Signification and Denotation From Boethius To Ockham.

St.
Bonaventure University - Franciscan Institute Publications
SIGNIFICATION AND DENOTATION FROM BOETHIUS TO OCKHAM

Author(s): Umberto Eco
Source: Franciscan Studies, Vol. 44, William of Ockham (1285-1347) Commemorative Issue
Part I (1984), pp. 1-29
Published by: St. Bonaventure University - Franciscan Institute Publications
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SIGNIFICATION AND DENOTATION
FROM BOETHIUS TO OCKHAM,*
Prima facie , Ockham has little to say about the tortured stor
the term "denotation." Baudry's Lexicon does not mention it. As
as I know- and in any case in his crucial texts on significatio
supposition, Ockham does not use "denotation" but at most "denot
in the passive form. However in this paper I shall try to provide
evidences for a further history of the term "denotation" and I
suggest that this term started to shift from the intensional side t
extensional one just with or after Ockham.
Today "denotation" (along with its counterpart, "connotat
is alternatively considered as a property or function of (i) single t
(ii) predicative sentences, (iii) descriptive noun phrases and defin
descriptions. In each case one has to decide whether this term h
be taken intensionally or extensionally: is "denotation" tied to m
ing or to referents? Does one mean by "denotation" what is mea
the term or the named thing and, in case of sentences, what is the ca
As far as connotation is concerned, if denotation has an exte
sional scope, it becomes the equivalent of intension; if on the
trary denotation has an intensional scope, then connotation beco
a sort of further meaning depending on the first one. These term
logical discrepancies are such that Geach (1962:65) suggested that
term should be "withdrawn from philosophical currency" sin
produces "a sad tale of confusion."
*1 thank Maria Teresa Beonio Brocchieri Fumagalli for her many usefu
gestions. I also thank Andrea Tabarroni, Roberto Lambertini and Costa
no Marmo for having discussed with me some passages of this paper, w
origin was a seminar on the medieval theory of signs, University of Bol
Chair of Semiotics, Academic Year 1982-83.
2 UMBERTO ECO
In the framework of st
Such is the case of Hje
denotative semiotics an
former is a semiotic w
the latter is a semiotic
denotative relationship
of expression and the f
according to Hjelmslev
Likewise Barthes (196
develops a merely int
relationship always occur
signified.1
Thus one can say that in the structuralistic milieu denotation,
if we assume as a parameter the well known Frege's triangle, is more
similar to the Sinn than to the Bedeutung , that is, more similar to the
sense than to the reference.2.
The whole picture changes radically in the Anglo-Saxon tradi-
tion of philosophy of language and of truth conditional semantics: in
Russell's "On denoting" (1905) denotation is undoubtedly linked to refer-
ence. This usage is followed by the whole of Anglo-Saxon philosophi-
cal tradition (see for instance Ogden and Richards 1923 and Morris
1946).
In this sense, an expression denotes the class of individuals of
1 In the framework of componential analysis, "denotation" has been used

for the sense-relationships expressed by a lexical term- such as 'father's brother*
expressed by 'uncle* (see for instance Leech 1974:238). Prieto (1975:67, 109)
means by '(denotative* or 'notative* any conception of a linguistic term or
of a significant object in so far as it appears as the member of a class of objects
fulfilling the same purpose ("membre de la classe du systme intercompr-
hension qui le dtermine"), where such a class belongs to the universe of sense.
2 This, at least, if one realizes that the Fregean Bedeutung was a very
ambiguous term, and should better be rephrased as "Bezeichnung" (which
translates more of less "designation"). In the German philosophical lexicon
"Bedeutung" stands usually for "meaning" while "Bezeichnung" stands for "refer-
ence" or "denotation" or "designation." See for instance Husserl (1970), where
it is said that a sign signifies (bedeutet) a meaning and designates ( bezeichnet )
a thing. Dummett (1973, 5) translates the Fregean "Bedeutung" as "referent"
or "denotation."
Signification and Denotation 3
which it is the name, while it connotes the properties by virtue of which

these individuals are recognized as members of the class in question.
If we substitute (as Carnap 1955 does) the couple denotation/conno-
tation with the couple extension/intension, we can say that denota-
tion is a function of connotation (except if one follows the theory of
rigid designation).
In order to avoid such a growing terminological confusion some-
body has preferred to use "designation" in place of "denotation" and
recently Lyons (1977,1:208) has proposed to use "denotation" in a neu-
tral way as between extension and intension.
However the situation is more complicated than that. Even when
denotation recognizably stands for extension it may refer (i) to a class
of individuals, (ii) to an actually existing individual (as in the case of
the rigid designation of proper names), (iii) to the truth value corres-
ponding to an assertive proposition (so that, in these frameworks, the
denotatum of a proposition is what is the case or the fact that <p) is
the case).
The first case in which "denotation" has been blatantly used in
an extensional sense was, as far as I know, the one of John Stuart Mill
(1843 , 1, II, V): "the word 'white* denotes all white things, as snow, paper,
the foam of the sea, and so forth, and implies, or as it was termed
by the schoolmen, connotes the attribute whiteness."
Peirce was probably the first one to realize that there was some-
thing odd in this usage. Peirce always used "denotation" to mean "the
direct reference of a symbol to its object" (CP, 1.559):
A Rhematic Indexical Sinsign is affected "by the real camel it denotes"

(2.261), a sign must denote an individual and must signify a character
(2.293), "a general term denotes whatever there may be which pos-
sesses the characters it signifies" (2.434), "every assertion contains such
a denotative or pointing-out function" (5.429), signs are designative
or denotative or indicative, in so far as they, like a demonstrative
pronoun, or a pointing finger, "brutely direct the mental eyeballs of
the interpreter to the object in question" (8.350),
but he understood clearly that- as far as "connotation" was

concerned- Mill was not following, as he claimed, the traditional
scholastic usage. The Schoolmen distinguished (at least until the four-
teenth century), between meaning (significare) and naming ( appellare ),
and used "connotation" not as opposed to "denotation" but in order
to define an additional form of signification.
4 UMBERTO ECO
"It has been, indeed, the opinion

the fourteenth, fifteenth, and sixt
in those ages used exclusively for
that is (nearly), for a reference to a
etc.) to the correlate of the obje
has however considered himself e
dictum, without the citation of
that time" (2.393).
Peirce remarks that the comm

was between "significare" and "n
He then remarks that Mill uses
and "to denote" for naming or r
from John of Salisbury (M etalogic
tur singularia sed universalia signi
that ... the precise meaning recog
at the time of John of Salisbury
before and since, and on the c
towards that of 'denote* w (2.434
In this discussion Peirce is rig
the same time. On one side, he l
ment "significare" partially shif
sional framework, but he did no
the following centuries, it main
the other side, he accepted "de
(arguing with Mill only a propos
very late that "denotare," origin
and intension, took over as an
I. Aristotle.
In De interpretatione (16a ff.), Aristotle implicitly but clearly de-

signs a semiotic triangle, in which words are related on one side to
concepts (or passions of the soul) and on the other to things. Aristo-
tle says that words are symbols of the passions and by symbol means
a conventional and arbitrary device.
He adds that words can be taken as symptoms (semeia) of the pas-
sions, since every verbal utterance can be, first of all, the symptom
of the fact that the utterer has something in his mind (we shall see
that this remark will be fully exploited only by Roger Bacon). As for
the passions of the soul, they are likenesses, or icons, of the thing.
In any case, we know the things through the passions of the soul
and there is no direct connection between symbols and things. We
name things by meaning their icons, that is, the corresponding ideas
they arouse in our minds. Aristotle does not use, for this symbolic
relation, the word semanein (that could be, as it was, translated by
"significare") but in many other circumstances he uses this verb to in-
dicate the relation between words and concepts.
Aristotle says (as Plato did) that single terms taken in isolation
do not assert anything about what is the case. They only 'mean' a
thought. Also sentences or complex expressions mean a thought but
only a particular kind of sentences (a statement, or a proposition
apphasis or lgos apophantiks) assert a true or false state of affairs. H
does not say that statements 'signify* what is true or false but rather
that they 'say* (the verb is lgein) that something A belongs (the verb
is yprchein) to something B.
II. Boethius.
Boethius translates "semanein" with "significare" but he follows

the Augustinin line of thought according to which "significado" is
the power that a word has to arouse in the mind of the hearer a
thought, through the mediation of which one can implement an act
of reference to things. He says that single terms signify the correspond-
ing concept or the universal idea and takes "significare"- as well as,
less frequently, "designare"- in an intensional sense. Words are con-
ventional instruments used to make known one's thoughts (sensa or
sententias) (In Per. herm.I).
Words do not designate res subiectas but passiones animae. The desig-
nated thing is at most called "underlying the concept of it (signification
ni supposita or suppositum)" , see de Rijk 1967: 180-181. 3
3 In Periherm. II, pp. 26-27, ed. Meiser, debating the question whether
words refer immediately to concepts or to things, Boethius uses in both cases
the expression 'designare.' In II, p. 20 he says in the same context, "vox vero
conceptiones animi intellectusque significat" and "voces vero quae intellec-
tus dsignant." In II, pp. 23-24, speaking of "litterae, voces, intellectus, res,"
6 UMBERTO ECO
As for "denotatio," Boethius use

how vague was the meaning of th
as vague as the meaning of the eq
be remembered that Boethius, in
used "nota" for both "symbolon"
"sad tale of confusion."
III. Anselm's "appellatio."
A more clear-cut distinction between signifying and referring is

posited by Anselm of Canterbury in his De Grammatico with the the-
ory of appellation.
By elaborating upon Aristotle's theory of paronyms, Anselm puts
forth the idea that when we call a given person a 'grammarian/ we
use this word paronymically. The word still signifies the quality of be-
ing a grammarian, but is used to refer to a given man. Thus for 'refer-
ence' Anselm uses "appellatio," and for 'meaning' uses "significado":
satis mihi probasti grammaticum non significare h ominem.... Ante dice-
he says that "litterae verba nominaque significant" and that "haec vero (no-
mina) principaliter quidem intellectus secundo vero loco res quoque dsig-
nant. Intellectus vero ipsi nihil aliud nisi rerum significativi sunt." In Arisi .
Categ. col. 159 B4-C8, says that "prima igitur ilia fiiit nominum positio per
quam vel intellectui subiecta vel sensibus designaret." It seems to me that "desig-
nare" and "significare" are taken as more or less equivalent. The real point
is that first words signify concepts and, because of that, and mediately, can
be referred to things. Cf. on the whole question de Rijk (1967, II, I, p. 178
ff.) Nuchelmans (1973:134) remarks that even though Boethius also uses "sig-
nificare," along with "designare, denuntiare, demonstrare, enuntiare, dicere"
with an object-expression to indicate what is true or false, however when
he uses the same terms with a person as a subject he means that someone
makes known his opinion that something is or is not the case: "the definition
of the enuntiatio or propositio as an utterance which signifies something true
or false reflects the fact that in Aristotle's view it is the thought or belief that
something is the case which is true or false in the primary sense. As Boethius
puts it, truth and falsity are not in things but in thoughts and opinions and
secondarily (post haec) in words and utterances- In Cat. 181b. Cf. also such
a passage as in In Per . I, p. 42, 1" (Nuchelmans 1973:134).
bas grammaticum significare hominem scientem grammaticam ... (se

... sufficienter probatum est grammaticum non esse appellativum gra
maticae sed hominis, nec esse significativum hominis sed grammatic
(4.30 ff.).
Such a distinction between signification and appellation (or nam-

ing) will be followed by Abelard.
IV. Abelard.
It has been remarked that in Abelard the logical terminology

is not definitely assested and that he frequently uses the same terms
in an equivocal sense. Nevertheless Abelard is the first author in which
the distinction between the intensional and the extensional aspects
of semantics is substantially (if not always terminologically) posited with
a great care. It is true that he speaks indifferently of "significado de
rebus" and "significatio de intellectibus," but it is equally true that for
him the primary sense of "significatio" is an intensional one, on the
Augustinin line of thought- where "significare" is "constituere" or
"generare" a concept of the mind.
Abelard in Ingredientibus (Geyer:307) makes clear that the intellec-
tual plane is the necessary intermediary between things and concepts.
"Not only is the 'significatio intellectuum' a priviledged 'significado/
but it is also the only legitimate semantic function of a noun, the only
function which a dialectician should bear in mind in examining speech"
(Beonio-Brocchieri, 1969:31).
By considering various contexts in which such terms as "significare,
designare, denotare, nominare, appellare" confront each other, one
can maintain that Abelard is using "significare" to refer to the intellectus
generated in the mind of the hearer, "nominare" for the referential
function, and- at least in some pages of Dialecticay but with un-
mistakeable clarity- "designare" and "denotare" for the relationship be-
tween the word and his definition or sententia (the sententia being an
'encyclopedical' meaning, of which the definition represents a partic-
ular 'dictionary-like' selection, provided for the purposes of a given act
of disambiguation). It is true that, as De Rijk and Nuchelmans remark,
there are many pages in which Abelard seems to take both "designare"
and "denotare" with an extensional scope, but there are other points
8 UMBERTO ECO
in which he uses the same term

There are two contexts (in 1,11
tion is the relationship between
tion and denotation is explicitely
of an expression. Arguing with
to which the vox has been impose
Abelard stresses the fact that th
denotantur atque in sententia i
4 In Dialctica (V, II, De definition

that a nomen is 'determinativm' of
and by hearing the name we can un
sententia contains all those differenc
that is, those who are useful to det
without ambiguities: "Sic enim plure
vae quae omnes in nomine 'corporis'
sententiam haec definitio tenet, sicu
tionale et mortale' vel 'animal gress
omnium differentiarum suarum de
intelligi; non tarnen omnes in defin
um superfluae locutionis.... Cum aute
lis diseiplinae' ac multae quoque form
quae omnes in nomine 'hominis' d
sententiam in definitionem ipsius t
partem constitutionis suae ipsius de
quae non sufficiunt ad constituen
Abelard 'designation' is "the semant
linguistic object" (strong extensio
equates "denotare" with "nominare."
ed. de Rijk, 1970) seem to support hi
in a strong extensional sense. See fo
Abelard argues with those who mai
not produce concepts but only have
speaks of a possible designation of th
"designare" for the first imposition
of baptismal ceremony in which the
namer and the thing named). See for
designandas imposite." But it is also
I, III, 3, 1, p. 123) 'designare' and 'den
ing, and in I, II, 3, 9, p. 97 and I, III, 3
al interpretation.
manifestum est eos ( = Garmundus) velie vocabula non omnia ilia sig-
nificare quae nominant, sed ea tantum quae definite dsignant, ut
'animal' substantiam animatam sensibilem aut ut 'album' albedinem,
quae semper in ipsis denotantur.
Words do not signify everything they can name.

They signify what they designate by a definition, as 'animal' sig-
nifies a sensitive animate substance, and this is exactly what is denoted
by (or in) the word.
It is clear that both designation and denotation stand firmly with
a strong intensional sense and are referred to the relationship between
an expression and its corresponding definitional content. Signification
has nothing to do with naming because the former remains "nomina-
tis rebus destructis," so that it is possible to understand the meaning
of "nulla rosa est" ( lngredientibus , ed. Geyer:309).
Another important aspect of Abelardo typology is that in this
way he distinguishes carefully between two senses of 'signification' that
can still puzzle our contemporary mind. Spade (1982:188 ff.) has re-
marked that for Schoolmen "significatio" is not 'meaning': "a term sig-
nifies that of which it makes a person to think" (and this is undoubtedly
the sense intended by Augustine), "so that, unlike meaning, significa-
tion is a species of the causal relation." Meaning (be it mental corre-
late, semantic content, intension, or any form of noematic, or ideal,
or cultural entity), is represented in the Middle Ages, as well in the
whole Aristotelian tradition, not by "significatio," but by the "senten-
tia" or by the definition.
It is true that we can find in the medieval tradition "significare"
either as "constituere intellectus" or as "significare speciem" (that seems
more tied to a non-causal notion of signification) but this difference
seems to become clear only with Abelard: the word causally "significai"
something to the mind, while the same word is correlated by way of
designation and/or denotation to a meaning, that is, to a "sententia"
or to a definition.
To summarize the above discussion, we can say that Abelard was
conceiving not of a semiotic triangle but of a sort of square that could
be represented as follows:
VOX significai INTELLECTUS

VOX dsignt vel dnott SENTENTIAM (and DEFINITION
VOX nominai vel appellai RES
IO UMBERTO ECO
V. Aquinas.
The same intensional trend is followed by Aquinas which remains

absolutely faithful to the position of Aristotle. In his commentary of
De interpretazione he uses "significare" for nouns and verbs (1,11,14) as
well as for these voices that mean naturally, such as the wail of infirms
and the sounds emitted by animals, and makes clear that by "significa-
do" he means an intensional phenomenon:
Non enim potest esse quod significent immediate ipsas res, ut ex ipso
modo significandi apparet: significai enim hoc nomen 'homo' naturam
humanam in abstr actione a singularibus. Unde non potest esse quod
significet immediate hominem singulrem.... Ideo necesse fit Aristoteli
dicere quod voces significant intellectus conceptiones immediate et eis
mediantibus res (I.II.15).
Later he says that the name signifies its definition (1,11,20). It is

true that when speaking of composition and division, that is, of affir-
mation and negation, he says that the former "significai ... coniunctio-
nem" and the latter "significat ... rerum separationem" (1,111,26), but it
is clear that even at this point, what is 'meant' is an operation of the
intellect ("intellectus dicitur verum secundum quod conformatur rei,"
1,111,28). An expression is neither true nor false, it is only the sign which
significai' a true or false operation of the intellect: "unde haec vox, 'homo
est asinus,' est vere vox et vere signum; sed quia est signum falsi, ideo
dicitur falsa" (1,111,31). "Nomina significant aliquid, scilicet quosdam con-
ceptus simplices, licet rerum compositarum..." (1,111,34). 5
As for "denotare" in all its forms, this term recurs 105 times in the
Thomistic lexicon (plus 2 instances of "denotatio"). Even a cursory prob-
ing suggests that Aquinas never used it in the strong extensional
5 Signification is so far from reference that, when a verb is used in a sen-

tence (let us say, "This man is white") the verb does not signify a state of affairs
but at most is the sign (in the sense of symptom) that something is predicated
of something else and that, at the end, a state of affairs is in some way indicat-
ed (I,V,60). "(Aristoteles) dixerat quod verbum non significat si est res vel non
est ... quia nullum verbum est significativum esse rei vel non esse.n (I, V, 69). The
verb est' significat the composition "Oratio vero significat intellectum composi-
tum" (I, VI, 75). See in Maier (1972:502) a reference to William of Shyreswood,
who seems to use "denotatio" in the same sense.
Signification and Denotation n
sense, that is, he never used it to say that a given proposition deno
a state of affairs or that a term denotes a thing. "Denotare" is alw
used in a weak sense.6
VI. The rise of the idea of supposition.
It is clear that such authors as Boethius, Abelard or Aquinas,

concerned with the problem of signification more than with the one
of appellation, were mainly interested in the psychological and onto-
logical aspects of language. We would say today that their semantics
was oriented towards a cognitive approach. It is interesting to remark
how certain modern scholars, interested in rediscovering the first
medieval manifestations of a modern truth conditional semantics, find
the whole business of signification a very embarassing one, which dis-
turbs the purity of the extensional approach such as it is definitely
settled by the theory of supposition.7
6 A preposition such as per "dnott causam instrumentalem" (V Sent .

1.1.4). A proposition like locutus est "dnott eumdem esse auctorem veteris
et novi testamenti" (Super I ad Hebraeos 1.1.) (where I do not think that "dnott"
ought to be taken in the sense of 'stands extensionally for' but rather as 'shows,
suggests, means that.' "Praedicatio per causam potest ... exponi per proposition
nem denotantem habitudinem causae" (1 Sent 30.1.1.) "Dicitur Christus sine
additione, ad denotandum quod oleo invisibili unctus est ..." (Super Ev. M at-
thaei 1.4). In all these and similar cases it seems to me that "denotatio" is used
in the weaker sense. Sometimes the term is used as "metaphorically or symbol-
ically means that...." See for instance the commentary In Job 10, where it is
said that at a certain point the lion stands for Job ("in denotatione Job rugitus
leonis"). The only puzzling passage I found is the one of 111 Sent . 7.3.2. where
it is said "Similiter est falsa: 'Filius Dei est praedestinatus,' cum non ponatur
aliquid respectu cujus possit antecessio denotari." But on the light of the above
statements one can say that what is here in question is a mental operation
concerning the understanding of a temporal sequence.
7 For instance de Rijk (1967:206) says that in Abelard "the non-logical
point of view seems to prevail" and the term "impositio" mostly stands for
prima inventio : "it is rarely found to denote some actual imposition in this
or that sentence pronounced by some actual speaker. When even the voces
are separated from the res, their connection with the intellectus brings the
12 UMBERTO ECO
In its more mature for

a term, when inserted
linguistic things. From
most elaborate theorie
long one, and there is a
1967 and 1982).8
With the theory of su
whelmed by the extens
far more important than
is primarily meant by a
can be correctly applie
Nevertheless this new
terms as "denotado", whic
For instance Peter of Spai
author to the domain of ps

the intellectus are said to re
tion, too, seems to suffer
view." Likewise (de Rijk 19
have done a better job ... t
in itself. n This means to
cians in the modern sense
8 It would be interesting
idea of the relationship be
notion of signification (as
species, or universais, or d
for instance in de Rijk (19
names as signifying a subs
undoubtedly the universa
dividual thing (163): "so w
(to supposit) as an equivale
individual thing" (164). It
that names do not signify
ture and not the actual ex
century there is still a con
and species) and nominatio
al things- see for instance
9 In the Commentary on
"significai proprie vel appe
quid": denotation seems sti
where he says that in the expression "sedentem possibile est ambulare"

what is denoted is not the concomitance between 'to si and 'to walk'
but rather the concomitance between 'being seate and 'having the
possibility ('potential of walking/ Once again it is difficult to tell whether
"denotare" has an intensional or an extensional function. Moreover
Peter also takes "significare" in a very broad sense, since ( Summulae
VI 2) "significatio termini, prout hie sumitur, est rei per vocem se-
cundum placitum representado" and it is undetermined whether this
res ought to be an individual thing or a universal nature (de Rijk
1982:169).
Where Peter implements a clear extensional theory is naturally
with its notion of suppositio as distinguished from signification (see also
Ponzio, 1983:134-135, with an interesting reference to Peirce,CP,
5.320).
Suppositio vero est acceptio termini substantivi pro aliquo. Differunt

autem suppositio et significatio, quia significatio est per impositionem
vocis ad rem significandam, suppositio vero est acceptio ipsius termi-
ni iam significantis rem pro aliquo.... Quare significatio prior est sup-
postone ( Summulae VI, 3).
However in Peter's theory there is a difference between extensionally

standing for a class and extensionally standing for an individual. In
the first case we have a natural supposition, in the second case an ac-
cidental one. (ib.40) In the same vein Peter distinguishes between "sup-
positio" and "appellatio".
Differt autem appellatio a suppositione et a significatione, quia appel-

latio est tantum de re existente, sed significatio et suppositio tam de
re existente quam non existente (ib.,x,l).
De Rijk (1982:169) says that "Peter's natural supposition is really

the denotative counterpart of signification." But if "denotation" is
intended- as it happens today- as the function performed by a prop-
er name pointing towards a single existing object, then Peter's suppo-
sition is far larger in its scope. "Homo" signifies an universal nature,
"supponit" naturally for all the existing men or for the class of men,
and "supponit" accidentally for an individual man. Thus "significatio"
and "suppositio" cover at least two different domains, whilst "denota-
do" and "designatio" are even more indeterminate:
14 UMBERTO ECO
meaning class individual
significatio suppositio suppositio

naturalis accidentalis
I
appellatici
i
nominatio
denotatio et designatio
The whole thing changes even terminologically with William of

Sherwood who "unlike Peter and the majority of thirteenth-century
logicians ... identifies a term's significative character with its referring
solely to actually existing things" (de Rijk 1982:170-171).
This will be the position of Roger Bacon, for whom signification
becomes denotative in the modern extensional sense of the term- even
though he does not use such a term as "denotatio."
VIL Bacon.
In De signis Bacon uses "significare, significatio, significatum" in

a sense that is radically different from the traditional one.
In DS 11,2 he says that "signum autem est illud quod oblatum sensui
vel intellectui aliquid dsignt ipsi intellectui." Apparently the Baco-
nian "dsignt" stands for the Augustinin "faciens in cogitationem
venire."10 However for Augustine the sign produces something in the
10 "Signum est enim res praeter speciem, quam ingerit sensibus, aliud
aliquid ex se faciens in cogitationem venire" (De doctrina christians, II, 1,1). Bacon
is less radical than Augustine as far as the sensible qualities of signs are con-
cerned, since he repeatedly admits that there can also be intellectual signs,
in the sense that, according to the tradition, also concepts can be considered
as signs of the perceived thing.
mind, while for Bacon a sign shows something (probably outside the
mind) to the mind.
For Bacon signs are not referred to their referent through the medi-
ation of a mental species, but point directly or are posited in order
to refer immediately to an object. It does not matter whether this ob-
ject is an individual (a concrete thing) or a species, a feeling, a passion
of the soul. What counts is that between a sign and the named object
there is no mental mediation . Thus Bacon uses "significare" in a mental
extensional sense.11
11 In his classification of signs Bacon had distinguished natural signs

(or physical symptoms, such as the Stoic semia, or as icons- which refer directly
by a sort of natural virtue to the objects they are like) from signs "ordinata
ab anima et ex intentione animae," that is, produced for some purpose by
a living being. Among the signa ordinata ab anima stand words and other con-
ventional visual signs, such as the circulus vini used as an emblem for taverns
and even commodities exposed in windows, in so far as they mean that other
members of the class to which they belong are sold inside the shop.
In all these cases Bacon speaks of "impositio," that is, of a conventional
act by which a given entity is appointed to name something else. It is clear
that convention for Bacon is not the same as arbitrariness: commodities ex-
posed in a window are chosen conventionally but not arbitrarily (they act
as a sort of metonomy, the member for the class). Likewise the circulus vini
is appointed as a sign conventionally but not arbitrarily, since in fact the
circle is a barrel-hoop, and thus it acts synecdochically and metonimically
at the same time, and represents a part of the barrel which is the container
of the wine ready to be sold. However in De signis most of the examples are
drawn from vocal language and it will be better to follow Bacon's train of
thoughts by remaining tied to this paramount example of conventional (and
arbitrary) signs. Bacon is not so naive to say that words only mean individual
and physical things. He says that they name objects but these objects can
also be in the mind. Signs can also name non-entities, "non entia sicut in-
finitum, vacuum, et chimaera, ipsum nichil sive pure non ens" (DS,II,2, 19;
but see also 11,3,27 and V,162). This means that, even when words signify
species, they do so by pointing extensionally to a class of mental objects. But
when, to name a species, we use a name previously used to name the cor-
responding thing, then we have an instance of second imposition. In any case
the relationship is an extensional one and the correctness of the reference
is guaranteed only by the actual presence of the signified object (be it a physical
or a mental one). A word signifies truly if and only if the object it signifies
is the case. It is true that Bacon says (DS 1,1) "non enim sequitur: 'signum
l6 UMBERTO ECO
Bacon definitely destroys the se

lated since Plato, by which the rel
ents is mediated by the idea, or th
Bacon the left side of the triangle
words and meanings) is reduced to
in actu est, ergo res significata est/ qu

sicut et entia," but this position canno
when he said that even an expression
In the case of Abelard rosa signified b
sionally, and in such a perspective the
even though the thing did not exist o
Bacon is different. When one says "th
the rose is the case), the meaning of
If one makes the same statement whe
does not refer to the actual rose but
the utterer has in his mind. There are
same sound rose is a token of two dif
carefully this important point. Bacon s
potest imponi ... omnibus rebus extra
admits that by convention we can nam
But he insists on the fact that one do
the single object, and the species. To u
other mental passion), the same word p
ent thing, one must implement a secon
et duplex significado, et aequivocatio,
sunt ad placitum nostrum imponen
clear that when one says "homo curri
the same sense of the expression "hom
referent of the vox if an individual an
are two equivocal ways to use the sa
the circle that, in a tavern, advertize
signifies the actual wine. If there is n
by a sign which refers to something w
of the sign is the idea or image of wi
the mind of the customer. For those
circle has lost its significance, in the
same words to refer to past or future
sense as when we point towards actua
Socrates and we express our ideas abou
sion Socrates in a new sense, the word
Bacon was always complaining that scholars of his time did not
know foreign languages. He knew Greek and he was able to read Arist
tle's De Interpretatione without trusting the Boethian translation. H
realizes that Boethius, by using twice the term "nota," disregards t
fact that, for Aristotle, words were "first of all" or "primarily" (see Kret
mann 1974) symptoms of the passions of the soul. Thus (DS,V,16
he interprets the Aristotelian passage according to his personal pos
tion: words are essentially in a symptomatic relation with species a
at most they can signify them only vicariously (by a second impositi
The very relation of signification is the one between words and thing
He disregards the fact that for Aristotle words, even though they we
symptoms of the mental passions, also signify them, to such an exte
that we can understand the named things only through the media-
tion of the understood species. For Aristotle- and for the medie
tradition before Bacon- extension was still a function of intension and
in order to ascertain whether something is the case one should firs
understand the meaning of the statement. For Bacon the only signif
cation of the statement is the fact that the referent is the case.
It is thus clear why in his terminological framework the sense of
"significado" undergoes a radical change. Before Bacon "nominantur
singularia sed universalia significantur," with Bacon "significantur sin-
gularia," or at least "significantur res" (even though a "res" can also
be a class, a feeling, a species).
transsumptionem" and is used equivocally in respect to the sense it had when

Socrates was alive (DS, IV, 2, 147). "Corrupta re cui facta est impositio, non
remanebit vox significative (DS, IV, 2, 147). The linguistic term remains, but
(as Bacon says at the beginning of De signis (1,1)), it remains as mere sub-
stance deprived of the 'ratio,' or of the semantic correlation that made of this
material token a word. In the same sense when the son dies, what remains
of the father is "substantia," but not the ttrelatio paternitatis" (DS,I,1,38). When
we speak of singular things "certum est inquirenti quod facta impositione soli
rei extra animam, impossibile est (quod) vox significet speciem rei tamquam
signum datum ab anima et significativum ad placitum, quia vox significativa
ad placitum non significai nisi per impositionem et institutione," while the
relationship between the mental species and the thing is (as also the
Aristotelian tradition knew) a psychological and not directly a semiotic one.
Bacon does not deny that species can be signs of things, but they are so in
an iconic mode, they are natural, not "ordinata ab anima." Thus "concessum
est vocem soli rei imponi et non speciei" (DS,V,163).
l8 UMBERTO ECO
VIII. Duns Scotus and Modistae.
As for Duns Scotus and modistae, they represent a sort of very

ambiguous hinge between the extensional and the intensional po
tion. Probably further analyses should be implemented on this poin
As far as modistae are concerned their dialectic between "modi
significandf and "modi essendi" is a very tortured one. Lambertini (1984)
has recently shown how this point remains rather ambiguous not only
in the original texts but also in the framework of contemporary inter-
pretations.
As for Duns Scotus, it is possible to find in his work contrasting
statements. To support the extensional view see: "verbum autem ex-
terius est signum rei et non intellectionis" ( Ordinatio 1,27,1). To sup-
port the intensional view see: "signifacre est alicuius intellectum
constituere" ( Quaestiones in Perihermeneia 11,54 la). There are also quo-
tations that seem to support a compromissory interpretation, such as
the following:
facta transmutatione in re, secundum quod existit non fit transmuta-

tione in significatione vocis, cuius causa ponitur, quia res non sig-
nificatur ut existit sed ut intelligitur per ipsam speciem intelligibilem....
Concedendum quod destructo signato destruitur signum, sed licet res
destruitur ut existit non tarnen res ut intelligitur nec ut est signata
destruitur (Quaest. in Periherm. III, 545 ff.).
Thus there are authors who consider Scotus as ranking among

extensionalists (see Nuchelmans 1973:196, "Duns Scotus, who already
stated that what is signified by the spoken sound is a thing rather than
a concept," with reference to the commentary on the Sentences, Or-
dinatio, I, d.27, qq. 1-3, nn. 83-84 [ed. Vatic. VI, 97-98], others, like
Heidegger (1916, in the reliable first part of his book, devoted to the
'real' Scotus and not to Thomas of Erfurt) for whom Scotus is very
close to a phenomenological view of meaning as a mental object, and
finally others who confess their perplexity.12 (See for an intensionalis-
tic interpretation, Marmo 1981-82 and 1984).
12 Boehner (1958:219) says that "Scotus already broke with this interpre-
tation of Aristotle's text, maintaining that the significate of the word, gener-
ally speaking, is not the concept but the thing." However, in footnote
IX. Ockham.
It has been argued whether the extensionalist theory of Ockham

be really so straightforward as it seems or not. Given the four senses
of "significare" outlined in Summa Logicae , pars I, cap. 33 (OPh I, 95-96)
only the first one has a clear extensional sense. Only in the first sense
terms lose their signification when the object they stand for does not
exist (either any longer or as yet). Nevertheless, even if Ockham used
"significare" and "denotari" also in an intensional sense (see for "sig-
nificare" Boehner 1958 and for "denotari" Marmo 1984), it is evident
that in many places he used them in an extensional context. My
hypothesis is that it has been this terminological usage that has in-
fluenced the further course of truth-conditional semantics.
What happens with Ockham- and happened with Bacon- is that
the semiotic triangle is definitely put upside down. Words are not con-
nected primarily to concepts and then, through the mental mediation,
to things: they are directly imposed upon things and states of affairs.
Likewise concepts refer to things directly.
Thus the semantic triangle now assumes the following format:
there is a direct relation between concepts and things, since concepts
are the natural signs that signify things, {Summa Logicae , pars I, c. 12
[OPh I, 41-44]) and there is a direct relation between words and those
things they are imposed to name, while the relation between words
and concepts is disregarded (cf. Tabarroni 1984; cf. also Boehner 1958,
p. 221).
Ockham is aware that Boethius says "voces significare concep-
tus" but he says that this has to be intended in the sense that "voces
sunt signa secundario significantia illa quae per passiones animae
primario importantur," where it is clear that "ilia" are things, not con-
cepts. Words signify the same things signified by concepts, but do not
signify concepts! (Summa Logicaey pars I, c. 1 [OPh I, 7-9]).
There is a very puzzling text where Ockham says that species can
only be a sign that reminds us of something that we have already and
29, he adds: "A thesis (by Fr. John B. Vogel, O.F.M.) is being written under
our direction on the problem of direct signification of the thing according
to Scotus; he has discovered a considerable discrepancy between the treat-
ment of this problem in the Oxoniense and the Quaestiones in Perihermeneias
opus primum and secundum " See Marmo 1981-82.
20 UMBERTO ECO
singularly known ( Qu
on this topic Boehner
Itemrepraesentatum deb
nunquam ducerei in cog
Exemplum: statua Hercu
culis nisi prius vidissem H
sit sibi similis aut non. S
aliquid praevium omni a
poni propter repraesenta
This text assumes as a

unable to figure out fro
before. This seems contr
only photographs but al
out the characteristics o
direct experience. I tried
in terms of cultural hist
though he lived in XIV
the iconography of the R
were not realistically de
types. Undoubtedly, wh
one recognizes The Saint
the individual So and So.
style of Latin sculptures
centuries.
There is however an epistemological explanation that accounts
for such an embarassing statement. If the real sign for individual things
is the concept, and the physical expression (be it word or an image)
is only a symptom of the inner image, then without the intuitive
knowledge of an object, physical expressions cannot "mean" anything.
Words or images neither create nor arouse something in the mind of
the addressee (as it could happen in the Augustinin semiotics) if in
that mind there is not, previously, the only possible sign of the ex-
perienced reality, namely, the mental one. Without such an inner sign,
the external expression results in being the symptom of an 'empty
thought/ The subversion of the semantic triangle that for Bacon was
the final term of a long lasting discussion, is for Ockham an unnegotia-
ble starting point.
There are persuasive demonstrations of the fact that Ockham also
used "significare" in a intensional sense (Boehner 1958 and Marmo 19

with a discussion of all these cases in which propositions still retain
their meaning independently of the fact whether they are true or false).
However in this paper I am not arguing about Ockham's semiotics b
about his semiotic lexicon. It is clear that he used "supponere" in an
extensional sense, since there is suppositio "quando terminus stat in
propositione pro aliquo" ( Summa Logicae , pars I, c. 63 [OPh I, 193])
It is equally evident that Ockham repeatedly equates "significare" (i
the first sense of the term, see Summa Logicae , pars I, c. 33 [OPh I, 9
with "supponere": "aliquid significar^, vel supponere vel stare pro a
quo" (Summa Logicaey pars I, c. 4 [OPh I, 15]). (See also Pinborg, 1972,
Now, it is in the context of the discussion on propositions and
suppositions that Ockham uses the expression "denotari." See for in
stance: "terminus supponit pro ilio, de quo vel de pronomine demon
strante ipsum, per propositionem denotatur praedicatum praedicari
si terminus supponens sit subjectum" (Summa Logicae} pars I, c. 63 [O
I, 194]). If the term is the subject of a proposition, then the thing
which the term has the "suppositio" is that of which the propositio
denotes that the predicate is predicated.
In "homo est albus" both terms suppose for the same thing and
by the whole proposition is denoted that it is the case that the sam
thing is both man and white: "denotatur in tali propositione, qu
illud, pro quo subiectum supponit, sit illud, pro quo praedicatum su
ponit" (Expos. Porphyr ., cap. 1 [OPh II, 25]). By the proposition a "si
nificatum" is denoted and this significatum is a state of affairs: "veri
et falsitas sunt quaedam praedicabilia de propositione importantia, qu
ita est a parte significati, sicut denotatur per propositionem, quae e
signum" (Expos. Periherm.y prooem., 12 [OPh II, 376]). Likewis
"denotari" is used for what is demonstrated to be by the conclusion
of a syllogism: "propter quam ita est a parte rei sicut denotatur ess
per conclusionem demonstrationis" (Summa Logicae , pars III- 2, c. 2
[OPh I, 548]; see also Moody 1935,6,3).
Sicut per istam 'Homo est animaP denotatur quod Sortes vere es
animal. Per istam autem 'homo est nomen' denotatur quod haec vox
'homo' est nomen.... Similiter per istam 'album est animal,' denotatur
quod ilia res, quae est alba, sit animal, ita quod haec sit ver
'Hoc est animal,' demonstrando illam rem, quae est alba, et propter
hoc pro ilia re subjectum supponit.... Nam per istam: 'Sortes est al-
bus' denotatur, quod Sortes est ilia res, quae habet albedinem, et
22 UMBERTO ECO
ideo praedicatum suppon

si in ista 'Hic est angelu
eodem, propositio est v
angelitatem ... sed denota
per tales propositiones: 'S
quod Sortes vere est hom
aliqua res, pro qua stat
praedicatum 'animai' ( S
The constant use of th

not denote a state of af
affairs is denoted . It is
tion between a proposit
tion and what is unders
to translate "denotatur"
thing is denoted even t
ma Logicae , pars I, cc
However, considering
category and that the v
tion with the mention
tion does not denote ne
to somebody that somet
pose that the Ockhamis
tio" in extensional contexts.
Because of the radical shift undergone by "significare" between
Bacon and Ockham, "denotare" is now ready to be intended exten-
sionally.
It is curious to remark that, according to Bacon and Ockham,
this terminological "revolution" concerned first of all "significatio" (and
involved "denotatio" only as a sort of side-effect). But "significatio" was
13 There is at least one instance of "denotare" in the active form. Maier

(1972: 98) quotes a passage from the Elementarium logicae (pp. 217-18) where
Ockham distinguishes between two senses of "appellare." The first is the An-
selmian one. As for the second one, Ockham writes: "aliter accipitur appel-
lare pro termino exigere vel denotare seipsum debere sub propriam formam."
It seems that here "denotare" stands for 'to require or postulate' a co-reference
within the framework of the linguistic context.
14 For a similar use of denotari see Quaestiones in Libros physicorum J,
ed. Corvino. Rivista Critica di storia della Filosofia X, 3-4, maggio-agosto 1955;
crit. ed. S. Brown (OPh VI, 402).
so strongly linked to meaning from the times of Boethius, that it, so

to speak, held out more bravely against the attack of the extensionalistic
point of view. In the following centuries we find "signification used again
in an intensional sense (see for instance Locke). Truth-conditional
semantics succeeded better in capturing "denotatio," whose semantic
status was more ambiguous.
The cognitive tradition resisted that capture, and "denotation"
was used by many authors as related to meaning.15 However after Mill
we find "denotation" more and more used for extension.
Is there any reason to believe that Mill borrowed from Ockham
the idea of using "denotation" as a technical term?
There are indeed many reasons to think that Mill elaborated his
System of logic referring to Ockham or at least to the Ockhamistic tra-
dition:
1 . Even though paying a remarkable attention to the intensional
aspects of language, Mill developed a theory of denotation which is
similar to the Ockhamistic theory of supposition. See for instance: "a
name can only be said to stand for, or be the name of, the thing of
which it can be predicated" (1843, II, v).
2. Mill borrows from the Schoolmen (as he says in II, v) the term
"connotation" and, when distinguishing between connotative and non-
connotative terms he says that the latter were called "absolute." Gar-
gani (1971:95) traces this terminology back to the Ockhamistic dis-
tinction between absolute and connotative terms.
3. Mill uses "signify" in the Ockhamistic way (that is, always ex-
tensionally, at least when it is taken in Ockham's first sense of "sig-
nificado"). "A non-connotative term is one which signifies a subject
only or an attitude only. A connotative term is one which denotes
a subject, and implies an attribute (II, v). Since the denotative func-
tion (in MilPs terms) is first of all performed by non-connotative terms,
it is clear that Mill equates "signify" with "denote." See also: "the name
... is said to signify the subjects directly , the attributes indirectly : it denotes
15 Maier (1972: 117) quotes Peter of Mantova: "Verba significantia ac-

tum mentis ut scio, cognosco, intelligo etc. dnotant cognitionem rerum sig-
nificatarum a terminis sequentibus ipsa verba per conceptum." Immediately
after this sentence, Peter provides an example: "Unde ista propositio 'tu cog-
noscis Socratem' significat quod tu cognoscis Socratem per hunc conceptum
'Socratem' in recto vel obliquo" ( Logica 19vb-20ra). It is clear that "deno-
24 UMBERTO ECO
the subjects and implies, or invo

connotes the attributes,... The on
nothing are proper names, and t
nification" (v).
4. Probably Mill accepts "denot
prejudiced than "signify," becau
"connote."
Nevertheless we have seen that Ockham had at most influenced,
but by no means supported, the extensional use of "denotatio." Where
can we find, in this story of the natural evolution of a term, the miss-
ing link?
Probably we should look at Hobbes' De Corpore I, better known
as Computatio sive logica.16
It is generally acknowledged that Hobbes depends on Ockham
as well as Mill depends on Hobbes. As a matter of fact Mill opens
his discussion on names with a close examination of Hobbes' ideas.
We should however remark that Hobbes follows Ockham as far
as the theories of universais and propositions are concerned, but de-
velops a different theory of signification. For Hobbes there is a clear
cut distinction between signifying (that is, to express the speaker's idea
in the course of an act of communication) and naming (in the classi-
cal sense of "appellare" or "supponere," see Hungerland and Vick 1981).
Mill realizes that for Hobbes names are first of all names of ideas
of things, but he finds in Hobbes evidence of the fact that "names ...
shall always be spoken ... as the names of things themselves (1843, II, i)"
and that "all names are names of something, real or imaginary.... A
general name is familiarly defined, a name which is capable of being
truly affirmed, in the same sense, of each of an indefinite number of
things (II, in)." Mill is here close to Hobbes, with the marginal differ-
ence that he calls 'general' the names that Hobbes called 'universal.'
But Mill uses "signify"- as we have seen- not in the sense of Hobbes
but in the sense of Ockham (and Hobbes' notion of "significare" he
uses rather "connote").
Being strongly interested in connotation, and not realizing that
tare" and "significare" are more or less equivalent and that both are used to
speak of propositional attitudes- an intensional subject par excellence .
16 I owe this suggestion to Andrea Tabarroni and Costantino Marmo,
personal communication.
his connotation is not so dissimilar from Hobbes* signification, Mill be-

lieves that, at the final end, Hobbes privileged naming (Mill's denota-
tion) over signifying (Mill*s connotation): Hobbes, like the Nominalists
in general, Mill says "bestowed little or no attention upon the conno-
tation of words: and sought for their meaning exclusively in what they
denote" (v).
This very curious way of reading Hobbes as if he were Bertrand
Russell, is due to the fact that Mill read him as if he were an orthodox
Ockhamist.
However, even though Mill took Hobbes for an Ockhamist, why
did he attribute to him the idea that names denote? Mill knew very
well that Hobbes used "to name" instead of "to denote" (see v), but
he probably remarked that Hobbes in De corpore I used "denotare" in
at least four cases- five in the English version that Mill certainly read,
since he quotes Hobbes* work as Computation or logic,17
A propos of the difference between abstract and concrete names,
Hobbes says that "abstractum est quod in re supposita existentem nomi-
nis concreti causam dnott, ut 'esse corpus/ 'esse mobile* ... et similia....
Nomina autem abstracta causam nominis concreti dnotant, non ip-
sam rem." (De Corpore, I,iii,3) It must be observed that for Hobbes ab-
stract names do denote a cause, but this cause is not an entity: it is
the criterion according to which an expression is employed (see Gar-
gani 1971:86; Hungerland and Vick 1981:21). However Mill rephrases
Hobbes* text in this way: "a concrete name is a name which stands
for a thing; an abstract name is a name which stands for an attribute
of a thing" (1843 II, v) - where "stand for" is the Ockhamistic "stare pro
aliquo." He also adds that he is using such words as 'concrete* and 'ab-
stract* "in the sense annexed to them by the Schoolmen."
Probably Mill extrapolated from Hobbes* quotation that, if abstract
names do not denote things, the concrete ones certainly do. In fact
Hobbes uconcretum autem est quod rei alicujus quae existere supponitur
nomen est, ideoque quandoque suppositum , quandoque subjectum , graece
17 Hunger land and Vick (1981:22 and 157) observe that the English
translation of De corpore- eve n though revised by Hobbes himself- obliterates
the difference between "significare" and "denotare." For example in English
Writings 1.18 (latin I,ii,7) "dnott" is translated as "signifies," where in E. W.
1,22 (latin I,ii,2) there is a "denote" that does not exist in the latin text ("voces
ilia universalitatis" become "these words ... which denote universality").
2 UMBERTO ECO
ypokeimenon appellator," and two li

position corpus est mobile "quandoq
nomine designatami (De Co. I,iii,3)
text where it is linked on one side
the other side to the idea of denotation.
It is true that concrete names can be proper either to a singular
thing or to a set of individuals, so that we can say that Hobbes* idea
of denotation, if any, was still midway between the "suppositio naturalis"
and the "suppositio accidentalis" of Peter of Spain. For this reason it
has been remarked (Hungerland and Vick 1981:51 ff.) that certainly
'to denote* has not for Hobbes the same sense than it has in contem-
porary philosophy of language, because it does not only apply to logi-
cal proper names but also to the class names and even to unexisting
entities. But also Mill accepted this view. Therefore he could have in-
tended Hobbes* 'to denote* in an extensional way.
In De Co. I,ii,7 Hobbes says that "homo quemlibet e multis homini-
bus, philosophus quemlibet e multis philosophis dnott propter omni-
um similitudinem." Thus the denotation concerns again any one of
a multitude of singular individuals, in so far as 'homo* and 'philosophus*
are concrete names of a class. In De Co. I,vi, 112, Hobbes says that
words are useful for proving through syllogisms because by them "un-
umquodque universale singularium rerum conceptus dnott infinita-
rum." For Hobbes words denote conceptions of singular things. Mill
translates in a clear extensional sense: "a general name ... is capable
of being truly affirmed of each of an indefinite number of things" (II, ii).
In De Co. II,ii, 12 it is said that the name 'parabola* can denote
both an allegory and a geometrical figure, and it is uncertain if Hobbes
meant 'significat* or 'nominat.*
To conclude:
1. Hobbes uses "denotare" at least three times in a way that en-
courages an extensional interpretation, and in contexts that recall the
Ockhamistic use of "significare" and "supponere."
2. Even though "denotare" is not used as a technical term, Hobbes
does consistently employ it in a way that precludes its interpretation
as a rough synonym of his own "significare," as Hungerland and Vick
(1981:153, footnote 2) persuasively remark.
3. It is likely that Hobbes did so under the influence of the other-
wise ambiguous "denotari" that he certainly found in Ockham.
4. Mill disregards Hobbes' theory of signification and reads Com

putano sive bgica as if it belonged to a totally Ockhamistic line of though
5. It is probable that Mill, under the influence of Hobbes' use of
"denotare," decided to oppose denotation (instead of 'naming') to con
notation.
These are obviously mere hypotheses. To tell the whole story of
what really happened in the course of the five centuries which stand
between Ockham and Mill is beyond the possibilities of a single scho-
lar. I only hope that my paper will encourage further research on this
matter, in order to ascertain if between Ockham and Mill there were
other messengers who handed down the torch of "denotation."
University of Bologna Umberto Eco

Bolognay Italy
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Signification and Denotation From Boethius To Ockham.

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SIGNIFICATION AND DENOTATION FROM BOETHIUS TO OCKHAM

St. Bonaventure University - Franciscan Institute Publications is collaborating with

1 In the framework of componential analysis, "denotation" has been used

which it is the name, while it connotes the properties by virtue of which

A Rhematic Indexical Sinsign is affected "by the real camel it denotes"

but he understood clearly that- as far as "connotation" was

"It has been, indeed, the opinion

Peirce remarks that the comm

In De interpretatione (16a ff.), Aristotle implicitly but clearly de-

Boethius translates "semanein" with "significare" but he follows

As for "denotatio," Boethius use

III. Anselm's "appellatio."

A more clear-cut distinction between signifying and referring is

satis mihi probasti grammaticum non significare h ominem.... Ante dice-

bas grammaticum significare hominem scientem grammaticam ... (se

Such a distinction between signification and appellation (or nam-

It has been remarked that in Abelard the logical terminology

in which he uses the same term

4 In Dialctica (V, II, De definition

Words do not signify everything they can name.

VOX significai INTELLECTUS

The same intensional trend is followed by Aquinas which remains

Later he says that the name signifies its definition (1,11,20). It is

5 Signification is so far from reference that, when a verb is used in a sen-

VI. The rise of the idea of supposition.

It is clear that such authors as Boethius, Abelard or Aquinas,

6 A preposition such as per "dnott causam instrumentalem" (V Sent .

In its more mature for

author to the domain of ps

where he says that in the expression "sedentem possibile est ambulare"

Suppositio vero est acceptio termini substantivi pro aliquo. Differunt

However in Peter's theory there is a difference between extensionally

Differt autem appellatio a suppositione et a significatione, quia appel-

De Rijk (1982:169) says that "Peter's natural supposition is really

meaning class individual

significatio suppositio suppositio

The whole thing changes even terminologically with William of

In De signis Bacon uses "significare, significatio, significatum" in

11 In his classification of signs Bacon had distinguished natural signs

Bacon definitely destroys the se

in actu est, ergo res significata est/ qu

transsumptionem" and is used equivocally in respect to the sense it had when

VIII. Duns Scotus and Modistae.

As for Duns Scotus and modistae, they represent a sort of very

facta transmutatione in re, secundum quod existit non fit transmuta-

Thus there are authors who consider Scotus as ranking among

It has been argued whether the extensionalist theory of Ockham

This text assumes as a

used "significare" in a intensional sense (Boehner 1958 and Marmo 19

ideo praedicatum suppon

The constant use of th

13 There is at least one instance of "denotare" in the active form. Maier

so strongly linked to meaning from the times of Boethius, that it, so

15 Maier (1972: 117) quotes Peter of Mantova: "Verba significantia ac-

the subjects and implies, or invo

his connotation is not so dissimilar from Hobbes* signification, Mill be-

ypokeimenon appellator," and two li

4. Mill disregards Hobbes' theory of signification and reads Com

University of Bologna Umberto Eco

Barthes, R., 1964. "Elements de smiologie." Communications 4.