AGENCY

BPI & FGI Insurance Corp. vs. Laingo

G.R. No. 205206 Mar. 16, 2016

FACTS: Rheozel, the son of Yolanda Laingo, opened a Platinum 2-in-1 Savings and Insurance
Account with the Bank of the Philippine Islands, a savings account where depositors are
automatically covered by an insurance policy against disability or death issued by petitioner
FGU Insurance Corporation (FGU Insurance), now known as BPI/MS Insurance Corporation. A
BPI Passbook as well as a Personal Accident Insurance Coverage Certificate was issued to
Rheozel with Yolanda as the beneficiary. On September 27, 2000, Rheozel died in a vehicular
accident. To answer for Rheozels burial and funeral expenses, Yolanda instructed her
secretary to inquire from the BPI about Rheozels death. The BPI Branch Manager
accommodated Yolandas request and allowed her to withdraw P995,000.00 from the
account. An employee of the BPI also went to Rheozels wake to verify some information and
for Yolanda to sign some documents for the withdrawal of the amount. It was only after two
years, when Rheozels sister Rhealyn was rearranging Rheozels personal things, that
Rheozels Personal Accident Insurance Coverage with FGU Insurance was discovered. She
promptly informed Yolanda, who filed a claim for insurance benefits under the policy. The
company denied the claim, stating that Yolanda should have filed the claim within three
calendar months from the death of Rheozel as required under Paragraph 15 of the Personal
Accident Certificate of Insurance.

ISSUE: whether or not Laingo, as named beneficiary who had no knowledge of the existence
of the insurance contract, is bound by the three calendar month deadline for filing a written
notice of claim upon the death of the insured.

RULING: No, Laingo is not bound by the 3-calendar rule in filing insurance claims since she
only learned the existence of the insurance coverage 2 years from the death of his son.

There is a rationale in the contract of agency, which flows from the "doctrine of
representation," that notice to the agent is notice to the principal. Here, BPI had been
informed of Rheozel's death by the latter's family. Since BPI is the agent of FGU Insurance,
then such notice of death to BPI is considered as notice to FGU Insurance as well. FGU
Insurance cannot now justify the denial of a beneficiary's insurance claim for being filed out
of time when notice of death had been communicated to its agent within a few days after the
death of the depositor-insured. In short, there was timely notice of Rheozel's death given to
FGU Insurance within three months from Rheozel's death as required by the insurance
company.

Since an agency relationship between BPI (as an agent) and FGI Insurance (as the principal)
was duly established, BPI, as agent of FGU Insurance, had the primary responsibility to ensure
that the 2-in-1 account be reasonably carried out with full disclosure to the parties concerned,
particularly the beneficiaries. Thus, it was incumbent upon BPI to give proper notice of the
existence of the insurance coverage and the stipulation in the insurance contract for filing a
claim to Laingo, as Rheozels beneficiary, upon the latters death.

As a general rule, the acts of the agent on behalf of the principal within the scope of the
delegated authority have the same legal effect and consequence as though the principal had
been the one so acting in the given situation.

It is the duty of the agent to act in good faith for the advancement of the interests of the
principal. In this case, BPI had the obligation to carry out the agency by informing the
beneficiary, who appeared before BPI to withdraw funds of the insured who was BPIs
depositor, not only of the existence of the insurance contract but also the accompanying terms
and conditions of the insurance policy in order for the beneficiary to be able to properly and
timely claim the benefit.

Thus, BPI acted as agent of FGU Insurance with respect to the insurance feature of its own
marketed product.
PARTNERSHIP

Michael C. Guy vs. Atty. Glenn C. Gacott

G.R. No. 206147 Jan. 13, 2016

FACTS:

Gacott purchased 2 brand new transreceivers from Quantech Systems Corporation (QSC)
through its employee Medestomas. Gacott returned the transreceivers to QSC due to defects
and requested for replacement. Medestomas promised to send Gacott the units within two
weeks.

Gacott did not receive the replacement units as promised. QSC informed him that there were
no available units and that it could not refund the purchased price. Despite several demands,
Gacott was never given a replacement neither a refund, he then filed a complaint for damages.

QSC was summoned. During the trial QSC did not present any evidence. RTC then decides in
favor of Gacott and directed QSC to pay Gacott jointly and severally for the damages and
refund incurred

During the execution stage, Gacott learned that QSC was not a corporation, but a general
partnership registered with SEC, and Guy was appointed as General Manager. Upon learning
that Guy had vehicles registered in his name, Gacott instructed the sheriff to proceed with
the attachment of one of the motor vehicles of Guy based on the certification issued by the
DOTC-LTO. The Sheriff attached Guys vehicle by virtue of the Notice of Attachment/Levy
upon Personalty upon the record custodian of the DOTC-LTO of Mandaluyong City.

Guy filed his Motion to Lift Attachment Upon Personalty, arguing that he was not a judgment
debtor and his vehicle could not be attached. Guy, also contends that he was never been a
party to the case, that he was never properly impleaded in the complaint. RTC denied Guys
motion. Aggrieved, he then filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the CA.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT GUY IS SOLIDARILY LIABLE WITH THE PARTNERSHIP FOR
DAMAGES ARISING FROM THE BREACH OF THE CONTRACT OF SALE WITH RESPONDENT
GACOTT

RULING: No, Guy is not solidarily liable. As a well-settled rule in partnership, partners liability
is subsidiary and generally joint, the immediate levy upon the property of a partner cannot
be made.

Article 1816 of the Civil Code states that All partners shall be liable pro rata with all their
property and after all the partnership assets have been exhausted for the contracts which
may be entered into in the name and for the account of the partnership.

In this case, the levy or attachment of property of Guy is improper since there is no record
showing that the partnership assets or efforts have been exhausted.

Thus, it was improper to hold Guy solidarily liable for the obligation of the partnership.
Felimon Manguiob vs. Judge Paul T. Arcangel and Alexandra Velasco

G.R. No. 152262 Feb 15, 2012

AGENCY

Dra. Mercedes Oliver vs. Philippine Savings Bank & Lilia Castro

G.R. No. 214567 April 4, 2016

TRUST

Heirs of Ureta vs. Ureta

G.R. No. 165748 September 14, 2011

Norma Edita Dy Sun-Ong vs. Jose Victory Dy Sun

G.R. No. 207435 July 1, 2015