How does the conclusion (4) follow from the preceding argument?
Why does a composite of self-identical images of Forms in matter
end up as the analogue of a drawing? What has happened to
Socrates humanity? Does it have no role to play in explaining the
presence of his qualities? A closer look at VI.3 [44] 15.24-38 as a
whole shows that G. merely intends this reference to support the
illustration of drawing and original, although in my opinion the pas-
sage contradicts G.s overall account of sensible qualities.
The purpose of VI.3 [44] 15 is to investigate whether moion and
nmoion are peculiar to the category of quality, in the same way as
son and nison are peculiar to quantity. We may surmise they are
not. Plotinus first contrasts the lgow of mandesignated as twith
its product and image in a corporeal naturedesignated as poin ti.
Then he unfolds a three-place proportion. The painted image of
Socrates is incorrectly (i.e. homonymously) called Socrates because
it consists of mere colours and paint which have nothing in common
with the original, viz. the sensible Socrates. In the same way the sen-
sible Socrates is incorrectly called Socrates since he consists of mere
colours and shapes which are images (mimmata) of their counterparts
in the lgow, i.e. humanity. Finally, the same relation holds between
this lgow and the veritable lgow of Humanity, i.e. the Form.
Hence, the first lgow, which creates the colours and shapes of the
sensible Socrates, is not the Form in Intellect but the creative lgow
in Soul, or rather itself Socrates individual soul4). It would seem,
then, that the sensible colours of the composite Socrates are the pro-
duct of the creative activity of a soul and not themselves direct rep-
resentations of the Forms of e.g. White (against 1 and 3). Hence they
cannot be called synonymously after the Form (against 1). The sta-
tus of colours and other qualities in spermatic lgoi is further dis-
cussed in VI.3 [44] 16. In the more elaborate discussion of quality
in II.6 [17] Plotinus claims that we tend to speak of qualities when
we are describing the characteristics that a lgow comprises all at
once, only to be unfolded in its activity. Hence almost all so-called
qualities are activities (nrgeiai) of a lgow or edow (for the identi-
fication see e.g. II.6 [17] 2. 14-15, II.7 [37] 3.12). This also applies
to individual sensible colours (e.g. II.b [17] 3.1-2 t on leukn p
so yeton o poithta, ll nrgeian). They arise as a result of the
activity of the lgow of humanity, not the activity of e.g. the Form
White. Of course these lgoi do not include matterso lgow in (2)
must mean definition. In II.7 [37] 3.7-14 Plotinus explicitly oppos-
es the two notions of lgow, and states with respect to the lgow that
creates body that it does not include matter (m tn lhn sumperiei-
896br 22-12-1998 16:34 Page 109
are thinking (IV.3 [27] 30.5-16, tr. p. 171). (2) We are in accord with
Intellect when we reason in accord with itas explained above,
because we reason in accord with the rule in reason that is caused
by Intellect. (i) The unchangeability of Intellect has to be reconciled
with growth in conceptual achievement on our partas shown
above this can be achieved without limiting our endowment from
Intellect to a natural cognitive ability. Such an Aristotelianizing
account of incarnate cognition (p. 179) would indeed be too Aristo-
telian to count as Plotinian. It is nevertheless true that under the
influence of Aristotles psychology Plotinus provides a strikingly orig-
inal account of the notion of recollection.
To conclude, in his book Prof. Gerson shows himself an analyti-
cal philosopher with an admirable command of the literature on his
subject. His approach to Plotinus through the latters criticism of
Aristotle is successful and illuminating, not least for the understand-
ing of Aristotle. However, G.s argument is dense, and in important
places his rather selective use of Plotinus texts is misleading. As a
result, he departs not only from the letter but also from the spirit of
Plotinus. All in all I regret I have to say that in spite of its virtues
this book cannot be regarded as a reliable guide to Plotinus philos-
ophy7).
manifested by or constructed out of sensible qualities (p. 92). The latter are the
activities of the former.
6) Cf I. 1 [53] 7.9-12: tn d tw cuxw to afisynesyai dnamin o tn afisyhtn
enai de, tn d p tw afisysevw ggignomnvn t z tpvn ntilhptikn enai
mllon: noht gr dh tata. And souls power of sense-perception need not be
perception of sensibles, but rather it must be receptive of the impressions produced
by sense-perception on the living being; these are already intelligible entities (tr. p.
165). For Plotinus epistemology in general see E.K. Emilsson, Cognition and its object,
in: L.P. Gerson (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Plotinus (Cambridge 1996), 217-49.
7) My research has been made possible by a fellowship of the Royal Netherlands
Academy of Arts and Sciences.