Volume 20 | Number 1
December 1959
Repository Citation
David W. Robertson, The Doctrine of Anticipatory Breach of Contract, 20 La. L. Rev. (1959)
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1959] COMMENTS
Unilateral Contracts
It has been frequently held that an anticipatory repudiation
of a unilateral contract is not actionable. 8 Such holdings are
based upon the notion that the reason for holding an anticipa-
tory repudiation to be a breach of contract is that otherwise the
injured party must continue to perform on his own part.1 ' Since
this reason would not apply to a unilateral contract because no
duty to perform exists in the repudiatee, the courts think it
unnecessary to apply the doctrine to unilateral contracts. But
as pointed out above in the discussion of the Hochster case, 20
the reasons for holding an anticipatory repudiation to be a
breach of contract are much more general. It is believed that
the reasons on which the doctrine can actually be sustained are
equally as applicable to unilateral contracts as to bilateral. 1
Another proposed reason for the rule that the doctrine does
not apply to unilateral contracts is that perhaps the most com-
mon kind of unilateral contract is the promise to pay money,
such as a promissory note.2 2 It is argued by some writers that
allowing suit on a promissory note prior to its coming due would
be tantamount to maturing a money obligation before its due
date. 23 This concept is often expressed in the phrase "acceler-
ating the date of maturity. ' 24 However, Corbin and others argue
that this is not the case, although it appears so superficially.
toward an acceptance of the doctrine. Some writers argue that the doctrine is
now law in Nebraska. Vold, Repudiation of Contracts. 5 NEB. L. BULL. 269
(1927).
16. 4 CORBIN, CONTRACTS 961 (1951).
17. Ibid.
18. Id. 962.
19. Ibid.
20. See page 120 supra.
21. 4 CORBIN, CONTRACTS 962 (1951).
22. Id. 963.
23. Ibid.
24. Id. 965.
19591 COMMENTS
Retraction
Another facet of the anticipatory breach doctrine which
should be considered is the fact that as long as the repudiatee
does not materially change his position in reliance on the re-
pudiation, the repudiator may retract it and announce his in-
tention to go through with the contract. The retraction may be
either express or tacit, provided the repudiatee has actual no-
tice of it. 27 If the repudiator does effectively retract his re-
pudiation, the effect of the repudiation as a breach is nullified,
and the repudiatee's obligation is reinstated.2 8 However, in order
to operate as a restoration of the contract, the retraction must
be made when the repudiator is in a position to perform his
obligation in all material respects. - 1 Furthermore, any signifi-
25. Ibid. See Comment, Anticipatory Breach, of Unilateral Contracts, 36 YALE
L.J. 263 (1926).
26. 4 CORBIN, CONTRACTS 962 (1951). A bilateral contract, one side of
which had been fully performed prior to the repudiation, is for purposes of this
rule a unilateral contract.
27. Id. 960.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. XX
Manifestation
There is no hard and fast rule as to what sort of manifesta-
tion is necessary to amount to a repudiation.3 2 The general rule
is that any unequivocal manifestation, either express or implied,
of intention not to go through with the contract, or of inability
to do so, will be sufficient. 33 This would include repudiation
4
of
the contract by making performance of it impossible.
Measure of Damages
The common law rule that damages are to be measured as of
the time for performance" is not changed in the case of an
anticipatory breach. 36 It is true that if the breach is not antici-
patory, the time for performance will have arrived when the
breach occurs. However, although the calculation of damages
may be more difficult, the general rule applies to the anticipa-
37
tory breach.
53. Noland v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 96 So.2d 360 (La. App. 1957) ; Baird
v. Employers' Liability Assur. Corp., 38 So.2d 669 (La. App. 1951); Mossler
Acceptance Corp. v. Naquin, 31 So.2d 247 (La. App. 1947) ; Mayer v. Succession
of McClellan, 30 So.2d 788 (La. App. 1947) ; Interurban Transp. Co. v. F. Strauss
& Sons, 196 So. 367 (La. App. 1940) ; Andrews v. Foster, 170 So. 563 (La. App.
1936).
54. See, e.g., Friedman Iron & Supply Co. v. J. B. Beaird Co., Inc., 222 La.
627, 63 So.2d 144 (1953).
55. LA. ClVIL CODE art. 1912 (1870) : "The effects of being put in default are
not only that, in contracts to give, the thing which is the object of the stipula-
tion is at the risk of the person in default; but in the cases hereinafter provided
for it is a prerequisite to the recovery of damages and of profits and fruits, or
the rescission of the contract."
Id. art. 1913: "In commutative contracts, where the reciprocal obligations are
to be performed at the same time, or the one immediately after the other, the
party who wishes to put the other in default, must, at the time and place ex-
pressed in, or implied by the agreement, offer or perform, as the contract requires,
that which on his part was to be performed, otherwise the opposite party will not
be legally put in default."
1959] COMMENTS
56. Woolie v. Carson Carbon Co., 177 La. 990, 149 So. 551 (1933); Stockle-
bach v. Bradley, 157 La. 336, 105 So. 363 (1925) ; Shelby Mills v. Nami, 1 La.
App. 116 (1924) ; Allen v. Steers, 39 La. Ann. 586, 2 So. 199 (1887) ; Camors v.
Madden, 36 La. Ann. 425 (1884); Abels v. Glover, 15 La. Ann. 247 (1860).
57. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1932 (1870) : "When there is an active violation of
the contract, damages are due from the moment the act of contravention has
been done, and the creditor is under no obligation to put the other in default in
order to entitle him to his action."
58. The injured party must offer to perform "at the time" stipulated in the
contract before he can put the other party in default. Carried to its logical con-
clusion, this would mean that if the injured party waited until after the time
performance was due, giving the other party a few extra days before making
demand, he would be unable to bring suit.
59. See Everhardt v. Sighinolfi, 232 La. 996, 95 So.2d 632 (1957) ; Di Cristina
v. Weiser, 215 La. 115, 42 So.2d 868 (1949). See also Erwin v. Fenwick, 6
Mart.(N.S.) 229.,(La. 1827).
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. XX
60
vent "surprise suits" by injured parties. Certainly a party
who unjustifiedly manifests his intention not to go through With
his contractual obligation when it comes due should not be heard
to complain that he is surprised at being sued for breach of con-
tract.
Another possible objection to the adoption of the anticipa-
tory breach doctrine in Louisiana is presented by Article 2052.
This article provides: "What is due only at a certain time, can-
not be demanded before the expiration of the intermediate
time. . . ." It seems clearly to stand for the proposition that an
obligation may not be sued upon until it is due. A case in which
this article was applied is American Machinery & Construction
Co. v. Stewart & Haas,6 1 wherein the right to recover judgment
for future royalties on the ground that the defendant had aban-
doned some rented machines and refused to comply with the
contract was denied, and the action declared premature. How-
ever, in the final analysis the defense of prematurity was sus-
tained because in consequence of other provisions in the contract
the obligation to pay the royalties was contingent on future
events, the outcome of which could not be foreseen at the time
of suit. In other words, the court found that the "equity of the
case" would "be reached" 62 by delaying the right to sue. It is
significant that no judicial interpretation of Article 2052 which
is directly at odds with the anticipatory breach doctrine has
been discovered.
Another argument against the construction of Article 2052
as presenting an obstacle to the adoption of the anticipatory
breach doctrine might be that Article 20536 modifies 2052 to
a certain extent. Article 2053 provides that "the term is always
presumed to be stipulated in favor of the debtor, unless it result
from the stipulation, or from circumstances, that it was also
agreed upon in favor of the creditor." Presumably this would
mean that if the debtor wants to accelerate payment of his
obligation he can do so."4 It could be argued from this assump-
tion that the obligor can accelerate the due date of his obligation
60. This conclusion is at least tenable from the wording of the article. See
note 55 supra.
61. 115 La. 192, 38 So. 960 (1905).
62. Id. at 195, 38 So. at 961.
63. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2053 (1870).
64. If the term is stipulated in the debtor's favor, he will presumably be able
to pay off the entire obligation at any time prior to its coming due, in the absence
of circumstances bringing his conduct under some other prohibition.
1959] COMMENTS
are due from the moment the act of contravention, has been
done."
An area in which the Louisiana law may require some quali-
fication of the anticipatory breach doctrine is the situation
where the repudiator retracts his repudiation. At common law
the repudiator may retract his repudiation and restore the con-
tractual obligations as long as the repudiatee has made no ma-
70
terial change of position in reliance on the repudiation. The
institution of suit by the repudiatee would be such reliance as
71 would probably not
to preclude retraction. This proposition
be accepted in Louisiana in view of Article 2047,72 which pro-
vides that the obligee may be allowed further time in which to
comply with his contractual obligation even after the institution
of suit. Presumably this principle would be applied in cases
where suit is instituted prior to the time performance was due
under the contract, as well as in suits at or after that time.
Thus, even though the repudiatee had instituted suit based upon
the repudiation, the repudiator under 2047 could be allowed to
retract his repudiation and go through with the contract.
Another area in which the anticipatory breach doctrine may
require some modification is in the matter of the calculation of
damages. At common law it is established that damages are to
be calculated on the basis of the extent of the injury as of the
73
time performance is due under the contract. The rule in Lou-
isiana is not so clear. It is true that language is often found in
the decisions indicating that damages are to be calculated as
of the time of the breach.7 4 However, it is arguable that, as the
anticipatory breach situation is largely undeveloped here, the
courts have not intended to make a distinction between the time
of the breach and the time performance is due. 75 In Friedman
Iron & Supply Co. v. J. B. Beaird, Inc.,76 there was an anticipa-
tory repudiation on the part of the defendant. Suit was brought
70. 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS 980 (1951).
71. Ibid.
72. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2047 (1870): "In all cases the dissolution of a coil-
tract may be demanded by a suit or by exception, . . . and the party in default
may, according to circumstances, have a further time allowed for the performance
of the conditions."
73. 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS 961 (1951).
74. See, e.g., McCord v. The West Feliciana R.R., 3 La. Ann. 285 (1848)
Seaton v. The Second Municipality of New Orleans, 3 La. Ann. 44 (1848).
75. Of course, in situations other than those involving an anticipatory breach,
the time of the breach and the time performance is due under the contract will be
the same.
76. 222 La. 627, 63 So.2d 144 (1953).
19591 COMMENTS
after the time for performance. The court said damages were
to be calculated as of the "date of the breach. ' 77 However, there
is substantial room for argument that this language was not
intended to establish a distinction between the time of the breach
and the time performance is due, in view of the fact that the
court was there announcing the date of the breach as opposed to
the date of trial as a basis for calculating damages. At one
point in the opinion the court states the rule in terms of "time
for delivery.178 If it should be decided that the Friedman case
is authority for the proposition that in the case of an anticipa-
tory breach damages are to be calculated as of the time of the
breach, there is room for valid argument that such a rule would
be unsound. This argument would be based on the principle
that damages are generally supposed to be based on the contem-
plation of the parties ;711 ordinarily the parties would contemplate
that damages would be based on the extent of the injury at the
time performance was due.
SUMMARY
Revival of Judgments
Following the rendition of a favorable judgment, the plain-
tiff looks next to execution thereon. Often, however, there are
reasons which prevent successful execution at that time. For
example, if the judgment is one for money, immediate execution
may be deterred by reason of the defendant's insolvency. There-
fore, in those legal systems which place a limitation on the life
of a judgment there must be some means provided to extend this
period if execution is not to be barred by the mere lapse of time.
The purpose of this Comment is to compare the procedure per-
mitting extension of the life of a judgment at the common law, in
France, and in Louisiana. Major emphasis is placed on the re-
vival of judgments in Louisiana and the contributions of the pro-
posed Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure in this area.