Andrey Burin

4/28/2017

Comparative Political Institutions (POLI 4011)

Yeltsins Parade of Treaties and Putins Breakneck Centralization: Two Flawed

Approaches and Their Consequences for Federalism in Russia

 Burin 1

Introduction

In the Economist Intelligence Units 2016 Democracy Index (an annual ranking of 167

countries worldwide based on five criteria: electoral process and pluralism; civil liberties; the

functioning of government; political participation; and political culture) Russia fell into the worst

of the four regime categories. Now considered as an authoritarian regime, Russia is the

lowest-ranked European nation and sits between Egypt and Qatar at #1341. This precipitous

democratic decline and move toward authoritarianism is a sharp turn in tone if not substance.

The 1980s and 1990s had brought heightened optimism from democracy-watchers worldwide

and the West to Russia. At the same time as the forces of globalization brought the world

ever-closer together and Russian democratization struggled to find its bearings, a little-known

career bureaucrat and FSB agent named Vladimir Putin ascended to the Russian presidency.

Putin had served as a close adviser to President Boris Yeltsin. There, he saw firsthand the

chaos that resulted from a jumble of ad hoc federal-regional treaties and an impotent central

government2. The lenses through which he viewed the painful democratization of the nineties

were much less rosy than the Wests, and he aimed to plant the seeds of a veritable

counter-revolution in Russia. Putin hoped to return Russia to the superpower status it once held

as the Soviet Union. His first major project as president was a complete restructuring of the

federal system in Russia. In order to understand the reasons for Russias current weakened

democracy and the extreme shift in power toward the center, it may be beneficial to examine a

key facet of its democracy, federalism.

1
"Democracy Index 2016: Revenge of the "deplorables"" (PDF). eiu.com. The Economist Intelligence Unit. 25
January 2017. Retrieved 26 January 2017.
2
ameron Ross, "Putins Federal Reforms and the Consolidation of Federalism in Russia: One Step Forward, Two Steps
C
Back!," Communist and Post-Communist Studies 36, no. 1 (2003): 31.
 Burin 2

According to Arend Lijphart, the diverse and wide-ranging variations of federalism can

be grouped together on one basic characteristic: a guaranteed division of power between central

and regional governments3. Another definition he suggests focuses on the non-centralization of

power, especially emphasizing that power should be distributed among multiple centers, not

from the top-down hierarchically, but rather with each power center holding equal importance,

despite different rights and duties4.

Mitin, focusing in on Russia, emphasized the institutional nature of federalism. He

argued that the key role of federalism was in structur[ing] the center-regional interaction by

determining the opportunities and constraints for individual, self-interested actors5. In the

1990s, disorder and disorganization plagued Russian federalism. Yeltsins presidency was not

able to address several important problems of Russias democratization. This led to asymmetrical

federalism. Yeltsin encouraged the regions to take as much sovereignty as they could swallow6

and they did. Vast institutional asymmetries and inequalities among the regions in terms of

relations with the center added to the dilemma. Bilateral treaties between the central government

and the regions often usurped the federal constitution, and an absence of federal oversight

resulted in the rise of authoritarianism and illiberal democratic principles in some regions7.

In a different way, Putins changes to the Russian system of federalism in 2000 also

created asymmetry and problems for Russian democracy. He used both informal and formal

3
Arend Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy : Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-six Countries, 2nd ed.
New Haven [Conn.]: Yale University Press, 2012, 175
4
Ibid., 177.
5
Dmitri Mitin, "From Rebellion to Submission: The Evolution of Russian Federalism Under Putin," Problems Of
Post-Communism 55, no. 5: 49. Military & Government Collection, EBSCOhost.
6
Steven Erlanger, "Tatar Area in Russia Votes on Sovereignty Today.(Foreign Desk)," The New York Times,
March 21, 1992.
7
ale R. Herspring, Putin's Russia : Past Imperfect, Future Uncertain, Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003, 200.
D
 Burin 3

methods to achieve rapid central consolidation. His formal methods included a new system of

presidential representatives, stripping immunity and autonomy from governors, and a

proliferation of federal activity and oversight in the regions. Informally, persecution of

opposition parties, the gathering of compromising information, and tightened control of the press

are a few of the tools Putin has utilized to grab power back from the regions. By examining the

flaws in each leaders system, a more equitable solution for Russian federalism might be found.

An Incomplete Revolution

Before the Soviet Unions collapse in 1991, the constitution of the USSR proclaimed that

its vast territory was governed as a federal and multinational state based upon the principles

of socialist federalism8. In reality, like the Soviet Unions judicial and legislative mechanisms of

government, much of the consensus-focused rhetoric and rule of law was overshadowed by

robust autocratic rule from the Kremlin. Leaders from Lenin to Stalin, Andropov, and

Khrushchev ran the government of the Soviet Union as an extremely centralized unitary state

with a parallel hierarchy, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU)9.

As the Cold War came to a denouement, the Russian Federation turned its attention to

democratization and liberal economic reforms. The issue of federalism in Russia became a topic

of serious debate. According to Ross, the breakneck economic and political changes that came

with the Soviet Unions collapse in 1991 were inextricably linked, and the illiberal distribution

of formerly state-owned industry and corporations may have precipitated the unsuccessful

implementation of political reforms and federalism. He places the blame for many of the

inadequacies of Russian federalism and democratization on the incomplete revolution that

8
"Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics," Review of Socialist Law 16, no. 1
(1990): 174.
9
Herspring, Putins Russia, 204.
 Burin 4

came with the collapse of communism10. Ruling elites were not united in welcoming Western

democracy and true capitalist economic reform, and stifled their growth. Two attempted coups in

1991 and an unconstitutional dissolution of the Russian parliament by Boris Yeltsin in 1993

destabilized the young democracy11. Furthermore, much was held over from the old Soviet

system. This included a complex structure of territorial organization, large inequities in the

concentration of power and wealth (most of which went to a handful of ruling elites) and many

of the provincial and central elites themselvesformer members of the Soviet nomenklatura12.

As the Russian economy began a difficult and volatile transition to freer markets in 1990,

the government split into two opposing factions on the questions of federalism and the

decentralization of political power. Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the CPSU and the

Soviet Unions first President (after he worked to create the position) advocated for saving the

Soviet Union, or at least some of its power over the large Republics. Though Gorbachev

spearheaded many of the early attempts at economic and political liberalization in Russia, as well

as a new era of negotiations with the West, he began to echo the sentiments of Soviet hard-liners

and military leadership. Alternatively, Boris Yeltsin, Russian parliamentary leader, began to

support movements for sovereignty in several former Soviet Republics. Yeltsin (acting as the

head of the Russian government at the timeas separate from the CPSU) even signed bilateral

treaties with these nascent republics: mostly countries in Middle Asia and the Baltics. He would

extend this practice of bilateral treaties to sub-national regions once he assumed the presidency

of the Russian Federation post-collapse. The chaos of this fractionalized leadership was mirrored

in the ad hoc nature of economic liberalization. Positions of power and influence (especially in

10
Cameron Ross, 2002, Federalism and Democratisation in Russia. New York: Manchester University Press, 22.
11
Michael Mandelbaum, "Coup De Grace: The End of the Soviet Union," Foreign Affairs 71, no. 1 (1991): 164.
12
Ross, Federalism and Democratization, 40.
 Burin 5

the provinces) were occupied not by champions of democracy yearning for a free and changed

Russia, but instead by holdovers from the Soviet era who quickly accumulated all of the political

and economic powers that they could and ruled as authoritarians13.

Federalism at the Dawn of Russian Democracy

Though military hardliners did their best to stave off the inevitable, the faltering Soviet

Union collapsed on December 26, 1991. Russias Federation Treaty, signed in 1992 by new

president Boris Yeltsin, was short-lived but outlined a complicated and asymmetrical system of

federalism that may have contributed to the difficulty of Russian democratization14. This basic

structure lives on in Russias present constitution. This first constitution (1993-present), working

from the treatys framework, created a total of eighty-nine sub-national territories, including

twenty-one ethnic republics, ten okrugs (autonomous regions), six territories, and forty-nine

provinces.15 Moscow and St. Petersburg were also designated as cities of federal importance, and

a Jewish Autonomous Region rounded out the list of subnational entities. Each differed in rights

and powers, with the twenty-one republics based on ethnicity gaining the most independence and

autonomy. The drafting of the 1993 Yeltsin Constitution codified federalism. A new federal

legislature w/an upper house, the Federation Council, also gave the regions a veto over laws

passed by the lower house (the Duma.) Many governors won election to this body and thus

increased their independence and legitimacy16.

Boris Yeltsin was Russias first popularly elected President, winning election in 1991.

According to Herspring, Yeltsin did not appreciate federalisms importance, as made clear by the

13
Herspring, Putins Russia, 180.
14
"1. Federation Treaty." Statutes and Decisions 33, no. 6 (1997): 25.
15
Ibid., 34.
16
Herspring, Putins Russia, 203.
 Burin 6

welter of concessions that he made both to oligarchs and provincial elites in his struggle to win

re-election in 199617. Under Yeltsin, asymmetrical institutions and last-minute deals with various

regional executives were the status quo. In an unusual setup for large federations, 47 of the 89

sub-national zones of Russia created bilateral treaties with the federal government. Each was a

complicated and unique arrangement including a general statement of principles as well as

detailed ordinances that varied from zone to zone18.

Another flaw of Yeltsin-era federalism was the federal constitutions lack of legitimacy.

This treaty-constitutional approach debilitated the power and centrality of the Russian

Federations Constitution. A treaty negotiated between the center and a subnational zone (with

the ethnic Republics, such as Tatarstan, gaining the most freedom) allowed for the possibility of

constitutional abridgment by the Republics and other sub-federal entities19. Thus, each Republic

held its negotiated treaty above the Federal Constitution. Additionally, the perpetual

renegotiation of treaties, completed once every five years, contributed to instability in Russia and

failed Lijpharts requirement for non-centralization of power, instead placing the strongest loci

of power by far in the regions20.

Mikhail Gorbachev said of federalisms history in the Soviet UnionUp to now, our

state has existed as a centralized and unitary state and none of us has yet had the experience of

living in a federation.21 Thus, it was not surprising that the mores and procedures of effective

federalism were not familiar to the Russian people or well-implemented by their government.

17
Ibid., 205.
18
Jeffrey Kahn, "Inter-Governmental Relations Under Yeltsin's New Federalism," In Federalism, Democratization,
and the Rule of Law in Russia, by Kahn, Jeffrey. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, Oxford Scholarship
Online, 149.
19
Ibid., 186.
20
Ibid., 169.
21
Stephan Kux, Soviet Federalism, Problems of Communism (MarchApril, 1990), 2.
 Burin 7

The Substance of Putins Reforms

Putin came into office with firsthand experience of the chaos that was 1990s Russian

federalism, having served as Yeltsins supervisor for Russias regions in 1997-9822. There, Putin

wrestled with the makeshift nature of 1990s Russian democratization that resulted in an

asymmetrical, undemocratic, and dysfunctional Russian federalism. This may serve to explain

Putins perception of a need for serious reform and centralization as he took office at the turn of

the millennium.23

Early on in his presidency, Putin decided that the relationship between Russias central

and provincial governments would be a key area of reform. His two chief reforms were the

creation of seven large administrative districts that would be used to consolidate power and a

complete restructuring of Yeltsins system of bilateral treaties. The first was initiated by the

establishment of seven federal districts (super-regions) headed by presidential envoys; five of

whom, reflecting Putins intelligence background and police connections, were military generals.

Putin kept the precise role of these representatives quiet, but his staff described their main

objectives as restoring the preeminence of federal law, defining the division of powers

between the centers, region, and local government, and coordinating and optimizing federal

agencies activity in regions, including a role in appointing and monitoring personnel in federal

agencies in the regions.24 Provincial governments veto powers on police chief appointments

were stripped, further increasing Putins capacity for oversight and influence over governmental

activity in the regions.

22
Herspring, Putins Russia, 201.
23
Alfred Stepan, Russian Federalism in Comparative Perspective, Post-Soviet Affairs 16, no. 2 (2000): 138.
24
Herspring, Putins Russia, 205.
 Burin 8

Putins second major change aimed to rectify the problems caused by Yeltsins surrender

of many federal powers, including constitutional supremacy, to the regions. The Kozak

commission was created to examine jurisdictional asymmetry and revamp the procedures for

local self-government25. The commissions head, Dimitrii Kozak, stated openly that the role of

bilateral treaties between the regions and the federal government was changing, and the

Constitution, presidential decrees, and Federal Government declarations would now take

precedent over the treaties26. Informally, these representatives were tasked with gathering

kompromat on regional leaders and also helped to consolidate Putins power in the regions by

removing political figures opposing the Kremlin. Central government control over federal

agencies in the regionsincluding the courts, police, and televisionwas also strengthened27.

Finally, Putin targeted the upper house of the Duma (the Federation Council) by replacing sitting

governors and chairmen of regional legislatures with full-time representatives who would be

appointed by governors and legislatures.

In his implementation of these reforms, Putin scattered former intelligence officials,

police, and military personnel throughout the regions. The seven administrative districts that he

created were actually based off of Russian military command structure.28 Further laws

weakening the power of the regions included granting the president the power to remove

governors and dismiss regional parliaments. The Presidential State Council was created as a sop

to make up for the governors lost seats in the Federation Council (upper house), but this was a

25
Johnny Rodin, "Rethinking Russian Federalism: The Politics of Intergovernmental Relations and Federal
Reforms," 2006, Stockholm Studies in Politics, 144.
26
Ibid., 147.
27
Ibid., 208.
28
Nikolai Petrov, Seven Faces of Putins Russia: Failed Districts as the New Level of State Territorial
Composition, Security Dialogue 33, no. 1 (March 2002): 76.
 Burin 9

strictly advisory role that only allowed them to meet with the president29. The federal

government was also gifted greater control over tax receipts and expenditures. Finally, in a key

move to buttress the federal governments formal and informal powers, at least twenty federal

agencies, from the Ministry of Justice to Tax agencies, criminal police, and the Ministry on

Publishing and TV and Radio-Broadcasting all opened offices in various regions.30 They worked

as direct extensions of the federal government31. This increased power in the regions, formally,

and informally, led to federal co-optation of many regional governors and a federal system

entirely dominated by the center32.

Conclusion

Both through these extensions of the federal governments limbs into regional affairs as

well as through informal means and coercion, Putin has rapidly consolidated power. According

to Mitin, Putins attempt at normalizing Russian federalism and bringing some order and a more

structured, centralized system was successful. However, he argues that these reforms amounted

to a comprehensive restructuring of center-regional interaction and the de facto

de-institutionalization of federalism33. Although these reforms have eased some of the tensions

and disorder that existed during the Parade of Treaties period of Russian history, federalism

and democracy will not fully take force in Russia without fundamental changes in the

governments operation. To boost its standing as a democracy and rise up from the category of

authoritarian regime, Lijpharts prescription for a guaranteed division of power between

29
Herspring. Putins Russia, 220.
30
Ibid., 224.
31
Ibid.
32
Rodin, Rethinking Russian Federalism, 160.
33
Mitin 2008. "From Rebellion to Submission. 51.
 Burin 10

central and regional governments34 will have to be met, election fraud on the regional and

national levels must be addressed, peaceful transition of power must be made possible, and the

federal government must put democratic precepts of the Russian Constitution and rule of law

before its own interests.

34
Arend Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy: 175.
 Burin 11

Bibliography

"1. Federation Treaty." Statutes and Decisions 33, no. 6 (1997)

"Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics," Review of

Socialist Law 16, no. 1 (1990).

"Democracy Index 2016: Revenge of the "deplorables"" (PDF). eiu.com. The Economist
Intelligence Unit. 25 January 2017. Retrieved 26 February 2017.

Erlanger, Steven. "Tatar Area in Russia Votes on Sovereignty Today.(Foreign Desk)." The New
York Times, March 21, 1992.

Herspring, Dale R. Putin's Russia : Past Imperfect, Future Uncertain. Lanham, Md.: Rowman &
Littlefield, 2003.

Kahn, Jeffrey. "Inter-Governmental Relations Under Yeltsin's New Federalism." In Federalism,

Democratization, and the Rule of Law in Russia, by Kahn, Jeffrey. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2002. Oxford Scholarship Online,

Kux, Stephan. Soviet Federalism. Problems of Communism (MarchApril, 1990). 1-20.

Arend Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy : Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-six

Countries, 2nd ed. New Haven [Conn.]: Yale University Press, 2012.

Michael Mandelbaum, "Coup De Grace: The End of the Soviet Union," Foreign Affairs 71, no. 1
(1991):

Mitin, Dmitri. 2008. "From Rebellion to Submission: The Evolution of Russian Federalism
Under Putin." Problems Of Post-Communism 55, no. 5: 49. Military & Government
Collection, EBSCOhost.

Petrov, Nikolai. Seven Faces of Putins Russia: Failed Districts as the New Level of State
Territorial Composition. Security Dialogue 33, no. 1 (March 2002): 73-91.

Rodin, Johnny. "Rethinking Russian Federalism: The Politics of Intergovernmental Relations &
Federal Reforms." 2006. Stockholm Studies in Politics.

Ross, Cameron. 2002. Federalism and Democratisation in Russia. New York: Manchester
University Press.

Ross, Cameron. "Putins Federal Reforms and the Consolidation of Federalism in Russia: One
Step Forward, Two Steps Back!" Communist and Post-Communist Studies 36, no. 1
(2003): 29-47.
 Burin 12

Stepan, Alfred. Russian Federalism in Comparative Perspective. Post-Soviet Affairs 16. no. 2
(2000): 133-176.