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Section 21

No. 1

G.R. No. L-9069 March 31, 1915

THE MUNICIPALITY OF CAVITE, plaintiff-appellant,


vs.
HILARIA ROJAS and her husband TIUNG SIUKO, alias SIWA, defendants-appellees.

Facts

The boundary line between the properties of the municipality of Cavite and the naval
reservation, as fixed in Act No. 1039 of the Philippine Commission, appears in the plan
prepared by a naval engineer and submitted as evidence by the plaintiff, Exhibit C of civil
case No. 274 of the Cavite court and registered in this court as No. 9071. According to said
plan, defendant's house is erected on a plat of ground that forms part of the promenade
called Plaza Soledad, and this was also so proven by the testimony of the plaintiff's
witnesses.

By section 3 of the said Act No. 1039, passed January 12, 1904, the Philippine Commission
granted to the municipality of Cavite all the land included in the tract called Plaza Soledad.
This court decided that neither the municipality nor the objectors were entitled to
inscription, for with respect to the objectors said plaza belonged to the municipality of
Cavite and with respect to the latter the said Plaza Soledad was not transferable property
of that municipality to be inscribed in its name, because he intention of Act No. 1039 was
that the said plaza and other places therein enumerated should be kept open for public
transit.

Issue

Whether or not a public plaza can be the subject of a leased contract.

Ruling

Therefore, it must be concluded that the contract, Exhibit C, whereby he municipality of


Cavite leased to Hilaria Rojas a portion of the Plaza Soledad is null and void and of no force
or effect, because it is contrary to the law and the thing leased cannot be the object of a
contract.
No. 2

KWONG SING, in his own behalf and in behalf of all others having a common or
general interest in the subject-matter of this action, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
THE CITY OF MANILA, defendant-appellant.

Not only must it appear that the interest of the public generally require an interference
with private rights, but the means adopted must be reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. If the
ordinance appears to the judicial mind to be partial or oppressive, it must be declared
invalid. The presumption is, however, that the municipal authorities, in enacting the
ordinance, did so with a rational and conscientious regard for the rights of the individual
and of the community.

Under the guise of police regulation, an attempt is not made to violate personal property
rights. The ordinance is neither discriminatory nor unreasonable in its operation. It applies
to all public laundries without distinction, whether they belong to Americans, Filipinos,
Chinese, or any other nationality. All, without exception, and each everyone of them
without distinction, must comply with the ordinance. There is no privilege, no
discrimination, no distinction. Equally and uniformly the ordinance applies to all engaged
in the laundry business, and, as nearly as may be, the same burdens are cast upon them.

Issue

Whether or not the ordinance of city of Manila invades fundamental right of the plaintiff.

Ruling

Our holding is, that the government of the city of Manila had the power to enact Ordinance
No. 532 and that as said ordinance is found not to be oppressive, nor unequal, nor unjust, it
is valid. This statement disposes of both assignments of error, for the improprietry of the
question answered by a witness for the defense over the objection of plaintiff's attorney
can be conceded without affecting the result.
No 3

CIPRIANO P. PRIMICIAS, General Campaign Manager of Coalesced Minority


Parties, petitioner,
vs.
VALERIANO E. FUGOSO, Mayor of City of Manila, respondent.

Facts

The Philippine legislature has delegated the exercise of the police power to the Municipal
Board of the City of Manila, which according to section 2439 of the Administrative Code is
the legislative body of the City. Section 2444 of the same Code grants the Municipal Board,
among others, the following legislative power, to wit: "(p) to provide for the prohibition
and suppression of riots, affrays, disturbances, and disorderly assemblies, (u) to regulate
the use of streets, avenues ... parks, cemeteries and other public places" and "for the
abatement of nuances in the same," and "(ee) to enact all ordinances it may deem necessary
and proper for sanitation and safety, the furtherance of prosperity and the promotion of
morality, peace, good order, comfort, convenience, and general welfare of the city and its
inhabitants."

Issue

Whether or not requiring permits to be secured durinf parade or procession violates


fundamental rights.

Ruling

A statute requiring pewrsons using the public streets for a parade or procession to procure
a special license therefor from the local authorities is not an unconstitutional abridgement
of the rights of assembly or a freedom of speech and press, where, as the statute is
construed by the state courts, the licensing authorities are strictly limited, in the issuance
of licenses, to a consideration, the time, place, and manner of the parade and procession,
with a view to conserving the public convenience and of affording an opportunity to
provide proper policing and are not invested with arbitrary discretion to issue or refuse
license.
No 4

CALAPAN LUMBER COMPANY, INC., plaintiff-appellee,


vs.
COMMUNITY SAWMILL COMPANY, ET AL., defendants-appellants.

Facts

This is an action for injunction, prohibition against defendant public officers,


compensatory, exemplary and nominal damages, attorney's fees and costs.

That the road and bridge in question, known as the Biga-Communal-Goob (from Km. 12.38
to 15.88) was constructed during the period from 1950 to 1952 by the plaintiff at its
exclusive expense with the knowledge and consent of the Provincial Board of Oriental
Mindoro.

Issue

Whether or not a public road be declared a private property.

Ruling

Upon the foregoing considerations, this Court is of the opinion, and so holds, that the road
involved in this case cannot be declared private property, and for that reason the Provincial
Board of Oriental Mindoro may elect between paying the appellee the total cost of the
construction of the road together with lawful interest from the date of actual disbursement
by the appellee to the date of payment.
No 5

CEBU OXYGEN & ACETYLENE CO., INC., petitioner,


vs.
HON. PASCUAL A. BERCILLES

This is a petition for the review of the order of the Court of First Instance of Cebu
dismissing petitioners application for registration of title over a parcel of land situated in
the City of Cebu.
The parcel of land sought to be registered was only a portion of M. Borces Street, Mabolo,
Cebu City. On September 23, 1968, the City Council of Cebu, through Resolution No. 2193,
approved on October 3, 1968, declared the terminal portion of M. Borces Street, Mabolo,
Cebu City, as an abandoned road, the same not being included in the City Development
Plan. 1 Subsequently, on December 19, 1968, the City Council of Cebu passed Resolution No.
2755, authorizing the Acting City Mayor to sell the land through a public
bidding. 2 Pursuant thereto, the lot was awarded to the herein petitioner being the highest
bidder and on March 3, 1969, the City of Cebu, through the Acting City Mayor, executed a
deed of absolute sale to the herein petitioner for a total consideration of P10,800.00. 3 By
virtue of the aforesaid deed of absolute sale, the petitioner filed an application with the
Court of First instance of Cebu to have its title to the land registered.
Issue

(1) Does the City Charter of Cebu City (Republic Act No. 3857) under Section 31, paragraph
34, give the City of Cebu the valid right to declare a road as abandoned? and

Ruling
From the foregoing, it is undoubtedly clear that the City of Cebu is empowered to close a
city road or street. In the case of Favis vs. City of Baguio, 7 where the power of the city
Council of Baguio City to close city streets and to vacate or withdraw the same from public
use was similarly assailed.
No 6

BRUNO S. CABRERA, petitioner,


vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS

Facts

In 1978, part of the northern end of the old road fronting the petitioner's house was
planted to vegetables in 1977 by Eulogia Alejandro. Anselmo Pea, who had bought
Angeles Vargas's share, also in the same part of the road, converted it into a piggery farm.

Learning about Resolution 158, the petitioner filed on December 29, 1978, a complaint
with the Court of First Instance of Catanduanes for "Restoration of Public Road and/or
Abatement of Nuisance, Annulment of Resolutions and Documents with Damages." He
alleged that the land fronting his house was a public road owned by the Province of
Catanduanes in its governmental capacity and therefore beyond the commerce of man. He
contended that Resolution No. 158 and the deeds of exchange were invalid, as so too was
the closure of the northern portion of the said road.

Issue

Whether or not petitioner is entitled for damages.

Ruling

we hold that the petitioner is not entitled to damages because the injury he has incurred,
such as it is, is the price he and others like him must pay for the welfare of the entire
community. This is not a case where his property has been expropriated and he is entitled
to just compensation. The construction of the new road was undertaken under the general
welfare clause.
No 7

Macasiano vs Diokno GR 97764 (August 10, 1992)

Facts:
Respondent Municipality passed Ordinance No. 86 which authorized the closure of
J.Gabriel, G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena Streets and the
establishment of a flea market thereon. This was passed pursuant to MMC Ordinance No.2
and was approved by the Metropolitan Manila Authority on July 20, 1990.

On August 8, 1990, respondent municipality and Palanyag entered into a contract


agreement whereby the latter shall operate, maintain & manage the flea markets and/or
vending areas in the aforementioned streets with the obligation to remit dues to the
treasury of the municipal government of Paraaque.

On September 13, 1990 Brig. Gen. Macasiano ordered the destruction and confiscation of
stalls along G.G. Cruz & Gabriel Street in Baclaran. He also wrote a letter to Palanyag
ordering the destruction of the flea market.

Hence, respondent filed a joint petition praying for preliminary injunction. The trial court
upheld the assailed Ordinance and enjoined petitioner from enforcing his letter-order
against Palanyag.

Issues:
WON an ordinance/resolution issued by the municipal council of Paraaque authorizing
the lease & use of public streets/thoroughfares as sites for the flea market is valid.

Held:
No. J. Gabriel, G.G. Cruz, Bayanihan, Lt. Garcia Extension and Opena Streets are local roads
used for public service and are therefore considered public properties of respondent
municipality. Properties of the local government devoted to public service are deemed
public and are under the absolute control of Congress. Hence, local governments have no
authority to control/regulate the use of public properties unless specific authority is vested
upon them by Congress.
No. 8

SPOUSES SOCRATES PILAPIL and ROSARIO PILAPIL, petitioners,


vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS

Facts

The testimony of Sesenando Longakit, the person named therein who has knowledge of the
surrounding facts and circumstances, and who was present during the deliberations,
passage and signing thereof, confirmed the existence of the camino vecinal on the property
of the Pilapils; (c) as to the claimed damages to the fruit trees and other plants belonging to
the Pilapils, the same had been separately litigated on, at the latter's instance, before the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court and had already been resolved against the Pilapils; besides,
there is insufficient proof to indicate that damage was done to such plants or that the
Pilapils planted trees and other plants on the camino vecinal; and (d) there is no merit in
the claim that witnesses Longakit and Pepito, being private individuals, are incompetent to
testify on the existence and location of the camino vecinal; both possess all the
qualifications and none of the disqualification's for witnesses under Section 20, Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court.

Issue

whether or not the Municipality of Liloan has a camino vecinal in sitio Bahak of barangay
Poblacion.

Ruling

It is beyond dispute that the establishment, closure or abandonment of the camino


vecinal is the sole prerogative of the Municipality of Liloan. No private party can interfere
with such a right. Thus, even if We are to agree with both the trial court and public
respondent that Longakit and Pepito were telling the truth, the decision of the Municipality
of Liloan with respect to the said camino vecinal in sitio Bahak must prevail. It is thus
pointless to concentrate on the testimonies of both witnesses since the same have, for all
intents and purposes, become irrelevant.
Section 22
No 1

ANTONIO FAVIS and CORAZON FAVIS doing business under the trade name "UNION
GROCERY & HARDWARE", plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
MUNICIPALITY OF SABANGAN, BONTOC, MOUNTAIN PROVINCE, defendant-appellee.

Facts

An appeal on questions of law, directly elevated to this Court by plaintiffs-appellants from


the adverse decision of the Court of First Instance of Baguio City.

Plaintiffs-appellants, Antonio Favis and Corazon Favis, doing business under the trade
name of "Union Grocery and Hardware", originally instituted on February 4, 1965, in the
City Court of Baguio City, this action for collection against defendant-appellee, the
Municipality of Sabangan, Bontoc, Mountain Province, for the recovery of the principal sum
of P1,115.00, representing the charge invoice value of G.I. pipes of various sizes needed by
defendant-appellee in its municipal waterworks construction, besides twelve (12%) per
cent interest and twenty-five (25%) per cent attorney's fees and costs. 1

Issue

Whether or not appellant is entitled for payment for the materials.

Ruling

In the present case, as pointed out by the Court a quo, the mayor of defendant municipality,
aside from not having claimed any authority to make the purchase of the materials
delivered by plaintiffs-appellants, had clearly indicated that the municipality would not be
bound to pay therefor and that the plaintiffs-appellants would have to look for payment to
the National Government through funds yet to be released by way of assistance to the
municipality.
No 2

CITY OF MANILA, petitioner-appellee,


vs.
TARLAC DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, oppositor-appellant.

Facts

The charter of the Army and Navy Club expired on 25 June 1958 and its members formed
the American Club, Inc., which was later renamed as the Army and Navy Club of Manila, Inc.
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 9332 was thus cancelled and replaced by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 51988 in the name of the new corporation and entry No. 18115/T-
9332 was carried over to the new certificate of title.

On 14 April 1961, then Mayor Arsenio Lacson of Manila advised the BPOE that the City of
Manila will exercise its right to repurchase the land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 2195. In June of the same year he requested the city fiscal to institute the proper court
action to compel the BPOE to reconvey the land. The city fiscal, however, believed that the
City did not have any cause of action, because, in his opinion, the right of the City to
reacquire the property could not extend beyond 10 years from and after the original
conveyance, as provided by Article 1508 of the Civil Code..

Issue

Did the officials of the City of Manila have power and authority to agree to the deletion of
the entry in appellant's certificates of title, and eliminate therefrom the right reserved to
the City to repurchase the land in question?

Ruling

For this purpose, the right is reserved to Tarlac Development Corporation to initiate a
distinct action where its rights may be fully clarified and determined; but the reannotation
order should be made effective on Tarlac's Certificate of Title No. 73444, as a preventive
measure to protect the eventual rights of the City of Manila against the claims of future
transferees.
No 3

MUNICIPAL BOARD, in representation of the City of Cebu, petitioner,


vs.
COURT OF TAX APPEALS, BOARD OF ASSESSMENT APPEALS,

In letters to the City Assessor of the City of Cebu dated June 17, 1959 and January 29, 1960,
the University of Southern Philippines Foundation, through its president, Mr. Agustin
Jereza, applied for inclusion in the list of real estate exempt from real property taxation the
following parcels of land which it leased from various persons for school purposes.

In reply, the City Assessor informed the University of Southern Philippines Foundation that
the aforesaid lots were considered exempt from real property taxation except Lots Nos.
313, 317, 340, 341, 342 and 460 B, rentals of which were paid their owners at P40.00,
P50.00, P50.00, P85.00, P85.00 and P50.00 per month, respectively.

Not satisfied with the letter-decision of the City Assessor, the University of Southern
Philippines Foundation appealed to the Board of Assessment Appeals of the City of Cebu.
After hearing, said Board rendered its decision granting exemption to Lots Nos. 313, 340,
341, 342, and 460-B. From this decision, the Municipal Board, in representation of the City
of Cebu, appealed to the Court of Tax Appeals.

Issue

Whether or not the City of Cebu may validly file an appeal.

Ruling

We hold that the City of Cebu may validly appeal from the decision of the City Board of
Assessment Appeals.

As to the personality of the Municipal Board to represent the City of Cebu in this suit,
suffice it to my that Sec. 58 of Commonwealth Act No. 58 expressly vests in the Municipal
Board the authority to appeal from the decision of the City Assessor to the Board of
Assessment Appeals. This indicates legislative intent to lodge in the Municipal Board the
right to represent the City in an appeal from an adverse decision of the Board of
Assessment Appeals.
No 4

MARIANO CALLEJA, petitioner,


vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, MUNICIPALITY OF IRIGA, JOSE VILLANUEVA and MARCIANO
TINO, respondents.

Petitioner is one of the nineteen civil service eligible employees of the Municipality of Iriga,
who were separated from the service when their positions were abolished by the municipal
council for lack of funds. Believing that their removal was without just cause, petitioner, in
his behalf and in behalf of the other dismissed employees, filed an action for mandamus
before the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur (Civil Case No. 5077) against the
Municipality of Iriga, the Members of the Municipal Council, and the Municipal Treasurer,
praying for their reinstatement and payment of their back salaries.

Issue

Whether or not Atty. Silvestre Felix, in his capacity as Municipal Attorney for the
Municipality of Iriga, who appeared in collaboration with the Provincial Fiscal as counsel
for respondent municipality and its officials in Civil Case No. 5077 of the Court of First
Instance of Camarines Sur, has the authority, under the law, to sign the notice of appeal in
said case, without the accompanying signature or conformity of the Provincial Fiscal.

Ruling

We declare, therefore, that the Municipal Attorney of a municipality, duly appointed in


accordance with the provisions of Republic Act 2264, is the legal officer of the municipality,
and as such legal officer he may appear in court as counsel for the municipality or any
municipal officer who is a party in a case in his official capacity.
No 5

THE MUNICIPALITY OF PAOAY, ILOCOS NORTE, petitioner,


vs.
TEODORO MANAOIS and EULOGIO F. DE GUZMAN, Judge of the Court of First Instance
of Pangasinan,respondents.

MONTEMAYOR, J.:

Teodoro Manaois having obtained a judgment against the municipality of Paoay, Ilocos
Norte in civil case No. 8026 of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Judge De Guzman
of said province issued a writ of execution against the defendant municipality. In
compliance with said writ the Provincial Sheriff of Ilocos Norte levied upon and attached to
some properties.

On July 26, 1949, the Provincial Fiscal of Ilocos Norte in representation of the municipality
of Paoay, filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan asking for the
dissolution of that attachment of levy of the properties above-mentioned. Judge De Guzman
in his order of October 6, 1949, denied the petition for the dissolution of the attachment; a
motion for reconsideration was also denied. Instead of appealing from that order the
municipality of Paoay has filed the present petition for certiorari with the writ of
preliminary injunction, asking that the order of respondent Judge dated October 6, 1946, be
reversed and that the attachment of the properties of the municipality already mentioned
be dissolved.

Issue

Whether or not the fishery lots are subject to execution.

Ruling

In conclusion, we hold that the fishery lots numbering about forty in the municipality of
Paoay, mentioned at the beginning of this decision are not subject to execution. For this
reason, the levy and attachment made by the Provincial Sheriff of Ilocos Norte of theses
fishery lots is void and the order of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan insofar as it
failed to dissolve the attachment made on these lots is reversed.
No 6

MACONDRAY AND CO., INC., plaintiff-appellant,


vs.
M. SARMIENTO, as City Treasurer of the City of Manila, defendant-appellee.

Facts

The plaintiff Macondray and Co., Inc., is a domestic corporation engaged as an agent and
dealer in new motor vehicles, accessories and spare parts, and of second-hand motor
vehicles which it receives as trade-ins from its buyers of new motor vehicles. The
defendant M. Sarmiento is the treasurer of the City of Manila.

On October 1, 1946, the Municipal Board of Manila passed Ordinance No. 2972, entitled "An
Ordinance Imposing License Fees on Dealers of Second-Hand Motor Vehicles And For Other
Purposes". Under this ordinance, the quarterly license fee for quarterly gross sales of
P50,000 is P500.

On October 24, 1946, the Manila Municipal Board approved Ordinance No. 2980 imposing
license fees on business dealers in motor vehicles and in accessories and other kinds of
machines. This ordinance was amended on May 30, 1947, by Ordinance No. 3046 entitled
"An Ordinance Amending Section One of Ordinance No. 2980, Imposing a License Fee On
The Business Of Dealers On Motor Vehicles And Accesories, And On Accessories and Spare
Parts (New Only)". Under this amended ordinance 3046, the quarterly license fee for
quarterly gross sales of P50,000 is P750.

Issue

Whether or not that the assessment and collection made by the defendant City treasurer
from the plaintiff-appellant of the amount of P912.50 is illegal and unjustified.

Ruling

In view of the foregoing, we find and hold that the assessment and collection made by the
defendant City treasurer from the plaintiff-appellant of the amount of P912.50 is illegal and
unjustified. The City Fiscal on behalf of the appellee claims that even assuming that
appellant is entitled to refund still, it may not recover interest, and he cites the case
of Sarasola vs. Trinidad, 40 Phil., 252 in support of his contention. The Sarasola case refers
to nonrecovery of interest against a sovereign government or State.
No 7

ESTANISLAO ALFONSO, plaintiff-appellant,


vs.
PASAY CITY, defendant-appellee.

Facts

This is a case where a registered owner of a parcel of land has lost possession way back in
1925 because it was taken by a municipal corporation (Municipality of Pasay) for road
purposes. It was never paid for, and so the ownership thereof remained in the name of the
registered owner. No annotation on said title was made as to any right, say easement of
right of way, which the City of Pasay might have acquired over the land. There is some
doubt as to whether Estanislao Alfonso ever made demands for the payment of his
property which was taken away from him without the benefit of either expropriation
proceedings or a negotiated sale. However, there is reason to believe that Alfonso has made
such demands as any owner of a valuable registered property would do, but as usually the
case, perhaps the demands were either ignored or action thereon was postponed and
perhaps forgotten with the charges of administration in Pasay that occurred since 1925 up
to 1954 when Alfonso finally brought the present action to recover either the possession of
the parcel or its value.

Issue

Whether or not the municipality of Pasay acquired the property through prescription.

Ruling

In the present case, Alfonso up to now the owner of the land in question, Lot No. 4368 of
the Cadastral Survey of Pasay, because being registered land, the City of Pasay or its
predecessor, Municipality of Pasay, did not and could not acquire it thru prescription. As
registered owner, he could bring an action to recover possession at any time because
possession is one of the attributes of ownership of land. However, said restoration of
possession by the City of Pasay is neither convenient nor feasible because it is now and has
been used for road purposes. So, the only relief available is for the City of Pasay to make
due compensation, which it could and should have done years ago since 1925.
No 8

BARTOLOME E. SAN DIEGO, plaintiff-appellee,


vs.
THE MUNICIPALITY OF NAUJAN, PROVINCE OF ORIENTAL MINDORO, defendant-
appellant.

Facts:

On September 5, 1950, the lessee requested for a five-year extension of the original lease
period. The request was, for some time, left pending before the municipal council, but on
December 1, 1951, after the lessee had reiterated his petition for extension, for the reason
that the typhoon "Wanda", which took place that month, destroyed most of his fish corrals,
the council adopted Resolution 222, series of 1951 extending the lease for another five (5)
years beginning January 1, 1952, with the express condition that the plaintiff would waive
the privilege to seek for reduction of the amount of rent which was to be based on the
original contract. After the resolution had been approved by the Provincial Board of
Oriental Mindoro, the lessor and the lessee, on December 23, 1951, contracted for the
extension of the period of the lease. The contract was approved and confirmed on
December 29, 1951 by Resolution 229, series of 1951, of the municipal council of Naujan
whose term was then about to expire. Pursuant to the said contract, the lessee filed a surety
bond of P52,000.00 and then reconstructed his fish corrals and stocked the Naujan Lake
with bagus fingerlings.

Issue

Whether or not there is impairment of contracts.

Ruling

We agree with the defendant-appellant in that the question Resolution 3 is not an


impairment of the obligation of contract, because the constitutional provision on
impairment refers only to contract legally executed. While, apparently, Resolution 3 tended
to abrogate the contract extending the lease, legally speaking, there was no contract
abrogated because, as we have said, the extension contract is void and inexistent.

In view of the foregoing, we hold that the municipal council of Naujan acted aright in
adopting Resolution 3, series of 1952, now in question.
No 9

CALTEX (PHILIPPINES), INC., THE SHELL COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS


LIMITED, and STANDARD VACUUM OIL COMPANY, plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
DELGADO BROTHERS, INC., and ALFREDO JACINTO, in his capacity as Commissioner
of Customs of the Port of Manila, respondents and appellants.

Facts

This is an appeal by the defendants, Delgado Brothers Inc. and Alfredo V. Jacinto, the latter
in his capacity as Commissioner of Customs at the port of Manila, from a decision of the
Court of First Instance of Manila, the dispositive part of which reads as follows: "Premised
upon the above considerations, the Court hereby declares that the 'checking charges' from
the plaintiffs on the cargoes of bulk petroleum products involved in this case and the
defendant Alfredo V. Jacinto, in his capacity as Commissioner of Customs, is hereby ordered
to refund to plaintiff Caltex (Philippines) Inc. the sum of P13,824.92; to plaintiff The Shell
Company of Philippine Islands Limited the sum of P9,416.00; and to plaintiff Standard-
Vacuum Oil Company the sum of P17,416.00, without interest. No special pronouncement
as to costs."

Issue

Whether or not the amendment done without public bidding was valid.

Ruling

This leads us to the ruling in the appealed decision that the amendment of June 1, 1951 is
null and void, for the reasons that it was done without public bidding. We may add to what
was pointed by the trial court that, although the "Arrastre Contract" (paragraph 45)
authorizes the parties to alter or amend any of the terms thereof. said authority must be
considered as being subject to the requirement of previous public biding, a formality
observed before the contract of October 21, 1950 was awarded to Delgado Brothers, Inc.
The "Arrastre Contract" is not an ordinary agreement involving merely the parties therein,
as the same effects the public in general, particularly as to the rates of and exemptions from
the arrastre charges.
No 10

PROVINCE OF CEBU vs.IAC, ATTY. GARCIA,G.R. No. 72841 January 29, 1987147 SCRA 447

On 1964, while then incumbent Governor Espina was on official business in Manila, the
Vice-Gov, Almendras and 3 members of the Provincial Board enacted A Resolution donating
to the City of Cebu anarea of over 380 hectares. The deed of donation was immediately
executed in behalf of the Province of Cebu by Vice-Governor Almendras and accepted in
behalf of the City of Cebu by Mayor Sergio Osmea,Jr. The document of donation was
prepared and notarized by a private lawyer.

The donated lots were to be sold by the City of Cebu to raise funds that would be used to
finance itspublic improvement projects. Upon his return from Manila, Governor Espina
disagreed with the donationand to prevent the sale of the lots, the officers and members of
the Cebu Mayor's League along withsome taxpayers, including Atty. Garcia, filed a case
seeking to have the donation declared illegal, null andvoid Named defendants in the suit
were the City of Cebu, City Mayor Sergio Osmea, Jr. and the Cebuprovincial officials
responsible for the donation of the province-owned lots.

For services rendered atty, Garcia filed a Notice of Attorney's Lien, praying that his
statement of claim of attorney's lien in said case be entered upon the records. To said
notice, petitioner Province of Cebuopposed: the payment of attorney's fees are not allowed
by law.

TC: in favor of atty garcia; on the basis of quantum meruit and fixing the amount at
P30,000.00.

Both parties appealed from the decision to the Court of Appeals. THe CA upheld the TC but
reduced theamount of the fees.

ISSUE: whether the governor may validly engage the services of a private lawyer and
whether theprovince may be held liable to pay the fees

HELD: Collaboration of a private law firm with the fiscal and the municipal attorney is not
allowed. Sec.1683 Revised Administrative Code:The provincial fiscal shall represent the
province and anymunicipality,..When the provincial fiscal is disqualified to serve
any municipality or other politicalsubdivision of a province, a special attorney may
be employed by its council

The municipality's authority to employ a private lawyer is expressly limited only to


situations where theprovincial fiscal is disqualified to represent it

Ratio: (1) local government should not be burdened with the expenses of hiring a private
lawyer; (2) theinterests of the municipal corporation would be best protected if a
government lawyer handles itslitigations.
No 11

OLONGAPO ELECTRIC LIGHT AND POWER CORPORATION, plaintiff appellant,


vs.
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION and THE MUNICIPALITY OF
OLONGAPO, defendants-appellees.

Facts

On 27 September 1959, the Federal Government of ' the United States of America returned
to the Republic of the Philippines the possession of what was then known as the
Community of Olongapo, a portion of the United States Naval Base at Subic Bay, in the
province of Zambales; and on 7 December 1959, the President of the Philippines, by
Executive Order No. 366, converted the area into an independent municipality known as
the Municipality of Olongapo. The Federal Government also turned over to the newly
created municipality the electric power facilities used by the United States Navy in the area,
including the transmission lines, poles, transformers, necessary appurtenances and
equipment existing thereon and agreed to furnish the municipality electric power to a
maximum load of 3,000 kilowatts until 12:00 o'clock noon of 7 December 1962.

On 19 June 1960, the plaintiff-appellant, Olongapo Electric Light and Power Corporation,
was granted a legislative franchise to install operate and maintain an electric light, heat and
power system in the municipality of Olongapo; and on 17 July 1960. it wrote the National
Power Corporation (NPC, for short), offering to buy electric power and requesting
information as to the terms and conditions thereof. The NPC wrote back asking how much
power and energy the appellant would need. In order to ascertain the same, the appellant
engaged the services of an engineer. In due time, a report was submitted to the NPC and,
thereafter, the appellant was apprised of the terms and conditions under which the NPC
would furnish power to it.

Issue

Whether or not the contract entered into was valid.

Ruling:

The argument of the appellant that the trial court has the authority to restrain the sale by
the NPC of electric power to the Municipality of Olongapo since the made is made in Manila,
where the principal offices of the NPC are located, and that all the managerial acts of the
General Manager, including the authority to order the enforcement of the sale and delivery
of electric power and energy to Olongapo, Zambales, emanate from Manila, may be correct
in so far as it concerns the sale and delivery of electric power and energy alone.
N0 12

TEOFILO ARCEL and JUAN CALINAWAN, petitioners-appellants,


vs.
SERGIO OSMEA, JR., ET AL., respondents-appellee.

Facts

The petitioner, Teofilo Arcel, a USAFFE Veteran of the second World War, was originally
appointed to the unclassified position of Watchman in the Office of the City Treasurer,
Cebu, with compensation at the rate of P2.00 per day, effective January 4, 1947, by former
Mayor of Cebu City, Vicente S. del Rosario. Later on, his daily wage was increased to P2.70
per day, effective July 1, 1951, by then Acting Mayor of Cebu City, Pedro Elizalde. Finally,
his daily wage was increased to P4.00 per day, effective July 1, 1952, by former Mayor of
Cebu City, Jose V. Rodriguez, to

Upon the above facts and other additional evidence presented during the trial, the court
below rendered judgment dismissing the petition, on the ground that the Municipal Board
of Cebu has authority to reduce the number of, or even abolish, positions in the service of
the city government; that there is no evidence that in the exercise of such discretion by the
Board, there was fraud or abuse of power; that petitioners are not civil service eligibles;
that the City of Cebu, which is an indispensable party, was not included in the complaint;
that there was non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, petitioners having failed to
bring the action of the Mayor to the attention of the President. From this judgment, only
Teofilo Arcel has appealed by means of the instant petition for certiorari.

Issue

Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to the wages.

Ruling

Anent the matter of non-inclusion of the City of Cebu as parties-respondent in the petition
for reinstatement and back wages, we have already held that the naming of the City Mayor,
Municipal Board, City Treasurer, and City Auditor in the petition is substantial compliance
with the law.4 There is no reason in this instance why we should depart from said ruling.
No 13

CLAUDIO GABUTAS, petitioner-appellant,


vs.
GUIDO D. CASTELLANES, in his capacity as Municipal Mayor of Calatrava, Negros
Occidental,respondent-appellee.

Facts

This is an appeal taken by Claudio Gabutas from the decision of the Court of First Instance
of Negros Occidental in Civil Case No. 4893 dismissing his petition for reinstatement and
recovery of back salaries filed against Guido D. Castellanes, in his capacity as Municipal
Mayor of Calatrava, Negros Occidental.

It is not disputed that on May 2, 1951 appellant was extended a temporary appointment as
member of the Municipal Police Force of Calatrava, Negros Occidental; that on May 10,
1955 he was suspended from the service as a result of the filing of Criminal Cases Nos.
4536 and 4537 against him in the Court of First Instance of said Province; that on June 1,
1955, during the period of his suspension, he was given a promotional appointment at the
rate of P780.00 per annum, with retroactive effect on July 1, 1954; that on September 12,
1957, while said criminal cases were still pending, appellee notified appellant of his
separation from the service effective September 15, 1957, and that on the 27th of the same
month, judgment was rendered in Criminal Cases Nos. 4536 and 4537 acquitting appellant.
Thereafter, appellee having refused to reinstate him to his position as member of the Police
Force of Calatrava, Negros Occidental, and to pay his back salary covering the period of his
suspension from May 10, 1955 to September 15, 1957, appellant instituted the present
action for Mandamus. After appellee had filed his answer disputing appellant's right to the
relief prayed for in his petition, the court, on September 27, 1958, rendered the appealed
judgment.

Issue

Whether or not appellant is entitled to his salary.

Ruling

On the other hand, it is true that appellant no longer seeks his reinstatement, but this is no
justification in law to deny him payment of the entire salary he failed to receive during his
suspension if the only condition imposed in that connection his acquittal has been
fulfilled. In this case, appellant having been acquitted of the charges which had given rise to
his suspension, we are of the opinion that he is entitled to the payment of his entire salary
corresponding to the period during which he was suspended. This period, however, must
necessarily end on the date when he was separated from the service.
No 14

BLUE BAR COCONUT COMPANY, plaintiff-appellee,


vs.
THE CITY OF ZAMBOANGA, defendant-appellant.

Facts

Questioning the validity of a municipal license tax on sale and/or export of coconut under
Zamboanga City Ordinances Nos. 340 and 357, Series of 1950, the Blue Bar Coconut Co.
brought action to recover license taxes paid under protest, plus interest and attorney's fees.
After issue was joined and the parties heard, the Court of First Instance, in view of the
Supreme Court is decision in G.R. No. L-14806, Zamboanga Copra Procurement Corp. vs.
Zamboanga City (promulgated on July 30, 1960) declaring void and ultra vires the
aforementioned ordinances, rendered judgment, ordering the City Treasurer of Zamboanga
City to refund P12,397.47, with interest at the legal rate from the filing of the complaint
until payment, plus P400.00 as reasonable attorney's fees. The city has appealed.

Issue

The legality of the award of interest and attorney's fees.

Ruling

It is but fair that the City should pay this interest from 1955, irrespective of its good faith,
since from that date it has had the use of the taxpayer's money that it illegally exacted.

With regard to the attorney's fees, we find no error in allowing them. The contrary holding
would mean that, in addition to being compelled to submit to an improper exaction, the
taxpayer must lose the amount of attorney's fees in getting back the money he had to pay
under protest, and of which it should not have been deprived at all. We fail to see any
justice in the appellant's claims.

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