A Strategic Plan for

Empowering Pakistans
Civil Society to Counter
Violent Extremism
JAN UARY 2015

Hedieh Mirahmadi
Waleed Ziad
Mehreen Farooq
About WORDE
The World Organization
for Resource Develop-
ment and Educations
(WORDE) mission is to
enhance communica-
tion and understanding
between diverse commu- Acknowledgements
nities to mitigate social
and political conflict. We would like to thank Will McCants, Director of the Project on U.S.
Relations with the Islamic World at Brookings, and his staff for their
WORDE utilizes a support of this project, and Robert Lamb, Senior Fellow at the Center
research-informed for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), for co-convening the
foundation for all of our
Empowering Pakistans Civil Society for Countering Violent Extremism
community-building and
working group at the Brookings 2014 U.S.-Islamic World Forum.
peacebuilding programs.
We conduct field-based
research to understand In addition, we are grateful for the recommendations and comments
the drivers of conflict, provided by participants and invitees of the Brookings U.S.-Islamic World
and identify community Forum working group, including Haroon Ullah (Senior Advisor
needs and opportunities to the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy), Eileen OConnor (Bureau
for empowering local of South and Central Asian Affairs, Department of State), Larry Sampler
stakeholders to promote (Office of Afghanistan and Pakistan Affairs, USAID), Irfan Saeed
strong, resilient commu- (Department of Homeland Security), Angela Aggeler (U.S. Embassy,
nities that can champion
Islamabad), Qamar-ul Huda (Hedayah), Christine Fair (Georgetown
pluralism, social cohe-
University), Hassan Abbas (National Defense University), Lisa Curtis
sion, and mutual respect.
(Heritage Foundation), Shuja Nawaz (Atlantic Council), Aakif Ahmad
Since 2010, WORDE (Convergence), Irfan Malik (USPAK Foundation), Saud Anwar (Mayor,
has been leading a South Windsor, CT), Shahid Javed Burki (Former Federal Minister,
comprehensive study to Pakistan), Donya Aziz (Former Member of National Assembly), Azhar
explore the capacity of Hussain (Peace Education Foundation), Javed Jabbar (Former Senator
civil society to promote and Federal Minister, Pakistan), Shafqat Mehmood (PAIMAN), Tariq
peace and stability in the Parvez (Former Director, National Counter Terrorism Authority), Huma
Afghanistan-Pakistan
Chughtai (Law, Governance, and Human Rights Specialist), Stephen
region. Our research
Tankel (American University), Noor ul-Haq Qadri (Former Federal Minister,
is primarily conducted
Pakistan), Syed Zia ul-Noor Shah (Muslim Hands Pakistan), Amil Khan
through intensive field
research led by WORDE (Political Communications Specialist), Waheed Ahmad (Legal and Human
Specialists. To date, our Rights Specialist), and Albar Sheikh (Counter-Terrorism Analyst).
team has traveled to over
75 cities and villages in Finally, we would like to thank the representatives from civil society,
Afghanistan and Pakistan the Pakistan government, international organizations, and the Pakistani
to conduct interviews diaspora interviewed in Pakistan and the United States (see Appendix).
with hundreds of tribal
elders, local religious
leaders and civil society
activists.
Photos courtesy of Mehreen Farooq and Waleed Ziad
A Strategic Plan for Developing This plan includes the
a Strategy following sections:
Empowering Pakistans for Pakistan

Civil Society to Counter

Violent Extremism Fostering
Support in

F
Pakistan for the
or over a decade, the U.S. and inter- CVE Agenda
national community has focused on
countering violent extremism (CVE)
in Pakistan, working closely with both
the Government of Pakistan (GoP) and civil Fostering
society.1 Based on the experience of senior Communication
U.S. government officials in Washington, D.C.
and Islamabad, international development
organizations, and diaspora community lead-
ers, along with Pakistani civil society orga- Identifying
nizations (CSOs) engaged in peacebuilding and Vetting
activities, we have laid out this strategic Partners
plan to help guide policy and practice in the
next critical years. In addition, WORDE has
cultivated recommendations from a working
group we convened at the 2014 Brookings Program
Design and
U.S.-Islamic World Forum. Selection

Several of the recommendations are based

on good practices that are currently imple-
Soliciting CVE
mented by U.S. government agencies, and
Program Concepts,
are provided here to guide U.S. policymakers, and Developing
Foreign Service officers, and the Pakistani- Requests for
American diaspora for future CVE program- Proposals (RFP)
ming. This Strategic Plan is an addendum to
the Brookings-WORDE study entitled Em-
powering Pakistans Civil Society to Counter Monitoring
Global Violent Extremism, which provides an and Evaluation
in depth analysis of this issue. (M&E)

Generating
Political
1
WORDEs 2012 report, Pakistans Civil Society: Alternative Capital for the
Channels to Countering Violent Extremism, illustrates the range Long Term
of innovative peacebuilding initiatives developed by Pakistans
civil society.

WORDE I The World Organization for Resource Development and Education v 1

 Developing a Strategy for Pakistan

C
VE is a broad term referring to initiatives that
aim to reduce the spread of ideologically moti-
vated violence. For the purposes of this Strategic
Plan, the CVE agenda may include programs that
focus on:

u Peacebuilding,
u Conflict resolution,
u Rule of law,
u Promoting positive values (e.g., pluralism,
interfaith/interethnic harmony, social cohesion),
and,
u Development assistance in conflict areas.

As part of its CVE agenda, the U.S. government has

supported a range of such innovative programs,
working with Pakistans civil society to build resilience
against extremism. However, due to the complex and
evolving nature of the problem, the U.S. government
has yet to reach a consensus as to what constitutes
the risk factors of violent extremism, the drivers of
radicalization, and vulnerable or at-risk populations.
In addition, there are several different views on which
programs should be part of the CVE agenda, and
whether certain geographic regions in Pakistan should
be prioritized.
Accordingly, the U.S. government should develop a
strategy for implementing the CVE agenda specifically
for Pakistan built on a shared understanding on these
issues among key U.S. agencies, including the State
Department, the National Counterterrorism Center
(NCTC), the Department of Defense (DOD), the U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID), and
the U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP).

A comprehensive interagency Pakistan-specific CVE strategy requires:

4 Defining risk factors of violent extremism (e.g., ideological, socioeconomic, and political risk
factors)

4 Identifying at-risk regions and target audiences for programming

4 Prioritizing efforts to reduce multiple forms of violence (e.g., sectarian, political, ethnic,
anti-state violence)

4 Guiding principles on what constitutes a CVE program

2 v A Strategic Plan for Engaging Pakistans Civil Society to Counter Violent Extremism
 Fostering Support in Pakistan for the CVE Agenda

T
o date, the U.S. CVE agenda has not received organize roundtable discussions with Pakistani
widespread public support in Pakistan for CSOs (including those that are U.S. government
several reasons. First, there is confusion as grant recipients and others), along with representa-
to what the agenda entails. This is partly due to the tives of the Pakistan Counter Terrorism Authority
lack of transparency of internationally funded CVE to identify terminology that would resonate among
programs. Second, the terminology is not popular Pakistanis.
in Pakistan, where more positive terms, such as
peacebuilding, are traditionally preferred. Finally,
the CVE agenda has engendered controversy par- Good Practices Reframing CVE
ticularly because it is perceived as a form of foreign
interference in Pakistans affairs. The Pakistan Youth Alliance (PYA) developed
an innovative model for re-branding CVE. Prior
The U.S. government can help foster buy-in for to conducting youth CVE workshops in one of
the CVE agenda by framing its strategy in line with Karachis most volatile neighborhoods, PYA con-
Pakistans objectives, as stated in the 2014 National ducted a survey of 500 youth from varying ethnic
Internal Security Policy. 3 This will enable officials and religious backgrounds. PYA determined
within the U.S. and Pakistan government and civil that terms like building unity, tolerance, and
society to approach CVE as a joint effort. communal harmony, had more resonance than
CVE within the community. The survey was then
Shared objectives and priorities, as articulated by followed by a series of open house events in out-
door tents featuring music, in which pamphlets
the U.S. government and the GoP, include:
incorporating these terms were disseminated to
u Enhancing interagency communication and build public support for the workshops.
multilateral cooperation
u Identifying local and transnational drivers of
violent extremism
u Building trust with vulnerable communities
u Engaging credible partners at the government
and civil society levels
u Prioritizing community-level interventions
u Investing in education and capacity-building of
leaders of influence, law-enforcement, and CVE
practitioners.

To further cultivate support in Pakistan, it is impor-

tant to publicly re-brand CVE objectives in more
acceptable terms such as peacebuilding, conflict
resolution, or stabilization. The U.S. Embassy could

3
Pakistans 2014 National Internal Security Policy is the countrys first national security strategy document.

WORDE I The World Organization for Resource Development and Education v 3

 Fostering Communication

U
.S. government officials provide several key
recommendations for improving interagency
communication and collaboration on the gov-
ernments CVE agenda in Pakistan.
u Promote Interagency Communication. Currently,
multiple U.S. government agencies (see Figure 1)
are involved in different aspects of CVE, with varying
degrees of communication and knowledge sharing.
Agreed upon definitions of CVE, regular communi-
cation, and sharing of good practices can improve
programming and facilitate the pooling of resources
across agencies. One option for streamlining coordi-
nation is to establish an interagency working group
specifically for CVE in Pakistan, based on the model of
the Interagency Af-Pak CVE Working Group.4 Another
option is for the Pakistan Desk at the State Depart-
ment to arrange monthly or quarterly video-telecon-
ferencing sessions amongst the Consulates to share
updates on their progress with regards to the compre-
hensive CVE strategy.

Figure 1: U.S. Government offices focusing on peacebuilding, conflict resolution, rule of law, promoting
positive values, and development assistance in conflict areas within Pakistan

National
Counter- US
terrorism Department Institute
USAID
Center of State of Peace
(NCTC)

Special Rep Center for

Afghanistan- Bureau
Strategic Office of
Bureau of Pakistan of Human Bureau of Democracy
Counter- Transition
South and Affairs and Rights, Counter- and
terrorism Initiatives
Central Asia Interagency Democracy terrorism Governance
Communi- (OTI)
CVE Working and Labor
cations
Group

USAID (Islamabad)
US Country
Embassy Rep
Islamabad (Islamabad)
OTI (Karachi and Lahore
Consulate)

Washington, DC Islamabad

4
This working group brought together U.S. government officials from the State Departments Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistans (SRAP)
office and the Bureau of Counterterrorism, USAID, and the National Counterterrorism Center.

4 v A Strategic Plan for Engaging Pakistans Civil Society to Counter Violent Extremism
 government officials can greatly facilitate ease
of access.

u Encourage communication and collab-

oration among CSOs. The U.S. government should
use its convening power to network Pakistani CSOs
with one another. Existing CSO coalitions should be
identified, and then venues such as conferences or
networking lunches could be offered to facilitate
synergy amongst peacebuilders. In addition, the U.S.
Embassy in Islamabad could organize an annual
open house event, such as a Civil Society Day, in
which previous and existing grantees and program
participants can network with other CSOs and learn
about potential funding opportunities.

u Foster communication between the U.S.

and Pakistan. Ongoing tensions between Washing-
Funding Conferences
ton, D.C. and Islamabad have had a negative impact
on CVE activities. Increased forums for communication There is an active debate regarding the
between the U.S. government, the GoP, and Pakistan efficacy of conferences and networking
civil society specifically on CVE can help alleviate mis- efforts in Pakistan. WORDE has found
apprehensions, and help all parties align their efforts that in both Pakistan and Afghanistan,
towards shared objectives. Pakistani CSOs currently
networking events are some of the most
engaged in peacebuilding activities advocate for open
effective means of fostering collaboration
forums at universities and Pakistani think tanks to fos-
between regional CSOs. For example, the
ter public debates on how to counter violent extrem-
Istehkam-e Pakistan conference, which
ism. It is particularly important to include academics,
brought religious leaders from across
students, and CVE practitioners in these forums. In
Pakistan together in Lahore in 2009, was
addition, USIP should continue its speakers series
in Islamabad in which CVE practitioners and experts critical to building public support for a
conduct briefings for U.S. government officials on campaign against the Taliban in Swat. Such
relevant CVE topics. conferences can be extremely beneficial,
as long as they are targeted at CSOs who
u Increase communication between CSOs and do not generally collaborate, and provided
the GoP. Both international and local CSOs occasion- they are implemented in a cost-effective
ally report that the GoP hinders their work by restrict- manner.
ing mobility and delaying No Objection Certificates
and visa approvals for international staff. CSOs who
have had a history of conducting CVE programs in
sensitive regions report that transparency vis--vis the
GoP is essential, and open communication with local

WORDE I The World Organization for Resource Development and Education v 5

 Identifying and Vetting Partners

financial reporting structures, and may require assis-

Key Recommendation: Develop a CSO
working group in Islamabad to help identify
and vet potential partners for peacebuilding, to
peer-review proposals, and to provide guidance
on CVE funding priorities.
tance in institutional capacity building.
In order to assess the capacity of a potential partner,
it is necessary to conduct site visits and to solicit
feedback from community stakeholders. Given secu-
rity restrictions, Foreign Service officers could partner
with organizations such as USIP, which face fewer

U
.S. government officials and Pakistani CSOs
recommend the following good practices
for identifying credible partners to carry out
CVE programs.
u Seek credible local organizations. U.S. Embassy
and USIP staff recommend reaching beyond organi-
zations who have received substantial international
funding, and engaging smaller non-donor driven
organizations which have experience, local credibility
and support networks, and innovative ideas. Partners
should demonstrate a commitment to their program-
ming objectives beyond the grant cycle. It is important
to note that organizations with credibility in their
communities often do not resemble international
organizations with sophisticated administrative and
travel restrictions, or hire additional local staff with
specific CVE expertise.
u Develop contact databases. A centralized data-
base of Pakistani activists and CSOs (including faith-
based organizations) engaged in peacebuilding, which
is updated in real time and shared between relevant
U.S. government agencies in Washington, D.C. and
in Islamabad, will also be beneficial in identifying
partners, maintaining relationships, and announcing
peacebuilding grant opportunities. WORDEs 2012
directory, From Community Building to Countering
Extremism: An A-to-Z Guide to Pakistans Civil Society,
provides detailed information on the capacity of
peacebuilding CSOs, and can serve as an effective
starting point.

Engaging Youth
The U.S. government should leverage from previous youth empowerment programs such as the Atlantic
Councils Emerging Leaders of Pakistan fellowship, which has fostered a network of young leaders dedi-
cated to peace and stability. Every year, 15 young Pakistanis are competitively selected to participate in
an exchange program in Washington, D.C. to meet with policymakers, community leaders, diaspora com-
munities, and regional experts to discuss Pakistans contemporary challenges. The program, which was
inaugurated in 2012, includes participants ranging from civil society activists, to business entrepreneurs
and journalists. Participants can help the U.S. government identify partners, and can also participate in
the development of peacebuilding programs.

6 v A Strategic Plan for Engaging Pakistans Civil Society to Counter Violent Extremism
u Consult the GoP and civil society. Officials en-
gaged in CVE programming can seek guidance from a
range of local actors (including alumni of U.S.-funded
programs, representatives of established CSOs, law
enforcement, media, and civic leaders) to improve the
process of identifying and vetting partners. In addi-
tion, members of the National Assembly should be
engaged to provide feedback on the credibility and
scope of CSOs in their constituencies. Furthermore,
the U.S. Embassy should consider the creation of an
institutionalized CSO working group in Islamabad
on a similar model as the Embassys religious leader
interfaith council.5 This working group could include
representatives from national development organi-
zations such as Strengthening Participatory Orga-
nization, the Aga Khan Development Fund, and the
Pakistan Poverty Alleviation Fund, which collaborate
with international organizations and have developed
extensive networks of partnerships at the grassroots
level. It is also important to reach out to coalitions of
peacebuilders, such as the Peacebuilders Pakistan
Conflict Mediation Network and the womens network,
Aman o Nisa.
u Target CSOs with positive relationships with
government. CVE practitioners also recommend
selecting partners that have a good working rela-
tionship with local, provincial, and national govern-
ments. While constructive criticism of government
policies can be beneficial for the development of
a democratic society, it is important to note that
organizations with an antagonistic relationship with
the GoP may not be able to sustain their program-
ming in the long term. There are many established
peacebuilding CSOs in Pakistan which have over-
come the trust deficit with the government, and
which are able to operate effectively despite the
pervasive culture of rent-seeking and clientelism
5
The interfaith council met regularly with political officers and the Deputy
Chief of Mission at the U.S. Embassy in an advisory capacity and provided
guidance on engaging religious leaders and conducting outreach to reli-
gious institutions. According to U.S. Embassy officials, this council was
critical in building trust between the U.S. government and religious leaders.
WORDE I The World Organization for Resource Development and Education v 7
Engaging the Diaspora
The Pakistani diaspora can be a valuable as-
set in several aspects of CVE programming,
from vetting partners and developing RFPs,
to conducting monitoring and evaluation. The
U.S. government engages key diaspora orga-
nizations (e.g., the Pakistani American Public
Affairs Committee (PAKPAC), the U.S.-Paki-
stan Foundation, the U.S.-Pakistan Womens
Council, and the Organization of Pakistani
Entrepreneurs of North America) for input on
contemporary issues concerning U.S.-Pakistan
relations. Similarly, diaspora leaders have
also led outreach efforts to the U.S. govern-
ment. For example, when the 2010 Enhanced
Partnership with Pakistan Act was announced
(authorizing $1.5 billion to Pakistan for civilian
assistance for five years), PAKPAC organized a
meeting to showcase diaspora and Pakistan-
based organizations that could partner with
the U.S. government for development initia-
tives. Nonetheless, systematic engagement of
the diaspora on CVE has been limited.
The NCTC can host educational seminars (e.g.,
community awareness briefings) for the Paki-
stani American community to raise awareness
of violent extremism in Pakistan to help mobi-
lize the community on this issue. In addition,
the State Department could regularly engage
the diaspora to provide U.S. government offi-
cials with cultural competency and assistance
in vetting projects. This engagement could
be facilitated through the establishment of a
diaspora advisory council on CVE comprising
community leaders including youth activists
and Pakistani-Americans engaged in develop-
ment programs in Pakistan.
Good Practices Institutionalize commonly associated with governance in develop-
Religious Leader Engagement ing countries. The U.S. government should consult
with such organizations for good practices on
working with Pakistani government officials.
Engaging religious leaders in implementing CVE
programs can be instrumental in garnering local
u Target CSOs with a consistent commitment to
support because they can effectively communicate
CVE. Given the international communitys increas-
program objectives in a culturally appropriate para-
ing interest in CVE, a cottage industry has grown in
digm through their mosques, shrines, and schools.
Pakistan with a host of new organizations entering
Their institutions can also serve as venues to host
the field. Both donors and civil society activists often
CVE-related community programming.
complain that organizations with insufficient experi-
ence have positioned themselves as CVE experts. In
Muslim Hands Pakistan, for example, conducts work
addition, some faith-based organizations with ties
in high-risk regions across Khyber Pakhtunkhwa prov-
to extremist groups are believed to have rebranded
ince and Baluchistan in collaboration with religious
themselves as moderates and claim to support the
scholars, CSOs, local politicians, and other leaders of
CVE agenda. While potential partners may not always
influence who have access to vulnerable communi-
align with U.S. foreign policy objectives or Western so-
ties at the grassroots level. The Director of Muslim
cial values, it is important to ensure that they have ex-
Hands, Syed Zia ul-Noor Shah, notes that amongst
perience in peacebuilding, have consistently opposed
their good practices is that their trustees include re-
Talibanization, and have not engaged in activities that
ligious leaders from across the ideological spectrum.
are detrimental to regional security. It is therefore
Moreover, their employees are local and have a keen
incumbent on donor organizations to examine the his-
understanding of cultural dynamics in each region.
tory of potential partner organizations, and scrutinize
Mosque imams, for example, often help in publicizing
public statements made by their leadership vis--vis
programs, while Sufi teachers help facilitate their work
terrorism and Talibanization. This will require providing
in their traditional role as social mediators.
cultural competency training that includes modules on
identifying extremist ideologies for program managers
Working with religious leaders requires high levels of
to vet potential partners.
cultural competency, both in recognizing which indi-
viduals share U.S. CVE objectives, and in understand-
u Invest in cultural competency training. CVE
ing how best to collaborate. Once potential partners
practitioners recommend a specially designed train-
are identified, the U.S. Embassy and Consulates could
ing program for Foreign Service officers involved in
hold quarterly meetings or conference calls where re-
outreach and program design. The curriculum of the
ligious leaders can discuss social and political issues
training should provide a clear understanding of CVE,
of concern. These could be modeled after the Council
and highlight regional risk factors. In-person and
of Foreign Relations Religion and Foreign Policy Con-
video-teleconferenced workshops can be provided by
ference Call Series, which seeks to engage religious
U.S. government officials formerly engaged in CVE in
and congregational leaders, scholars, and thinkers
Pakistan, local civil society representatives, and mem-
from across the [U.S.] in cross-denominational con-
bers of the diaspora. CVE practitioners recommend
versations on global issues.1
that such a training program would be useful if mul-
tiple viewpoints are presented, and if structured in the
1
Religion and Foreign Policy Bulletin, Council on Foreign Relations, form of interactive discussions rather than lectures.
January 1, 2009.

8 v A Strategic Plan for Engaging Pakistans Civil Society to Counter Violent Extremism
 Program Design and Selection

U
.S. government officials, CVE practitioners and
CSOs have recommended the following good
practices in selecting and designing effective
programs:
u Invest in research. Despite the number of CVE
projects in Pakistan, there is a dearth of research on
drivers of violent extremism, target audiences, program
efficacy, funding priorities, and public opinion
regarding the CVE agenda. The U.S. government can
encourage Pakistani organizations involved in CVE,
universities, and Pakistan-based policy institutes to
conduct research on these issues. In addition, the U.S.
government can support peace and conflict resolution
studies programs in Pakistani universities, or provide
scholarships to Pakistani students in this field. Further-
more, the State Department could consider developing
a research grant competition similar to the Department
of Defenses Minerva Initiative,6 or the Department
of Justice National Institute of Justices Research,
Evaluation, and Development Project Grants,7 which
would focus on evaluating the efficacy of U.S. govern-
ment-funded CVE programs from 2001 to present.
Research on CVE can also be further enhanced
through forums hosted at think tanks in Washington,
D.C. that bring together policymakers, academics, and
experts. The Pentagons unclassified weekly Af-Pak
Federation Forum, which involves stakeholders across
the U.S. government in both Washington, D.C. and
Islamabad through video teleconferencing, can also
offer such a venue.
u Seek local input. The U.S. Embassy should also
collaborate with local partners to develop working
Key Recommendations: Encourage
research-informed program designs by:
4 Supporting local organizations, universi-
ties and think tanks to conduct research
on risk factors of violent extremism;
4 Hosting working groups to identify
funding priorities;
4 Hosting annual conferences for peace-
builders to share good practices;
4 Investing in research to evaluate efficacy
of previous CVE programs; and,
4 Disseminating research findings in think
tanks, and unclassified interagency
forums.
groups involving community stakeholders to identify
mutually agreeable funding priorities prior to imple-
menting programs in a specific region. Additionally, the
U.S. Embassy could host annual conferences that net-
work peacebuilders (including organizations that have
received international support and those who have not
yet received foreign funding) to share good practices
and challenges in the field so that future programs are
strengthened by that knowledge base.
u Concentrate resources. While U.S. government
and international CVE resources are limited, the prob-
lem in Pakistan is vast. If U.S. government-supported
projects are scattered across the country, they are
unlikely to generate sufficient momentum to develop

6
The Minerva Research Initiative, established by former Secretary Gates in 2008, funds research programs that build deeper understandings of the social,
cultural, and political dynamics that influence violent extremism and other factors that cause violent conflict and political instability around the world.
7
The National Institute of Justices Research, Evaluation, and Development Project Grants have funded social science research that explores a wide range of
topics including the drivers of conflict and evaluation frameworks for CVE programs.

WORDE I The World Organization for Resource Development and Education v 9

Figure 2: Examples of Target Audiences for CVE Programs in Pakistan

Communities u Impoverished families

vulnerable to risk u Refugees and IDPs
factors of violent u Marginalized communities
extremism
u Youth exposed to extremist narratives

u Regions with a large proportion of

the population living in poverty
The general
u Regions with a large number of institutions
population in
regions with a affiliated with extremist groups
high concentration u Regions with limited civil and political
of risk factors rights (e.g., FATA)
u Regions with frequent incidents of
sectarian violence

Influencers u Community leaders

who can prevent u Thought leaders
violent extremism u Credible voices (e.g., religious scholars)
from within u Educators
communities
u Social workers

u Political parties
Institutions that u Advocacy organizations that represent
specifically address marginalized communities
grievances of u Law enforcement
vulnerable u Social welfare organizations that serve
populations low-income communities
u Social workers

community resilience. Collectively, USAID, the U.S.
Embassy, and USIP should consider selecting an
at-risk district, where they can concentrate their re-
sources to generate longer lasting and visible results.
A series of pilot programs could be carried out in a
high-risk district in Southern Punjab, for example,
which is still secure enough to operate in and enable
regular monitoring. Ideally, CVE programs could be
buttressed by high-visibility development programs in
the same district, which can help generate trust with
the local community.
u Build off of existing conflict resolution pro-
grams. Conflict resolution programs, which are a ma-
jor component of CVE, have been implemented across
Pakistan for several decades. Several organizations

10 v A Strategic Plan for Engaging Pakistans Civil Society to Counter Violent Extremism
such as the Orangi Pilot Project (OPP) and Sungi have
integrated effective conflict resolution components
in their community development programs. In some
of the most volatile areas of Karachi, for example, the
OPP has initiated neighborhood policing programs
and fostered dialogue between ethnic factions. The
U.S. government can support such existing programs
as part of the CVE agenda rather than issuing Re-
quests for Proposals (RFP) for new programs.
u Look for scalability and sustainability. Ideally,
programs should be selected which can be scaled or
replicated. However, it is important to note that proj-
ects should only be reproduced in regions with similar
demographics or risk factors of violent extremism. For
example, an effective program in Multan (southern
Punjab) may not be appropriate in Malakand (Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa province).
It is further important to select projects that have
alternative means of support, preferably from within
their own communities, which are sustainable even
after international funding has ceased. The U.S. gov-
ernment should also consider supporting for-profit
social enterprise projects that reduce the risk factors
of violent extremism (see Figure 3) to help build sus-
tainability of these programs. For example, in a region
facing ethnic tension, providing micro-loans to a gar-
ment workshop established and operated by men and
women from different ethnicities can both alleviate
tensions and generate income.
u Target the right population. Given ethnic, geo-
graphical, and economic differences in Pakistan, it is
important to ensure that programs are impacting the
right demographics and are framed in a language that
resonates amongst the target population. Some CVE
practitioners contend that the whole country could be
considered at-risk, and therefore it is not necessary to
target programs towards a specific audience. Howev-
er, given limited resources, programs should be geared
8
Each program might have several programming objectives, which can relate to CVE, and therefore multiple theories of change.
WORDE I The World Organization for Resource Development and Education v 11
towards high-risk populations (see Figure 2). CSO
roundtables for the design and selection of projects,
comprised of different segments of the population,
from faith leaders to social activists, could assist in
determining whether a project will speak to the target
population.
u Determining CVE specific outcomes. Each
U.S.-funded program should be required to have at
least one theory of change8 that articulates how the
programs outputs and outcomes intend to alleviate
or reduce specific risk factors of violent extremism
that pertain to a region. Organizations should then
be required to monitor and evaluate their programs
progress by developing evaluation methodologies that
assess whether the projects outputs and outcomes
confirmed the theory of change.
Developing a theory of change
By providing [insert program objective],
the program will alleviate [insert relevant risk
factors of radicalization], and [state out-
comes that address the push and pull fac-
tors that contribute to violent extremism].
(See Figure 3 for examples of risk factors)
For example, if a program provides vocational
training to unemployed young adults in Jhang
(a city in Punjab where extremist groups,
notably Lashkar e-Jhangvi, have targeted
recruitment), the following theory of change
may apply: By providing skills training to
a vulnerable population, the program will
alleviate socioeconomic risk factors such
as unemployment. By doing so, the program
will deter individuals from seeking financial
support from charities linked to extremist
organizations.
Figure 3: Risk Factors of Violent Extremism in Pakistan
Psychological Factors
u Post traumatic stress disorders
resulting from war, humanitarian
crises, or forced migration
u Mental illnesses
u Thrill-seeking complexes
Extremist Beliefs and Values
u Justification of violence to bring
about change
u Glorification of martyrdom
u Intolerance towards religious
minorities and Muslims who do
not practice Islam according to
extremist interpretations of the
faith
u Consider when to brand. Several Pakistani CSOs
mention that they are hesitant to apply for U.S. gov-
ernment funding because of branding requirements.
Therefore, grant issuing agencies should consider the
costs and benefits of branding, particularly for CSOs
working on sensitive CVE programs. Pakistani CVE
practitioners noted that initiatives tend to succeed
when they appear to be entirely locally driven. This
lends greater credibility to their work, and overtime
enables local communities to have ownership of the
CVE agenda.
12 v A Strategic Plan for Engaging Pakistans Civil Society to Counter Violent Extremism
Socioeconomic Factors
u Unemployment
u Food insecurity
u Financial incentives for joining
extremist groups
u The participation of kinship
groups in violent extremism
Political Grievances
u Limited civil and political rights
u Corrupt/inefficient governance
and weak rule of law
u Slow/inept judicial structures
u GoP support for U.S. military
intervention in the region
In some circumstances, the U.S. government has de-
veloped initiatives using alternative branding schemes
that do not overtly reference the U.S. Despite this,
Pakistan civil society representatives note that CSOs
may still hesitate to use the alternative branding, be-
cause communities often recognize that the pseud-
onyms are ultimately linked to the U.S.
 Soliciting CVE Program Concepts and Developing Requests
for Proposals (RFP)

P
ractitioners and policymakers have noted the rather than short-term outputs, and can also give
following good practices for developing RFPs CSOs more time for strategic development and
relating to CVE projects: planning.

u Prioritize small grants & encourage CSO coali-
tions for CVE. Pakistani civil society activists often
contend that large grants beyond the absorptive ca-
pacity of small CSOs can lead to financial mismanage-
ment or corruption. Therefore, micro grant programs
of $50,000 or less, such as those implemented by
USIP and USAIDs Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI),
should be expanded and replicated by other U.S. gov-
ernment agencies to encourage smaller organizations
with grassroots reach to apply. Moreover, with smaller
grants, it is possible to pilot innovative programs at a
low cost to taxpayers.
u Increase communication between the prime
and sub-contractors. Grant recipients stress that
increased communication between the prime and
the sub-contractor is vital. In particular, timelines
for milestones and deadlines for deliverables should
be discussed early in the project design phase, and
reviewed throughout the projects implementation to
reflect any changes in program design that may arise
as a result of extenuating factors. Similarly, the prime

For larger grants, the U.S. government can incentivize

the development of CSO coalitions for CVE by requir-
ing a specific number of local partners to carry out the
program. This can enable smaller organizations to ap-
ply for funding, which would otherwise not be eligible
or capable to apply for large grants.

u Prioritize funding for building institutional ca-

pacity. Many grassroots CSOs currently conducting
effective work need to build their core capabilities to
carry out larger initiatives. Therefore, the U.S. govern-
ment should prioritize institutional capacity develop-
ment training (e.g., non-profit management, financial
management, coalition building assistance, communi-
cations, media, and social media training).

u Extend grant durations. CSOs consistently recom-

mend that grant durations should be expanded to
two years or more, and that grant allocations should
be expedited. Extended grant periods would allow
implementing partners to focus on longer-term impact

WORDE I The World Organization for Resource Development and Education v 13

should be notified if the sub-contractor is unable to
fulfill any part of the grant. Recipients of foreign aid
further recommend that grants should provide greater
flexibility to allow implementing partners to modify
their work plan, budget, or M&E approach during the
project time frame. In addition, the prime contractor
should communicate any delays in disbursing funds
to the subcontractor. Delayed payments can have a
detrimental impact, particularly on grassroots CSOs
that are operating on limited budgets.
u Encourage feedback and consultation. U.S.
government agencies should require primes and their
subcontractors to have an efficient and transpar-
ent process of feedback for each grant, allowing for
constructive criticism of the process. A CSO working
group (as referenced above), comprised of recipi-
ents of U.S. and international grants and other local
stakeholders, could also advise on how to make RFPs
accessible to local organizations, and how to tailor
RFPs to the needs of at-risk communities.
u Improve grant accessibility. The process of
applying for CVE related grants should be more trans-
parent and readily accessible to Pakistani CSOs. The
U.S. Embassy should consider offering grant writing
workshops or seminars, specifically geared towards
organizations involved in peacebuilding. These should
also be offered across the country, through universi-
ties or the Embassys Lincoln Corners.9 Such venues
can be also be used to inform CSOs of other interna-
tional government or private grant opportunities and
channels such as the Global Community Engagement
and Resilience Fund.
u Expand the pool of applicants for RFPs. While
the U.S. government posts RFPs online on grants.gov
and on the Embassys web page, that information
often does not filter down to local organizations that
may be eligible to apply for funding. Pakistani CSOs
often claim that navigating grants.gov is cumbersome,
and that they are only made aware of international
funding opportunities when larger international orga-
nizations have already won bids and are seeking local
partners.
Grant opportunities should be announced through
multiple channels including email and social media
to individuals and organizations in a U.S. government
contact database. As discussed above, this would
comprise Pakistani CSOs and alumni of U.S.-funded
programs such as the International Visitor Leadership
Program (IVLP) and other conferences and training
initiatives. These contacts should be engaged by the
U.S. government over the long term, and regularly
informed of new initiatives and funding opportunities
so they can further disseminate this information within
their networks.

Key Recommendations: Broadly publicize grant-writing workshops, and all CVE grant opportunities
including micro grant competitions through the Embassys Lincoln Corners and alumni network and
social media.

9
Lincoln Corners (LCs) provide access to current and reliable information about America through books, magazines, videos, internet, databases, and
programs to the general public. The resources of the LCs are open and accessible to the public. Currently there are 15 LCs located in around Islamabad,
Rawalpindi, Muzaffarabad, Peshawar, Karachi, Bahawalpur, Faisalabad, Sargodha, Khairpur, Larkana, Hyderabad, and Skardu.

14 v A Strategic Plan for Engaging Pakistans Civil Society to Counter Violent Extremism
 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E)
C
ongress should require that all CVE related
programs include monitoring and evaluation
(M&E) frameworks that consider the theo-
ries of change for each initiative. Evaluations should
indicate how the target audience benefited from the
program, and whether community resilience against
violent extremism increased, or risk factors to violent
extremism decreased. For example, media programs
that seek to promote positive values (such as tol-
erance and social cohesion) or counter extremist
narratives could use pre and post-tests that measure
whether individuals support for violent extremism
decreased as a result of the program. Ideally, inde-
pendent research firms, employing local experts with
WORDE I The World Organization for Resource Development and Education v 15
high degrees of cultural competency, should carry out
evaluations for larger programs to ensure that there is
no conflict of interest in reporting program outcomes.
It is important to note that many CVE programs are
not publicly framed as such due to social or political
sensitivities. In such cases, evaluations that overtly
seek to assess the programs efficacy in reducing
violent extremism may jeopardize the programs legiti-
macy. Therefore, evaluations must be designed with
direct guidance from CVE practitioners, the Pakistani
diaspora, or university research centers that are famil-
iar with the sensitive nature of CVE programming in
Pakistan.
 Generating Political Capital for the Long Term

C
ongressional support for peacebuilding in
areas at risk of violent extremism is necessary
to maintain high levels of funding for Pakistan.
As the U.S. draws down its military presence in the re-
gion, it will be vital to support soft-power approaches
to promote regional stability. This is particularly im-
portant given security officials concerns that a large
number of Pakistanis are traveling to the Middle East
to join ISIS. A Congressional hearing in Washington,
D.C. specifically on the importance of engaging civil
society for peacebuilding would help elevate this issue
and cultivate public support for continued engage-
ment in Pakistan.

The Pakistani diaspora can also play an important

role in informing Congress on the importance of this
issue. In addition, Washington, D.C.-based think tanks
can host lectures and conferences to further promote
engagement of Pakistans civil society amongst policy-
makers, academics, and the diaspora.
Policymakers should also encourage the U.S. media to
cover peacebuilding initiatives by Pakistan-based or
diaspora CSOs. Media coverage can both bolster ex-
isting work, and encourage others to become engaged
in such efforts. This can also help the American public
understand the potential of partnership with Paki-
stans civil society in the global fight against violent
extremism.
Ultimately, even if the term CVE is abandoned intern-
ally within the U.S. government, it is important to build
support for a long-term peacebuilding agenda within
a framework that will be palatable for Pakistanis. This
will require a continued commitment to implementing
traditional programs that focus on promoting plural-
ism, conflict resolution, violence prevention, public
safety, and the rule of law, which the U.S. government
has supported for decades.
Conclusion
Partnering with Pakistans civil society is critical
for U.S. efforts to promote peace and stability
in the region. Local activists and organizations
in Pakistan have developed a range of innova-
tive CVE initiatives to protect their communi-
tiesfrom public awareness campaigns and
inter-community dialogues, to educational
seminars that refute extremist ideologies. How-
ever, faced with increasing insecurity and a lack
of resources, Pakistans civil society requires
continued international support. By expanding
the pool of potential partners, enhancing com-
munication and engagement of stakeholders,
and adapting grants to local needs, the U.S. can
help empower Pakistanis to face the challenge
of violent extremism.

16 v A Strategic Plan for Engaging Pakistans Civil Society to Counter Violent Extremism
 Appendix: List of Interview Subjects and Roundtable Participants
U.S.-Islamic World Forum (Doha)
Hassan Abbas, Department Chair,
Regional and Analytical Studies at
National Defense University
Angela Aggelar, Counselor for Public
Affairs, U.S. Embassy, Islamabad
Waheed Ahmad, Legal and Human
Rights specialist
Donya Aziz, Former Member of
National Assembly, Pakistan
Huma Chughtai, Law, Governance, and
Human Rights specialist. Member, Aman
o Nisa
Lisa Curtis, Senior Research Fellow,
The Heritage Foundation
Azhar Hussain, President, Peace &
Education Foundation
Javed Jabbar, Former Federal Minister,
Pakistan
Amil Khan, Political Communications
specialist
Qamar-ul Huda, Director of Dialogue
and Collaboration, Hedayah, International
Center of Excellence for Countering
Violent Extremism
Robert Lamb, Senior Fellow and Director
of the Program on Crisis, Conflict and
Cooperation, Center for Strategic and
International Studies
Irfan Malik, President, US PAK
Foundation; former Director of PAKPAC
Shafqat Mehmood, Chairman, PAIMAN
Alumni Trust
Eileen OConnor, Deputy Assistant
Secretary, Bureau of South and Central
Asian Affairs
Tariq Parvez, Chairman, Initiative for
Public Security; former Director, National
Counter-Terrorism Authority, Pakistan
Nur ul-Haq Qadri, Former Federal
Minister and Member of National
Assembly, representing FATA
Larry Sampler, Assistant to the
Administrator, Office of Afghanistan
and Pakistan Affairs (OAPA)
Syed Zia ul Noor Shah, Country
Director, Muslim Hands, Pakistan
Albar Sheikh, Counter-terrorism analyst
Stephen Tankel, Assistant Professor,
American University
Haroon Ullah, Senior Advisor to the
Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy
Pakistan
Mishael Ali Khan, Foundation for
Integrated Development Action
Jon Boone, The Guardian
Oliver Hayes, First Secretary Political,
British High Commission
Rizaq Fahim, College of Youth Activist
and Development
Darlene Foote, Deputy Office Director,
Office of Stabilization and Governance,
USAID
Marc-Andre Franche, Country Director,
UNDP
Sarwat Jahan, Creative Associates
Taher Saeed Kazmi, Society for
Education and Peacebuilding
Dilawar Khan, CODE
Raza Shah Khan, SPADO
Amber Kimbro, Deputy Country
Representative, OTI, USAID Pakistan
Office
Kalsoom Lakhani, Invest 2 Innovate
William McCue, Political Officer, U.S.
Embassy, Islamabad
Mike McMahon, Justice Sector Program
Officer, INL, U.S. Embassy
Naseer Memon, Strengthening
Participatory Organization
Peer Mudassir Shah & Shahid Ilyas
Khan, Salook
Muhammad Munir, International Islamic
University, Islamabad
Mark Parkison, Director, Office of
Stabilization and Governance, USAID,
Pakistan
Mossarat Qadeem, PAIMAN
Sam Toporowski, Second Secretary
Political, British High Commission
Tonia Weik, Director Community Engage-
ment Office, Public Affairs Section, U.S.
Embassy, Islamabad
Amer Zafirullah & Areebah Shah,
Pakistan Youth Change Advocates
Syed Ali Abbas Zaid, Pakistan Youth
Alliance
Washington, D.C.
Akif Ahmad, Co-founder, Convergence
Saud Anwar, Founder, PAKPAC; Mayor
of South Windsor, CT
Irfana Anwer, Pakistan Team Leader,
Institute for Inclusive Security
Michelle Brooks, National Counter-
terrorism Center
Shahid Javed Burki, Former Federal
Minister, Pakistan; Former Vice President,
The World Bank
Ashley Clingman-Jackson, Bureau of
Counterterrorism, State Department
Col. William Cosby, Former Deputy DIO,
South Asia, Department of Defense
Christine Fair, Assistant Professor,
Georgetown University
Anjana Kazmi (U.K .based), Develop-
ments in Literacy (Global)
Michael Kugelman, Senior Program
Associate, South and Southeast Asia,
Wilson Center
Joshua Litwin, Program Manager, OTI,
USAID
Sean MacLeay, Program Manager, OTI,
USAID
Nadia Naviwala, Former Country
Representative (Pakistan), USIP
Shuja Nawaz, Director, South Asia
Center, Atlantic Council
Sarah Peck, Former Director, U.S.-
Pakistan Womens Council
Javed Qamar, President, Organization
of Pakistani Entrepreneurs
Irfan Saeed, Senior Policy Advisor,
Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties,
Department of Homeland Security
Sam Sager, Program Manager, Office of
Transition Initiatives, USAID
Kathryn Schalow, Director of South and
Central Asia, Press and Public Diplomacy,
State Department
David Sedney, Former Deputy Assistant
Secretary of Defense
Jumaina Siddiqui, Program Manager -
Pakistan, National Democratic Institute
Cheryl Steele, Senior Associate, Booz
Allen Hamilton, detailed to the Global
Community Engagement and Resilience
Fund (GCERF)
Joseph Zilligen, Office of the Special
Representative for Afghanistan and
Pakistan, State Department.
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