1) PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
The accused
appellee, vs. NEMECIO B. CERVANTES,
accused-appellant.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
The accused, Nemecio B. Cervantes, appealed to this
Court from the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of
Pasay City, in Criminal Case No. 92-0567, convicting
him of the rape of a 16-year old girl. He was charged
with the commission of the offense in an information
that read:
The undersigned State Prosecutor of the
Department of Justice upon prior sworn
complaint of Rosalyn M. Salvador, the
offended party, hereby accuses NEMECIO
B. CERVANTES of the crime of rape
penalized under Article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code, committed as follows:
That in or about June 1991, in Pasay City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, armed with a knife, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
threatened and succeeded in having
sexual intercourse with the said
ROSALYN M. SALVADOR against her will
and consent, to her damage and
prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[1]
The Solicitor General, adopting by and large the
findings of the trial court, gives a brief narration of the
evidence for the prosecution.
VICTIM ROSALYN SALVADOR (who was
crying until the end of her testimony)
testified that sometime on June 1991 at
7:00 p.m., she was alone inside their
house at No. 87 R. Higgins Street, Pasay
City, because her mother was in the store
at Villamor Airbase, her eldest brother was
with a friend and the younger one, was
playing. While watching a TV show (pp. 6-
7, tsn, Sept. 14, 1992), accused Nemecio
Cervantes whom she fondly called `Kuya
Dodong, who was renting part of their
house for more than 6 years, knocked on
the door of the victims house. Rosalyn
Salvador peeped at the window to find out
who was knocking at the door, she
discovered, it was Nemecio Cervantes.
The latter asked for some water, so, the
victim opened the door and gave him
water (pp. 7-10, supra). The accused did
not drink the water; instead, he entered
the house then dragged the victim inside
the comfort room. The accused kept on
kissing the face, neck and all parts of the
body of the victim who was crying and
resisting (pp. 10-11, supra). Later on, the
victim was asked by the accused, with a
knife poked on the middle portion of her
throat, to take off her t-shirt and short
pants and to lay down, to which she gave
in (pp. 11-12, supra).
removed victims bra and panty and
inserted his penis to the vagina of Rosalyn
Salvador. She felt pain (pp. 11-13,
supra).Immediately thereafter, the
accused left the victim in the comfort room
with a warning not to tell anybody;
otherwise, she and her brothers will be
killed by the accused (pp. 13-14, supra).
The victim washed her face and her entire
body then she met her mother in the store.
She never told her mother earlier about
the rape because of the death threat (pp.
14-15, supra).
Sometime on August 1991 and November
1991, the same rape incident happened
between Rosalyn Salvador and Nemecio
Cervantes under the same circumstances
of death threats to her, her brothers and
her mother (pp. 17-18, supra).
The victim first reported the rape incident
to her Tita then to her mother on February
3, 1992 (pp. 18-19, supra). She was
accompanied by her Tita and her mother
to the NBI where she executed a sworn
statement (Exhs. B to B-6). By reason of
the sexual abuse, Rosalyn Salvador failed
to go to school for few months and she got
failing grades. As to moral damages, she
cannot quantify the same in terms of
money. Her feelings was pagkainis at
pagkasuklam to Nemecio Cervantes (pp.
21-22, tsn, Sept. 14, 1992).
Dr. Ruperto Sombilon, Jr., Medico Legal
Officer, NBI, Manila, testified that on
February 2, 1992 at 8.30 p.m., he
conducted a genital examination on the
person of Rosalyn Salvador. His findings
were old-healed hymenal lacerations, in 3
oclock and 9 oclock positions; the age of
which correlates to the date of commission
of rape cases (Exhs. A to A-2). Said
lacerations were caused by a male organ
and that at the time of the rape, Rosalyn
Salvador was still a virgin.[2]
The accused, in his defense, asserted that the
incident complained of had come about because of
mutual desire and consent of both parties, he and
private complainant still then being sweethearts.
On 05 September 1994, the trial court found for the
prosecution, and it rendered judgment convicting
Cervantes of rape. The court held:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court
finds Nemecio Cervantes guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the charge of Rape
against him. Accordingly, he is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and to pay Rosalyn
Salvador the sum of P500,000.00 as moral
damages.
Costs against Nemecio Cervantes.[3]
In this appeal, accused-appellant raised a lone
assignment of error, i.e., that
The Court a quo erred in convicting the
accused guilty as charged for the crime of
rape the same being contrary to the facts,
the evidence and the law/jurisprudence on
the matter.[4]
The Court, almost invariably, is asked in rape cases
to choose between the discordant, often essentially
irreconcilable, declaration of the victim and that of the
accused. In that determination, an appellate court,
realizing many times that it cannot hope to be in a
position greater than, or even equal to, that of the trial
court which can observe up close the demeanor of
witnesses in giving their testimony, simply would
accord due respect to the findings of the lower court.
Here, the records do not give any trace of whim or
arbitrariness on the part of the court a quo in its
assessment of the facts; quite the contrary, it appears
to have been judicious in its findings.
Rosalyn, who was barely 16 years of age when she
underwent her harrowing experience, in tears[5] gave
this detailed account of the incident:
Q On the second week of June 1991 at around 7:00
in the evening what are you doing at that time?
A I was watching T.V.
Q While you were watching T.V. at around 7:00 in the
evening of the second week of June 1991 do you
recall if there was any unusual incident that
happened?
A Yes sir.
Q And what was this unusual incident that happened?
A Kuya Dodoy knocked at our door.
Q Now you mentioned the name `kuya Dodoy who
was this `kuya Dodoy?
A He is renting in our house.
Q And what is his full name if you know?
A Nemecio Cervantes.
Q Why do you call him Miss Salvador `kuya Dodoy?
A Because I respect him as a renter in our house.
Q And how long has he been renting in your house?
A For more than 6 years.
Q In other words you are around ten years old when
`kuya Dodoy or Nemecio Cervantes started renting in
your house?
A Yes sir.
ATTY. CATLY:
I would like to make of record that the witness while
testifying she is continuously crying your honor.
COURT:
Put it in record.
Q What part of your house, `kuya Dodoy is renting?
A He was with the other who rented at our house.
Q Also inside your house?
A No sir.
Q Where in particular?
A After at the left side.
Q Now in going to his room does he have to pass the
same door in going inside your house?
A No sir the way to our house is different from the
way to the room he had rented.
Q Now you mentioned while ago that `kuya Dodoy or
Nemecio Cervantes knocked at your door while you
were watching T.V. at around 7:00 in the evening
what did you do?
A I peeped at the window to find out who is knocking
at the door and I saw him.
Q When you saw him what happened?
A He was asking for water, I opened the door and
give the water.
Q Now do you recall whether he drank the water that
you gave to him?
A No sir.
Q Was he able to enter your house when you gave
the water?
A Yes sir.
Q While he was able to get inside your house what
did he do if any?
A He dragged me hinatak going to the comfort room.
Q Was he able to drag you at the comfort room?
A Yes sir.
Q While inside the comfort room what did `kuya
Dodoy or Nemecio Cervantes do to you if any?
A He kept kissing me.
Q What part of your body did he kiss you?
A On the face, neck, all the parts of my body.
Q While he was doing this to you what did you do?
A I was just crying.
Q Now while he was kissing you what did he do if
any?
A He asked me to remove my clothes.
Q By the way what were you wearing at that time?
A I was in T-shirt and walking short.
Q And when he told you to remove your clothes what
did you do?
A I did what he told me because he was pointing his
knife on me.
Q What particular part of your body does he poke his
knife to you?
A Witness pointing to the middle portion of her throat.
Q Did he says anything when he poke his knife to you
at your throat?
A Yes sir.
Q What did he say?
A He told me not to tell anybody about it because if I
do so he will kill me.
Q And were you able to remove your clothes as
ordered by Nemecio Cervantes?
A Yes sir.
Q What else were you wearing aside from your T-shirt
and walking short?
A Bra and panty.
Q And will you inform this honorable court who
remove your panty and bra?
A He was the one who remove the bra.
Q How about your panty?
A Nemecio Cervantes sir.
Q Now after the accused removed your bra and panty
what things did he do if any?
A He was inserting his sex organ to my organ.
Q Do you recall if he was able to place his organ to
your organ?
A Yes sir.
Q What did you feel when you felt his organ inside upheld the conviction of an accused for rape even
your organ? when the complainant discloses the incident days or
A Pain. even months after its occurrence. It is not uncommon
Q Now after he was able to insert his organ to your for young girls to conceal for some time the assaults
organ what happened next? on their virtue particularly when there is a threat by
A He left me inside the comfort room and warned me the rapist on the victim or her family.[9] The
not to tell anybody. complainant has testified:
Q What else did he do other than warning you not to Q What did he say?
tell anybody. A He told me not to tell anybody about it because if I
A He told that he would kill me and my brothers. did so he will kill me.
Q How while he was kissing you inside the comfort xxxxxxxxx
room did you not think to shout and ask for help? Q What else did he do other than warning you not to
A No sir, because I was surprised of what he was tell anybody.
doing to me. A He told that he would kill me and my brothers.[10]
Q Now after he left you in the comfort room what did The Court agrees with the sentence imposed but finds
you do if any? the award of P500,000.00 by way of damages to be
A I washed my face and my entire body. far in excess of that currently set under prevailing
Q And when you washed your entire body what did jurisprudence. In People vs. Joya,[11] the Court has
you feel or see if any? reiterated the rule of adjudging against the convicted
A I saw blood on my panty. accused moral damages of P50,000.00 in (the) rape
Q Now after you had washed yourself after that of young girls, with ages ranging from thirteen to
incident what did you do? nineteen years.
A I left the house and I went to the store where my WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is
mother was. AFFIRMED with the modification that the award of
Q Were you able to see your mother at your store? moral damages is reduced to P50,000.00. Costs
A Yes sir. against accused-appellant.
Q And what transpired when you arrived at the store SO ORDERED.
of your mother?
A My mother asked where I came from.
Q What did you tell her?
A I told her I came from the house.
Q What did she ask you if any?
A She told me why I was sad and my eyes are red.
Q What did you tell to your mother?
A I told her that I have just woke up.
Q What other things transpired if any?
A She did not ask any more.
Q You stated a while ago `kuya Dodoy will you please
point him if he is inside the court room?
A (Person pointed to identified himself as Nemecio
Cervantes.)[6]
Appellant would instead point to complainants mother
Angelina, his paramour, to be the real instigator of the
complaint against him, supposedly because she was
outraged when appellant broke off their relationship
and, consequently, in a fit of jealousy, anger and
revenge, she induced her daughter to falsely accuse
him of rape. Quite unlikely! No mother would stoop so
low as to subject her daughter to shame merely to
assuage her own hurt feelings.[7] The sweetheart
theory, likewise, should deserve no better treatment.
Except for a spurious love letter allegedly sent by the
victim, no evidence was adduced to support the claim.
Such a letter, even if genuine, could not have been a
carte blanche or an open invitation for sexual
indulgence. Indeed, had the two really been
sweethearts, it would be hard to accept their having
chosen a comfort room, rather than a more suitable
rendezvous, for their tryst.[8]
2) PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
Accused-appellant stresses on the delay of the appellee, vs. VICENTE TY and CARMEN TY,
complainant in reporting the incident. This court has accused-appellants.
 DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
Vicente Ty AND Carmen Ty were charged with the
crime of kidnapping and failure to return a minor in an
nd
information filed by 2 Assistant City Prosecutor of
Kalookan City Rosauro J. Silverio, the accusatory
portion of which reads:
That on or about the month of April 1989, in Kalookan
City, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being
then the owners, proprietors, managers and
administrators of Sir John Clinic and as such said
accused had the custody of Arabella Somblong, a
minor, conspiring together and mutually helping one
another and with deliberate intent to deprive the
parents of the child of her custody, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously fail to restore the
custody of said Arabella Sombong to her parents by
giving said custody of subject minor to another person
without the knowledge and consent of her parents.
[1]
Contrary to Law.
Both accused were arrested, and then arraigned on
October 27, 1992 when they pleaded not guilty to the
crime charged.
After trial, on May 31, 1995, a decision was rendered
by the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City, Branch
123, the decretal portion of which disposes as follows:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds both accused
Spouses Vicente Ty and Carmen Ty guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping a minor
and failure to return the same as defined and
penalized by Article 270 of the Revised Penal Code
and hereby sentences them to suffer imprisonment of
reclusion perpetua. The accused are hereby ordered
to pay the private complainant the sum of
P100,000.00 by way of moral damages caused by
anxiety, by her being emotionally drained coupled by
the fact that up to this date she could not determine
the whereabouts of her child Arabella Sombong.
[2]
SO ORDERED.
The accused now interposes this appeal alleging the
ensuing assignment of errors, viz:
I From then on, nothing was heard of the complainant.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
FINDING THAT APPELLANTS
DELIBERATELY FAILED TO RESTORE
THE CHILD TO HER MOTHER, AND
CONVICTING THEM UNDER ART. 270
OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE, AND
SENTENCING THEM TO RECLUSION
PERPETUA;
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT
HOLDING THAT THE CRIME
COMMITTED, IF ANY, IS THAT
DEFINED AND PENALIZED UNDER
ART. 227 OF THE REVISED PENAL
CODE;
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT
RECOMMENDING EXECUTIVE
CLEMENCY PURSUANT TO
PRECEDENT IN PEOPLE vs.
GUTIERREZ, 197 SCRA 569; and
IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
AWARDING COMPLAINANT THE SUM
OF P100,000.00 BY WAY OF MORAL
[3]
DAMAGES.
The relevant antecedents surrounding the case are as
follows:
On November 18, 1987, complainant Johanna
Sombong brought her sick daughter Arabella, then
only seven (7) months old, for treatment to the Sir
John Medical and Maternity Clinic located at No. 121
First Avenue, Grace Park, Kalookan City which was
owned and operated by the accused-appellants.
Arabella was diagnosed to be suffering bronchitis and
diarrhea, thus complainant was advised to confine the
child at the clinic for speedy recovery. About three (3)
days later, Arabella was well and was ready to be
discharged but complainant was not around to take
her home. A week later, complainant came back but
did not have enough money to pay the hospital bill in
the amount of P300.00. Complainant likewise
confided to accused-appellant Dr. Carmen Ty that no
one would take care of the child at home as she was
working. She then inquired about the rate of the
nursery and upon being told that the same was
P50.00 per day, she decided to leave her child to the
care of the clinic nursery. Consequently, Arabella was
[4]
transferred from the ward to the nursery.
Thereafter, hospital bills started to mount and
accumulate. It was at this time that accused-appellant
Dr. Ty suggested to the complainant that she hire a
yaya for P400.00 instead of the daily nursery fee of
P50.00. Complainant agreed, hence, a yaya was
hired. Arabella was then again transferred from the
nursery to the extension of the clinic which served as
[5]
residence for the hospital staff.
She neither visited her child nor called to inquire
about her whereabouts. Her estranged husband came
to the clinic once but did not get the child. Efforts to
get in touch with the complainant were unsuccessful
as she left no address or telephone number where
she can be reached. This development prompted Dr.
Ty to notify the barangay captain of the childs
[6]
abandonment. Eventually, the hospital staff took
[7]
turns in taking care of Arabella.
Sometime in 1989, two (2) years after Arabella was
abandoned by complainant, Dr. Fe Mallonga, a
dentist at the clinic, suggested during a hospital staff
conference that Arabella be entrusted to a guardian
who could give the child the love and affection,
personal attention and caring she badly needed as
she was thin and sickly. The suggestion was
favorably considered, hence, Dr. Mallonga gave the
[8]
child to her aunt, Lilibeth Neri.
In 1992, complainant came back to claim the
daughter she abandoned some five (5) years back.
When her pleas allegedly went unanswered, she filed
a petition for habeas corpus against accused-
appellants with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City. Said petition was however denied due course
and was summarily dismissed without prejudice on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction, the alleged detention
having been perpetrated in Kalookan City.
Thereafter, the instant criminal case was filed against
accused-appellants.
Complainant likewise filed an administrative case for
dishonorable conduct against accused-appellant Dr.
Carmen Ty before the Board of Medicine of the
Professional Regulation Commission. This case was
subsequently dismissed for failure to prosecute.
On October 13, 1992, complainant filed a petition for
habeas corpus with the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, this time against the alleged guardians
of her daughter, namely, Marietta Neri Alviar and
Lilibeth Neri. On January 15, 1993, the trial court
rendered a decision granting the petition and ordering
the guardians to immediately deliver the person of
Cristina Grace Neri to the complainant, the court
having found Cristina to be the complainants child. On
appeal to the Court of Appeals, however, said
decision was reversed on the ground that the
guardians were not unlawfully withholding from the
complainant the rightful custody of Cristina after
finding that Cristina and complainants daughter are
not one and the same person. On January 31, 1996,
[9]
this Court in Sombong v. Court of Appeals
affirmed the Court of Appeals decision.
In this appeal, accused-appellants would want us to
take a second look and resolve the issue of whether
or not they are guilty of kidnapping and failure to
return a minor. Accused-appellants of course contend
that they are not guilty and the Solicitor General
agrees. In its Manifestations and Motion in lieu of
Appellees Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General
recommends their acquittal.
We agree.
As we have mentioned above, this Court in Sombong
[10]
v. Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
Court of Appeals reversing the trial courts ruling that
complainant has rightful custody over the child,
Cristina Grace Neri, the latter not being identical with
complainants daughter, Arabella. The Court
discoursed, thusly:
Petitioner does not have the right of custody over the
minor Cristina because, by the evidence disclosed
before the court a quo, Cristina has not been shown
to be petitioners daughter, Arabella. The evidence
adduced before the trial court does not warrant the
conclusion that Arabella is the same person as
Cristina.
xxx
In the instant case, the testimonial and circumstantial
proof establishes the individual and separate
existence of petitioners child, Arabella, from that of
private respondents foster child, Cristina.
We note, among others, that Dr. Trono, who is
petitioners own witness, testified in court that,
together with Arabella, there were several babies left
in the clinic and so she could not be certain whether it
was Arabella or some their baby that was given to
private respondents. Petitioners own evidence shows
that, after the confinement of Arabella in the clinic in
1987, she saw her daughter again only in 1989 when
she visited the clinic. This corroborates the testimony
of petitioners own witness, Dra. Ty, that Arabella was
physically confined in the clinic from November, 1987
to April, 1989. This testimony tallies with her assertion
in her counter-affidavit to the effect that Arabella was
in the custody of the hospital until April, 1989. All this,
when juxtaposed with the unwavering declaration of
private respondents that they obtained custody of
Cristina in April, 1988 and had her baptized at the
Good Samaritan Church on April 30, 1988, leads to
the conclusions that Cristina is not Arabella.
Significantly, Justice Lourdes K. Tayao-Jaguros,
herself a mother and the ponente of the herein
assailed decision, set the case for hearing on August
30, 1993 primarily for the purpose of observing
petitioners demeanor towards the minor Cristina. She
made the following personal but relevant
manifestation:
The undersigned ponente as a mother herself of four
children, wanted to see how petitioner as an alleged
mother of a missing child supposedly in the person of
Cristina Neri would react on seeing again her long lost
child. The petitioner appeared in the scheduled
hearing of this case late, and she walked inside the
courtroom looking for a seat without even stopping at
her alleged daughters seat; without even casting a
glance on said child, and without even that tearful
embrace which characterizes the reunion of a loving
mother with her missing dear child. Throughout the
proceedings, the undersigned ponente noticed no
signs of endearment and affection expected of a
mother who had been deprived of the embrace of her
little child for many years. The conclusion or finding of
undersigned ponente as a mother, herself, that
petitioner-appellee is not the mother of Cristina Neri
has been given support by aforestated observation
xxx.
xxx
Since we hold that petitioner has not been established
by evidence to be entitled to the custody of the minor
Cristina on account of mistaken identity, it cannot be
said that private respondents are unlawfully
withholding from petitioner the rightful custody over
Cristina. At this juncture, we need not inquire into the
validity of the mode by which private respondents
acquired custodial rights over the minor, Cristina.
xxx
Under the facts and ruling in Sombong, as well as the
evidence adduced in this case accused-appellants
must perforce be acquitted of the crime charged,
there being no reason to hold them liable for failing to
return one Cristina Grace Neri, a child not
conclusively shown and established to be
complainants daugther, Arabella.
The foregoing notwithstanding, even if we were to
consider Cristina Grace Neri and Arabella Sombong
as one and the same person, still, the instant criminal
case against the accused-appellants must fall.
Before a conviction for kidnapping and failure to
return a minor under Article 270 of the Revised Penal
Code can be had, two elements must concur, namely:
(a) the offender has been entrusted with the custody
of the minor, and (b) the offender deliberately fails to
restore said minor to his parents or guardians. The
essential element herein is that the offender is
entrusted with the custody of the minor but what is
actually punishable is not the kidnapping of the minor,
as the title of the article seems to indicate, but rather
the deliberate failure or refusal of the custodian of the
minor to restore the latter to his parents or
[11]
guardians. Said failure or refusal, however, must
not only be deliberate but must also be persistent as
to oblige the parents or the guardians of the child to
seek the aid of the courts in order to obtain
[12]
custody. The key word therefore of this element
is deliberate and Blacks Law Dictionary defines
deliberate as:
Deliberate, adj. Well advised; carefully considered;
not sudden or rash; circumspect; slow in determining.
Willful rather than merely intentional. Formed, arrived
at, or determined upon as a result of careful thought
and weighing of considerations, as a deliberate
judgment or plan. Carried on coolly and steadily,
especially according to a preconceived design; given
to weighing facts and arguments with a view to a
choice or decision; careful in considering the
consequences of a step; slow in action; unhurried;
characterized by reflection; dispassionate; not rash.
People v. Thomas, 25 Cal. 2d 880, 156 P. 2d 7, 17,
18.
By the use of this word, in describing a crime, the idea
is conveyed that the perpetrator weighs the motives
for the act and its consequences, the nature of the
crime, or other things connected with his intentions,
with a view to a decision thereon; that he carefully
considers all these, and that the act is not suddenly
committed. It implies that the perpetrator must be
capable of the exercise of such mental powers as are
called into use by deliberation and the consideration
[13]
and weighing of motives and consequences.
Similarly, the word deliberate is defined in Corpus
Juris Secundum as:
DELIBERATE.
As a Verb
The word is derived from two Latin words which mean
literally concerning and to weigh, it implies the
possession of a mind capable of conceiving a
purpose to act, and the exercise of such mental
powers as are called into use by the consideration
and weighing of the motives and the consequences of
the act; and has been defined as meaning to
consider, reflect, take counsel, or to weigh the
arguments for and against a proposed course of
action; to consider and examine the reasons for and
against, consider maturely, ponder, reflect upon, or
weigh in the mind; to reflect, with a view to make a
choice; to weigh the motives for an act and its
consequences, with a view to a decision thereon.
As an Adjective
The word, used adjectively, implies action after
thought and reflection, and relates to the end
proposed; indicates a purpose formed in a mind
capable of conceiving a purpose; and is based upon
an intention accompanied by such circumstances as
evidence a mind fully conscious of its own purpose
and design. It has been defined as meaning carefully
considered; circumspect; entered upon after
deliberation and with fixed purpose, formed after
careful consideration, and fully or carefully
considering the nature or consequences of an act or
measure; maturely reflected; not sudden or rash,
carefully considering the probable consequences of a
step; premeditated; slow in determining; weighing
facts and arguments with a view to a choice of
decision; well-advised.
Under some circumstances, it has been held
synonymous with, or equivalent to, intentional,
premeditated, and willful.
Under other circumstances, however, it has been
compared with, or distinguished from, premeditated,
[14]
sudden, and willful.
Essentially, the word deliberate as used in the article
must imply something more than mere negligence; it
must be premeditated, obstinate, headstrong,
foolishly daring or intentionally and maliciously wrong.
In the case at bar, it is evident that there was no
deliberate refusal or failure on the part of the
accused-appellants to restore the custody of the
complainants child to her. When the accused-
appellant learned that complainant wanted her
daughter back after five (5) long years of apparent
wanton neglect, they tried their best to help herein
complainant find the child as the latter was no longer
under the clinics care. Accused-appellant Dr. Ty did
not have the address of Arabellas guardians but as
soon as she obtained it from Dr. Fe Mallonga who
was already working abroad, she personally went to
the guardians residence and informed them that
herein complainant wanted her daughter back. Dr. Ty
testified as follows:
Q: Now, since you said a while ago that when you
placed the child under the (sic) guardianship, you are
(sic) aware that the natural mother will get back the
child, why did you not return the minor to the natural
mother?
A: During that time mam, the resident physician who
will (sic) discharged the baby was not present
because she was abroad.
Q: But then madam witness, are you aware where the
child was and to whom it was given?
A: The exact address was not given to me, mam,
before the resident physician left for abroad so, I
asked the PAO to give me one month to have (sic) a
long distance call to this doctor and asked her for the
whereabout(s) of the child.
Q: And where you granted the thirty-day period by the
Officer of the PAO?
A: Yes, mam.
Q: What happened if any during that thirty-day
period?
A: I was able to talk to Fe Mallonga in Bahrain and
she told me the exact address of the guardian, mam.
Q: Were (sic) you informed (of) the exact address of
the guardian, did you informed (sic) the PAO?
A: Yes, mam.
ATTY. WARD:
Q: Then, what happened next, madam witness?
A: I was the one who went to the address to be sure
that the child was really there, mam.
Q: And did you see the child?
A: Yes, mam.
Q: What did you do with the child?
A: I just tell (sic) the child. Ay and laki mo na pala. I
just told the child like that and Ive (sic) talked also to
the guardian during that time, mam.
Q: And what did you tell the guardian?
A: I told the guardian that the rightful mother was
claiming for the child and that we should talked (sic)
with each other at the PAO for the decision, mam.
Q: Did the guardian bring the child to the PAOs Office
(sic)?
A: No mam, she did not appear.
Q: Why?
A: They told me first that they are (sic) going to
contact a lawyer but for (sic) several days, she did not
[15]
respond anymore, mam.
When the guardians refused to return the child,
accused-appellant Dr. Ty sought the assistance of the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) which
conducted a conference among the parties but since
a case was yet to be filed, the custody of the minor
remained with the guardians. This fact is evident from
the following testimony, thus:
Q: You testified on cross-examination that you located
the whereabouts of the child sometime later, what
steps did you take up (sic) after you found the child?
A: I explained to the guardian that the verbal
agreement between the supposed to be guardianship
was only a plain guardianship and not as an adoption,
sir.
Q: You said you went to the NBI after you found the
child, why did you go to the NBI?
A: Because the guardian are (sic) not willing to
surrender the child to the PAOs Office (sic). that is
[16]
why I asked their help, sir.
xxx
Q: Now, when you informed the present custodian
that the natural mother is now claiming the child, why
were you not able to get the minor?
A: I was not able to get the minor so I asked the help
of the NBI to have the child surrender (sic), mam.
ATTY. WARD:
Q: And what happened when you get (sic) the
assistance of the NBI?
A: They were the ones who asked the guardian to
surrender the child, mam.
Q: You stated a while ago that there was no written
agreement between you or your hospital and the
guardian of the minor, is that correct?
A: Yes, mam.
Q: For what reason if you know, why (did) the
guardian did (sic) not follow you or obey you when
you want (sic) to get back the child?
[17]
A: I dont know of any reason, mam.
The efforts taken by the accused-appellants to help
the complainant in finding the child clearly negate the
finding that there was a deliberate refusal or failure on
their part to restore the child to her mother. Evidence
is simply wanting in this regard.
It is worthy to note that accused-appellants conduct
from the moment the child was left in the clinics care
up to the time the child was given up for guardianship
was motivated by nothing more than an earnest
desire to help the child and a high regard for her
welfare and well-being.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision
appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Accordingly, accused-appellant VICENTE TY
and CARMEN TY are hereby ACQUITTED of the
crime charged and are ordered to be released
immediately unless they are being detained for other
lawful causes. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
3) IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR BETTY
CHUA SY ALIAS "GRACE CABANGBANG" FOR
THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS.
PACITA CHUA, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
MR. & MRS. BARTOLOME CABANGBANG ET AL.,
respondents-appellees.
Francisco R. Sotto and Associates for petitioner-
appellant.
Teofilo F. Manalo for respondents-appellees Mr. &
Mrs. Cabangbang.
Enrico R. Castro for respondent-appellee Victor T.
Villareal.
CASTRO, J.:

This is an appeal direct to this Court from the
decision of May 21, 1964 of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal dismissing Pacita Chua's petition for
habeas corpus directed against Bartolome
Cabangbang and his wife Flora Cabangbang.
Pacita Chua, when still in the prime of youth,
supported herself by working in nightclubs as a
hostess. And sexual liaison she had with man after
man without benefit of marriage. She first lived with a
certain Chua Ben in 1950 by whom she had a child
who died in infancy. She afterwards cohabited with Sy
Sia Lay by whom she had two children named Robert
and Betty Chua Sy. The latter child was born on
December 15, 1957. Shortly after the birth of Betty,
Pacita Chua and Sy Sia Lay separated. Finding no
one to fall back on after their separation, Pacita Chua
lingered in and around nightclubs and gambling joints,
until she met Victor Tan Villareal. In due time she
became the latter's mistress. In 1960 another child, a
girl, was born to her. In 1961 when this last child was
still an infant, she and Villareal separated. Without
means to support the said child, Pacita Chua gave
her away to a comadre in Cebu.
Sometime in May 1958 Bartolome Cabangbang and
his wife, a childless couple, acquired the custody of
the child Betty who was then barely four months old.
They have since brought her up as their own. They
had her christened as Grace Cabangbang on
September 12, 1958. 1
There is some testimonial conflict on how the
Cabangbang spouses acquired custody of the girl
Betty (or Grace), Pacita Chua avers that in October
1958, while she and Villareal were still living together,
the latter surreptitiously took the child away and gave
her to the Cabangbangs, allegedly in recompense for
favors received. She supposedly came to know of the
whereabouts of her daughter, only in 1960 when the
girl, who was then about three years old, was brought
to her by Villareal, who shortly thereafter returned the
child to the Cabangbangs allegedly thru threats
intimidation, fraud and deceit. The Cabangbang
spouses assert in rebuttal that Mrs. Cabangbang
found the child, wrapped in a bundle, at the gate of
their residence; that she reared her as her own and
grew very fond of her; and that nobody ever molested
them until the child was 5- years of age.lwphi1.et
At all events, it is the lower court's finding that the
child was given to the Cabangbang spouses by
Villareal with the knowledge and consent of Pacita
Chua.
By letter dated June 6, 1963 addressed to the
Cabangbang spouses, with copy furnished to
Villareal, Pacita Chua thru counsel demanded the
surrender to her of the custody of the child. Failing to
secure such custody, Pacita Chua (hereinafter
referred to as the petitioner) filed on June 14, 1963 a
petition for habeas corpus with the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, praying that the court grant her
custody of and recognize her parental authority over
the girl. Named respondents in the petition were
Villareal and the spouses Cabangbang.
On June 15, 1963 a writ was issued commanding
the provincial sheriff of Rizal or any of his deputies to
produce the body of Betty Chua Sy or Grace
Cabangbang before the court a quo on June 17,
1963, at 8:30 a.m. However, for reasons not stated in
the record, the child was not produced before the
lower court as ordered.
On June 21, 1963 Villareal filed his answer to the
petition. The Cabangbangs filed their answer the next
day.
After due trial, the lower court on May 21, 1964
promulgated its decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads as follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court has
come to the conclusion that it will be for the welfare of
the child Betty Chua Sy also known as Grace
Cabangbang to be under the custody of respondents
Mr. and Mrs. Bartolome Cabangbang. Petition
dismissed. No pronouncement as to costs.
In this appeal now before us, the petitioner tenders
for resolution two issues of law which, by her own
formulation, read as follows: "The lower court erred
when it awarded the custody of petitioner's daughter
Betty Chua Sy or Grace Cabangbang, who is less
than seven (7) years old, in favor of respondents Mr.
and Mrs. Bartolome Cabangbang, and [2] illegally
deprived petitioner of parental authority over her
daughter."
We resolve both issues against the petitioner.
I.
Stated succinctly, the petitioner's thesis is that
pursuant to the mandate contained in article 363 of
the Civil Code she cannot be separated from her child
who was less, seven years of age, and that she
cannot be deprived of her parental authority over the
child because not one of the grounds for the
termination, loss, suspension or deprivation of
parental authority provided in article 332 of the same
Code obtains in this case.
Whether the petitioner can be legally separated from
her child, Betty Chua Sy or Grace Cabangbang, is an
issue that is now moot and academic. Having been
born on December 15, 1957, the child is now 11 years
of age. Consequently, the second paragraph of art.
363 of the Civil Code, which prohibits the separation
of a child under seven years of age from her mother,
"unless the court finds compelling reasons for such
measure," has no immediate relevance. The petitioner
correctly argues, however, that the reasons relied
upon by the lower court i.e., "petitioner is not
exactly an upright woman" and "it will be for the
welfare of the child" are not strictly speaking,
proper grounds in law to deprive a mother of her
inherent right to parental authority over her child. It
must be conceded that minor children be they
legitimate, recognized natural, adopted, natural by
legal fiction or illegitimate, other than natural as
specified in art. 269 of the Civil Code are by law
under the parental authority of both the father and the
mother, or either the father or the mother, as the case
may be. But we take the view that on the basis of the
aforecited seemingly unpersuasive factual premises,
the petitioner can be deprived of her parental
authority. For while in one breath art. 313 of the Civil
Code lays down the rule that "Parental authority
cannot be renounced or transferred, except in cases
of guardianship or adoption approved by the courts,
or emancipation by concession," it indicates in the
next that "The courts may, in cases specified by law
deprive parents of their [parental] authority." And
there are indeed valid reasons, as will presently be
expounded, for depriving the petitioner of parental
authority over the minor Betty Chua Sy or Grace
Cabangbang.
It is the lower court's finding that the child was given
to the Cabangbangs by Villareal with the knowledge
and consent of the petitioner. In support of this
finding, it cited the facts that the petitioner did not at
all not ever report to the authorities the alleged
disappearance of her daughter, and had not taken
any step to see the child when she allegedly
discovered that she was in the custody of the
Cabangbangs. It discounted the petitioner's claim that
she did not make any move to recover the child
because the Cabangbangs are powerful and
influential. The petitioner is bound by the foregoing
findings of fact. Having taken her appeal directly to
this Court, she is deemed to have waived the right to
dispute any finding of fact made by the trial court. 2
Art. 332 of the Civil Code provides, inter alia:
The courts may deprive the parents of their authority
or suspend the exercise of the same if they should
treat their children with excessive harshness or
should give them corrupting orders, counsels, or
examples, or should make them beg or abandon
them. (emphasis supplied)
Abandonment is therefore one of the grounds for
depriving parents of parental authority over their
children.
Was the petitioner's acquiescence to the giving by
Villareal of her child to the Cabangbangs tantamount
to abandonment of the child? To our mind, mere
acquiescence without more is not sufficient to
constitute abandonment. But the record yields a host
of circumstances which, in their totality, unmistakably
betray the petitioner's settled purpose and intention to
completely forego all parental response possibilities
and forever relinquish all parental claim in respect to
the child.
She surrendered the custody of her child to the
Cabangbangs in 1958. She waited until 1963, or after
the lapse of a period of five long years, before she
brought action to recover custody. Her claim that she
did not take any step to recover her child because the
Cabangbangs were powerful and influential, does not
deserve any modicum of credence. A mother who
really loves her child would go to any extent to be
reunited with her. The natural and normal reaction of
the petitioner once informed, as she alleged, and
her child was in the custody of the Cabangbangs
should have been to move heaven and earth, to use a
worn-out but still respectable cliche, in order to
recover her. Yet she lifted not a finger.
It is a matter of record being the gist of her own
unadulterated testimony under oath that she wants
the child back so that Sy Sia Lay, the alleged father,
would resume providing the petitioner the support
which he peremptorily withheld and ceased to give
when she gave the child away. A woman scorned,
she desires to recover the child as a means of
embarrassing Villareal who retrieved the jeep he gave
her and altogether stopped living with and supporting
her. But the record likewise reveals that at the pre-trial
conducted by the court a quo, she expressed her
willingness that the child remain with the
Cabangbangs provided the latter would in exchange
give her a jeep and some money.
The petitioner's inconsistent demands in the course
of the proceedings below, reveal that her motives do
not flow from the wellsprings of a loving mother's
heart. Upon the contrary, they are unmistakably
selfish nay, mercenary. She needs the child as a
leverage to obtain concessions financial and
otherwise either from the alleged father or the
Cabangbangs. If she gets the child back, support for
her would be forthcoming so she thinks from the
alleged father, Sy Sia Lay. On the other hand, if the
Cabangbangs would keep the child, she would agree
provided they gave her a jeep and some money.
Indeed, the petitioner's attitude, to our mind, does
nothing but confirm her intention to abandon the child
from the very outset when she allowed Villareal to
give her away to the Cabangbangs. It must be noted
that the abandonment took place when the child,
barely four months old, was at the most fragile stage
of life and needed the utmost care and solicitude of
her mother. And for five long years thereafter she did
not once move to recover the child. She continuously
shunned the natural and legal obligations which she
owed to the child; completely withheld her presence,
her love, her care, and the opportunity to display
maternal affection; and totally denied her support and
maintenance. Her silence and inaction have been
prolonged to such a point that her abandonment of
the child and her total relinquishment of parental claim
over her, can and should be inferred as a matter of
law. 3
Note that this was not the only instance when she
gave away a child of her own flesh and blood. She
gave up her youngest child, named Betty Tan
Villareal, to her comadre in Cebu because she could
not support it.
Of incalculable significance is the fact that nowhere
in the course of the petitioner's lengthy testimony did
she ever express a genuine desire to recover her
child Betty Chua Sy or Grace Cabangbang or, for
that matter, her other child Betty Tan Villareal
because she loves her, cares for her, and wants to
smother her with motherly affection. Far from it. She
wants Betty Chua Sy or Grace Cabangbang back so
that the alleged father would resume giving her (the
petitioner) support. She wants her back to humiliate
and embarrass the respondent Villareal who, with her
knowledge and consent, gave the child to the
Cabangbangs. But "most unkindest cut of all"!
she nevertheless signified her readiness to give up
the child, in exchange for a jeep and some money.
We therefore affirm the lower court's decision, not on
the grounds cited by it, but upon a ground which the
court overlooked i.e., abandonment by the
petitioner of her child. 4
Contrast the petitioner's attitude with that of the
respondents Cabangbang especially the
respondent Flora Cabangbang who, from the moment
the child was given to them, took care of her as if she
were her own flesh and blood, had her baptized, and
when she reached school age enrolled her in a
reputable exclusive school, for girls.
Ironically enough, the real heart-rending tragedy in
this case would consist not in taking the child away
from the Cabangbangs but in returning her to the
custody of the petitioner.
For, by her own admission, the petitioner has no
regular source of income, and it is doubtful, to say the
very least, that she can provide the child with the
barest necessities of life, let alone send her to school.
There is no insurance at all that the alleged father, Sy
Sia Lay an unknown quantity, as far as the record
goes would resume giving the petitioner support
once she and the child are reunited. What would then
prevent the petitioner from again doing that which she
did before, i.e., give her away? These are of course
conjectures, but when the welfare of a helpless child
is at stake, it is the bounden duty of courts which
they cannot shirk to respect, enforce, and give
meaning and substance to a child's natural and legal
right to live and grow in the proper physical, moral
and intellectual environment. 5
This is not to say that with the Cabangbang
spouses, a bright and secure future is guaranteed for
her. For life is beset at every turn with snares and
pitfalls. But the record indubitably pictures the
Cabangbang spouses as a childless couple of
consequence in the community, who have given her
their name and are rearing her as their very own child,
and with whom there is every reason to hope she will
have a fair chance of normal growth and development
into respectable womanhood.
Verily, to surrender the girl to the petitioner would be
to assume quite incorrectly that only mothers
are capable of parental love and affection. Upon the
contrary, this case precisely underscores the
homiletic admonition that parental love is not
universal and immutable like a law of natural science.
II.
The petitioner assails as illegal and without basis the
award of the custody of Grace Cabangbang or Betty
Chua Sy to the Cabangbang spouses upon the
grounds, first, that the couple are not related by
consanguinity or affinity to the child, and second,
because the answer of the spouses contains no
prayer for the custody of the child.
The absence of any kinship between the child and
the Cabangbangs alone cannot serve to bar the lower
court from awarding her custody to them. Indeed, the
law provides that in certain cases the custody of a
child may be awarded even to strangers, as against
either the father or the mother or against both. Thus,
in proceedings involving a child whose parents are
separated either legally or de facto and where it
appears that both parents are improper persons to
whom to entrust the care, custody and control of the
child, "the court may either designate the paternal or
maternal grandparent of the child, or his oldest
brother or sister, or some reputable and discreet
person to take charge of such child, or commit it to
and suitable asylum, children's home, or benevolent
society." 6
Parenthetically, sections 6 and 7 of Rule 99 of the
Rules of Court belie the petitioner's contention that
the first sentence of art. 363 of the Civil Code, which
states that
In all questions on the care, custody, education and
property of children, the latter's welfare shall be
paramount.....
applies only when the litigation involving a child is
between the father and the mother. That the policy
enunciated, in the abovequoted legal provision is of
general application, is evident from the use of the,
adjective all meaning, the whole extent or quantity
of, the entire number of, every one of. 7 It is,
therefore, error to argue that if the suit involving a
child's custody is between a parent and a stranger,
the law must necessarily award such custody to the
parent. Sec 7, Rule 99 of the Rules of Court, precisely
contemplates, among others, a suit between a parent
and a stranger who, in the words of the provision, is
"some reputable resident of the province." And under
the authority of the said rule, the court if it is for the
best interest of the child may take the child away
from its parents and commit it to, inter alia, a
benevolent person.
The petitioner's contention that the answer of the
spouses Cabangbang contains no prayer for the
retention by them of the custody of the child, is
equally devoid of merit. The several moves taken by
them are clear and definitive enough. First, they
asked for her custody pendente lite. Second, they
sought the dismissal of the petition below for lack of
merit. Finally, they added a general prayer for other
reliefs just and equitable in the premises. Surely the
above reliefs prayed for are clearly indicative of the
Cabangbangs' genuine desire to retain the custody of
Betty Chua Sy or Grace Cabangbang.
III.
Sec. 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court provides that
"Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the
writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of
illegal confinement or detention by which any person
is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful
custody of any person is withheld from the person
entitled thereto." The petitioner has not proven that
she is entitled to the rightful custody of Betty Chua Sy
or Grace Cabangbang. Upon the contrary, by
wantonly and completely shunting aside her legal and
moral obligations toward her child, she must be
deemed as having forfeited all legitimate legal and
moral claim to her custody. The lower court acted
correctly in dismissing her petition.
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment a quo is affirmed. No
pronouncement as to costs.
4) IN THE MATTER OF THE ADMISSION TO THE
BAR AND OATH-TAKING OF SUCCESSFUL BAR
APPLICANT AL C. ARGOSINO, petitioner.
RESOLUTION
FELICIANO, J.:
A criminal information was filed on 4 February 1992
with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
101, charging Mr. A.C. Argosino along with thirteen
(13) other individuals, with the crime of homicide in
connection with the death of one Raul Camaligan on
8 September 1991. The death of Raul Camaligan
stemmed from the infliction of severe physical injuries
upon him in the course of "hazing" conducted as part
of university fraternity initiation rites. Mr. Argosino and
his co-accused then entered into plea bargaining with
the prosecution and as a result of such bargaining,
pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of homicide
through reckless imprudence. This plea was accepted
by the trial court. In a judgment dated 11 February
1993, each of the fourteen (14) accused individuals
was sentenced to suffer imprisonment for a period
ranging from two (2) years, four (4) months and one
(1) day to four (4) years.
Eleven (11) days later, Mr. Argosino and his
colleagues filed an application for probation with the
lower court. The application for probation was granted
in an Order dated 18 June 1993 issued by Regional
Trial Court Judge Pedro T. Santiago. The period of
probation was set at two (2) years, counted from the
probationer's initial report to the probation officer
assigned to supervise him.
Less than a month later, on 13 July 1993, Mr.
Argosino filed a Petition for Admission to Take the
1993 Bar Examinations. In this Petition, he disclosed
the fact of his criminal conviction and his then
probation status. He was allowed to take the 1993 Bar
Examinations in this Court's En Banc Resolution
dated 14 August 1993.1 He passed the Bar
Examination. He was not, however, allowed to take
the lawyer's oath of office.
On 15 April 1994, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition with
this Court to allow him to take the attorney's oath of
office and to admit him to the practice of law, averring
that Judge Pedro T. Santiago had terminated his
probation period by virtue of an Order dated 11 April
1994. We note that his probation period did not last
for more than ten (10) months from the time of the
Order of Judge Santiago granting him probation dated
18 June 1993. Since then, Mr. Argosino has filed
three (3) Motions for Early Resolution of his Petition
for Admission to the Bar.
The practice of law is not a natural, absolute or
constitutional right to be granted to everyone who
demands it. Rather, it is a high personal privilege
limited to citizens of good moral character, with
special educational qualifications, duly ascertained
and certified.2 The essentiality of good moral
character in those who would be lawyers is stressed
in the following excerpts which we quote with
approval and which we regard as having persuasive
effect:
In Re Farmer: 3
xxx xxx xxx
This "upright character" prescribed by the statute, as
a condition precedent to the applicant's right to
receive a license to practice law in North Carolina,
and of which he must, in addition to other requisites,
satisfy the court, includes all the elements necessary
to make up such a character. It is something more
than an absence of bad character. It is the good name
which the applicant has acquired, or should have
acquired, through association with his fellows. It
means that he must have conducted himself as a man
of upright character ordinarily would, or should, or
does. Such character expresses itself, not in
negatives nor in following the line of least resistance,
but quite often, in the will to do the unpleasant thing if
it is right, and the resolve not to do the pleasant thing
if it is wrong. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
And we may pause to say that this requirement of the
statute is eminently proper. Consider for a moment
the duties of a lawyer. He is sought as counsellor, and
his advice comes home, in its ultimate effect, to every
man's fireside. Vast interests are committed to his
care; he is the recipient of unbounded trust and
confidence; he deals with is client's property,
reputation, his life, his all. An attorney at law is a
sworn officer of the Court, whose chief concern, as
such, is to aid the administration of justice. . . .
xxx xxx xxx4
In Re Application of Kaufman,5 citing Re Law
Examination of 1926 (1926) 191 Wis 359, 210 NW
710:
It can also be truthfully said that there exists nowhere
greater temptations to deviate from the straight and
narrow path than in the multiplicity of circumstances
that arise in the practice of profession. For these
reasons the wisdom of requiring an applicant for
admission to the bar to possess a high moral
standard therefore becomes clearly apparent, and the
board of bar examiners as an arm of the court, is
required to cause a minute examination to be made of
the moral standard of each candidate for admission to
practice. . . . It needs no further argument, therefore,
to arrive at the conclusion that the highest degree of
scrutiny must be exercised as to the moral character
of a candidate who presents himself for admission to
the bar. The evil must, if possible, be successfully met
at its very source, and prevented, for, after a lawyer
has once been admitted, and has pursued his
profession, and has established himself therein, a far
more difficult situation is presented to the court when
proceedings are instituted for disbarment and for the
recalling and annulment of his license.
In Re Keenan:6
The right to practice law is not one of the inherent
rights of every citizen, as in the right to carry on an
ordinary trade or business. It is a peculiar privilege
granted and continued only to those who demonstrate
special fitness in intellectual attainment and in moral
character. All may aspire to it on an absolutely equal
basis, but not all will attain it. Elaborate machinery
has been set up to test applicants by standards fair to
all and to separate the fit from the unfit. Only those
who pass the test are allowed to enter the profession,
and only those who maintain the standards are
allowed to remain in it.
Re Rouss:7
Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with
conditions, and a fair private and professional
character is one of them; to refuse admission to an
unworthy applicant is not to punish him for past
offense: an examination into character, like the
examination into learning, is merely a test of fitness.
Cobb vs. Judge of Superior Court:8
Attorney's are licensed because of their learning and
ability, so that they may not only protect the rights and
interests of their clients, but be able to assist court in
the trial of the cause. Yet what protection to clients or
assistance to courts could such agents give? They
are required to be of good moral character, so that the
agents and officers of the court, which they are, may
not bring discredit upon the due administration of the
law, and it is of the highest possible consequence that
both those who have not such qualifications in the first
instance, or who, having had them, have fallen
therefrom, shall not be permitted to appear in courts
to aid in the administration of justice.
It has also been stressed that the requirement of good
moral character is, in fact, of greater importance so
far as the general public and the proper administration
of justice are concerned, than the possession of legal
learning:
. . . (In re Applicants for License, 55 S.E. 635, 143
N.C. 1, 10 L.R.A. [N.S.] 288, 10 Ann./Cas. 187):
The public policy of our state has always been to
admit no person to the practice of the law unless he
covered an upright moral character. The possession
of this by the attorney is more important, if anything,
to the public and to the proper administration of
justice than legal learning. Legal learning may be
acquired in after years, but if the applicant passes the
threshold of the bar with a bad moral character the
chances are that his character will remain bad, and
that he will become a disgrace instead of an ornament
to his great calling a curse instead of a benefit to
his community a Quirk, a Gammon or a Snap,
instead of a Davis, a Smith or a Ruffin.9
All aspects of moral character and behavior may be
inquired into in respect of those seeking admission to
the Bar. The scope of such inquiry is, indeed, said to
be properly broader than inquiry into the moral
proceedings for disbarment:
Re Stepsay: 10
The inquiry as to the moral character of an attorney in
a proceeding for his admission to practice is broader
in scope than in a disbarment proceeding.
Re Wells: 11
. . . that an applicant's contention that upon
application for admission to the California Bar the
court cannot reject him for want of good moral
character unless it appears that he has been guilty of
acts which would be cause for his disbarment or
suspension, could not be sustained; that the inquiry is
broader in its scope than that in a disbarment
proceeding, and the court may receive any evidence
which tends to show the applicant's character as
respects honesty, integrity, and general morality, and
may no doubt refuse admission upon proofs that
might not establish his guilt of any of the acts
declared to be causes for disbarment.
The requirement of good moral character to be
satisfied by those who would seek admission to the
bar must of necessity be more stringent than the norm
of conduct expected from members of the general
public. There is a very real need to prevent a general
perception that entry into the legal profession is open
to individuals with inadequate moral qualifications.
The growth of such a perception would signal the
progressive destruction of our people's confidence in
their courts of law and in our legal system as we know
it.12
Mr. Argosino's participation in the deplorable "hazing"
activities certainly fell far short of the required
standard of good moral character. The deliberate
(rather than merely accidental or inadvertent) infliction
of severe physical injuries which proximately led to
the death of the unfortunate Raul Camaligan, certainly
indicated serious character flaws on the part of those
who inflicted such injuries. Mr. Argosino and his co-
accused had failed to discharge their moral duty to
protect the life and well-being of a "neophyte" who
had, by seeking admission to the fraternity involved,
reposed trust and confidence in all of them that, at the
very least, he would not be beaten and kicked to
death like a useless stray dog. Thus, participation in
the prolonged and mindless physical beatings inflicted
upon Raul Camaligan constituted evident rejection of
that moral duty and was totally irresponsible behavior,
which makes impossible a finding that the participant
was then possessed of good moral character.
Now that the original period of probation granted by
the trial court has expired, the Court is prepared to
consider de novo the question of whether applicant
A.C. Argosino has purged himself of the obvious
deficiency in moral character referred to above. We
stress that good moral character is a requirement
possession of which must be demonstrated not only
at the time of application for permission to take the
bar examinations but also, and more importantly, at
the time of application for admission to the bar and to
take the attorney's oath of office.
Mr. Argosino must, therefore, submit to this Court, for
its examination and consideration, evidence that he
may be now regarded as complying with the
requirement of good moral character imposed upon
those seeking admission to the bar. His evidence may
consist, inter alia, of sworn certifications from
responsible members of the community who have a
good reputation for truth and who have actually
known Mr. Argosino for a significant period of time,
particularly since the judgment of conviction was
rendered by Judge Santiago. He should show to the
Court how he has tried to make up for the senseless
killing of a helpless student to the family of the
deceased student and to the community at large. Mr.
Argosino must, in other words, submit relevant
evidence to show that he is a different person now,
that he has become morally fit for admission to the
ancient and learned profession of the law.
Finally, Mr. Argosino is hereby DIRECTED to inform
this Court, by appropriate written manifestation, of the
names and addresses of the father and mother (in
default thereof, brothers and sisters, if any, of Raul
Camaligan), within ten (10) day from notice hereof.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished to the
parents or brothers and sisters, if any, of Raul
Camaligan.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero
and Melo, JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, J. is on leave.
5) Zialcita, et al. v. PAL, RO4-3-3398-76, 20
February 1977
Facts:
Complainant Zialcita, an international flight
stewardess of PAL, wasdischarged from the service
on account of her marriage. In separating Zialcita,
PALinvoked its policy which stated that flight
attendants must be single, and shall beautomatically
separated from employment in the event they
subsequently getmarried. They claimed that this
policy was in accordance with Article 132 of theLabor
Code. On the other hand, Zialcita questioned her
termination on account of her marriage, invoking
Article 136 of the same law.
Issue:
W/N Zialcita was validly terminated on account of her
marriage.
Ruling
:NO. When Presidential Decree No. 148, otherwise
known as theWomen and Child Labor Law, was
promulgated in 13 March 1973, PALs policy hadmet
its doom. However, since no one challenged its
validity, the said policy wasable to obtain a
momentary reprieve. Section 8 of PD148 is exactly
the same
provision reproduced verbatim in Article 136 of the
Labor Code, which waspromulgated on 1 May 1974
and took effect six months later.Although Article 132
enjoins the Secretary of Labor to establish
standardsthat will ensure the safety and health of
women employees and in appropriatecases shall by
regulation require employers to determine appropriate
minimumstandards for termination in special
occupations, such as those of flight attendants,it is
logical to presume that, in the absence of said
standards or regulations whichare yet to be
established, the policy of PAL against marriage is
patently illegal.
deceased Tomasa Magalito according to the rites of
Article 136 is not intended to apply only to women
employed in ordinaryoccupations, or it should have
categorically expressed so. The sweepingintendment
of the law, be it on special or ordinary occupations, is
reflected inthe whole text and supported by Article
135 that speaks of non-discriminationon the
employment of women.
6) THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS,
Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. ALFREDO ROSIL (alias
LIBAT), Defendant-Appellant.
Ildefonso de Guzman Mendiola for appellant.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.
VILLA-REAL, J.:
Alfredo Rosil ( alias Libat) appeals to this court from
the sentence of the Court of First Instance of Palawan
convicting him of the crime of parricide without any
modifying circumstance, and sentencing him to life
imprisonment, the accessories of law, an indemnity of
P500 to the heirs of the deceased, and to pay the
cost.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
In support of his appeal, the appellant assigns the
following alleged errors as committed by the trial court
in its judgment, to wit:
1. The lower court erred in holding the accused and
appellant guilty of the crime of
parricide.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
2. The trial court erred in sentencing the herein
appellant to cadena
perpetua.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
3. The court of origin erred in not estimating the
following attenuating circumstances: (1) vindicacion
proxima de una ofensa grave al acusado; (2) arrebato
y obcecacio; and (3) lack of instruction on the part of
the accused herein
appellant.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
4. The court below erred in not acquitting the accused
from the crime charged in the
information.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
5. The court below erred in denying the petition for
continuance of the hearing of this case by the
defense.
The following facts were proved at the trial beyond a
reasonable doubt: chanrobles virtual law library
The accused Alfredo Rosil ( alias Libat) married the
the Tabanua tribe to which both of them belonged.
Prior to October 13, 1930 the accused became
suspicious that his wife was unfaithful to him, because
she would leave their home alone and go with a man
named Urbano. Later she deserted the conjugal home
for another house, refusing to return when her
husband begged her to do so. On the afternoon of the
day of record, October 13, 1930, the accused spoke
to his wife about her conduct, and she answered that
she had a right to act as she did. At this the defendant
slapped her and beat her with a strip of rattan. As she
resisted, he stabbed her in the left side of the breast
with the knife Exhibit B, and then gave himself up at
once to the barrio lieutenant, Santiago Garcia, his
half-brother, to whom he said he had killed his wife,
and delivered up the knife, Exhibit B. An hour later his
victim died. The following morning Santiago Garcia
went to the defendant' home, where the crime had
been committed, in the sitio of Cumapcap, barrio of
Bucungan, municipality of Puerto Princesa, Province
of Palawan, and there he found the body of the
deceased Tomasa Magalito on a bed, with a wound in
the right side of her breast. On October 20, 1930
while the defendant was under arrest, he was
investigated by the provincial fiscal, Antonio Lacson,
who questioned him in English, the clerk of court
Pedro Valdes interpreting into the Cuyuno dialect
which is the defendant's native dialect. The
statements he made at that investigation appears in
Exhibit D, which he signed after its contents had been
interpreted for him into Cuyuno, and wherein he
relates the same facts he had recounted to his half-
brother.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
At the preliminary investigation held on October 22,
1930 before Gaudencio Abordo, the justice of the
peace of Puerto Princesa, the accused, with counsel
de oficio, upon arraignment pleaded guilty, ratifying
what he had stated before the provincial fiscal (Exhibit
D) and signing Exhibit C of his own free will, after its
contents had been interpreted into the Tagbanua
dialect, which he
understands.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
The above statement of fact, proven beyond a
reasonable doubt at the trial, leaves no room for
doubt that the accused was the one who caused the
death of the deceased Tomasa Magalito, to whom he
was married according to the rites of the tribe of
Tagbanuas to which both of them belonged, which
rites sanctioned said marriage according to the
admission of the accused, and constitutes the crime
of parricide, defined and penalized in article 402 of
the Penal Code, the penalty fixed by law being life
imprisonment to death. To gratitude said penalty the
mitigating circumstances of passion and obfuscation
must be considered, without any aggravating
circumstance to offset it, for which reason the penalty
must be imposed in the minimum degree, that is, life
imprisonment.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
Wherefore, finding the judgment appealed from to be
in conformity with the law and the evidence, it is
hereby affirmed in its entirely with costs against the
appellant, it being understood that in accordance with
the Revised Penal Code the penalty is reclusion
perpetua and not cadena perpetua. So ordered.
7) PBM Employees vs PBM
Facts:
The petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees
Organization (PBMEO) is a legitimate labor union
composed of the employees of the respondent
Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., and petitioners.
Benjamin Pagcu and Rodulfo Munsod are officers and
members of the petitioner Union. Petitioners claim
that on March 1, 1969, they decided to stage a mass
demonstration at Malacaang on March 4, 1969, in
protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police.
PBMEO thru Pagcu confirmed the planned
demonstration and stated that the demonstration or
rally cannot be cancelled because it has already been
agreed upon in the meeting. Pagcu explained further
that the demonstration has nothing to do with the
Company because the union has no quarrel or
dispute with Management. The Management, thru
Atty. C.S. de Leon, Company personnel manager,
informed PBMEO that the demonstration is an
inalienable right of the union guaranteed by the
Constitution but emphasized that any demonstration
for that matter should not unduly prejudice the normal
operation of the Company. Workers who without
previous leave of absence approved by the Company,
particularly , the officers present who are the
organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail to
report for work the following morning shall be
dismissed, because such failure is a violation of the
existing CBA and, therefore, would be amounting to
an illegal strike. Because the petitioners and their
members numbering about 400 proceeded with the
demonstration despite the pleas of the respondent
Company that the first shift workers should not be
required to participate in the demonstration and that
the workers in the second and third shifts should be
utilized for the demonstration from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M. on
March 4, 1969, filed a charge against petitioners and
other employees who composed the first shift, for a
violation of Republic Act No. 875(Industrial Peace
Act), and of the CBA providing for 'No Strike and No
Lockout.' Petitioners were held guilty in by CIR for
bargaining in bad faith, hence this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or Not the petitioners right to freedom of
speech and to peaceable assemble violated.
Held:
Yes. A constitutional or valid infringement of human
rights requires a more stringent criterion, namely
existence of a grave and immediate danger of a
substantive evil which the State has the right to
prevent. This is not present in the case. It was to the
interest herein private respondent firm to rally to the
defense of, and take up the cudgels for, its
employees, so that they can report to work free from
harassment, vexation or peril and as consequence
perform more efficiently their respective tasks
enhance its productivity as well as profits. Herein
respondent employer did not even offer to intercede
for its employees with the local police. In seeking
sanctuary behind their freedom of expression well as
their right of assembly and of petition against alleged
persecution of local officialdom, theemployees and
laborers of herein private respondent firm were
fighting for their very survival, utilizing only the
weapons afforded them by the Constitution the
untrammelled enjoyment of their basic human rights.
The pretension of their employer that it would suffer
loss or damage by reason of the absence of its
employees from 6 o'clock in the morning to 2 o'clock
in the afternoon, is a plea for the preservation merely
of their property rights. The employees' pathetic
situation was a stark reality abused, harassment
and persecuted as they believed they were by
thepeace officers of the municipality. As above
intimated, the condition in which the employees found
themselves vis-a-vis the local police of Pasig, was a
matter that vitally affected their right to individual
existence as well as that of their families. Material
loss can be repaired or adequately compensated. The
debasement of the human being broken in morale
and brutalized in spirit-can never be fully evaluated in
monetary terms. As heretofore stated, the primacy of
human rights freedom of expression, of peaceful
assembly and of petition for redress of grievances
over property rights has been sustained. To regard
the demonstration against policeofficers, not against
the employer, as evidence of bad faith in collective
bargaining and hence a violation of the collective
bargaining agreement and a cause for the dismissal
from employment of the demonstratingemployees,
stretches unduly the compass of the collective
bargainingagreement, is "a potent means of inhibiting
speech" and therefore inflicts a moral as well as
mortal wound on the constitutional guarantees of free
expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition.
Circulation is one of the aspects of freedom of
expression. If demonstrators are reduced by one-
third, then by that much the circulation of the Issue
raised by the demonstration is diminished. The more
the participants, the more persons can be apprised of
the purpose of the rally. Moreover, the absence of
one-third of their members will be regarded as a
substantial indication of disunity in their ranks which
will enervate their position and abet continued alleged
police persecution.
8) JIMENEZ VS. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
109 Phil 273
FACTS:
Plaintiff Joel Jimenez filed a complaint praying
of a decree annulling his marriage with Remedios
Canizares. He claimed that the orifice of her genitals
was too small to allow the penetration of a male organ
or penis for copulation. He also claimed that the
condition of her genitals existed at the time of
marriage and continues to exist. The wife was
summoned and served with a copy of the complaint
but she did not file an answer. The court entered an
order requiring defendant to submit to a physical
examination by a competent lady physician to
determine her physical capacity for copulation.
Defendant did not submit herself to the examination
and the court entered a decree annulling the
marriage. The City Attorney filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, among the grounds that the
defendants impotency has not been satisfactorily
established as required by law; that she had not been
physically examined because she refused to be
examined.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage may be annulled
on the strength only of the lone testimony of the
husband who claimed and testified that his wife is
impotent.
HELD:
The law specifically enumerates the legal
grounds that must be proved to exist by indubitable
evidence to annul a marriage. In the case at bar, the
annulment of the marriage in question was decreed
upon the sole testimony of the husband who was
expected to give testimony tending or aiming at
securing the annulment of his marriage he sought and
seeks. Whether the wife is really impotent cannot be
deemed to have been satisfactorily established
because from the commencement of the proceedings
until the entry of the decree she had abstained from
taking part therein.
Although her refusal to be examined or failure
to appear in court show indifference on her part, yet
from such attitude the presumption arising out of the
suppression of evidence could not arise or be inferred
because women of this country are by nature coy,
bashful and shy and would not submit to a physical
examination unless compelled to by competent
authority.
A physical examination in this case is not self-
incriminating. She is not charged with any offense .
She is not being compelled to be a witness against
herself.
Impotency being an abnormal condition
should not be presumed. The presumption is in favor
of potency. The lone testimony of the husband that
his wife is physically incapable of sexual intercourse
is insufficient to tear asunder the ties that have bound
them together as husband and wife.
9) MAGDALENA ESTATE, INC., WILLIAM A.
YOTOKO and FELIPE BENABAYE, petitioners,
vs.
KAPISANAN NG MGA MANGGAGAWA SA
MAGDALENA ESTATE, INC., respondent.
Roxas and Sarmiento for petitioners.
Rufino B. Risma and Pedro S. de Guzman for
respondents.
BARRERA, J.:
This is a petition to review on certiorari the resolution
en banc of the Court of Industrial Relations dated
February 14, 1961, in CIR Case No. 1616-ULP.
On June 6, 1958, Acting CIR Prosecutor Pedro M.
Ligaya filed with the CIR, on behalf of respondent
Kapisanan Ng Mga Manggagawa sa Magdalena
Estate, Inc. (NAFLU), a complaint for unfair labor
practice (docketed as Case No. 1616-ULP) against
petitioners Magdalena Estate, Inc., William A. Yotoko,
and Felipe Benabaye, under Section 4(a),
subsections 1, 4, 5 and 6, of Republic Act No. 875. In
substance, said complaint alleged that petitioners
locked out the 66 members of respondent Union on
November 25, 1957, resulting in the filing in the CIR
of Case No. 1517-ULP; that thereafter because the
workers were readmitted on December 9, 1957, the
said Case No. 1517-ULP was dismissed at the
instance of the Union; that shortly before December
25, 1957 the officers and agents of petitioner
Corporation required the members of the Union to
sign application form (Annex E of complaint),
otherwise they would not receive Christmas bonus;
that sometime on February 28, 1958 and thereafter,
petitioner Corporation, by its officers and agents,
again required and had been requiring the members
of respondent Union to sign another application form
(Annex F of complaint) under threat of dismissal, but
they refused; that, as a consequence, on April 13,
1958, petitioner Corporation dismissed from
employment the following officers and/or members of
respondent Union, to wit: Buenaventura de la Cruz,
Ramon Veloso, Potenciano Lerios, Serapio Gasigan,
Nicolas Benigno, Manuel Orbien, Rosendo Manuel,
Domingo Limbauam, Andres Mayuga, Amando
Losana, Nicasio Palogan, Roberto Lopez, Geronimo
Gilliaco, Isidro Gatan, Antonio Tandaya, Candido
Quilang, Eugenio Narabe, and Cenon Galvez, without
just cause, because of their union affiliations and
activities, due to their refusal to sign the application
form (Annex F), and for having filed charges against
the petitioners, as well as for being about to give
testimonies in connection therewith; and that on
March 6, 1958, another member of respondent Union
(Nelson Helican) was unjustly dismissed from work for
union membership.
Answering amended complaint, petitioners specifically
denied all the material allegations therein contained,
but admitted that the laborers specified in Paragraph
13 of said complaint were in fact laid off on April 13,
1958, and the services of Nelson Helican were,
likewise, terminated on March 6, 1958. As special
defenses, petitioners contended that the controversy
was submitted by respondent Union for conciliation to
the Conciliation Service of the Department of Labor
(Regional Office 111), and while conferences were
being, the Union ceased attending them and its
members resumed working after the overhauling and
inventory of the equipment of petitioner Corporation,
leaving the impression that the Union desisted from
pursuing its demands; that Republic Act No. 875 does
not require that the responsive reply of the employer
to the proposals or demands of its employees be in
writing, consequently, the verbal replies of petitioners
on October 24, and 29, 1957 and on November 19
and 26, 1957, constitute substantial compliance with
the provisions of law on the matter; that respondent
Union is not yet qualify to be the exclusive
representative of all the employees and laborers in
petitioner Corporation, for purposes of collective
bargaining, because it has not been designated or
selected by the majority of the employees there
having been no certification election; and that the
members of respondent Union are employed in
petitioner Corporation, as per agreement, on a day-to-
day basis, and depending upon the needs and
exigencies of the Roads Department of petitioner
Corporation and that the latter reserved the right to
determine who and how many laborers will be hired to
work in said department from day to day.
Issues having been joined, the case was heard and,
thereafter, the CIR (on September 5, 1960) rendered
a decision (thru Judge Arsenio Martinez) declaring
petitioners guilty of unfair labor practice and directing
them to cease and desist from further committing
unfair labor practice acts, and to reinstate respondent
Union members Candido Quilang, Buenaventura de
la Cruz, Eugenio Narabe, and Nelson Helican to their
former positions in the Roads Department of
petitioners, with full back wages from April 13, 1958
(for Quilang, Cruz, and Narabe) and from March 6,
1958 (for Helican) up to their actual reinstatement,
with all the rights, privileges, and benefits, including
seniority appertaining thereto. The CIR also
suggested that in case of an opening or when the
exigencies of petitioners' business requires additional
laborers, the other 15 complainants-members of
respondent Union who did not testify and prove their
case be given the chance to work again with
petitioner Corporation.
From this portion of the decision omitting the 15
complainants-members of the Union in the order of
reinstatement, respondent Union filed a motion for
reconsideration and, on March 27, 1961, the CIR en
banc issued a resolution1 declaring that "there being
substantial evidence of unfair labor practice
committed against the fifteen employees, the
affirmative action taken for said four (Quilang, Cruz,
Narabe and Helican) should be applied to the fifteen,
namely, reinstatement with back wages from April 13,
1958, until reinstated."
Dissatisfied with said resolution, petitioners filed with
us the present petition for review.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the
foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and
approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice
to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their
case not covered by this stipulation of facts.
1wph1.t
Petitioners claim that the present case is not a class
suit under Section 12, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court;
hence, the relief granted to the 4 dismissed
employees who appeared and testified may not be
extended to the 15 others who did not appear and
testify at the hearing of the case. Petitioners might be
correct if this were an ordinary proceeding under the
Rules of Court. But this is not and, as a rule, the CIR,
in the hearing, investigation, and determination of any
question or controversy and in exercising its duties
and power under Commonwealth Act No. 103, "is not
bound by any technical rules of evidence, but may
inform its mind as it may deem just and equitable".
Substantially, though not strictly, the complaint in the
Instant case complies with the requirements of a class
suit under the Rules of Court. Note that, as the CIR
correctly found, the complaint was filed in the name of
the respondent Union, and all the dismissed laborers,
except Nelson Helican, are regular employees of the
company and members of the Union. Said the CIR:
1. The complaint was filed in the name of the
Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa sa Magdalena
Estate (NAFLU):
2. All the dismissed laborers involved in this case are
members of the complainant union. Their membership
was known to the respondents, through Exhibits "1-A"
and "12" which, according to the company's counsel,
Mr. Sarmiento, came to their possession in the latter
part of 1957;
3. All the dismissed laborers, except Nelson Helican,
are all regular employees of the company. The fifteen
who did not testify are also regular employees, is
could be seen from respondents' Exhibits "31", "31-A"
to "31-IIII", where their periods of employment with the
respondent are made to appear under the columns
"Experience", "Employer", "Position Held", and
"Salary".
The causes of action and common to all the
complainants, viz: the requirement to sign application
forms which would place them under temporary basis,
removable at pleasure of the company; their refusal to
sign said applications; and their dismissal because of
said refusal.
The subject matter of the complaint (namely,
reinstatement with full back-wages to their former
positions) is a matter of general or common interest to
all 19 dismissed employees.
Petitioners next contend that the CIR erred in finding
that there is substantial evidence of unfair labor
practice committed by petitioners against the 15
employees who did not appear and testify at the
hearing of the case. The following factual findings of
the CIR disclose, however, substantial evidence of
unfair labor practice committed by petitioners against
said employee-members respondent Union:
All these employees worked continuously for a long
time. They were never required to sign any contract of
employment. It was only on December 16, 1957,
January 2 and February 1958 that they were required
to sign application forms. By signing these contracts,
they would be placed at the mercy the company,
because after the expiry date of said contracts, the
respondents could dismiss them.
After two years of employment, and after the
company came to know of the existence of the union
on November 10, 1957, the fifteen who did not testify
were required to sign contract forms, the same
contract required of the four who testified. The
contract makes the employees temporary after the
have worked for two years.
As could be seen from respondents' Exhibits "33",
"33-A" to "33-GGGG", the fifteen who did not testify
did not sign the contract.
Respondents' Exhibits "20", "20-A" to "20-K", show
that on April 12, 1958, the fifteen who did not testify
were given notices of separation and letters of
dismissal like the four who testified.
3. It is claimed that the dismissal was due to the
trenchment policy. This policy was implemented only
in the Road Department in the early part of 1958,
because that was the only department wherein a
labor union existed. The fifteen dismissed laborers
were working in that department.
4. Respondents claim that all these dismissed
laborers are inefficient and lazy. If this is true, why did
the company send them separation notices when they
could have discharged the without notices?
Lastly, it must be noted in said letters of dismissal the
company said: "We thank you for your invaluable
services and do not hesitate to approach us if you
need references in the future." This expression of
gratitude does not tally with the imputation of
inefficiency, drunkenness, laziness, etc.
The case of Dimayuga, et al. v. CIR, et al. (L-10213,
May 27, 1957) cited by petitioners is not in point.
Unlike the instant case which was filed in the Union's
name for its dismissed members, the Dimayuga case
was filed in petitioner's individual names as individual
complainants. Secondly, the instant case is an unfair
labor practice case, whereas the Dimayuga case is
not. In the Dimayuga case, the CIR warned
petitioners that unless they appear individually and
testify to justify their respective claims, the same may
be denied, whereas in the case at bar, there was no
such warning and neither the court nor the petitioners
asked that the 15 others give testimony. Lastly, in the
instant case, the 4 dismissed employees testified not
only on their behalves, but also on behalf of the other
15 who did not testify.
Petitioners also contend that the CIR erred in not
considering their claim of a retrenchment policy, by
reason of which, the 19 employees in question had to
be dismissed. The claim is untenable, in the light of
the factual finding of the CIR, to wit:
3. It is claimed that the dismissal was due to the
retrenchment policy. This policy was implemented
only in the Road Department in the early part of 1958,
because that was the only department wherein a
labor union existed. The fifteen dismissed laborers
were working in that department.
Lastly, petitioners argue that the lower court erred in
not considering the evidence on the cause of the
dismissal of the 15 employees. There was actually no
necessity for so doing on the part of the CIR, it having
found substantial evidence of unfair labor practice
against the other 15 dismissed employees from the
testimony of the 4 employees who appeared and
testified during the hearing of the case. To do so
would have been a useless formality. Suffice to say
that, as the complaint alleged, all 19 were found to
have been dismissed by petition "their union affiliation
and activities, for their sign the application form Annex
"F", above referred to, and for having filed charges
against the respondents (herein petitioners)."
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the resolution of the
court a quo appealed from is hereby affirmed, with
costs against petitioners. It is so ordered.
10) PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYMENT
ORGANIZATION, NICANOR TOLENTINO,
FLORENCIO, PADRIGANO RUFINO, ROXAS
MARIANO DE LEON, ASENCION PACIENTE,
BONIFACIO VACUNA, BENJAMIN PAGCU and
RODULFO MUNSOD, petitioners, vs. PHILIPPINE
BLOOMING MILLS CO., INC. and COURT OF
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents.
Facts:
Philippine Blooming Employees Organization
(PBMEO) decided to stage a mass demonstration in
front of Malacaang to express their grievances
against the alleged abuses of the Pasig Police.
After learning about the planned mass demonstration,
Philippine Blooming Mills Inc., called for a meeting
with the leaders of the PBMEO. During the meeting,
the planned demonstration was confirmed by the
union. But it was stressed out that the demonstration
was not a strike against the company but was in fact
an exercise of the laborers' inalienable constitutional
right to freedom of expression, freedom of speech
and freedom for petition for redress of grievances.
The company asked them to cancel the
demonstration for it would interrupt the normal course
of their business which may result in the loss of
revenue. This was backed up with the threat of the
possibility that the workers would lose their jobs if
they pushed through with the rally.
A second meeting took place where the company
reiterated their appeal that while the workers may be
allowed to participate, those from the 1st and regular
shifts should not absent themselves to participate,
otherwise, they would be dismissed. Since it was too
late to cancel the plan, the rally took place and the
officers of the PBMEO were eventually dismissed for
a violation of the No Strike and No Lockout clause of
their Collective Bargaining Agreement.
The lower court decided in favor of the company and
the officers of the PBMEO were found guilty of
bargaining in bad faith. Their motion for
reconsideration was subsequently denied by the
Court of Industrial Relations for being filed two days
late.
Issue:
Whether or not the workers who joined the strike
violated the CBA?
Held:
No. While the Bill of Rights also protects property
rights, the primacy of human rights over property
rights is recognized. Because these freedoms are
"delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely
precious in our society" and the "threat of sanctions
may deter their exercise almost as potently as the
actual application of sanctions," they "need breathing
space to survive," permitting government regulation
only "with narrow specificity." Property and property
rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights
are imprescriptible. In the hierarchy of civil liberties,
the rights to freedom of expression and of assembly
occupy a preferred position as they are essential to
the preservation and vitality of our civil and political
institutions; and such priority "gives these liberties the
sanctity and the sanction not permitting dubious
intrusions."
The freedoms of speech and of the press as well as
of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of
grievances are absolute when directed against public
officials or "when exercised in relation to our right to
choose the men and women by whom we shall be
governed.
12) BIENVENIDO M. CADALIN, ROLANDO M.
AMUL, DONATO B. EVANGELISTA, and the rest of
1,767 NAMED-COMPLAINANTS, thru and by their
Attorney-in-fact, Atty. GERARDO A. DEL
MUNDOvs. PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS
EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATIONS
ADMINISTRATOR, NLRC, BROWN & ROOT
INTERNATIONAL, INC. AND/OR ASIA
INTERNATIONAL BUILDERS CORPORATION
GRN 104776, December 5,1994.
FACTS:
This is a consolidation of 3 cases of SPECIAL CIVIL
ACTIONS in the Supreme Court for Certiorari.
On June 6, 1984, Cadalin, Amul and Evangelista, in
their own behalf and on behalf of 728 other OCWs
instituted a class suit by filing an Amended
Complaint with the POEA for money claims arising
from their recruitment by ASIA INTERNATIONAL
BUILDERS CORPORATION (AIBC) and employment
by BROWN & ROOT INTERNATIONAL, INC (BRI)
which is a foreign corporation with headquarters in
Houston, Texas, and is engaged in construction; while
AIBC is a domestic corporation licensed as a service
contractor to recruit, mobilize and deploy Filipino
workers for overseas employment on behalf of its
foreign principals.
The amended complaint sought the payment of the
unexpired portion of the employment contracts, which
was terminated prematurely, and secondarily, the
payment of the interest of the earnings of the Travel
and Reserved Fund; interest on all the unpaid
benefits; area wage and salary differential pay; fringe
benefits; reimbursement of SSS and premium not
remitted to the SSS; refund of withholding tax not
remitted to the BIR; penalties for committing
prohibited practices; as well as the suspension of the
license of AIBC and the accreditation of BRII
On October 2, 1984, the POEA Administrator denied
the Motion to Strike Out of the Records filed by
AIBC but required the claimants to correct the
deficiencies in the complaint pointed out.
AIB and BRII kept on filing Motion for Extension of
Time to file their answer. The POEA kept on granting
such motions.
On November 14, 1984, claimants filed an opposition
to the motions for extension of time and asked that
AIBC and BRII declared in default for failure to file
their answers.
On December 27, 1984, the POEA Administrator
issued an order directing AIBC and BRII to file their
answers within ten days from receipt of the order.
(at madami pang motions ang na-file, new
complainants joined the case, ang daming inavail na
remedies ng both parties)
On June 19, 1987, AIBC finally submitted its answer
to the complaint. At the same hearing, the parties
were given a period of 15 days from said date within
which to submit their respective position papers. On
February 24, 1988, AIBC and BRII submitted position
paper. On October 27, 1988, AIBC and BRII filed a
Consolidated Reply, POEA Adminitartor rendered
his decision which awarded the amount of $824,
652.44 in favor of only 324 complainants. Claimants
submitted their Appeal Memorandum For Partial
Appeal from the decision of the POEA. AIBC also
filed its MR and/or appeal in addition to the Notice of
Appeal filed earlier.
NLRC promulgated its Resolution, modifying the
decision of the POEA. The resolution removed some
of the benefits awarded in favor of the claimants.
NLRC denied all the MRs. Hence, these petitions filed
by the claimants and by AlBC and BRII.
The case rooted from the Labor Law enacted by
Bahrain where most of the complainants were
deployed. His Majesty Ise Bin Selman Al Kaifa, Amir
of Bahrain, issued his Amiri Decree No. 23 on June
16, 1176, otherwise known re the Labour Law for the
Private Sector. Some of the provision of Amiri Decree
No. 23 that are relevant to the claims of the
complainants-appellants are as follows:
Art. 79: x x x A worker shall receive payment for each
extra hour equivalent to his wage entitlement
increased by a minimum of twenty-rive per centurn
thereof for hours worked during the day; and by a
minimum off fifty per centurn thereof for hours worked
during the night which shall be deemed to being from
seven oclock in the evening until seven oclock in the
morning .
Art. 80: Friday shall be deemed to be a weekly day of
rest on full pay.
If employee worked, 150% of his normal wage shall
be paid to him x x x.
Art. 81; x x x When conditions of work require the
worker to work on any official holiday, he shall be paid
an additional sum equivalent to 150% of his normal
wage.
Art. 84: Every worker who has completed one years
continuous service with his employer shall be entitled
to Laos on full pay for a period of not less than 21
days for each year increased to a period not less than
28 days after five continuous years of service.
A worker shall be entitled to such leave upon a
quantum meruit in respect of the proportion of his
service in that year.
Art. 107: A contract of employment made for a period
of indefinite duration may be terminated by either
party thereto after giving the other party prior notice
before such termination, in writing, in respect of
monthly paid workers and fifteen days notice in
respect of other workers. The party terminating a
contract without the required notice shall pay to the
other party compensation equivalent to the amount of
wages payable to the worker for the period of such
notice or the unexpired portion thereof.
Art. Ill: x x x the employer concerned shall pay to such
worker, upon termination of employment, a leaving
indemnity for the period of his employment calculated
on the basis of fifteen days wages for each year of
the first three years of service and of one months
wages for each year of service thereafter. Such
worker shall be entitled to payment of leaving
indemnity upon a quantum meruit in proportion to the
period of his service completed within a year.
ISSUE:
1. WON the foreign law should govern or the
contract of the parties.(WON the complainants who
have worked in Bahrain are entitled to the above-
mentioned benefits provided by Amiri Decree No. 23
of Bahrain).
2. WON the Bahrain Law should apply in the
case. (Assuming it is applicable WON complainants
claim for the benefits provided therein have
prescribed.)
3. Whether or not the instant cases qualify as;
a class suit (siningit ko nalang)
(the rest of the issues in the full text of the case refer
to Labor Law)
RULING:
1. NLRC set aside Section 1, Rule 129 of the
1989 Revised Rules on Evidence governing the
pleading and proof of a foreign law and admitted in
evidence a simple copy of the Bahrains Amiri Decree
No. 23 of 1976 (Labour Law for the Private Sector).
NLRC applied the Amiri Deere, No. 23 of 1976, which
provides for greater benefits than those stipulated in
the overseas-employment contracts of the claimants.
It was of the belief that where the laws of the host
country are more favorable and beneficial to the
workers, then the laws of the host country shall form
part of the overseas employment contract. It approved
the observation of the POEA Administrator that in
labor proceedings, all doubts in the implementation of
the provisions of the Labor Code and its implementing
regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor.
The overseas-employment contracts, which were
prepared by AIBC and BRII themselves, provided that
the laws of the host country became applicable to
said contracts if they offer terms and conditions more
favorable than those stipulated therein. However
there was a part of the employment contract which
provides that the compensation of the employee may
be adjusted downward so that the total computation
plus the non-waivable benefits shall be equivalent to
the compensation therein agree, another part of the
same provision categorically states that total
remuneration and benefits do not fall below that of the
host country regulation and custom.
Any ambiguity in the overseas-employment contracts
should be interpreted against AIBC and BRII, the
parties that drafted it. Article 1377 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines provides:
The interpretation of obscure words or stipulations in
a contract shall not favor the party who caused the
obscurity.
Said rule of interpretation is applicable to contracts of
adhesion where there is already a prepared form
containing the stipulations of the employment contract
and the employees merely take it or leave it. The
presumption is that there was an imposition by one
party against the other and that the employees signed
the contracts out of necessity that reduced their
bargaining power.
We read the overseas employment contracts in
question as adopting the provisions of the Amiri
Decree No. 23 of 1976 as part and parcel thereof.
The parties to a contract may select the law by which
it is to be governed. In such a case, the foreign law is
adopted as a system to regulate the relations of the
parties, including questions of their capacity to enter
into the contract, the formalities to be observed by
them, matters of performance, and so forth. Instead of
adopting the entire mass of the foreign law, the
parties may just agree that specific provisions of a
foreign statute shall be deemed incorporated into their
contract as a set of terms. By such reference to the
provisions of the foreign law, the contract does not
become a foreign contract to be governed by the
foreign law. The said law does not operate as a
statute but as a set of contractual terms deemed
written in the contract.
A basic policy of contract is to protect the expectation
of the parties. Such party expectation is protected by
giving effect to the parties own choice of the
applicable law. The choice of law must, however, bear
some relationship the parties or their transaction.
There is no question that the contracts sought to be
enforced by claimants have a direct connection with
the Bahrain law because the services were rendered
in that country.
2. NLRC ruled that the prescriptive period for
the filing of the claims of the complainants was 3
years, as provided in Article 291 of the Labor Code of
the Philippines, and not ten years as provided in
Article 1144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines nor
one year as provided in the Amiri Decree No. 23 of
1976.
Article 156 of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976
provides:
A claim arising out of a contract of employment shall
not actionable after the lapse of one year from the
date of the expiry of the Contract.
As a general rule, a foreign procedural law will not be
applied in the forum (local court), Procedural matters,
such as service of process, joinder of actions, period
and requisites for appeal, and so forth, are governed
by the laws of the forum. This is true even if the action
is based upon a foreign substantive law.
A law on prescription of actions is sui generis in
Conflict of Laws in the sense that it may be viewed
either as procedural or substantive, depending on the
characterization given such a law. In Bournias v.
Atlantic Maritime Company (220 F. 2d. 152, 2d Cir.
[1955]), where the issue was the applicability of the
Panama Labor Code in a case filed in the State of
New York for claims arising from said Code, the
claims would have prescribed under the Panamanian
Law but not under the Statute of Limitations of New
York. The U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
Panamanian Law was procedural as it was not
specifically intended to be substantive, hence, the
prescriptive period provided in the law of the forum
should apply. The Court observed: . . . we are
dealing with a statute of limitations of a foreign
country, and it is not clear on the face of the statute
that its purpose was to limit the enforceability, outside
as well as within the foreign country concerned, of the
substantive rights to which the statute pertains. We
think that as a yardstick for determining whether that
was the purpose, this test is the most satisfactory
one.
The Court further noted: Applying that test here it
appears to us that the libellant is entitled to succeed,
for the respondents have failed to satisfy us that the
Panamanian period of limitation in question was
specifically aimed against the particular rights which
the libellant seeks to enforce. The Panama Labor
Code is a statute having broad objectives. The
American court applied the statute of limitations of
New York, instead of the Panamanian law, after
finding that there was no showing that the
Panamanian law on prescription was intended to be
substantive. Being considered merely a procedural
law even in Panama, it has to give way to the law of
the forum (local Court) on prescription of actions.
However the characterization of a statute into a
procedural or substantive law becomes irrelevant
when the country of the forum (local Court) has a
borrowing statute. Said statute has the practical
effect of treating the foreign statute of limitation as
one of substance. A borrowing statute directs the
state of the forum (local Court) to apply the foreign
statute of limitations to the pending claims based on a
foreign law. While there are several kinds of
borrowing statutes, one form provides that an action
barred by the laws of the place where it accrued will
not be enforced in the forum even though the local
statute was not run against it.
Section 48 of Code of Civil Procedure is of this kind. It
provides: If by the laws of the state or country where
the cause of action arose, the action is barred, it is
also barred in the Philippine Islands.
Section 48 has not been repealed or amended by the
Civil Code of the Philippines. In the light of the
1987 Constitution, however, Section 48 cannot be
enforced ex proprio vigore insofar as it ordains the
application in this jurisdiction of Section 156 of the
Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976.
The courts of the forum (local Court) will not enforce
any foreign claim obnoxious to the forums public
policy. To enforce the one-year prescriptive period of
the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 as regards the
claims in question would contravene the public policy
on the protection to labor.
In the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the
1987 Constitution emphasized that:The state shall
promote social justice in all phases of national
development (Sec. 10).
The state affirms labor as a primary social economic
force. It shall protect the rights of workers and
promote their welfare (Sec. 18).
Article 1144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
provides:
The following actions must be brought within ten
years from the time the right of action accross:
(1) Upon a written contract; (2) Upon an obligation
created by law; (3) Upon a judgment
In this case, the claim for pay differentials is primarily
anchored on the written contracts between the
litigants, the ten-year prescriptive period provided by
Art. 1144(l) of the New Civil Code should govern.
3. NO. A class suit is proper where the subject matter
of the controversy is one of common or general
interest to many and the parties are so numerous that
it is impracticable to bring them all before the court.
When all the claims are for benefits granted under the
Bahrain law many of the claimants worked outside
Bahrain. Some of the claimants were deployed in
Indonesia under different terms and condition of
employment.
Inasmuch as the First requirement of a class suit is
not present (common or general interest based on the
Amiri Decree of the State of Bahrain), it is only logical
that only those who worked in Bahrain shall be
entitled to rile their claims in a class suit.
While there are common defendants (AIBC and BRII)
and the nature of the claims is the same (for
employees benefits), there is no common question of
law or fact. While some claims are based on the Amiri
Law of Bahrain, many of the claimants never worked
in that country, but were deployed elsewhere. Thus,
each claimant is interested only in his own demand
and not in the claims of the other employees of
defendants. A claimant has no concern in protecting
the interests of the other claimants as shown by the
fact, that hundreds of them have abandoned their co-
claimants and have entered into separate
compromise settlements of their respective claims.
The claimants who worked in Bahrain can not be
allowed to sue in a class suit in a judicial proceeding.
WHEREFORE, all the three petitioners are
DISMISSED.

In Article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights, the

1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor,
local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and
promote full employment and equality of employment
opportunities for all.

Thus, the applicable law on prescription is the

Philippine law.

The next question is whether the prescriptive period

governing the filing of the claims is 3 years, as
provided by the Labor Code or 10 years, as provided
by the Civil Code of the Philippines.