the possession in severalty.
The payment of rentals by respondents reveal that they are mere lessees. As such, the possession of In numerous cases it has been held or stated that parol partition may be sustained on the
respondents over Lot No. 1639-D is that of a holder and not in the concept of an owner. One who ground of estoppel of the parties to assert the rights of a tenant in common as to parts of land
possesses as a mere holder acknowledges in another a superior right which he believes to be ownership, divided by parol partition as to which possession in severalty was taken and acts of individual
whether his belief be right or wrong. 41 Since the possession of respondents were found to be that of ownership were exercised. And a court of equity will recognize the agreement and decree it to
lessors of petitioners, it goes without saying that the latter were in possession of Lot No. 1639-D in the be valid and effectual for the purpose of concluding the right of the parties as between each
concept of an owner from 1952 up to the time the present action was commenced. other to hold their respective parts in severalty.
Partition may be inferred from circumstances sufficiently strong to support presumption. 42 Thus, after a A parol partition may also be sustained on the ground that the parties thereto have acquiesced
long possession in severalty, a deed of partition may be presumed. 43 It has been held that recitals in in and ratified the partition by taking possession in severalty, exercising acts of ownership with
deeds, possession and occupation of land, improvements made thereon for a long series of years, and respect thereto, or otherwise recognizing the existence of the partition.
acquiescence for 60 years, furnish sufficient evidence that there was an actual partition of land either by
deed or by proceedings in the probate court, which had been lost and were not recorded. 44 And where a A number of cases have specifically applied the doctrine of part performance, or have stated
tract of land held in common has been subdivided into lots, and one of the lots has long been known and that a part performance is necessary, to take a parol partition out of the operation of the statute
called by the name of one of the tenants in common, and there is no evidence of any subsequent claim of frauds. It has been held that where there was a partition in fact between tenants in common,
of a tenancy in common, it may fairly be inferred that there has been a partition and that such lot was set and a part performance, a court of equity would have regard to enforce such partition agreed
off to him whose name it bears. 45 to by the parties.

Respondents insist that the absence of any annotation in the certificate of title showing any partition of Two more points have constrained this Court to rule against respondents. First, respondents Wilfreda
Lot No. 1639 and that OCT No. 6725 has not been canceled clearly indicate that no partition took place. Maglucot-Alejo and Constancio Alejo offered to buy the share of Roberto Maglucot. Second, the tax
The logic of this argument is that unless partition is shown in the title of the subject property, there can declarations contain statements that the houses of respondents were built on the land owned by Roberto
be no valid partition or that the annotation in the title is the sole evidence of partition. Maglucot.
On the first point, petitioners presented Aida Maglucot who testified that after respondents were informed
that petitioners were going to use Lot No. 1639-D belonging to Roberto Maglucot, respondents Wilfreda
Maglucot-Alejo and Constancio Alejo went to the house of said witness and offered to buy the share of
Roberto Maglucot. 52 Aida Maglucot further testified that they refused the offer because they also intend
to use the lot for a residential purpose. 53 This testimony of Aida Maglucot is unrebutted by respondents,
and the CA did not touch upon this finding of fact. Hence, the offer to buy has been established by the
unrebutted evidence of the petitioners. Why would they give such offer if they claim to be at least a co-
owner of the said lot? In effect, respondents impliedly admit the title of the petitioners and that they are
not co-owners, much less the sole owners, of Lot No. 1639-D.
On the second point, the existence of Tax Declaration No. 04-557 in the names of Constancio Alejo and
Godofreda Maglucot, 54 Tax Declaration No. 04-87-13 in the names of Leopoldo Maglucot and Regina
Barot, 55 Tax Declaration No. 04-593 in the names of Severo Maglucot and Samni Posida 56 showing that
the houses of the above-mentioned persons are constructed on the land of Roberto Maglucot 57 constitute
incontrovertible evidence of admission by the same persons of the ownership of the land by Roberto
Maglucot. Tax Declarations are public documents. Unless their veracity is directly attacked, the contents
therein are presumed to be true and accurate. 58The lone testimony of Severo Maglucot that Roberto
Maglucot was only made to appear as owner of the land in their respective declarations because he was
the administrator of Lot No. 1639 is uncorroborated and not supported by any other evidence.
No injustice is dealt upon respondents because they are entitled to occupy a portion of Lot No. 1639,
particularly Lot No. 1639-A, in their capacity as heirs of Tomas Maglucot, one of the original co-owners
of Lot No. 1639 in accordance with the sketch plan of said lot showing the partition into six portions. 59
Finally, this Court takes notice of the language utilized by counsel for petitioners in their petition for review
on certiorari.1wphi1 Thrice in the petition, counsel for petitioners made reference to the researcher of
the CA. First, he alluded to the lack of scrutiny of the records and lack of study of the law "by the
researcher." 60 Second, he cited the researcher of the CA as having "sweepingly stated without reference
to the record" 61 that "[w]e have scanned the records on hand and found no evidence of any partition."
Finally, counsel for petitioners assailed the CA decision, stating that "this will only show that there was
no proper study of the case by the researcher." 62
Any court when it renders a decision does so as an arm of the justice system and as an institution apart
from the persons that comprise it. Decisions are rendered by the courts and not the persons or personnel
that may participate therein by virtue of their office. It is highly improper and unethical for counsel for
petitioners to berate the researcher in his appeal. Counsel for petitioner should be reminded of the
elementary rules of the legal profession regarding respect for the courts by the use of proper language in
its pleadings and admonished for his improper references to the researcher of the CA in his petition. A
lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive, or menacing language or behavior before the courts. 63
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE and the
decision of the Regional Trial Court is hereby REINSTATED.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.

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