No. 759. Miranda v.
Arizona (facts)
1. Miranda v. Arizona 384 US 436
Panaligan, Celina
(landmark case, make sure to read original)
June 13, 1966
Doctrine: The prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory,
stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of
procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination. By
custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a
person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way.
Recit ready: (the four cases found below applying the rules laid down in this case are
already summarized)
Facts:
Miranda is composed of a consolidation of four cases reversing 3 rulings and affirming 1 ruling,
applying the rules discussed pertaining to an accuseds rights during custodial investigations and
proceedings. The rules are enumerated and summarized as follows:
[The accused] must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent,
that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the
presence of an attorney, and that, if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him
prior to any questioning if he so desires. Opportunity to exercise these rights must be afforded to
him throughout the interrogation. After such warnings have been given, and such opportunity
afforded him, the individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to
answer questions or make a statement. But unless and until such warnings and waiver are
demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can
be used against him.
On the right/ privilege against self-incrimination:
All these policies point to one overriding thought: the constitutional foundation underlying the
privilege is the respect a government -- state or federal -- must accord to the dignity and integrity
of its citizens. To maintain a "fair state-individual balance," to require the government "to
shoulder the entire load," 8 Wigmore, Evidence 317 (McNaughton rev.1961), to respect the
inviolability of the human personality, our accusatory system of criminal justice demands that the
government seeking to punish an individual produce the evidence against him by its own
independent labors, rather than by the cruel, simple expedient of compelling it from his own
mouth. Chambers v. Florida, 309 U. S. 227, 235-238 (1940). In sum, the privilege is fulfilled only
when the person is guaranteed the right "to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the
unfettered exercise of his own will."
When, in the course of the proceedings, do these rights apply?
We are satisfied that all the principles embodied in the privilege apply to informal compulsion
exerted by law enforcement officers during in-custody questioning. An individual swept from
familiar surroundings into police custody, surrounded by antagonistic forces, and subjected to
the techniques of persuasion described above cannot be otherwise than under compulsion to
speak. As a practical matter, the compulsion to speak in the isolated setting of the police station
may well be greater than in courts or other official investigations, where there are often impartial
observers to guard against intimidation or trickery.
On March 13, 1963, petitioner, Ernesto Miranda, was arrested at his home and taken in custody
to a Phoenix police station. He was there identified by the complaining witness. The police then
took him to "Interrogation Room No. 2" of the detective bureau. There he was questioned by two
police officers. The officers admitted at trial that Miranda was not advised that he had a right to
have an attorney present. Two hours later, the officers emerged from the interrogation room with
a written confession signed by Miranda. At the top of the statement was a typed paragraph
stating that the confession was made voluntarily, without threats or promises of immunity and
with full knowledge of my legal rights, understanding any statement I make may be used against
me.
At his trial before a jury, the written confession was admitted into evidence over the objection of
defense counsel, and the officers testified to the prior oral confession made by Miranda during
the interrogation. Miranda was found guilty of kidnapping and rape. He was sentenced to 20 to
30 years' imprisonment on each count, the sentences to run concurrently. On appeal, the
Supreme Court of Arizona held that Miranda's constitutional rights were not violated in obtaining
the confession, and affirmed the conviction. In reaching its decision, the court emphasized
heavily the fact that Miranda did not specifically request counsel.
Held: US SC reversed. It is clear that Miranda was not in any way apprise of his right to consult
with an attorney and to have one present during the interrogation, nor was his right not to be
compelled to incriminate himself effectively protected in any other manner. Without these
warnings, the statements were inadmissible. The mere fact that he signed a statement which
contained a typed-in clause stating that he had "full knowledge" of his "legal
rights" does not approach the knowing and intelligent waiver required to relinquish constitutional
rights.
No. 760. Vignera v New York (facts)
Petitioner, Michael Vignera, was picked up by New York police on October 14, 1960, in
connection with the robbery three days earlier of a Brooklyn dress shop. They took him to the
17th Detective Squad headquarters in Manhattan. Sometime thereafter, he was taken to the
66th Detective Squad. There a detective questioned Vignera with respect to the robbery. Vignera
orally admitted the robbery to the detective. The detective was asked on cross-examination at
trial by defense counsel whether Vignera was warned of his right to counsel before being
interrogated. The prosecution objected to the question, and the trial judge sustained the
objection. Thus, the defense was precluded from making any showing that warnings had not
been given. While at the 66th Detective Squad, Vignera was identified by the store owner and a
saleslady as the man who robbed the dress shop. At about 3 p.m., he was formally arrested. The
police then transported him to still another station, the 70th Precinct in Brooklyn, "for detention."
At 11 p.m., Vignera was questioned by an assistant district attorney in the presence of a hearing
reporter, who transcribed the questions and Vignera's answers. This verbatim account of this
ese proceedings contains no statement of any warnings given by the assistant district attorney.
At Vignera's trial on a charge of first degree robbery, the detective testified as to the oral
confession. The transcription of the statement taken was also introduced in evidence. At the
conclusion of the testimony, the trial judge charged the jury in part as follows:
"The law doesn't say that the confession is void or invalidated because the police officer didn't
advise the defendant as to his rights. Did you hear what I said? I am telling you what the law of
the State of New York is."
Vignera was found guilty of first degree robbery. He was subsequently adjudged a thirdfelony
offender and sentenced to 30 to 60 years' imprisonment. The conviction was affirmed without
opinion by the Appellate Division, Second Department, and by the Court of Appeals, also without
opinion. In argument to the Court of Appeals, the State contended that Vignera had no
constitutional right to be advised of his right to counsel or his privilege against self-incrimination.
Held: The foregoing indicates that Vignera was not warned of any of his rights before the
questioning by the detective and by the assistant district attorney. No other steps were taken to
protect these rights. Thus, he was not effectively apprised of his Fifth Amendment privilege or of
his right to have counsel present, and his statements are inadmissible.
No. 761. Westover v United States (facts)
At approximately 9:45 p.m. on March 20, 1963, petitioner, Carl Calvin Westover, was arrested
by local police in Kansas City as a suspect in two Kansas City robberies. A report was also
received from the FBI that he was wanted on a felony charge in California. The local authorities
took him to a police station and placed him in a line-up on the local charges, and, at about 11:45
p.m., he was booked. Kansas City police interrogated Westover on the night of his arrest. He
denied any knowledge of criminal activities. The next day, local officers interrogated him again
throughout the morning. Shortly before noon, they informed the FBI that they were through
interrogating Westover and that the FBI could proceed to interrogate him. There is nothing in the
record to indicate that Westover was ever given any warning as to his rights by local police. At
noon, three special agents of the FBI continued the interrogation in a private interview room of
the Kansas City Police Department, this time with respect to the robbery of a savings and loan
association and bank in Sacramento, California. After two or two and one-half hours, Westover
signed separate confessions to each of these two robberies which had been prepared by one of
the agents during the interrogation. At trial, one of the agents testified, and a paragraph on each
of the statements states, that the agents advised Westover that he did not have to make a
statement, that any statement he made could be used against him, and that he had the right to
see an attorney. Westover was tried by a jury in federal court and convicted of the California
robberies. His statements were introduced at trial. He was sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment
on each count, the sentences to run consecutively. On appeal, the conviction was affirmed by
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
Held: We reverse. On the facts of this case, we cannot find that Westover knowingly and
intelligently waived his right to remain silent and his right to consult with counsel prior to the time
he made the statement.
The record simply shows that the defendant did, in fact, confess a short time after being
turned over to the FBI following interrogation by local police. Despite the fact that the FBI agents
gave warnings at the outset of their interview, from Westover's point of view, the warnings came
at the end of the interrogation process. In these circumstances, an intelligent waiver of
constitutional rights cannot be assumed.
.But here, the FBI interrogation was conducted immediately following the state interrogation in
the same police station -- in the same compelling surroundings. Thus, in obtaining a confession
from Westover the federal authorities were the beneficiaries of the pressure applied by the local
incustody interrogation. In these circumstances, the giving of warnings alone was not sufficient
to protect the privilege.
No. 584. California v Stewart (facts)
In the course of investigating a series of purse-snatch robberies in which one of the victims had
died of injuries inflicted by her assailant, respondent, Roy Allen Stewart, was pointed out to Los
Angeles police as the endorser of dividend checks taken in one of the robberies. At about 7:15
p.m., January 31, 1963, police officers went to Stewart's house and arrested him. One of the
officers asked Stewart if they could search the house, to which he replied, "Go ahead." The
search turned up various items taken from the five robbery victims. At the time of Stewart's
arrest, police also arrested Stewart's wife and three other persons who were visiting him. These
four were jailed along with Stewart, and were interrogated. Stewart was taken to the University
Station of the Los Angeles Police Department, where he was placed in a cell. During the next
five days, police interrogated Stewart on nine different occasions. Except during the first
interrogation session, when he was confronted with an accusing witness, Stewart was isolated
with his interrogators.
During the ninth interrogation session, Stewart admitted that he had robbed the deceased and
stated that he had not meant to hurt her. Police then brought Stewart before a magistrate for the
first time. Since there was no evidence to connect them with any crime, the police then released
the other four persons arrested with him. Nothing in the record specifically indicates whether
Stewart was or was not advised of his right to remain silent or his right to counsel. In a number
of instances, however, the interrogating officers were asked to recount everything that was said
during the interrogations. None indicated that Stewart was ever advised of his rights. Stewart
was charged with kidnapping to commit robbery, rape, and murder. At his trial, transcripts of the
first interrogation and the confession at the last interrogation were introduced in evidence. The
jury found Stewart guilty of robbery and first degree murder, and fixed the penalty as death. On
appeal, the Supreme Court of California reversed. It held that, under this Court's decision in
Escobedo, Stewart should have been advised of his right to remain silent and of his right to
counsel, and that it would not presume in the face of a silent record that the police advised
Stewart of his rights.
Held: We affirm. In dealing with custodial interrogation, we will not presume that a defendant has
been effectively apprised of his rights and that his privilege against self-incrimination has been
adequately safeguarded on a record that does not show that any warnings have been given or
that any effective alternative has been employed. Nor can a knowing and intelligent waiver of
these rights be assumed on a silent record. Furthermore, Stewart's steadfast denial of the
alleged offenses through eight of the nine interrogations over a period of five days is subject to
no other construction than that he was compelled by persistent interrogation to forgo his Fifth
Amendment privilege.
OPINIONS: (by Ignacio, Quina)
DISSENTS (and what they basically tryna say)
[J. CLARK, WHITE, HARLAN, and STEWART] [Clark wrote his own, Harlan was joined by
White & Stewart, White was joined by Harlan and Stewart] [also I am paraphrasing lol]
There is no precedent that supports the new rules that SC dished out./There is no
basis on the 5th Amendment for the new Miranda rights (it shouldn't be extended to the
police station since 5th Amendment only covers trials,)
The OLD RULE: Voluntariness test of the 14 th Amendment-- that is, taking into
consideration the totality of circumstances in deciding whether or not they deprived
an accused of a free choice to admit, to deny, or to refuse to answer (essentially, an
involuntary admission of guilt)
J.WHITE:
It is not enough that SC is merely concerned that SOME confessions are
coerced and that the present judicial procedures are inadequate, that they
would resort to judicial legislation. There are alternatives that
should be explored-- i.e.: require transcripts or observers, impose specific
time limits, or employ other devices.
If the counsel is present and the accused confesses, or the counsel tells
the accused to confess, how is that any less coercive?
The need for a counsel to be present invariably focuses more on the will of
the COUNSEL, and not the ACCUSED. There is no basis for this in the 5th
Amendment, which contemplates the will of the ACCUSED.
It has never been suggested before this case that the very first response to
the very first question following the start of custody is conclusively
presumed to be a product of overborne will.
 In fact, only a minority of US judges consider in-custody interrogation to be
a violation of the 5th Amendment.
J.HARLAN:
Lawyers might actually be an obstalce to truth-finding. The evils of normal
police questioning are exaggerated, because interrogation is no doubt often
inconvenient and unpleasant for the suspect
The lawyer himself may become an obstacle in truth finding.
Basically says stick to the status quo because we dont have a basis for
these fvkin rules SC just plucked them out of thin air
The decision thwarts sound efforts at reform, which should have taken place
in the Legislature instead of the SC. This Court used to be more patient lol
he was saying that the SC decided too quickly
2. Magtoto v. Manguera - 63 SCRA 4
by IGNACIO, Quina
DOCTRINE: The right to be informed of the right to remain silent and the right to counsel
take effect only upon the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution (JANUARY 17 1973)
The petition is a consolidated case, of three others-- namely, Simeon v. Villaluz (court in Pasig,
Rizal), Magtoto v. Manguera (court in Occidental Mindoro), and People v. Isnani (court in
Zamboanga del Sur). The issue is whether or not, an EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION made by
the accused without being informed of the right to remain silent and the right to counsel may be
admissible in evidence, prior to the institution of the 1973 Constitution which provides for such
rights (in Art 4, Sec 20). Judges Manguera and Villaluz ruled that it was admissible in evidence,
while Judge Isnani ruled that it was not admissible-- all three decisions were promulgated prior
to the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution on Jan 17, 1973.
Petitioners contend that the ratification of the 1973 Constitution is retroactive, and thus the
confessions should be rendered inadmissible in evidence. They argue that even if the
Constitution were not retroactive, the Revised Penal Code still requires that they must have
been informed beforehand.*
HELD:
- No such right existed before the institution of the 1973 Constitution.
- To give retroactive effect to this constitutional guarantee would cause an unsettling effect on
the administration of justice. People who were previously convicted may be acquitted if applied
retroactively.
- Art 125 of the RPC does not impliedly give the right to counsel, it merely ALLOWS accused to
confer with counsel. If anything, it merely confers the right to be INFORMED OF THE CAUSE
OF HIS DETENTION.
- Decisions of Manguera and Villaluz sustained, Isnani's is set aside.
ADDITIONAL INFO:
* ART 125 par. 2: In every case, the person detained shall be informed of the cause of his
detention and shall be allowed, upon his request, to communicate and confer at any time with
his attorney or counsel. (As included in the RPC by RA 1083)
* CRIM 1: Art 22 of RPC retroactive effect of penal laws must work to favor of the accused;
NOT APPLICABLE because it refers to substantive penal laws-- the constitutional provision is a
procedural rule of evidence; the constitutional provision is prospective, not retroactive; as a rule
constitutional provisions should be given a prospective effect
CASTRO, dissenting:
- Art 125 par. 2 of the RPC makes it an obligation on the part of the officer to inform the person
of his right to counsel before custodial investigation, and such has been in existence since the
inclusion of this paragraph in the RPC by virtue of RA 1083.
- On the unsettling effect: I reject any proposition that would blindly uphold the interests of
society at the sacrifice of the dignity of any human being.
- In any case, it wouldn't be a problem because the Court will be looking at other credible
evidence, since extrajudicial confessions have always been regarded as corroboraty, never as
primary proof.
3. People v. Mahinay GR 122485 February 1, 1999
RECIT READY: Mahinay was convicted by the lower court of rape with homicide. In his
testimony, he narrated that when he was arrested the police officers plan to salvage him if he
would not admit that he was the one who raped and killed the victim. Scared, he executed an
extra-judicial confession. He claimed that he was assisted by Atty. Restituto Viernes only when
he was forced to sign the extra-judicial confession. SC held that his extrajudicial confession did
not violate his constitutional right to counsel since it contradicts the testimony of the lawyer who
assisted him, and the circumstantial evidence given by the trial court. The Court gave guidelines
and procedure in arresting, detaining or investigating at the time of making the arrest and of
custodial interrogation.
Facts:
Mahinay worked as a houseboy of Isip. His task was to take care of Isip's house which was
under construction. The victim was Ma. Victoria Chan, who was 12 years old and the neighbor of
Isip.
On June 25, 1995 at 8AM Mahinay joined Gregorio Rivera in a drinking spree. He left at 10AM
to go out with friends.
Ma. Victoria was still seen between 8-9PM that day. Later, at 9 o'clock in the evening, appellant
showed up at Norgina Rivera's store to buy lugaw. She notice that appellant appeared to be
uneasy and in deep thought. His hair was disarrayed; he was drunk and was walking in a dazed
manner. She asked why he looked so worried but he did not answer. Then he left and walked
back to the compound.
Elivira Chan noticed her daughter was missing. Isip testified appellant failed to show up for
supper that night. The following day at 2AM, appellant boarded a passenger jeepney and
disappeared. At 7AM, a boy found the dead body of Ma. Victoria inside the septic tank of the
compound. Police found in the 2nd floor of the house under construction the shorts, belt and hair
ribbon which belonged to the victim.
Mahinay was finally arrested. When he was brought to the police station he executed an extra-
judicial confession wherein he narrated in detail how he raped and killed the victim. Also, when
appellant came face to face with the victim's mother and aunt, he confided to them that he was
not alone in raping and killing the victim. He pointed to Zaldy and Boyet as his co-conspirators.
(However, the SC held his testimony of the events in relation to them was too unbelievable.) He
was charged with rape with homicide to which he pleaded not guilty. Lower court convicted him
of the crime charged, sentencing him to the penalty of death. The case went to the SC for
automatic review.
In Mahinay's testimony, he said that when he was apprehended by the police officers, they
brought him to a big house somewhere in Manila. There, appellant heard the police officers plan
to salvage him if he would not admit that he was the one who raped and killed the victim.
Scared, he executed an extra-judicial confession. He claimed that he was assisted by Atty.
Restituto Viernes only when he was forced to sign the extra-judicial confession.
Issue: WON appellant's extrajudicial confession was executed in violation of his constitutional
right to counsel
Ruling:
No.
His contention is belied by the records as well as the testimony of the lawyer who assisted, retained or appointed), any member of his immediate family, or any medical doctor, priest or
warned and explained to him his constitutionally guaranteed pre-interrogatory and custodial minister chosen by him or by any one from his immediate family or by his counsel, or be visited
rights. (The lawyer said he explained even in Filipino) by/confer with duly accredited national or international non-government organization. It shall be
the responsibility of the officer to ensure that this is accomplished;
Trial court gave credence to several circumstantial evidence, which upon thorough review of the
Court is more than enough to prove appellants guilt beyond the shadow of reasonable doubt. 7. He must be informed that he has the right to waive any of said rights provided it is made
These circumstantial evidence are as follows: voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently and ensure that he understood the same;

Accused Larry Mahinay during the custodial investigation and after having been informed of his
constitutional rights with the assistance of Atty. Restituto Viernes of the Public Attorney's Office
voluntarily gave his statement admitting the commission of the crime. Said confession of
accused Larry Mahinay given with the assistance of Atty. Restituto Viernes is believed to have
been freely and voluntarily given. That accused did not complain to the proper authorities of any
maltreatment on his person. He did not even informed the Inquest Prosecutor when he sworn to
the truth of his statement that he was forced, coerced or was promised of reward or leniency.
That his confession abound with details known only to him. The Court noted that a lawyer from
the Public Attorney's Office Atty. Restituto Viernes and as testified by said Atty. Viernes he
informed and explained to the accused his constitutional rights and was present all throughout
the giving of the testimony. That he signed the statement given by the accused. Lawyer from the
Public Attorney's Office is expected to be watchful and vigilant to notice any irregularity in the
manner of the investigation and the physical conditions of the accused. The post mortem
findings shows that the cause of death Asphyxia by manual strangulation; Traumatic Head injury
Contributory substantiate. Consistent with the testimony of the accused that he pushed the
victim and the latters head hit the table and the victim lost consciousness.
8. In addition, if the person arrested waives his right to a lawyer, he must be informed that it
must be done in writing AND in the presence of counsel, otherwise, he must be warned that the
waiver is void even if he insist on his waiver and chooses to speak;
9. That the person arrested must be informed that he may indicate in any manner at any time or
stage of the process that he does not wish to be questioned with warning that once he makes
such indication, the police may not interrogate him if the same had not yet commenced, or the
interrogation must ceased if it has already begun;
10. The person arrested must be informed that his initial waiver of his right to remain silent, the
right to counsel or any of his rights does not bar him from invoking it at any time during the
process, regardless of whether he may have answered some questions or volunteered some
statements;
11. He must also be informed that any statement or evidence, as the case may be, obtained in
violation of any of the foregoing, whether inculpatory or exculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be
inadmissible in evidence.

4. People v. Camat- 256 SCRA 52

The Court, as guardian of the rights of the people lays down the procedure, guidelines and
PETITIONER: People of the Philippines
duties which the arresting, detaining, inviting, or investigating officer or his companions
RESPONDENT: Armando Rodriguez Camat (aka Amboy Camat) and Wilfredo Tanyag Del
must do and observe at the time of making an arrest and again at and during the time of
Rosario (aka Willie)
the custodial interrogation in accordance with the Constitution, jurisprudence and Republic Act
No. 7438: It is high-time to educate our law-enforcement agencies who neglect either by
ignorance or indifference the so-called Miranda rights which had become insufficient and which SUMMARY: Camat and Del Rosario were charged with the complex crime of robbery with
the Court must update in the light of new legal developments: homicide and frustrated homicide for robbing and stabbing/attempting to kill Penalver and for
killing Sinoy. During the police investigation, the police investigator testified on the witness stand
1. The person arrested, detained, invited or under custodial investigation must be informed in a that Camat admitted that Del Rosario was a co-conspirator in the crime. SC held that even
language known to and understood by him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown though the Court could not convict Del Rosario based on Camats extra-judicial confession,
the warrant of arrest, if any; Every other warnings, information or communication must be in a there are other pieces of evidence sufficient to sustain a conviction (i.e. Penalvers testimony).
language known to and understood by said person;
FACTS:
2. He must be warned that he has a right to remain silent and that any statement he makes may
be used as evidence against him; - Armando Rodriguez Camat (aka Amboy Camat) and Wilfredo Tanyag Del Rosario (aka Willie)
were charged with the complex crime of robbery with homicide and frustrated homicide.
3. He must be informed that he has the right to be assisted at all times and have the presence of
an independent and competent lawyer, preferably of his own choice; - Nelson Sinoy and Gonzalo Penalver are members of the Philippine Marines. They were
walking along Quirino Avenue when they noticed 2 men trailing them closely. Sinoy and
4. He must be informed that if he has no lawyer or cannot afford the services of a lawyer, one Penalver crossed the street to avoid the men following them, but Del Rosario rushed to Sinoy,
will be provided for him; and that a lawyer may also be engaged by any person in his behalf, or and kicked the latter while Camat followed Del Rosario and stabbed Sinoy. Penalver kicked
may be appointed by the court upon petition of the person arrested or one acting in his behalf; Camat, who in turn, stabbed the former. When Penalver fell to the ground, Del Rosario grabbed
the clutch bag.
5. That whether or not the person arrested has a lawyer, he must be informed that no custodial
- Sinoy and Penalver, despite their injuries, ran away and were brought by a policeman to the
investigation in any form shall be conducted except in the presence of his counsel or after a
valid waiver has been made; hospital. Sinoy died in the hospital, but Penalver survived. Camat and Del Rosario interposed
the defense of alibi. Camat claimed that he was already in his house, and before going home, he
6. The person arrested must be informed that, at any time, he has the right to communicate or worked as a card dealer in the saklaan. This was corroborated by his mother-in- law, who
confer by the most expedient means telephone, radio, letter or messenger with his lawyer (either claimed she was with Camat at the time the
latter was at home.
- Del Rosario claimed that he was with his wife during the time the crime was committed, and
they sold vegetables along a sidewalk of Quirino Ave. in Baclaran. Upon going home, he claimed
that he never left the house again. His mother supported his story. Both claimed they did not
know each other prior to the date of the commission of the crime.
- Patrolman Odeo Cario, to whom the case was assigned, testified on the following:
That Camat orally admitted to him their participation in the killing of the soldiers. Cario
also testified that Camat gave the names of Del Rosario and a certain person named Roland
as his co-conspirators in the crime charged.
That Camat admitted that Del Rosario was the one who actually stabbed Sinoy.
That when he and another policeman traced the whereabouts of Del Rosario and
brought him for questioning, Del Rosario admitted his involvement in the crime, and that the
electric tester they stole from Penalver can be recovered from his relatives.That they were able
to identify Camat with the help of a vendor who witnessed the incident, and said
witness identified Camat as the one who killed Sinoy.
The lower court found both Camat and Del Rosario guilty of the crime of robbery with
homicide and frustrated homicide. Appellants now argue that the trial court cannot
reply solely on Camats extrajudicial confession as a basis of their conviction because
it was obtained during custodial investigation, in violation of their constitutional rights.
ISSUES:
1. W/N their constitutional rights were violated NO.
2. W/N Camats admission is binding on Del Rosario NO.
3. W/N evidence is sufficient to support a conviction YES.
4. W/N the appellants were deprived of their right of confrontation when the prosecution failed to
produce the informer who allegedly pointed to/identified Camat NO.
RULING: CA affirmed.
RATIO:
1. The lower court cannot just rely on the testimony of Camat because there is no
showing that the appellants were duly advised of the mandatory guarantees under the
Bill of Rights.
2. No reliance can be placed on the imputation therein because it violates the rule on res inter
alios acta (a thing done between others does not harm or benefit others) and does not fall under
the exceptions thereto, especially since it was made after the supposed homicidal conspiracy.
An extrajudicial confession is binding only upon the confessant and is not admissible
against his co-accused. As against the latter, the confession is hearsay.
3. The testimony of a single witness, if found convincing and trustworthy by the trial court, is
sufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Penalvers testimony was found
to be categorical and candid, untainted by inconsistencies, contradictions or evasions. It
creditably chronicles the material details in the commission of the crimes in question, and should
accordingly be given full credence.
There was also no evidence of any ulterior or evil motive on the part of Penalver that might have
led him to give fabricated testimony against the appellants. He, and even Camat, declared in
open court that they did not know each other before the incident. And where there is no
evidence indicating that the principal witness for the prosecution was moved by improper motive,
the presumption is that he was not so moved, and his testimony is entitled to full faith and credit.
The appellants alibis could not also be given credence even if they are corroborated by other
witnesses. The witnesses in this case are the mother and mother-in-law, who are naturally
expected to make statements in his favor. The positive identification of the malefactors made by
Penalver negates appllants submissions on their respective alibis.
4. The accuseds constitutional right to meet the witnesses face to face is limited to proceedings
before the trial court. Accordingly, appellants reliance upon this constitutional right is misplaced
as the same is available to him at the trial and not during a custodial investigation.
It is the prerogative of each party to choose its own witnesses in accordance with its own
assessment of the evidence it needs to prove its case. If appellants felt that the vendor might
have a grudge against Camat, there was nothing to prevent them from determining that fact on
the witness stand by calling said vendor via compulsory process available to them both under
the Constitution and the Rules of Court.
5. People v. Taylaran 108 SCRA 373
23 October 1981
Doctrine:
The provision does not contemplate cases where no written confession was sought to be
presented in evidence as a result of formal custodial investigation. If he voluntarily admits and it
was precisely because he surrendered to admit, the constitutional safeguards to be informed of
his rights to silence and to counsel may not be invoked.
Recit-ready:
Taylaran killed Atup by inflicting several stab wounds with a bolo. Apparently, his motive was due
to Atups promise to kill him with a barang thus preempting her actions by killer her. He
eventually surrendered to policeman Basilan and confessed it. Later in defense, Taylaran
testified that he only accidentally killed her.
The Court held that the accident version of Taylaran is difficult to accept, hard to believe, and
inherently incredible. Atup sustained several wounds on different parts of her body. Moreover,
Article IV, Section 20 is not applicable in his favor where no written confession was sought to be
presented in evidence as a result of formal custodial investigation. The testimony of the police
on the confession Taylaran made when he surrendered is hardly a police investigation and not
within the scope thus it is admissible. In any case, the testimony from his confession to Busalla
is admissible as it was not in the course of a police investigation.
Facts:
Goring Taylaran went to the house of Ofremia Atup, a quack doctor and his
grandmonther-in-law, for treatment of his snakebite late evening in Bohol
While being treated, Taylaran suddenly drew a small bolo and stabbed her several
times killing her
Afterwhich, he proceeded to the house of Atups son to kill him and his wife but failed
because of their refusal to let him enter
Taylaran surrendered himself to policeman Basilad at the municipal hall and
confessed that he killed Atup because she promised to kill him with a barang thus
killing her first
 Taylaran however, during trial, defended that he actually killed her by accident. When
Atup was trying to light the kerosene lamp, Taylaran accidentally hit her chest when
she bended at the same time as he was raising his hand with the bolo to be used to
treat his wound.
Issue: WON The confession of Taylaran to Basilan and Busalla are admissible as
evidence?
Held:
It is difficult to accept the accident version without corroboration. More than one
wound was found on different parts of the body which could not be inflicted by a single
stroke. The first wound could possibly have been accidentally inflicted, but the other,
wounds could not have.
That the wounding was with intent to kill is reflected by appellants statement that he
killed the old woman because she had allegedly promised to kill him by barang or by
witchcraft, which he gave upon surrendering to Pat. Demetrio Basilad at the Municipal
Building.
It was just natural for appellant to explain to the police why he was surrendering. For
Pat. Basilad to testify on what appellant said on this score is thus perfectly proper, and
full credence must be accorded to him, being obviously an impartial witness. It is not a
matter of whether the statement is a part of the res gestae to be admissible.
Juanita also testified, when appellant was already in jail, he told her that he killed her
mother because of witchcraft, corroborating Pat. Basilads testimony.
The testimony of both Pat. Basilad and Juanita Busalla on the inculpatory statement of
appellant is legally admissible not because the statement is part of the res gestae, but
for said witnesses having heard appellant made the statement on their own
perception.
Appellant has also invoked the provision of Article IV, Section 20 of the Constitution in
trying to block the admission of his declaration to Pat. Basilad that he killed Ofremia
Atup because of her alleged vow to kill him by witchcraft, contending that the
safeguards therefor have not been made available to him.
The applicability of the foregoing provision does not seem to contemplate cases
like the present where no written confession was sought to be presented in
evidence as a result of formal custodial investigation. What was testified to is only
what appellant told the police why he is surrendering to them. It is but natural for one
who surrenders to the police to give reason or explanation for his act of surrendering.
It can hardly be said that under such circumstance, the surrenderee is already under
investigation, within the meaning of the constitutional provision. As the Solicitor
General correctly observes on the circumstances of this case: If however, he
voluntarily admits the killing and it was precisely because he surrendered to
admit the killing, the constitutional safeguards to be informed of his rights to
silence and to counsel may not be invoked.
In any case, as previously pointed out, another witness, Juanita Busalla, who is not a
policeman, also testified to appellant telling her when he was already in jail, that he
killed Ofremia Atup because of her promise to kill him by means of witchcraft, the
same declaration he supposedly made to Pat. Basilad, upon surrendering after the
killing. The constitutional safeguard invoked can have no application to Juanitas
testimony on what appellant told her not in the course of a police investigation.
At any rate, even without the admission, the accident version of appellant is inherently
incredible.
6. People v. Marcos
Recit Ready: This case involves kidnapping of Benedict Gonzales by his uncle Moises Marcos.
Moises was the one who pointed to John and Peter Doe about his nephew being one of the
richest families there. He wrote the ransom letter demanding 200,000. They went to NBI but
Moises convinced the father to just bargain and loan the money for his nephews release. He
was found guilty as a principal in kidnapping. He argues now that his confession was taken
without the assistance of counsel and that even if there is a waiver of counsel, he still needs a
counsel for that. The court observed that when the person was not yet under the police custody
when he gave his statement, he was just invited to answer some questions. Moises admitted
that he voluntarily gave those statements and that he voluntarily expressed his intent to not get a
counsel through a freely signed waiver. The fact that he signed the waiver freely and his
admissions in open court render his defense as useless.
Facts: 9 year old Benedict Gonzales was kidnapped by his uncle Moises and two others under
the identity of John and Peter Doe. The boy was taken into Baesa Caloocan believing that his
father had an accident. Moises is the only one under custody because the other escaped arrest.
Moises was the one who wrote the ransom note and was the one found to have pointed to the
identity of the boy as being one of the richest. His defense for writing the letter is that he is afraid
that the two others made threats that madidisgrasya his children. He was found guilty of being
a principal in the kidnapping. He argues that when the NBI took his extrajudicial confession, he
was not assisted by counsel and even though he did make a waiver, he still needs a counsel to
do that.
ISSUE: WON an extrajudicial confession without the assistance of counsel is valid
WON the waiver was valid if made without a counsel
HELD: YES. The court observed that when the person was not yet under the police custody
when he gave his statement, he was just invited to answer some questions. Moises admitted
that he voluntarily gave those statements and that he voluntarily expressed his intent to not get a
counsel through a freely signed waiver. The fact that he signed the waiver freely and his
admissions in open court render his defense as useless.
7. People v. Rapeza
Facts:
Appellant Jerry Rapeza was charged of murder for killing the spouses Cesar Ganzon and
Priscilla Libas. Appellee contends that upon the supplied information that the appellant wanted
to confess, SPO2 Ciriaco Gapas invited the former for questioning and thus was brought to the
police station without informing his rights. The Solicitor General further contends that the
appellant was not informed of his constitutional right at the time of his alleged detention for the
custodial investigation began only when the investigators started to elicit information from him
which took place at the time he was brought to the house of Atty. Reyes. Moreover, appellant did
not interpose any objection to having Atty. Reyes as his counsel. However, the appellant testified
that he claims that he affixed his thumb mark through violence and intimidation. He stresses that
he was not informed of his rights during the time of his detention when he was already
considered a suspect as the police had already received information of his alleged involvement
in the crimes. Neither did a competent and independent counsel assist him from the time he was
detained until trial began. Appellant likewise maintains that although the Sinumpaang Salaysay
states that his rights were read to him, there was no showing that his rights were explained to
him in a way that an uneducated person like him could understand. The RTC found him guilty of
both crimes. The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court.
Issue:
Whether appellants extrajudicial confession is admissible in evidence to warrant the verdict of
guilt.
Held:
The constitutional requirement obviously had not been observed. Settled is the rule that the
moment a police officer tries to elicit admissions or confessions or even plain information from a
suspect, the latter should, at that juncture, be assisted by counsel, unless he waives this right in
writing and in the presence of counsel. Appellant did not make any such waiver.
x x x The competent or independent lawyer so engaged should be present from the beginning
to end, i.e., at all stages of the interview, counseling or advising caution reasonably at every turn
of the investigation, and stopping the interrogation once in awhile either to give advice to the
accused that he may either continue, choose to remain silent or terminate the interview. (people
vs. Daniega)
The standards of "competent counsel" were not met in this case given the deficiencies of the
evidence for the prosecution. Although Atty. Reyes signed the confession as appellants counsel
and he himself notarized the statement, there is no evidence on how he assisted appellant. The
confession itself and the testimonies of SPO2Gapas and SPO2 Cuizon bear no indication that
Atty. Reyes had explained to appellant his constitutional rights. Furthermore, Atty. Reyes was not
appellants counsel of choice but was picked out by the police officers allegedly through the
barangay officials. Appellants failure to interpose any objection to having Atty. Reyes as his
counsel cannot be taken as consent under the prevailing circumstances. As discussed earlier,
appellant was not properly informed of his rights, including the right to a counsel preferably of his
own choice. It was made to appear in the alleged confession that appellant was informed of his
right to a counsel of his own choice and that if he cannot afford the services of one, the police
shall provide him with one, it was overlooked that it was not similarly made to appear in the
same statement that appellant was advised that he had the option to reject the counsel provided
for him by the police authorities.
WHEREFORE, the Decisions of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 52, Palawan, Puerto Princesa
City in Criminal Case Nos. 13064 and 13202 and the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
00642 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant Jerry Rapeza y Francisco is hereby
ACQUITTED for insufficiency of evidence leading to reasonable doubt.
8. People v. Judge Ayson - 175 SCRA 216 (1989)
Doctrine: Miranda Rights apply only to persons under custodial investigation for the commission
of offenses.
Before the case is filed in court (or with a public prosecutor for preliminary investigation) but
after being taken into custody, the accused may, during his interrogation, exercise his
Miranda rights. After the case is filed, he has the right to refuse to be a witness, the right not to
have any prejudice whatsoever result to him by reason of such refusal, the right to testify on his
own behalf subject to cross-examination by the prosecution, and while testifying, the right
against self-incrimination
Recit Ready: Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk in the Philippine Airlines, assigned in
Baguio City. It was alleged that he was involved in irregularities in the sales of plane tickets so
the PAL management investigated. He intimated his willingness to compromise and so signed a
handwritten admission and statement. However, no compromise agreement was reached nor
consummated. An estafa case was file against him. Part of the evidence submitted were the
handwritten admission and statement of Ramos, which Judge Ayson excluded for they were
taken without Ramos being informed of his Miranda Rights. He explained that in custodial
investigations, the right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made
with the assistance of counsel, and that the rights in custodial investigation cannot be waived
except in writing and in the presence of counsel. According to him, the PAL investigation is
within the coverage of the constitutional provision, Ramos being detained at the time the
investigation was conducted. The Solicitor General sided with Ramos that the evidence must be
accepted by the Court. The issue is WON Judge Ayson committed grave abuse of discretion for
declaring such Exhibits as inadmissible as evidence. The Court held YES Felipe Ramos was
NOT under custodial interrogation when he made the statements under Exhibits A and K even
without counsel (which was prior to and during the administrative inquiry into the discovered
irregularities in the ticket sales). The statements under Exhibits A and K were voluntary and
spontaneous acts on his part which may not be excluded on the ground that the so-called
Miranda rights had not been accorded to him. In this case, the statement was not made under
custodial investigation, thus is not protected by the Miranda Doctrine
Facts:
Felipe Ramos was a PAL ticket freight clerk and he was investigated by the PAL management
It was alleged that he was involved in irregularities in the sales of plane tickets, the PAL
management notified him of an investigation to be conducted.
That investigation was scheduled in accordance with PAL's Code of Conduct and Discipline, and
the Collective Bargaining Agreement signed by it with the Philippine Airlines Employees'
Association (PALEA) to which Ramos pertained.
Before the investigation, on Feb. 8, a letter was sent by Ramos stating his willingness to settle
the amount of P76,000. The findings of the Audit team were given to him, and he refuted that he
misused proceeds of tickets also stating that he was prevented from settling said amounts. He
proffered a compromise however this did not ensue. Two months after a crime of estafa was
charged against Ramos.
o This handwritten note would later be labelled as Exhibit K
During the investigation on Feb 9, Ramos admitted:
o That he did not make disclosure of the tickets mentioned in the findings of the
Audit Team, that he did misuse the proceeds, and that he was willing to pay
back the money, but was prevented from doing so because of shame, and
that he was still willing to settle his obligation
o Those answers he made were taken down in writing and would later be
labelled as Exhibit A
In the proceedings against Ramos for estafa, the prosecutors offered both Exhibits A and K as
evidence against Ramos, but the defendants attorneys objected stating that the documents,
which appeared to be confessions, were taken WITHOUT the accused being represented by a
lawyer .
Judge Ayson declared Exhibits A and K as inadmissible in evidence stating that such were
given in violation of Ramos right against self-incrimination and rights in custodial interrogation
o For Exhibit A: it does NOT appear that the Reyes was reminded of his rights
to remain silent, to have counsel, and that when he made the statement, it
was with assistance of counsel
o For Exhibit K: it does NOT appear that Reyes was assisted by counsel when
he made the statement
Issue: WON Judge Ayson committed grave abuse of discretion for declaring such Exhibits as
inadmissible as evidence? YES
Held: YES
Felipe Ramos was NOT under custodial interrogation when he made the statements under
Exhibits A and K even without counsel
The statements under Exhibits A and K were voluntary and spontaneous acts on his part
which may not be excluded on the ground that the so-called Miranda rights had not been
accorded to him
The SC held that the right against self-incrimination is accorded to every person who gives
evidence, whether voluntarily or under compulsion of subpoena, in any civil, criminal, or
administrative proceedings. The right is not to be compelled to be a witness against oneself.
It prescribes an option of refusal to answer incriminating questions and not a prohibition of
inquiry. It simply secures to a witness the right to refuse to answer any incriminatory question,
which is one where the answer to which as a tendency to incriminate him for some crime.
However, the right cannot be claimed at any other time. In fact, the Constitution does not impose
any duty on the judge or any other officer presiding over a trial, hearing, or investigation, any
 obligation to advise a witness of his right against self-incrimination. As such, the right against
self-incrimination is not automatically operation and it must be claimed.
On the other hand, the rights under custodial investigation apply to persons under investigation
for the commission of an offense, that is, persons who are suspects under investigation by
police authorities
Custodial investigation is defined as questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a
person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way
Rights in custodial interrogation as laid down in Miranda v. Arizona: the rights of the accused
include:
o he shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of
such right
o nor force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the
free will shall be used against him.
o any confession obtained in violation of these rights shall be inadmissible in
evidence.
Not every statement made to the police by a person involved in a crime is within the scope of
Constitutional protection, as if the same is not made under custodial interrogation or under
investigation for the commission of an offense, the statement if not protected.
With respect to a defendant in a criminal case already pending in court, there is no occasion to
speak of his right under custodial investigation because the same no longer exists.
Thus, while the right against self-incrimination may be invoked during civil, administrative, or
criminal proceedings, the Miranda Rights apply only to persons under custodial investigation for
the commission of offenses.
In this case, the statement was not made under custodial investigation, thus is not protected
by the Miranda Doctrine. Also, Ramos even voluntarily answered the said questions during the
administrative investigation.
The SC also held that:
o Before the case is filed in court, but after having been taking into custody or
otherwise deprived of his liberty in some significant way, the accused has
the right: to remain silent, to counsel, to be informed of the said rights, not to
be subjected to force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means that
vitiates free will, to have evidence obtain in violation of these rights as
inadmissible
o After the case is filed in court the accused has the right: to refuse to be a
witness, Not to have any prejudice whatsoever result to him by such refusal,
To testify on his own behalf, subject to cross-examination by the prosecution
o While testifying: to refuse to answer a specific question that tends to
incriminate him for some crime other than that for which he is then
prosecuted
9. People v. Marra
DOCTRINE:
Custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a
person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way.
It is only after the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and begins
to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect is taken into custody, and the police carries out a
process of interrogations that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements that the rule begins
to operate.
FACTS:
Respondent was accused of killing Nelson Tandoc
Prosecution side:
Nelson Tandoc and Jimmy Din (witness) were provoked by suspects group
which eventually led to a brawl between the two groups
After the fight, Tandoc and Din decided to walk back to the hotel wherein
Din worked as an administrator
In the hotel they noticed that the same group of men they got into a fight
with were there
Din claims that respondent suddenly pulled out his gun and shot Tandoc
While conducting their investigation, the police asked out around for
possible leads and witnesses. Since one of the testimonies said that the
shooter was wearing a guard uniform, the police asked who was the guard
on duty during the time of the shooting.
Police learned that Marra was the guard on duty. When asked if he owned a
gun, respondent answered in the affirmative and said that the gun was at
hiss house
When they arrived, Marra took a .38 caliber revolver from inside an
aparador and handed it to De Vera. De Vera also found five live bullets and
one spent shell.
Smelling gunpowder from the barrel of the gun, De Vera asked Marra when
he last fired the gun but the latter denied ever having done so.
Abruptly, De Vera asked him pointblank why he shot Tandoc. Marra at first
denied the accusation but when informed that someone saw him do it, he
said that he did so in selfdefense, firing at the victim only
Respondents side:
he insisted that when he handed the gun to the policeman, there were five
live bullets, and not four live bullets and one empty shell as claimed by the
prosecution. Prior to the incident, he had never met Jimmy Din nor does he
know of any cause why Din would harbor any ill feelings against him.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Marra was under custodial investigation when he admitted the killing but
invoked selfdefense.
HELD:
No
Custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated by law enforcement officers
after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of
action in any significant way.
It is only after the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime
and begins to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect is taken into custody, and the
police carries out a process of interrogations that lends itself to eliciting incriminating
statements that the rule begins to operate.
In the case at bar, appellant was not under custodial investigation when he made the
admission. There was no coercion whatsoever to compel him to make such a
statement. Indeed, he could have refused to answer questions from the very start
when the policemen requested that they all go to his residence.
The police inquiry had not yet reached a level wherein they considered him as a
particular suspect. They were just probing into a number of possibilities, having been
merely informed that the suspect was wearing what could be a security guards
uniform.
10. People v. Maqueda - 242 SCRA 565
Britisher Horace William Barker, a consultant of the World Bank, and his Filipino wife,
Teresita Mendoza, chose the peace and quiet of a country home not any near the
metropolis of Manila or its environs, but in the rugged and mountainous terrain of Tuba,
Benguet.
 Ray Dean Salvosa. A perusal of the Sinumpaang Salaysay fails to convince us that it is an
extrajudicial confession

27 August 1991, in the sanctity of their own home, Horace was brutally slain and Teresita
What Maqueda gave was just an extrajudicial admisssion
badly battered with lead pipes on the occasion of a robbery. Sufficient prima facie
evidence pointed to Rene Salvamante, the victims former houseboy, as one of the
perpetrators of the ghastly crime.
SEC. 26. Admission of a party.The act, declaration or omission of party as to a relevant fact
As to Renes coconspirator, the prosecution initially included one Richard Malig y Severino in the may be given in evidence against him. x x x
information for robbery with homicide and serious physical injuries1 filed on 19 November 1991
with Branch 10 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Benguet at La Trinidad, Benguet.
SEC. 33. Confession.The declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense
charged, or of any offense necessarily included therein, may be given in evidence against him.
Only Richard Malig was arrested. On 22 January 1992, prior to the arraignment of Richard
Malig, the prosecution filed a motion to amend the information2 to implead as co accused Hector
In a confession, there is an acknowledgment of guilt. The term admission is usually applied in
Maqueda alias Putol because the evaluation of the evidence subsequently submitted
criminal cases to statements of fact by the accused which do not directly involve an
established his complicity in the crime, and at the hearing of the motion the following day, the
acknowledgment of his guilt or of the criminal intent to commit the offense with which he is
Prosecutor further asked that accused Richard Malig be dropped from the information because
charged.
further evaluation of the evidence disclosed no sufficient evidence against him.
And under Section 3 of Rule 133, an extrajudicial confession made by the accused is not
sufficient for conviction unless corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti.
The motion to drop Malig was granted and warrants for the arrest of accused Salvamante and
Maqueda were issued. Maqueda was subsequently arrested on 4 March 1992, and on 9
trial court admitted the Sinumpaang Salaysay of accused Maqueda although it was taken
April 1992, he filed an application for bail. He categorically stated therein that he is
without the assistance of counsel because it was of the opinion that since an information had
willing and volunteering to be a State witness in the aboveentitled case, it appearing that
already been filed in court against him and he was arrested pursuant to a warrant of arrest
he is the least guilty among the accused in this case.
issued by the court, the Sinumpaang Salaysay was not, therefore, taken during custodial
The prosecution rebutted the testimony of Hector Maqueda by presenting Fredesminda
investigation.
Castrence and SPO3 Armando Molleno. Castrence, the owner of the polvoron factory where
Maqueda worked, testified that she started her business only on 30 August 1991 and thus it was
impossible for her to have hired Maqueda on 5 July 1991. SPO3 Molleno declared that he It heavily relied on People vs. Ayson16 where this Court elucidated on the rights of a person
informed Maqueda of his constitutional rights before Maqueda was investigated and that under custodial investigation and the rights of an accused after a case is filed in court. The trial
Maqueda voluntarily and freely gave his Sinumpaang Salaysay (Exhibit LL).10 court went on to state:
RTC conviction based on the confession and the proof of corpus delicti as well as on
circumstantial evidence. At the time of the confession, the accused was already facing charges in court. He no longer
had the right to remain silent and to counsel but he had the right to refuse to be a witness and
Only three pages of the brief, typed double space, are devoted to his arguments which are not to have any prejudice whatsoever result to him by such refusal. And yet, despite his knowing
anchored on his alibi that at the time the crime was committed he was not in Benguet but in fully well that a case had already been filed in court, he still confessed when he did not have to
Sukat, Muntinglupa, Metro Manila, and the failure of the star witnesses for the prosecution to do so.17
identify him. He alleges that Mrs. Barker, when investigated at the hospital, pointed to Richard
Malig as the companion of Rene Salvamante, and that when initially investigated, the two While we commend the efforts of the trial court to distinguish between the rights of a person
housemaids gave a description of Salvamantes companion that fitted Richard Malig. under Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution and his rights after a criminal complaint or
information had been filed against him, we cannot agree with its sweeping view that after such
We find no merit in this appeal. As hereinafter shown, the defense of alibi is unconvincing. filing an accused no longer [has] the right to remain silent and to counsel but he [has] the right
to refuse to be a witness and not to have any prejudice whatsoever result to him by such
refusal. If this were so, then there would be a hiatus in the criminal justice process where an
The accuseds arguments which stress the incredibility of the testimonies of Mrs. Barker and the
accused is deprived of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel and to be
househelps identifying Maqueda are misdirected and misplaced because the trial court had
informed of such rights. Such a view would not only give a very restrictive application to Section
ruled that Mrs. Teresita Mendoza Barker and the two housemaids, Norie Dacara and Julieta
12(1); it would also diminish the said accuseds rights under Section 14(2), Article III of the
Villanueva, were not able to positively identify Maqueda. The trial court based his conviction on
Constitution.
his extrajudicial confession and the proof of corpus delicti, as well as on circumstantial evidence.
He should have focused his attention and arguments on these.
The exercise of the rights to remain silent and to counsel and to be informed thereof under
Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution are not confined to that period prior to the filing of a
criminal complaint or information but are available at that stage when a person is under
investigation for the commission of an offense.
the trial court made a distinction between an extrajudicial confessionthe Sinumpaang
Salaysayand an extrajudicial admission the verbal admissions to Prosecutor Zarate and
t was, therefore, wrong for the trial court to hold that Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution
is strictly limited to custodial investigation and that it does not apply to a person against whom a
criminal complaint or information has already been filed because after its filing he loses his right
to remain silent and to counsel. If we follow the theory of the trial court, then police authorities
and other law enforcement agencies would have a heyday in extracting confessions or
admissions from accused persons after they had been arrested but before they are arraigned
because at such stage the accused persons are supposedly not entitled to the enjoyment of the
rights to remain silent and to counsel.
The Sinumpaang Salaysay of Maqueda taken by SPO2 Molleno after the formers arrest was
taken in palpable violation of his rights under Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution. As
disclosed by a reading thereof, Maqueda was not even told of any of his constitutional rights
under the said section. The statement was also taken in the absence of counsel.
In the light of his admissions to Prosecutor Zarate and Ray Dean Salvosa and his willingness to
be a state witness, Maquedas participation in the commission of the crime charged was
established beyond moral certainty. His defense of alibi was futile because by his own admission
he was not only at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission, he also admitted his
participation therein. Even if we disregard his extrajudicial admissions to Prosecutor Zarate and
Salvosa, his guilt was, as correctly ruled by the trial court, established beyond doubt by
circumstantial evidence.
It is not enough to prove that the accused was somewhere else when the crime was committed,
he must demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the
crime at the time of its commission.34 Through the unrebutted testimony of Mike Tayaban, which
Maqueda does not controvert in his brief, it was positively established that Maqueda and a
companion were seen at 7:00 a.m. of 27 August 1991 at the waiting shed in Aguyad, Tuba,
Benguet, a place barely a kilometer away from the house of the Barkers. It was not then
impossible for Maqueda and his companion to have been at the Barker house at the time the
crime was committed. Moreover, Fredisminda Castrence categorically declared that Maqueda
started working in her polvoron factory in Sukat only on 7 October 1991, thereby belying his
testimony that he started working on 5 July 1991 and continuously until 27 August 1991.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant appeal is DISMISSED and the appealed
decision of Branch 10 of the Regional Trial Court of Benguet in Criminal Case No. 91CR1206 is
AFFIRMED in toto.
Costs against accusedappellant HECTOR MAQUEDA @ PUTOL.
SO ORDERED.
11. People v. Balisteros - 237 SCRA 499
KEY TAKE-AWAY: The defense that a violation of sec. 12 of the bill of rights is a personal one
and cannot be invoked by other parties
GR/SCRA/DATE: 110289 October 7, 1994
PETITIONER: People of the Philippines
RESPONDENT: Salvador Balisteros, Nilo Avestro and Ernesto Galvante
PONENTE: Regalado
Petition:
That the trial court gravely erred (1) in finding that the killing took place in an
uninhabited place and was deliberately augmented by another wrong not necessary
for its commission; (2) in giving weight and substance to the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses and disregarding the theory of the accused-appellants; and (3)
in finding the
accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime.
Facts
August 16, 1991, Eliza Merceada went to work in the store of Romeo Abad and
delivered early merienda to the farm laborers at 8:00 AM.
Eliza saw the three respondents in Balisteros' hut drinking gin.
At 11:00 AM Eliza had to go back to the farm to bring the laborers their lunch. This
time she went with Romeo Abad.
After feeding the laborers, Eliza was walking back to Romeo's truck when she heard
shouts of "huwag!!! Huwag!!!" And then saw the three respondents running away from
the direction of the shouts.
Later that day, Romeo Abad being missing was searched for by Eliza and Yolanda.
They found Romeo Abad dead and with his intestines out in the place where Eliza
heard the shouts came from.
Police gave chase to the three respondent suspects who were seen to have fled to
Mindoro via Plaza Lawton in Manila.
The three respondent suspects were arrested in Plaza Lawton and brought back to
Pandi, Bulacan where it all happened.
Respondents were tried in the RTC and were found guilty. Material in this case
however is that Respondent Galvante testified against the two other respondents
identifying them as the killers of Abad.
Position of Respondents:
Their guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt Galvante executed a sworn
statement wherein he admitted his guilt without assistance of counsel.
The reason why Galvante gave that testimony was because he was under extreme
pressure
ISSUE:
W/N Galvante's rights were violated in accordance with the present rules for
qualification of a State Witness
HELD/RATIO:
NO.
Galvante executed a sworn statement wherein he categorically admitted his guilt but
without the assistance of a counsel.
Appellants claim that Galvante "made his sworn statement in the presence of Atty.
Alejandro, the counsel of the plaintiff (sic), Mr. Matic, the two brothers of the
deceased, the Mayor of Pandi and another person whom he did not know. With this
battery of persons surrounding him, we could imagine the pressure exerted on
Galvante"
Appellants cannot seek solace in the provision they have invoked.
What is provided by the modified formulation in the 1987 Constitution is that a
confession taken in violation of said Section 12 and Section 17 of the same Article
"shall be inadmissible in evidence against him," meaning the confessant. This
objection can be raised only by the confessant whose rights have been violated as
such right is personal in nature.
FINAL RULING:
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the court a quo is hereby AFFIRMED, with
costs against accused-appellants.
12. Gamboa v. Judge Cruz - 162 SCRA 675
RECIT READY:
Gamboa was arrested for vagrancy and later was included in a police lineup where he was
identified by the complainant as a companion in a robbery. After his identification, he was made
to sit down in front of the complainant while the latter was being interrogated by the police
investigator. An information for robbery was filed against petitioner. During the hearings he filed
a Motion to Acquit claiming that since there was no presence of his counsel during the police
lineup, his constitutional right to counsel was violated.
The SC held that his right to counsel was not violated. Police lineups are not yet part of the
custodial inquest and when petitioner was identified by the complainant at the police lineup, he
had not yet been held to answer for a criminal offense. When the process had not yet shifted
from the investigatory to the accusatory, as when the police investigation does not elicit a
confession, the accused may not yet avail of the services of his lawyer.
FACTS
Gamboa was arrested for vagrancy without a warrant of arrest. The following day, he
was included in a lineup where complainant Bernal pointed at him and identified him
as a companion for robbery. He was then brought along to the interrogation of the
complainant by a police investigator while the latter gave her statement
An information for robbery was filed against petitioner and later he was arraigned.
During the hearings, instead of presenting his defense, petitioner filed a Motion to
Acquit on the ground that the conduct of the lineup, without notice and presence of his
counsel, violated his right to counsel and due process
When the court denied his Motion to Acquit, petitioner contends that respondent judge
acted with grave abuse of discretion insisting that the order of the court was void for
violating his rights
ISSUE: WON petitioner was denied of his constitutional rights to counsel and due process
HELD: NO
The right to counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation such as when the
investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information/confession from the
accused. At such point, the person being interrogated must be assisted by counsel to
avoid the pernicious practice of extorting false admissions from the person undergoing
interrogation
However in this case, the police lineup was not yet part of the custodial inquest, hence
petitioner was not yet entitled at such stage to counsel
When petitioner was identified by the complainant at the police lineup, he had not yet
been held to answer for a criminal offense. When the process had not yet shifted from
the investigatory to the accusatory, as when the police investigation does not elicit a
confession, the accused may not yet avail of the services of his lawyer
In the course of petitioners identification in the police lineup, the accusatory
process had not yet set in; confrontation between the State and the
petitioner had not yet begun.
But the court would have to remind police investigators that while there is no real need
to afford a suspect the services of counsel during a lineup, the moment there is a
move to elicit admissions or confessions or even plain information, even though they
may appear innocent or innocuous at the time, from the suspect, he should then and
there be assisted by counsel
On the right to due process, petitioner was not in any way deprived of this right as he
was duly represented by a lawyer. He was accorded all the opportunities to be heard
and to present evidence; only that he chose not to and instead opted to file a Motion
to Acquit.
YAP, Dissenting:
The investigatory part of the proceedings started when the accused was singled out
and ordered to sit down in front of the complainant while the latter gave her
statement which led to the filing of the information. At this point, it can be said that the
custodial investigation had already begun
The right to counsel must be afforded to the accused the moment he is under
custodial investigation and not only when a confession is being exacted from him
SARMIENTO, Dissenting:
Although accused was already in custody and detained for some other cause
(vagrancy), it left him little or no choice other than to face his accuser. The situation
had reached the critical stage of the inquiry in which the confrontation becomes an
accusation rather than a routine procedure preliminary to a formal prosecution
He was in custody not for the usual questioning but for an existing charge, although
the investigation was in connection with another offense. The confrontation,
exacerbated by the pressure of actual custody, had become adversarial rather than
informational, and the assistance of counsel to the accused is a matter of
constitutional necessity
Police lineup per se does not amount to a critical stage of the investigation, as it
merely forms part of the evidence-gathering process; but in this case, the accused
already stood charged and detained for an offense and he was made to confront the
complainant in an interrogation. Other than the lineup, the subsequent confrontation
had reinforced his need for legal assistance.
13. People v. Loveria - 187 SCRA 47
July 2, 1990
Ponente: Cortres, J.
Doctrine: The right to counsel cannot be invoked in a police lineup where the
complainant was the one being investigated and questioned and the accused was not
questioned at all.
Facts:
On February 21, 1985, Loveria was charged with robbery for conspiring with 3 other men of
hold-uping a passenger jeepney resulting in the death of Ricardo Yamson (passenger), the
injuries of Cerilo Manzanero (Driver), and the stealing of Richard Bales (conductor) watch and
wallet. The RTC found Loveria guilty of robbery with homicide and frustrated homicide with the
aggravating circumstance of having been committed by a band.
Loveria argues before the Supreme Court that the manner in which he was identified by
Manzanero at the headquarters of the 225th Philippine Constabulary (PC) in Cogeo, Antipolo,
Rizal, was in violation of his constitutional right to counsel.
Issue:
Whether the manner in which Loveria was identified at the headquarters of the 225 th PC was in
violation of his constitutional right to counsel. NO.
Ruling:

Sec. 20, Art. IV of the 1973 Constitution, which was in force at the time the events under review
occurred reads:
Sec. 20. No person shall be compelled to be witness against himself. Any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to
counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other
means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation
of this section shall be inadmissible in the evidence.
Sec. 12 (1), Art. III of the 1987 Constitution provides similar guarantees by stating:
Sec. 12(1). Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right
to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If
the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights
cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
The court must emphasize that the so called Miranda rights contained in the above quoted
constitutional provisions may be invoked by a person only while he is under custodial
investigation [People v. Duero, G.R. No. 52016, May 13, 1981, 104 SCRA 379]. which has been
defined as the questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken
into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way [People v.
Caguioa, G.R. No. L38975, January 17, 1980, 95 SCRA 2, 9 citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436]. Hence, for instance, these constitutional rights may no longer be claimed by a defendant in
a criminal case already pending in court [People v. Ayson, G.R. No. 85215, July 7, 1989]
because he is no longer under custodial investigation.
In the case of Gamboa v. Cruz, the Supreme Court, which ruled that the right to counsel of a
person under custodial investigation cannot be invoked until such time that the police
investigators start questioning, interrogating or exacting a confession from the person under
investigation. The Court held that in the police lineup conducted in that particular case, it was the
complainant who was being investigated and who gave a statement to the police while the
accused was not questioned at all.
Since, as in the Gamboa case, the appellant was not investigated when Manzanero was in the
process of identifying him, he cannot claim that his right to counsel was violated because at that
stage, he was not entitled to the constitutional guarantee invoked.
14. People v. Hatton 210 SCRA 1
June 16, 1992
Doctrine: Where suspect was brought to police station only for identification; right to counsel
does not apply.
Facts:
Glenn Hatton was charged with the crime of murder for the death of Faustino Algarme.
In arraignment, Hatton assisted by his counsel, pleaded not guilty.
Principal witness for prosecution: Ongue and Basierto
- Town of Catarman, Northern Samar was celebrating fiesta
- Algarme (victim) and his three friends (Ongue, Basierto and Aboda) were on their
way to Engr. Corbillo
- They noticed 2 men coming towards them; one was short and stocky while the
other one is tall
- The tall man tapped the shoulder of Algarme with his left hand and stabbed the
latter with his right hand.
- Ongue did not know the man who stabbed Algarme, but took notice of his mestizo
features.
- Basierto recognized the tall man who stabbed Algarme when the latter turned his
face towards him
- Victim died of massive hemoorhage secondary to stab wound
- Incident reported to the police; they beamed their flashlights towards the house of
Nonong Hatton where they believed that the tall man and his companion entered
Day after incident: Ongue went to police and told them features of assailant; he said
that if they can show or present a person who fits in the description, he can identify
him. No person was presented
2nd Day: Ongue picked up from his office to identify their suspect (Glenn Hatton)
Hattons defense: alibi
- At the house of his friend Eddie Laguitan.
- Corroborated by Mrs. Laguitan, Eddies mother and another person in the group,
Jaime Mijares
- Denied having stabbed Algarme
- He categorically stated, he was left-handed
RTC:
- Hatton was guilty beyond reasonable doubt
Hence, this petition.
Issues:
1. W/N the trial court erred in holding that the accused being left handed is a detail
comparatively trivial and does not destroy the credibility of witness
2. W/N the trial court erred in holding the identification of the accused as the victims
attacker is positive and convincing considering that no courtroom identification was
made, and the said identification was based solely on a pretrial lineup of sorts,
conducted in violation of the accused appellants right to counsel, and in a manner
filled with innumerable suggestive influences
3. W/N the lower court erred in holding that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable
doubt
Held:
First Issue: The accused being a left handed is not a trivial matter
A left-handed person cannot be expected to deliver a thrust with the same intensity
using his right hand
The knife was deeply embedded
It is erroneous for the trial judge to conclude that there was no direct proof that from
the location of the wound, the relative positions of assailant and victim and the
trajectory of the blow considering the internal organ pierced thereby, the injury could
not have been inflicted by a right handed person.
Second Issue:
In People v. Llanera, the Court held that There is no law requiring a police line-up as
essential to a proper identification
Even if there was no police line-up, there could still be proper identification as long as
such identification was not suggested to the witnesses by the police
Important lines in the cross-examination (Ongue)
A The accused Glenn Hatton was just sitting along the bench there and a policeman told me
that he is their suspect and I immediately looked at him. Although he was wearing long sleeves
polo (sic) at the time of the incident but I immediately identified him and told the police that he is
really the one who stabbed the victim.
Q You mean to tell the court that you only identified the accused after the police indicated him to
you to be one of their suspect?
A Yes, sir.
Q So before the police pointed him to you had no idea that the assailant was one among those
seated on the bench?
A Not yet, Your Honor, but when the police asked me to identify who among those persons
seated on the bench and when I looked at them I immediately identify the accused Glenn Hatton
to be the person who stabbed Faustino Algarme that night
In the testimony, it is clear the Ongue did not positively identify the accused-appellant
He identified the accused, not because he was certain it was really the assailant who
stabbed the deceased, but because he was the only mestizo in the station and
because he was pointed to the policeman as their suspect.
The fact is that the accused-appellant was not identified in a police lineup. He was
pointed to by the police as their suspect.
On Section 12:
Seeking shelter under the just quoted U.S. v. Wade case, the accused also argued that when he
was presented in a line-up of sorts he was not represented by a counsel.
This argument has no merit. The doctrine enunciated in the case of U.S. v. Wade is that the
presence of counsel is indispensable in a post-indictment lineup. In that case, the accused
had already been arrested and a lawyer already appointed to represent him. It was fifteen days
after his arrest and the appointment of a lawyer to represent him when he was presented in a
police lineup to be identified by the prosecution witness. There was no doubt that Wade in that
case was already under custodial investigation where his right to counsel already attached.
In the instant case, Hatton was brought to the police station only to be identified, by a witness to
the killing of Algarme. Technically, he was not yet under custodial investigation.
The right to counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation, i.e., when the investigating
officer starts to ask questions to elicit information and/or confessions or admissions from the
respondent/ accused. At such point or stage, the person being interrogated must be assisted by
counsel to avoid the pernicious practice of extorting false or coerced admissions or confessions
from the lips of the person undergoing interrogation, for the commission of an offense.
Final Ruling: Hatton is Acquitted on Reasonable Doubt.
15. People v. Frago - 232 SCRA 653
May 31, 1994, J. Bellosillo
Doctrine
A police line-up is not part of the custodial inquest. The accused is not entitled to
counsel at this stage. He had not yet been held to answer for a criminal offense.
Therefore, he was not deprived of his right to be assisted by counsel because the
accusatory process had not yet set in.
Recit Ready
Frago was charged with the rape of Jicelyn Lansap and attemepted rape of Ronalyn
Pastera. He was acquitted on reasonable doubt for the attempted rape of Ronalyn
Pastera but was found guilty of the rape of Jicelyn Lansap.
Frago claims that the court erred when he was identified without the assistance of
counsel. He invoked that the right of an accused to counsel at all stages of the
proceedings, the most crucial of which is his identification, and denial thereof entitles
him to acquittal.
WON assistance of counsel should be given to Frago when he was being identified.
NO.
The right to counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation, i.e., when the
investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit
A police line-up is not part of the custodial inquest. The accused is not
entitled to counsel at this stage.
He had not yet been held to answer for a criminal offense.
Therefore, he was not deprived of his right to be assisted by
counsel because the accusatory process had not yet set in.
There is nothing in the records which shows that in the course of the identification
from the police line-up, the police investigator sought to extract any admission or
confession from appellant.
But his defense of insufficiency of identification is sustained.
Jicelyn Lansap had no reasonable basis for pointing to the accused. The
Pastera sisters were able to identify the accused. They identified him on 28
September 1990, whereas Jicelyn pointed him out only on 8 October 1990.
Jicelyns identification of Orlando Frago was merely patterned after the
identification made by the Pastera sisters. This is then a derivative, not
positive, identification.
Facts
Orlando Frago was charged with rape and attempted rape
Crim Case No. 9144 rape against Jicelyn Lansap, guilty
Crim Case No 9145 attempted rape against Ronalyn Pastera, acquitted
on reasonable doubt by lack of clear and convincing evidence.
Frago first went to the house of the residence of Ronalyn Pastera where he entered
Ronalyns room. He was about to take her outside her room when she suddenly woke
up and screamed for help which woke her father up. Frago dropped Ronalyn and ran
out of the house. Frago then went to the boarding house of Jicelyn Lansap. At around
5:30 am, Lansap was awakened by Frago who was strangling her. She shouted for
help so that Frago ran away. She felt pain all over her body, more particularly in her
private part, and she discovered she was no longer wearing her skirt and underwear.
She also found herself in the vacant house of Dado Andor and not at her boarding
house.
 Frago claims that the trial court erred in convicting him on the basis of an identification
that was made without the assistance of counsel and according credence to the story
of Jicelyn, thereby denying his constitutional right to be presumed innocent until
proved guilty beyond reasonable doubt. He argues that it was during his detention,
when he was not assisted by counsel, that he was identified by Jicelyn. He invoked
People v. Hassan where this Court affirmed the right of an accused to counsel at all
stages of the proceedings, the most crucial of which is his identification, and denial
thereof entitles him to acquittal.
Issue
WON assistance of counsel should be given to Frago when he was being identified.
NO.
Held
In People v. Hassan, the accused was identified without being placed in a police line-
up. The confrontation between the eyewitness and the accused violated the right of
the accused to counsel in all stages of the investigation especially at its most crucial
stage the identification of the accused. The accused was therefore acquitted.
In this case, Frago was singled out by Jicelyn in a police line-up composed of ten
persons. All of them were mustached and five were long-haired. Some were stout
while others were slim.
The right to counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation, i.e., when the
investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit
A police line-up is not part of the custodial inquest. The accused is not
entitled to counsel at this stage.
He had not yet been held to answer for a criminal offense.
Therefore, he was not deprived of his right to be assisted by
counsel because the accusatory process had not yet set in.
There is nothing in the records which shows that in the course of the identification
from the police line-up, the police investigator sought to extract any admission or
confession from appellant.
But the Court sustains his defense on the insufficiency of the identification of Frago.
Jicelyn had no reliable basis for pointing to the accused as the person who
raped her. She did not have the opportunity to observe the height of the
rapist; and, that the only evidence of sexual intercourse is the result of the
medical examination.
The Pastera sisters were able to identify the Frago because their room was
lighted with a wick/gas lamp and he was not wearing anything in his face.
They identified him on 28 September 1990, whereas Jicelyn pointed him out
only on 8 October 1990. Jicelyns identification of Orlando Frago was merely
patterned after the identification made by the Pastera sisters. This is then a
derivative, not positive, identification.
Fragos denial and alibi are inherently weak, but the prosecution cannot rely
on their frailty to enhance its cause. Every circumstance favoring the
innocence of the accused must be taken into account and the proof against
him must survive the test of reason.
16. People v. Gamboa 194 SCRA 372
Doctrine: The constitutional right provided in Section 12(1) shall only extend to testimonial
compulsion.
Any testimony obtained through any means which vitiate the free will of the accused shall not be
used against him.
[No recit ready dahil sobrang ikli ng case]
Facts:
Gamboa, together with Celdran, was originally charged with murder. He was identified as the
one who shot Rene Impas with a shotgun.
The charge against Celdran was dismissed but Gamboa was convicted by the RTC with
reclusion perpetua and ordered to indemnify the victims family for an amount of P30,000.
Some of his contentions in his appeal are [ones related to the section]:
o His confession is inadmissible because he was maltreated which resulted into 27 injuries.
o The shotgun, as the murder weapon, should be inadmissible because it was obtained without
a warrant.
o The paraffin test conducted on him is inadmissible because it was done without his counsel.
Issues: WN his rights under investigations were violated?
Held:
On his confession
The court disregarded his notion that his confession should be inadmissible. The court stated
that this would be worthless since the prosecution did not rely on his testimony alone.
On the shotgun
The court held that while the warrantless search should be looked into, there are other evidence
sufficient to prove his guilt. This would consist of the testimonies of the witnesses, and the
ballistics test found in the crime scene against those found in his home.
On the paraffin test
The court held that the paraffin test conducted, regardless of the presence of his counsel, is
admissible. The constitutional right granted to people under investigation covers only testimonial
compulsion. This does not extend to body examinations, such as paraffin tests.
17. People v. Linsangan 195 SCRA 784
DOCTRINE
Although accused was not assisted by counsel when he initialed the P10-bills, his right against
self-incrimination was not violated for his possession of the marked bills did not constitute a
crime.
FACTS
Police operatives of the Drug Enforcement Unit of the Western Police District were informed
that there was rampant drug using and pushing in Dinalupihan St, Tondo, Manila
o Pusher was described to be a boy about 20 yrs old, 55 in height, ordinary build
o He allegedly sold marijuana to anybody, regardless of age
Police Lieutenant Manuel Caeg and other members of the unit organized a buy-bust operation
to effect arrest of said drug pusher
Five days before the appointed date, the police operatives conducted a test-buy operation on
Rizal Avenue, Sta Cruz Manila.
o They arrested a person for violation of Sec 8 of RA 6425 (Possession or Use of Prohibited
Drugs)
o Under questioning, the person informed them that he bought marijuana at Dinalupihan St in
Tondo
On Nov 13, 1987 at 10am, 2 P10 bills were given to Pat. Corpuz who had marked them with
his initials T.C. he gave one also to the informer. o They went to Dinalupihan, using an owner-
type jeep
o They were all in civilian clothes. Pat COrpuz wore a maong shorts, white t-shirt placed over his
shoulders
o Pat. Corpuz asked the informant, while walking together, where the suspect was and the
informant pointed to the appellant who was seated by the gutter about 6 meters away from
them, seemingly waiting for someone. He was wearing blue and green shorts and sando
o The informer raised his hand as a signal to the appellant, who rose and walked toward them
o He told appellant kukuha ako. And told accused he would also buy P10 worth marihuana
while his compadre (Pat. Corpuz) would fetch ten cigarette sticks of handrolled marijuana at P2
per stick
o Accused went inside house and emerged, handed it over to Pat. Corpuz and informer
o Pat. Corpuz took them with his right hand and at the same time grabbing the accused with his
other hand, saying Pulis ito, hwag kang pumalag!
o The accused tried to resist but was overpowered; informer took to his heels
Pat. Ruiz frisked Linsangan and retrieved the marked ten peso bills, asking appellant to sign
his name on the two P10 bills
Just when the appellant was being apprised of his constitutional rights, his uncle, a neighbor
and the brgy chairman arrived offering P500 to Pat Corpuz to let the accused go.
The sticks were found positive for marijuana.
Accused was filed a case for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Law. Accused denied charge
and gave a different version of the event.
Trial Court found him guilty; Hence the appeal
ISSUES
1. W/N accuseds right to counsel violated No RULING & RATIO
HELD
1. No, accuseds right to counsel was not violated.
The courts assessment of the credibility of the prosecutions witnesses is entitled to
great respect unless and until they are clearly shown to be arbitrary, which the defense failed to
do.
Although there were inconsistencies in affidavit of arrest prepared by Pat. Corpuz,
they involve only minor details which do not affect over all picture of the case
Appellant was not denied due process during custodial investigation
Although he was not assisted by counsel when he initialed the P10 bills that the police
found tucked in his waist, his right against self-incrimination was not violated for his possession
of the marked bills did not constitute a crime; the subject of the prosecution was his act of selling
marijuana cigarettes.
His conviction was not based on the presence of his initials on the P10 bill, but on the
fact that the trial court believed the testimony of the policemen that they arrested him while he
was actually engaged in selling marijuana cigarettes to a member of the arresting party.
Law enforcers are presumed to have performed their official duties in a regular
manner.
DISPOSITION: Appeal dismissed.
18. People v. De Las Marinas 196 SCRA 504
[30 April 1991] [Ponente: Paras]
By Cabochan, Jonas
DOCTRINE: It is the police officers who confiscated the same who should have signed said
[Receipt for Property Seized]. If the accused were the one to sign, it is tantamount to an
extrajudicial confession. [He was made to admit the commission of the offense without informing
him of his constitutional rights.]
RECIT-READY: Orlando de las Marinas was arrested in a buy-bust operation. After his arrest,
he and his co-accused were made to sign a Receipt of Property Seized. The issue is WON such
a receipt is inadmissible as evidence. Yes it is inadmissible as evidence since it is the police who
should have signed such. The accused was made to admit the commission of the offense
without informing him of his constitutional rights.
FACTS:
> This is a case where the accused (Orlando de la Marinas AKA Lando) was found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt in the RTC of Pasay, Branch 115, for violating Sec. 15 of RA6425 (Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972). The information charged him for feloniously selling 1 aluminum foil
containing roughly 1/8 gram of shabu (Methamphetamine)
> The Prosecution presented 3 witnesses:
1. P/Cpl. Adolfo Acroy, a member of the team in the buy-bust operation. He was given
marked money (1 100-peso bill and 1 50-peso bill). The informant led them to Lando
and Boy (AKA Angel Torres) in front of a sari-sari store at Cabrera St. Acroy asked for
P150.00 worth of shabu, money received by Lando then given to Boy. Afterwards, Boy
left and returned after 5-10 minutes and handed a small aluminum foil, which
contained shabu. Acroy then gave the pre-arranged signal of scratching his head to
signal his team and caught them. The team prepped the evidence and turned it over to
the Narcotics Unit. Acroy then prepped the Receipt for property Seized and asked the
accused to sign it.
2. Sgt. Isidro, who corroborated the testimony of Acroy, and stated that the team
witnessed the transaction from 30-35 meters away.
3. Nelly Cariaga, Forensic Chemist, who testified that the examined specimen gave a
positive result for shabu and hydrochloride.
> Defense:
1. de las Marinas testified that he is a tricycle driver by day and Tanod by night. He
said that during a ronda as Tanod, he bumped into a friend, Boy Lopez, who was in
the custody of 2 NARCOM men. Lopez asked him to point to the source of shabu for
which Lopez was arrested for. de la Marinas then pointed to the house of Angel
Torres, where the latter was arrested, but de las Marinas was also made to board the
same car with Boy Lopez and Torres, and taken to Crame, instead of EDSA as
promised.
2. Sam Sagudang, a co-tanod of de las Marinas. He said that when the accused was
on duty, 2 people approached the accused. De las Marinas then asked permission
from him, and he did not know where they went. [Pretty useless witness I know]
> The trial court found the accused guilty.
ISSUE: WON Receipt for Property Seized is inadmissible as evidence for violating Article
3 Section 12?
HELD: YES, the evidence is inadmissible.
> [A]ccused-appellant was the victim of a clever ruse to make him sign the Receipt for Property
Seized which, in effect, is an extrajudicial confession of the commission of the offense.
> It is the police officers who confiscated the same who should have signed said receipt. No
doubt this is a violation of the constitutional right of appellant to remain silent. He was made to
admit the commission of the offense without informing him of his constitutional rights. Such a
confession obtained in violation of the Constitution is inadmissible in evidence.
Extra: de las Marinas was still found guilty because of the testimonies and documentary
evidence of the prosecution. The trial court mainly relied on such.
> RTC said that [t]he Court gives full credit to the evidence of the prosecution. It has found
nothing in the record to disbelieve the testimonies of the Government. Further, it stated that
the Court finds it hard to believe the theory of the defense. The accused failed to substantiate his
defense of alibi. That the accused exposed himself to good advantage of meeting people
engaged in shabu deals. He became acquainted and even established friendship with Boy
Lopez and Boy Torres, known drug traffickers."
> The findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are generally accorded great
respect.
> Torres escaped from custody. This was prior to the arraignment and was at large even when
this decision was promulgated.
19. People v. Enrique 204 SCRA 674 (1991)
Doctrine: Signatures of an accused on a receipt for seized property is considered as a
confession or admission.
Confessions or admissions covered by Section 12 need not be explicit; they can be
merely implicit in any evidence that is communicative in nature.
In this case, the accused affixed his signature on marijuana sticks because he feared
that the police might substitute it with something else during trial. In effect, the affixing of his
signature amounted to an admission of his culpability.
Facts:
A buy-bust operation was conducted at 2:45pm in a restaurant upon learning from a
civilian informant that a certain Bong of Aparri has been selling sticks of marijuana.
Patrolman Natividad handed to the seller (later identified as Antonio Enrique) a
marked P10.00 bill; the seller handed Natividad sticks of marijuana.
Immediately after the transaction, Natividad confirmed that the item was in fact
marijuana and gave the signal to the team to arrest the seller.
The RTC found accused Enrique guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
During the investigation, however, the accused, unassisted by counsel, wrote his
name on the rolled marijuana cigarettes. Patrolman Quebalayan testified that the
accused affixed his name thereon voluntarily and that this gesture was intended as a
security against substitution. Yet, Quebalayan and the other arresting officers exerted
no efforts to inform the accused of his rights under custodial investigation.
Issue:
W/N the marijuana sticks are admissible as evidence?
Held:
No.
Ratio:
In effect, the accuseds act amounted to an admission of his culpability in violation of
the right to counsel. Such admission is therefore inadmissible as evidence.
However, the accused was still convicted in the end.
Notwithstanding this setback for the prosecution, accused cannot be acquitted
because his conviction did not rest solely on his admission. He has completely failed
to rebut by contrary evidence the testimonies and documentary evidence presented
by the prosecution.
20. People v. Bandin 226 SCRA 299
(From Jech Tiu)
-PEOPLE v. BANDIN = Booking sheet
BANDIN was arrested for possession of drugs
He signed the Booking Sheet and Arrest Report at the police station, as well as the Receipt of
Property Seized without the assistance of counsel
The SC held that when an arrested person signs a Booking Sheet and Arrest Report at a
police station, he does not admit the commission of an offense nor confess to any
incriminating circumstance
o The Booking Sheet is merely a statement of the accuseds being booked as well as
the date of his arrest.
o It is a police report and may be useful in charges of arbitrary detention against the
police themselves
o The Booking Sheet is not an extra-judicial statement and cannot be the basis of a
judgment of conviction
The SC also held that as regards the signature on the Receipt of Property Seized, the same
was tantamount to an admission because mere possession of drugs is a crime in itself
o The act was tantamount to an extra-judicial and uncounselled admission made in
clear violation of the Bill of Rights
21. People v. Escordial, 373 SCRA 585
January 16, 2002
By: Santos, Patrick
Doctrine: For evidence supposedly inadmissible to be rejected by the courts, they have to
be assailed during trial as required by Rule 132, 36 Rules on Evidence. To not assail the
evidence would deem the right to object to the admissibility of evidence waived and the
evidence accepted as if it was completely valid.
Facts
This is about a review of a criminal case filed against accused Anthony Escordial, accused
of robbery with rape he is supposedly sentenced to death.
The three women named Erma Blanca, Michelle Darunday and Ma. Teresa Dellaver were
roommates in a boarding house who slept beside each other in one room.
o While they were asleep, Erma was awakened by a presence of a man who proceeded to
shush her and asked where the money was.
o The other two were also woken up and the accused also asked them where their money was.
He asked two of the girls to blindfold each other and blindfolded Michelle on his own.
o He got on top of the girl and raped her in the presence of her roommates.
After the ordeal, the man talked to the three girls and singled out Michelle, as the accused
knew her and used to catcall her during the day.
Testimonies from neighbors, the landlords as well as policemen were taken and all of them
corroborated to incriminate the accused.
During the day of the arrest, the policemen were able to identify the accused in a
basketball court watching a game and asked him to come with as he was a suspect in a criminal
case.
o Witnesses were able to identify the accused and the three girls also recognized his build and
his eyes.
Michelle also was able to recognize him through the scars which she managed to feel during
the ordeal.
However, during the testimony of the accused, the facts began to split off from the
prosecutions version.
For his defense, accused testified that he was participating in a cockfight during the time of
the crime, this testimony was corroborated by some of the witnesses for the defense.
o To add to that, when the police officers went to Negros Occidental, the accused hometown,
the officers had no warrant of arrest, only a mission order.
The accused further testified that when he was positively identified in a line-up where he
was the only one handcuffed and did not have an attorney, the police officers beat him up during
his transfer to Bacolod which was the victims hometown and the city where the crime was
committed.
o This was in order for him to confess that he did the deed since he was already identified as
the accused.
The police officers even pulled a knife to his neck, threatening to kill him if he refused to
confess.
Days after, when the accused relatives went to the station to see him, the accused was
severely injured this was corroborated in the courts records of the medical certificate issued
by the hospital.
 The Regional Trial Court convicted accused of Robbery with Rape which instanced this
automatic appeal to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Were the accuseds constitutional rights respected in this case, especially as to the fact
that he was not informed of his right to be silent and that a lawyer was not presented to him, nor
was he given the chance to avail of one especially during his custodial interrogation and line-
up identification?
RULING: Claim of inadmissibility of evidence needs to be assailed during the trial, failure to do
so will make such inadmissible evidence valid even though supposedly invalid.
Accused contends that the trial court erred in not excluding evidence obtained
from him during the interrogation for violation of accused-appellants rights under
Section 12.
While it cannot be denied that accused-appellant was deprived of his right to be
informed of his rights to remain silent and to have a competent and independent
counsel, he has not shown that, as a result of his custodial interrogation, the police
obtained any statement from him whether inculpatory or exculpatory.
o The fact remains that the records show that he has said nothing during
the interrogation.
o In fact, accused-appellant testified that at no point, even when
subjected to physical torture, did he ever admit committing the crime with
which he was charged. In other words, no uncounseled statement was
obtained from accused-appellant which should have been excluded as
evidence against him.
Of greater significance is the fact that accused-appellant was never assisted by
counsel, whether of his own choice or provided by the police officers, from the time of
his arrest in Pontevedra, Negros Occidental to the time of his continued detention at
the Bacolod police station.
o Although accused-appellant made no statement during this time, this
fact remains important insofar as it affects the admissibility of the out-of-
court identification of accused-appellant by the prosecution witnesses.
o As a rule, an accused is not entitled to the assistance of counsel in a
police line-up considering that such is usually not a part of the custodial
inquest.
However, the cases at bar are different inasmuch as accused-
appellant, having been the focus of attention by the police after
he had been pointed to by a certain Ramie as the possible
perpetrator of the crime, was already under custodial
investigation when these out-of-court identifications were
conducted by the police.
An out-of-court identification of an accused can be made in various ways. In a
show-up, the accused alone is brought face to face with the witness for identification,
while in a police line-up, the suspect is identified by a witness from a group of persons
gathered for that purpose.
o Custodial investigations are recognized as critical confrontations of the
accused which necessitate the presence of counsel.
We have thus ruled that any identification of an uncounseled
accused made in a police line-up, or in a show-up for that matter,
after the start of the custodial investigation is inadmissible as
evidence against him.
Here, accused-appellant was identified by the
witnesses in a show-up. The problem is the accused
has no counsel which meant that this evidence should
have been held as inadmissible against him.
Be that as it may, as the defense failed to object immediately when these
witnesses were presented by the prosecution or when specific questions regarding
this matter were asked of them, as required by Rule 132, 36 of the Rules on
Evidence, accused-appellant must be deemed to have waived his right to object to
the admissibility of these testimonies.
22. People v. Ang Chun Kit 251 SCRA 660
December 29, 1995
By: Consolacion, Ray
Facts:
ANG CHUN KIT, a Chinese national and reputed to be a member of a Hong Kong-
based drug syndicate operating in Metro Manila, was collared by NARCOM operatives
in a buy-bust operation after he sold to shabu. His car also yielded more of the
regulated drug neatly tucked in a Kleenex box.
On November 1991, a Confidential Informer (CI) reported to Chief Investigator Avelino
I. Razon that he (CI) had arranged a transaction with a drug dealer interested in
selling a kilo of shabu and agreed to consummate the sale that evening at the lobby of
the Cardinal Santos Medical Center. Chief Investigator Razon immediately organized
a buy-bust team with SPO2 Cesar Jacobo as poseur-buyer. Forty (40) bundles of
genuine and counterfeit P100-bills were prepared.
The team went to the Cardinal Santos Medical Center. The CI and SPO2 Jacobo who
was carrying the plastic bag of money proceeded to the lobby of the hospital while the
others moved around to avoid detection. The accused arrived. He was met at the
lobby by the CI who introduced SPO2 Jacobo to him as the person interested to buy
shabu. After allowing the accused a quick look at the bundles of money, SPO2 Jacobo
and the CI followed him to the parking lot where the latter took out from the trunk of
his car a blue plastic bag and handed it to SPO2 Jacobo. After ascertaining that the
bag contained approximately one (1) kilo of shabu, SPO2 Jacobo handed the boodle
money to the accused. Then SPO2 Jacobo casually lit a cigarette to signal to the other
NARCOM operatives to move in and effect the arrest.
The other members of the team closed in, placed the accused under arrest and seized
the money from him. They also searched his vehicle and found on the dashboard of
his car three (3) packets more of crystalline substance in a Kleenex box.
SPO3 San Jose brought the regulated drug recovered to the PC Crime Laboratory
where the forensic chemist confirmed the substance found in the bag and in the
Kleenex box to be shabu.
The accused refuted the charges. He tried to explain his presence at the Cardinal
Santos Medical Center thus: In the early evening of 8 November 1991 as he was
preparing to have dinner with some friends in Greenhills, San Juan, he received a call
from his friend Johnny Sy asking if he could ride with him to Greenhills to visit a sick
friend at the Cardinal Santos Medical Center. Since he (accused) was able to borrow
the car and the driver of his cousin Roman Ong, he acceded to Johnny. He passed for
him and his friend Anthony Co and brought them to the medical center. Johnny and
Anthony alighted in front of the lobby. He proceeded to the parking lot with the driver
and answered the call of nature. Then he lit a stick of cigarette. However some twenty
(20) to thirty (30) minutes later, plainclothesmen with guns drawn, Johnny and
Anthony in tow, suddenly appeared from nowhere and arrested him and Uy without
informing them the reason for their arrest. He together with Uy, Sy and Co was then
brought to Camp Crame where he was mauled, detained and interrogated without the
assistance of counsel. His repeated requests to make a telephone call to his relatives
and counsel were denied.
Issue:
 Whether or not the constitutional rights of the accused was violated when he
was asked to sign the receipt of lists of items confiscated from him without the
assistance of counsel.
Held:
Yes, the Court agreed with the accused that his signature on the receipt or lists of
items confiscated from him is inadmissible in evidence as there is no showing that he
was then assisted by counsel. In People v. Mauyao we said that "conformance to
these documents are declarations against interest and tacit admissions of the crime
charged, since merely unexplained possession of prohibited drugs is punished by law.
They have been obtained in violation of his right as a person under custodial
investigation for the commission of an offense, there being nothing in the records to
show that he was assisted by counsel." They have been obtained in violation of his
right as a person under custodial investigation for the commission of an offense, there
being nothing in the records to show that he was assisted by counsel."
But as in the cases of Mauyao and Morico, accused Ang Chun Kit's conformity to the
questioned documents has not been a factor in his conviction since his guilt has been
adequately established by the detailed and unshaken testimonies of the officers who
apprehended him. Hence even disregarding the questioned documents we still find
the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.
23. People v. Gallarde, 325 SCRA 835 (February 17, 2000)
(Ponente: Chief Justice Davide, Jr.)
By: Shannin Mae Olivarez
Recit-Ready:
An information for the special complex crime of rape with homicide was filed charging accused-
appellant of having sexual intercourse with one Editha Talan, a minor, 10 years of age, against
her will and consent, and thereafter, with intent to kill, cover the nose and mouth of the said
minor resulting to her death and was buried in the field. Through circumstantial evidence, the
trial court rendered a decision finding accused-appellant guilty of the crime of murder and
sentenced him to reculsion perpetua, in which he also needed to pay the heirs of the victim
actual damages. It convicted accused-appellant of the crime of murder only, not of the complex
crime of rape with homicide because of the lack of proof of carnal knowledge.
The issue in this case is whether or not the right against self-incrimination is violated if pictures
of the accused were taken, without assistance of counsel, as part of the evidence. The SC held
that such is NOT a violation of the right against self-incrimination. The SC did not agree with the
RTCs rejection of the photographs taken of Gallarde immediately after the incident on the
ground that the same were taken while Gallarde was already under the mercy of the police.
The taking of pictures of an accused even without the assistance of counsel, being a purely
mechanical act, is not a violation of his constitutional right against self-incrimination.
The constitutional right of an accused against self-incrimination proscribes the use of physical or
moral compulsion to extort communications from the accused and not the inclusion of his body
in evidence when it may be material. Purely mechanical acts are not included in the prohibition
as the accused does not thereby speak his guilt, hence the assistance and guiding hand of the
counsel is not required. The essence of the right against self-incrimination is testimonial
compulsion, that is, the giving of evidence against himself through a testimonial act. Hence, it
has been held that a woman charged with adultery may be compelled to submit a physical
examination to determine her pregnancy; and an accused may be compelled to submit to
physical examination and to have substance taken from his body for medical determination as to
whether he was suffering from gonorrhoea which was contracted by his victim; to expel
morphine from his mouth; to have the outline of his foot traced to determine its identity with
bloody footprints; and to be photographed or measured, or his garments or shoes removed or
replaced, or to move his body to enable the foregoing things to be done.
Facts:
June 24, 1997: Gallarde was charged with the special complex crime of rape with
homicide
May 6, 1997: In the evening, amidst the field located at Brgy. Trenchera (Municipality
of Tayug, Province of Pangasinan, Philippines) Gallarde, by means of force, violence and
intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously have sexual intercourse with
one Editha Talan, a minor-10 years of age, against her will and consent, and thereafter, with
intent to kill, cover the nose and mouth of the said minor resulting to her death and then bury her
in the field, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said Editha Talan
Arraignment on September 1, 1997: Gallarde, with the assistance of the counsel,
entered a plea of not guilty; the trial of the case immediately ensued as the defense waived the
holding of the pre-trial conference
Summary of testimonies:
o Evening of May 26, 1997: at the house of spouses duardo and Elena Talan in Brgy.
Trenchea, Tayug, Pangasinan, their neighbours converged; among them were appellant Radel
Gallarde, Francisco, Renato, Edwin, all surnamed Fernandez, Romel Hernandez, Jaime
Cabinta, Rosy Clemente, Jon Talen, Noel Arellaga and Ramil Bargo; Idling by was Editha, 10
year old daughter of spouses Talan
o A fluorescent lamp illuminated them as they partook beer; after a while, Roger stood up and
invited Jaime and appellant to dine in the kitchen. Jaime, too, stepped out of the kitchen to
urinate. Outside the house, he chanced upon appellant and Editha talking to eath other; Jaime
whistled at appellant but instead of minding him, the latter sprinted towards the road leading to
his house
o Thereafter, Editha entered the kitchen and took hold of a kerosene lamp; Jaime followed her
and asked where she was going; Editha answered that she would look for appellant; soon
Editha left enroute to where appellant fled
o By 10:00 oclock that evening, the drinking buddies had dispersed but Jaime, Francisco,
Edwin and Rose regrouped at Renatos place where they talked and relaxed. Moments later,
Roger arrived and informed them that Editha was missing; Roger asked the group to help look
for her
o Elena Talan informed his uncle, Barangay Ex-kagawad Mario Fernandez, about her
daughters disappearance; the latter, together with his son Edwin, wife Virginia and nephew
Freddie Cortez wasted no time in joining their neighbours search the houses, dikes and fields to
look for the missing child; the searchers used a lighted rubber tire
o When Jaime mentioned that appellant was the last person he saw talking to Editha, the
searchers went back to the house of appellant; 7 meters away from appellants house, one of
the searchers, Alfredo Cortez, found Edithas left foot slipper. Suddenly, Edwin Fernandez
announced: Tata, Radel is here! pointing to the toilet about 6 meters away from appellants
house. The searchers found appellant squatting with his short pants; His hands and knees were
covered with soil. When confronted by ex-kagawad Hernandez why he was there, appellant
answered he was relieving himself
o After the confrontation at the toilet, Ex-kagawad Fernandez brought appellant to Brgy.
Captain Felicisimo Mendoza, informing the latter that appellant was the last person seen talking
with the missing child; Fernandez then rejoined the searchers
o Back in the field, Virginia Fernandez tripped on a wet ground. As she reached for her slipper,
she saw Edithas right foot slipper (the other one was found near the house of Gallarde)
o Around 3 meters farther from Edithas right foot slipper; another slipper was found. It was old,
8 to 9 inches in length and appellant was seen wearing it in the morning of that day
o The searchers, thereafter, noticed dishevelled grasses. Along the way, they saw a wide hole
among the dishevelled grass. Ex-kagawad Fernandez accidentally dropped the lighted rubber
tire and as his nephew Freddie picked it up, the latter exclaimed: Uncle, look at this loose soil!
Ex-kagawad Fernandez forthwith scratched some earth aside and then Edithas hand pitted out
o The cause of Edithas death as revealed in the post-mortem examination showed
suffocation of the lungs as a result from powerful covering of the nose and mouth, associated
with laceration of the vagina and raptured hymen
Gallarde was the lone witness for the defense; he interposed a denial and the alibi
that he was at home with his mother and brothers at the time the crime occurred; he declared
that he is 18 years old, single, a former construction worker
He knew Editha, a neighbour whom he considered as a sister because she used to
come to his house; they never had a quarrel or misunderstanding; he neither raped nor killed
Editha
On cross-examination by the prosecutor and to questions propounded by the court,
Gallarde admitted that he saw Editha on the night of May 6, 1997 in her parents house,
particularly in the kitchen; he was there because he joined a group drinking Colt 45 beer, as he
was called by Rudio Fernandez
Gallarde knows Kgd. Mario Fernandez, but after he left the Talan residence he did not
see Kgd. Fernandez anymore; Kgd. Fernandez saw him in his (Gallardes) toilet on the night of
May 6; thereafter Fernandez took him to the barangay captain and later he was turned over to
the PNP at Camp Narciso Ramos
The police informed him that he was a suspect in the rape and killing of Editha Talan,
and he told them that he did not commit the crime; at the Talan residence he was wearing short
pants and rubber slippers
Fernandez asked him to pull down his shorts and he complied; he was then wearing
briefs with a hemline that was a little loose; he was informed that a cadaver was recovered near
his house; when he was asked questions while in police custody, he was nto represented by any
lawyer
Gallarde further declared on cross-examination and on questions by the court that he
considered Editha Talan as a sister and her parents also treated him in a friendly manner; when
he came to know that Edithas parents suspected him of the crime, he was still on friendly terms
with them. However, he did not go to them to tell them he was innocent because they
brandished a bolo in anger
Finally, he testified that in the evening of May 6 he came to know that Editha died; she
was still alive when he was drinking at the back of the Talan house and left for home; from the
time he arrived, he never left again that night, and his mother and brothers knew it for a fact
February 12, 1998: the RTC rendered a decision convicting Gallarde of the crime of
murder only, not of the complex crime of rape with homicide because of the lack of proof of
carnal knowledge
The RTC did not appreciate the alternative circumstance of intoxication either as a
mitigating or aggravating circumstances pursuant to Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code
because Gallardes alleged inebriation (intoxication) on the night of 6 May 1997, was not
satisfactorily proven
As to the civil aspect of the case: the RTC considered the stipulation of the parties on
27 October 1997 fixing a liquidated amount of P70,000 as actual damages, and leaving the
matter of moral damages to the discretion of the court
The RTC was not inclined to award moral damages because the evidence before it
tends to disclose that on the night of 6 May 1997, before she died, Editha was a much-neglected
child.
In his Appellants Brief filed on 16 March 1999, Gallarde alleges that the trial court
committed the following errors:
o In convicting him of the crime of murder in an information for rape with homicide
o In concluding that the prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt that he was
responsible for the death of Editha Talan
o In not acquitting him on the ground of notches of proof beyond reasonable doubt
SC sustains Gallardes contention that the trial court erred in convicting him of murder
in an information charging him of rape with homicide
In the absence then in the information of an allegation of any qualifying circumstance,
Gallarde cannot be convicted of murder; an accused cannot be convicted of an offense higher
than that with which he is charged in the complaint or information under which he is tried
It matters not how conclusive and convincing the evidence of guilty may be, but an
accused cannot be convicted of any offense, unless it is charged in the complaint or information
for which he is tried, or is necessarily included in that which is charged
He has a right to be informed of the nature of the offense with which he is charged
before he is put on trial; to convict an accused of a higher offense than that charged in the
complaint or information under which he is tried would be an unauthorized denial of that right
SC agrees with the RTC that the evidence for the prosecution, although
circumstantial, was sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of Gallarde for the
death of Editha
Issue:
Whether or not the right against self-incrimination is violated if pictures of the accused
were taken, without assistance of counsel, as part of the evidence No.
Held/Ruling:
Constitutional Right against Self-Incrimination:
The constitutional right of an accused against self-incrimination proscribes the use of
physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from the accused an not the inclusion of
his body in evidence when it may be material
Purely mechanical acts does not thereby speak his guilt, hence the assistance and
guiding hand of counsel is not required
The essence of the right against self-incrimination is testimonial compulsion, that is,
the giving of evidence against himself through a testimonial act
There is also no merit in Gallardes argument that the failure of the prosecution to prove
beyond reasonable doubt the place and time of the commission of the crime is fatal and will
justify his acquittal
Decision:
Radel Gallarde is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as principal of the
crime of Homicide
24. Estacio v. Sandiganbayan (March 6, 1990) (Chung, Lyn)
Parties:
Petitioner: Jesus Estacio Y Estrella
Respondent: Sandiganbayan
Facts:
Aug 26, 1981 accused Romero Villasanta openend a current account with
Lucena City Branch of the Solid Bank.
Represented himself as engaged in the construction business.
deposited an initial amount of 1500.
as part of the sinister plot. Villasanta openend another current account with the
Cubao Branch of the Solid Bank
represented himself as a new businessman and owner of the Romero
Villasanta Construction
opened another bank account in Traders Royal Bank still represented himself as
engaged in the construction business.
After having opened three current accounts with three different banks, Villasanta
and the syndicate began their insidious operations. - he issued checks without
corresponding funds in such accounts where it will be drawn from.
On the same day, the checks are forwarded to the Clearing house of the CB for the
standard clearing thereof.
At the Central Bank Clearing House were accused Manuel Valentino (who later on
became a state witness), a bookkeeper detailed at the Clearing Office, Central Bank
 of the Philippines and accused Jesus Estacio, janitor-messenger of the Central Bank 25. People v. De Jesus
of the Philippines who were then waiting for the demand envelope containing the DOCTRINE: The right to counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation, i.e., when the
checks deposited by accused Villasanta. investigating officer starts to ask questions to elicit information or confession or admission from
As soon as the demand envelope arrived, Estacio got the same, placed it inside the accused
his push cart and brought the envelope inside the comfort room at the fourth floor of
Facts:
the Central Bank Building.
Accused Estacio then waited for state witness Valentino and accused Villasanta. On September 8, 1987, at about 8:30 p.m., three unidentified men flagged down the tricycle of
When state witness Valentino and Villasanta arrived, the former took the demand Leonardo Garcia. After a few minutes ride, Leonardo was stabbed 17 times of the neck, trunk
envelope and pulled out the checks in question and thereafter gave the same to and on the extremities, causing his death. His meager earning that day of P40.00 was taken
accused Villasanta. from him.
State witness Valentino got hold of the attached bank clearing statement of Solid
Bank, Lucena Branch. Thereafter, the case of Garcia was referred to Pat. Rogelio Lorbes for investigation. On
After the accused had altered the bank clearing statement, accused Valentino, the September 9, 1987, Cpl. Arnaldo Limpoco and Pfc. Reynaldo Zapata were dispatched to a
CB bookkeeper, prepared a Central Bank Manifest and in the column "Amount" he particular stall along San Agustin St., Public Market. Pasig to look for a certain "Eddie" and
another surnamed Tupaz in connection with the death of Leonardo.
placed the correct figures P992,723.99 in the line opposite the Consolidated Bank and
Trust Company. Upon finding the two, the police officers asked them whether they had knowledge of the stabbing
As soon as this Manifest was signed by prosecution witness Alfonso Magsalin, CB incident, to which they allegedly answered in the affirmative. "Eddie," accused Edgardo de
Chief of Division, accused Valentino superimposed thereon the amount of Jesus, and Tupaz, herein appellant Carlos Tupaz, were brought by the officers to police
"P344,238.29" thereby making it appear that such was the only amount received for headquarters, where they were turned over to Pat. Lorbes. The two were then interrogated by
Solid Bank, Lucena Branch Pat. Lorbes without the assistance of counsel. Thereafter, Pat. Lorbes fetched a lawyer from
All told, the syndicate was able to defraud the Solid Bank, Lucena City Branch CLAO, Atty. Oscar Saldivar, and in the latters presence, reduced the statements of the two
and/or the Central in the total amount of P648,564.70. This syndicate was able to accused to writing. Both accused signed their respective statements.
achieve by falsifying the Central Bank Manifest of August 28, 1981 and the clearing
Thereafter an information for robbery with homicide was filed against petitioners Carlos Tupaz
statement for Solid Bank, Lucena, dated August 28, 1981
and Eduardo de Jesus with the RTC of Pasig which adjudged them as GUILTY.
In seeking a reconsideration of Our aforesaid Resolution, petitioner claims that:
a) his extra-judicial statements dated May 4 and 5, 1982 (Exhs. E and E-1)
ISSUE: WON admissions obtained during custodial interrogations without the benefit of Miranda
are inadmissible in evidence as he was not properly informed of his
warnings and in the absence of counsel are admissible in evidence when the same are later
constitutional rights, and there was no valid waiver on his part of such rights
reduced into writing and signed in the presence of counsel.
prior to the taking of those statements; that the statements were extracted
through force and intimidation;
HELD: NO
so what really happened?
While Estacio was under investigation, he was briefed by the investigator of
In the case of Morales v. Ponce Enrile this Court laid down the correct procedure for peace
his rights under custodial investigation
officers to follow when making an arrest and in conducting a custodial investigation
When asked if he wished to waive the saif rights, HE AGREED, and
proceeded to sign a waiver. He then procedded to make certain Extra-
"At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform
judicial statements
him of the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. He
Then, his lawyer, at the last minute, arrived, read the waiver, and confirmed
shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that
with Estacio whther he indeed sought to waive his rights and Estacio
any statement he might make could be used against him. The person arrested shall
confirmed the waiver
have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the
ISSUE: WON Estacios extra-judicial statements are inadmissible in evidence because there
most expedient means by telephone if possible or by letter or messenger. It shall
was no valid waiver on his part of such rights prior to teht aking of those statements
be the responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No
HELD: NO.
custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel
SC held that while the initial waiver is invalid been without the presence of a
engaged by the person arrested, by any person on his behalf or appointed by the
counsel. However, this was subsequently cured when the counsel arrived at the list
court upon petition either of the detainee himself of by anyone on his behalf . The right
minute and he signed the waiver with the presence.
to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the
if the accused had not voluntarily waived his constitutional rights prior to the
assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid
investigation or had wanted to chanfe his mind by availing of his right to remain silent
down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in
after his counsel arrived and read the statement before the accused signed it, he
evidence
could easily have refused to sign the same and demand possession fo the unsigned
statements.
The right to counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation, i.e., when the investigating
NOTE: however, this ruling no longer holds under the present state of law because counse must
officer starts to ask questions to elicit information or confession or admission from the accused.
be present at every stage of the investigation and not only during the closing stage.
In the instant case, the presence of counsel was subsequent to the commencement of the
questioning. Therefore there was a clear violation of the right to counsel which thereby renders
the statements inadmissible in evidence.

26. People v. Bolanos 211 SCRA 262 (July 3, 1992)
Rosales, Andrew
*4 pages only*
Ponente: PARAS,
Doctrine: While Bolanos and Magtibay were boarded in the police jeep, and on their way to the
station, Bolanos confessed killing the victim. This was the only evidence relied upon to convict
him. As Bolanos was already on board the police jeep, he was already under custodial
investigation and should have been informed of his Miranda Rights already. Given that the extra-
judicial confession is inadmissible, the accused must be acquitted.
RR:
While BOLANOS and MAGTIBAY were boarded in the police jeep and on their way to
the station, BOLANOS was asked about the killing and he confessed killing the victim
The same went on to be the only evidence relied upon to convict BOLANO
The SC held that being under custodial investigation while on board the police patrol
jeep on the way to the Police Station where formal investigation may have been
conducted, appellant should have been informed of his Constitutional rights under
Section 12
In this case, while being on board the jeep, BOLANO was already
considered to be under custodial investigation
Also, given that the extra-judicial confession is inadmissible, the accused
must be acquitted.
Darvin:
From the moment the accused is, in any way, significantly deprived of
liberty, he cannot be asked questions, unless he is assisted by counsel and
was well informed of his rights under Section 12.
Otherwise, any confession or admission made by him is
inadmissible
Factual Antecedents:
Bolanos was charged with the murder of Pagdalian
They had had a drinking spree the night before
They found the victim in a makeshift bed covered in blood.
The police boarded the two accused in their jeep and proceeded to the Police Station
for investigation.
On the way, after he was asked by the police if he killed the victim, the accused told
the police that he killed the victim because the victim was abusive;
Position of Petitioner:
The statement of the accused was considered admissible in evidence against him because it
was given freely and before the investigation.
Position of Respondent:
The lower court erred in admitting in evidence the extra-judicial confession of appellant while on
board the police patrol jeep.
It was done in violation of appellant's Constitutional right to beinformed, to remain silent and to
have a counsel of his choice, while already under police custody.
Issue: W/N the extra-judicial confession of the accused is inadmissible
HELD/RATIO:
YES, the extra-judicial confession of the accused is inadmissible
Being already under custodial investigation while on board the police patrol jeep on
the way to the Police Station where formal investigation may have been conducted,
appellant should have been informed of his Constitutional rights under Article III,
Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution.
The fact that the alleged confession obtained while on board the police vehicle was
the only reason for the conviction,
No other eveidce was presented and the basis was the oral testimony alone
Appellant's conviction was not proved beyond reasonable doubt, this Court has no
recourse but to reverse the subject judgment under review.
Final Ruling
WHEREFORE, finding that the Constitutional rights of the accused- appellant have been
violated, the appellant is ACQUITTED
27. People v. Lucero - 249 SCRA 425
Case: People v. Lucero
Doctrine: Right to counsel all-important in custodial investigation. Denial of such will lead to the
acquittal of the accused.
Recit-Ready:
Alejandro Lucero, Bienvenido Echavez, Balbino Echavez, Peter Doe, Richard Doe and John
Doe were charged with the crime of robbery with homicide.
They were accused of committing robbery with violence and intimidation against persons against
Dr. Demetrio Madrid. The robbery was committed by blocking the Dr. Madrids Benz while
cruising along Mindanao Avenue. Mr. Bernales, the driver of Dr. Madrid, was shot resulting to
instantaneous death. Cash, gold jewelries and accessories, and a Rolex watch were stolen
from Dr. Madrid. Out of the original perpetrators, only Lucero, and the Echavez brothers were
apprehended. Others remained at large.
Dr. Madrid and his driver were rushed by concerned citizens to the Veterans Memorial Hospital.
Two hours later, his driver died of hemorrhage as a result of the gunshot wound he sustained.Dr.
Madrid survived. He reported the incident to the Quezon City police. When no action was taken
on his case, he filed his complaint with the Special Operations Group of the Central Intelligence
Service (CIS).
Two days later, they apprehended Balbino Echavez and Alejandro Lucero. They turned them
over to the Investigation Department of the CIS
Pfc. Alberto Pursal was assigned to conduct the investigation of the suspects. He declared that
even before the investigation started, Lucero verbally admitted his participation in the crime and
that he was the one who shot Bernales, the driver of Dr. Madrid
In any event, Pfc. Pursal went thru the motions of investigation. He informed Lucero of his
constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel. When Lucero told him that he had no
lawyer, Pursal informed the CIS Legal Department about Luceros need for a lawyer.In due time,
Atty. Diosdado Peralta appeared at the investigators office at around 9:00 p.m. He identified
himself as the lawyer who was requested to assist Lucero and inquired about the latters
whereabouts. He was then directed to where Lucero was.
Prelate informed Luceros right to remain silent and that hes not obliged to give any statement
without presence of a counsel. No reaction from Lucero so Peralta gather the impression that
Lucero understood his advice.
When the investigation started, Peralta left to attend the wake of his friend, Capt. Dacanay in
Fort Bonifacio.
Lucero was accompanied by two (2) CIS agents to Atty. Peraltas house. The extrajudicial
statement of Lucero (Exhibit C), was presented to Atty. Peralta. It was already signed by
Lucero. In the presence of the two (2) CIS agents. Lucero, despite the explanation of Atty.
Peralta, voluntarily gave the statement.
In Luceros defense, Lucero denied knowing Dr. Madrid, the Echavez brothers and the other
accused in this case. He said he only met Dr. Madrid at the CIS Office during the police lineup.
He was made to lineup four (4) times before Dr. Madrid finally identified him on the fourth time.
Lucero also claimed he signed the extrajudicial confession (Exhibit C) under duress. He denied
engaging the services of Atty. Peralta. He likewise confirmed that Atty. Peralta was not present
during his actual custodial interrogation.
RTC convicted Lucero while Echavez brothers were acquitted due to insufficient evidence.
RTC convicted the accused, Lucero on the basis of alleged extra judicial confession.
SC reversed and set aside the RTC conviction of Lucero.
The conviction of appellant rests on two (2) facts: (a) his
positive identification by the complainant, and (b) his extrajudicial confession admitting his
participation in the crime. We find that the evidence proving these facts cannot stand scrutiny.
the credibility of the main prosecution eyewitness, Dr. Demetrio Madrid who identified appellant,
is seriously open to doubt. It stands unrebutted on the record that appellant had to participate at
the police line up four (4) times before he was finally identified by Dr. Madrid. There is no reason
for the ambivalence. The robbery took place in broad daylight and the three malefactors wore no
mask.
Initially, Dr. Madrid claimed that he could identify only one of the robbers who staged the hold up
At another point, Dr. Madrid said he could identify two of the malefactors.
appellants conviction cannot be based on his extrajudicial confession.
The 1987 Constitution requires that a person under investigation for the commission of a crime
should be provided with counsel. We have constitutionalized the right to counsel because of our
hostility against the use of duress and other undue influence in extracting confessions from a
suspect.
The trial court did not display the required sensitivity to appellants right to counsel. Indeed, it did
not impose a rigorous respect for the right. It was satisfied that there was substantial
compliance with the requirements of right to counsel.
The records show that Atty. Peralta, who was not the counsel of choice of appellant, arrived at
the CIS Office on the second night of appellants detention.
Atty. Peralta himself admitted he received no reaction from appellant although his impression
was that appellant understood him. Worse, Atty. Peralta left appellant in the custody of the CIS
agents when his real interrogation started. He said he had to attend the wake of a friend. His
attitude did not speak well of the importance he gave to his role as counsel to a person under
custodial interrogation for the commission of a very serious offense.
It was during his absence that appellant gave an uncounseled confession. They tried to cure his
uncounseled confession for the next day, appellant was brought by two (2) CIS agents to Atty.
Peraltas house.
We hold that when the Constitution requires the right to counsel, it did not mean any kind of
counsel but effective and vigilant counsel.
Neither can the trial court convict appellant on the ground that alibi is inherently a weak defense.
Chiseled in our jurisprudence is the rule that the onus is on the prosecution to prove the guilt of
the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
Issue: WON extra-judicial confessions made without the presence of the counsel of choice of
the accused can be admitted as evidence for convicting a suspected criminal?
HELD: No. The 1987 Constitution requires that a person under investigation for the commission
of a crime should be provided with counsel. We have constitutionalized the right to counsel
because of our hostility against the use of duress and other undue influence in extracting
confessions from a suspect.
28. People v. Parojinog - 203 SCRA 673 (very very short case lol)
by IGNACIO, QUINA
Renee Parojinog was charged with triple murder along with others in the RTC
of Ozamiz City, to which he pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued against him, while the
others remained at large.
DOCTRINE: The choice of counsel is lodged with the policemen at first, but the
accused can reject the lawyer they have chosen and should object before trial.
FACTUAL ANTECEDENT:
March 31 1984: Group of policemen in Ozamiz City were ambushed by members
of the NPA. Three of the said policemen died.
August 1 1984: Parojinog was investigated by the police regarding the ambush, in
which Parojinog confessed that he surrendered to Governor Sagrado of Misamis
Occidental. He described in detail how the ambush was planned and carried
out.
Records show that Parojinog was well informed of his rights to remain
silent, to counsel and that should he be unable to afford it he will be
provided with one. Parojinog agreed to a certain Atty. Fernando Fuentes to be his
lawyer, and Atty. Fuentes was present and advised him throughout the investigation
and even afterwards.
He only alleged during the trial that the counsel was in fact, not his choice but the
policemen's and that Atty. Fuentes was actually not present during the investigation
when he made the confession.
HELD:
Records & witness accounts refute the allegation that Atty. Fuentes was not present at the
investigation. The Supreme Court held that Parojinog had the right to reject Fuentes, but
because he failed to object or bring up the matter before trial, he is deemed to have accepted
him.
29. People v. Pamon 217 SCRA 501
Doctrine: If the counsel is appointed by the investigators, generally, admissions made before
said counsel are inadmissible unless the appointment was made with the conformity of the
confessor. Pamon never signified that he had a lawyer of choice, hence he was merely provided
without one and he clearly acquiesced thereto.
Recit Ready (from Jech Tiu):
PAMON asserted that ATTY. LIGORIO was not his choice of counsel and that he was
forced to sign a paper, which turned out to be a letter to LIGORIO. LIGORIO, however, was
present during the time when PAMONs confession was made and sworn to and has participated
during the investigation. The SC held that the Constitutional mandate is that, as a general rule,
the counsel present must not be just any counsel, but one who has been chosen by the
accused. No in custody investigation shall be conducted, unless it be in the presence of counsel
engaged by the person arrested. By any person in his behalf. Appointed by the court upon
petition either of the detainee himself or by someone in his behalf
The SC also held that where investigators provide for counsel, the confession taken in
the presence of such counsel is inadmissible as evidence because it fails to satisfy the
Constitutional guarantee. However, there are exceptions to the said doctrine. Where the counsel
has been appointed by the investigators with the conformity of the confessant, the latters
confession is considered as valid and binding upon him. In other words, the rule is otherwise if
the accused acquiesced to the choice of Counsel. In this case, PAMON never signified that he
had a lawyer of choice and, hence, he was merely provided with one and he clearly acquiesced
thereto.
Facts:
In the morning of July 26, 1985, Robert Te drove his 3/4-ton cargo truck from his
residence in Sta. Filomena to Sindutan, Roxas, Zamboanga del Norte to buy copra.
While they were negotiating a road in Lipakan, the truck got stuck in the mud.
As a result, the trucks of Lily Wong and Gerson Dulang which were following his truck
were blocked and could not proceed. In order to pull the truck from the mud, Robert Te
ordered his companions to tie the wrench of the truck to a coconut tree with a cable.
Robert Te remained behind the wheel to maneuver the truck. While in that position, a
man approached Robert Te and shot him on the bridge of his nose. The latter died
instantly. Another shot was fired and Cesar Siga was hit. Thereafter, the truck was
burned by another man. The gunman escaped and boarded the last truck which was
the one owned by Gerson Dulang.
Initial investigations by the police and the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
pointed to the New People's Army (NPA) as the killers. However, subsequent
investigations by the Criminal Investigation Service (CIS) yielded Fortunato Pamon as
the one responsible for Robert Te's death.
Fortunato Pamon was arrested by virtue of a warrant of arrest for a murder charge. He
admitted that he shot and killed Robert Te.
He said in the affidavit that he shot Te because of an order from Mayor
Inocencio Feras.
He said that he was promised P15,000.00 by Inocencio Feras as payment
for the job. The money will be given by one Gerson Dulang
The extrajudicial was subscribed and sworn and was reaffirmed during the
preliminiary investigations.
an information for murder was filed against Fortunato Pamon, as principal by direct
participation, Inocencio Feras and Gerson Dulang as principals by inducemet, and
John Doe, alias "Dodo" as accomplice.
Inocencio Feras died at the course of the trial.
During the trial, the prosecution presented the testimonies of Evangeline Te, the
widow of Robert Te, Rolando Salatandre, Judge Vicente Aseniero, Victoriano Jauculan
and Hipolito Andig.
Evangeline Te testified that at about 9:00 o'clock in the morning of July 25, 1985, she
received a call from Gerson Dulang.
Gerson Dulang invited Robert Te to a birthday party in his house. Te
accepted the invitation and went to Dulangs house. When he returned to
the house at 2 in the afternoon, he disclosed to his wife that he (Te) and
Dulang will be meeting in the mountain to find who is the better man among
them.
Rolando Salatandre testified that the extrajudicial Confession of Fortunato Pamon was
voluntary and that it was in accordance with the constitutional mandate. This was
reaffirmed by Judge Vicente Aseniero in his testimony. (There were several other
witnesses, which pointed Pamon as the gunman).
Defense:
The defense, on the other hand, presented the testimony of Gerson Dulang
who professed ignorance of the crime; of Raul Curativo, a neighbor of
Fortunato Pamon, who described the killer as "short, dark in complexion,
with curly hair and was bearded", and who said that Fortunato Pamon was
not the killer;
The trial court convicted Fortunato Pamon, Dalang, and one John Doe
The defense alleged that Pamon was forced to sign a paper during the
custodial investigation which forced him to take responsibility of the crime.
In upholding the voluntariness of the extrajudicial Confession, the trial court
also observed that only Fortunato Pamon could have known the identities of
his co-conspirators and that he did not present evidence that the CIS knew
them beforehand.
the court also said that assuming that the Confession was inadmissible,
there were other evidences which proved beyond reasonable doubt the guilt
of accused Fortunato Pamon, among which was the positive identification
by witnesses pointing to him as the killer.
Dulang claimed that the trial court erred in adminitting the Confession as it was
violative of Article III, Section 12 (1) of the Constitution, which guarantees a person
under investigation the right to be assisted by an independent counsel of his own
choice and the right against torture and violence. Any violation of said guarantees
renders an extrajudicial confession inadmissible.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a violation of the right of the accused to have a competent and
independent counsel of his own choice. NO
Whether or not the extrajudicial confession of Fortunato Pamon is inadmissible as evidence for
conviction. NO (the evidence was only admissible with respect to him but not to his co accused.
RULING: NO. The court upheld the admissibility of the extrajudicial confession.
A confession constitutes an evidence of high order since it is supported by the strong
presumption that no person of normal mind would deliberately and knowingly confess
to a crime unless prompted by truth and his conscience.
This presumption of spontaneity and voluntariness stands unless the
defense proves otherwise.
It is admissible until the accused successfully proves that it was given as a
result of violence, intimidation, threat, or promise of reward of leniency.
The Court believed that Fortunato Pamon did not present enough proof to overcome
the presumption.
Apart from his testimony that he was maltreated, Fortunato Pamon
presented no other substantial proof to buttress his claim. He did not submit
any medical certificate which would attest to his allegation that he was
mauled and was hit on the head.
The examining physician also found no sign of physical maltreatment in
Pamons body.
Neither did he file any complaint against his manhandlers with the proper
authorities.
In People v. Damaso the Court held that: where the defendants
did not present evidence of compulsion, or duress nor violence on
their person; where they failed to complain to the officer who
administered their oaths; where they did not institute any criminal
or administrative action against their alleged intimidators for
maltreatment; where there appeared to be no marks of violence
on their bodies; and where they did not have themselves
examined by a reputable physician to buttress their claim, all
these were considered by this Court as factors indicating
voluntariness.
Fortunato Pamon had several chances to deny the voluntariness of his Confession.
1. when he and Atty. Rubencio Ligorio conferred;
2. when he subscribed the Confession before Judge Vicente Aseniero on March 20,
1987; and
3. when he was before the investigating officer on March 23, 1987. In the last instance,
instead of repudiating his Confession, he reaffirmed it.
Aside from holding that the extrajudicial Confession of Fortunato Pamon had been
voluntarily given, We also hold that it was given in the presence and with the
assistance of counsel.
 However, Pamon claimed that Atty. Ligorio was not the counsel of his
choice.
We are well aware of the constitutional mandate that the counsel present
must not be just any counsel, but one who has been chosen by the
accused.
The Court already ruled in the previous cases that where the counsel is
provided by investigators, the confession taken in the presence of such
counsel is inadmissibile as evidence because it fails to satisfy the
constitutional guarantee.
But this doctrine recognizes certain exceptions. Where the counsel has
been appointed by the investigators with the conformity of the confessant,
the latter's confession is considered as valid and binding upon him
The Court upheld the validity of confession only against Pamon but not against
Dulang because of insufficiency of evidence of the participation of the latter to the
crime.
Also, Fortunato Pamon had no personal knowledge of Gerson Dulang's
participation. He only heard from alias "Dodo" that Gerson Dulang hired him
to kill Robert Te.
An extrajudicial confession is binding only upon the confessant and is not
admissible against his co-accused.
the confession of Fortunato Pamon vis-a-vis Gerson Dulang was, as the
appellant called it, double hearsay.
30. People v. Baello 224 SCRA 218
July 1, 1993
Facts:
On 10 October 1990,. Barangay Captain Eustaquio R. Borja awoke to find out that the
front door of his residence, was open and that their television set in the sala was
missing. Eustaquio told his wife about what he saw and they proceeded upstairs to
Issue:
check on their 22-year old daughter, Veronica Borja. Upon entering the room, they
were shocked to find the bloodied corpse of their daughter lying in bed. Eustaquio
proceeded to the Barangay Hall from where he called the police. The couple later
discovered that a cassette player, a camera, and various pieces of jewelry in their
Held:
daughter's cabinet, all worth about P50,000.00, were likewise missing.
On the same day, the Medico-Legal Officer of the Crime Laboratory Services,
performed an autopsy. He concluded that the cause of death was multiple stab
wounds.
The police were able to recover the missing television set from the house of Eugenio
Tagifa (or Tadifa), husband of the accused's sister. Tagifa was brought to the police
station for questioning. On 11 October 1990, Tagifa executed a "Sinumpaang
Salaysay" wherein he pointed to the accused as the person who had placed the
television set under the stairs of his house.
The accused was captured in Makati and brought to the police station. He made an
oral admission of his participation in the crime. He was then endorsed to the Criminal
Investigation Division (CID) for formal investigation.
The accused was asked if he could understand, read and write Tagalog, and he
replied that he could. The accused was likewise asked if he could afford the
services of counsel; he answered that he could not. Upon being asked if he was
willing to avail of the services of Atty. Eber Generoso of the Public Attorney's
Office (PAO), the accused replied in the affirmative. Atty. Generoso then brought
the accused away from the police investigators so that the two of them could
talk privately. Atty. Generoso inquired from the accused whether or not he had
any participation in the crime and told him that if he had none, he must not
make any admission or statement as this would be prejudicial to him. The
accused, however, said, "Attorney, aaminin ko na ho total ginawa ko naman."
The accused then told Atty. Generoso that he was the one who took the
television set but denied having killed Veronia Borja. Afterwards, the police
started the formal investigation of the accused in the presence of Atty.
Generoso.The accused gave his statement before the police and this was
reduced into writing and marked at the trial as Exhibit "L." Atty. Generoso read
the statement to the accused and then let the accused read it himself. The
accused gave then signed Exhibit "L," after which Atty. Generoso also signed
the same.
The version of the accused is as follows: He only finished fourth grade of elementary
school. He was at the house of his cousin after having watched a movie when the
police came. They handcuffed him and then brought him to the Pasig Police
Headquarters. He was immediately detained and not subjected to any investigation.
Afterwards, he was mauled inside the jail by Antonio Gabriel, the nephew of Capt.
Borja, and two of Gabriel's companions. These persons beat him up by kicking and
punching his stomach and back, and striking his back and buttocks with a "baston."
He was unable to recall the day when his statement was taken down, though he
remembers it was in the afternoon. On that particular afternoon, he was taken
downstairs and told that he would be given a lawyer to assist and defend him.
However, Atty. Generosa, the lawyer assigned to him, simply sat down and stared at
him doing anything. Atty. Generoso told him that he would be going somewhere and
then left for about an hour. When Atty. Generoso came back, the statement was
already typewritten and Atty. Generoso merely signed it after which the accused was
asked to sign, which he did as he was promised that he would be released after
signing.
Whether or not accused- apellant was fully and duly assisted by a counsel
engaged by him and that the accused-apellants confession during custodial
investigation was admissible in evidence.
Yes, the Court held that, while it is true that Atty. Generoso was not initially his
counsel of choice, the fact remains that after the accused was asked if he could
afford the services of counsel and he answered in the negative, he was
informed that he would be provided with one Atty. Generoso of the PAO to
assist him during the investigation. He then voluntarily accepted the services of
Atty. Generoso. This was in compliance with paragraph (1), Section 12, Article III
of the Constitution.
The Court cited the case of People vs. Parojinog wherein it held that: It is very
clear from the aforequoted provision that a person under investigation for the
commission of an offense may choose his own counsel but if he cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided with one. While the initial choice of the
lawyer in the latter case is naturally lodged in the police investigators, the accused
really has the final choice as he may reject the counsel chosen for him and ask for
another one.
Exhibit "L" completely belies the allegation that the accused was not fully assisted by
Atty. Generoso during the investigation. Said document discloses that the accused
was informed of his constitutional rights by Atty. Generoso in extenso. Atty. Generoso
conferred with the accused, warned the latter of the consequences of his confession
and even advised him not to make any; however, the accused insisted on going ahead
 with his confession, although he only confessed to the robbery. It was only after the
said conference that the accused gave a statement. After it was completed, Atty.
Generoso again explained to him the contents and the adverse effects of his
confession, but the accused found himself at ease with his conscience by voluntarily
affixing his signature therein. If, indeed, he had any objections to his statement, he
should not have signed Exhibit "L," or he should have at least voiced out such
objections to Atty. Generoso. Atty. Generoso, as an officer of the PAO, would
not have affixed his signature in the extra-judicial confession as counsel for the
accused had he known of any infirmity in its execution. If he did so, he would
have been remiss in the performance of his duty and unfaithful to his office. But there
must be convincing proof of that for he has in his favor the presumption of regularity in
the performance of his duty.
The Court finally held also that, People vs. Layuso, stated: This Court denounces
in the strongest terms possible the widespread misconception that the
presence of a lawyer under the "right to counsel" provision of the Constitution
is intended to stop an accused from saying anything which might incriminate
him. The right to counsel is intended to prelude the slightest coercion as would
lead the accused to admit something false. The lawyer, however, should never
prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily telling the truth. Whether it is an
extrajudicial statement or testimony in open court, the purpose is always the
ascertainment of truth.
31. People v. Agustin - 240 SCRA 541
RECIT READY: Agustin was charged with five informations of murder, frustrated murder and
attempted murder. RTC acquitted appellant except in the 2 murder case. Appellant impugned the
validity of his extrajudicial statement. He declared that he was forced to admit to the shooting,
and that he did out of fear. He also asserted that the armed men stayed with him and their
presence deterred him from telling the investigating fiscal that he was being threatened. The
Supreme Court held that (1) appellant was not fully and properly informed of his rights (to waive
his right to remain silent and counsel) (2) appellant was left with no freedom to intelligently or
freely hire his own counsel (after the appellant said that he wanted to be assisted by counsel,
the City fiscal, through suggestive language, immediately informed him that Atty. Cajucom was
ready to assist him) (3) presence of armed men vitiated his free will (4) the Court has serious
doubts about his ability to understand Atty. Cajucom's explanation of his constitutional rights
(appellant is familiar with only Ilocano, while he was informed of his rights in English and
Tagalog).
Facts:
Five separate informations filed with RTC charging accused of murder, frustrated murder and
attempted murder. Appellant and Quiao was arrested. However, the latter escaped. RTC
acquitted appellant except in the 2 murder cases.
Prosecution established the following facts: Five individuals were in a vehicle driving in Baguio. A
man fired at the passengers with a rifle. In the vehicle, Dr. Bayquen and Anna Francisco were
killed. Accused Quiao, an alleged former military agent or "asset" who had been picked up in
La Union by the police authorities, confessed during the investigation conducted by Baguio City
Fiscal Erdolfo Balajadia in his office that he was the triggerman in the fatal shooting.
Appellant Agustin was picked up by military personnel and was taken to the same office of the
city fiscal where he was investigated in connection with the crim. Similarly, he was assisted by
Atty. Cajucom and Ms. Napeas took down the stenographic notes, which the appellant and Atty.
Cajucom signed. The appellant narrated therein his knowledge of the shooting of Dr. Bayquen
and revealed the identities of his cohorts in the crime. In a confrontation two days later, he
identified Quiao as "Sony," the triggerman.
The appellant, who is a farmer and whose highest educational attainment was grade four,
impugned the validity of his extrajudicial statement. He alleged that he was met by two men who
took him to their car where two other companions, armed with arms, were waiting. They then
brought him out of Pangasinan. He later learned that they were on their way to Baguio City.
Along Kennon Road, he was made to stoop down at the back seat whenever they would reach a
toll booth, and then brought out three times near the ravines and made to kneel at gunpoint in
order to force him to admit his involvement in the shooting, which he finally did out of fear. Then
he was brought to the Office of the City Fiscal of Baguio City.
While he was giving his statement at the fical's office, the armed men stayed with him and their
presence deterred him from telling the investigating fiscal that he was being threatened. He
further declared that although he was given a lawyer, Atty. Reynaldo Cajucom, to assist him, he,
nevertheless, asked for his uncle who is a lawyer, Atty. Oliver Tabin, and that Atty. Cajucom
interviewed him from only two minutes in English and Tagalog but not in Ilocano, the dialect he
understands. Finally, he asserted that he was promised by his captors that he would be
discharged as a state witness if he cooperates, but the plan did not push through because his
co-accused, Quiao, escaped.
Issues:
WON appellant's extrajudicial statement was obtained in violation of Section 12 (1), Article III of
the Constitution
Held:
Yes. Since it is the only evidence which links him to the crimes of which he was convicted, he
must then be acquitted.
Since we cannot even reads or decipher the stenographic notes in the yellow pads, we cannot
expect the appellant, who is a farmer and who reached only the fourth grade, to read or decipher
its contents. We have to rely solely on the transcript and presume its accuracy. A perusal of the
transcript convinces us that the appellant was not given a fair deal and was deprived of his rights
under Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution.
Firstly, he was not fully and properly informed of his rights. Appellant was not explicitly told
of his right to have a competent and independent counsel of his choice, specifically asked if he
had in mind any such counsel and, if so, whether he could afford to hire his services, and, if he
could not, whether he would agree to be assisted by one to be provided for him. him. He was
not categorically informed that he could waive his rights to remain silent and to counsel
and that this waiver must be in writing and in the presence of his counsel. He had, in fact,
waived his right to remain silent by agreeing to be investigated. Yet, no written waiver of such
right appears in the transcript and no other independent evidence was offered to prove its
existence.
Secondly, fiscal immediately suggested the availability of Atty. Cajucom without first distinctly
asking the appellant if he had a counsel of his own choice and if he had one, whether he
could hire such counsel; and if he could not, whether he would simply exercise his right to
remain silent and to counsel. While it is true that in custodial investigations the party to be
investigated has the final choice of counsel and may reject the counsel chosen for him by the
investigator and ask for another one, the circumstances obtaining in the custodial interrogation
of the appellant left him no freedom to intelligently and freely do so. Also, in his presence
were military officers who brought him to the Fiscal's Office for investigation. This testimony
was unrebutted by the prosecution. The presence of the military officers and the continuing
fear that if he did not cooperate, something would happen to him, was like a Damocles
sword which vitiated his free will.
Moreover, considering that the appellant is familiar only with Ilocano, the Court has serious
doubts about his ability to understand Atty. Cajucom's explanation of his constitutional
rights since Atty. Cajucom did so in English and Tagalog.
(Also, he was unlawfully arrested.) Appellant is acquitted.
32. People v. Guillermo, 420 S 326
The accused-appellant was found guilty for the murder of his employer, Victor Keyser. He
was imposed the maximum penalty for the crime and was sentenced to die by lethal injection
When the police asked how he did it, according to the prosecution witness Romualdo
Campos (security guard of Greatmore Corporation), Guillermo said that he bashed the victim on
the head with a piece of wood, and after Keyser fell, he dismembered the body with a
carpenters saw. He then mopped up the blood on the floor with aplastic foam. Guillermo then
turned over to the police a bloodstained, two-foot long piece of coconut lumber and a carpenters
saw.
Keysers death shocked the nation. Appellant Guillermo, who was then in police custody, was
interviewed on separate occasions by two TV reporters, namely: Augusto Gus Abelgas of ABS-
CBN News and Kara David of GMA Channel 7. Both interviews were subsequently broadcast
nationwide.
When asked why he killed his employer, Guillermo stated that Keyser had not paid him for
years, did not feed him properly, and treated him like an animal.
At the trial, appellant Guillermos defense consisted of outright denial. He alleged he was a
victim of police frame-up.
He testified that he had been an employee of Keyser for more than a year prior to the latters
death. On the date of the incident, he was all alone at the Keyser Plastics factory compound as
a stay-in employee.
The trial court disbelieved appellants version of the incident, but found the prosecutions
evidence against him weighty and worthy of credence.
Position of Petitioner/s: APPELLANT
Appellant contends that his conviction was based on inadmissible evidence.
He points out that there is no clear showing that he was informed of his constitutional rights
nor was he made to understand the same by the police investigators.
In fact, he says, he was only made to read said rights in printed form posed on the wall at the
police precinct.
He was not provided with the services of counsel during the custodial investigation, as
admitted by SPO1 Reyes.
Position of Respondent/s:
The OSG counters that the evidence clearly shows that the appellant admitted committing the
crime in several instances, not just during the custodial investigation.
o He admitted having killed his employer to the security guard, Campos, and even sought
Campos help in disposing of Keysers body.
o The appellants statements before members of the media are likewise admissible in
evidence as these statements were made freely and voluntarily in response to questions by
news reporters, not by police or other investigating officer.
The appellant voluntarily confessed to the killing even before the police could enter the
premises and even before any question could be posed to him. Furthermore, after the police
investigators had entered the factory, the appellant pointed to the place where Keysers corpse
was found.
The OSG submits that not every statement made to the police falls within the ambit of
constitutional protection. That in the admissions cited above, appellant was not yet under
custodial investigation. Rather his statements to the police at the crime scene were spontaneous
and voluntary, not elicited through questioning, and hence must be treated admissible in
evidence.
ISSUE:
1. W/N the prosecutions evidence (extrajudicial confession) is sufficient to prove the appellants
guilt beyond reasonable
doubt (ONLY ISSUE IN CASEBOOK)
HELD/RATIO:
YES, the Constitutional safeguards do not apply to spontaneous statements, or those not
elicited through questioning by law enforcement authorities but given in an ordinary manner
whereby the appellant verbally admits to having committed the offense.
For a confession to be admissible, it must satisfy the following requisites:
1. Must be voluntary;
2. Must be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel;
3. Must be express; and
4. Must be in writing.
However, the confession appellant made while he was under investigation by SPO1
CarlitoReyes for the killing of Keyser,falls short of the protective standards laid down by the
Constitution.
The polices cavalier treatment of the constitutional guarantees was evident from SPO1
Reyes testimony on cross-examination. Instances include:
o SPO1 Reyes asked the accused to read his constitutional rights written on the wall.
o Did not provide the accused with counsel because it was a Sunday afternoon and no
lawyers were around and accused already admitted to crime.
o When asked how did SPO1 Reyes know that the accused already understood his rights, he
said I believe he understood because he answered wala akong dapat pagsisihan.
Appellants alleged confession at the police station lacks the safeguards required by the Bill of
Rights.
o The investigating officer made no serious effort to make appellant aware of his basic rights
under custodial investigation. He only made flimsy excuses such as It was a Sunday afternoon
and no lawyers were around.
o Yet despite the absence of counsel, the officer proceeded with said investigation. Moreover,
the record is bare of any showing that appellant had waived his constitutional rights in writing
and in the presence of counsel.
People vs. Dano- even if the admission or confession was gospel truth and given voluntarily,
if done without counsel, it is inadmissible.
Within this right of a person under interrogation to be informed is an implied correlative
obligation on the part of the police investigator to explain the said rights and ensure that the
accused understood the same.
Ceremonial shortcuts(such as asking them to read the rights on the wall) in the
communication of abstract constitutional principles ought not be allowed for it diminishes the
liberty of the person facing custodial investigation.
BUT the inadmissibility of the confession at the police station does not necessarily lead to his
acquittal because constitutional safeguards on custodial investigation (Miranda principles) do not
apply to spontaneous statements, or those not elicited through questioning by law enforcement
authorities but given in an ordinary manner whereby the appellant verbally admits to having
committed the offense.
Purpose of rights in Sec. 12, Article III of Constitution are meant to preclude the slightest use
of the States coercive power as would lead an accused to admit something false. It is not
intended to prevent him from freely and voluntarily admitting the truth outside the sphere of such
power.
> in this case, assuming that his extra-judicial admissions during custodial investigation are
inadmissible, Guillermo spontaneously made confessions to private individuals and such
evidence is admissible.
33. People v. Mojello
Facts:Appellant DindoMojello, alias "Bebot" was charged with the crime of rape
with homicide in an Information.
On an investigation conducted by SPO2 Wilfredo Giducos, appellant admitted
that he was the perpetrator of the dastardly deed. Appellant was assisted by
Atty. Isaias Giduquio during his custodial interrogation. His confession was
witnessed by Barangay Captains Wilfredo Batobalanos and Manolo Landao.
Batobalanos testified that after it was executed, the contents of the document
were read to appellant who later on voluntarily signed it. Appellant's
extrajudicial confession was sworn before Judge Cornelio T. Jaca of the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Sta. Fe-Bantayan.
Appellant was arraigned and entered a plea of "not guilty."
The trial court rendered judgment finding Dindo guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of rape with homicide, and sentencing him to suffer the
death penalty. It found that Dindo was arrested at Bantayan while attempting to
board a motor launch bound for Cadiz City.
On this appeal before the Supreme Court, Dindo alleges that the lower court
gravely erred in admitting in evidence the alleged extrajudicial confession sine
he was not freely, intelligently and voluntarily entered into. He argues that he
was not knowingly and intelligently apprised of his constitutional rights before
the confession was taken from him. Hence, his confession, and admissions
should be deemed inadmissible in evidence under the fruit of the poisonous
tree doctrine.
Issue: W/N his confession is in violation of Section 13 Article 3 of the
Constitution therefore inadmissible?
Miranda doctrine requires that
(a) any person under custodial investigation has the right to remain silent
(b) anything he says can and will be used against him in a court of law
(c) he has the right to talk to an attorney before being questioned and to have
his counsel present when being questioned
(d) if he cannot afford an attorney, one will be provided before any questioning
if he so desires.
The phrase "preferably of his own choice" does not convey the message that
the choice of a lawyer by a person under investigation is exclusive as to
preclude other equally competent and independent attorneys from handling the
defense; otherwise the tempo of custodial investigation will be solely in the
hands of the accused who can impede, nay, obstruct the progress of the
interrogation by simply selecting a lawyer who, for one reason or another, is
not available to protect his interest.
In this case, Atty. Giduquio was a competent and independent counsel of
appellant
within the contemplation of the Constitution. No evidence was presented to
negate his competence and independence in representing appellant during the
custodial investigation. Moreover, appellant manifested for the record that Atty.
Giduquio was his choice of counsel during the custodial proceedings.
While the choice of a lawyer in cases where the person under custodial
interrogation cannot afford the services of counsel or where the preferred
lawyer is not available is naturally lodged in the police investigators, the
suspect has the final choice as he may reject the counsel chosen for him and
ask for another one. A lawyer provided by the investigators is deemed engaged
by the accused when he does not raise any objection against the counsel's
appointment during the course of the investigation, and the accused thereafter
subscribes to the veracity of the statement before the swearing officer. (See
People v. Continente)
The right to counsel at all times is intended to preclude the slightest coercion
as would lead the accused to admit something false. The lawyer, however,
should never prevent an accused from freely and voluntarily telling the truth.
In this case, the December 17, 1996 custodial investigation upon appellant's
apprehension by the police authorities violated the Miranda doctrine on two
grounds: (1) no counsel was present; and (2) improper waiver of the right to
counsel as it was not made in writing and in the presence of counsel. However,
the December 23, 1996 custodial investigation complied with Art. III, Sec. 12,
par. 1. Even though improper interrogation methods were used at the outset,
there is still a possibility of obtaining a legally valid confession later on by
properly interrogating the subject under different conditions and
circumstances than those which prevailed originally.
Appellant Mojello claimed his life was threatened, thereby inducing him to
execute an extrajudicial confession, yet he neither filed any case against the
person who threatened him, nor he report this to his counsel. He further
claimed that he did not understand the contents of the confession which was
read in the Visayan dialect, yet he admits that he uses the Visayan dialect in his
daily discourse.
The confessant bears the burden of proof that his confession is tainted with
duress, compulsion or coercion by substantiating his claim with independent
evidence other than his own self-serving claims that the admissions in his
affidavit are untrue and unwillingly executed. Bare assertions will certainly not
suffice to overturn the presumption.
The test for determining whether a confession is voluntary is whether
defendant's will was overborne at the time he confessed. In cases where
Miranda warnings have been given, the test of voluntariness should
subsequently applied in order to determine the probative weight of
confession.
34. People v. Sayaboc
FACTS
In its decision, the trial court found Benjamin Sayaboc guilty of the crime of murder, with
treachery as the qualifying circumstance and craft and price or reward as aggravating
circumstances. It then sentenced him to the maximum penalty of death. As for the other
accused, the court held that the treachery employed by Sayaboc could not be taken against
them and, therefore, declared them guilty of the crime of homicide only, with the first as principal
and the two others as accomplices. From this decision, accused appealed.
Anent the third assignment of error, appellants contend that the extrajudicial confession of
Sayaboc may not be admitted in evidence against him because Atty. Cornejo, the PAO lawyer
who was his counsel during the custodial investigation, was not a competent, independent,
vigilant, and effective counsel. He was ineffective because he remained silent during the entire
proceedings. He was not independent, as he was formerly a judge in the National Police
Commission, which was holding court inside the PNP Command of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya.
ISSUE: Whether the extrajudicial confession of Sayaboc is not admissible in evidence.
HELD: YES.
35. People v. Olermo (17 July 2003) | Ponente: Azcuna, J.
the
the (This is a relatively simple case. Humaba lang kasi nilagay testimonies ng bawat victim ng illegal
be recruitment. Kung may time basahin na lang yung orig kasi pwede i-skip yun tapos hanapin na
the lang yung 4th issue sa SC tapos goods na for Sec. 12 discussion/recit)
Doctrine: The right to counsel is intended to preclude the slightest coercion as would lead the
appellant to admit something false. Moreover, the words preferably of his own choice do not
mean that the choice of a lawyer by appellant is exclusive as to preclude other equally
competent and independent attorneys from handling the defense.
Facts:
Olermo was charged with five counts of estafa and one count of illegal recruitment in large
scale. It was alleged in the information for illegal recruitment that Olermo, for a fee, enlisted and
recruited Spouses Villanueva, Berador, Majarucon and Tubale for employment/job placement
abroad without first securing the necessary license or authority to engage in recruitment activity
from the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency.
The five informations for estafa, on the other hand, reveal that Olermo had collected placement,
transportation, and other fees from the same individuals she had illegally recruited.
For her part, Olermo denied all of the charges against her and said that she only tourist visas
and, with respect to Berador, she was only helping him process his trainees visa. She also
denied ever having represented herself to have had the authority to deploy workers for overseas
employment.
On August 23, 1996, the trial court rendered a decision convicting appellant of the crimes
charged.

Jurisprudence provides that extrajudicial confessions are presumed to be voluntary. The
condition for this presumption, however, is that the prosecution is able to show that the
constitutional requirements safeguarding an accuseds rights during custodial investigation have
been strictly complied with, especially when the extrajudicial confession has been denounced.
The rationale for this requirement is to allay any fear that the person being investigated would
succumb to coercion while in the unfamiliar or intimidating environment that is inherent in
custodial investigations. Therefore, even if the confession may appear to have been given
voluntarily since the confessant did not file charges against his alleged intimidators for
maltreatment, the failure to properly inform a suspect of his rights during a custodial
investigation renders the confession valueless and inadmissible.
Apart from the absence of an express waiver of his rights, the confession contains the passing
of information of the kind held to be in violation of the right to be informed under Section 12,
Article III of the Constitution. The right to be informed requires the transmission of meaningful
information rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract
constitutional principle.27 It should allow the suspect to consider the effects and consequences
of any waiver he might make of these rights. More so when the suspect is one like Sayaboc,
who has an educational attainment of Grade IV, was a stranger in Nueva Vizcaya, and had
already been under the control of the police officers for two days previous to the investigation,
albeit for another offense.
Issue: There were 6 issues raised before the SC, but the only issue relevant to Art. III Sec. 12
is: W/N the trial court gravely erred in disregarding the right of Olermo to have a
competent and independent counsel
Held: NO. Olermos right to a competent and independent counsel was not disregarded.
Olermo, that the court a quo gravely erred in disregarding her right to a competent and
independent counsel. She notes that during the presentation of the prosecutions first witness on
August 11, 1993, she was represented by Atty. Hortensio Domingo, who was not her retained
counsel for the case. During the hearing, Atty. Domingo manifested that appellant herself
requested him to represent her in that days hearing since her counsel, Atty. Yuseco, was still in
Cagayan. During the second, third, fourth and fifth hearings, Olermo was represented by
another counsel, a de oficio one, a certain Atty. Ricardo Perez, again because counsel for
appellant was not around. Because of these instances, appellant claims that she was deprived
of her right to competent counsel because the lawyers who represented her in the
abovementioned hearings were not familiar with her case and, hence, were not able adequately
to protect her interests.
Article III, Section 12, paragraph (1) of the Constitution provides:
Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right x
x x to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice, x x x.
The right to counsel is intended to preclude the slightest coercion as would lead the appellant to
admit something false. Moreover, the words preferably of his own choice do not mean that the
choice of a lawyer by appellant is exclusive as to preclude other equally competent and
independent attorneys from handling the defense. If this were so, the tempo of justice would be
solely within the control of appellant who could choose to impede the judicial process by simply
selecting a lawyer who, for one reason or another, is not available to defend her.
36. Tanenggee v. People 699 SCRA 639
Doctrine:
Constitutional proscription invoked by petitioner does not apply to inquiries made in the context
of private employment but is applicable only in cases of custodial interrogation.
The constitutional proscription against the admissibility of admission or confession of guilt
obtained in violation of Section 12, Article III of the Constitution, as correctly observed by the CA
and the OSG, is applicable only in custodial interrogation.
Facts:
On March 27, 1998, five separate Informations for estafa through falsification of commercial
documents were filed against petitioner. That on or about July 24, 1997, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused, being then a private individual, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously defraud, thru falsification of commercial document, the
METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST CO. (METROBANK), being then the Manager of the
COMMERCIO BRANCH OF METROBANK located at Divisoria, Manila, and taking advantage of
his position as such, prepared and filled up or caused to be prepared and filled up METROBANK
Promissory Note with the amount of P16,000,000.00 in the name reading "ROMEO TAN",
feigning and forging or causing to be feigned and forged on top of said name the signature of
Romeo Tan.
The prosecution alleged that on different occasions, appellant caused to be prepared promissory
notes and cashiers checks in the name of Romeo Tan, a valued client of the bank since he has
substantial deposits in his account, in connection with the purported loans obtained by the latter
from the bank.
For his defense, appellant Carlos Lo Tanenggee testified that he is a holder of a Masters degree
from the Asian Institute of Management, and was the Branch Manager of Metrobank Commercio
Branch from 1994 until he was charged in 1998 [with] the above-named offense. He was with
Metrobank for nine (9) years starting as assistant manager of Metrobank Dasmarias Branch,
Binondo, Manila. As manager, he oversaw the day to day operations of the branch, solicited
accounts and processed loans, among others.
Appellant claimed that Elevado asked him to sign a paper (Exhibit "N") in connection with the
audit investigation; that he inquired what he was made to sign but was not offered any
explanation; that he was intimidated to sign and was threatened by the police that he will be
brought to the precinct if he will not sign; that he was not able to consult a lawyer since he was
not apprised of the purpose of the meeting; and that "just to get it over with" he signed the paper
which turned out to be a confession. After the said meeting, appellant went to see Tan at his
office but was unable to find the latter. He also tried to phone him but to no avail.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused, Carlos Lo Tanenggee, guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the offense of estafa thru falsification of commercial documents.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Petitioner appealed the judgment of conviction to the CA. On December 12, 2006, the CA
promulgated its Decision13 affirming with modification the RTC Decision and disposing of the
appeal as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED for lack of merit and the Decision dated 25 June 1999 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 30 convicting the accused-appellant Carlos Lo
Tanenggee on five counts of estafa through falsification of commercial documents is hereby
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that in Criminal Case No. 98-163806, he is further ordered to
indemnify Metrobank the sum of P16 Million with interest at 18% per annum counted from 24
July 1997 until fully paid.
The Parties Arguments
While he admits signing a written statement, petitioner refutes the truth of the contents thereof
and alleges that he was only forced to sign the same without reading its contents. He asserts
that said written statement was taken in violation of his rights under Section 12, Article III of the
Constitution, particularly of his right to remain silent, right to counsel, and right to be informed of
the first two rights. Hence, the same should not have been admitted in evidence against him.
On the other hand, respondent People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), maintains that petitioners written statement is admissible in evidence since the
constitutional proscription invoked by petitioner does not apply to inquiries made in the context
of private employment but is applicable only in cases of custodial interrogation. The OSG thus
prays for the affirmance of the appealed CA Decision.
Issue: W/n the signed written statement during the audit investigation in the context of private
employment is admissible as evidence? Yes.
Held:
Petitioners written statement is admissible in evidence.
The constitutional proscription against the admissibility of admission or confession of guilt
obtained in violation of Section 12, Article III of the Constitution, as correctly observed by the CA
and the OSG, is applicable only in custodial interrogation.
Custodial interrogation means any questioning initiated by law enforcement authorities after a
person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
manner. Indeed, a person under custodial investigation is guaranteed certain rights which attach
upon the commencement thereof, viz: (1) to remain silent, (2) to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice, and (3) to be informed of the two other rights
above.19 In the present case, while it is undisputed that petitioner gave an uncounseled written
statement regarding an anomaly discovered in the branch he managed, the following are clear:
(1) the questioning was not initiated by a law enforcement authority but merely by an internal
affairs manager of the bank; and, (2) petitioner was neither arrested nor restrained of his liberty
in any significant manner during the questioning. Clearly, petitioner cannot be said to be under
custodial investigation and to have been deprived of the constitutional prerogative during the
taking of his written statement.
Moreover, in Remolona v. Civil Service Commission, we declared that the right to counsel
"applies only to admissions made in a criminal investigation but not to those made in an
administrative investigation." Amplifying further on the matter, the Court made clear in the recent
case of Carbonel v. Civil Service Commission:
However, it must be remembered that the right to counsel under Section 12 of the Bill of Rights
is meant to protect a suspect during custodial investigation. Thus, the exclusionary rule under
paragraph (2), Section 12 of the Bill of Rights applies only to admissions made in a criminal
investigation but not to those made in an administrative investigation.
Petitioners written statement was given voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.
Petitioner attempts to convince us that he signed, under duress and intimidation, an already
prepared typewritten statement. However, his claim lacks sustainable basis and his supposition
is just an afterthought for there is nothing in the records that would support his claim of duress
and intimidation.
Moreover, "it is settled that a confession or admission is presumed voluntary until the contrary is
proved and the confessant bears the burden of proving the contrary." Petitioner failed to
overcome this presumption.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR No. 23653 dated December 12, 2006 and September 6, 2007, respectively, are
hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the minimum term of the indeterminate
sentence to be imposed upon the petitioner should be four (4) years and two (2) months of
prision correccional.
37. People v. Sunga, GR 126029, 2003
(SKIP the testimonies if you read the originals.)
Doctrine:
The sole, uncorroborated testimony of an accused who turned state witness may suffice to
convict his co-accused if it is given unhesitatingly and in a straightforward manner and is full of
details which by their nature could not have been the result of deliberate afterthought; otherwise,
it needs corroboration the presence or lack of which may ultimately decide the cause of the
prosecution and the fate of the accused.
Facts:
July 12, 1994
the mutilated body of Jocelyn Tan was found at a coffee plantation in Jacana, Brgy.
Bancao-Bancao in Puerto Princesa City, Palawan
Jocelyn is a minor and a high school student of Palawan Integrated National School,
(PINS)
Case filed against several accused with the ff. relevant info
Accused: Rey Sunga, Ramil Lansang, Inocencio Pascua, Jr., and Lito Octac as
principals, and Locil Cui alias Ginalyn Cuyos as accomplice
Case was filed against them in RTC of Puerto Princesa city
accused of rape with homicide
on the occasion of rape and to enable them to conceal the commission of the crime,
the accused together with LOCIL CUI, a minor who cooperated in the execution of the
offense as ACCOMPLICE, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, taking
advantage of their superior number and strength, with intent to kill, treacherously
attack, assault, and use personal violence upon JOCELYN TAN by repeatedly
stabbing and smashing a stone on her head, thereby inflicting upon her mortal
wounds and multiple fractures on her skull which were the direct cause of her death
shortly thereafter.
Arraignment: pleaded not guilty
Sept. 26, 1994
accused filed a petition for bail underscoring the weakness of the Peoples evidence,
there being no direct evidence against them, a fact admitted by the City Prosecutor in
his resolution for their indictment.
Oct. 18
prosecution filed motion to discharge accused Local Cui: to be state witness because
the legal requisites for her discharge had been complied with, supported by her sworn
statement which detailed how her co-accused carried out the crime
co-accused opposed: it could only be filed during trial on the merits and that Locils
testimony was not absolutely necessary
Oct. 20
trial court deferred the resolution of the bail petition until after the prosecution had
rested its case
granted the motion to discharge Locil
Accused: assailed discharge of Local before CA
CA: issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) enjoining the trial court from proceeding with the
trial of the case
TRO lapsed, however, without a preliminary injunction being issued, hence, the trial of the case
resumed
Prosecutions version
June 29, 1994
Locil boarded a tricycle bearing the marking RyanRyan from the SSS Office in
Puerto Princesa City where a lesbian who had a birthmark on the right side of the
face, was already on board. She invited Locil for a joy ride
tricycle driver, Rey Sunga (Sunga), was instructed by the lesbian to go to Mendoza
Park.
At Mendoza park, the lesbian alighted and spoke to Jocelyn Tan, the victim, who was
dressed in a PINS uniform and the both of them joined Locil aboard the tricycle which
was already driven by Inocencio Pascua (Pascua) vice Sunga who had in the
meantime left.
the four of them proceeded to and reached Barangay Irawan, Puerto Princesa City
and on reaching a forested area, Jocelyn was met by Sunga who held her and by
Ramil Lansang (Lansang) who wrapped his arm around her waist as they dragged her
to a nearby buho clumps.
There, Jocelyn was made to lie down. Her skirt was raised and her panty was taken
off by Lansang. As she lay face up with both her hands held by Sunga and Pascua,
Lansang stripped naked, placed himself on top of Jocelyn, inserted his penis into her
vagina and seemed to be pumping.
Sunga took turn to have sexual intercourse with Jocelyn as Lansang and one who
was not known to Locil and whom the latter described as one who has chinky or
narrow eyes, later identified to be Pascua, kept Jocelyn pinned down by her hands.
Pascua too subsequently had carnal knowledge of Jocelyn who all along struggled
against her malefactors
Locil, who witnessed everything, was then pulled by the lesbian and led back into the
tricycle where they awaited Lansang, Sunga and Pascua to ride with them. All five
thereafter headed back to Puerto Princesa City proper, leaving Jocelyns body behind.
When the five reached the Mendoza Park where Locil alighted, she was warnedto
keep mum about the incident, otherwise something would also happen to her. Locil
then repaired to her boarding house.
Until she was arrested following the discovery on July 12, 1994 of Jocelyns corpse,
she did not report the incident to anyone.
Documentary evidence on two extrajudicial confession of Sunga
1. 1st Sworn Statement executed before SPO2 Janoras signed by Sunga and assisting
counsel Atty. Rocamora, City Legal Officer- Lansang then forcibly undressed Jocelyn
and raped her while he (Sunga) and Locil watched. After consummating his carnal
desire, Lansang hit Jocelyn with a 2 x 2 piece of wood on her head and successively
on different parts of her body. When Jocelyn was already dead, Locil also whacked
Jocelyns body many times. The group then headed back to the city proper, leaving
Jocelyns remains at the scene of the crime.
2. Another sworn statement before Special Investigator Abordo of the NBI- Lansang, Lito
Octa (should be Octac) and a certain Jun left Mendoza Park and proceeded to Irawan
after asking Locil, one Bing Manila, and a certain Josie to fetch Jocelyn at her school;
that Jun drove the tricycle back to the city proper and he transported their female
 companions including Jocelyn to Irawan; that at Irawan, Lansang raped the struggling
Jocelyn whose hands were then held by Josie; that after Lansang and Jun raped
Jocelyn, Lansang smashed her head twice in accordance with his plan to kill her
which plan was known to him (Sunga), Locil, Octac and Jun; that at 1:30 a.m. of June
30, 1994, Lansang, Sunga, Octac and Jun returned to Irawan, took Jocelyns corpse
and dumped it at a coffee plantation in Jacana Road; and that he did not take part in
the rape or killing of Jocelyn but merely joined the group due to Lansangs promise to
give him P500.00.
ACCUSED ALIBI
1. Sunga - who had previously been convicted for robbery with homicide, denied having
anything to do with the rape and killing of Jocelyn. He branded as false the testimony
of Locil whom he claimed is a prostitute and a pimp and was always seen loitering at
Mendoza Park.
Re: 1st Sworn Statement: After having been arrested without a warrant by the police
in the evening of July 15, 1994 at the corner of Rizal and Valencia streets while
picking up passengers, he was brought to the police station where he was subjected
to violence and intimidation by SPO2 Pantollano and a certain Ka Ronnie to coerce
him to pinpoint to anybody, and he involuntarily did. He was made to appear before
police investigator Janoras on that same night of July 15, 1994 during which he signed
the second and third pages of a three paged affidavit He was later brought on July 18,
1994 to the Capitol building where he signed the first page of his confession after
which Atty. Agustin Rocamora also signed the same.
2nd Sworn Statement - Sunga initially affirmed having given the answers to questions
propounded therein by the NBI Investigator and having executed the confession for
the purpose of applying to become a state witness in the case. He subsequently
retracted his acknowledgement of Exhibit I as his own confession. While he admitted
having participated in the preliminary investigation at the MTCC of Puerto Princesa
City, he could not remember having given most of the statements he made therein.
While he admitted having participated in the preliminary investigation at the MTCC of
Puerto Princesa City, he could not remember having given most of the statements he
made therein.
2. Defense presented Other Witnesses (SKIP if you read the full case. Not important)
Mar. 7 Decision
the trial court convicted Sunga and Lansang as principals of the crime of Rape with
Homicide and sentenced each to suffer the penalty of DEATH, and Pascua as
principal in the crime of Rape.
Hence, the automatic review of the case by this Court pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended.
Issue/s:
1. Whether the discharge by the lower court of Locil Cui as a state witness is in
accordance with law; and
2. Whether the guilt of appellants has been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
FIRST ISSUE
Court: There was nothing irregular with the order discharging Locil
discharge was ordered in the course of what originally were hearings on the petition of
the accused for bail and after the prosecution had presented several of its witnesses
and submitted Locils sworn statement.
Motion for discharge could be done at any stage of the proceedings, and discharge
can be effected from the filing of the information to the time the defense starts to offer
any evidence.
Section 9, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court
1. the discharge must be with the consent of the accused sought to be a state witness;
2. his testimony is absolutely necessary;
3. no other direct evidence is available for the proper prosecution of the offense
committed except his testimony;
4. his testimony can be substantially corroborated in its material points;
5. he does not appear to be the most guilty; and
6. he has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude.
Case at hand: all were satisfied
Locil was the only person who saw what happened to Jocelyn.
Her testimony was thus indispensable.
That she did not appear to be the most guilty among the accused
that she had not been convicted of an offense involving moral turpitude
the susceptibility of material corroboration of her testimony at the time of her
discharge in view of the other evidence in the hands of the prosecution.
The requirement of a hearing in support of the discharge had been substantially
complied with when the trial court, during the hearings on the bail petition, already
received evidence from the prosecution including Locils sworn statement and also
heard in open court the defenses arguments in opposition thereto.
Even if Locils discharge failed to comply with all the requirements embodied in
Section 9, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, her testimony would not, for that sole
reason, be discarded or disregarded for, in the discharge of a codefendant, the trial
court may reasonably be expected to commit error which is not reversible, the
underlying principle being that it does not affect the competency and quality of
testimony of the discharged defendant.
Locils Testimony
the testimony of the erstwhile accused-turned state witness Locil is the most pivotal,
for it is an eyewitness account of what transpired before and at the time of Jocelyns
death.
Her testimony is the only direct evidence identifying appellants and relating in detail
their specific overt acts
like any other testimony, this Court may not readily accept Locils statements hook,
line and sinker because in the assessment of the testimony of a co-accused-turned
state witness, the same must be received with great caution and must be carefully
scrutinized.
The testimony of a self-confessed accomplice or coconspirator imputing the blame to or
implicating his co-accused
cannot, by itself and without corroboration, be regarded as proof to a moral certainty
that the latter committed or participated in the commission of the crime. T
must be substantially corroborated in its material points by unimpeachable testimony
and strong circumstances and must be to such an extent that its trustworthiness
becomes manifest
Sungas two extrajudicial confessions, which strictly speaking were admissions for they referred
to statements of fact which did not directly involve an acknowledgement of guilt or of the criminal
intent to commit the offense with which he was charged, could have lent corroborative support to
Locils testimony, having likewise given details of how the crime took place. Contrary, however,
to the trial courts ruling, this Court finds Sungas admissions to be inadmissible in evidence not
only against him but also against his coaccused appellants.
SECOND ISSUE (RELATED)
A person under investigation for the commission of an offense is guaranteed the following rights
by the Constitution:
 1. the right to remain silent;
2. the right to have competent and independent counsel of his own choice, and to be
provided with one if he cannot afford the services of counsel; and
3. the right to be informed of these rights.
Case at hand: right to counsel was denied Sunga during his execution of Exhibit Aadmission
before the police on the ground that the counsel who assisted him, Atty. Agustin Rocamora, was
the City Legal Officer of Puerto Princesa.
People vs. Bandula
Court made it sufficiently clear that the independent counsel for the accused in custodial
investigations cannot be a special counsel, public or private prosecutor, counsel of the police, or
a municipal attorney whose interest is admittedly adverse to the accused.
Case at hand: Atty Roca-Mora provides legal aid and support to the mayor and the city in
carrying out the delivery of basic services to the people, which includes maintenance of peace
and order and, as such, his office is akin to that of a prosecutor who unquestionably cannot
represent the accused during custodial investigation due to conflict of interest.
Sunga could not have possibly known the ramifications of his choice of a city legal
officer to be his counsel.
The duty of law enforcers to inform him of his Constitutional rights during custodial
interrogations to their full, proper and precise extent does not appear to have been
discharged.
Notatu dignum: Nothing in the records shows that Atty. Rocamora exerted efforts to safeguard
Sungas rights and interests, especially that of his right not to be a witness against himself. In
fact, glaringly, Atty. Rocamora was not even made to testify so he could have related the extent
of legal assistance he extended to Sunga at the police station.
Accdg to SPO2 Janoras,
Rocamora did not, if at all, fully apprise Sunga of his rights and options prior to giving
his (Sungas) admission.
Evidently, Atty. Rocamora, without more, merely acted to facilitate the taking of the
admission from Sunga.
Sunga failed to present evidence as to the maltreatment he claimed to have suffered
in the hands of SPO4 Pantollano and Patrolman Bolos, he did not have any lawyer by
his side at the time these two policemen started asking him questions about Jocelyns
death.
At that point, Sunga was already under custodial investigation without the assistance
of counsel.
Custodial investigation
the stage where the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an
unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect taken into custody by
the police who carry out a process of interrogation that lends itself to elicit
incriminating statements
Case at hand
Sungas second extrajudicial admission is inadmissible, due to the absence of counsel
to assist him when he executed it on August 3, 1994 before the NBI of Puerto
Princesa City.
Although Sunga declared in open court that he made such admission in connection
with his desire to apply as state witness which admission he later repudiated, this
does not make his confession admissible.
Sunga was at the time still under detention at the NBI office and had been languishing
in jail since his arrest in midJuly 1994.
His desire to regain his freedom is not difficult to understand, he having lost it once
due to his conviction for another crime.
His admission which was done without the benefit of counsel consisted of answers to
questions propounded by the investigating agent of the NBI and not of a unilateral
declaration of his participation in the crime.
These conditions are constitutive of an atmosphere pervading that of a custodial
investigation and necessitating the assistance of a competent and independent
counsel of Sungas choice as a matter of right but which he had none.
Any information or admission given by a person while in custody which may appear
harmless or innocuous at the time without the competent assistance of an
independent counsel must be struck down as inadmissible.
Even if the confession contains a grain of truth or even if it had been voluntarily given,
if it was made without the assistance of counsel, it is inadmissible.
The waiver by Sunga of his right to counsel was not a valid waiver it was executed not in the
presence of counsel, contrary to the express requirement of the Constitution.
Sunga having had no counsel when he made his admission before the NBI and his waiver of the
right to have one being invalid, his statementExhibit I is inadmissible.
The testimony of Sunga during the preliminary investigation before the Municipal Trial Court did
not render his extrajudicial admission into a judicial one which could be used against him and his
coappellants.
Neither could his other statements in such proceeding admitting his participation in the crime be
utilized to establish his and the other appellants guilt.
For in that preliminary investigation, Sunga again was effectively denied of his essential right to
counsel. Atty. Rocamora was appointed Sungas counsel de officio but just like the assistance he
extended during the execution of Exhibit A, Atty. Rocamora utterly did nothing in defense of
Sungas cause. While Sunga was being asked by the judge a barrage of questions calling for
answers which could and did incriminate him, Atty. Rocamora did not offer the slightest objection
to shield his client from the damning nature thereof.
The right to counsel
applies in certain pretrial proceedings that can be deemed critical stages in the
criminal process.
The preliminary investigation can be no different from the incustody interrogations by
the police, for a suspect who takes part in a preliminary investigation will be subjected
to no less than the States processes, oftentimes intimidating and relentless, of
pursuing those who might be liable for criminal prosecution.
Case at hand
In the case at bar, Sunga was thrust into the preliminary investigation and while he did
have a counsel, for the latters lack of vigilance and commitment to Sungas rights, he
was virtually denied his right to counsel.
The right to counsel (cont.)
involves more than just the presence of a lawyer in the courtroom or the
mere propounding of standard questions and objections;
means an efficient and decisive legal assistance and not a simple
perfunctory representation.
People vs. Abano: where the confession by the therein accused in the preliminary
investigation was excluded as inadmissible due to the absence of her counsel, this
Court will not admit Sungas. This makes it unnecessary to discuss and emphasize the
conflict on material points of Sungas and Locils accounts of the incident.
 In light of the weak evidence for the prosecution, the defense of alibi as well as of denial by
appellants is accorded credence, for it is precisely when the prosecutions case is weak that the
defense of alibi assumes importance and becomes crucial in negating criminal liability.
In fine, regardless of the probative weight of appellants alibi, the prosecution still has the onus of
proving the guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the accused and cannot rely on the weakness of
the defense evidence. The prosecution having failed to discharge its burden, appellants
presumed innocence remains and must thus be acquitted.
WHEREFORE, for failure of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of
appellants Rey Sunga, Ramil Lansang and Inocencio Pascua in Criminal Case No. 11984 the
decision therein is hereby SET ASIDE and REVERSED and said appellants are hereby
ACQUITTED of the crime charged.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ORDERED to cause the IMMEDIATE RELEASE of
the appellants from custody, unless they are being held for some other lawful cause, and to
INFORM this Court within five (5) days from receipt of this Decision of the date appellants were
actually released from confinement.
38. People v. Ibaez 698 SCRA 161 (2013)
KEY TAKE-AWAY/RECIT-READY
Custodial investigation understood as any questioning initiated by law enforcement
authorities after a person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of
action in any significant manner
o SC points out that Nabilgas was already under custodial investigation by the
authorities when he executed the alleged written confession.
Custodial investigation begins when there is no longer a general
inquiry into an unsolved crime and the investigation has started to
focus on a particular person as a suspect
i.e., when the police investigator starts interrogating or
exacting a confession from the suspect in connection
with an alleged offense.
Right to Counsel
o Effective and vigilant counsel - necessarily and logically requires that the
lawyer be present and be able to advise and assist his client from the time
the confessant answers the first question asked by the investigating officer
until the signing of the extrajudicial confession.
The extrajudicial confession of Nabilgas was not corroborated by a
witness who was present at the time the written confession was
made.
Court notes in this regard that the prosecution did not
present Atty. Go at the witness stand despite hints
made during the early stages of the trial that she would
be presented.
FACTS:
Appellants Cachuela and Ibanez assailing the decision of the CA
o CA affirmed the RTC decision of Paranaque, finding the appellants guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of robbery with
homicide, - reclusion perpetua
Prosecutions evidence:
o Revealed that on July 2004, Ibanez went to Weapons System Corp. (WSC)
on board an old car, and told Henessy Auron, WSCs Secretary and Sales
Representative, that he was the one who bought a gun barrel at the
companys gun show in SM Megamall
o Ibanez inquired from Henessy about the schedule and the rates of WSCs
firing range and he amount of the membership fee of its gun club
He also asked the days when there are many people in the firing
range and whether Henessy was WSCs only female employee
o July 26, 2004, 9 AM Henessy arrived at WSC and rang the doorbell, but no
one opened the door.
She went to the back of the office where the firing range was
located, and called Zaldy Gabao, another employee of WSC
Zaldy answered from inside the store but Henessy did not
understand what he said
Henessy returned to the front door and called again
Zaldy replied that he could not open the door because his hands has
been tied
o After an hour, the police arrived and opened the gate at the back using
acetylene
When Henessy and the police entered the premises, they saw that
Zaldy had been handcuffed to the vault
Zaldy informed the police that the companys gunsmith, Rex
Dorimon, was inside the firing range
Rex Dorimon, was inside the firing range, and saw the lifeless body
of Rex
o Dr. Voltaire Nulud conducted an autopsy on the body of Rex:
Victim suffered several gunshot wounds on the head, thorax and
abdomen, caused by a .45 pistol
o NBI received an information from an asset that the group of Cachuela was
involved in the robbery of WSC and in the killing of one of its employees;
and that Cachuela had been looking for prospective buyers of firearms
o NBI formed an entrapment team and proceeded to Bacoor, Cavite to execute
the operation
Upon their arrival, Melvin Nabilgas, approached them and told them
that he had been sent by Cachuela and Ibanez to look for buyers
of firearms
Police introduced themselves and told Nabiglas that they were
conducting an entrapment operation; Nabiglas surrendered
Asset contacted Cachuela and informed that him that Nabiglas ha
already talked to the buyers, and that they would like to see the
firearms being sold
Cachuela set up a meeting with the buyers at a gasoline
station in Naic, Cavite
o NBI Special Investigator Allan Lino, Supervising
Agent Jerry Abuera and the asset went to the
agreed place
o Cachuela came and talked to them, and
brought them inside his house where
Cachuela showed the several firearms
o Agents inquired about the firearms legal
documentation
Latter sensed that the meeting was a
set-up
NBI arrested Cachuela and recovered
4 firearms from his home
NBI conducted a follow-up operation on Ibanez whom
the asset also contacted
 o Ibanez directed the asset to bring the
prospective buyers to his residence in Imus,
Cavite
o NBI agents went to Imus and there met Ibanez
who they saw inside a Nissan California car
o Lino, Abiera and the asset entered the car, and
asked Ibanez where the firearms were
o Ibanez brought out 2 firearms, and showed
them to the agents
o Agents asked WON the guns had legal
documentation then arrested Ibanez when he
was becoming suspicious agents recovered
2 guns from Ibanez
o At the NBI main office Zaldy pointed to the appellants during a police line-
up, as the persons responsible for the robbery ar WSC and for the killing of
Rex
o Nabiglas also executed a handwritten confession implicating the appellants
and Zaldy in the crime
o Accused all pleaded not guilty
o During trial, Zaldy died
o RTC found appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex
crime of robbery with homicide, and sentenced them to suffer reclusion
perpetua
o CA - affirmed
ISSUE:
WON the out-of-court identification and the extrajudicial confession is admissible as evidence
HELD: NABIGLLAS EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION IS INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE
Lino testified that Zaldy identified the appellants as the persons involved in the robbery of WSC
and in the killing of Rex in a police line-up held at the NBI Main Office
o Zaldy did NOT testify in court since he was brought to the National Center for
Mental Health, and subsequently died there during trial
o For this reason, the court examined with greater scrutiny Linos testimony
regarding Zaldys alleged out-of-court identification
People v. Algarme (procedure for out-of-court identification and the test to determine its
admissibility)
o Done thru:
Show-ups the suspect alone is brought face-to-face with the
witness for identification
Line-ups a witness identifies the suspect from a group of persons
line up for the purpose
o Totality of Circumstances test:
Witness opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime
The witness degree of attention at that time
Accuracy of any prior description, given by the witness
Level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification
Length of time between the crime and the identification
Suggestiveness of the identification procedure
In the PRESENT CASE
o Lino merely stated that Zaldy, during a police line-up, identified the appellants
as the persons involved in the robbery of WSC and in the killing of Rex
o Lino did NOT state when the line-up took place, how the line-up has been
conducted, who were the persons in the line-up with the appellants, and
WON the line-up was confined to persons of the same height and built as
the appellants
Linos failure to state relevant details surrounding the police line-up
is a glaring omission that renders unreliable Zaldys out-of-court
identification
Court holds that Naglibas extrajudicial confession is inadmissible in evidence
The Court has consistently held that an extrajudicial confession, to be admissible, must satisfy
the following requirements: (1) the confession must be voluntary; (2) it must be made with the
assistance of a competent and independent counsel, preferably of the confessants choice; (3) it
must be express; and (4) it must be in writing.
Nabiglas was already under custodial investigation by the authorities when he executed the
alleged written confession
People v. Rapeza
o Lawyer called to be present during custodial investigation should, as far as
reasonably possible, be the choice of the individual undergoing questioning
o If furnished by the police to the accused the lawyer should be competent,
independent and prepared to fully safeguard the constitutional rights of the
accused
Nabiglas confession was NOT made with the assistance of a competent and independent
counsel
o Services of Atty. Go, lawyer who acted in Nabiglas behalf, were provided by
the NBI
She was assigned the task even if Nabiglas open declaration to the
agencys investigators that he already had a lawyer in the person
of Atty. Donardo Paglinawan
Atty. Go merely represented herself to be a mere witness to the
confession
Nothing in the records show that Atty. Go ascertained WON
Nabiglas confession was made voluntarily, WON he fully
inderstood the nature and the consequence of his extrajudicial
confession and its impact on his constitutional rights
Nabiglas extrajudicial confession is inadmissible in evidence against the appellants in view od
the res inter alios acta rule
o The rule provides that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act,
declaration, or omission of another
o Consequently, an extrajudicial confession is binding only on the confessant
and is not admissible against his or her co-accused because it Is considered
hearsay against them
o Exception:
Admission made by a conspirator under Section 30, Rule 130 of
rules of court
Conspiracy must first be proved by evidence other than
the admission itself
Admission relates to the common object
It has been made while the declarant was engaged in
carrying out the conspiracy
DOES NOT APPLY IN THE PRESENT CASE SINCE THERE WAS
NO PIECE OF EVIDENCE PRESENTED TO PROVE THAT
NABIGLAS CONSPIRED WITH THE APPELLANTS IN
COMMITTING THE CRIME CHARGED
Conspiracy cannot be proved
Nabiglas was acquitted by the RTC due to insufficiency of evidence to prove his participation in
the crime
39. People v. Matignas, 379 SCRA 56
Doctrine: The constitutional requirement of independent counsel is not met when the NBI
Regional Director summons a lawyer for the accused.
If counsel arrives after the custodial investigation had already been started, a confession in
such investigation shall be constitutionally flawed and shall be inadmissible as evidence.

Facts:
The RTC found accused Matignas and de Guzman guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
rape with homicide and sentencing them to death.
The RTC based its Ruling merely on the testimony of the prosecutions witnesses.
Basis for the RTC Ruling:
That both accused were seen near the scene of the crime during the relevant times.
That they were positively identified as the persons who were at or near the scene of
the crime or near the place where the victim was found dead during the time relevant
in these cases.
That the admission of accused Noel de Guzman, which only he could have known,
that his co-accused Matignas strangled the victim after they raped the victim bolsters
the evidence for the prosecution.
Hence, this automatic review in view of the death penalty.
Issues (Held/Ratio):
1. Whether the trial court erred in finding the prosecution witnesses credible? No
The testimonies of the witnesses were clear and straightforward in depicting how
appelants had followed and later grabbed the victim near the vicinity of the locus
criminis (where the crime was committed) a few hours before her naked body was
found.
The trial court found the witnesses to be reliable and credible and not driven by any ill
will or false motive in testifying against appelants. Settled is the rule that where the
culpability or the innocence of the accused hinges on the credibility of the witnesses
and the veracity of their testimonies, the findings of trial courts are given the highest
degree of respect. This is because of its unique opportunity to observe them firsthand
and to note their demeanor, conduct and attitude. Hence, their findings on such
matters are binding and conclusive on appellate courts, unless some facts or
circumstances of weight and substance have been overlooked, misapprehended or
misinterpreted.
2. Whether the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to warrant the conviction of appellants?
Yes
Circumstantial evidence is defined as that which indirectly proves a fact in issue an
inference which the factfinder draws from the evidence established. Resort thereto is
essential when the lack of direct testimony would result in setting a felon free.
There can be a verdict of conviction based on circumstantial evidence when the
curcumstancese proved form an unbroken chain which leads to a fair and reasonable
conclusion pinpointing the accused, to the exclusion of all the others, as the
perpetrator of the crime. In order that circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to
convict, the same must comply with these essential requisites:
(a) there is more than one circumstance;
(b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven
(c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
In this case, the following circumstances form the unbroken chain which lead us to
conclude beyond moral certainty that appellants were the culprits. Two people saw
accused de Guzman tailing the victim; accused Matignas was also sighted near the
place during that time; Matignas bullcap was near the body of the victim; and that the
witnesses had no ill motive against both the accused.
3. Whether the RTC erred in not rejecting accused de Guzmans statement given to the NBI?
Yes
For an extrajudicial confession to be admissible, the following requisites must be met
(a) the confession must involve an express and categorical acknowledgment of guilt
(b) the facts admitted must constitute a criminal offense
(c) the confession must have been given voluntarily
(d) the confession must have been intelligently made by the accused while realizing
the importance of such act.
Appellant de Guzman was assisted by a lawyer when he reduced his extrajudicial
confession into writing. However, this fact did not satisfy the requirement that
an independent counsel be made available to a person under custodial
investigation.
Instead of giving accused the option to choose his own counsel, NBI Regional Director
Salvador Ranin instead summoned Atty. Florante Dizon to assist accused.
Moreover, the testimony of Atty. Dizon shows that the custodial investigation started
without his presence.
Thus, the belated arrival of a lawyer the following day, though prior to the actual
signing of the uncounseled confession, did not cure the defect, for the investigators
had already extracted incriminatory statements from the accused. Therefore, the
assailed extrajudicial confession is deemed constitutionally flawed and inadmissible in
evidence.
40. Manila Water Company v. Rosario, GR 188747, 2014
Sebastian, Lui
Doctrine: The constitutional right to counsel is available only during custodial investigation. If
the investigation is merely administrative conducted by the employer and not a criminal
investigation, the admission made during such investigation may be used as evidence to justify
dismissal.
Recit ready: Del Rosario was absorbed as an employee of Manila Water. The company found
Del Rosario and his co-employee, Manguera, involved in the pilferage and the sale of water
meters to the companys contractor for personal gain. He was asked to explain in writing why he
should not be dealt with administratively. He confessed his involvement in the act and pleaded
for the companys forgiveness. Manila Water conducted a hearing so Del Rosario can explain
his side. During the formal investigation, he was found guilty of violating the Companys Code of
Conduct and was dismissed thereafter. Del Rosario averred that his admission to the
misconduct was coerced by the company, and that such admission made without the counsels
assistance, could not be made as basis in terminating his employment. Although the issue was a
closed aspect of the case, the Court mentioned that the constitutional right to counsel is
available only during custodial investigation. If the investigation is merely administrative
conducted by the employer and not a criminal investigation, the admission made during such
investigation may be used as evidence to justify dismissal.

Facts:
Del Rosario was initially an Instrument Technician by Metropolitan Waterworks and
Sewerage System (MWSS). When MWSS was reorganized, he was absorbed as an
employee of Manila Water.
Manila Water discovered that 24 water meters were missing in its stockroom. Upon
initial investigation, it appeared that Del Rosario and his co-employee, a certain Danilo
Manguera, were involved in the pilferage and the sale of water meters to the
companys contractor.
Manila Water issued a Memorandum directing Del Rosario to explain in writing within
72 hours why he should not be dealt with administratively for the loss of the water
meters.
In his letter-explanation, Del Rosario confessed his involvement in the act charged
and pleaded for forgiveness, promising not to commit similar acts in the future.
Manila Water conducted a hearing to afford Del Rosario the opportunity to personally
defend himself and to explain and clarify his defenses. During the formal investigation,
he was found responsible for the loss of the water meters and therefore liable for
violating the Companys Code of Conduct. He was dismissed from employment.
Del Rosario filed an action for illegal dismissal claiming that his severance from
employment is without just cause. He averred that his admission to the misconduct
charged was not voluntary but was coerced by the company. Such admission
therefore, made without the assistance of a counsel, could not be made basis in
terminating his employment.
Manila Water pointed out that he was indeed involved in the taking of the water meters
from the companys stock room and of selling these to a private contractor for
personal gain. Such acts are punishable punishable by dismissal for being violative of
Sec. 11.1 of the Companys Code of Conduct.
The company invited the attention of the Court to the fact that Del Rosario himself
confessed his involvement to the loss of the water meters not only in his letter-
explanation, but also during the formal investigation, and in both instances, pleaded
for his employers forgiveness.
Issues:
WON the award of separation pay to Del Rosario was correct NO
WON Del Rosarios admission is admissible as evidence to justify his dismissal from
employment YES
*(The Court only discussed the doctrine/s on awarding separation pay. The 2 nd issue is included
in what the Court considered as a closed aspect of the case since it was not an issue raised on
appeal by Del Rosario.)
Held:
Manila Water argues that separation pay or financial assistance is not awarded to
employees guilty of gross misconduct or for cause reflecting on his moral character.
Del Rosario maintains that there is no legal ground to justify his termination. He
insists that his admission pertaining to his involvement in the loss of the water
meters was merely coerced by the company. Since his dismissal was without valid
or just cause, Del Rosario avers that Manila Water is guilty of illegal dismissal
rendering it liable for the payment of backwages and separation pay.
The correctness of the Labor Arbiters pronouncement on the legality of Del Rosarios
dismissal is no longer an issue and is beyond modification.
While Manila Water timely appealed the ruling of the Labor Arbiter awarding
separation pay to Del Rosario, the latter did not question the dismissal of his illegal
termination case. (Due process prevents the grant of additional awards to parties who
did not appeal.) Thus, the Court will no longer dwell on the issue of WON Del Rosario
was illegally dismissed from employment.
Included in the closed aspect of the case is respondents argument that the absence
of his counsel when he admitted the charge against him diminished the
evidentiary value of such admission. Nonetheless, it may be mentioned that the
constitutional right to counsel is available only during custodial investigation.
If the investigation is merely administrative conducted by the employer and not
a criminal investigation, the admission made during such investigation may be
used as evidence to justify dismissal.
The attendant circumstances in this case considered, SC ruled to deny Del Rosario
separation pay since the admitted cause of his dismissal amounts to serious
misconduct. He is not only responsible for the loss of the water meters in flagrant
violation of the companys policy but his act is in utter disregard of his partnership with
his employer in the pursuit of mutual benefits.
The appellate court erred in awarding separation pay to Del Rosario without taking
into consideration that the transgression he committed constitutes a serious offense.
The grant of separation pay to a dismissed employee is determined by the cause of
the dismissal. The years of service may determine how much separation pay may be
awarded but it is not the reason why such pay should be granted at all.
41. People v. Pinlac - 165 SCRA 675
Yarra, Joe Anthony
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
In this case, private respondent Pinlac was convicted by RTC Makati of committing robbery (in
the house of Sato) and robbery with homicide (in the house of Osamu who was also killed).
Such rulings are now assailed in this case. The alleged robberies happened in San Lorenzo
Village Makati City sometime on April 1984 in the houses of Sato and Osamu (who were
neighbors). Pinlac was the husband of Delia Marcelino who was the cook of Mr. Sato. According
to the facts, both incidents happened on April 7 when Mr. Sato upon returning home discovered
that his Alba Seiko watch, a gold necklace, and cash money were all missing. He reported to the
Makati Police Station and police investigators were sent to both houses. Upon investigation,
they would learn of Osamus death in the hospital. The police investigators explained how both
robberies including the incidental killing of Osamu were perpetrated. They would say that the
unlawful entry to the house of Sato was done by detaching jalousies of a window, while for
Osamus house, a screen wall near the back door was slashed to facilitate entry.
These reports were denied by Pinlac. He narrated that during those times, he never left his
house (as also corroborated by a defense witness). He further testified that on April 9, three
policemen came to his house and arrested him for the crimes charged without a warrant of
arrest. He was brought to the houses of Sato and Osamu and was ordered to reenact according
to what the police theorized how the crimes were committed. During the interrogation at the
police headquarters, he was tortured and forced to admit the crimes charged. Eventually, he
succumbed and finally signed a prepared confession as he could no longer bear the torture for 7
solid hours. In this case, Pinlac assails his conviction, contending that the trial court erred in
admitting in evidence his extra-judicial confession, allegedly obtained through force, torture,
violence and intimidation, without having been apprised of his constitutional rights and without
assistance of counsel.
ISSUE: Should there be conviction? Was there violation of constitutional rights?
RULING:: No. Appeal (filed by the Solicitor General) is meritorious. Yes there was violation of
constitutional rights.
Prosecution presented no direct evidence or testimony to identify accused as the perpetrator of
the crimes charged. Furnished evidence by police authorities were merely circumstantial
(fingerprints, window slabs, etc.). These were all explained by Pinlac, especially from his
statement that he was ordered to reenact as stated from the facts. Another evidence as well
would be the extra-judicial confession which is now also being assailed as violative of the
Constitution. In the case of People v. Galit, citing Morales v. Ponce Enrile, SC reiterated the
correct procedure for peace officers to follow when making arrest and in conducting custodial
investigation:
DOCTRINE
For (1) making arrest, it is the arresting officers duty to inform the reason therefor and there
must be an arrest warrant. The arrested person shall be informed of his constitutional rights to
remain silent and to counsel including the right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or
anyone he chooses. These must be accomplished. For (2) custodial investigation, it shall be
conducted in the presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested, by any person on his
behalf, or appointed by court upon petition by detainee or anyone in his behalf. Right to counsel
may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with assistance of counsel. Any
statement obtained in violation of these procedures, whether exculpatory or inculpatory in whole
or in part shall be INADMISSIBLE in evidence.... and when the Constitution requires a person to
be informed of his right to remain silent and to counsel, it must be presumed to contemplate the
transmission of a meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial recitation of an abstract
constitutional principle. The latter is insufficient. An officer is not only duty-bound to tell the
person such rights; he must also EXPLAIN their effects in practical terms. The right of a person
under investigation to be informed implies a correlative obligation on the part of the police
investigator to explain, and contemplates an effective communication that results in
understanding what is conveyed. Short of this, there is a denial of the right. And so absent such
requisite (act of sufficiently explaining), admission or confession made by a person under
investigation cannot be admitted in evidence even though he may have been apprised of his
constitutional rights to silence and to counsel.
In the case at hand, SC found that the evidence for the prosecution failed to prove compliance
with these constitutional rights. No assistance of counsel and Pinlacs alleged waiver was made
without assistance of counsel. Prosecution wasnt also able to satisfactorily rebut the narration
about the torture leading to the extra-judicial confession. Appealed decision is reversed and
petitioner is hereby acquitted
42. People v. Rous - 242 SCRA 732
Doctrine:
A confession is admissible until the accused successfully proves that it was given as a result of
violence, intimidation, threat, or promise of reward or leniency
Facts:
At around 3:30 a.m. of 15 December 1987; the victim Pastor Pasahol in his car driven by
Rolando Laygo, his companion, left Candon, Ilocos Sur bound for Meycauayan, Bulacan. When
they reached Barangay Santiago, Bauang, La Union, 2 armed men who, according to Rolando
Laygo, alighted from a red car which stopped beside the victim's car, and then the 2 shot the
victim. Thereupon, one of the assailants took the clutch bag from the compartment of the victim's
car which, according to the victim's wife, Selwyn Pasahol, contained gold coins, earrings with
diamond and refined gold worth more than P600,000.00. Thereafter the hold-uppers took the
victim's car which was found abandoned by the peace officers about 2 kilometers away from the
place where the crime was committed. 2 days after, the victim died as a result of the inflicted gun
shot wounds.
Sgt. Gaddi invited Laygo to the CIS Office in the afternoon of 15 December 1987, and
interviewed the latter, who denied knowledge of the incident. On the next day, Sgt. Gaddi again
invited Laygo to the CIS Office and after questioning him for 30 minutes, Laygo broke down and
admitted that he and Socrates Rous were parties to the conspiracy of the original plan to commit
Robbery and not to inflict harm on Pastor Pasahol. With Laygo's revelation, Sgt. Gaddi took his
sworn statement denominated as "Sinumpaang Salaysay" on 16 December 1987 with the
assistance of Atty. Abraham Datlag, which is a confession of his participation in the commission
of robbery and implicated Socrates Rous in the commission of the crime. Laygo, on the same
date, also executed a document entitled "Kusang Loob na Kahilingan" also assisted by Atty.
Abraham Datlag who assisted him in the custodial investigation and witnessed by spouses Fely
Laygo and Tiburcio Laygo. Both documents bear the signatures of Ally. Abraham Datlag who
assisted him in the custodial investigation and witness a by spouses Fely Laygo and Tiburcio
Laygo. Rolando Laygo also executed another "Sinumpaang Salaysay" on 22 December 1987
without the assistance of a lawyer. On December 29 or 30, 1987, Socrates Rous alias Bobby
was arrested by Sgt. Gaddi when he accompanied Capt. Luvimindano Garcia in the latter's
appearance before the CIS District Commander, Lt. Col. Pimentel, in the CIS Office at San
Fernando, La Union. With Laygo's confession, Sgt. Gaddi also investigated Rous who, on 7
January 1987, executed the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" with the assistance of Atty. Roberto Ferrer
who affixed his signature thereon.
Subsequently, on the basis of the affidavit of the victim's wife, Selwyn Pasahol, the affidavit of
Sgt. Roberto Gaddi and the sworn statements of Rolando Laygo, the Provincial Fiscal filed on
17 December 1987 the case (Highway Robbery with Homicide) against Rolando Laygo, Bobby
Rous, John Doe and Peter Doe, and on 21 December 1987, the case for Carnapping was filed
against the respondents. After joint trial against Laygo and Rous only, as the other accused were
never arrested and have remained at large, the trial court rendered a decision acquitting Rous of
the charge of carnapping, but finding both Rous and Laygo guilty under the charge of Highway.
Laygo and Rous appealed, with both of them ascribing as error the admission of their
extrajudicial confessions.
Issue: Whether Laygos and Rous extra-judicial confessions, signed in the presence of the
counsel, are admissible as evidence even if the counsel arrived shortly after the custodial
investigation has started and left before the last 3 questions were asked.
Held:
The record shows that the investigating officer fully informed Laygo of his right to counsel and
categorically asked Laygo whether he wanted the assistance of counsel, to which inquiry, Laygo
expressed his desire to be so assisted by counsel. Thereupon, the investigating officer, Sgt.
Robert Gaddi, brought him to the office of Atty. Abraham Datlag. Laygo and Atty. Datlag
conferred for a while; thereafter, Sgt. Gaddi and Laygo returned to the CIS Office of Sgt. Gaddi
and Sgt. Gaddi started the investigation. Atty. Datlag arrived soon after the investigation started
and left before the last three questions were asked, instructing them to follow him to his office.
After the extra-judicial statement of Laygo was finished, Gaddi and Laygo went to the office of
Atty. Datlag, after which, Atty. Datlag conferred with Laygo and then advised Laygo to sign.
Laygo did so and Atty. Datlag thereupon likewise signed.

Thus, there was more than substantial compliance with the constitutional requirement that a
person under investigation for the commission of a crime should be provided with counsel under
Art III Sec 12. Further, nowhere in the evidence is it shown that coercion was ever employed by
the investigating officer in obtaining the confession of Laygo. The investigation was even
witnessed by the relatives of Laygo. The fact that Atty. Datlag arrived shortly after the
investigation of Laygo had begun and left before the confession was concluded does not negate
the validity and admissibility of said confession for the reason that after the confession was put
down in writing, Laygo and the investigating officer proceeded to the office of Atty. Datlag and
the latter then read the confession, conferred with Laygo and then advised Laygo to sign the
confession. The confession was voluntary and the signing thereof by Laygo was done upon
advice of counsel. The constitutional requirements were thus fully complied with. Moreover, the
presence of Rolando's uncle, Tiburcio Laygo, and the latter's wife, Fely, clearly precluded the
use of coercion in extracting the confession.
A confession constitutes evidence of high order since it is supported by the strong presumption
that no person of normal mind would deliberately and knowingly confess to a crime unless
prompted by truth and his conscience. A confession is admissible until the accused successfully
proves that it was given as a result of violence, intimidation, threat, or promise of reward or
leniency. There is not a speck of evidence to show that the confession of Laygo was extracted
by such means or promise. Atty. Datlag would not have affixed his signature to the extrajudicial
confession of Laygo as counsel for Laygo had he known or had he been informed by Laygo of
any infirmity in its execution. Said confession is, therefore, admissible in evidence. The same
ruling applies to the extrajudicial confession of Rous.
43. People v. Alicando - 251 SCRA 293
[12 December 1995] [Ponente: Puno]
By Cabochan, Jonas
DOCTRINE: The burden to prove that an accused waived his right to remain silent and the right
to counsel before making a confession under custodial interrogation rests with the prosecution. It
is also the burden of the prosecution to show that the evidence derived from confession is not
tainted as fruit of the poisonous tree. The burden has to be discharged by clear and convincing
evidence.
RECIT-READY: Automatic review of the imposition for the death penalty since this is a crime of
Rape with Homicide. While the victims father was away, the accused had carnal knowledge with
Khazie Mae Penecilla, a minor 4 years of age, and had his left hand choking her neck. The
victim died. When the victims body was discovered, a witness came forward to the family and
claimed that she saw the accused commit the crime, to which PO3 Danilo Tan arrested and
interrogated the accused without the benefit of counsel. On basis of such confession, evidence
was discovered and adduced. The issue is WON the evidence is inadmissible as the accused
never properly waived his right to counsel? Yes, the evidence is inadmissible, since the accused
never waived his right to counsel, yet the accused verbally confessed. Further, due to the
inadmissibility of the confession, the subsequent evidence acquired due to it are likewise
inadmissible as they are the fruit of the poisonous tree.
FACTS:
> Case of Rape with Homicide and the imposition of the Death Penalty, thus the automatic
review of the SC.
> Involves the rape and death of Khazie Mae Penecilla, a minor, 4 years of age.
> Romeo Penecilla, father of the victim,was drinking liquor with Rodriguez and Gaddo in
Penecillas house. Alicando (Accused) joined, but would leave and return (he lived in the
neighbourhood; around 5 arms length away). At about 4:30PM, Penecillas group stopped
drinking and left.
> Luisa Rebada lives in the neighbourhood. At about 5:30PM that same day, she saw the victim
in Alicando's house and offered to buy her yemas, but the accused closed the window. She then
heard the victim crying, and approached the accuseds house and peeped through a space
between the floor and door. Rebada saw that Alicando was naked, on top of the victim, with his
left hand choking her neck. She retreated.
> Romeo (Father) returned at around 8PM, and could not find Khazie Mae. They searched all
night but to no avail. At dawn, Leopoldo Santiago, another neighbour, went down from his house
to answer the call of nature, only to find the lifeless body of the victim under his house.
> 9AM: Rebada informed the parents what she saw and that Alicando committed the deed.
Accused was arrested and interrogated by PO3 Danilo Tan. He verbally confessed his guilt
without the assistance of counsel. On the basis of his uncounselled verbal confession and follow
up interrogations, the police came to know and recovered from appellants house, Khazie Maes
green slippers, a pair of gold earrings, a buri mat, a stained pillow and a stained Tshirt all of
which were presented as evidence for the prosecution.
> Upon autopsy, it was discovered that Khazie Mae died to Asphyxia (AKA Suffocation) by
strangulation (likely the direct cause), Fractured 2nd Cervical vertebra, and a vaginal
haemorrhage.
> Trial Court found the accused guilty and sentenced him to death by electrocution. [Saying
Here ends Khazie Maes quest for justice. Her tormentor must suffer for the grievous offense he
had committed. He deserves no mercy."]
> Since the death penalty was imposed, this automatic review was in order.
ISSUE: WON the evidence of the prosecution is inadmissible due to that fact that it cant be
shown that the accused properly waived his right to counsel? [Accused verbally confessed to the
crime without the benefit of counsel.]
HELD: YES, the evidence is inadmissible.
> We find that the Decision of the trial court sentencing the appellant to death is shot full of
errors, both substantive and procedural. The conviction is based on an amalgam of inadmissible
and incredible evidence and supported by scoliotic logic.
> The physical evidence is inadmissible for they were gathered by PO3 Danilo Tan of the Iloilo
City PNP as a result of custodial interrogation where appellant verbally confessed to the crime
without the benefit of counsel. That for almost 2 days, the accused was never represented by
counsel.
> [T]he Constitution has stigmatized as inadmissible evidenceuncounselled confession or
admission. PO3 Tan did not even have the simple sense to reduce the all important confession
of the appellant in writing. Neither did he present any writing showing that appellant waived his
right to silence and to have competent and independent counsel. Despite the blatant violation of
appellants constitutional right, the trial court allowed his uncounselled confession to flow into the
records and illicitly used it in sentencing him to death.
> It is not only the uncounselled confession that is condemned as inadmissible, but also
evidence derived therefrom. The pillowand the Tshirt with the alleged bloodstains were
evidencederived from the uncounselled confession illegally extracted by the police from the
appellant.
> We have not only constitutionalized the Miranda warnings in our jurisdiction. We have also
adopted the libertarian exclusionary rule known as the fruit of the poisonous tree, a phrase
minted by Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter in the celebrated case of Nardone v. United States,
where once the primary source (the tree) is shown to have been unlawfully obtained, any
secondary or derivative evidence (the fruit) derived from it is also inadmissible. This is based
on the principle that evidence illegally obtained by the State should not be used to gain other
evidence because the originally illegally obtained evidencetaints all evidence subsequently
obtained.
> But even assuming arguendo that the pillow and the t shirt were admissible evidence, still, the
trial court erred in holding that they strongly corroborated the testimony of Luisa Rebada that
the victim was raped. For one, there was no basis for the trial court to conclude that the stains
on the pillow and tshirt were human bloodstains. The pillow and the tshirt were not examined by
any expert.
> The burden to prove that an accused waived his right to remain silent and the right to counsel
before making a confession under custodial interrogation rests with the prosecution. It is also the
burden of the prosecution to show that the evidence derived from confession is not tainted as
fruit of the poisonous tree. The burden has to be discharged by clear and convincing evidence.
> Be that as it may, our commitment to the criminal justice system is not only to convict and
punish violators of our laws. We are equally committed to the ideal that the process of detection,
apprehension, conviction and incarceration of criminals should be accomplished with fairness,
and without impinging on the dignity of the individual.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision in Criminal Case No. 43663, convicting accused Arnel
Alicando of the crime of Rape with Homicide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death is
annulled and set aside and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. No
costs.
Kapunan DISSENT: Evidence falling under one to the exlusionary rule
> Courts have generally approved the view that it is not necessary to hold that all evidence is
fruit of the poisonous tree. Under one of the recognized exceptions, the more appropriate
question in such cases is whether the evidence to which the objection is made would not have
been discovered at all but for the illegality or would have been discovered anyway by sources or
procedures independent of the illegality.
> I submit, that under the peculiar circumstances of this case, the evidence objected to would
have been inevitably discovered anyway. In a long line of cases, courts have recognized that
evidence derived from information obtained illegally is not absolutely inadmissible under the fruit
of the poisonous tree doctrine where it is shown that such evidence would have been inevitably
gained even without the unlawful act.
44. People v. De Guzman - 194 SCRA 191
March 4, 1991
Ponente: Regalado, J.
The team closed in on De Guzman and, after identifying themselves as NARCOM agents,
placed him under arrest. They confiscated the marked money from him. Querubin turned over a
plastic bag containing marijuana dried leaves to Bazar, who conducted a field test on the
contents when they arrived at NARCOM headquarters. The results were positive. The following
day he prepared a Receipt of Property Seized which he asked De Guzman to sign. On
December 10, 1987, he got the plastic bag from the locker where it had been placed under the
care of a custodian and delivered it to the PC Crime Laboratory at Camp Olivas for examination.
Issue:
Whether Querubins action violated De Guzmans constitutional rights when he asked De
Guzman to sign the receipt of property seized with respect to the positively identified marijuana
leaves from De Guzman. YES.
Ruling:
The trial judge regarded as telltale signs of De Guzmans guilt his submissiveness when he was
arrested and the fact that he signed without objection the Receipt of Seized Property, which was
later offered as Exhibit C. One can easily be cowed into silence by men with drawn guns and
ostensible authority and may even be intimidated into involuntary admissions as De Guzman
claims he was when he signed the receipt. That receipt was in reality an admission which
the accused appellant was forced to make without the assistance of counsel and without
being first informed of the constitutional rights of a person facing custodial investigation.
That evidence was totally inadmissible under the Bill of Rights and the consistent rulings
of this Court since the case of People v. Galit.
The constitutional presumption of innocence is not an empty platitude meant only to embellish
the Bill of Rights. Its purpose is to balance the scales in what would otherwise be an uneven
contest between the lone individual pitted against the People of the Philippines and all the
resources at their command. Its inexorable mandate is that, for all the authority and influence of
the prosecution, the accused must be acquitted and set free if his guilt cannot be proved beyond
the whisper of a doubt. That mandate shall be enforced.

Doctrine: Confessions or admissions covered by the provision, however, need not be

explicit; they can be merely implicit in any evidence that is communicative in nature.
(Bernas Green Book, p. 482)

That receipt was in reality an admission which the accused appellant was forced to make
without the assistance of counsel and without being first informed of the constitutional
rights of a person facing custodial investigation. That evidence was totally inadmissible
under the Bill of Rights and the consistent rulings of this Court since the case of People
v. Galit.

Facts:

Benjamin de Guzman, who claimed he was a chicharon vendor, was arrested for selling
marijuana. Charged with violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, he was convicted after trial by
the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan and sentenced to life imprisonment plus a fine of
P20,000.00.

The case was based on an operation conducted by the Narcotics Command (NARCOM) of
Malolos Bulacan. Due to a tip given to the office, the chief of the NARCOM district organized a
buy-bust operation composed of Sgt. Querubin, Sgt. Amad, Sgt. Bazar, and the informer.
SECTION 13
1. Cardines v. Rosete
March 22, 1995
Bellosillo, J.
DOCTRINE: The accused had the right to be granted bail because under the Rules of Court at
the time the application was made, bail was a matter of right except when the offense charged
with a capital offense or when punishable with reclusion perpetua. The case against the accused
was punishable only with life imprisonment. Life imprisonment is different from reclusion
perpetua (see table below).
FACTS:
Two separate criminal complaints were filed against Erlie Claro, Emilo Claro and
Albert Reyes for illegal recruitment. Upon filing the case, Erlie Claro and Emilio Claro
were placed under preventive detention while Reyes remained at large. On November
23, 1993, Judge Rosete granted the accused provisional liberty on a bond of P20,000
each on the ground that the right to bail was guaranteed by the Constitution and
should not be denied the accused except those charged with a capital offense and
since the maximum penalty that could possibly imposed was only life imprisonment,
the penalty is therefore bailable.
After conducting the preliminary investigation, respondent Judge was convinced that
the crime charged has been committed and that the accused were probably guilty
thereof. He then canceled the bail bonds and issued warrants for their arrest. The
provincial prosecutor filed two informations before the RTC one for illegal
recruitment in large scale, and another for estafa.
Petitioners (complainants) filed a case against Judge Rosete for misconduct and
gross ignorance of the law. They alleged that the accused should not have been
granted bail because the imposable penalty for illegal recruitment in large scale
amounting to economic sabotage (under Art. 29 of the Labor Code) is life
imprisonment and a fine of P100,000.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused should have been granted bail
HELD:
Yes. Petition was dismissed.
The law existing at the time of the alleged illegal recruitment, which was sometime in
May to July 1993, and when the accused applied for bail was the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure which took effect 1 October 1988. The rule at that time was that a
person under detention shall before conviction be granted bail as a matter of right.
Two exceptions however were recognized: (a) when the person was charged with a
capital offense, or (b) when the offense charged was punishable with reclusion
perpetua, in both instances when the evidence of guilt was strong. Interestingly, life
imprisonment was not among the exceptions, which leads us to the conclusion that
persons accused of crimes punishable with life imprisonment were entitled to bail as
a matter of right.
Apparently, complainants find difficulty dissociating the concept of life imprisonment
from reclusion perpetua. As we have repeatedly held, these terms are not
synonymous. The Court noted the following differences:
RECLUSION PERPETUA LIFE IMPRISONMENT
prescribed under the Revised Penal Code imposed for serious offenses penalized by
special laws
carries with it accessory penalties does not carry with it any accessory
penalty
entails incarceration for at least thirty (30) does not appear to have any definite extent
years after which the convict becomes or duration
eligible for pardon
Consequently, under Adm. Cir. No. 1294, a person now charged with an offense
punishable with death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment is no longer entitled to
bail as a matter of right when evidence of guilt is strong. If life imprisonment be
considered embraced in reclusion perpetua, as implied from complainants
asseverations, there would have been no need for its separate inclusion in Adm. Cir.
No. 1294. Obviously, the amendments therein cannot be applied retroactively to the
present case since the application would be unfavorable to the accused.
Other important things to note under Adm. Cir. No. 1294:
When the imposable penalty for the offense charged is death, reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment, a person charged therewith is no longer entitled to bail as a matter
of right for then admission to bail is addressed to the sound discretion of the court
depending on whether the evidence of guilt is strong.
The prosecution which has the burden of showing that evidence of guilt is strong must
be accorded an opportunity to present such evidence which the court shall consider in
determining whether the accused or the person charged therefor should be granted
bail. Judicial discretion must be exercised regularly, legally, and within the confines of
procedural due process, i.e., after evaluation of the evidence submitted by the
prosecution.
2. Paderanga vs CA
August 28, 1995
Justice Ragalado
DOCTRINE:
Right to bail is accorded to persons constructively arrested even though they have not
been physically arrested.
RECIT READY:
When Ely Roxas was implicated for multiple murder, his counsel was Miguel Paderanga,
his former employer. Strangely, Roxas implicated Paderanga alleging that he was the
mastermind behind the Bucag Massacre. An arrest warrant was issued for Paderanga
but before the same can be served, he filed a Motion for Admission to Bail. He was,
however, then confined in a hospital and manifested that he was submitting himself to the
custody of the law; the prosecution offered no objection. He managed to appear before
the court to post bail as well as attend the hearings. Bail cannot be posted unless
custody is acquired, either through arrest or voluntary surrender. Its purpose is to relieve
the accused from the rigors of imprisonment until his conviction, and yet secure
appearance during trial.
While it is true that Paderanga posted bail before he was actually arrested, nevertheless,
given the factual circumstances, he was constructively under custody. He voluntarily
submitted himself to the custody of the law and the jurisdiction of the trial court. Given
that the offense is punishable by reclusion perpetua or higher, the grant of bail is
discretionary upon the court depending on the strength of evidence. A trial, summary in
nature, must thus be held so that the prosecution may present evidence, and the court
must justify the grant or denial of bail based on the evidence.
FACTS:
This is a case which is a Petition for certiorari on the CAs decision denying the motion
for reconsideration on petition for bail.
Miguel P. Paderanga was included in anamended information for the crime of multiple
murder as the mastermind.
Paderanga, through his counsel, filed a Motion for Admission of Bail before a Warrant of
Arrest could be issued by the lower court.
Paderanga was unable to appear for the hearing due to an ailment that needed medical
attention. His counsel manifested that they were submitting custody over the person of
their client to the local chapter president of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and that,
for purposes of said hearing, he considered being in the custody of the law.
The Court of Appeals denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration on his right to
bail.
The Court of Appeals reasoned that Paderanga was granted bail when he was not in the
custody of the law, thus not eligible for the grant of the petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not it is proper to admit bail even though petitioner is not yet in custody of
law.
HELD:
NO
RATIO:
The SC held that under Section 1 of Rule 114, as amended, bail is defined as the
security given for the release of a person in the custody of the law, furnished by him or a
bondsman, conditioned upon his appearing before any court as required under the
conditions specified in the said Rule
The main purpose of bail is to:
Relieve an accused from the rigors of imprisonment until his conviction
Secure his appearance at the trial
Thus, as bail is intended to secure ones provisional liberty, the same cannot be posted
before custody over him has been acquired by the judicial authorities, either by:
Lawful arrest
Voluntary surrender
Thus, only those who have been either arrested, detained, or otherwise deprived of their
freedom, will ever have the occasion to seek the protective mantle extended by the right
to bail.
But the person seeking provisional release need not wait for a formal complaint or
information to be filed against him
In this case, while it is true that Paderanga posted bail before he was actually arrested,
nevertheless, given the factual circumstances, he was constructively under custody.
He voluntarily submitted himself to the custody of the law and the jurisdiction of the RTC
A person is considered to be in the custody of law when:
He is arrested by virtue of a warrant of arrest or by warrantless arrest
He has voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court by surrendering to
the proper authorities.
SC also held that under jurisprudence, when the person has actually posted a bail bond,
which was accepted the court; he has effectively submitted himself to the jurisdiction of
the court over his person.
The SC further held that the right to bail may be waived considering its personal nature.
Thus, the general rule is that prior to conviction by the RTC of a criminal offense, an
accused is entitled to be released on bail as a matter of right, the exceptions thereto
being the instances where the penalty is either capital punishment, reclusion perpetua, or
life imprisonment, where the evidence of guilt is strong
Under the general rule, upon proper application for admission to bail, the court having
custody of the accused should grant the same after a hearing conducted to specifically
determine the conditions of the bail in accordance with Section 2 of Rule 114
Under the exception, a hearing is mandatory in nature, whether summary or otherwise,
required with the participation of both the defense and the prosecution to specifically
ascertain whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong for the provisional liberty of the
applicant.
But the burden of proof is on the prosecution to show that the evidence meets the
required quantum. The prosecution is also entitled to due process and, thus, it must be
given an opportunity to present, within a reasonable amount of time, all the evidence that
it may want to introduce before the court may resolve the application.
When the court eventually issues its Order, whether favorable or adverse to the accused,
the same should contain:
A summary of evidence of the prosecution
Conclusion as to whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong
The court cannot rely on mere affidavits or recitals of their contents, as these represent
only hearsay evidence and, thus, are insufficient to establish the quantum of evidence
that the law require.
3. Yap v CA
FACTS
Petitioner was convicted of estafa for misappropriating amounts equivalent to P5,500,000.00.
He filed a notice of appeal, and moved to be allowed provisional liberty under the cash bond he
had filed earlier in the proceedings. The motion was denied by the RTC.
Petitioner filed with the CA a Motion to Fix Bail for the Provisional Liberty of Accused Appellant
Pending Appeal, invoking the last paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the 1997 Revised Rules of
Court. The Solicitor General opined that the petitioner may be allowed to post bail in the amount
of P5.5 million and be required to secure a certification/guaranty from the Mayor of the place of
his residence that he is a resident of the area and that he will remain to be so until final judgment
is rendered or in case he transfers residence, it must be with prior notice to the court and private
complainant.
The CA upheld the Solicitor Generals recommendation. A motion for reconsideration was filed,
seeking the reduction of the amount of bail fixed by CA, but was denied.
ISSUES
1. W/N the CA committed GADLEJ in fixing the bail in the amount of P5.5 million
based on the petitioners civil liability
2. 2) W/N the CA unduly restricted petitioners constitutional liberty of abode and
travel in imposing the other conditions for the grant of bail.
RULING & RATIO
1. Yes.
a. The Rules of Court never intended for the civil liability of the accused to be a guideline or
basis for determining the amount of bail. The amount should be high enough to assure the
presence of the accused when required but no higher than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this
purpose. To bail at an amount equivalent to the civil liability of which petitioner is charged is to
permit the impression that the amount paid as bail is an exaction of the civil liability that accused
is charged of. Bail is not intended as a punishment nor as a satisfaction of civil liability which
should necessarily await the judgment of the appellate court.
b. Imposing bail in an excessive amount could render meaningless the right to bail. The Court
will not hesitate to exercise its supervisory powers over lower courts should the latter, after
holding the accused entitled to bail, effectively deny the same by imposing a prohibitory sum or
exacting unreasonable conditions.
c. Section 9, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure advises courts to consider the
following factors in the setting of amount of bail:
. a) Financial ability of the accused to give bail
. b) Nature and circumstances of the offense
. c) Penalty for the offense charged
. d) Character and reputation of the accused
. e) Age and health of the accused
. f) Weight of the evidence against the accused
. g) Probability of the accused appearing at the trial
. h) Forfeiture of other bail
. i) The fact that the accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested
. j) Pendency of other cases where the accused is on bail
2. NoThe condition imposed is simply consistent with the nature and function of a bail bond,
which is to ensure that petitioner will make himself available at all times whenever the Court
requires his presence. Besides, petitioner is not prevented from changing abodes, he is merely
required to inform the court in case he does so.
DISPOSITION
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. Petitioners bail pending appeal is reduced
from P5,500,000.00 to P200,000.00. In all other respects, the resolutions of the Court of
Appeals, dated October 6, 1999 and November 25, 1999, respectively, are AFFIRMED. No
pronouncement as to costs.
4. Narciso v. Sta Romana-Cruz
FACTS
An information for parricide was filed against Joselito Narciso for the death of his wife
Corazon Sta. Romana-Narciso. After his review asked and motion for reconsideration
was both denied, he asked for reinvestigation of his warrant of arrest. Prosecutor
found no reason to disturb and the case was remand for arraignment and trial.
Thereafter, he filed an Urgent Ex-Parte to allow him to Post Bail. The Public
Prosecutor registered no objection and said motion was granted on the same day.
It was opposed by respondents herein, then they moved for the postponement of the
hearings because no witness was available, Not obtaining any resolution on her
Motion To Lift Order Allowing Accused to Post Bail private complainant (respondent
herein) filed this petition before the CA.
CA granted the petition. Hence this case. Petitioner averred that CA erred when it
reversed and set aside the order of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which
granted the petitioner his constitutional right to bail, considering the absence of strong
evidence or proof of his guilt, and more especially when the public prosecutors, who
have direct control of the proceedings and after assessment of the evidence, have
themselves recommended the grant of bail.
ISSUE: Whether the bail granted was valid and CA should not have reversed RTC.
HELD : No.
Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides: "All persons, except those charged
with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall,
before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as
may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required."
Furthermore, Section 7, Article 114 of the Rules of Court, as amended, also provides:
"No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, when evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to
bail regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.
The Court of Appeals ruled, however, that there was no basis for such finding, since
no hearing had been conducted on the application for bail -- summary or otherwise.
The appellate court found that only ten minutes had elapsed between the filing of the
Motion by the accused and the Order granting bail, a lapse of time that could not be
deemed sufficient for the trial court to receive and evaluate any evidence. We agree
with the CA
Stressing in Basco v. Rapatalo that the judge had the duty to determine whether the
evidence of guilt was strong, the Court held: x x x x x x x x x "Consequently, in the
 application for bail of a person charged with a capital offense punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, a hearing, whether summary or otherwise in
the discretion of the court, must actually be conducted to determine whether or not the
evidence of guilt against the accused is strong.
Jurisprudence is replete with decisions compelling judges to conduct the required hearings in
bail applications, in which the accused stands charged with a capital offense. The absence of
objection from the prosecution is never a basis for the grant of bail in such cases, for the judge
has no right to presume that the prosecutor knows what he is doing on account of familiarity with
the case. "Said reasoning is tantamount to ceding to the prosecutor the duty of exercising
judicial discretion to determine whether the guilt of the accused is strong. Judicial discretion is
the domain of the judge before whom the petition for provisional liberty will be decided. The
mandated duty to exercise discretion has never been reposed upon the prosecutor."
Basco v. Rapatalo summarized several case that emphasized the mandatory
character of a hearing in a petition for bail in a capital case. It enunciated the following
duties of the trial judge in such petition:
"(1) Notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to
submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court as amended;
"(2) Conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the
prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong
for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion (Sections 7 and
8, supra);
"(3) Decide whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong based on the
summary of evidence of the prosecution (Baylon v. Sison, supra);
"(4) If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval
of the bailbond. (Section 19, supra). Otherwise, petition should be denied."
The Court added: "The above-enumerated procedure should now leave no room for
doubt as to the duties of the trial judge in cases of bail applications. So basic and
fundamental is it to conduct a hearing in connection with the grant of bail in the proper
cases that it would amount to judicial apostasy for any member of the judiciary to
disclaim knowledge or awareness thereof."
Additionally, the courts grant or refusal of bail must contain a summary of the
evidence for the prosecution, on the basis of which should be formulated the judge's
own conclusion on whether such evidence is strong enough to indicate the guilt of the
accused. The summary thereof is considered an aspect of procedural due process for
both the prosecution and the defense; its absence will invalidate the grant or the
denial of the application for bail.
5. People v. Cabral G.R No. 179946 Dec. 23, 2009
Facts:
Accused Odiamar was charged with rape upon the complaint of Cecille Buenafe. In a
bid to secure a temporary liberty, accused-respondent filed a motion praying that he
be released on bail which the petitioner opposed by presenting real, documentary and
testimonial evidence. The lower court however, granted the motion to bail on the
ground that the evidence is not strong.
Believing that the accused- respondent was not entitled to bail as the evidence
against him was strong, the prosecution filed two motions which the lowered court
disposed of.
On appeal before the CA, the CA denied the petition
Issue:
WON the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
the issuing the assailed decision and resolution despite a showing by the prosecution that there
is strong evidence proving respondents guilt for the crime charged.
Held:
Yes.The grant or denial of an application for bail is dependent on whether the
evidence of guilt is strong which the lower court should determine in a hearing called
for the purpose.
In this case, accused- respondent was being charged with rape qualified by the use of
deadly weapon punishable by reclusion perpetua to death.
As such, bail is discretionary and not a matter of right.
The grant or denial of an application for bail is, therefore dependent on whether the
evidence of guilt is strong which the lower court should determine in a hearing called
for the purpose.
The determination of whether the evidence of guilt is strong, in this regard, is a matter
of judicial discretion.
While the lower court would never be deprived of its mandated prerogative to exercise
judicial discretion, this court would unhesitatingly reverse the trial courts findings if
found to be laced with grave abuse of discretion.
Wherefore petition is granted.
Duties of judge in case an application for bail is filed'
1. Notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit
his recommendation.
2. Conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the
prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong
for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its discretion.
3. Decide whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary
of evidence of the prosecution)
4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of
the bail bond. Otherwise, petition should be denied.
6. Govt of USA v Purganan
17 December 2002
(NOTE: Be sure to read the original)
Doctrine:
The rule is that bail is not a matter of right in extradition cases. Accordingly and to best serve the
ends of justice, after a potential extraditee has been arrested or placed under the custody of the
law, bail may be applied for and granted as an exception, only upon a clear and convincing
showing (1) that, once granted bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk or a danger to the
community; and (2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances
including, as a matter of reciprocity, those cited by the highest court in the requesting state when
it grants provisional liberty in extradition cases therein. Since this exception has no express or
specific statutory basis, and since it is derived essentially from general principles of justice and
fairness, the applicant bears the burden of proving the above two-tiered requirement with clarity,
precision and emphatic forcefulness.
Facts:
The US Government, through diplomatic channels, sent to the Philippine Government
a Note Verbale and other documents requesting the extradition of Mark B. Jimenez,
also known as Mario Batacan Crespo.
Upon learning, Jimenez sought and was granted a TRO by RTC-Manila which was
assailed by the Secretary of Justice before the Supreme Court. Initially, the Courtby
a vote of 9/6dismissed the Petition. On a Mortion for Reconsideration, it
reconsidered and reversed its earlier Decision.
Thereafter, the US Govt, represented by the Philippine DOJ, filed with the RTC a
Petition for Extradition
Jimenez was the subject of an arrest warrant by the US District Court-Southern
District of Florida. It was for the following charges: (1) conspiracy to defraud the United
States and to commit certain offenses; (2) tax evasion (3) wire fraud (4) false
statements (5) illegal campaign contributions.
In order to prevent the flight of Jimenez, petitioners prayed for an order for his
immediate arrest pursuant to Section 6 of PD No. 1069. Jimenez countered it and
prayed that the arrest warrant be set for hearing. The RTC granted the Motion of
Jimenez and set the case for hearing..
The RTC issued its questioned Order, directing the issuance of a warrant for his arrest
and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at one million pesos in cash.After Jimenez had
surrendered his passport and posted the required cash bond, he was granted
provisional liberty via the challenged Order.
Issue: WON In extradition cases, accused has a right to bail? NO
Held:
Since PD 1069 is intended as a guide for the implementation of extradition treaties,
understanding certain postulates of extradition will aid us in properly deciding the
issues raised here:
1) Extradition Is a Major Instrument for the Suppression of Crime:
Extradition treaties are entered into for the purpose of suppressing crime by
facilitating the arrest and the custodial transfer of a fugitive from one state to
the other.
2) The Requesting State Will Accord Due Process to the Accused: An
extradition treaty presupposes that both parties thereto have examined, and
that both accept and trust, each others legal system and judicial process.
3) The Proceedings Are Sui Generis: Extradition proceedings are not
criminal in nature. In criminal proceedings, the constitutional rights of the
accused are at fore; in extradition which is sui generisin a class by itself
they are not. The process of extradition does not involve the determination
of the guilt or innocence of an accused. His guilt or innocence will be
adjudged in the court of the state where he will be extradited. Hence, as a
rule, constitutional rights that are only relevant to determine the guilt or
innocence of an accused cannot be invoked by an extradite. The ultimate
purpose of extradition proceedings in court is only to determine whether the
extradition request complies with the Extradition Treaty, and whether the
person sought is extraditable.
4) Compliance Shall Be in Good Faith: The executive branch of government
voluntarily entered into the Extradition Treaty, and the legislative branch
ratified it. Hence, the Treaty carries the presumption that its implementation
will serve the national interest.
5) There Is an Underlying Risk of Flight: Persons to be extradited are
presumed to be flight risks. This prima facie presumption finds
reinforcement in the experience of the executive branch.
Does this provision sanction RTC Judge Purganans act of immediately setting for
hearing the issuance of a warrant of arrest? Negative.
Section 6 of PD 1069 (Extradition Law) uses the word immediate to qualify the arrest
of the accused. This qualification would be rendered nugatory by setting for
hearing the issuance of the arrest warrant. Arrest subsequent to a hearing can
no longer be considered immediate. By using the phrase if it appears, the law
further conveys that accuracy is not as important as speed at such early stage. The
trial court is not expected to make an exhaustive determination to ferret out the
true and actual situation, immediately upon the filing of the petition.
We stress that the prima facie existence of probable cause for hearing the petition
and, a priori, for issuing an arrest warrant was already evident from the Petition itself
and its supporting documents.
Verily, sending to persons sought to be extradited a notice of the request for
their arrest and setting it for hearing at some future date would give them ample
opportunity to prepare and execute an escape. Neither the Treaty nor the Law
could have intended that consequence, for the very purpose of both would have been
defeated by the escape of the accused from the requested state.
Even Section 2 of Article III of our Constitution does not require a notice or a hearing
before the issuance of a warrant of arrest. To determine probable cause for the
issuance of arrest warrants, the Constitution itself requires only the examination
under oath or affirmationof complainants and the witnesses they may produce.
There is no requirement to notify and hear the accused before the issuance of
warrants of arrest.
Proper procedure in extradition cases:
Upon receipt of a petition for extradition and its supporting documents, the
judge must study them and make, as soon as possible, a prima facie finding
whether (a) they are sufficient in form and substance, (b) they show
compliance with the Extradition Treaty and Law, and (c) the person sought
is extraditable.
At his discretion, the judge may require the submission of further
documentation or may personally examine the affiants and witnesses of the
petitioner.
If, in spite of this study and examination, no prima facie finding is possible,
the petition may be dismissed at the discretion of the judge. On the other
hand, if the presence of a prima facie case is determined, then the
magistrate must immediately issue a warrant for the arrest of the extraditee,
who is at the same time summoned to answer the petition and to appear at
scheduled summary hearings.
Prior to the issuance of the warrant, the judge must not inform or
notify the potential extraditee of the pendency of the petition, lest the
latter be given the opportunity to escape and frustrate the proceedings.
It is suggested by the use of the word conviction, the constitutional provision on bail,
as well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has
been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply
to extradition proceedings, because extradition courts do not render judgments
of conviction or acquittal.
Moreover, the constitutional right to bail flows from the presumption of
innocence in favor of every accused. It follows that the constitutional provision on
bail will not apply to a case like extradition, where the presumption of innocence is not
at issue.
That the offenses for which Jimenez is sought to be extradited are bailable in
the United States is not an argument to grant him one in the present case. To
stress, extradition proceedings are separate and distinct from the trial for the offenses
 for which he is charged. He should apply for bail before the courts trying the
criminal cases against him, not before the extradition court.
The rule is that bail is not a matter of right in extradition cases. However, the
judiciary has the constitutional duty to curb grave abuse of discretion and tyranny, as
well as the power to promulgate rules to protect and enforce constitutional rights.
Furthermore, we believe that the right to due process is broad enough to induce the
grant of basic fairness to extraditees. Indeed, the right to due process extends to the
life, liberty or property of every person. It is dynamic and resilient, adaptable to
every situation calling for its application.
Accordingly and to best serve the ends of justice, we believe and so hold that, after a
potential extraditee has been arrested or placed under the custody of the law,
bail may be applied for and granted as an exception, only upon a clear and
convincing showing (1) that, once granted bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk or
a danger to the community; and (2) that there exist special, humanitarian and
compelling circumstances including, as a matter of reciprocity, those cited by the
highest court in the requesting state when it grants provisional liberty in extradition
cases therein. Since this exception has no express or specific statutory basis, and
since it is derived essentially from general principles of justice and fairness, the
applicant bears the burden of proving the above two-tiered requirement with clarity,
precision and emphatic forcefulness.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed RTC Order dated May 23,
2001 is hereby declared NULL and VOID, while the challenged Order dated July
3,2001 is SET ASIDE insofar as it granted bail to Respondent Mark Jimenez. The bail
bond posted by private respondent is CANCELLED. The Regional Trial Court of
Manila is directed to conduct the extradition proceedings before it, with all deliberate
speed pursuant to the spirit and the letter of our Extradition Treaty with the United
States as well as our Extradition Law. No costs.
Bellosillo (Separate Opinion)
It is settled that the power to admit to bail exists in extradition proceedings, although
as a matter of policy it may only be granted under exceptional circumstances.
Apart from these cases, there is likewise a considerable number of authorities which
support the general view that the power to admit to bail is a necessary incident of the
power to hear and determine cases. A fortiori, even in the absence of express
statutory grant of authority to courts, judicial power to admit to bail parties properly
within their jurisdiction must be deemed to exist. It must be mentioned, however, that
this authority is not absolute for the Constitution, statutes and the Rules of Court
render it readily subject to limitations.
Significantly, the extradition treaty between the United States and the Philippines, and
the Philippine Extradition Law (PD 1069) contain no provision expressly withholding
from the courts the power to grant bail. It would be thus reasonable to presume that
they had not so intended. Indeed, the treaty fails to even remotely suggest such
judicial limitation insisted upon by the Government.
If the view of the Government is to be adopted, it would restrict the reciprocal
operation of the treaty, and create a striking lack of symmetry between the rights of
Filipinos subject of extradition and that of American extraditees. Filipino citizens
sought to be extradited by the United States government will be absolutely denied of
the chance at provisional liberty during the pendency of the extradition proceedings
against them; while American fugitives from justice sought to be extradited by the
Philippine government could always exercise the right to petition for bail, and
consequently, enjoy better chances of avoiding the inconvenience of incarceration
during the pendency of the extradition proceedings. Certainly, there is no warrant for
the discrimination.
Equity tilts in favor of Jimenez in light of the ruling in Montana v. Ocampo where bail
was allowed to an elected senator charged with murder and frustrated murder. The
Court there took special notice of the accuseds official and social standing as senator
from which was concluded that flight risk was remote due public image. Similarly,
Jimenez is a duly elected Congressman with personal circumstances that will not be a
flight risk.
As the vast powers and enormous resources of both the United States of America and
the Republic of the Philippines are marshalled against Jimenez, he is certainly entitled
to some measure of protection to ensure that no unwarranted intrusions or undue
curtailment of his liberty is committed.
I vote to REMAND the petition to the court a quo to ensure that proper safeguards are
afforded respondent in the course of the extradition proceedings.
Puno (Separate Opinion)
The majority opinion submits that neither P.D. No. 1069 nor the Constitution authorize
the judge to immediately set for hearing the request for a warrant of arrest against the
Jimenez.
The majority failed to allocate the proper weight due to the constitutional rights of the
Jimenez to life, liberty and to due process. These rights are now conceded in the
civilized world as universal in character and it was never the intent of the RPUS
Extradition Treaty to trivialize their significance.
Considering that in the case at bar, the extradition proceeding is only at its evaluation
stage, the nature of the right being claimed is nebulous and the degree of prejudice he
will allegedly suffer is weak, we accord greater weight to the interests espoused by the
government.
We stressed that the denial of the private respondents privilege of notice and hearing
during the evaluation stage of the extradition proceeding is merely a soft restraint on
his right to due process, viz.: In tilting the balance in favor of the interests of the
State, it is not ruling that the private respondent has no right to due process at all
throughout the length and breadth of the extrajudicial proceedings. Procedural due
process requires a determination of what process is due, when it is due, and the
degree of what is due.
The extradition process against the private respondent has, however, moved away
from the stage of evaluation of documents by the executive officials of the Philippine
government. A formal petition for the extradition of the Jimenez has now been filed
with our court of justice. With this development, the competing interests of our
government and of the private respondent have developed new dimensions and they
need to be rebalanced. I respectfully submit the following propositions, viz.:
a. A potential extraditee has the right to be notified of the filing of the petition
for extradition. It is my humble submission that from the moment the petition
for extradition is filed before the extradition court, a potential extraditee has
the right to demand that he be furnished a copy of the petition.
b. The need for a hearing to determine whether a warrant of arrest should be
issued against an extraditee is addressed to the sound discretion of the
extraditing judge. The majority leans heavily on the use of the word
immediate which qualified the arrest of an extraditee. It holds that the
qualification would be rendered nugatory by setting for hearing the issuance
of the arrest warrant. I beg to disagree. I submit that the decision whether
to send notice to an extraditee and hear him before ordering his arrest
should be left to the sound discretion of the extraditing judge.
 I respectfully submit that a potential extraditee can hinge his right to bail in our
Constitution. The mere silence of our extradition treaty with the Unites States and
our extradition law does not negate the right to bail of a potential extraditee. Our
adherence to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, as well as international norms, customs
and practices support an extraditees right to bail. I proffer the following
propositions:
1. The right to bail inheres from the rights to life, liberty and to due process.
Our Constitution jealously guards every persons right to life and liberty
against unwarranted state intrusion
2. The right of an extraditee to apply for bail should be treated in light of our
other treaty obligations, especially those concerning the promotion and
protection of human rights.
3. There is no customary rule of international law prohibiting bail in extradition
cases.
4. Even the United States grants bail to an extraditee, albeit in exceptional
circumstances.
5. While an extraditee may apply for bail, its grant is discretionary depending
on whether it will frustrate the ends of justice.
6. The burden of proof to justify the arrest and detention of the potential
extraditee initially rests on the petitioning executive authorities.
7. After the warrant of arrest is issued, the burden of proof on the right to be
admitted to bail shifts on the potential extraditee.
In fairness to both parties, the case should be remanded to the extradition court so
that the proper procedure and standard to determine the right to bail can be complied
with. I put no blame on the extradition court nor to the parties in this regard for
we are still developing our jurisprudence on extradition. First, the petitioner has
the burden of proof to show that the issuance of a warrant of arrest against the private
respondent will serve the ends of justice. Second, on the issue of whether the private
respondent is entitled to bail, the petitioner cannot rely on the presumption against bail
in extradition proceedings. Third, in granting bail to the private respondent, the
standard used by the extraditing court is not clear. An extradition proceeding is sui
generis, hence, neither the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal
cases nor the standard of proof of preponderance of evidence in civil cases can apply.
The Court should fashion out a higher standard to govern the grant of bail to a
possible extraditee. The higher standard is demanded by the fact that our extradition
treaty obligates us to assure that an extraditee will not abscond from our jurisdiction.
Failure to comply with this obligation will expose our country to international
embarrassment. The standard, I propose, is the standard of clear and convincing
evidence which is higher than mere preponderance of evidence but lower than
proof beyond reasonable doubt.
7. SERAPIO V. SANDIGANBAYAN by Jyn E. Aragon
January 28, 2003
(Case Book, Jech Tiu; Internet Sources)
DOCTRINE:
It is not necessary that an accused be first arraigned before the conduct of hearings on his
application for bail. For when a bail is a matter of right, an accused may apply for and be granted
bail even prior to arraignment.
An application for bail in a case involving an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua to death
may also be heard even before an accused is arraigned. If the court finds in such case that the
accused is entitled to bail because the evidence against him is not strong, he may be granted
provisional liberty even prior to arraignment.
RECIT READY:
The SANDIGANBAYAN erred in ordering the arraignment of SERAPIO before
proceeding with the hearing for bail
The SC held that the arraignment of an accused is not a prerequisite to the
conduct of hearings on his petition for bail
A person is allowed to petition for bail as soon as he is deprived of his
liberty by virtue of his arrest or voluntary surrender
An accused need not wait for his arraignment before filing a petition for bail
The SC also held that an accused may apply for an be granted bail even
prior to arraignment:
1. In cases where bail is a matter of right
2. In cases where the application for bail involves an offense punishable by
reclusion perpetua to death
3. If the court finds in such cases that the accused is entitled to bail because the
evidence against the him is not strong
FACTS:
Before the Court are two petitions for certiorari filed by petitioner Edward Serapio, assailing the
resolutions of the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan denying his petition for bail, motion for a
reinvestigation and motion to quash, and a petition for habeas corpus, all in relation to Criminal
Case No. 26558 for plunder wherein petitioner is one of the accused together with former
President Joseph E. Estrada, Jose Jinggoy P. Estrada and several others.
Petitioner was a member of the Board of Trustees and the Legal Counsel of the Erap Muslim
Youth Foundation, a non-stock, nonprofit foundation established in February 2000 ostensibly for
the purpose of providing educational opportunities for the poor and underprivileged but
deserving Muslim youth and students, and support to research and advance studies of young
Muslim educators and scientists.
Petitioner, as trustee of the Foundation, received on its behalf a donation in the amount of Two
Hundred Million Pesos (P200 Million) from Ilocos Sur Governor Luis Chavit Singson. Later
that year, Singson publicly accused then president Estrada and his cohorts of engaging in
several illegal activities, including its operation on the illegal numbers game known as jueteng
which triggered the Ombudsman to file cases of plunder against the former president and others
who were allegedly involved. The Sandiganbayan set the arraignment of the accused, including
petitioner.
In the meantime, on April 27, 2001, petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan an Urgent Petition for
Bail which was set for hearing on May 4, 2001. For his part, petitioners co-accused Jose
Jinggoy Estrada filed on April 20, 2001 a Very Urgent Omnibus Motion alleging that he was
entitled to bail as a matter of right.
During the hearing on May 4, 2001 on petitioners Urgent Petition for Bail, the prosecution
moved for the resetting of the arraignment of the accused earlier than the June 27, 2001
schedule. However, the Sandiganbayan denied the motion of the prosecution and issued an
order declaring that the petition for bail can and should be heard before petitioners arraignment
on June 27, 2001 and even before the other accused filed their respective petitions for bail.
Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan set the hearing for the reception of evidence on petitioners
petition for bail on May 21 to 25, 2001. The Sandiganbayan issued a resolution requiring the
attendance of petitioner as well as all the other accused during the hearings on the petitions for
bail under pain of waiver of cross-examination. The Sandiganbayan, citing its inherent powers to
proceed with the trial of the case in the manner it determines best conducive to orderly
proceedings and speedy termination of the case, directed the other accused to participate in the
said bail hearing considering that under Section 8, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court,
whatever evidence is adduced during the bail hearing shall be considered automatically
reproduced at the trial.
The bail hearing did not proceed because petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion to
quash the amended Information on the grounds that as against him, the amended Information
does not allege a combination or series of overt or criminal acts constitutive of plunder; as
against him, the amended Information does not allege a pattern of criminal acts indicative of an
overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy.
The prosecution objected to the holding of bail hearing until petitioner agreed to withdraw his
motion to quash. The prosecution contended that petitioners motion to quash the amended
Information was antithetical to his petition for bail. He also filed a petition for Habeas Corpus.
Meanwhile, Jose Jinggoy Estrada filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion praying that said court
resolve his motion to fix his bail. The Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying petitioners
motion to quash the amended Information. The motion to fix bail filed by Jose Jinggoy Estrada
was also denied by the Sandiganbayan.
Jose Jinggoy Estrada filed a petition for certiorari for the nullification of a resolution of the
Sandiganbayan denying his motion to fix bail.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not petitioner should first be arraigned before hearings of his petition for bail may
be conducted
2. Whether petitioner may file a motion to quash the amended Information during the pendency
of his petition for bail
3. Whether a joint hearing of the petition for bail of petitioner and those of the other accused is
mandatory
4. Whether the People waived their right to adduce evidence in opposition to the petition for bail
of petitioner and failed to adduce strong evidence of guilt of petitioner for the crime charged
HELD/RATIO: 1. NO. The arraignment of an accused is not a prerequisite to the conduct of
hearings on his petition for bail. A person is allowed to petition for bail as soon as he is deprived
of his liberty by virtue of his arrest or voluntary surrender. An accused need not wait for his
arraignment before filing a petition for bail. In cases where it is authorized, bail should be
granted before arraignment, otherwise the accused may be precluded from filing a motion to
quash.
However, the foregoing pronouncement should not be taken to mean that the hearing on a
petition for bail should at all times precede arraignment, because the rule is that a person
deprived of his liberty by virtue of his arrest or voluntary surrender may apply for bail as soon as
he is deprived of his liberty, even before a complaint or information is filed against him. The
Courts pronouncement in Lavides should be understood in light of the fact that the accused in
said case filed a petition for bail as well as a motion to quash the information filed against him.
Thus, to condition the grant of bail to an accused on his arraignment would be to place him in a
position where he has to choose between
(1) filing a motion to quash and thus delay his release on bail because until his motion
to quash can be resolved, his arraignment cannot be held, and
(2) foregoing the filing of a motion to quash so that he can be arraigned at once and
thereafter be released on bail.
This would undermine his constitutional right not to be put on trial except upon a valid complaint
or Information sufficient to charge him with a crime and his right to bail. It is therefore not
necessary that an accused be first arraigned before the conduct of hearings on his application
for bail. For when bail is a matter of right, an accused may apply for and be granted bail even
prior to arraignment. The ruling in Lavides also implies that an application for bail in a case
involving an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua to death may also be heard even before
an accused is arraigned. Further, if the court finds in such case that the accused is entitled to
bail because the evidence against him is not strong, he may be granted provisional liberty even
prior to arraignment; for in such a situation, bail would be authorized under the circumstances.
In fine, the Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess of
jurisdiction in ordering the arraignment of petitioner before proceeding with the hearing of his
petition for bail.
2. YES. The Court finds that no such inconsistency exists between an application of an accused
for bail and his filing of a motion to quash. Bail is the security given for the release of a person in
the custody of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman, to guarantee his appearance before
any court as required under the conditions set forth under the Rules of Court. Its purpose is to
obtain the provisional liberty of a person charged with an offense until his conviction while at the
same time securing his appearance at the trial.
A person may apply for bail from the moment that he is deprived of his liberty by virtue of his
arrest or voluntary surrender. On the other hand, a motion to quash an Information is the mode
by which an accused assails the validity of a criminal complaint or Information filed against him
for insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defects which are apparent in the face of the
Information.
As a general rule, an accused may file a motion to quash the Information before arraignment.
The right of an accused to seek provisional liberty when charged with an offense not punishable
by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, or when charged with an offense punishable
by such penalties but after due hearing, evidence of his guilt is found not to be strong, do not
preclude his right to assail the validity of the Information charging him with such offense.
However, a motion to quash a criminal complaint or Information on the ground that the same
does not charge any offense is granted, the case is dismissed and the accused is ordered
released - the petition for bail of an accused may become moot and academic.
3. NO. There is no provision in the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure or the Rules of
Procedure of the Sandiganbayan governing the hearings of two or more petitions for bail filed by
different accused or that a petition for bail of an accused be heard simultaneously with the trial of
the case against the other accused. The matter of whether or not to conduct a joint hearing of
two or more petitions for bail filed by two different accused or to conduct a hearing of said
petition jointly with the trial against another accused is addressed to the sound discretion of the
trial court. Unless grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction is shown,
the Court will not interfere with the exercise by the Sandiganbayan of its discretion. It may be
underscored that in the exercise of its discretion, the Sandiganbayan must take into account not
only the convenience of the State, including the prosecution, but also that of the accused and
the witnesses of both the prosecution and the accused and the right of accused to a speedy trial.
The Sandiganbayan must also consider the complexities of the cases and of the factual and
legal issues involving petitioner and the other accused.
4. NO. Petitioners claim that the prosecution had refused to present evidence to prove his guilt
for purposes of his bail application and that the Sandiganbayan has refused to grant a hearing
thereon is not borne by the records. The prosecution did not waive, expressly or even impliedly,
its right to adduce evidence in opposition to the petition for bail of petitioner. It must be noted
that the Sandiganbayan had already scheduled the hearing dates for petitioners application for
bail but the same were reset due to pending incidents raised in several motions filed by the
parties, which incidents had to be resolved by the court prior to the bail hearings. The bail
hearing was eventually scheduled by the Sandiganbayan on July 10, 2001 but the hearing did
not push through due to the filing of this petition on June 29, 2001. The delay in the conduct of
hearings on petitioners application for bail is therefore not imputable solely to the
Sandiganbayan or to the prosecution. Petitioner is also partly to blame therefor, as is evident
from the following list of motions filed by him and by the prosecution.
When the grant of bail is discretionary, the prosecution has the burden of showing that the
evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. However, the determination of whether or not the
evidence of guilt is strong, being a matter of judicial discretion, remains with the judge. This
discretion by the very nature of things, may rightly be exercised only after the evidence is
submitted to the court at the hearing. Since the discretion is directed to the weight of the
evidence and since evidence cannot properly be weighed if not duly exhibited or produced
before the court, it is obvious that a proper exercise of judicial discretion requires that the
evidence of guilt be submitted to the court, the petitioner having the right of cross-examination
and to introduce his own evidence in rebuttal. Accordingly, petitioner cannot be released from
detention until the Sandiganbayan conducts a hearing of his application for bail and resolve the
same in his favor. Even then, there must first be a finding that the evidence against petitioner is
not strong before he may be granted bail.
8. Rodriguez V. Judge GR 157977
FACTS:
After the arrest of petitioners Eduardo Tolentino Rodriguez and Imelda Gener Rodriguez,
they applied for bail which the trial court granted on September 25, 2001. They posted cash
bonds for the bail set for P1M for each. The US government moved for reconsideration of the
grant of bail which was denied. The US government filed a petition for certiorari entitled Govt of
the USA v. Hon. Ponferrada where the court directed the trial court to resolve the matter of bail
guided by this courts ruling on Government of the USA v. Hon. Purganan. The lower court,
without prior notice and hearing, cancelled the cash bond of the petitioners and ordered the
issuance of a warrant of arrest. Petitioners filed a very urgent motion for the reconsideration of
the cancellation of their bail which was denied. Hence, this special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition directed against the order for cancellation of cash bond and issuance of a warrant of
arrest.
ISSUE: Whether or NOT there should be notice and hearing before the cancellation of bail
HELD: YES. Petition is GRANTED IN PART. SET ASIDE for petitioner IMELDA GENER
RODRIGUEZ.
The grant of the bail, presupposes that the co-petitioner has already presented evidence to
prove her right to be on bail, that she is no flight risk, and the trial court had already exercised its
sound discretion and had already determined that under the Constitution and laws in force, co-
petitioner is entitled to provisional release.
Under these premises, co-petitioner Imelda Gener Rodriguez has offered to go on
voluntary extradition; that she and her husband had posted a cash bond of P1 million each; that
her husband had already gone on voluntary extradition and is presently in the USA undergoing
trial; that the passport of co-petitioner is already in the possession of the authorities; that she
never attempted to flee; that there is an existing hold-departure order against her; and that she
is now in her 60s, sickly and under medical treatment, we believe that the benefits of continued
temporary liberty on bail should not be revoked and their grant of bail should not be cancelled,
without the co-petitioner being given notice and without her being heard why her temporary
liberty should not be discontinued. Absent prior notice and hearing, the bails cancellation was in
violation of her right to due process.
We emphasize that bail may be granted to a possible extraditee only upon a clear and
convincing showing that:
1) he will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and
2) there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances
9. Leviste vs CA
Facts:
Jose Antonio Leviste was charged with the crime of murder but was convicted by the RTC for
the lesser crime of homicide. He appealed the RTC's decision to the CA then he field an
application for admission to bail pending appeal, due to his advanced age and health condition,
and claiming the absence of any risk or possibility of flight on his part.
The CA denied his application on the ground that the discretion to extend bail during the course
of appeal should be exercised with grave caution and only for strong reasons. That bail is not a
sick pass for an ailing or aged detainee or a prisoner needing medical care outside the prison
facility.
On this matter, Levisete questioned the ruling of the CA and averred that the CA committed
grave abuse of discretion in the denial of his application for bail considering that none of the
conditions justifying denial of bail under the Sec. 5 (3) Rule 114 of the Rules of Court was
present. That when the penalty imposed by the trial court is more than six years but not more
than 20 years and the circumstances in the above-mentioned provision are absent, bail must be
granted to an appellant pending appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the application for bail of
Leviste.
HELD:
No, under Sec 5 of Rule 114 bail is discretionary, upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment. Under par. 3 of the same rule if
the penalty impose is more than 6 years the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail be
cancelled upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or
other circumstances:
1. that he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the
crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
2. that he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated
the conditions of his bail without a valid justification;
3. that he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon;
4. that the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail;
or
5. that there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the
appeal.
That bail is expressly declared to be discretionary pending appeal and it cannot be said that CA
committed grave abuse of discretion. After conviction by the trial court, the presumption of
innocence terminates and, accordingly, the constitutional right to bail ends, from then on the
grant of bail is subject to judicial discretion.
10. Govt of Hong Kong v Hon. Olalia, April 19, 2007
Doctrine:
- Bail can be granted in extradition cases
Recit Ready:
MUNOZ was charged before the HK Court with three counts of the offense accepting an
advantage as agent under HK Law
The DOJ received from its HK counterpart a request for the provisional arrest of MUNOZ
HK filed with the RTC a petition for the extradition of MUNOZ and the latter filed a petition for
bail, which was denied
The SC held that while it has ruled that bail is available only in criminal proceedings and does
not apply in extradition proceedings, it cannot ignore the modern trend in PUBLIC
INTERNATIONL LAW, which places primacy on the worth of the individual person and the
sanctity of human rights
o The Philippines has the responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every
person to liberty and due process, ensuring that those detained or arrested can
participate in the proceedings before a court, to enable the latter to decide without
delay on the legality of the detention and order their release if justified
o The RP authorities are under obligation to make available to every person under
detention such remedies that safeguard their fundamental right to liberty, which
includes the right to bail
The SC also held that:
o The exercise of the States power to deprive an individual of his liberty is not
necessarily limited to criminal proceedings
- Respondents in administrative proceedings, such as deportation and
quarantine, have likewise been detained
o To limit bail to criminal proceedings would be to close its eyes to jurisprudential
history
- The SC has already admitted the right to bail to those persons who are not
involved in criminal proceedings
- If bail can be granted in deportation cases on the basis of the UNIVERSAL
DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, then there is no justification as to
why it should not also be allowed in extradition cases
Both deportation and extradition cases are administrative
proceedings where the innocence or guilt of the person detained
is not an issue
The SC further held that the right of a prospective extradite to apply for bail in this jurisdiction
must be viewed in light of the various treaty obligations of the RP concerning respect for the
promotion and protection of human rights
o The presumption lies in favor of human liberty
Moreover, the SC held that an extradition proceeding, while ostensibly administrative, bears
all earmarks of a criminal process:
o It entails a deprivation of liberty on the part of the potential extradite
- The extradite is subjected to arrest, prolonged restraint of liberty, and
forced to transfer to the demanding State following the proceedings
o The means employed to attain the purpose of extradition is also the machinery of
Criminal Law
In addition, the SC held while our EXTRADITION LAW does not provide for the grant of bail to
an extraditee, there is no provision prohibiting him from filing a motion for bail, a right to due
process under the Constitution
Furthermore, the SC held that pacta sunt servanda does not necessarily mean that in keeping
with its treaty obligations, the RP should diminish a potential extradites rights to life, liberty, and
due process
Last but not least the SC held that clear and convincing evidence should be the standard
used in granting bail in extradition cases, which is:
- Lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt
- Higher than preponderance of evidence
o The applicant must prove by clear and convincing evidence that he is not a flight
risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition court
Facts:
- On January 30, 1995, the Republic of the Philippines and the then British Crown Colony of
Hong Kong signed an "Agreement for the Surrender of Accused and Convicted Persons." It took
effect on June 20, 1997.
- Private respondent Muoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court with three (3) counts of
the offense of "accepting an advantage as agent," in violation of Section 9 (1) (a) of the
Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, Cap. 201 of Hong Kong. He also faces seven (7) counts of the
offense of conspiracy to defraud, penalized by the common law of Hong Kong. On August 23,
1997 and October 25, 1999, warrants of arrest were issued against him. If convicted, he faces a
jail term of seven (7) to fourteen (14) years for each charge.
- On September 13, 1999, the DOJ received from the Hong Kong Department of Justice a
request for the provisional arrest of private respondent. The DOJ then forwarded the request to
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) which, in turn, filed with the RTC of Manila, Branch 19
an application for the provisional arrest of private respondent.
- On September 23, 1999, the RTC, Branch 19, Manila issued an Order of Arrest against private
respondent. That same day, the NBI agents arrested and detained him.
- Meanwhile, as early as November 22, 1999, petitioner Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for the extradition of private respondent, docketed
as Civil Case No. 99-95733, raffled off to Branch 10, presided by Judge Ricardo Bernardo, Jr.
For his part, private respondent filed, in the same case,- a petition for bail which was opposed
by petitioner.
 - After hearing, or on October 8, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. issued an Order denying of administrative proceedings, taking into cognizance the obligation of the
the petition for bail, holding that there is no Philippine law granting bail in extradition Philippines under international conventions to uphold human rights.
cases and that private respondent is a high "flight risk." - If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no justification why it should not also be
- On October 22, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. inhibited himself from further hearing Civil allowed in extradition cases. Likewise, considering that the Universal Declaration of Human
Case No. 99-95733. It was then raffled off to Branch 8 presided by respondent judge. Rights applies to deportation cases, there is no reason why it cannot be invoked in extradition
- On October 30, 2001, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the cases. After all, both are administrative proceedings where the innocence or guilt of the person
Order denying his application for bail. This was granted by respondent judge in an detained is not in issue.
Order dated December 20, 2001 allowing private respondent to post bail - Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed
- Hence, the instant petition. Petitioner alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse of in the light of the various treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to bail; that promotion and protection of human rights. Under these treaties, the presumption lies in favor of
there is nothing in the Constitution or statutory law providing that a potential extraditee has a human liberty. Thus, the Philippines should see to it that the right to liberty of every individual is
right to bail, the right being limited solely to criminal proceedings. not impaired.
- Extradition has thus been characterized as the right of a foreign power, created by treaty, to
Issue: demand the surrender of one accused or convicted of a crime within its territorial jurisdiction,
- Does a potential extraditee have a right to bail? and the correlative duty of the other state to surrender him to the demanding state. 8 It is not a
criminal proceeding.9 Even if the potential extraditee is a criminal, an extradition proceeding is
not by its nature criminal, for it is not punishment for a crime, even though such punishment may
Held:
follow extradition.10 It is sui generis, tracing its existence wholly to treaty obligations between
- In Government of United States of America v. Hon. Guillermo G. Purganan, Presiding Judge,
different nations.11 It is not a trial to determine the guilt or innocence of the potential
RTC of Manila, Branch 42, and Mark B. Jimenez, a.k.a. Mario Batacan Crespo,1 this Court,
extraditee.12 Nor is it a full-blown civil action, but one that is merely administrative in
speaking through then Associate Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, later Chief Justice, held that
character.13 Its object is to prevent the escape of a person accused or convicted of a crime and
the constitutional provision on bail does not apply to extradition proceedings. It is "available only
to secure his return to the state from which he fled, for the purpose of trial or punishment. 14
in criminal proceedings,"
- Obviously, an extradition proceeding, while ostensibly administrative, bears all earmarks of a
- At first glance, the above ruling applies squarely to private respondents case. However, this
criminal process. A potential extraditee may be subjected to arrest, to a prolonged restraint
Court cannot ignore the following trends in international law: (1) the growing importance of the
of liberty, and forced to transfer to the demanding state following the proceedings.
individual person in public international law who, in the 20th century, has gradually attained
"Temporary detention" may be a necessary step in the process of extradition, but the length of
global recognition; (2) the higher value now being given to human rights in the international
time of the detention should be reasonable.
sphere; (3) the corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal human rights in
- While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extraditee, however, there
fulfilling their treaty obligations; and (4) the duty of this Court to balance the rights of the
is no provision prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail, a right to due process under
individual under our fundamental law, on one hand, and the law on extradition, on the other.
the Constitution.
- The modern trend in public international law is the primacy placed on the worth of the
- An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof required in granting or
individual person and the sanctity of human rights. Slowly, the recognition that the individual
denying bail can neither be the proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the
person may properly be a subject of international law is now taking root.
standard of proof of preponderance of evidence in civil cases. While administrative in character,
- The Philippines, along with the other members of the family of nations, committed to uphold the
the standard of substantial evidence used in administrative cases cannot likewise apply given
fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person. This
the object of extradition law which is to prevent the prospective extraditee from fleeing our
commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our Constitution which provides: "The State
jurisdiction. In his Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice
values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights." The
Reynato S. Puno, proposed that a new standard which he termed "clear and convincing
Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every
evidence" should be used in granting bail in extradition cases. According to him, this
person to liberty and due process, ensuring that those detained or arrested can participate in the
standard should be lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance of
proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide without delay on the legality of the detention
evidence. The potential extraditee must prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that he is not
and order their release if justified. In other words, the Philippine authorities are under obligation
a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition court.
to make available to every person under detention such remedies which safeguard their
- In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence to show that he is
fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include the right to be admitted to bail. While this
not a flight risk. Consequently, this case should be remanded to the trial court to determine
Court in Purganan limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings, however, in
whether private respondent may be granted bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence."
light of the various international treaties giving recognition and protection to human rights,
particularly the right to life and liberty, a reexamination of this Courts ruling in Purganan is in
11. Enrile v. Sandiganbayan
order.
Doctrine:
o First, we note that the exercise of the States power to deprive an individual
Bail acts as a reconciling mechanism to accommodate both the accused right to provisional
of his liberty is not necessarily limited to criminal proceedings. Respondents
liberty before and during trial, and the societys interest in assuring the accused presence in the
in administrative proceedings, such as deportation and quarantine, 4 have
trial.
likewise been detained.
Bail can be either mandatory or discretionary. Generally, the Constitutions mandates the right to
o Second, to limit bail to criminal proceedings would be to close our eyes to our
bail except in capital offenses, reclusion perpetua, or death. In these cases, right to bail can still
jurisprudential history. Philippine jurisprudence has not limited the exercise
be granted upon the discretion of the court provided that the accused poses no threat to society
of the right to bail to criminal proceedings only. This Court has admitted to
or is not a flight risk.
bail persons who are not involved in criminal proceedings. In fact, bail has
been allowed in this jurisdiction to persons in detention during the pendency
Recit Ready: No need kasi maikli ung case
Facts:
Enrile is charged with plunder for his involvement in the diversion and misuse of appropriation
under the Priority Development Assistance Fund. Upon being charged, Enrile filed for an
omnibus motion praying he be allowed to post bail should probable cost is found against him.
Sandiganbayan denied his motion for being premature for he was not yet arrested. After
denying his motion, the Sandiganbayan ordered his arrest.
Enrile surrendered to Camp Crame and was confined to the PNP General Hospital for his
medical examination. There, he filed his Motion for Detention at the PNP General Hospital and
Motion to Fix Bail based on the ff grounds:
o Prosecution failed to establish that his guilt is strong
o He was only charged for a penalty of reclusion temporal
o He was not a flight risk and his age and physical condition should be seriously considered
The Sandiganbayan denied his motion beause:
o The prosecution has not yet presented evidence before the Court
o Mitigating circumstances such as age and health are not considered in the determination of
bail
Issue: WN Enrile should be granted bail. YES
Held:
Bail can be either mandatory or discretionary. Generally, the Constitutions mandates the right
to bail except in capital offenses, reclusion perpetua, or death. In these cases, right to bail can
still be granted upon the attending circumstances.
The right to bail is the Philippines responsibility under the UDHR, that the state shall value
the dignity of every person. The right to bail is granted upon clear and convincing showing that:
o The accused is not a flight risk or a danger to the community
o There exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances
In Enriles case, his political and social standing, as well as his respect for the legal process
belies the claim of flight risk.
Also, his advanced age and ill health is a compelling reason for the grant of bail. This would
enable him to attend to his condition and ensure his appearance before court.
To wait for the trial before the application of bail also defeat the purpose of the provisional
liberty, which is to enable the accused to build his defense
The Court thus balances the scales of justice by protecting the interest of the People through
ensuring his personal appearance at the trial, and at the same time realizing for him the
guarantees of due process as well as to be presumed innocent until proven guilty.
Bail granted for P1,000,000
12. People v. Judge Donato & Rodolfo Salas 198 SCRA 13 June 5, 1991
Rosales, Andrew
KEY TAKE-AWAY: Rodolfo Salas, along w/ Josefina Cruz & Jose Conception were arrested and
charged for robbery. At that time, the applicable law prescribed a penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death. EO No. 187 was enacted w/c reduced the penalty to prision mayor, thus making the same
a bailable offense. In this case, bail has become a matter of right. If bail is a matter of right,
the prosecution loses the right to present evidence for the denial thereof. The court has
also repeatedly held that the right to bail may be availed even during the pendency of the
appeal. However, the right to bail can be waived; and there is such a waiver in this case
made by Rodolfo Salas.
RR:
SALAS, along CRUZ and CONCEPCION were arrested and charged for REBELLION
At that time, the applicable law prescribed a penalty of reclusion perpetua to death EO
187 was enacted, which reduced the penalty to prision mayor, thus making the same
a bailable offense
The SC held that under Section 3, Rule 114 of the RoC, all persons in custody, before
final conviction, shall be entitled to bail as a matter of right, except those charged with
a law at the time of its commission and at the time of the application for bail, is
punishable by reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt is strong
The SC also held that in instances where bail is a matter of right, the prosecution does
not have the right to present evidence for the denial of the same
But in cases where the grant of bail is discretionary, due process requires
that the prosecution must be given an opportunity to present, within a
reasonable time, all the evidence that it may desire to introduce before the
court should resolve the motion for bail
However, the guidelines for fixing the amount of bail are provided for in
Section 10, Rule 114 of the RoC and, as such, the said amount is not a
matter left entirely to the discretion of the court
The SC further held that as a general rule, any right or privilege conferred by statute
or guaranteed by the Constitution may be waived, except when the same:
Is in derogation of a statutory right
Infringes on the rights of others
Would be against public policy, morals, and public interest
According to Commonwealth v. Petrillo, rights guaranteed to one accused of a crime
fall naturally into two classes:
Those in which the State, as well as the accused, is interested
May not be waived
Those which are personal to the accused, which are in the nature of
personal privileges
May be waived
Bail is defined as the security given for the release of a person in the custody of the
law
Bail presupposes that the person applying for it should be in the custody of
the law o Custody has been held to mean nothing less than actual
imprisonment
It is also defined as the detainer of a person by virtue of a lawful
authority, or the care and possession of a thing or person
In this case, a compromise was entered into whereby the arrest warrants
for CRUZ and CONCEPCION were to be lifted but Salas was to remain in
legal custody
Last but not least, the SC held that the right to bail is one Constitutional right,
which can be waived
It is a right personal to the accused
The waiver of the right will not be contrary to law, public order, public
policy, morals, good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a
right recognized by law
Factual Antecedents:
Private respondent Rodolfo Salas, alias "Commander Bilog", and his co-accused were
charged for the crime of rebellion.
A day after the filing of the original information (for the rebellion charges), a petition
for habeas corpus for private respondent and his co-accused was filed with this Court
(G.R. No. 76009) which was later on dismissed on the basis of the agreement of the
parties under which private respondent "will remain in legal custody and will face trial
 before the court having custody over his person" and the warrants for the arrest of his
co-accused (Josefina Cruz and Jose Concepcion) are deemed recalled and they shall
be immediately released but shall submit themselves to the court having jurisdiction
over their person.
Private respondent filed a petition for bail which herein petitioner opposed on the
ground that since rebellion became a capital offense under the provisions of P.D. Nos.
1996, 942 and 1834, which amended Article 135 of the RPC, by imposing the penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death on those who promote, maintain, or head a rebellion
the accused is no longer entitled to bail as evidence of his guilt is strong.
On 5 June 1987, the President issued Executive Order No. 187 repealing P.D. Nos.
1996, 942 and 1834 and restoring to full force and effect Article 135 of the RPC as it
existed before the amendatory decrees. Thus, the original penalty for rebellion, prision
mayor and a fine not to exceed P20,000.00, was restored.
Respondent Judge, taking into consideration EO 187, granted private respondent's
petition for bail, fixed the bail bond at P30,000.00 and imposed upon private
respondent the additional condition that he shall report to the court once every two (2)
months within the first ten (10) days of every period thereof.
In a motion to reconsider, petitioner asked the court to increase the bail from
P30,000.00 to P100,000.00 because the private respondent "had in the past escaped
from the custody of the military authorities and the offense for which he is charged is
not an ordinary crime, like murder, homicide or robbery, where after the commission,
the perpetrator has achieved his end" and that "the rebellious acts are not
consummated until the well-organized plan to overthrow the government through
armed struggle and replace it with an alien system based on a foreign ideology is
attained." This was also pursuant to the Department of Justice Circular No. 10.
On 17 July 1987, petitioner filed a supplemental motion for reconsideration indirectly
asking the court to deny bail to the private respondent and to allow it to present
evidence in support thereof considering the "inevitable probability that the accused will
not comply with this main condition of his bail to appear in court for trial.
The Respondent Court found the "supplemental" motion for reconsideration to be
without merit and resolved only to increase the amount of bail from P30,000.00 to
P50,000.00.
ISSUE:
1. W/N Judge Donato acted with grave abuse of discretion when he denied petitioners
supplemental motion for reconsideration with prayer to be given the opportunity to adduce
evidence in support of its opposition to the grant of bail to respondent Salas.
2. W/N Judge Donato acted with grave abuse of discretion when he granted bail to Respondent
Salas.
3. W/N Respondent Salas has waived his right to bail.
HELD/RATIO:
1. YES, it was error for the respondent court to fix the bond at P30,000.00, then later at
P50,000.00 without hearing the prosecution. The guidelines for the fixing of the amount of
bail provided for in Section 10 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court are not matters left
entirely to the discretion of the court. However, it is only in cases where the right of bail is
DISCRETIONARY when the Courts can deny such right to the accused.
During the pendency of the application for bail, Executive Order No. 187 was issued
by the President, by virtue of which the penalty for rebellion as originally provided for
was restored. The restored law was the governing law at the time the respondent
court resolved the petition for bail.
Bail cannot be denied to the private respondent for he is charged with the crime of
rebellion to which the penalty of prision mayor and a fine not exceeding P20,000.00 is
attached. It is, therefore, a bailable offense.
Therefore, before conviction bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It
is a matter of right when the offense charged is punishable by any penalty
lower than reclusion perpetua. To that extent the right is absolute.
In People vs. Hernandez, et al.,
Despite the fact that the accused was already convicted, although
erroneously, by the trial court for the complex crime of rebellion with multiple
murders, arsons and robberies, and sentenced to life imprisonment, the SC
granted bail during the pendency of his appeal from such conviction.
The 1987 Constitution strengthens further the right to bail by explicitly providing that it
shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended.
This overturns the Court's ruling in Garcia-Padilla vs. Enrile, et al.
Bail as a matter of right vs. Bail as a discretionary matter for the courts:
If the offense charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua, bail becomes a
matter of discretion.
Accordingly, the prosecution does not have the right to present evidence for
the denial of bail in the instances where bail is a matter of right.
In the cases where the grant of bail is discretionary, due process requires
that the prosecution must be given an opportunity to present, within a
reasonable time, all the evidence that it may desire to introduce before the
court should resolve the motion for bail.
As held by the Court in People vs. Dacudao, et al.
Certain guidelines in the fixing of a bail bond call for the presentation of
evidence and reasonable opportunity for the prosecution to refute it. Among
them are (1) the nature and circumstances of the crime, (2) character and
reputation of the accused, (3) the weight of the evidence against him, (4)
the probability of the accused appearing at the trial, (5) whether or not the
accused is a fugitive from justice, and (6) whether or not the accused is
under bond in other case.
In the instant case, petitioner has sufficiently made out allegations
which necessitate a grant of an opportunity to be heard for the
purpose of determining the amount of bail, but not for the denial
thereof.
2. YES, the respondent Judge then clearly acted with grave abuse of discretion in
granting bail to the private respondent as he has effectively waived his right to bail.
3. YES, the private respondent has waived his right to bail in G.R. No. 76009 (Petition for
Writ of Habeas Corpus). Salas was in agreement with the government that he shall remain
in legal custody in exchange for the release of his co-accused.
In G.R. No. 76009 - Respondent Salas reached an agreement with the government
wherein the petition for habeas corpus will be withdrawn with detainee Rodolfo Salas
to remain under custody, whereas his co-detainees Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo
Concepcion will be released immediately.
The parties in G.R. No. 76009 stipulated that: Petitioner Rodolfo Salas will remain in
legal custody and face trial before the court having custody over his person.
 Private respondent maintains that the term "legal custody" as used in the
Joint Manifestation and Motion simply means that private respondent
agreed to continue to be in the custody of the law or in custodia legis and
nothing else; it is not to be interpreted as waiver.
In defining bail as the security given for the release of a person in custody
of the law, Section 1 of Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court admits no
other meaning or interpretation for the term "in custody of the law" than that
as above indicated. The purpose of bail is to relieve an accused from
imprisonment until his conviction and yet secure his appearance at the trial.
It presupposes that the person applying for it should be in the custody of the
law or otherwise deprived of liberty.
Consequently, having agreed in G.R. No. 76009 to remain in legal
custody, private respondent had unequivocally waived his right to bail.
Validity of the waiver
Article 6 of the Civil Code expressly provides: Rights may be waived, unless
the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good
customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.
As to what rights and privileges may be waived, the authority is settled:
the Doctrine of Waiver extends to rights and privileges of any
character, and, since the word "waiver" covers every conceivable
right, it is the general rule that a person may waive any matter
which affects his property, and any alienable right or privilege of
which he is the owner or which belongs to him or to which he is
legally entitled, whether secured by contract, conferred with
statute, or guaranteed by Constitution, provided such rights and
privileges rest in the individual, are intended for his sole
benefit, do not infringe on the rights of others, and further
provided the waiver of the right or privilege is not forbidden
by law, and does not contravene public policy; and the
principle is recognized that everyone has a right to waive, and
agree to waive, the advantage of a law or rule made solely for the
benefit and protection of the individual in his private capacity, if it
can be dispensed with and relinquished without infringing on any
public right, and without detriment to the community at large. . . .
Although the general rule is that any right or privilege conferred by
statute or guaranteed by constitution may be waived, a waiver in
derogation of a statutory right is not favored, and a waiver will be
inoperative and void if it infringes on the rights of others, or would be
against public policy or morals and the public interest may be waived.
Even the 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes a waiver of rights guaranteed by its
Bill of Rights. Section 12(l) of Article III thereof on the right to remain silent and to have
a competent and independent counsel, preferably of his own choice states these
rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
This provision merely particularizes the form and manner of the
waiver; it, nevertheless, clearly suggests that the other rights may be
waived in some other form or manner provided such waiver will not offend
Article 6 of the Civil Code.
The right to bail is another of the constitutional rights which can be
waived. It is a right which is personal to the accused and whose waiver
would not be contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good
customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.
13. De La Camara.v. Enage - 41 SCRA 3 (1971)
Doctrine: Guidelines in the fixing of bail was summarized in Villaseor v. Abano, which are:(1)
ability of the accused to give bail; (2) nature of the offense; (3) penalty for the offense charged;
(4) character and reputation of the accused; (5) health of the accused; (6) character and
strength of the evidence; (7) probability of the accused appearing in trial; (8) forfeiture of other
bonds; (9) whether the accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested; and (10) if the
accused is under bond for appearance at trial in other cases.
All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired
even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be
required. Discretion is with the court to rule on the question of bail. However, where conditions
imposed upon a defendant seeking bail would amount to a refusal thereof and render nugatory
the constitutional right to bail, the Court will not hesitate to exercise their supervisory powers and
provide the required remedy.
Recit Ready: Mayor De la Camara was arrested and detained at the Provincial Jail of Agusan,
for his alleged participation in the killing of fourteen and the wounding of twelve other laborers of
the Tirador Logging Co. 18 days later, the Provincial Fiscal of Agusan filed cases of multiple
frustrated murder and for multiple murder against petitioner, his co-accused Tagunan and Galgo.
On January 14, 1969 an application for bail was filed by petitioner which was granted and the
amount was fixed at the excessive amount of P1,195,200.00. The issue in this case is WON the
bail was excessive. The Court held YES, where the right to bail exists, it should not be
rendered nugatory by requiring a sum that is excessive. So the Constitution commands. If there
were no such prohibition, the right to bail becomes meaningless. Nothing can be clearer,
therefore, than that the amount of P1,195,200.00 is clearly violative of this constitutional
provision under the circumstances.
Facts:
This case has become moot and academic because the petitioner escaped from provincial case
however, the Court deems it advisable for the guidance of lower court judges, to set forth anew
the controlling and authoritative doctrines that should be observed in fixing the amount of the
bail sought in order that full respect be accorded to such a constitutional right
This is a petition for certiorari regarding an order of respondent Judge Enage, who fixed the bail
of petitioner, Ricardo De la Camara, in the sum of P1,195,200.00, which is assailed as
repugnant to the constitutional mandate prohibiting excessive bail.
Ricardo De la Camara, Municipal Mayor of Magsaysay, Misamis Oriental was arrested on 7
November 1968 and detained at the Provincial Jail of Agusan, for his alleged participation in the
killing of 14 and the wounding of 12 other laborers of the Tirador Logging Co., at Nato,
Esperanza, Agusan del Sur, on 21 August 1968.
Thereafter, on 25 November 1968, the Provincial Fiscal of Agusan filed with the Court of First
Instance a case for multiple frustrated murder and another for multiple murder against De la
Camara, his co-accused Nambinalot Tagunan and Fortunato Galgo, resulting from the aforesaid
occurrence.
Then on 14 January 1969, came an application for bail filed by De la Camara with the lower
court, premised on the assertion that there was no evidence to link him with such fatal incident
of 21 August 1968. He likewise maintained his innocence. Judge Manuel Lopez Enage
(Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City, Branch II)
 started the trial of De la Camara on 24 February 1969, the prosecution resting its case on 10
July 1969.
The Judge, on 10 August 1970, issued an order granting De la Camara's application for bail,
admitting that there was a failure on the part of the prosecution to prove that De la Camara
would flee even if he had the opportunity, but fixed the amount of the bail bond at the excessive
amount of P1,195,200.00, the sum of P840,000.00 for the information charging multiple murder
and P355,200.00 for the offense of multiple frustrated murder.
On 12 August 1970, the Secretary of Justice, Vicente Abad Santos, upon being informed of such
order, sent a telegram to the Judge stating that the bond required "is excessive" and suggesting
that a P40,000.00 bond, either in cash or property, would be reasonable.
De la Camara filed motion for reconsideration to reduce the amount. The Judge however
remained adamant. De la Camara filed a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court. In the
meanwhile, De la Camara had escaped from the provincial jail.
Issue: WON the bail was excessive and thus, unconstitutional as per Art. 3 Sec. 13 - YES
Held: Yes.
Before conviction, every person is bailable except if charged with capital offenses when the
evidence of guilt is strong.
o Such a right flow from the presumption of innocence in favor of every
accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom, only to be
acquitted after.
o A bail is intended as a guarantee that the accused would not frustrate or flee
from the trial. In the language of Cooley: a "mode short of confinement
which would, with reasonable certainty, insure the attendance of the
accused" for the subsequent trial.
Where, however, the right to bail exists, it should not be rendered nugatory by requiring a
sum that is excessive because otherwise, the right becomes meaningless. Amount of bail
imposed in this case is clearly violative of the constitution.
If there were no such prohibition, the right to bail becomes meaningless. It would have been
more forthright if no mention of such a guarantee were found in the fundamental law.
It is not to be lost sight of that the United States Constitution limits itself to a prohibition against
excessive bail. As construed in the latest American decision, "the sole permissible function of
money bail is to assure the accused's presence at trial, and declared that 'bail set at a higher
figure than an amount reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose is "excessive" under the
Eighth Amendment."
Nothing can be clearer, therefore, than that the challenged order of 10 August 1970
fixing the amount of P1,195,200.00 as the bail that should be posted by De la
Camara, the sum of P840,000.00 for the information charging multiple murder, there
being 14 victims, and the sum of P355,200.00 for the other offense of multiple
frustrated murder, there being 12 victims, is clearly violative of this constitutional
provision.
Under the circumstances, there being only two offenses charged, the amount required
as bail could not possibly exceed P50,000.00 for the information for murder and
P25,000.00 for the other information for frustrated murder. Nor should it be ignored in
the present case that the Department of Justice did recommend the total sum of
P40,000.00 for the two offenses.
Guidelines in the fixing of bail was summarized in Villaseor v. Abano, which are: (1)
ability of the accused to give bail; (2) nature of the offense; (3) penalty for the offense charged;
(4) character and reputation of the accused; (5) health of the accused; (6) character and
strength of the evidence; (7) probability of the accused appearing in trial; (8) forfeiture of other
bonds; (9) whether the accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested; and (10) if the
accused is under bond for appearance at trial in other cases.
No attempt at rationalization can give a color of validity to the challenged order. There
is grim irony in an accused being told that he has a right to bail but at the same time
being required to post such an exorbitant sum. What aggravates the situation is that
the lower court judge would apparently yield to the command of the fundamental law.
In reality, such a sanctimonious avowal of respect for a mandate of the Constitution
was on a purely verbal level. There is reason to believe that any person in the position
of petitioner would under the circumstances be unable to resist thoughts of escaping
from confinement, reduced as he must have been to a state of desperation.
In the same breath that he was told he could be bailed out, the excessive amount
required could only mean that provisional liberty would be beyond his reach. It would
have been more forthright if he were informed categorically that such a right could not
be availed of. There would have been no disappointment of expectations then.
De la Camara's subsequent escape, however, cannot be condoned. That is why he is
not entitled to the relief prayed for. What the Judge did, on the other hand, does call
for repudiation from the Supreme Court.
14. Paderanga vs. CA
August 28, 1995
By: Consolacion, Ray
(Same with Digest #2 under Section 13)
Facts:
On January 28, 1990, petitioner was belatedly charged in an amended information as
a co-conspirator in the crime of multiple murder for the killing of members of the Bucag
family sometime in 1984 in Gingoog City of which petitioner was the mayor at the time.
The original information, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Gingoog City, had
initially indicted for multiple murder eight accused suspect, namely, Felipe Galarion,
Manuel Sabit, Cesar Sabit, Julito Ampo, Eddie Torion, John Doe, Peter Doe And
Richard Doe as the alleged conspirators in the indiscriminate slaying of the spouses
Romeo and Juliet Bucag and their son, Romeo, Jr. However, only one of the accused,
Felipe Galarion, was apprehended, tried and eventually convicted. Galarion later
escaped from prison. The others have remained at large up to the present.
In a bizarre twist of events, one Felizardo ("Ely") Roxas was implicated in the crime. In
an amended information dated October 6, 1988, he was charged as a co-accused
therein. As herein petitioner was his former employer and thus knew him well, Roxas
engaged the former's services as counsel in said case. Ironically, in the course of the
preliminary investigation therein, said accused, in a signed affidavit dated March 30,
1989 but which he later retracted on June 20, 1990, implicated petitioner as the
supposed mastermind behind the massacre of the Bucag family.
Then, upon the inhibition of the City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro City from the case
per his resolution, the DOJ, designated a replacement, State Prosecutor Henrick F.
Gingoyon, for purposes of both the preliminary investigation and prosecution of the
criminal case. Pursuant to a resolution of the new prosecutor, petitioner was finally
charged as a co-conspirator in said criminal case in a second amended information.
Petitioner assailed his inclusion therein as a co-accused all the way to this Court in
G.R. No. 96080 entitled "Atty. Miguel P. Paderanga vs. Hon. Franklin M. Drilon, Hon.
Silvestre H. Bello III, Atty. Henrick F. Gingoyon, Helen B. Canoy and Rebecca B. Tan."
In an en banc decision promulgated on April 19, 1991, the Court sustained the filing of
the second amended information against him.
Under this backdrop, the trial of the base was all set to start with the issuance of an
arrest warrant for petitioner's apprehension but, before it could be served on him,
petitioner through counsel, filed a motion for admission to bail with the trial court which
set the same for hearing. Petitioner duly furnished copies of the motion to State
Prosecutor Henrick F. Gingoyon, the Regional State Prosecutor's Office, and the
 private prosecutor, Atty. Benjamin Guimong. On November 5, 1992, the trial court
proceeded to hear the application for bail. Four of petitioner's counsel appeared in
court but only Assistant Prosecutor Erlindo Abejo of the Regional State Prosecution's
Office appeared for the prosecution.
As petitioner was then confined at the Cagayan Capitol College General Hospital due
to "acute costochondritis," his counsel manifested that they were submitting custody
over the person of their client to the local chapter president of the integrated Bar of the
Philippines and that, for purposes of said hearing of his bail application, he considered
being in the custody of the law. Prosecutor Abejo, on the other hand, informed the trial
court that in accordance with the directive of the chief of their office, Regional State
prosecutor Jesus Zozobrado, the prosecution was neither supporting nor opposing the
application for bail and that they were submitting the same to the sound discretion of
the trial judge.
Upon further inquiries from the trial court, Prosecutor Abejo announced that he was
waiving any further presentation of evidence. On that note and in a resolution dated
November 5, 1992, the trial court admitted petitioner to bail in the amount of
P200,000.00. The following day, November 6, 1992, petitioner, apparently still weak
but well enough to travel by then, managed to personally appear before the clerk of
court of the trial court and posted bail in the amount thus fixed. He was thereafter
arraigned and in the trial that ensued, he also personally appeared and attended all
the scheduled court hearings of the case.
The subsequent motion for reconsideration of said resolution filed twenty (20) days
later on November 26, 1992 by Prosecutor Gingoyon who allegedly received his copy
of the petition for admission to bail on the day after the hearing, was denied by the trial
court in its omnibus order dated March 29, 1993. Prosecutor Gingoyon elevated the
matter to respondent Court of Appeals. Thus were the resolution and the order of the
trial court granting bail to petitioner was annulled by the CA on November 24, 1993.
Respondent CA observed in its decision that at the time of petitioner's application for
bail, he was not yet "in the custody of the law," apparently because he filed his motion
for admission to bail before he was actually arrested or had voluntarily surrendered. It
further noted that apart from the circumstance that petitioner was charged with a crime
punishable by reclusion perpetua, the evidence of guilt was strong as borne out by the
fact that no bail was recommended by the prosecution, for which reasons it held that
the grant of bail was doubly improvident. Lastly, the prosecution, according to
respondent court, was not afforded an opportunity to oppose petitioner's application
for bail contrary to the requirements of due process.
Petitioner contends that the evidence on record negates the existence of such strong
evidence as would bar his provisional release on bail. Furthermore, the prosecution,
by reason of the waiver by Prosecutor Abejo of any further presentation of evidence to
oppose the application for bail and whose representation in court in behalf of the
prosecution bound the latter, cannot legally assert any claim to a denial of procedural
due process.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner may be granted bail.
Held:
Yes, the Court held that Section 13, Article III of the Constitution lays down the rule
that before conviction, all indictees shall be allowed bail, except only those charged
with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when the evidence of guilt is strong. In
pursuance thereof, Section 4 of Rule 114, as amended, now provides that all persons
in custody shall, before conviction by a regional trial court of an offense not punishable
by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, be admitted to bail as a matter of
right. The right to bail, which may be waived considering its personal nature and
which, to repeat, arises from the time one is placed in the custody of the law, springs
from the presumption of innocence accorded every accused upon whom should not
be inflicted incarceration at the outset since after trial he would be entitled to acquittal,
unless his guilt be established beyond reasonable doubt.
Thus, the general rule is that prior to conviction by the regional trial court of a criminal
offense, an accused is entitled to be released on bail as a matter of right, the present
exceptions thereto being the instances where the accused is charged with a capital
offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment and the
evidence of guilt is strong. Under said general rule, upon proper application for
admission to bail, the court having custody of the accused should, as a matter of
course, grant the same after a hearing conducted to specifically determine the
conditions of the bail in accordance with Section 6 (now, Section 2) of Rule 114. On
the other hand, as the grant of bail becomes a matter of judicial discretion on the part
of the court under the exceptions to the rule, a hearing, mandatory in nature and
which should be summary or otherwise in the discretion of the court, is required with
the participation of both the defense and a duly notified representative of the
prosecution, this time to ascertain whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong for the
provisional liberty of the applicant. Of course, the burden of proof is on the
prosecution to show that the evidence meets the required quantum.
Where such a hearing is set upon proper motion or petition, the prosecution must be
given an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may
want to introduce before the court may resolve the application, since it is equally
entitled as the accused to due process. If the prosecution is denied this opportunity,
there would be a denial of procedural due process, as a consequence of which the
court's order in respect of the motion or petition is void. At the hearing, the petitioner
can rightfully cross-examine the witnesses presented by the prosecution and
introduce his own evidence in rebuttal. When, eventually, the court issues an order
either granting or refusing bail, the same should contain a summary of the evidence
for the prosecution, followed by its conclusion as to whether or not the evidence of
guilt is strong. 30 The court, though, cannot rely on mere affidavits or recitals of their
contents, if timely objected to, for these represent only hearsay evidence, and thus are
insufficient to establish the quantum of evidence that the law requires.
In this appeal, the prosecution assails what it considers to be a violation of procedural
due process when the court below allowed Assistant Prosecutor Erlindo Abejo of the
Regional State Prosecutor's Office to appear in behalf of the prosecution, instead of
State Prosecutor Henrick P. Gingoyon who is claimed to be the sole government
prosecutor expressly authorized to handle the case and who received his copy of the
motion only on the day after the hearing had been conducted. Accordingly, the
prosecution now insists that Prosecutor Abejo had no authority at all to waive the
presentation of any further evidence in opposition to the application for bail and to
submit the matter to the sound discretion of the trial court. In addition, they argue that
the prosecution was not afforded "reasonable time" to oppose that application for bail.
It is undisputed that the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor acted as the
collaborating counsel, with State Prosecutor Henrick Gingoyon, in the criminal case on
the basis of an authority from then Chief State Prosecutor Fernando de Leon which
was sent through radio message on July 10, 1992 and duly received by the Office of
the Regional State Prosecutor on the same date. This authorization, which was to be
continuing until and unless it was expressly withdrawn, was later confirmed and then
withdrawn only on July 12, 1993 by then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon. This
was done after one Rebecca Bucag-tan questioned the authority of Regional State
Prosecutor Jesus Zozobrado and State Prosecutor II Erlindo Abejo to enter their
appearance as collaborating government prosecutors in said criminal case. It was in
 fact by virtue of this arrangement that the same Prosecutor Zozobrado and Prosecutor Belmonte at that time. Instead, the bullet hit May Sibayan. He argues that there were
Perseverando Arana entered their appearance as collaborating prosecutor in the procedural infirmities that attended the trial such as (a) the hearsay character of the
previous hearing in said case. Hence, on the strength of said authority and of its testimony of the Peoples third witness which was heard in the absence of accused -
receipt of the notice of the hearing for bail, the Regional State Prosecutor's Office,
appellant and his counsel; (b) the denial of due process on account of the perceived
through Prosecutor Abejo, could validly represent the prosecution in the hearing held
on November 5, 1992. bias of the trial judge; (c) the illegality of accused appellants arrest and detention; and
(d) the absence of preliminary investigation.
Issue
Secondly, although it is now claimed that Prosecutor Abejo was allegedly not familiar
WON Nitchas arrest and detention was illegal after posting a bail bond. NO.
with the case, he nonetheless was explicitly instructed about the position of the
Regional State Prosecutor's Office on the matter. Prosecutor Zozobrado, whose office Held
received its copy of the motion on the very day when it was sent, that is, October 28, The act of posting bail bond by Nitcha negated the illegality of the arrest apart from
1992, duly instructed Prosecutor Abejo to manifest to the court that the prosecution the fact that he entered a plea of not guilty which is tantamount to foregoing the right
was neither supporting nor opposing the application for bail and that they were to question the illegality of the arrest.
submitting the matter to its sound discretion. Obviously, what this meant was that the The subsistence of a bail bond is no legal obstacle to Nitchas immediate incarceration
prosecution, at that particular posture of the case, was waiving the presentation of any after promulgation of a decision involving a felony punishable by reclusion perpetua.
countervailing evidence. When the court a quo sought to ascertain whether or not that Sec. 13, Art III of the Constitution provides that before conviction bail is
was the real import of the submission by Prosecutor Abejo, the latter readily answered
either a matter of right or of discretion.
in the affirmative.
It is a matter of right when the offense charged is punishable by
15. People v. Nitcha any penalty lower than reclusion perpetua.
If the offense charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua, bail
becomes a matter of discretion. It shall be denied if the evidence
January 19, 1995, J. Melo of guilt is strong. The courts discretion is limited to determining
whether or not evidence of guilt is strong.
If an accused who is charged with a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua
Doctrine
is convicted by the trial court and sentenced to suffer such a penalty, bail is
Sec. 13, Art III of the Constitution provides that before conviction bail is either a matter
neither a matter of right on the part of the accused nor of discretion on the
of right or of discretion.
part of the court. The court would not have only determined that the
It is a matter of right when the offense charged is punishable by any penalty
evidence of guilt is strongwhich would have been sufficient to deny bail
lower than reclusion perpetua.
If the offense charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua, bail becomes a even before convictionit would have likewise ruled that the accuseds guilt
matter of discretion. It shall be denied if the evidence of guilt is strong. The has been proven beyond reasonable doubt. Bail must not then be granted
courts discretion is limited to determining whether or not evidence of guilt is to the accused during the pendency of his appeal from the judgment of
strong. conviction.
The Court also ruled that the qualifying circumstance of treachery was not attendant in
Facts
the killing. The crime committed is homicide and not murder.
Florestan Nitcha was pronounced guilty for the murder of May Villa Rica Sibayan.
Jojo Belmonte went out of his house to buy some cigarettes. Before he
could buy cigarettes, Doro Nitcha arrived, uttered the words You are one of
them, then started mauling him. A few minutes had gone into the fight when
May Villarica (aka Lydia), Joselito, Agustin and Marcelina (Nenet), all
surnamed Sibayan, arrived. May and Joselito tried to pacify the two but
Doro Nitcha refused to be pacified. The fighting stopped upon the arrival of
Doro Nitchas sister Victoria Corpuz. Likewise, May and the Sibayans
proceeded towards their house. While the Sibayans were on their way
home, Florestan Nitcha, brother of doro, arrived at the sari-sari store
brandishing a gun and shouting in Tagalog. Appelant Florestan Nitcha then
fired his gun in the direction of the Sibayans and hit May at the back of her
fead. Appelan then aimed at Joselit bu missed. May was brought to the
hospital where she died. Florestan went back to his mothers house before
proceeding to the police station of San Quintin, Pangasinan where he
surrendered himself.
Appellant claims that it was no him who fired the gun but was one of the companions
of Jojo Belmonte. The bullet missed the head of his brother who was fighting with
 a. Murder through the use of unlicensed or illegally-possessed firearm for the
SECTION 14 killing of Florentino Lim (from the wealthy Lim Ket Kai family of Cagayan)
b. Unlawful possession, control and custody of a pistol with ammunition, in
1.Olaguer vs. Military (1987) violation of General Orders Nos. 6 and 7 in relation to PD No. 9
Doctrine: - Case was a cause celebre in Cagayan
- Pres. Marcos, pursuant to the recommendation of Defense Sec. Enrile, withdrew his
Military tribunals have no jurisdiction over civilians when the civil courts are open and functional. earlier order to transfer the case to the civil courts.
- Case was retained in the military court.
Recit-ready: - All the accused were detained without bail in the P.C. Stockade in Camp Crame
- Almost daily trials were held for more than 13 months.
Olaguer and several others were captured and detained during Martial Law. They were charged - On 1976, decision was promulgated by the Military Commission finding:
with subversion and other criminal offenses and were to be tried by Military Commission No. 34. a. five of the accused (Luis Tan, Ang Tiat Chuan, Mariano Velez, Jr., Antonio
During the pendency of the case, however, President Marcos lifted Martial Law. Hence, the Occacciones, and Leopoldo Nicolas) guilty of Murder.
military tribunal no longer had jurisdiction to try Olaguer and the others since the civil courts b. A sixth accused, Marciano Benemerito, was found guilty of both murder and
were open and functional again. illegal possession of firearm
c. Eight of the accused, including the petitioners (William Tan, Joaquin Tan,
Facts: Vicenta Tan), were acquitted of the charges
On Dec. 24. 1979, Olaguer and several others were captured by the military and were detained - On Jan. 1981, Proclamation No. 2045 ended martial rule and abolished military
in Camp Crame. They were all civilians. Olaguer was kept detained in Camp Crame while the tribunals and commissions
others were transferred to Camp Bagong Diwa in Bicutan. - On May 22, 1987, the Court promulgated a decision in Olaguer v. Military
Commission, declaring that military commissions and tribunals have no jurisdiction,
On 1980, they were charged with subversion and 7 other criminal charges, to be tried by Military even during the period of martial law, over civilians charged with criminal offenses
Commission No. 34. They subsequently filed 2 petitions to the the SC: the first for habeas properly cognizable by civil courts, as long as those courts are open and functioning
corpus and the second sought to enjoin Military Commission No. 34 from taking further action as they did during the period of martial law.
regarding the case. - Cruz v. Enrile: several months after EDSA revolution, the Court nullified the
proceedings leading to the conviction of non-political detainees who should have been
(It is important to note that during the pendency of the case, President Marcos lifted Martial Law brought before the courts of justice.
on 1981). - Sept. 15, 1988: Secretary of Justice Sedfrey Ordonez issued DO No. 226 designating
State Prosecutor Barrios to collaborate with the City Fiscal of Cagayan de Oro City in
Issue: WON military courts have jurisdiction over the petitioners when the civil courts are open the reinvestigation of Criminal Case No. MC-1-167.
and functional - Nov. 15, 1988: Barrios was designated as Acting City Fiscal
- Without conducting an investigation, Fiscal Barrios filed two informations in RTC
Held: No. Cagayan
a. Illegal Possession of Firearm
While the military courts have jurisdiction over civilians during Martial Law, they cease to have so b. Murder against all the 15 original defendants
when Martial Law is lifted and the civil courts are functional. Martial Law created an exception - The State Prosecutor incorrectly certified in the informations that the case was filed in
to the general rule of exclusive subjection to the civil jurisdiction, and renders offenses accordance with the Supreme Court Order.
against the law of war, as well as those of a civil character, triable by military tribunals. - Nov. 7, 1988: petitioners Tan filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition praying that
Public danger warrants the substitution of executive process for judicial process. The the informations in Crim. Cases Nos. 88824 and 88825, and the order of respondent
immunity of civilians from military jurisdiction must, however, give way in areas governed Judge dated October 26, 1988 be annulled, and that the public respondents or any
by martial law. When it is absolutely imperative for public safety, legal processes can be other prosecution officer "be permanently enjoined from indicting, prosecuting and
superseded and military tribunals authorized to exercise the jurisdiction normally vested in trying them anew for the offenses charged therein because they had already been
courts. acquitted of the same by Military Commission No. 1 in Crim. Case No. MC167"

However, since the country was not in a state if war nor under Martial Law. the military
tribunals cannot try and exercise jurisdiction over civilians for civil offenses committed by
them which are properly cognizable by the civil courts that have remained open and
have been regularly functioning.
Issue:
W/N State Prosecutor Barrios exceeded his jurisdiction and gravely abused his discretion in
reprosecuting them upon the supposed authority of Cruz v. Enrile.

2. TAN v. BARRIOS
October 18, 1990
Facts: Position of State Prosecutor:
- Criminal Case for illegal possession of firearm was already withdrawn (accused is
- On 1975, the three petitioners, with 12 others, were arrested and charged in Criminal dead)
Case No. MC-1-67 before the Military Commission No. 1 for the crimes of:
 - The reprosecution of the petitioner will not constitute double jeopardy because the
nullity of jurisdiction of the military tribunal that acquitted them prevented the first
jeopardy from attaching, thereby nullifying their acquittal.
Solicitor General
- Proceedings involving civilians before a military commission were null and void
because we ruled in Olaguer that military tribunals are bereft of jurisdiction over
civilians, hence, their decisions, whether of conviction or acquittal, do not bar
reprosecution for the same crime before a civil court
Held
- The public respondents gravely abused their discretion and acted without or in
excess of their jurisdiction in misconstruing the third paragraph of the dispositive
portion of this Court's decision in Cruz vs. Enrile as their authority to refile in the civil
court the criminal actions against petitioners who had been tried and acquitted by
Military Commission No. 1 during the period of martial law.
- The ruling in Cruz v. Enrile bounds only the parties of the said case. This court's
pronouncement in Cruz vs. Enrile nullifying the proceedings in military courts against
the civilian petitioners therein and ordering the re-filing of informations against them in
the proper civil courts, may not affect the rights of persons who were not parties in that
case and who, not having submitted to the court's jurisdiction, did not have their day in
court.
- The Court did not nullify the court martial proceedings against the other civilians-
petitioners (Cruz v. Enrile) who:
a. Finished serving their sentences
b. Had been granted amnesty
c. Had been acquitted by military courts
In the interest of justice and consistency, the Olaguer should, in principle, be applied
prospectively only to future cases and cases still ongoing or not yet final when the
decision was promulgated. Hence, there should be no retroactive nullification of final
judgments, whether of conviction or acquittal, rendered by military courts against civilians before
the promulgation of the Olaguer decision. Such final sentences should not be disturbed by
the State. Only in particular cases where the convicted person or the State shows that there
was serious denial of the Constitutional rights of the accused should the nullity of the sentence
be declared and a retrial be ordered based on the violation of the constitutional rights of the
accused, and not on the Olaguer doctrine. If a retrial is no longer possible, the accused should
be released since the judgment against him is null on account of the violation of his
constitutional rights and denial of due process.
It may be recalled that Olaguer was rescued from a court martial which sentenced him to death
without receiving evidence in his defense. It would be a cruel distortion of the Olaguer
decision to use it as authority for reprosecuting civilians regardless of whether, unlike
Olaguer, they had been accorded a fair trial and regardless of whether they have already
been acquitted and released, or have accepted the sentences imposed on them and
commenced serving the same. Not everybody who was convicted by a military court, much
less those who were acquitted and released, desires to undergo the ordeal of a second trial for
the same offense, albeit in a civil court. Indeed, why should one who has accepted the
justness of the verdict of a military court, who is satisfied that he had a fair hearing, and
who is willing to serve his sentence in full, be dragged through the harrow of another
hearing in a civil court to risk being convicted a second time perchance to serve a heavier
penalty? Even if there is a chance of being acquitted the second time around, it would be small
comfort for the accused if he is held without bail pending the completion of his second trial which
may take as long as, if not longer than, the sentence he has been serving or already served.
Double Jeopardy:
The doctrine of "operative facts" applies to the proceedings against the petitioners and their co-
accused before Military Commission No. 1. The principle of absolute invalidity of the jurisdiction
of the military courts over civilians should not be allowed to obliterate the "operative facts" that in
the particular case of the petitioners, the proceedings were fair, that there were no serious
violations of their constitutional right to due process, and that the jurisdiction of the military
commission that heard and decided the charges against them during the period of martial law,
had been affirmed by this Court (Aquino vs. Military Commission No. 2, 63 SCRA 546) years
before the Olaguer case arose and came before us.
Because of these established operative facts, the refiling of the information against the
petitioners would place them in double jeopardy, in hard fact if not in constitutional logic.
3. US v. Luling
US v. LULING
G.R. No. L-11162; Aug. 12, 1916; Johnson, J.
Facts:
A complaint was filed in the CFI of Manila charging appellant F. Luling with a violation
of Section 316 of Act No. 355 of the United States Philippine Commission. The
complaint alleged that:
The accused was a employed as a customs officer of the Government of the
Phil. Islands.
Using such capacity, he solicited from one Rufino Elord the sum of 100
pesos in order to secure the importation of certain rolls of paper in which a
large quantity of opium was hidden.
The defendant was duly arrested, arraigned, tried, found guilty, and convicted by the
lower court.
In his appeal before the Supreme Court, the appellant contended that Section 316 of
the said act was unconstitutional in that the State is without right or authority to enact
a law by virtue of which certain facts only shall constitute prima facie proof of guilt.
The said provision provides in part:
And evidence of such soliciting, demanding, exacting, or receiving, satisfactory to
the court in which such trial is had, shall be regarded as prima facie evidence that
such soliciting, demanding, exacting, or receiving was contrary to law, and shall put
upon the accused the burden of proving that such act was innocent and not with
unlawful intention. The reception of gift by any officer or employee in the Philippine
customs service from any importer or exporter, either directly or indirectly, shall
prima facie be deemed to be a violation of the provisions of this section.
ISSUE: Whether the said provision was unconstitutional
HELD: No. Judgment of conviction was affirmed.
RATIO:
No rule has been better established in criminal law that every man is presumed to be
innocent until his guilt is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. In criminal prosecution,
therefore, the burden is upon the state to prove every fact and circumstance
constituting the crime charged, for the purpose of showing the guilt of the accused.
 While that is the rule, many of the States have established a different rule and have
provided that certain facts shall constitute prima facie evidence of guilt, and that then
the burden is put upon the defendant to show or to explain that such facts or acts are
not criminal. (Sanders v. State, Fuller v. State, US v. Gooding,)
Commonwealth v. Minor: In case of statutory crimes, no constitutional provision is
violated by a statute providing that proof by the state of some material fact/s shall
constitute prima facie evidence of guilt, and that the burden is shifter to the defendant
for the purpose of showing that such act or acts are innocent and are committed
without unlawful intention.
Unlike common law offenses, in the Phils., no act is a crime unless it is made so by
statute. The state having the right to declare what acts are criminal, within certain well
defined limitations, has a right to specify what act or acts shall constitute a crime, as
well as what proof shall constitute prima facie evidence of guilt, and then put upon the
defendant the burden of showing that such act/s are innocent and are committed
without any criminal intent.
Hence, Sec. 316 of Act No. 355 does not violate any of the provisions of the Act of
Congress of July 1, 1902.
With regard to the defendants guilt, the Supreme Court held that the lower court
committed no error in finding that the offense had indeed been committed.
4. People v. Mingoa - 92 PHIL. 856
Facts:
Found short in his accounts as officer-in-charge of the office of the municipal treasurer
of Despujols, Romblon, and unable to produce the missing fund amounting to P3,938
upon demand by the provincial auditor, Aquino Mingoa was prosecuted for the crime
of malversation of public funds in the Court of First Instance of Romblon.
Mingoa explained to the examining officer that some days before he had, by
mistake, put the money in a large envelope which he took with him to a
show and that he forgot it on his seat and it was not there anymore when he
returned.
But he did not testify in court and presented no evidence in his favor.
Having been found guilty as charged and sentenced to the corresponding penalty, he
appealed to the Court of Appeals.
But that court certified the case to the Supreme Court on the ground that it involved a
constitutional question.
Issue:
Whether Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides that "the failure of a public
officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon
demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such
missing funds or property to personal use" violates the constitutional right of the accused to be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved cannot be sustained.
Held:
The validity of statutes establishing presumptions in criminal cases is now a settled
matter, Cooley, in his work on constitutional limitations (8th ed., Vol. I, pp. 639-641),
says that "there is no constitutional objection to the passage of a law providing that the
presumption of innocence may be overcome by a contrary presumption founded upon
the experience of human conduct, and enacting what evidence shall be sufficient to
overcome such presumption of innocence."
In line with this view, it is generally held in the United States that the legislature may
enact that when certain facts have been proved they shall, be prima facie
evidence of the existence of the guilt of the accused and shift the burden of proof
provided there be a rational connection between the facts proved and the ultimate fact
presumed so that the inference of the one from proof of the others is not unreasonable
and arbitrary because of lack of connection between the two in common experience.
The same view has been adopted here as may be seen from the decisions
of the Supreme court in US vs. Tria (17 Phil 303); US vs. Luling (34 Phil
725); and People vs. Merilo (GR L-3489, 28 June 1951).
The statute in the present case creates a presumption of guilt once certain
facts are proved.
It makes the failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming, upon proper demand,
any public funds or property with which he is chargeable prima facie evidence that he
has put such missing funds or property to personal use.
The ultimate act presumed is that the officer has malversed the funds or property
entrusted to his custody, and the presumption is made to arise from proof that he has
received them and yet he has failed to have them forthcoming upon proper demand.
Clearly, the fact presumed is but a natural inference from the fact proved, so that it
cannot be said that there is no rational connection between the two. Furthermore, the
statute establishes only a prima facie presumption, thus giving the accused an
opportunity to present evidence to rebut it.
The presumption is reasonable and will stand the test of validity laid down in the
above citations.
Herein, Mingoa's explanation is inherently unbelievable and cannot overcome
the presumption of guilt arising from his inability to produce the fund which was
found missing.
If the money was really lost without Mingoa's fault, the most natural thing for him to do
would be to so inform his superiors and apply for release from liability. But this he did
not do. Instead, he tried to borrow to cover the shortage. And on the flimsy excuse that
he preferred to do his own sleuthing, he even did not report the loss to the police.
Considering further, as the prosecution points out in its brief, Mingoa had at first tried
to avoid meeting the auditor who wanted to examine his accounts, and that for
sometime before the alleged loss many teachers and other employees of the town
had not been paid their salaries, there is good ground to believe that Mingoa had
really malversed the fund in question and that his story about its loss was pure
invention.
5. People v. Dumlao
Dumlao vs. COMELEC
DOCTRINE:
Explicit is the constitutional provision that, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself
and counsel (Article IV, section 19, 1973 Constitution). An accusation, according to the
fundamental law, is not synonymous with guilt.
FACTS:
Dumlao, Igot and Salapantan Jr. are candidates for the 1980 elections
They assail certain provisions of Batas Pambansa Blg. 51, 52, and 53
Specifically, Igot and Salapantan question the constitutionality of Section 4 of BP 52
which states:
Any person who has committed any act of disloyalty to the
State, including acts amounting to subversion, insurrection, rebellion or other similar
crimes, shall not be qualified to be a candidate for any of the offices covered by this
Act, or to participate in any partisan political activity therein:
 provided, that a judgment of conviction for any of the aforementioned crimes shall be
conclusive evidence of such fact and
the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes before a civil court or military
tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be prima facie evidence of such fact.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the challenged provisions are unconstitutional as they contravene the
constitutional presumption of innocence.
HELD: YES
Explicit is the constitutional provision that, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be
heard by himself and counsel
An accusation, according to the fundamental law, is not synonymous with guilt. The
challenged proviso contravenes the constitutional presumption of innocence, as a
candidate is disqualified from running for public office on the ground alone that
charges have been filed against him before a civil or military tribunal.
It condemns before one is fully heard. In ultimate effect, except as to the degree of
proof, no distinction is made between a person convicted of acts of disloyalty and one
against whom charges have been filed for such acts, as both of them would be
ineligible to run for public office.
A person disqualified to run for public office on the ground that charges have been
filed against him is virtually placed in the same category as a person already convicted
of a crime with the penalty of arresto, which carries with it the accessory penalty of
suspension of the right to hold office during the term of the sentence (Art. 44, Revised
Penal Code).
And although the filing of charges is considered as but prima facie evidence, and
therefore, may be rebutted, yet, there is clear and present danger that because of
the proximity of the elections, time constraints will prevent one charged with acts of
disloyalty from offering contrary proof to overcome the prima facie evidence against
him.
Additionally, it is best that evidence pro and con of acts of disloyalty be aired before
the Courts rather than before an administrative body such as the COMELEC.
Fernando, C.J., concurring:
The provision of the Election Code that disqualifies a person to run as a candidate if a charge of
disloyalty to the State is filed against him is, moreover, tainted with arbitrariness.That brings
us to the assailed provision as to the sufficiency of the filing of charges for the commission of
such crimes as subversion, insurrection, rebellion or others of similar nature before a civil court
or military tribunal after preliminary investigation, being a prima facie evidence of such fact and
therefore justifying the disqualification of a candidate. The opinion of the Court invoked the
constitutional presumption of innocence as a basis for its being annulled. That conclusion is well-
founded. Such being the case, I am in full agreement I would add that such a provision is
moreover tainted with arbitrariness and therefore is violative of the due process clause.
Teehankee, J., separate opinion:
I concur with the majoritys declaration of invalidity of the portion of the second paragraph of
section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 which would make the mere filing of charges of
subversion, insurrection, rebellion or other similar crimes before a civil court or military tribunal
after preliminary investigation prima facie evidence of the fact of commission of an act of
disloyalty to the State on the part of the candidate and disqualify him from his candidacy. Such a
provision could be the most insidious weapon to disqualify bona fide candidates who seem to be
headed for election and places in the hands of the military and civil prosecutors a dangerous
and devastating weapon of cutting off any candidate who may not be to their liking through the
filing of lasthour charges against him.
. Administrative rules or regulations can neither expand nor constrict the law
Abad Santos, J., concurring:
I concur but wish to add that a judgment of conviction as provided in Se
c. 4, par. 2 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 should be one which is final and unappealable.
6. MARQUEZ V. COMELEC
RECIT READY
Marquez, a defeated candidate for the position of the Governor of Quezon, petitioned for the
disqualification of the duly elected Governor, Rodriguez, for allegedly being a fugitive from
justice since he had a pending case against him in California. Comelec dismissed the petition
because Rodriguez had already been proclaimed the winner and the petition has ceased to be a
pre-proclamation issue. Petitioners contend that the disqualification clause in the LGC expressly
disqualifying fugitives from justice is clear. But the SC states that it posits a possible
constitutional infirmity for the clause embraced those who were merely facing criminal charges.
However, Art 73 of the Rules and Regulations of the LGC issued by the Oversight Committee
which defined the term fugitives from justice as only those who have been convicted by final
judgment is inordinate as it expands the true meaning of the law. The case is therefore
remanded to Comelec to determine whether or not Rodriguez is a fugitive from justice in light of
the courts opinion in the case at bar.
FACTS
Marquez, a defeated candidate for the position of Governor of Quezon petitioned
against the winning candidate, Rodriguez, for being allegedly a fugitive from justice
At the time Rodriguez filed a certificate of candidacy, a criminal charge against him for
fraud or grand theft of property was still pending in the court of Los Angeles,
California. A warrant has yet to be served on account of his alleged flight from the
US
COMELEC dismissed the petition since Rodriguez had already been proclaimed as
the duly elected Governor of Quezon and the petition for disqualification has ceased
to be a pre-proclamation controversy
According to petitioner, the Local Govt Code expressly disqualified fugitives from
justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad from seeking any elective
office
The Solicitor General agrees and concludes that the phrase fugitive from
justice includes not only those who flee after conviction to avoid
punishment but also those who after being charged, flee to avoid
prosecution
ISSUE: WON Rodriguez, at the time of the filing of his certificate of candidacy is a fugitive from
justice and therefore is ineligible from holding on to an elective local office
HELD:
The court agrees with the Oversight Committeetasked to formulate on rules and
regulations for the effective implementation of the LGCthat the disqualification on
fugitives from justice would have a possible constitutional infirmity for it embraced
those who merely were facing criminal charges
The Committee came up with Article 73 on the Rules and Regulations
implementing the LGC:
Fugitives from justice refers to a person who has been convicted
by final judgment
However, Article 73, to the extent that it confines the term fugitive from justice to
refer only to a person who has been convicted by final judgment is an inordinate and
undue circumscription of the law
but must remain congruent to it
 Unfortunately, COMELEC did not make any definite finding on whether or not, private
respondent Rodriguez is a fugitive from justice, as such term must be interpreted and
applied in the light of the courts opinion
The omission is understandable since COMELEC dismissed outrightly the petition on
the basis of Art 73
This SC, not being a trier of facts, is thus constrained to remand the case to the
COMELEC for a determination of this unresolved factual manner
DAVIDE, Separate opinion:
Art 73 unreasonably expands the scope of the disqualification in the LGC because it
disqualifies all those who have been convicted by final judgment, regardless of the
extent of the penalty imposed and of whether they have served or are serving their
sentences or have evaded sentence by jumping bail or leaving the country. The
definition disregards the true and accepted meaning of the word fugitive
There is no doubt in the constitutionality of the disqualification based on the
presumption of innocence clause in the Bill of Rights
The disqualification in question does not involve the issue of presumption of
innocence. One is not disqualified because he is presumed guilty by the
filing of an information or criminal complaint against him. He is disqualified
because he is a fugitive from justice i.e., he was not brought within the
jurisdiction of the court because he had successfully evaded arrest; or if he
was brought within the jurisdiction of the court and was tried and convicted,
he has successfully evaded service of sentence because he had jumped
bail or escaped
The disqualification then is based on his flight from justice; it is not the
challenged disqualifying provision which overcomes the presumption of
innocence but rather the disqualified person himself who has proven his
guilt
7. PEOPLE V. HOLGADO
FACTS:
Appellant was charged in the CFI of Romblon with slight illegal
detention because according to information, being a private person, he feloniously and without
justifiable motive, kidnap and detain one Artemia Fabreag in the house of Holgado for about 8
hours thereby depriving Fabreag of personal liberty
On May 8, 1948, the trial court proceeded as follows Court:
Is this the case ready for trial? Fiscal:
I am ready, your honor.Court: to the accused. Q. do you have an attorney or are you going to
plead guilty? A. I have no lawyer and I will plead guilty.Court:
Arraign the accused. Note:
Interpreter read the information to the accused in the local dialect after which he was asked this
question.Q. What do you plead? A. I plead guilty, but I was instructed by one Mr. Ocampo.Q.
Who is that Mr. Ocampo, what is his complete name? A. Mr. Numeriano Ocampo.
The provincial fiscal is hereby ordered to investigate that man. Fiscal:
I have investigated this case and found out that this Ocampo has nothing to do with the case
and I found no evidence against this Ocampo. Court:
Sentenced reservedo CFI convicted Holgado of kidnapping and serious illegal detention.
ISSUES:
W/N Holgados right to counsel was violated by the lower court. - YES
RULING & RATIO:
1. In the caption of case, it appears that the offense charged was SLIGHT ILLEGAL
DETENTION while in the body, he was charged of kidnapping and serious illegal detention
a. The SC held that since accused pleaded guilty and no evidence appears to have been
presented by either party, the judge must have deduced capital offense from the facts pleaded in
the information
o Under the circumstances, particularly the qualified plea given while unaided by counsel, it is
not prudent for the trial court to render such judgment finding the accused guilty of a capital
offense without absolute evidence to determine and clarify the true facts of the case!
o The proceedings of the trial court are irregular from the beginning because it was expressly
provided under Rule 112, Section 3 of the Rules of Court that
- If the defendant appears without attorney, he must be informed by the court
that it is his right to have attorney being arraigned., and must be asked if he
desires the aid of attorney, the Court must assign attorney de oficio to
defend him. A reasonable time must be allowed for procuring attorney.
o Under the provision, when a defendant appears without an attorney, the court has 4 important
duties!
1. Inform defendant that it is his right to have an attorney before arraignment
2. Court must ask if he desires the aid of an attorney
3. If he desires and is unable to employ, Court must assign attorney de oficio to
defend him
4. If he desires to procure an attorney of his own, Court must grant a reasonable time
therefore
o None of the duties have been complied with by the trial court! It did not inform defendant of
his right to have an attorney
nor did it ask him if he desired the air of one
 - The question asked was framed in a way to have been construed as a suggestion
from the court to plead guilty if he had no attorney!! Do you have an attorney or are
you going to plead guilty?
With regard the Mr Ocampo Court failed to inquire as to the true import of the qualification; no
investigation was opened by the Court on this matter in the presence of the accused and there is
no way of determining whether that instruction was a good defense or vitiate voluntariness of
confession
hours before trial, the FBI agent, accompanied by the prosecutor, showed five color photographs
to the witnesses, three of whom identified the picture of respondent. At trial, all four witnesses
made incourt identifications of respondent, but only one of these witnesses was "positive" of her
identification. The fact that three of the witnesses had previously identified respondent from the
color photographs, and the photographs themselves, were also admitted into evidence. The only
other evidence implicating respondent in the crime was the testimony of the Government
informant. On the basis of this evidence, respondent was convicted on all counts of the
indictment.

On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, sitting en
o Court was satisfied with the information of the fiscal that he has investigated Ocampo and banc, reversed respondent's conviction. Noting that "the dangers of mistaken identification from
found that he had nothing to do with the case uncounseled lineup identifications . . . are applicable in large measure to photographic, as well
as corporeal, identifications.
Court should have seen to it that the accused be assisted by counsel specially because of the
qualified plea given by him and the seriousness of the offense found to be capital by the court! The Court of Appeals reasoned that this Court's decisions in Wade, Gilbert, and Stovall
compelled the conclusion that a pretrial photographic identification, like a lineup, is a "critical"
Case is reversed and remanded. stage of the prosecution at which the accused is constitutionally entitled to the attendance of
counsel. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals held that respondent was denied his Sixth
Amendment right to "the Assistance of Counsel for his defence" when his attorney was not given
8. US v Ash
an opportunity to attend the display of the color photographs on the very eve of trial.
June 21, 1973
Panaligan, Celina
Hence, this appeal to the Supreme Court by the State.
Doctrine: the right to counsel may only be invoked during crucial stages of the prosecution
Issue: W/N the right to counsel embodied in the Sixth Amendment of the US Constitution may
(e.g. during lineup, arraignment, preliminary investigation, hearing, conviction), which the pre-
be invoked during the pretrial photographic identification stage, or the process of displaying
trial photographic identification stage, or the display of photographs to the witnesses of a crime
photographs (of accused) to the witnesses of a crime for the purpose of identifying the accused
for the purpose of identifying the accused, is not
Held: No.
Recit Ready: The US Supreme Court reversed and remanded to the Court of Appeals a
decision by the Court of Appeals holding that the right to counsel (Assistance to Counsel)
We are not persuaded that the risks inherent in the use of photographic displays are so
embodied in the Sixth Amendment of the US Constitution is extended to pretrial photographic
pernicious that an extraordinary system of safeguards is required.
lineups of suspects. In a photographic lineup, colored pictures of various suspects in a case are
presented to witnesses in order for witnesses to identify which among the suspects are most
We conclude that the dangers of mistaken identification, mentioned in Wade, were removed
probably the accused in a case. The Supreme Court ruled that a pretrial photographic lineup,
from context by the Court of Appeals and were incorrectly utilized as a sufficient basis for
such as the one conducted immediately before trial in this robbery case, is not a crucial stage in
requiring counsel. Although Wade did discuss possibilities for suggestion and the difficulty for
the proceedings, unlike a lineup, where a suspect is required to be physically present,
reconstructing suggestivity, this discussion occurred only after the Court had concluded that the
warranting the need of counsel assistance. No such attendance is required of a suspect in
lineup constituted a triallike confrontation, requiring the "Assistance of Counsel" to preserve the
photographic lineups of suspects.
adversary process by compensating for advantages of the prosecuting authorities.
Facts: (taken from Justice Brennans dissent)
Since the accused himself is not present at the time of the photographic display, and asserts no
right to be present, no possibility arises that the accused might be misled by his lack of
On the morning of August 26, 1965, two men wearing stocking masks robbed the American
familiarity with the law or overpowered by his professional adversary. Similarly, the counsel
Security and Trust Co. in Washington, D.C. The robbery lasted only about three or four minutes,
guarantee would not be used to produce equality in a triallike adversary confrontation. Rather,
and, on the day of the crime, none of the four witnesses was able to give the police a description
the guarantee was used by the Court of Appeals to produce confrontation at an event that
of the robbers' facial characteristics. Some five months later, on February 3, 1966, an FBI agent
previously was not analogous to an adversary trial. Even if we were willing to view the counsel
showed each of the four witnesses a group of black and white mug shots of the faces of five
guarantee in broad terms as a generalized protection of the adversary process, we would be
black males, including respondent, all of generally the same age, height, and weight.
unwilling to go so far as to extend the right to a portion of the prosecutor's trial preparation
Respondent's photograph was included because of information received from a Government
interviews with witnesses.
informant charged with other crimes. None of the witnesses was able to make a "positive"
identification of respondent.
We hold, then, that the Sixth Amendment does not grant the right to counsel at photographic
displays conducted by the Government for the purpose of allowing a witness to attempt an
On April 1, 1966, an indictment was returned charging respondent and a codefendant in five
identification of the offender. This holding requires reversal of the judgment of the Court of
counts relating to the robbery of the American Security and Trust Co. Trial was finally set for May
Appeals. Although respondent Ash has urged us to examine this photographic display under the
8, 1968, almost three years after the crime and more than two years after the return of the
due process standard enunciated in Simmons v.
indictment. During the entire two-year period between indictment and trial, although one of the
United States, the Court of Appeals, expressing the view that additional findings would be
witnesses expressly sought an opportunity to see respondent in person, the Government never
necessary, refused to decide the issue.
attempted to arrange a corporeal lineup for the purposes of identification. Rather, less than 24
We decline to consider this question on this record in the first instance. It remains open, of
course, on the Court of Appeals' remand to the District Court.
Reversed and remanded.
Stewart, J., concurring
A photographic identification is quite different from a lineup, for there are substantially fewer
possibilities of impermissible suggestion when photographs are used, and those unfair
influences can be readily reconstructed at trial. It is true that the defendant's photograph may be
markedly different from the other displayed, but this unfairness can be demonstrated at trial from
an actual comparison of the photographs used or from the witness' description of the display.
Similarly, it is possible that the photographs could be arranged in a suggestive manner, or that,
by comment or gesture, the prosecuting authorities might single out the defendant's picture. But
these are the kinds of overt influence that a witness can easily recount, and that would serve to
impeach the identification testimony. In short, there are few possibilities for unfair
suggestiveness and those rather blatant and easily reconstructed. Accordingly, an accused
would not be foreclosed from an effective cross-examination of an identification witness simply
because his counsel was not present at the photographic display. For this reason, a
photographic display cannot fairly be considered a "critical stage" of the prosecution.
Brennan, J., dissenting
The dangers of misidentification are even greater at a photographic display than at a lineup.
Moreover, as in the lineup situation, the possibilities for impermissible suggestion in the context
of a photographic display are manifold. Such suggestion, intentional or unintentional, may derive
from three possible sources. First, the photographs themselves might tend to suggest which of
the pictures is that of the suspect. For example, differences in age, pose, or other physical
characteristics of the persons represented, and variations in the mounting, background, lighting,
or markings of the photograph all might have the effect of singling out the accused. Second,
impermissible suggestion may inhere in the manner in which the photographs are displayed to
the witness. The danger of misidentification is, of course, "increased if the police display to the
witness . . . the pictures of several persons among which the photograph of a single such
individual recurs or is in some way emphasized." And, if the photographs are arranged in an
asymmetrical pattern, or if they are displayed in a time sequence that tends to emphasize a
particular photograph, "any identification of the photograph which stands out from the rest is no
more reliable than an identification of a single photograph, exhibited alone." Third, gestures or
comments of the prosecutor at the time of the display may lead an otherwise uncertain witness
to select the "correct" photograph.
Thus, as is the case with lineups, "[i]mproper photographic identification procedures, . . . by
exerting a suggestive influence upon the witnesses, can often lead to an erroneous
identification. . . ."
9. SALAW V. NLRC
RECIT READY
Salaw was terminated from employment on the ground that he allegedly fraudulently sold private
respondents foreclosed properties. However, during the investigation he was expressly made to
appear by the private respondents before the investigation committee without the assistance of
counsel. Petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal which the NLRC dismissed. The SC
ruled that petitioner was not accorded due process of law. The respondents premised their
dismissal solely on the admission of the offense imputed to him during the investigation.
However, this admission by the petitioner was extracted from him by the CIS without the
assistance of counsel and which was made the sole basis for his dismissal and therefore cannot
be admitted in evidence against him.
FACTS
Petitioner Salaw was employed by the private respondent Associated Bank as a credit
investigator-appraiser
The Criminal Investigation Service (CIS) of the Philippine Constabulary extracted from
petitioner, without the assistance of counsel, a Sworn Statement which made it appear
that the petitioner, in cahoots with a co-employee, sold twenty sewing machines and
electric generators which had been foreclosed by the respondent bank for 60,000 and
divided the proceeds among themselves
Tuazon, the bank manager, requested petitioner to appear before the banks
Personnel Discipline and Investigation Committee expressly stating that petitioner
should appear without counsel or representative
Petitioner was later terminated from employment for alleged serious misconduct or
willful disobedience and fraud or willful breach of the trust reposed on him by the
private respondents
Petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter declared that the
petitioners dismissal was illegal and ordered his reinstatement but the NLRC reversed
the decision and affirmed the dismissal of the petitioner
ISSUE: WON the dismissal of the petitioner was legally justified
HELD: NO
The requirements for the lawful dismissal of an employee by his employee are two
fold: substantive and procedural
The investigation of petitioner Salaw by the banks investigating committee violated his
constitutional right to due process in as much as he was not given a chance to defend
himself
Petitioner was unreasonably and expressly denied the assistance of
counsel during the investigation
While administrative and quasi-judicial bodies are not bound by the technical rules of
procedure,, the right to counsel has to be observed and is inviolable
The respondents premised their action in dismissing the complaint on his supposed
admission of the offense imputed to him by the CIS in its interrogation. The said
admission was carried in a Sworn Statement. But aside from this Statement, no other
evidence was presented by the respondents to establish this culpability of the
complainant in the fraudulent sale of respondents foreclosed properties
The admission by the petitioner was extracted from him by the CIS without the
assistance of counsel and which was made the sole basis for his dismissal and
therefore cannot be admitted in evidence against him
10. People v. Liwanag
Doctrine:
the right to be heard by counsel is the right to effective assistance of counsel
A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be
made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the
circumstances of counsels challenged conduct, and to evaluate the
conduct from counsels perspective at the time.
 Strickland standard invoked by accused-appellant is too stringent for
application in Philippine judicial setting. Strickland only seeks to
ensure that the adversarial testing process is present in a case by
requiring that the assistance rendered by counsel be effective.
In Philippine judicial setting, a counsel assisting an accused is
presumed to be providing all the necessary legal defense which are
reasonable under the circumstances in accordance with said norm
Section 14 (2) of the Philippine Constitution, the assistance afforded
by counsel to an accused in light of the Philippine constitutional
requirement need only be in accordance with the pertinent provisions
of the Rules of Court, the Code of Professional Responsibility and the
Canons of Professional Ethics.
NORMS:
Section 20 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court
Code of Professional Responsibility
Canons 2, 12, 17, 18, 19
Canons of Professional Ethics
failure to quash the information, his participation in the trial and presenting evidence in
his behalf, placed him in estoppel to make such challenge.
He has patently waived any objection or irregularities and is deemed as having
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court.
It should be noted that the legality of arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court
over the person of the accused. Consequently, if objection on such ground is waived,
the illegality of the arrest is not sufficient reason for setting aside an otherwise valid
judgment rendered after the trial, free from error. The technicality cannot render the
subsequent proceedings void and deprive the State of its right to convict the guilty
when the facts on the record point to the culpability of the accused.
The right to be heard by himself and counsel, a personal right guaranteed by the Bill
of Rights to an accused, just like any other personal right, may be waived.
Issue: WON Lope Liwanag was deprived of the right to be heard by counsel is the right to
effective assistance of counsel as he claimed that the assistance extended to him by his former
counsel was ineffective to the extent that private complainant, as well as prosecution witnesses
SPO1 Armando P. Sevilla and Editha Hernandez, were hardly cross-examined, while Dra.
Louella Nario was not cross-examined at all.
HELD: No. It is sufficient that the counsel of the accused complied with the standards set by law
and the rules of court re- practice of legal profession.
Based on the findings of the trial court, accused appellant was not at all prejudiced by the
alleged ineffectiveness of his counsel. The alleged failures by his counsel to safeguard his rights
from the time he was arrested up to the time he was sentenced and the alleged inadequacies in
the direct and cross-examinations of prosecution witnesses were ultimately inconsequential to
the eventual outcome of the case. If at all, the outcome was the result of the strength of the
prosecution evidence rather than the failures and inadequacies in the conduct of the defense.
Facts:
Accused-appellant Lope Liwanag y Buenaventura, and his coaccused Randy
Simbulan and Ramil Vendibil, were charged with crime of highway robbery with
multiple rape committed against Corazon Hernandez on April 27, 1992, in the
Municipality of Paranaque, Metro Manila.
Corazon Hernandez was on her way home at around 1am and so she hired the
tricycle by Ramil Vendibil for a special trip.
Simbulan and Liwanag boarded the tricycle. Liwanag entered at the passenger side,
threatened Hernandez with an icepick and declared hold-up.
Noting that Hernandez only had Php. 60.00, malefactors decided to have their way
with Hernandez to make their misdeeds fruitful.
Hernandez was subjected to acts of lasciviousness while on board the tricycle while
traveling the road.
Eventually, the suspects brought Hernandez to vacant-lot and satisfied their lusts and
illicit deeds by having sexual intercourse with the victim.
Hearing that shes going to be killed by the malefactors, Hernandez pleaded for her
life and offered that she would give what the offenders want.
They haggled for the price but eventually agreed that the offenders would demand
Php. 2,000 (from initial demand of 10k) in exchange for the life and safety of
Hernandez.
Hernandez reported the incident to her mother which eventually reported the incident
to Fort Bonifacio Police. There they planned an entrapment operation.
Guadalupe, Makati, Burger Machine corner. Hernandez gave the envelope with
money to Liwanag and immediately boarded the bus away from Liwanag. Liwanag
scrambled and was apprehended by the Police.
Liwanag alleged that while waiting for a ride in front of Jollibee at Guadalupe, Makati,
he was arrested by policemen in civilian clothes for being a rebel soldier, based on a
mark on his right fist indicating his membership in the Guardians Luzon, an
association of soldiers. He was brought to Fort Bonifacio where he allegedly met for
the first time Randy Simbulan and Ramil Vendibil. He claimed that the three of them
were beaten and subjected to electric shocks. He also claimed that policemen forced
his co accused to point to him.
Accused Appellant submits that he was deprived of his constitutional right to counsel
under Article III, Section 14, (2) of the 1987 Constitution which provides, thus:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until
the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and
counsel, x x x. (Italics supplied)
As a consequence, accusedappellant claims that from the time he was arrested up to
the time of his conviction, he was deprived of his other constitutional rights,
particularly his right to be secure in his person against unreasonable searches and
seizures,4 his right investigation,5 and his right to bail.6
to preliminary In addition, accusedappellant claims that the assistance extended to
him by his former counsel was ineffective to the extent that private complainant, as
well as prosecution witnesses SPO1 Armando P. Sevilla and Editha Hernandez, were
hardly crossexamined, while Dra. Louella Nario was not crossexamined at all.
In any case, accusedappellant claims that he could not have committed the crime
being imputed to him as he was engaged in a drinking session at the very moment
when the alleged crime was committed.
Accusedappellant maintains that the trial court erred in convicting him because: 1) the
prosecution failed to provide sufficient evidence positively identifying him as the
perpetrator of the crime; 2) inconsistencies tainted the prosecution evidence; 3) the
manner by which the crime was committed was improbable; and, 4) complainant
failed to offer any resistance prior to and even during her alleged rape.
11. People v. Larranaga
February 3, 2004
Doctrine
The right to counsel in the Constitution shows that the preference in the choice of
counsel pertains to persons under investigation rather than an accused in a criminal
prosecution.
 The choice of counsel by the accused in a criminal prosecution is not a plenary one. If
the chosen counsel deliberately makes himself scarce, the court is not precluded from
appointing a de oficio counsel whom it considers competent and independent to
enable the trial to proceed until the counsel of choice enters his appearance.
It is the right and duty of the trial court to control the crossexamination of witnesses,
both for the purpose of conserving its time and protecting the witnesses from
prolonged and needless examination. Where several accused are being tried jointly
for the same offense, the order in which counsel for the several defendants shall
cross-examine the states witnesses may be regulated by the court and one of them
may even be denied the right to crossexamine separately where he had arranged with
the others that counsel of one of them should cross-examine for all.
Canon 14 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics states that a judge may properly intervene
during trial to promote expeditious proceeding, prevent unnecessary waste of time
and dilly-dallying of counsel or clear up obscurities.
Due process is not denied by the exclusion of irrelevant, immaterial, or incompetent
evidence or testimony of an incompetent witness.
Recit Ready (from Jech Tiu)
During trial, LARRANAGAs counsel de parte unceremoniously withdrew
Thus, LARRANAGA asked for a continuance of 3 weeks to 1 month wanting to
procure counsel of his own choice
In order to prevent any dilatory maneuvers on the part of the defense counsel, the
court appointed counsel de oficio and refused to suspend the trial
LARRANGA contested that he was denied the right to counsel
The SC held that there is no denial of the right to counsel where a counsel de oficio
was appointed during the absence of the accuseds counsel de parte, pursuant to the
courts desire to finish the case as early as practicable under the continuous trial
system
The appointment of counsel de oficio under such circumstances is not
proscribed by the Constitution
The SC also held that the preference in the choice of counsel applies more aptly and
specifically to a person under custodial investigation, rather than an accused in a
criminal prosecution
But even if the application is extended, such preferential discretion is not
absolute as would enable the accused to choose a particular counsel to the
exclusion of others who are equally capable
The choice of counsel by the accused in a criminal prosecution is not a
plenary one, because if the chosen counsel deliberately makes himself
scarce, then the court is not precluded from appoint a de oficio counsel
The SC further held that an application for a continuance in order to secure the
services of counsel is ordinarily addressed to the discretion of the court and the denial
thereof is not ordinarily an infringement of the accuseds right to counsel
The right of the accused to select his own counsel must be exercised in a
reasonable time and in a reasonable manner
Last but not least, the SC held that while the accused has the right to discharge or
change his counsel at any time, the same is, to some extent, subject to supervision by
the court, particularly after trial has commenced
The court may deny the application to discharge counsel, where it appears
that such application is not made in good faith, but is made for the purposes
of delay
Facts
Respondents were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of kidnapping
and serious illegal detention and sentencing each of them to suffer the penalties of
two (2) reclusiones perpetua
Rusia, one of the suspects of the case, became a state witness. He
narrated the events that took place.
They kidnapped Marijoy and Jacqueline Chong. They took them to a cliff
where they drank and smoked weed. They took turns raping Marijoy
afterwhich they pushed her off a cliff resulting to her death. They also took
turns raping Jacqueline. She tried to run towards the road. The group
boarded the van, followed her and made fun of her. They brought her back
to the van where she was beaten up until she passed out.
Appellants claim that the trial court have trampled upon their rights of (a) right to be
assisted by counsel at every stage of the proceedings; (b) right to confront and cross- -
examine the prosecution witnesses; (c) right to produce evidence on their behalf; and
(d) right to an impartial trial.
Issue
WON the minimum requirements of due process were accorded to appellants during
the trial of these cases
Held
Sec. 14, Article III of the Constitution provides the essential elements of due process
in a criminal prosecution
SECTION 14. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense
without due process of law.
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent
until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself
and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the
witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the
attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf.
However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence
of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to
appear is unjustifiable.
Appellants fault the trial court first, for appointing counsel de oficio despite their
insistence to be assisted by counsel of their own choice; and second, for refusing to
suspend trial until they shall have secured the services of new counsel.
There was no denial of right to counsel were a counsel de oficio was
appointed during the absence of the accuseds counsel de parte, pursuant
to the courts desire to finish the case as early as practicable under the
continuous trial system.
It was the strategic machinations of appellants and their counsel de parte
which prompted the trial court to appoint counsel de oficio. The
unceremonious withdrawal of appeal of their counsel and the refusal to
return to the court for trial undermines the continuity of the proceedings.
The right to counsel in the Constitution shows that the preference in the
choice of counsel pertains to persons under investigation rather than an
accused in a criminal prosecution.
The choice of counsel by the accused in a criminal prosecution is not a
plenary one. If the chosen counsel deliberately makes himself scarce, the
court is not precluded from appointing a de oficio counsel whom it considers
competent and independent to enable the trial to proceed until the counsel
of choice enters his appearance.
 Neither was there a violation of right to counsel by denying their request for
the suspension of trial for their search for new counsel.
Appellants requested either one month or three weeks to look for
new counsel.. Such period is unreasonable.
Appellants also fault the trial court for depriving them of the right to crossexamine
Rusia and the other prosecution witnesses.
All of appellants counsel de parte had a fair share of time in grilling Rusia
concerning his background to the kidnapping of Marijoy and Jacqueline. The
limitation on the length of time counsel for appellants may cross-examine
Rusia cannot be labeled as a violation of the latters constitutional right.
It is the right and duty of the trial court to control the cross-examination of
witnesses, both for the purpose of conserving its time and protecting the
witnesses from prolonged and needless examination. Where several
accused are being tried jointly for the same offense, the order in which
counsel for the several defendants shall cross-examine the states
witnesses may be regulated by the court and one of them may even be
denied the right to crossexamine separately where he had arranged with the
others that counsel of one of them should cross-examine for all.
The failure of the PAO lawyers to cross-examine some of the prosecution
witnesses was due to appellants obstinate refusal.
Appellants impute bias and partiality to Judge Ocampo when he asked questions and
made comments when the defense witnesses were testifying.
Canon 14 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics states that a judge may properly
intervene during trial to promote expeditious proceeding, prevent
unnecessary waste of time and dilly-dallying of counsel or clear up
obscurities.
The intervention by way of comment of Judge Ocampo during the hearing
was not only appropriate but necessary. His comments were honest
observations intended to warn the witnesses to be candid to the court.
Statements regarding the witnesses for the defense do not indicate any
bias.
The comments made against Lourdes Montalvan were not to cast
doubt on her moral character but to determine the credibility of
her story.
Appellants assail the trial courts exclusion of the testimonies of four (4) airlines
personnel which were intended to prove that Larraaga did not travel to Cebu from
Manila or from Cebu to Manila on July 16, 1997.
Larranaga attempted to prove that he was at Quezon City so distant that his
participation in the crime was impossible. To prove that he was not in the
preflight and postflight of the four (4) major airlines flying the route of Cebu
to Manila and Manila to Cebu on July 15 and 16, 1997 would not prove the
legal requirement of physical impossibility because he could have taken
the flight from Manila to Cebu prior to that date, such as July 14, 1997.
To prove that he was enrolled during a certain period of time does not
negate the possibility that he went home to Cebu City.
Due process is not denied by the exclusion of irrelevant, immaterial, or
incompetent evidence or testimony of an incompetent witness.
Due process is satisfied when the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity
to explain their sides of the controversy. In this case, there is no showing of violation of
due process.
12. People v Regala
27 April 1982
Doctrine:
The
Recit-ready:
The
Facts:
Rudy Regala and Delfin Flores stabbed with a knife Sgt. Juan Desilos of the Philippine
Constabulary killing him.
Erlina Tindon and Evanglista both testified as eyewitnesses.
Desilor was guarding an exit gate in a coronation dance when Regala and
Flores attempted to go inside through it.
Desilos pushed them and prohibited them from going thru the exit. Regala
took a knife from his waist and stabbed him. Afterwhich, they ran away.
Dr. de los Santos testified that the knife exhibited during the hearing was not brought
to the hospital. Sergeant Taleon, who was at the scene, recovered the knife 5 meters
away from the scene dripping with blood.
Witnesses for defense who were meters behind the incident testified that they did not
know the man who stabbed Desilos but saw Regala drinking in a canteen far from
Magallanes Gate before the incident. One testified that she knew Regala for a long
time but did not see him at the incident. Another testified that he was with Regala, who
was at his side, drinking at the moment the stabbing incident was announced. Another
testified that he was guarding another gate and the incident occurred on the following
night contrary to the testimony of the other side.
Regala testified that he was at the canteen at that time and that he knew Flores but
did not see him that day.
He was arrested with Ampuan on the following day at the market. He was
later released and then arrested again now with Espinas. He was
maltreated and ordered to admit the crime.
Days later, Regala and Flores were brought to the municipal building and
the taken to the provincial jail.
Flores testified that he was arrested that night when he drew a knife when someone
boxed him after the announcement of the incident. He was also maltreated.
The trial Judge gave more credence to the testimonies of petitioner. Regala was
convicted of murder with assault and Flores was found guilty as accessory. Regala
was imposed the penalty of death.
Issue: WON Regala was denied due process in the absence of an impartial trial?
Held:
The jurisprudence under the 1935 Constitution treated the right of an accused to
impartial trial as an aspect of the guarantee of due process. Under the present
Constitution, that right to impartial trial is now expressly declared as one of the
cardinal rights of an accused.
It is a fundamental right enshrined in the Constitution that no one is to be deprived of
his liberty without due process of law. Moreover, there is a specific reference to its
indispensability in a criminal prosecution. Thus is emphasized its importance for an
accused. He can rely on the guarantee of fairness according to the fundamental law,
 which moreover, provides additional safeguards at the stage of trial. Our Constitution
does indeed go far in throwing the mantle of its protection on the one who is caught in
the meshes of criminal law. The proceeding must neither be arbitrary nor unjust. It is to
underscore the importance of a trial judge being detached and objective, free from
bias
The thrust of appellants posture is that the trial Judge, considering his fully justified
indignation and revulsion at the commission of such a monstrous crime of murder,
became prejudiced against appellant (as well as his codefendant) after his previous
criminal conviction was brought forth during the trial, to the extent that the trial Judge
no longer gave due consideration to the evidence of the defense
WE do not agree with counsel de officio that the trial court failed to accord appellant
Rudy Regala a fair trial. Appellant has not pointed, and We have found none, to
any part or stage of the trial betraying the trial Judges hostility, bias and
prejudice against the appellant after the prosecution had brought forth the fact
of appellants previous criminal conviction. As a matter of fact, appellants previous
conviction of the crimes of malicious mischief and slight physical injuries was testified
to only by the witness last presented by the prosecution in its evidence in chief. And
the trial Judge, contrary to the claim of the appellant, gave due consideration to his
evidence as shown by the fact that in the decision of conviction, the trial Judge
examined extensively the testimonies of all the eight witnesses for the defense.
Consequently, while the quoted portions of the judgment of conviction are
interspersed with statements and phrases which properly should not have been
made as they may be wrongly interpreted as indicative of bias and prejudice,
such aforestated statements and phrases in the judgment of conviction do not
per se constitute evidence of bias and impartiality in the conduct of the trial by
the trial Judge as to violate appellants right to an impartial trial. WE view the trial
Judges aforequoted statements and phrases as merely an expression, in the very
words of appellants counsel de officio herself, of the Judges fully justified indignation
and revulsion at the commission of such a monstrous crime.
Wherefore, appellant rodolfo regala alias rudy regala is hereby found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide aggravated by recidivism and by contempt
for or insult to a public authority or disregard of the respect due the offended party on
account of his rank, without any mitigating circumstance, and he is hereby sentenced
to suffer an indeterminate term of imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years of
prison mayor as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum:
thus modified, the judgment appealed from his hereby affirmed in all other respects.
13. Enrile v. Salazar - 186 SCRA 217
DOCTRINE:
There is nothing inherently irregular or contrary to law in filing against a respondent an
indictment for an offense different from what is charged in the initiatory complaint, if warranted
by the evidence developed during the preliminary investigation.
FACTS:
Year: 1990
Feb. 27, 1990
Senate Minority Floor Leader Juan Ponce Enrile was arrested by law enforcement officers led by
Director Alfredo Lim of the NBI.
Basis: warrant issued by Hon. Jaime Salazar of the RTC of Quezon City
charged Senator Enrile, the spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and Gregorio
Honasan with the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder
allegedly committed during the period of the failed coup attempt from November 29 to
December 10, 1990.
Senator Enrile was taken to and held overnight at the NBI headquarters on Taft
Avenue, Manila, without bail, none having been recommended in the information and
none fixed in the arrest warrant.
Feb. 28, 1990
brought to Camp Tomas Karingal in Quezon City
given over to the custody of the Superintendent of the Northern Police District, Brig.
Gen. Edgardo Dula Torres.
Senator Enrile, through counsel, filed the petition for habeas corpus herein (which was
followed by a supplemental petition filed on March 2, 1990), alleging that he was
deprived of his constitutional rights in being, or having been:
1. held to answer for criminal offense which does not exist in the statute books;
2. charged with a criminal offense in an information for which no complaint was initially
filed or preliminary investigation was conducted, hence was denied due process;
3. denied his right to bail
4. arrested and detained on the strength of a warrant issued without the judge who
issued it first having personally determined the existence of probable cause
Court
issued the writ prayed for, returnable March 5, 1990
set the plea for hearing on March 6, 1990.
Mar. 5, 1990
the Solicitor General filed a consolidated return for the respondents which had been
contemporaneously but separately filed by two of Senator Enriles co-accused, the
spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio, and raised similar questions.
return urged that the petitioners case does not fall within the Hernandez ruling
because the information in Hernandez charged murders and other common crimes
committed as a necessary means for the commission of rebellion, whereas the
information against Sen. Enrile et al. charged murder and frustrated murder committed
on the occasion, but not in furtherance, of rebelion..
the Solicitor General would distinguish between the complex crime (delito complejo)
arising from an offense being a necessary means for committing another, which is
referred to in the second clause of Article 48, Revised Penal Code, and is the subject
of the Hernandez ruling, and the compound crime (delito compuesto) arising from a
single act constituting two or more grave or less grave offenses referred to in the first
clause of the same paragraph, with which Hernandez was not concerned and to
which, therefore, it should not apply.
Mar 6
oral argument: parties heard
Court issued resolution: granting Senator Enrile and the Panlilio spouses provisional
liberty conditioned upon their filing, within 24 hours from notice, cash or surety bonds
of P100,000.00 (for Senator Enrile) and P200,000.00 (for the Panlilios),
it was issued without prejudice to a more extended resolution on the matter of the
provisional liberty of the petitioners and stressed that it was not passing upon the legal
issues raised in both cases.
ISSUE/S:
1. What should be the treatment to the Hernandez ruling: a) abandon, b) hold Hernandez
applicable only to offenses committed in furtherance, or as a necessary means for the
commission, of rebellion, but not to acts committed in the course of a rebellion or c)
maintain Hernandez as applying to make rebellion absorb all other offenses
committed in its course, whether or not necessary to its commission or in furtherance
thereof.
2. Was Senator Enrile deprived of his constitutional rights in being, or having been:
1. held to answer for criminal offense which does not exist in the statute books;
 2. charged with a criminal offense in an information for which no complaint was initially
filed or preliminary investigation was conducted, hence was denied due process;
3. denied his right to bail; and
4. arrested and detained on the strength of a warrant issued without the judge who
issued it first having personally determined the existence of probable cause.
HELD:
Applicability of Hernandez Ruling
Majority voted that the ruling remains good law, its substantive and logical bases have withstood
all subsequent challenges and no nw ones are presented here persuasive enough to warrant a
complete reversal. Hernandez remains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of
rebellion with any other offense committed on the occasion thereof, either as a means necessary
to its commission or as an unintended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion.
Held to answer for criminal offense which does not exist in the statute books;
Read in the context of Hernandez, the information does indeed charge the petitioner
with a crime defined and punished by the Revised Penal Code: simple rebellion
Charged with a criminal offense in an information for which no complaint was initially filed or
preliminary investigation was conducted, hence was denied due process
The record shows otherwise, that a complaint against petitioner for simple rebellion
was filed by the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, and that on the
strength of said complaint a preliminary investigation was conducted by the
respondent prosecutors, culminating in the filing of the questioned information.
There is nothing inherently irregular or contrary to law in filing against a respondent an
indictment for an offense different from what is charged in the initiatory complaint, if
warranted by the evidence developed during the preliminary investigation.
Arrested and detained on the strength of a warrant issued without the judge who issued it first
having personally determined the existence of probable cause
it is not the unavoidable duty of the judge to make such a personal examination, it
being sufficient that he follows established procedure by personally evaluating the
report and the supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor.
Merely because said respondent had what some might consider only a relatively brief
period within which to comply with that duty, gives no reason to assume that he had
not, or could not have, so complied; nor does that single circumstance suffice to
overcome the legal presumption that official duty has been regularly performed.
Denied right to bail
In the light of the Courts reaffirmation of Hernandez as applicable to petitioners case,
and of the logical an.d necessary corollary that the information against him should be
considered as charging only the crime of simple rebellion, which is bailable before
conviction, that must now be accepted as a correct proposition.
The criminal case before the respondent Judge was the normal venue for invoking the
petitioners right to have provisional liberty pending trial and judgment.
The original jurisdiction to grant or deny bail rested with said respondent.
The correct course was for petitioner to invoke that jurisdiction by filing a petition to be
admitted to bail, claiming a right to bail per se by reason of the weakness of the
evidence against him.
Only after that remedy was denied by the trial court should the review jurisdiction of
this Court have been invoked, and even then, not without first applying to the Court of
Appeals if appropriate relief was also available there.
WHEREFORE, the Court reiterates that based on the doctrine enunciated in People vs.
Hernandez, the questioned information filed against petitioners Juan Ponce Enrile and the
spouses Rebecco and Erlinda Panlilio must be read as charging simple rebellion only, hence
said petitioners are entitled to bail, before final conviction, as a matter of right. The Courts
earlier grant of bail to petitioners being merely provisional in character, the proceedings in both
cases are ordered REMANDED to the respondent Judge to fix the amount of bail to be posted
by the petitioners. Once bail is fixed by said respondent for any of the petitioners, the
corresponding bail bond filed with this Court shall become functus oficio. No pronouncement as
to costs.
OTHER OPINIONS
1. Fernan C.J. - separate dissenting and concurring
I cannot go along with the view of the majority in the instant case that Hernandez remains
binding doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other offense
committed on the occasion thereof, either as a means necessary to its commission or as an
unintended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion
The majority of the Court
correct in adopting, albeit impliedly, the view in Hernandez case that when an offense
perpetrated as a necessary means of committing another, which is an element of the
latter, the resulting interlocking crimes should be considered as only one simple
offense and must be deemed outside the operation of the complex crime provision
(Article 48) of the Revised Penal Code.
As in the case of Hernandez, the Court, however, failed in the instant case to
distinguish what is indispensable from what is merely necessary in the commission of
an offense, resulting thus in the rule that common crimes like murder, arson, robbery,
etc. committed in the course or on the occasion of rebellion are absorbed or included
in the latter as elements thereof.
I concur in the result insofar as the other issues are resolved by the Court but I take exception to
the vote of the majority on the broad application of the Hernandez doctrine.
1. Melancio-Herrera and Feliciano, J.J. - separate opinion
The remand of the case to the lower Court for further proceedings is in order. The Writ of
Habeas Corpus has served its purpose.
1. Gutierrez, Jr., J. - concurring
The crime of rebellion consists of many acts. The dropping of one bomb cannot be isolated as a
separate crime of rebellion. Neither should the dropping of one hundred bombs or the firing of
thousands of machine gun bullets be broken up into a hundred or thousands of separate
offenses, if each bomb or each bullet happens to result in the destruction of life and property.
The same act cannot be punishable by separate penalties depending on what strikes the fancy
of prosecutorspunishment for the killing of soldiers or retribution for the deaths of civilians.
1. Paras, J. - concur with sep. opinion of Padilla
1. Padilla, J. - dissenting opinion
I dissent, however, from the majority opinion insofar as it holds that the information in question,
while charging the complex crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder, is to
be read as charging simple rebellion.
Difference with Hernandez case:
Hernandez - (appealed case) Hernandez had been convicted by the trial court of the complex
crime of rebellion with murder, arson and robbery, and his plea to be released on bail before the
Supreme Court, pending appeal, gave birth to the now celebrated Hernandez doctrine that the
crime of rebellion complexed with murder, arson and robbery does not exist.
Case at hand - (original case) information has been recently filed in the trial court and the
petitioners have not even pleaded thereto. The prosecution and the lower court, not only had the
Hernandez doctrine (as case law), but Executive Order No. 187 of President Corazon C. Aquino
dated 5 June 1987 (as statutory law) to bind them to the legal proposition that the crime of
rebellion complexed with murder, and multiple frustrated murder does not exist
That information is clearly a nullity and plainly void ab initio. Its head should not be allowed to
surface. As a nullity in substantive law, it charges nothing; it has given rise to nothing. The
warrants of arrest issued pursuant thereto are as null and void as the information on which they
are anchored. And, since the entire question of the informations validity is before the Court in
these habeas corpus cases, I venture to say that the information is fatally defective, even under
procedural law, because it charges more than one (1) offense
The prosecution must file an entirely new and proper information, for this entire exercise to merit
the serious consideration of the courts.
1. Bidin, J. - concurring and dissenting
CONCUR: All except remanding case for further proceedings to fix the amount of bail
(discussion not related)
1. Sarmiento, J. - concurring and dissenting
Concur: agree that the information may stand as an accusation for simple rebellion. Since the
acts complained of as constituting rebellion have been embodied in the information, mention
therein of murder as a complexing offense is a surplusage, because in any case, the crime of
rebellion is left fully described. At any rate, the government need only amend the information by
a clerical correction, since an amendment will not alter its substance.
Diseent: orders the remand of the matter of bail to the lower court (discussion not related)
14. People v Legazpi (1940)
Super short case! Copied everything haha
FACTS
On October 21, 1936, Eligio Legaspi, Dionisio Perez, Leon Maraiio, Andres Concha,
Andres Quintano, Antonio Borromeo, Isidoro Agaton, and Mariano Ofiate, who were
then chief, sergeant, and members respectively of the municipal police force of Naga,
Camarines Sur, were charged with robbery in the Court of First Instance of Camarines
Sur.
In accordance with the provisions of section 2272 of the Revised Administrative
Code of 1917, as amended by Act No. 3206, the municipal president of Naga
suspended the said accused pending the final decision of the case by the court. After
hearing, the trial court absolved the accused on the ground of reasonable doubt,
without, however, making any pronouncement in the decision regarding their right to
collect their remuneration during the period of their suspension.
On September 17, 1937, the herein appellants filed a motion asking the trial court to
confirm their claim to their salaries in view of their acquittal. The court, in its order of
October 13, 1937, hereinabove referred to, denied the petition. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE
Whether or not the trial court erred in refusing to make a pronouncement as to the right of the
appellants to receive their compensation during their suspension from office. NO
HELD
The pertinent portion of section 2272 of Act No. 2711, as amended by Act No. 3206,
which is now in issue, provides as follows:
o "When a chief or member of the municipal police is accused in court of any
felony or violation of law by the provincial fiscal, the municipal president
shall immediately suspend the accused from office pending the final
decision of the case by the courts and, in case of acquittal, the accused
shall be entitled to payment of the entire salary he failed to receive during
his suspension if the court should so provide in its sentence." (Italics ours.)
It is clear that when a chief or member of the municipal police is accused in court of
any felony or violation of law, he may be suspended immediately by the municipal
president, and that should he be acquitted, he may receive his entire salary for the
term of his suspension "if the court should provide in its sentence."
In other words, mere exculpation does not entitle the suspended police official to the
salary which accrued during suspension. The court must authorize payment. In the
present case, the lower court advisedly declined to so authorize. We find no reason for
interfering with the exercise of the authority conferred upon the lower court.
The order appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellants.
15. People v. Dela Cruz (2002)
Facts
- Accused-apppellant Danilo dela Cruz was found guilty of two counts of rape and one
count of acts of lasciviousness by the RTC.
- August 29, 1997 two informations for rape were filed.
a. Criminal Case No. 15163-R That sometime in the month of September,
1990, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above- named accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of his daughter, JEANNIE
ANN DELA CRUZ, a minor, then 11 years of age, against her will and
consent.
b. Criminal Case No. 15164-R That sometime in the month of July, 1995, in
the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above- named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously and by means of force and intimidation, have carnal
knowledge of his daughter, JEANNIE ANN DELA CRUZ, a minor, then 16
years of age, against her will and consent.
- December 11, 1997, another information was filed in violation of RA No. 7610 (The
Special Protection Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act.
a. Criminal Case No. 15368 - R - That on or about the 2nd day of August,
1997, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above- named accused, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously commit sexual abuse on his daughter either by
raping her or committing acts of lasciviousness on her, which has debased,
degraded and demeaned the intrinsic worth and dignity of his daughter,
JEANNIE ANN DELA CRUZ as a human being.
The cases were consolidated and a trial ensued.
The victim was the child of Danilo dela Cruz.
Testimonies of Jeannie Ann (victim):
Her father started molesting her when she was seven. He warned not to her
mother because what they are doing is a normal thing.
In 1990, she was sexually-abused in their house in Baguio. She was 11 years
old.
The accused abused her one night in July 1995 when she was 16 years old.
She did not tell anyone as he threatened her that he would kill her or her mother
and siblings.
The third incident: August 1997
 The victim went outside to deal with what happened to her. While walking
outside she saw a white L-300 van belonging to the police.
She flagged down and narrated to the police officers what happened to her.
Police went to their house and Danilo voluntarily went with them to the Police
Station.
- Testimony of Dr. Bandonill, medico-legal officer: he found two healed lacerations; he
said that it is possible that penetration happened several times.
- Defense of Danilo:
Denied all the allegations
Claimed that his wife and Jeannie Ann conspired to file the cases against him
because they had resentments against him. He said Jeannie Ann blamed him
for having caused her break-up with her boyfriend Charles. His wife wanted him
out because she had a paramour
RTCs Decision:
Criminal Case No. 15163 R: guilty beyond reasonable doubt; reclusion perpetua
Criminal Case No. 15164- R: guilty beyond reasonable doubt (incest rape in 1995); penalized
under Sec 11 of RA 7659 (Heinous Crime Law)
Criminal Case No. 15368-R: guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense Acts of
Lasciviousness defined under Article 336 of RPC instead of violation of RA 7610
Issue (in relation to Sec. 12)
W/N the Information in Criminal Case No. 15368-R should be null and void.
Held
Information in Criminal Case No. 15368-R is null and void
The Court also finds that accused-appellant cannot be convicted of rape or acts of
lasciviousness under the information in Criminal Case No. 15368-R, which charges accused-
appellant of a violation of R.A. No. 7610 (The Special Protection of Children Against Child
Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act), either by raping her or committing acts of
lasciviousness.
It is readily apparent that the facts charged in said information do not constitute an offense. The
information does not cite which among the numerous sections or subsections of RA No. 7610
has been violated by accused-appellant. Moreover, it does not state the acts and omissions
constituting the offense, or any special or aggravating circumstances attending the same, as
required under the rules of criminal procedure. Section 8, Rule 110 thereof provides:
Designation of the offense.The complaint or information shall state the designation of
the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and
specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the
offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it.
The allegation in the information that accused-appellant willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously commit sexual abuse on his daughter [Jeannie Ann] either by raping her or
committing acts of lasciviousness on her is not a sufficient averment of the acts
constituting the offense as required under Section 8, for these are conclusions of law, not
facts.
The information in Criminal Case No. 15368-R is therefore void for being violative of the
accused- appellants constitutionally-guaranteed right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him.
Even though the accused failed to call the attention of the Court regarding the defects of the
Information, the Court may motu proprio dismiss said information at this stage:
a. Patent violation of the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of
accusation against him
b. Appeal in criminal proceeding throws the whole case open for review
Other Important Parts of the Decision:
- Delay in reporting a rape incident does not necessarily impair the credibility of the
victim (can be brought by fear)
- No woman would fabricate charges of sexual abuse, allow an examination of her
private parts and endure humiliation.
- The trial court erred in imposing the supreme penalty of death for the rape committed
in 1995. RA No. 7659, which was already in force at that time requires that the
circumstances of minority of the victim and her relationship with the offender must
concur for death penalty to be imposable.
-
16. People v. Esperanza
ON June 14, 1997, Gina left for Manila to attend to some business. After Gina left, Irma
observed that although Nelson slept in the sala when she and Jenelle were about to
sleep, she would later found him betwwen her and Jenelle.
Irma was awakened by the feeling that her breast were being mashed and that
something was being inserted into her vagina. Irma recognized that it was Nelson.
Nelson then laid on top of her, undressed her, and forcefully inserted his penis into her
vagina.
Nelson warned her not to tell anybody otherwise, he would kill her.
It was only on June 24 same year that Irma got the courage to leave the house of
Nelson.
In Manila, Mary, a friend of Irma, testified that Irma admitted to her that Nelson raped
hera dn they wanted ot seek assistance of their teacher Mrs. Salcedo
So.. Nelson was charged for the rape of his 13 years old niece
supposedly, minority and relationship (which 3 rd civil degree sila ni nelson) are
qualifying circumstance in the crime of rape.
But the information does not allege that he is related to her within 3 rd civil degree of
consanguinity and was charge under the par 1 of Art 355 of RPC (intimidation), and not
under par 2 or 3 (minority/ deprivation of reason)
We also take note of the fact that while the informations allege that Irma was 13 years
old at the time she was raped, her birth certificate reveals that she was only 11 years old
at the time, having been born on 29 November 1985.
ISSUE: can Nelson be held liable of statutory rape instead?
HELD: NO!
SC held that to convict him under either of these statutory provisions is to deprive him
of the constitutional right to be informed of the accusation against him. Section 14 (2),
Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that [i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
SC also held that in this case, the specific relationship, that he is a relative by
consanguinity or affinity within 3rd civil degree, must have been alleged.
 Qualifying circumstance must be alleged in the information and proved during the trial.
17. People v. Purazo
Doctrine: The date is not an essential element of the crime of rape, for the gravamen of the
offense is carnal knowledge of a woman.
Recit Ready (from Jech Tiu):
PURAZO was charged and convicted of rape and he alleged that the information failed to state
with particularity the time when the rape was committed and, thus, violating his right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusations against him
o It provided merely sometime in the Month of March 1997
The SC held that under Section 11, Rule 110 of the RoC, it is not necessary to state in the
complaint or information the precise time at which the offense was committed, except when time
is a material ingredient of the offense, provided it meets two criteria:
o It is as near as to the actual date of commission of the offense as the complaint or
information of the prosecuting officer will permit
o The time ultimately proved should be as so alleged in the complaint or information
The SC also held that under jurisprudence, date is not an essential element in the crime of
rape, as the gravamen of the offense is carnal knowledge of a woman
o Thus, the time or place of commission in rape cases need not be accurately stated
The SC further held that where the time or place or any other fact alleged is not an essential
element of the crime charged, conviction may be had on proof of the commission of the crime,
provided that the specific crime charged was committed prior to the date of the filing of the
complaint or information, even if:
o It appears that the crime was not committed at the precise time or place alleged
o The proof fails to sustain the existence of some immaterial fact set out in the
complaint
FACTS:
SOLOMON PURAZO was found guilty by the trial court of rape perpetrated against
his own twelve (12)-year old daughter ROWENA.
He was sentenced to death and ordered to indemnify his victim P100,000.00 for moral
damages
To prove the guilt of the accused, the prosecution presented six (6) witnesses.
The combined testimonies of the prosecution witnesses show that the ordeal of
ROWENA started when she was seven (7). She endured her tribulation until she was
nearly twelve (12).
she lived with her father and the latters common-law wife, Amalia Montejas,
together with the latters daughter by another man, two (2) younger half-
brothers, a younger half-sister, and her aunt Rebecca Purazo, the sister of
her father.
From the time she turned seven (7) until she was eleven (11), her father would insert
his finger into her sex organ, until he finally inserted his penis into her vagina. Purazo
did this to Rowena so many times that the latter could no longer remember the
number of times.
Rowena remembered that her father sexually molested her twice or thrice a
week whenever he was drunk or under the influence of drugs.
When she was ten years old, she disclosed these experiences to her
stepmother but the latter ignored here.
At 11, she told the rape incidents to her aunt and grandmother, but when
Purazo was confronted, he denied the accusation.
One time, Rowena refused to go home when her father commanded her to do so.
Because of her refusal, Purazo hit Rowena which resulted to dizziness of the latter.
The incidents of hitting, dragging and brutal acts of Purazo were witnessed by
Rowenas grandmother, aunt, and nieces.
Purazo told Rowena that he would kill her because she had defamed him. Upon
hearing this, Rowena ran outside the house and went to the Barangay Hall to report
the matter.
Rowena disclosed that she was not only mauled but was also sexuallly
molested.
Rowena was brought to Cebu Medical Center where she was physically examined.
The doctor noticed that her hymenal ring was intact and former did not find any
swelling that signifies irritation.
Rowena was also tested negative for the presence of spermatozoa which
however can only last for three days inside the uterus.
Purazo professed innocence and claimed that the rape tales were concocted by his
rebellious daughter to get back to him after he had been imposing corporal
punishment to her for staying out late at night.
Trial court found Purazo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of raping his minor daughter
and sentenced him death.
ISSUE: Whether or not Purazo shall be exonerated because the criminal complaint charged no
specific instance when the offence was commited.
RULING: NO
Section 11, Rule 110, of the Rules of Court, provides:
Sec. 11. Time of Commission of the Offense. - It is not necessary to state in the
complaint or information the precise time at which the offense was committed
except when time is a material ingredient of the offense, but the act may be alleged
to have been committed at anytime as near to the actual date at which the offense
was committed as the information or complaint will permit.
we said that the time averred in the complaint or information would only
need, unless the precise time of commission of the offense is an essential
element thereof, to meet two (2) criteria:
(a) it is as near to the actual date of commission of the offense as the
complaint or information of the prosecuting officer will permit; and,
(b) the time ultimately proved should be as so alleged in the complaint or
information.
the date is not an essential element of the crime of rape, for the gravamen of the
offense is carnal knowledge of a woman.
as such the time or place of commission in rape cases need not be accurately stated.
18. Garcia v People
Doctrine:
The real nature of the crime charged is determined by the facts alleged in the Information
and not by the title or designation of the offense contained in the
caption of the Information. It is fundamental that every element of which the offense is
comprised must be alleged in the Information.
Recit Ready: [No need kasi sobrang ikli lang ng case]
Facts:
Garcia was charged with estafa by Apolonio by issuing 3 checks drawn against
insufficient funds. The checks were issued as payment for vegetables amounting to
P87,000.00 purchased from Apolonio. The checks were supposedly drawn by Garcias
husband, daughter, and cousin. Garcias defense that she here customer paid the checks,
while also contesting that she does not issue checks not written by her.
 The Information of complaint stated that the said accused unlawfully and feloniously
defraud one DOLORES S. APOLONIO by means of false manifestations and fraudulent
representations induced the said DOLORES S. APOLONIO to accept the following
checks knowingly full well that were all false and untrue as said checks
whenpresented to the bank for payment were all dishonored for the reason Drawn
Against Insufficient Funds, and were made solely for the purpose of obtaining, as in fact
she did obtain assorted vegetables in the amount of P87,000.00;
She was found guilty by the trial court of the crime of Estafa under Art. 315, Sec. 2(2)
(sic) of the Revised Penal Code. There is a typographical error in the dispositive of the
trial court. There is no 2(2).
The Petitioner now contests that her constitutional right to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against her was violated. She asserts while she was charged
for Estafa under Art. 315, Sec. 2(a) o, she was penalized for Estafa under Art. 315, Sec.
2(d) (sic) of the Revised Penal Code
2(a) penalizaes false representations in defrauding another. 2(d) penalizes the
issuance of insufficiently funded checks
Issue: WN the Information was insufficient in informing Garcia of the nature and cause of
the complaint.
Held: The facts provided in the Information is sufficient.
Section 6, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that the acts
and commission constituting the offense must be alleged in the Information. Section 8
provides that there be a designation of offense provided in a statute.
The real nature of the crime charged is determined by the facts alleged in the
Information and not by the title or designation of the offense contained in the caption of
the Information. It is fundamental that every element of which the offense is comprised
must be alleged in the Information.
The court held that while there is no actual designation in the Information, she was
clearly charged under 2(a) by using false representations by issuing invalid checks to
obtain the vegetables.
The court also held that there was no proof that she was penalized under 2(d). While
there was a typographical error in the dispositive which caused the confusion, the body
of the decision clearly indicates that she is guilty of 2(a). The trial court found that fraud
was committed prior or simultaneously the issuance of the check.
The court also held that she is guilty of fraud either way. Fraud is a generic term
embracing all means resulting in damage to another or by which undue and
unconscientious advantage is taken of another.
19. People vs. dela Cruz
DOCTRINE: The allegation in the information that accused-appellant willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously commit sexual abuse on his daughter [Jeannie Ann] either by raping her or
committing acts of lasciviousness on her is not a sufficient averment of the acts constituting
the offense as required under Section 8, for these are conclusions of law, not facts. The
information in Criminal Case No. 15368R is therefore void for being violative of the his
constitutionally guaranteed right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him.
FACTS:
Year: 2002
Accused-appellant: Danilo Dela Cruz
Danilo dela Cruz
found guilty of two (2) counts of rape and one (1) count of acts of lasciviousness
September 1990: had carnal knowledge of his daughter, JEANNIE ANN DELA CRUZ,
a minor, then 11 years of age, against her will and consent
July 1995: carnal knowledge of his daughter, JEANNIE ANN DELA CRUZ, a minor,
then 16 years of age, against her will and consent
Dec. 11, 1997: another information was filed against him charging him with violation of
RA 7610 (The Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination Act) for committing sexual abuse on his daughter either by raping her
or committing acts of lasciviousness on her, which has debased, degraded and
demeaned the intrinsic worth and dignity of his daughter, JEANNIE ANN DELA CRUZ
as a human being.
TC: ordered consolidation of 3 cases
Arraignment: entered a plea of not guilty to each of the charges
Prosecution Witnesses:
1. Jeannie Ann - started molesting her since she was 7yo
warned not to tell her mother
told her that it was a normal thing between father and mother
warned Jeannie Ann that her mother might kill them should she learn about the things
that they did
believed him, did not tell anyone about the sexual acts he performed on her
did not tell anyone because she was convinced by the accused-appellant that the
sexual activities which he performed on her were proper
Sept 1990
raped her when her mother was at the market
did not resist because she thought that what her father was doing to her was a normal
act
July 1995
again molested when her mother was in church meeting
could only cry, as she was afraid of accusedappellant, because he threatened her that
he would kill her or her mother and siblings
Aug. 1997
again molested her
accused-appellant told her, I love you very much. Promise me that I will be the only
one who will do this to you.
Only stopped when he heard Aileen, a boarder in their house, calling Jeannie Ann and
immediately fixed her clothes and hair, then moved away from her.
she went out of the house to deal with what had just happened to her. While walking
outside toward the bridge, she saw a white L300 van belonging to the police
flagged down the vehicle and narrated to the two police officers riding therein, SPO2
Bravo and SPO2 Ong, what accusedappellant had just done to her
 The policemen accompanied her back to their house where they met accused-
appellant whom Jeannie Ann identified as the person who had raped her.
Accused appellant voluntarily went with the policemen to the Baguio City Police
Station
Medico legal officer
found two old healed lacerations at 5 oclock and 7 oclock positions on Jeannie Anns
hymen
said that the lacerations could have been inflicted more than three months prior to the
date of the examination and considering the proximity of their location, could have
been inflicted at the same time
said it was possible that penetration happened several times.
further testified that the frequent insertion of a finger or other rigid object, with a
diameter of more than an inch, could cause the lacerations as well as the lax condition
of vaginal walls
Mrs. dela Cruz
mother of accused
shocked upon hearing Jeannie Anns statement before the police that accused-
appellant had been performing oral sex on their daughter Jeannie Ann since the latter
was seven years old
it was the first time that she learned about it.
saw letters from different women showing that her husband was having relations with
other women
denied accused-appellants claims that she had a paramour and that she helped
Jeannie Ann file the complaints against him because she (Mrs. dela Cruz) wanted to
get back at him for being unfaithful to her
Day of arrest
SPO2 Leonardo Cruz Bravo interviewed accusedappellant. The interview was
reduced to writing and he was asked to sign the same.
He did not read the document, as he did not have his eyeglasses with him at that time.
At first, he refused to sign the document without the presence of his counsel. S
PO2 Leonardo Cruz Bravo, however, told him that his refusal to sign the document
may be interpreted as a sign of resistance on his part.
he thereafter decided to sign the document
acknowledged that while teaching in Saint Louis Center, a student filed a case against
him because he allegedly embraced her (Miguel) in the Science Laboratory Room of
the school, and that he signed an amicable settlement of the complaint. However, he
denied the truth of that complaint against him and said that the filing thereof was not
the cause of his dismissal from Saint Louis Center.
admitted that the letters from Emily and Maureen addressed to him were his but
insisted that they were only his friends, and that Emilys reference to him as her
boyfriend in one of her letters was only a joke
He said Jeannie Ann blamed him for having caused her breakup with her boyfriend
Charles.
His wife, on the other hand, wanted him out of her life because she had a paramour
Fr. Exequiel Veloso, Principal of the Don Bosco Technical Institute in Tarlac
testified that he had known him since 1994 and was not aware of any untoward
incident involving the latter.
said that none of the lady teachers ever complained about accused appellant
Fr. Jean Marie Tchang, Director of the Don Bosco Elementary School in Trancoville, Baguio City,
testified that he was a very competent teacher in Science and had a very good
relationship with the other teachers
He said he regretted that he t left his teaching job at the Don Bosco Elementary
School after only one year
TC Decision: found him guilty on all 3 cases
Appealed: He alleges that Jeannie Anns testimony was fabricated and inconsistent.
Jeannie Ann failed to immediately notify the authorities, or at least her mother, of her
harrowing experience he allegedly committed against her
ISSUE: W/N the court erred in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt?
HELD: the trial court did not err in finding accusedappellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
raping his daughter Jeannie Ann in September 1990 and July 1995. SC however finds that
accused-appellant cannot be convicted of rape or acts of lasciviousness under the
information in Criminal Case No. 15368R.
The Court has adhered to the rule that when the testimony of a woman who states under oath
that she has been raped meets the test of credibility, the accused may be convicted on the
basis of such testimony. A rape victim who testifies in a categorical, straightforward,
spontaneous and frank manner, and who remains consistent, is a credible witness.
Case at hand
found Jeannie Anns testimony to be natural, coherent and touching as she recounted
her harrowing experience in the hands of her father
The trial court judge saw from the face of the victim the anguish and the pain and the
shame and the embarrassment as she broke down and cried several times in the
course of her testimony every time she was asked [about] the despicable acts of her
father.
Moreover, no woman would fabricate charges of sexual abuse, allow an examination
of her private parts and endure the humiliation of a public trial where she would be
forced to recount the details of her unfortunate experience had she not really been
raped.
The delay in reporting a rape incident does not necessarily impair the credibility of the
victim where the delay can be attributed to the pattern of fear instilled by the threats of
bodily harm, especially when made by a person who exercised moral ascendancy
over the victim.
It is not uncommon for a young girl to conceal for sometime the assault on her virtue
because of the rapists threat on her life, or on the life of the other members of her
family.
On the other hand, the trial court found accusedappellant to be evasive in his narration of his
story. All that he offered in his defense were his bare denials. Denial, like alibi, is an inherently
weak defense and cannot prevail over the positive and credible testimony of the prosecution
witness that the accused committed the crime. A mere denial constitutes negative evidence
which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the declaration of a credible witness
who testifies on affirmative matters.

Other court findings
1. Penalty should be reclusion perpetual and not death - In Criminal Case No.
15164R, the father-daughter relationship was alleged in the information and proven in
the course of the trial. However, Jeannie Anns minority, although likewise alleged in
the information, was not sufficiently proved. All that was offered to establish her age
was her bare testimony that she was born on April 18, 1979. The prosecution failed to
present her birth certificate, or in lieu thereof, other documentary evidence such as her
baptismal certificate, school records which would have aided the court in verifying her
claim that she was a minor when she was raped by him in July 1995. In the absence
of adequate proof of Jeannie Anns minority, the penalty imposable for the offense in
Criminal Case No. 15164R is reclusion perpetua.
Relevant to topic
1. The Court also finds that accused-appellant cannot be convicted of rape or acts of
lasciviousness under the information in Criminal Case No. 15368R, which charges
accused-appellant of a violation of R.A. No. 7610 (The Special Protection of Children
Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act), either by raping her or
committing acts of lasciviousness.
It is readily apparent that the facts charged in said information do not constitute an
offense.
The information does not cite which among the numerous sections or
subsections of R.A. No. 7610 has been violated by accused appellant.
It does not state the acts and omissions constituting the offense, or any special
or aggravating circumstances attending the same, as required under the rules of
criminal procedure.
Sec. 8 Rule 110
Designation of the offense.The complaint or information shall state the designation of the
offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and
specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the
offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it.
Case at hand
The allegation in the information that accused-appellant willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously commit sexual abuse on his daughter [Jeannie Ann] either by raping her or
committing acts of lasciviousness on her is not a sufficient averment of the acts
constituting the offense as required under Section 8, for these are conclusions of
law, not facts.
The information in Criminal Case No. 15368R is therefore void for being violative of
the his constitutionally guaranteed right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him.
Although accused-appellant failed to call the attention of both the trial court and this
Court regarding the defects of the information in Criminal Case No. 15368R, the
Court may motu proprio dismiss said information at this stage, pursuant to its
ruling in Suy Sui vs. People, because the information is a patent violation of the
right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him and of the basic principles of due process.
Moreover, an appeal in a criminal proceeding throws the whole case open for review,
and it is the duty of the appellate court to correct such errors as might be found in the
appealed decision, whether these errors are assigned or not.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 6 in Criminal
Cases Nos. 15163R and 15164R is hereby MODIFIED, as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. 15163R, the accused appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay the victim the amounts of Fifty Thousand
Pesos (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity and Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as
moral damages;
2. In Criminal Case No. 15164R, the appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua, and ordered to pay the amounts of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) as civil indemnity and Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral
damages.
3. The Information in Criminal Case No. 15368R is declared null and void for being
violative of the accusedappellants constitutionallyguaranteed right to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Hence, the case against him
isDISMISSED.
20. People v. Begino
Yarra, Joe Anthony
FACTS:
This is an appeal from the decision of CA affirming the RTC decision that convicted
appellant Begino of the crime of rape. The Information, formally charged on Jan 1999
reads as paraphrased: that sometime on Aug 1994, Begino being then the STEPFATHER
of private complainant (AAA), with lewd design, and by using force and intimidation did
willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously have carnal knowledge of said AAA, an 8 year old
girl, against her consent, to her damage. Begino pleaded not guilty.
According to private complainant (born in 1986) she and Begino were alone in the house
(sometime on Aug 1994) when the latter removed all her clothes, as well as his clothes,
and placed himself on top of AAA to commit sexual intercourse. AAA attempted but was
unable to make a resistance. She felt pain and was thereafter intimidated that Begino
would kill her and her mother if she would tell anybody about the incident. She claimed to
have been raped by Begino 4 times on different occasions. A DSWD representative who
assisted her in executing her sworn statement and Dr. Barazona who did medical
examination were witnesses for the prosecution. According to the medical findings, there
were lacerations on AAAs hymen caused by the intercourse. On the other hand, the
defense prensented Begino himself, Camilo Begino (cousin of appellant), and Reynaldo
as witnesses. Begino testified that on the same time and day when rape was allegedly
committed, he was at the coconut plantation of Apolinario Malalauan together with
Camilo and Reynaldo husking coconuts, and that there was never a time that he left the
workplace. These claims were corroborated by Camilo and Reynaldo saying that
appellant was with them the whole day on Aug 2 1994.
RTC ruled in favor of AAA convicting appellant of statutory rape aggravated by the fact
that victim is below 18 years old and that offender is common law husband of AAAs
mother (BBB). Hence the penalty raised to death, together with civil indemnity and Hence the qualifying circumstance not having been properly pleaded, Begino should be
damages. RTC found inconsistencies (different statements on who owned the plantation, convicted only of statutory rape under Article 266-A, par. (d) for having carnal knowledge
since Camilo testified that he owned the plantation, etc.). CA affirmed the conviction but of a woman under 12 years old, punishable by reclusion perpetua. Total civil damages
reduced death to reclusion perpetua in view of RA 9346 proscribing imposition of death were also reduced.
penalty.
21. People v Ching
November 22, 2007
ISSUE: Should there be conviction?
Panaligan, Celina

RULING: Yes, but the sentenced penalty was erroneous. Doctrine: in order to recognize the constitutional right of an accused to be informed of
the nature and cause of accusation against him, it is not necessary in rape cases to
determine the exact time and date of the incident, so long as the essential requisites of
The RTC found appellant guilty of statutory rape qualified because AAA is below 18 years
rape, and mainly that a man had carnal knowledge of a woman, are proven.
old and offender is common law husband of BBB, leading to imposition of death pursuant
Jurisprudence has allowed rape cases to prosper with only the month or the year of the
to par. 1 of Article 266-B (affirmed by CA). However, SC held that appellant could not be
incident alleged in the Information
indicted for this qualified rape and penalized under par. 1 of Art 266-B. This technical flaw
committed by the lower courts is a matter that cannot be ignored. Article 266-B, par. 1
Recit Ready
provides: death penalty shall be imposed when the victim is under 18 years old and the
offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian or the common law spouse of the
Accused William Ching was convicted by the RTC of the crime of rape for raping his own
parent of the victim.
minor daughter. He was sentenced to death, which was commuted to reclusion perpetua
in lieu of RA 9346. When the case was elevated by the CA to the SC, William Ching
DOCTRINE
alleged that his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
This Court ruled that the circumstances that qualify a crime (such as the one above
accusation against him (Sec. 14, Art III) had been violated, for the Informations charging
stated) should be ALLEGED and proved beyond reasonable doubt as the crime itself. The
him with rape did not state the particular time and date of the 3 incidents.
age of the victim and her relationship with the offender must BOTH be alleged in the
information and proven during trial, otherwise death penalty cannot be imposed. However
The SC sustained in conviction, and held that the date or time of the commission of rape
in this case, the Information stated that Begino is the STEPFATHER of AAA which isnt
is not a material ingredient of the said crime because the gravamen of rape is carnal
apparently the case. A stepfather is the husband of ones mother by virtue of marriage. It
knowledge of a woman through force and intimidation. The precise time when the rape
presupposes a legitimate relationship between appellant and the victims mother.
took place has no substantial bearing on its commission. As such, the date or time need
However the evidence adduced by prosecution as well as found by the trial court itself
not be stated with absolute accuracy.
showed that Begino is not the stepfather of AAA but the COMMON LAW SPOUSE of BBB ,
primarily because Begino and BBB were never married. The real father of AAA is married
to and separated from BBB, and the latter was only living with Begino. Since Begino is
Facts
not the stepfather of AAA, the prosecutions failure to prove this qualifying circumstance
bars conviction for qualified rape. In the same vein, what was actually proven is that
-A rape case was filed against the accused William Ching for raping his own minor
Begino was the common law spouse of BBB, however this was NOT ALLEGED in the
daughter
Information In People v. Garcia, it was ruled that qualifying circumstances must be
-Three separate informations were consolidated into one; these described 3 rape
properly pleaded in the indictment. If the same are not pleaded but proved, they shall be
incidents that occurred once in the year 1996, and twice in May 1998
considered only as aggravating since the latter admit of proof even if not pleaded. But
-William Ching was convicted and sentenced to the death penalty, taking into account the
more importantly, it would be a denial of the right of the accused to be informed of the
aggravating circumstance of relationship and the minority of Chings daughter AAA
charges against him and consequently, a denial of due process, if he is charged with
-RTC elevated the case to the CA, which elevated the case to the SC based on the
simple rape and be convicted of its qualified form, although the qualifying circumstance
allegation that the conviction of the accused was in violation of his rights under Sec. 14
resulting in capital punishment was not alleged in the indictment. Since the qualifying
of the Bill of Rights
circumstance of common law spouse was not alleged in the information for rape against
-According to Ching, his conviction was based on insufficient evidence as the exact date
Begino, he could not be convicted of qualified rape as he was not properly informed of
and time of the rape incidents were not alleged in the Informations
the nature and cause of accusation against him. In criminal prosecution, it is fundamental
-the Informations only indicated the year of the first rape incident (sometime in the year
that every element of the crime charged must be alleged in the information for the
1996) and the month and year of the other 2 rape incidents (one evening of May 1998;
purpose of enabling the accused to properly interpose defense.
in the evening of May 1998)
-in lieu of RA 9346, the death penalty was commuted to reclusion perpetua without
benefit of parole
-the SC sustained the conviction by stating that the lack of particularity as to the date and
time of a rape incident is not fatal to an Information of rape and would not affect the
validity of the conviction of rape
Issue
W/N Chings right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him
was violated when the informations charging him with rape did not include the exact date
and time of the 3 rape incidents
Held
No.
An information is an accusation in writing charging a person with an offense,
subscribed by the prosecutor and filed with the court. To be considered as valid and
sufficient, an information must state the name of the accused; the designation of the
offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions offended party; the approximate date
of the commission of
the offense; and the place where the offense was committed. The purpose of the
requirement for the informations validity and sufficiency is to enable the accused to
suitably prepare for his defense since he is presumed to have no independent knowledge
of the facts that constitute the offense.
With respect to the date of the commission of the offense, Section 11, Rule 110 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure specifically provides that it is not necessary to state
in the information the precise date the offense was committed except when it is a material
ingredient of the offense, and that the offense may be alleged to have been committed on
a date as near as possible to the actual date of its commission. In rape cases, failure to
specify the exact dates or times when the rapes occurred does not ipso facto make the
information defective on its face. The reason is obvious. The date or time of the
commission of rape is not a material ingredient of the said crime because the gravamen
of rape is carnal knowledge of a woman through force and intimidation. The precise time
when the rape took place has no substantial bearing on its commission. As such, the
date or time need not be stated with absolute accuracy. It is sufficient that the complaint
or information states that the crime has been committed at any time as near as possible
to the date of its actual commission.
Hence, the allegations in the informations which stated that the three incidents of rape
were committed in the year 1996 and in May 1998 are sufficient to affirm the conviction of
appellant in the instant case.
22. Conde v. Rivera by Jyn E. Aragon
January 25, 1924
(Casebook; Internet Sources)
DOCTRINE:
The legal proposition is that where a prosecuting officer, without good cause, secures
postponements of the trial of a defendant against his protest beyond a reasonable period of
time, as in this instance for more than a year, the accused is entitled to relief by habeas corpus
to obtain his freedom.
The right to a speedy trial includes the right to a prompt rendition of judgment, for in the absence
of a decision, the stage of trial has not been completed.
Recit Ready:
FACTS: Aurelia Conde, formerly a municipal midwife in Lucena Tayabas, has been forced to
respond to no less than five information for various crimes and misdemeanors, has been
appeared with her witnesses and counsel at hearings no less than on eight different occasions
only to see the cause postponed, has twice been required to come to the Supreme Court for
protection, and now, after the passage of more than one year from the time when the first
information was filed, seems as far away from a definite resolution of her troubles as she was
when originally charged.
ISSUE: WON a lapse of one year of postponement is already a violation of Condes right to a
speedy trial?
HELD: Philippine Organic and Statutory law expressly guarantee that in all criminal prosecutions
the accused shall enjoy the right to have a speedy trial. The Government of the Philippines
should be the last to set an example of delay and oppression in the administration of justice.
Aurelia Conde, like all other accused persons shall have the right to have a speedy trial in order
that if innocent she may go free, and she has been deprived of that right in defiance of law. The
Court is thus under a moral and legal obligation to see that these proceedings come to an end
and that the accused is discharged from the custody of law. WE lay down the legal proposition
that where a prosecuting officer, without good cause, secures postponements of the trial of a
defendant against his protest beyond a reasonable period of time, as in this instance for more
than a year, the accused is entitled to relief by habeas corpus to obtain his freedom.
FACTS:
Aurelia Conde, formerly a municipal midwife in Lucena Tayabas, has been forced to respond to
no less than five information for various crimes and misdemeanors, has been appeared with her
witnesses and counsel at hearings no less than on eight different occasions only to see the
cause postponed, has twice been required to come to the Supreme Court for protection, and
now, after the passage of more than one year from the time when the first information was filed,
seems as far away from a definite resolution of her troubles as she was when originally charged.
ISSUE: WON a lapse of one year of postponement is already a violation of Condes right to a
speedy trial?
HELD: YES. Philippine Organic and Statutory law expressly guarantee that in all criminal
prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to have a speedy trial. The Government of the
Philippines should be the last to set an example of delay and oppression in the administration of
justice. Aurelia Conde, like all other accused persons shall have the right to have a speedy trial
in order that if innocent she may go free, and she has been deprived of that right in defiance of
law. Dismissed from her humble position, and compelled to dance attendance on courts while
investigations and trials are arbitrarily postponed without her consent is palpably and openly
unjust to her and a detriment to the public.
By the use of reasonable diligence, the prosecution could have settled upon the appropriate Delay in a case is counted from the time it is filed. Thus, the accused cannot claim his right to a
information, could have attended to the formal preliminary examinations, and could have speedy trial was violated because the case was filed 9 months after his arrest and investigation.
prepared the case for a trial free vexations, capricious and oppressive delays.
If a case is dismissed and then refiled, a delay in the refiling of a case is not a delay in the trial. If
The Court is thus under a moral and legal obligation to see that these proceedings come to an the case has not yet been refiled, there can be no trial to speak of.
end and that the accused is discharged from the custody of law. The legal proposition is that
where a prosecuting officer, without good cause, secures postponements of the trial of a
defendant against his protest beyond a reasonable period of time, as in this instance for more 23. Nepomuceno v. Secretary of National Defense
than a year, the accused is entitled to relief by habeas corpus to obtain his freedom. (From Jech Tiu)
NEPOMUCENO, along with several others, have yet to be arraigned for their respective
NOTE from Casebook: Speedy Trial is a two-edged sword. It can work against or to the offenses before the Military Tribunal
advantage of the accused. Since the prosecution has the burden of proof, delay in the trial
occasioning disappearances of witnesses and dimming of memories can actually lessen the
This is due to the fact that they filed a Motion to Quash and then a Supplemental Motion
chances of conviction. Similarly, the accuseds own witnesses can disappear or suffer a similar
dimming of memory. Hence, the concept of speedy trial is necessarily relative and determination questioning the constitutionality of the Military Commissions, and even asked for preliminary
of whether the right has been violated must be based on the balancing of various factors. Length injunction to suspend the trials
of delay is certainly a factor to consider; but other factors must also be considered such as the
reason for the delay, the effort of the defendant to assert his right, and the prejudice caused the
defendant. They later assert that their right to a speedy trial is violated and seek the dismissal of the
case
While it is the duty of the prosecution to see to it that criminal cases are tried without unfounded
delays, the accused himself, cannot sleep on said right but must see to it that his case be tried The SC held that it is true that criminal cases have been dismissed upon a showing of a
at an early date[He] cannot agree to the repeated postponements of the trial of his case, and violation of the right to speedy trial, but not one has been found to be where the accused
then when he finds the government absent or unable to go to trial on any of the dates of hearing, have not yet been arraigned
take advantage of such absences and ask for the dismissal of the case. Much less may he be
allowed to connive in the hiding of the witnesses in order to delay trial.
The constitutional privilege was never intended as furnishing a technical means for escaping o In cases in which the denial of the right to speedy trial resulted in the dismissal of
trial. The right to a speedy trial should not be used to deprive the state of reasonable the case, the prosecution, after arraignment and in the trial set for the case:
opportunity of fairly indicting criminals. The dismissal of a case which has been pending for 99
days despite the telegram of the fiscal asking for postponement because of illness should be set
aside. ! Failed to enter into trial without a valid excuse
! Otherwise present its evidence without a valid excuse
The right to speedy trial is relative, subject to reasonable delays and postponements arising ! Repeatedly asked for the postponement of the trial without a valid excuse
from illness, medical attention, and body operations. Speedy trial means one that can be had as
soon after indictment is filed as the prosecution can with reasonable diligence prepare for trial.
o In this case, any delay in the disposition of NEPOMUCENOs case is attributable to
The right maybe waived, but the waiver is not inferred from mere failure of the accused to urge his own actions.
the trial of the case. Such waiver or abandonment may be presumed only when the
postponement of the trial has been sought and obtained by the accused himself or by his o Also, any delay in filing the charges was brought about by the exigencies of martial
attorney.
law and by the circumstances of the case

The right to a speedy trial includes the right to a prompt rendition of judgment, for in the absence
of a decision, the stage of trial has not been completed. Thus, where a judgment was appealed The SC also held that a delay in the trial of the case must be vexatious, capricious, and
and was demanded for the retaking of the testimony of an important witness, the retaking of the oppressive to constitute a denial of the right to speedy trial
testimony dragged on for a year because of the failure of the witness to appear six or seven
times, the records were sent back to the appellate court and for almost a decade since the case
was originally appealed nothing has yet been done, the case should be dismissed. The SC further held that speedy trial is necessarily relative and is consistent with reasonable
delays
However, when an appeal could not be decided because the stenographer who took the o The Constitution prohibits only unreasonable delays
stenographic notes of the trial could not be located and the appellate court had issued 14
resolutions to expedite the disposition of the case, the accused cannot claim that his right to a
Last but not least, the right to speedy trial may be waived, except when otherwise expressly
speedy trial has been violated. The delay was not capricious.
so provided by law
Thus, the right must be asserted
! In this case, petitioners themselves never moved for the setting of the case
for trial in assertion of the rights
24. Mateo. Jr, v. Villaluz, 50 SCRA 18
Doctrine: Due process cannot be satisfied in the absence of that degree of objectivity on the
part of a judge sufficient to reassure litigants of his being fair and being just.
Facts:
American Express Bank was robbed and an American serviceman was killed. Four criminal
actions were filed against petitioners for robbery in a band with homicide. The case went to
respondent judge. In June 24, 1971 petitioner Martinez filed a motion to dismiss, but respondent
judge did not decide on it. Another suspect, Reyes, was arrested. The presiding judge issued an
order pursuant to the New Rules of Court to let the Motion to Dismiss be resolved until after the
prosecution has presented and rested its evidence as against Reyes. Reyes executed an extra-
judicial statement, signed and sworn the truth before the judge and in that statement implicated
petitioners. The judge was aware of this, and it was for this reason that he had deferred ruling on
petitioner Martinez' motions to dismiss until after the prosecution has presented and rested its
evidence as against Reyes. Reyes, however, was tried separately from and in the absence of
petitioners; so that the proceedings against him did not constitute evidence against petitioner.
On November 26, while the motion to dismiss remained unresolved, the prosecution filed a
'Motion to Present Additional Evidence.' Petitioner Mateo filed an opposition. Respondent judge
granted the motion of the prosecution. When the prosecution called Reyes as an additional
witness, in the course of his testimony, Reyes stated that he had executed it because he had
been threatened by a government agent. (Note: purport that statement was "subscribed and
sworn to before the respondent Judge"). Petitioners filed a motion for Disqualification of
respondent Judge contending that respondent Judge 'in the exercise of his sound discretion
[should] disqualify himself from sitting in this case under the second paragraph of Section 1 of
Rule 137 of the Rules of Court,' because Rolando Reyes had repudiated the statement that he,
Reyes, had sworn to before the Honorable Respondent Judge and the latter perforce would
have to pass upon that repudiation. Respondent Judge denied the motion for disqualification.
Issue: WON respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
or jurisdiction in refusing to disqualify himself
Held:
Yes. Due process cannot be satisfied in the absence of that degree of objectivity on the part of a
judge sufficient to reassure litigants of his being fair and being just. Due process of law requires
a hearing before an impartial and disinterested tribunal, and that every litigant is entitled to
nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. A judge has both the duty of rendering
a just decision and the duty of doing it in a manner completely free from suspicion as to its
fairness and as to his integrity.
For the fundamental requisite of impartiality for due process to be satisfied, the Rules of Court
provision on disqualification contains this additional paragraph: "A judge may, in the exercise of
sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than
those mentioned above."
The specific issue then that must be resolved is whether the circumstance of a party having
subscribed before respondent Judge an extra-judicial statement purporting to describe the
manner in which an offense was committed, later on repudiated by him as the product of
intimidation in the course of his having been asked to testify against petitioners, would suffice to
negate that degree of objectivity the Constitution requires? The answer must be in the
affirmative. Respondent Judge could not be totally immune to what apparently was asserted
before him in such extrajudicial statement. Moreover, it is unlikely that he was not in the slightest
bit offended by the affiant's turnabout with his later declaration that there was intimidation by a
government agent exerted on him. His sense of fairness under the circumstances could easily
be blunted. The absence of the requisite due process element is thus noticeable. It was he who
attested to its due execution of the extrajudicial statement. At that time, their motion for dismissal
of the charges against them was pending; its resolution was deferred by respondent Judge until
after the prosecution had presented and rested its evidence. It cannot be doubted then that
respondent Judge in effect ruled that such extra-judicial statement was executed freely. With its
repudiation on the ground that it was not so at all, coercion having come into the picture there is
apparent the situation of a judge having to pass on a question that by implication had already
been answered by him. For respondent Judge was called upon to review a matter on which
he had previously given his opinion. It is this inroad in one's objectivity that is sought to be
avoided by the law on disqualification. The misgivings then as to the requirement of due process
for "the cold neutrality of an impartial judge" not being met are justified.
25. In Re: Oliver
(1948)
Santos, Patrick
Facts
A Michigan circuit judge summarily sent the petitioner to jail for contempt of court.
The reason to this was in accordance with Michigan law, a one-man grand jury
investigation into alleged gambling and official corruption.
o This investigation presumably took place in the judges chambers.
However, two other circuit judges were present in an advisory capacity, also a prosecutor
and a stenographer was also there.
o Bottomline, the public was excluded and the questioning was in secret in
accordance with the tradition grand jury method.
After petitioner gave his testimony, the jury did not believe his story due to the fact that
another witness has already presented contradicting evidence.
o Because of this, the grand-jury charged the petitioner with contempt and
immediately convicted him to sixty days in jail all without the benefit of counsel.
Three days later, a lawyer filed a petitioner for habeas corpus alleging that petitioner was
not given the right to counsel and that petitioner was not held in jail under any judgement,
decree or execution.
The courts gave an overview of the one-man jury system used in this case wherein it was
made with the interest of more rigorous law enforcement, greater emphasis should be put upon
the investigative procedure for probing and for detecting crime.
o Should the grand-jury find the testimony false or evasive, they have the power to
sentence the one making the testimony in contempt.
ISSUE: Can petitioner be privately sentenced and convicted for contempt?
RULING: Counsel have not cited, and we have been unable to find, a single instance of a
criminal trial conducted in camera in any federal, state, or municipal court during the history of
this country. Nor have we found any record of even one such secret criminal trial in England
since abolition of the Court of Star Chamber in 1641.
This nations accepted practice of guaranteeing a public trial to an accused has its roots in
our English common law heritage.
In giving content to the constitutional and statutory commands that an accused be given a
public trial, the state and federal courts have differed over what groups of spectators, if any,
could properly be excluded from a criminal trial. But, unless in Michigan and in one-man grand
jury contempt cases, no court in this country has ever before held, so far as we can find, that an
accused can be tried convicted, and sent to jail when everybody else is denied enterance to the wished, despite the irregularity of the proceeding.
court except the judge and his attaches.
At the very least, an accused is, at the very least, entitled to have his friends, relatives and
counsel present, no matter with what offense he may be charged.
In the case before us, the petitioner was called as a witness to testify in secret before a 27. Tampar v. Usman - 200 SCRA 652 (August 16, 1991)
one-man grand jury conducting a grand jury investigation. In the midst of petitioners testimony, Rosales, Andrew
the proceedings abruptly changed. The investigation became a trial.
o Even in jail, according to undenied allegations, his lawyer was denied an Doctrine: The Yamin or oath provision in ShaRia Law effectively deprives a litigant of his
opportunity to see and confer with him. Even when the lawyer filed the Habeas Corpus, nothing constitutional right to due process. It denies a party's right to confront the witnesses
was clarified. against him and to cross examine them.
o In view of this nation's historic distrust of secret proceedings, their inherent dangers
to freedom, and the universal requirement of our federal and state governments that criminal
trials be public, the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee that no one shall be deprived of his FACTS: Records of the case show that petitioners filed a complaint against respondents
liberty without due process of law means at least that an accused cannot be thus sentenced to for annulment of sale in extrajudicial settlement of estate. Petitioners deny that they
prison. entered into an agreement with respondents and claimed that their signatures in such
were forged. The court required the parties to submit statements of at least two witnesses
to prove their claims and challenged respondents to take an oath (yamin/vamin?)
declaring that there is no truth to claim of forgery.
26.Garcia vs. Domingo

Doctrine: The plaintiff (muddai) has the burden of proof, and the taking of an oath (yamin) rests
The size of the place where the trial is held is immaterial with regard to the right to a public trial. upon the defendant (muddaaalai). If the plaintiff has no evidence to prove his claim, the
defendant shall take an oath and judgment shall be rendered in his favor by the Court.
Recit-ready: Should the defendant refuse to take an oath, the plaintiff shall affirm his claim under oath
in which case, judgment shall be rendered in his favor. Should the plaintiff refuse to
Judge Garcia was in charge of 8 criminal cases. It was agreed by him and the parties of the affirm his claim under oath, the case shall be dismissed.
case that the trial will be held on Saturdays at Judge Garcia's chambers. The court held that
having the trial in the judge's chambers didn't bar the constitutional right to a public trial since By virtue of the yamin/vamin?/oath, judgement was rendered in favour of respondents.
people were still allowed to attend if they so wish. The fact that the chambers were smaller than
the court was immaterial. ISSUE: WON the Shariah court committed a grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the
complaint by cognizance by the court of the yamin of respondent Usman is not only
Facts: unprocedural, but likewise amounts to a deprivation of their constitutional right to be
heard.
Judge Garcia was in charge of deciding 8 criminal cases against Calo, Carbonnel, and
Lorenzana. These cases were to be tried on Saturdays at the chambers of Judge Garcia. The HELD: YES.
accused were accompanied by their counsel at all times and initially none of them objected to
the irregularity of the proceedings. However Calo and Carbonnel soon contested that holding the The Court shares the concern of petitioners in the use of the yamin in this proceeding,
trial in the chambers of Judge Garcia deprived of their right to due process. Specifically, their and for that matter, before Philippine Sharia courts. Section 7 of the Special Rules of
right to a public trial. Procedure prescribed for Sharia courts aforecited provides that if the plaintiff has no
evidence to prove his claim, the defendant shall take an oath and judgment shall be
Issue: WON holding the trial at Judge Garcia's chambers on Saturdays denied Calo and rendered in his favor by the Court. On the other hand, should defendant refuse to take an
Carbonnel their right to a public trial. oath, plaintiff may affirm his claim under oath, in which case judgment shall be rendered
in his favor.
Held: No.

Said provision effectively deprives a litigant of his constitutional right to due process. It
A public trial means that the trial can be attended by anyone interested in the proceedings.
denies a party's right to confront the witnesses against him and to cross examine them. It
Furthermore, their relationship to the parties need not be shown. In the case at bar, there was no
should have no place even in the Special Rules of Procedure of the Sharia courts of the
showing that the trial excluded the public from attending. While it is true that less people may
country.
attend the trial since Judge Garcia's chambers were smaller than the court, this fact did not
show that the right to public trial was transgressed. People were still free to attend if they so
But the dismissal of case is upheld because petitioners failed to adduce evidence to
support the complaint, but not because of the yamin/vamin?/oath taken by the
respondent. The supreme court said that a committee to review the rules regarding the
yamin/vamin?/oath and to make necessary amendments.
28. Fajardo vs Garcia
Doctrine: The availability of this remedy is conditioned on a showing of "a capricious, arbitrary
and whimsical exercise of power, the very antithesis of the judicial prerogative in accordance
with centuries of both civil law and common law traditions."
Facts: To an information charging petitioners, Oscar Fajardo, Cesar Fajardo and Rodrigo
Doliente, with the crime of murder, a plea of not guilty was entered.
The evidence for the prosecution disclosed that at the time of the arrest of petitioners, all of them
were suffering from wounds on different parts of their bodies.
Dr. Herminio Academia was sent by Oscar and Cesars father to examine and treat such wounds
which was done at the detention cell in Subic, Zambales. The corresponding medical certificates
were then issued by such doctor.
Petitioner Oscar Fajardo testified and made reference to the medical certificates released by
such doctor. However, when the respondent judge (Himerio Garcia) asked him where the doctor
was, he said that the doctor had left the country and is now residing in the United States.
Judge was asked for leave to serve written interrogatories on Dr. Herminio Academia at his
place of residence in the United States. It was argued his testimony on the examination and
treatment of the wounds on the bodies of all of the accused would be crucial for the defense, the
offense charged being of a very serious character. However, the motion was denied.
Issue: W/N the denial of motion violated the petitioners right to compulsory process to secure
"the production of evidence in his behalf."
Held: The Supreme Court held that it would be premature, at the very least, to conclude that
such a fatal infirmity has infected the proceeding. The fact that the petitioners were treated in the
hospital by a doctor in question could be testified to by other witnesses, including the nurses
who must have been present. It cannot be assumed that there would be an insuperable
objection to the presentation of the medical certificate as to the wounds alleged to have been
inflicted, as they could very well show traces of such maltreatment. Even the length of their stay
in the hospital could be verified by its records.
Constitutional rights granted an accused are intended to assure a full and unimpeded
opportunity for him to meet what in the end could be a baseless accusation. Moreover, at the
stage of the trial reached, there was an element of prematurity to this proceeding. At any rate,
the presumption to be indulged is that a trial judge can fairly weigh and appraise the evidence
submitted by the respective parties.
Extra: to quote from Panaligan v. Adolfo, that the availability of this remedy is conditioned on a
showing of "a capricious, arbitrary and whimsical exercise of power, the very antithesis of the
judicial prerogative in accordance with centuries of both civil law and common law traditions."
29. Carredo v. People
FACTS:
1. On February 3, 1983, petitioner was charged with malicious mischief
before the Municipal Trial Court of Malabuyoc, Cebu City. He deposited a cash
bond for his provisional liberty. Upon arraignment, he entered a plea of not
guilty and thereafter he filed a written waiver of appearance.
2. At the hearing on August 14, 1985 the prosecution moved for
the recall of its principal witness for the purpose of identifying the accused-
petitioner who was not then present. Hence, a subpoena was issued to
petitioner who failed to appear on said date.
3. The defense counsel justified petitioner's absence in
that the latter presence can no longer be required as he already filed a written
waiver of appearance.
4. He filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied.
Petitioner elevated the matter to the RTC of Cebu City through a petition for
certiorari and prohibition. In an order dated January 28, 1987, the said trial court
denied the same. Hence, the present petition. ISSUES 1. Whether or not an
accused (petitioner) who, after arraignment, waives his further appearance
during the trial can be ordered arrested by the court for non- appearance upon
summons to appear for purposes of identification.- YES
a. Restated: Whether or not petitioner can be compelled, on pain of being
arrested and his cash bond getting confiscated, to be present during the trial for
purposes of his identification by the prosecution witnesses in a complaint for
malicious mischief despite his written waiver of appearance.
RULING & RATIO/ DOCTRINE:
The waiver made only constitutes a waiver of the right of the accused to meet the witness
face to face. It does not in effect deprive the prosecution of its right to require the
presence of the accused for the purpose of identification by its witnesses which is vital in
the conviction of the accused. It does not further release the accused from his obligation
under the bond to appear in court whenever so required. The accused is accorded with
the right to waive his own personal right but not his duty and obligation to the court.
Jurisprudence on the interpretation of the Constitutional provision (Article 4, Section 19
1973 Constitution = Article 3, Section 14, present)
Aquino, Jr. vs. Military Commission No. 2
Six justices - of the view that petitioner may waive his right to be present at all
stages of the proceedings, Five justices were in agreement that he may so
waive such right, except when he is to be identified.
The result was that the order of the respondent military commission requiring
his presence at all times during the proceedings before it should be modified in
 the sense that petitioner's presence shall be required only in the instance just his absence. He did not admit that he is the very person named as defendant in
indicated. the case on trial. His admission is vague and far from unqualified. He cannot
therefore seek the benefit of the exception recognized in Presiding Judge.
People vs.Presiding Judge

The accused was charged with murder before the Regional Trial Court of Pangasinan.
Upon his arraignment he manifested orally in open court that he is waiving his right to be
present during the trial.The prosecuting fiscal moved that the accused be compelled to
appear and be present at the trial so that he can be identified by the prosecution
witnesses.This court sustained the position of the accused on the strength of the ruling
of this Court in Aquino.

Peoplevs.Prieto,Sr.,

The present Constitution certainly has not made a dent on the traditional and
correct concept of a bail as given to allow the release of a person in the custody
of the law on condition that he would appear before any court whenever so
required. Upon failure to do so, the warrant of arrest previously issued can be a
sufficient justification for his confinement."

Further, in Aquino, Jr. vs. Military Commission No. 2, the late Chief Justice Fred
Ruiz Castro, in his concurring and dissenting opinion, clearly stated that "the
accused may waive his presence in the criminal proceedings except at the
stages where identification of his person by the prosecution witnesses is
necessary.

The 1973 Constitution now unqualifiedly permits trial in absentia even of capital
offenses, provided that after arraignment he may be compelled to appear for the
purpose of identification by the witnesses of the prosecution, or provided he
unqualifiedly admits in open court after his arraignment that he is the person
named as the defendant in the case on trial.

Reason for requiring the presence of the accused, despite his waiver, is, if
allowed to be absent in all the stages of the proceedings without giving the
People's witnesses the opportunity to identify him in court, he may in his
defense say that he was never identified as the person charged in the
information and, therefore, is entitled to an acquittal.

5. Petitioner:

He should not be ordered arrested for non-appearance since he filed a

written waiver that "he admits that he could be identified by witnesses who have
testified at the time that said accused was not present."o

SC: What is stated in Presiding Judge as an exception is when the accused

"unqualifiedly admits in open court after his arraignment the he is the person
named as defendant in the case on trial," no more no less. In the present case
petitioner only admits that he can be identified by the prosecution witnesses in