G.R. No. 126466 January 14, 1999 ARTURO BORJAL a.k.a.

ART BORJAL and MAXIMO

SOLIVEN, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and FRANCISCO WENCESLAO,
respondents.

Facts : During the congressional hearings on the transport crisis sometime in September 1988
undertaken by the House Sub-Committee on Industrial Policy, those who attended agreed to
organize the First National Conference on Land Transportation (FNCLT) to be participated in by
the private sector in the transport industry and government agencies concerned in order to find
ways and means to solve the transportation crisis. More importantly, the objective of the FNCLT
was to draft an omnibus bill that would embody a long-term land transportation policy for
presentation to Congress. The conference which, according to private respondent, was estimated
to cost around P1,815,000.00 would be funded through solicitations from various sponsors such
as government agencies, private organizations, transport firms, and individual delegates or
participants. 2 On 28 February 1989, at the organizational meeting of the FNCLT, private
respondent Francisco Wenceslao was elected Executive Director. As such, he wrote numerous
solicitation letters to the business community for the support of the conference. Between May and
July 1989 a series of articles written by petitioner Borjal was published on different dates in his
column Jaywalker. The articles dealt with the alleged anomalous activities of an "organizer of a
conference" without naming or identifying private respondent. Neither did it refer to the FNCLT as
the conference therein mentioned. Quoted hereunder are excerpts from the articles of petitioner
together with the dates they were published Issue :

Issue : Whether or not there are sufficient grounds to constitute guilt of petitioners for libel

Held : A privileged communication may be either absolutely privileged or qualifiedly privileged.

Absolutely privileged communications are those which are not actionable even if the author has
acted in bad faith. An example is found in Sec. 11, Art.VI, of the 1987 Constitution which exempts
a member of Congress from liability for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any Committee
thereof. Upon the other hand, qualifiedly privileged communications containing defamatory
imputations are not actionable unless found to have been made without good intention justifiable
motive. To this genre belong "private communications" and "fair and true report without any
comments or remarks To reiterate, fair commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged
and constitute a valid defense in an action for libel or slander. The doctrine of fair comment
means that while in general every discreditable imputation publicly made is deemed false,
because every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially proved, and every false
imputation is deemed malicious, nevertheless, when the discreditable imputation is directed
against a public person in his public capacity, it is not necessarily actionable. In order that such
discreditable imputation to a public official may be actionable, it must either be a false allegation
of fact or a comment based on a false supposition. If the comment is an expression of opinion,
based on established facts, then it is immaterial that the opinion happens to be mistaken, as long
as it might reasonably be inferred from the facts There is no denying that the questioned articles
dealt with matters of public interest. A reading of the imputations of petitioner Borjal against
respondent Wenceslao shows that all these necessarily bore upon the latter's official conduct and
his moral and mental fitness as Executive Director of the FNCLT. The nature and functions of his
position which included solicitation of funds, dissemination of information about the FNCLT in
Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention
order to generate interest in the conference, and the management and coordination of the various
and justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the following cases:
activities of the conference demanded from him utmost honesty, integrity and competence. These
are matters about which the public has the right to be informed, taking into account the very public
1. A private communication made by any person to another in the performance of any legal, moral
character of the conference itself. Generally, malice can be presumed from defamatory words, the
or security duty; and
privileged character of a communication destroys the presumption of malice. The onus of proving
actual malice then lies on plaintiff, private respondent Wenceslao herein. He must bring home to
2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial,
the defendant, petitioner Borjal herein, the existence of malice as the true motive of his conduct.
legislative or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement,
report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in
the exercise of their functions.

In this case, there is no doubt that the first three elements are present. The statements that
Olmedo, through connivance with NHA officials, was able to obtain title to several lots in the area
and that he was involved in a number of illegal activities (attempted murder, gambling and theft of
fighting cocks) were clearly defamatory. There is no merit in his contention that landgrabbing, as
charged in the information, has a technical meaning in law.[16] Such act is so alleged and proven
in this case in the popular sense in which it is understood by ordinary people.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and the petitioner is
ACQUITTED of the crime charged.
Disini v. The Secretary of Justice
FACTS:
Petitioners assail the validity of several provision of the Republic Act (R.A.) 10175, the Cybercrime
Prevention Act of 2012.
Petitioners claim that the means adopted by the cybercrime law for regulating undesirable
cyberspace activities violate certain of their constitutional rights. The government of course asserts
that the law merely seeks to reasonably put order into cyberspace activities, punish wrongdoings,
and prevent hurtful attacks on the system.
RULING: Section 4(c)(3) of the Cybercrime Law
Section 4(c)(3) provides:
(3) Unsolicited Commercial Communications. The transmission of commercial electronic
communication with the use of computer system which seeks to advertise, sell, or offer for sale
products and services are prohibited unless:
(i) There is prior affirmative consent from the recipient; or
(ii) The primary intent of the communication is for service and/or administrative announcements
from the sender to its existing users, subscribers or customers; or
(iii) The following conditions are present:
(aa) The commercial electronic communication contains a simple, valid, and reliable
way for the recipient to reject receipt of further commercial electronic messages (opt-
out) from the same source;
(bb) The commercial electronic communication does not purposely disguise the source
of the electronic message; and
(cc) The commercial electronic communication does not purposely include misleading
information in any part of the message in order to induce the recipients to read the
message.
The above penalizes the transmission of unsolicited commercial communications, also known as
"spam." The term "spam" surfaced in early internet chat rooms and interactive fantasy games.
One who repeats the same sentence or comment was said to be making a "spam."
The Government, represented by the Solicitor General, points out that unsolicited commercial
communications or spams are a nuisance that wastes the storage and network capacities of
internet service providers, reduces the efficiency of commerce and technology, and interferes with
the owners peaceful enjoyment of his property. Transmitting spams amounts to trespass to ones
privacy since the person sending out spams enters the recipients domain without prior permission.
The OSG contends that commercial speech enjoys less protection in law.
These have never been outlawed as nuisance since people might have interest in such ads. What
matters is that the recipient has the option of not opening or reading these mail ads. That is true
with spams. Their recipients always have the option to delete or not to read them.
To prohibit the transmission of unsolicited ads would deny a person the right to read his emails,
even unsolicited commercial ads addressed to him. Commercial speech is a separate category
of speech which is not accorded the same level of protection as that given to other constitutionally
guaranteed forms of expression but is nonetheless entitled to protection.36 The State cannot rob
him of this right without violating the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression.
Unsolicited advertisements are legitimate forms of expression.
Hence, void for being unconstitutional.
PHARMACEUTICAL Vs Duque
FACTS : Named as respondents are the Health Secretary, Undersecretaries, and Assistant
Secretaries of the Department of Health (DOH). For purposes of herein petition, the DOH is
deemed impleaded as a co-respondent since respondents issued the questioned RIRR in their
capacity as officials of said executive agency.1Executive Order No. 51 (Milk Code) was issued by
President Corazon Aquino on October 28, 1986 by virtue of the legislative powers granted to the
president under the Freedom Constitution. One of the preambular clauses of the Milk Code states
that the law seeks to give effect to Article 112 of the International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk
Substitutes (ICMBS), a code adopted by the World Health Assembly (WHA) in 1981. From 1982
to 2006, the WHA adopted several Resolutions to the effect that breastfeeding should be
supported, promoted and protected, hence, it should be ensured that nutrition and health claims
are not permitted for breastmilk substitutes.In 1990, the Philippines ratified the International
Convention on the Rights of the Child. Article 24 of said instrument provides that State Parties
should take appropriate measures to diminish infant and child mortality, and ensure that all
segments of society, specially parents and children, are informed of the advantages of
breastfeeding. On May 15, 2006, the DOH issued herein assailed RIRR which was to take effect
on July 7, 2006.
Issue: . Whether Administrative Order or the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations (RIRR)
issued by the Department of Health (DOH) is not constitutional;
Held: YES
under Article 23, recommendations of the WHA do not come into force for members,in the same
way that conventions or agreements under Article 19 and regulations under Article 21 come into
force. Article 23 of the WHO Constitution reads:
Article 23. The Health Assembly shall have authority to make recommendations to Members with
respect to any matter within the competence of the Organization
for an international rule to be considered as customary law, it must be established that such rule
is being followed by states because they consider it obligatory to comply with such rules
Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law
either
By transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an international law
be transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation.
The incorporation method applies when, by mere constitutional declaration, international law is
deemed to have the force of domestic law.
Consequently, legislation is necessary to transform the provisions of the WHA Resolutions into
domestic law. The provisions of the WHA Resolutions cannot be considered as part of the law of
the land that can be implemented by executive agencies without the need of a law enacted by the
legislature
G.R. No. 155282 January 17, 2005
MOVIE AND TELEVISION REVIEW AND CLASSIFICATION BOARD (MTRCB), petitioner, vs.
ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION and LOREN LEGARDA, respondents.
On October 15, 1991, at 10:45 in the evening, respondent ABS-CBN aired Prosti-tuition, an
episode of the television (TV) program The Inside Story produced and hosted by respondent
Legarda. It depicted female students moonlighting as prostitutes to enable them to pay for their
tuition fees. In the course of the program, student prostitutes, pimps, customers, and some faculty
members were interviewed. The Philippine Womens University (PWU) was named as the school
of some of the students involved and the facade of PWU Building at Taft Avenue, Manila
conspicuously served as the background of the episode.
The showing of The Inside Story caused uproar in the PWU community. Dr. Leticia P.
de Guzman, Chancellor and Trustee of the PWU, and the PWU Parents and Teachers Association
filed letter-complaints with petitioner MTRCB. Both complainants alleged that the episode
besmirched the name of the PWU and resulted in the harassment of some of its female students.
Acting on the letter-complaints, the MTRCB Legal Counsel initiated a formal complaint with the
MTRCB Investigating Committee, alleging among others, that respondents did not submit The
Inside Story to petitioner for its review and exhibited the same without its permission, thus,
violating Section 7 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1986 and Section 3, Chapter III and Section
7, Chapter IV of the MTRCB Rules and Regulations.
On February 5, 1993, after hearing and submission of the parties memoranda, the MTRCB
Investigating Committee rendered a Decision, the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the aforementioned premises, the respondents are ordered to pay the sum of
TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00) for non-submission of the program, subject of this
case for review and approval of the MTRCB.
Heretofore, all subsequent programs of the The Inside Story and all other programs of the ABS-
CBN Channel 2 of the same category shall be submitted to the Board of Review and Approval
before showing; otherwise the Board will act accordingly.
Respondents then filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 77, Quezon City. It seeks to: declare as unconstitutional Sections 3(b), 3(c), 3(d), 4, 7,
and 11 of P. D. No. 1986 and Sections 3, 7, and 28 (a) of the MTRCB Rules and Regulations; (in
the alternative) exclude the The Inside Story from the coverage of the above cited provisions;
and annul and set aside the MTRCB Decision dated March 12, 1993 and Resolution dated April
14, 1993. Respondents averred that the above-cited provisions constitute prior restraint on
respondents exercise of freedom of expression and of the press, and, therefore, unconstitutional.
Furthermore, the above cited provisions do not apply to the The Inside Story because it falls
under the category of public affairs program, news documentary, or socio-political editorials
governed by standards similar to those governing newspapers. The RTC rendered a decision in
favour of the respondent.
Petitioner MTRCB through the Solicitor General, contends inter alia: first, all television programs,
including public affairs programs, news documentaries, or socio-political editorials, are subject
to petitioners power of review under Section 3 (b) of P.D. No. 1986 and pursuant to this Courts
ruling in Iglesia ni Cristo vs. Court of Appeals; second, television programs are more accessible
to the public than newspapers, thus, the liberal regulation of the latter cannot apply to the former;
third, petitioners power to review television programs under Section 3(b) of P. D. No. 1986 does
not amount to prior restraint; and fourth, Section 3(b) of P. D. No. 1986 does not violate
respondents constitutional freedom of expression and of the press.
Issue:
Whether the MTRCB has the power or authority to review the The Inside Story prior to
its exhibition or broadcast by television?
Ruling:
Settled is the rule in statutory construction that where the law does not make any
exception, courts may not except something therefrom, unless there is compelling reason
apparent in the law to justify it. Ubi lex non distinguit nec distinguere debemos. Thus, when the
law says all television programs, the word all covers all television programs, whether religious,
public affairs, news documentary, etc. The principle assumes that the legislative body made no
qualification in the use of general word or expression.
It bears stressing that the sole issue here is whether petitioner MTRCB has authority to
review The Inside Story. Clearly, we are not called upon to determine whether petitioner violated
Section 4, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the Constitution providing that no law shall be passed
abridging the freedom of speech, of oppression or the press. Petitioner did not disapprove or ban
the showing of the program. Neither did it cancel respondents permit. Respondents were merely
penalized for their failure to submit to petitioner The Inside Story for its review and approval.
Therefore, we need not resolve whether certain provisions of P. D. No. 1986 and the MTRCB
Rules and Regulations specified by respondents contravene the Constitution.
Consequently, we cannot sustain the RTCs ruling that Sections 3 (c) (d), 4, 7 and 11 of P. D. No.
1986 and Sections 3, 7 and 28 (a) of the MTRCB Rules and Regulations are unconstitutional. It
is settled that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act
may be heard and decided by the court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for
judicial inquiry, namely: (1) that the question must be raised by the proper party; (2) that there
must be an actual case or controversy; (3) that the question must be raised at the earliest possible
opportunity; and, (4) that the decision on the constitutional or legal question must be necessary to
the determination of the case itself.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed RTC Decision dated November
18, 1997 and Order dated August 26, 2002 are hereby REVERSED. The Decision dated March
12, 1993 of petitioner MTRCB is AFFIRMED. Costs against respondents.
ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. Commission on Elections
Facts:
This is a Petition for Certiorari assailing Commission on Elections (Comelec) en banc Resolution
No. 98-1419 1 dated April 21, 1998. In the said Resolution, the poll body "RESOLVED to approve
the issuance of a restraining order to stop ABS-CBN or any other groups, its agents or
representatives from conducting such exit survey and to authorize the Honorable Chairman to
issue the same." The Resolution was issued by the Comelec allegedly upon "information from [a]
reliable source that ABS-CBN (Lopez Group) has prepared a project, with PR groups, to conduct
radio-TV coverage of the elections and to make [an] exit survey of the vote during the elections
for national officials particularly for President and Vice President, results of which shall be
[broadcast] immediately." The electoral body believed that such project might conflict with the
official Comelec count, as well as the unofficial quick count of the National Movement for Free
Elections (Namfrel). It also noted that it had not authorized or deputized ABS-CBN to undertake
the exit survey.
Held:
The Supreme Court grants the petition; the Comelec resolution is nullified.
Freedom of expression a fundamental principle of a democratic government. The freedom of
expression is a fundamental principle of our democratic government. It is a 'preferred' right and,
therefore, stands on a higher level than substantive economic or other liberties. Our Constitution
clearly mandates that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the press. At
the very least, free speech and a free press consist of the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully
any matter of public interest without prior restraint. The freedom of expression is a means of
assuring individual self-fulfillment, of attaining the truth, of securing participation by the people in
social and political decision-making, and of maintaining the balance between stability and change.
It represents a profound commitment to the principle that debates on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide open. 18 It means more than the right to approve existing political
beliefs or economic arrangements, to lend support to official measures, or to take refuge in the
existing climate of opinion on any matter of public consequence. And paraphrasing the eminent
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, we stress that the freedom encompasses the thought we hate, no
less than the thought we agree with.
Freedom of expression; limited by valid exercise of police power. The realities of life in a complex
society, however, preclude an absolute exercise of the freedoms of speech and of the press. Such
freedoms could not remain unfettered and unrestrained at all times and under all circumstances.
They are not immune to regulation by the State in the exercise of its police power.
Theoretical tests in determining the validity of restrictions to freedom of expression. There are two
theoretical tests in determining the validity of restrictions to freedom of expression. These are the
'clear and present danger' rule and the 'dangerous tendency' rule. The first, as interpreted in a
number of cases, means that the evil consequence of the comment or utterance must be
'extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high' before the utterance can be
punished. The danger to be guarded against is the 'substantive evil' sought to be prevented. The
'dangerous tendency' rule, on the other hand, may be epitomized as follows: If the words uttered
create a dangerous tendency which the state has a right to prevent, then such words are
punishable. It is not necessary that some definite or immediate acts of force, violence, or
unlawfulness be advocated. It is sufficient that such acts be advocated in general terms. Nor is it
necessary that the language used be reasonably calculated to incite persons to acts of force,
violence, or unlawfulness. It is sufficient if the natural tendency and probable effect of the utterance
be to bring about the substantive evil which the legislative body seeks to prevent.
Supreme Court adheres to the "clear and present danger" test. Unquestionably, this Court adheres
to the "clear and present danger" test. In setting the standard or test for the "clear and present
danger" doctrine, the Court echoed the words of Justice Holmes: "The question in every case is
whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a
clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right
to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree."
In borderline conflict between freedom of expression and state action to ensure clean and free
elections, the Court leans in favor of freedom. Even though the government's purposes are
legitimate and substantial, they cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental
personal liberties, when the end can be more narrowly achieved. The freedoms of speech and of
the press should all the more be upheld when what is sought to be curtailed is the dissemination
of information meant to add meaning to the equally vital right of suffrage. When faced with
borderline situations in which the freedom of a candidate or a party to speak or the freedom of the
electorate to know is invoked against actions allegedly made to assure clean and free elections,
this Court shall lean in favor of freedom. For in the ultimate analysis, the freedom of the citizen
and the State's power to regulate should not be antagonistic. There can be no free and honest
elections if, in the efforts to maintain them, the freedom to speak and the right to know are unduly
curtailed.
Exit polls do not constitute clear and present danger of destroying the credibility and integrity of
the electoral process. The Comelec justifies its assailed Resolution as having been issued
pursuant to its constitutional mandate to ensure a free, orderly, honest, credible and peaceful
election. It contends that "an exit poll has the tendency to sow confusion considering the
randomness of selecting interviewees, which further make[s] the exit poll highly unreliable. The
probability that the results of such exit poll may not be in harmony with the official count made by
the Comelec is ever present. In other words, the exit poll has a clear and present danger of
destroying the credibility and integrity of the electoral process." Such arguments are purely
speculative and clearly untenable. First, by the very nature of a survey, the interviewees or
participants are selected at random, so that the results will as much as possible be representative
or reflective of the general sentiment or view of the community or group polled. Second, the survey
result is not meant to replace or be at par with the official Comelec count. It consists merely of the
opinion of the polling group as to who the electorate in general has probably voted for, based on
the limited data gathered from polled individuals. Finally, not at stake here are the credibility and
the integrity of the elections, which are exercises that are separate and independent from the exit
polls. If at all, the outcome of one can only be indicative of the other.
Re: Live TV and Radio Coverage of the Hearing of President Corazon C. Aquinos Libel
Case.
In connection with the libel case filed by then President Aquino against certain journalists, the trial
judge had initially allowed a live coverage of the case. One of the accused protested and the
Supreme Court issued a resolution banning the same.
The Court recognized that granting or denying permission to the media to broadcast, record, or
photograph court proceedings involves weighing the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the
press, the right of the public to information and the right to public trial, and on the other hand, the
due process rights of the defendant and the inherent and constitutional power of the courts to
control their proceedings in order to permit the fair and impartial administration of justice.
Collaterally, it also raises issues in the nature of media, particularly television and its role in society,
and of the impact of new technologies on law. It found that there was no discussion by the
Constitutional Commission on the same and Philippine courts have not squarely ruled on the
question.
It adverted to the current rule of the Federal Courts of the U.S. banning televisions cameras in
criminal trials. And it cited the case of Estes vs. Texas where the United States Supreme Court
held that television coverage of judicial proceedings involves an inherent denial of the due
process rights of a criminal defendant.
"Experience likewise has established the prejudicial effect of telecasting on witnesses. Witnesses
might be frightened, play to the camera, or become nervous. They are subject to extraordinary
out-of-court influences which might affect their testimony. Also, telecasting not only increases the
trial judges responsibility to avoid actual prejudice to the defendant, it may as well affect his own
performance. Judges are human beings also and are subject to the same psychological reactions
as laymen. For the defendant, telecasting is a form of mental harassment and subjects him to
excessive public exposure and distracts him from the effective presentation f his defense.
"The television camera is a powerful weapon which intentionally or inadvertently can destroy an
accused and his case in the eyes of the public."
In its resolution the Supreme Court held that - Considering the prejudice it poses to the
defendants right to due process as well as to the fair and orderly administration of justice and
considering further that the freedom of the press and the right of the people to information may be
served and satisfied by less distracting, degrading and prejudicial means, live radio and television
coverage of court proceedings shall not be allowed. Video footages of court hearings for news
purposes shall be restricted and limited to shots of the courtroom, the judicial officers, the parties
and their counsel taken prior to the commencement of official proceedings. No video shots or
photographs shall be permitted during the trial proper.
In 2001 in another case involving another President, the Supreme Court re-examined this
resolution and affirmed the ban. [A.M. No. 01-4-03-SC. June 29, 2001.] RE: REQUEST RADIO-
TV COVERAGE OF THE TRIAL IN THE SANDIGANBAYAN OF THE PLUNDER CASES
AGAINST THE FORMER PRESIDENT JOSEPH E. ESTRADA.
The Court declared that the issue involved the weighing out of the constitutional guarantees of
freedom of the press and the right to public information, on the one hand, and the fundamental
rights of the accused, on the other hand, along with the constitutional power of a court to control
its proceedings in ensuring a fair and impartial trial. When these rights race against one another,
jurisprudence tells us that the right of the accused must be preferred to win.
The Court seemed afraid of the power of medium as generating both histrionics and in terms of
possible public opinion tainting the judicial process.

With the possibility of losing not only the precious liberty but also the very life of an accused, it
behooves all to make absolutely certain that an accused receives a verdict solely on the basis of
a just and dispassionate judgment, a verdict that would come only after the presentation of credible
evidence testified to by unbiased witnesses unswayed by any kind of pressure, whether open or
subtle, in proceedings that are devoid of histrionics that might detract from its basic aim to ferret
veritable facts free from improper influence, and decreed by a judge with an unprejudiced mind,
unbridled by running emotions or passions.
Witnesses and judges may very well be men and women of fortitude, able to thrive in hardy
climate, with every reason to presume firmness of mind and resolute endurance, but it must also
be conceded that "television can work profound changes in the behavior of the people it focuses
on." Even while it may be difficult to quantify the influence, or pressure that media can bring to
bear on them directly and through the shaping of public opinion, it is a fact, nonetheless, that,
indeed, it does so in so many ways and in varying degrees. The conscious or unconscious effect
that such a coverage may have on the testimony of witnesses and the decision of judges cannot
be evaluated but, it can likewise be said, it is not at all unlikely for a vote of guilt or innocence to
yield to it. It might be farcical to build around them an impregnable armor against the influence of
the most powerful media of public opinion.
The right of the accused to a public trial is not the same as publicized trial.
An accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right that belongs to him, more than anyone else,
where his life or liberty can be held critically in balance. A public trial aims to ensure that he is
fairly dealt with and would not be unjustly condemned and that his rights are not compromised in
secrete conclaves of long ago. A public trial is not synonymous with publicized trial; it only implies
that the court doors must be open to those who wish to come, sit in the available seats, conduct
themselves with decorum and observe the trial process. In the constitutional sense, a courtroom
should have enough facilities for a reasonable number of the public to observe the proceedings,
not too small as to render the openness negligible and not too large as to distract the trial
participants from their proper functions, who shall then be totally free to report what they have
observed during the proceedings.
There is some irony that the accused who may have subjected his victims to such indignities gets
to preserve his own dignity as he is called to account for his crimes.
RE: REQUEST RADIO-TV COVERAGE OF THE TRIAL IN THE SANDIGANBAYAN OF THE
PLUNDER CASES AGAINST THE FORMER PRESIDENT JOSEPH E. ESTRADA
A.M. No. 01-4-03-SC.
June 29, 2001
Facts: On 13 March 2001, the Kapisanan ng mgaBrodkaster ng Pilipinas (KBP) sent a
letterrequesting this Court to allow live media coverage of the anticipated trial of the plunder and
other criminal cases filed against former President Joseph E. Estrada before the Sandiganbayan.
The petitioners invoked other than the freedom of the press, the constitutional right of the people
to be informed of matters of public concern which could only be recognized, served and satisfied
by allowing live radio and television coverage of the court proceedings. Moreover, the live radio
and television coverage of the proceedings will also serve the dual purpose of ensuring the desired
transparency in the administration of justice.
However, in the Resolution of the Court on October 1991, in a case for libel filed by then President
Corazon C. Aquino read that the Court resolved to prohibit live radio and television coverage of
court proceedings in view of protecting the parties right to due process, to prevent distraction of
the participants in the proceedings and to avoid miscarriage of justice.
Issue : Whether the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press and right to information of
public concern be given more weight than the fundamental rights of the accused.
Ruling : The petition is denied.
The courts recognize the constitutionally embodied freedom of the press and the right
to public information. It also approves of media's exalted power to provide the most accurate and
comprehensive means of conveying the proceedings to the public and in acquainting the public
with the judicial process in action; nevertheless, within the courthouse, the overriding
consideration is still the paramount right of the accused to due process which must never be
allowed to suffer diminution in its constitutional proportions.
Due process guarantees the accused a presumption of innocence until the contrary is proved in a
trial that is not lifted above its individual settings nor made an object of public's attention and where
the conclusions reached are induced not by any outside force or influencebut only by evidence
and argument given in open court, where fitting dignity and calm ambiance is
demanded."Television can work profound changes in the behavior of the people it focuses on."The
conscious or unconscious effect that such coverage may have on the testimony of witnesses and
the decision of judges cannot be evaluated but, it can likewise be said, it is not at all unlikely for a
vote of guilt or innocence to yield to it.
Although an accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right that belongs to him, more than
anyone else, where his life or liberty can be held critically in balance. A public trial aims to ensure
that he is fairly dealt with and would not be unjustly condemned and that his rights are not
compromised. A public trial is not synonymous with publicized trial; it only implies that the court
doors must be open to those who wish to come, sit in the available seats, conduct themselves
with decorum and observe the trial process. In the constitutional sense, a courtroom should have
enough facilities for a reasonable number of the public to observe the proceedings, not too small
as to render the openness negligible and not too large as to distract the trial participants from their
proper functions, who shall then be totally free to report what they have observed during the
proceedings.
GMA NETWORK, INC., Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
G.R. No. 205357 September 2, 2014
PONENTE: Peralta
TOPIC: Freedom of expression, of speech and of the press, airtime limits
FACTS:
The five (5) petitions before the Court put in issue the alleged unconstitutionality of Section
9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 limiting the broadcast and radio advertisements of
candidates and political parties for national election positions to an aggregate total of one hundred
twenty (120) minutes and one hundred eighty (180) minutes, respectively. They contend that such
restrictive regulation on allowable broadcast time violates freedom of the press, impairs the
peoples right to suffrage as well as their right to information relative to the exercise of their right
to choose who to elect during the forth coming elections
Section 9 (a) provides for an aggregate total airtime instead of the previous per
station airtime for political campaigns or advertisements, and also required prior COMELEC
approval for candidates television and radio guestings and appearances.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 on airtime limits violates
freedom of expression, of speech and of the press.
HELD:
YES. The Court held that the assailed rule on aggregate-based airtime limits is
unreasonable and arbitrary as it unduly restricts and constrains the ability of candidates and
political parties to reach out and communicate with the people. Here, the adverted reason for
imposing the aggregate-based airtime limits leveling the playing field does not constitute a
compelling state interest which would justify such a substantial restriction on the freedom of
candidates and political parties to communicate their ideas, philosophies, platforms and programs
of government. And, this is specially so in the absence of a clear-cut basis for the imposition of
such a prohibitive measure.
It is also particularly unreasonable and whimsical to adopt the aggregate-based time
limits on broadcast time when we consider that the Philippines is not only composed of so many
islands. There are also a lot of languages and dialects spoken among the citizens across the
country. Accordingly, for a national candidate to really reach out to as many of the electorates as
possible, then it might also be necessary that he conveys his message through his advertisements
in languages and dialects that the people may more readily understand and relate to. To add all
of these airtimes in different dialects would greatly hamper the ability of such candidate to express
himself a form of suppression of his political speech.

Bayan, et al., Vs. Eduardo Ermita, et al.,

G.R. No. 169838
April 25, 200

Facts: The petitioners, Bayan, et al., alleged that they are citizens and taxpayers of the Philippines
and that their right as organizations and individuals were violated when the rally they participated
in on October 6, 2005 was violently dispersed by policemen implementing Batas Pambansa No.
880.

Petitioners contended that Batas Pambansa No. 880 is clearly a violation of the Constitution and
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other human rights treaties of which
the Philippines is a signatory. They argue that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit before one can stage
a public assembly regardless of the presence or absence of a clear and present danger. It also
curtails the choice of venue and is thus repugnant to the freedom of expression clause as the time
and place of a public assembly form part of the message which the expression is sought.
Furthermore, it is not content-neutral as it does not apply to mass actions in support of the
government. The words lawful cause, opinion, protesting or influencing suggest the exposition
of some cause not espoused by the government. Also, the phrase maximum tolerance shows
that the law applies to assemblies against the government because they are being tolerated. As
a content-based legislation, it cannot pass the strict scrutiny test. This petition and two other
petitions were ordered to be consolidated on February 14, 2006. During the course of oral
arguments, the petitioners, in the interest of a speedy resolution of the petitions, withdrew the
portions of their petitions raising factual issues, particularly those raising the issue of whether B.P.
No. 880 and/or CPR is void as applied to the rallies of September 20, October 4, 5 and 6, 2005.
Issue: Whether the Calibrated Pre-emptive response and the Batas Pambansa No. 880,
specifically Sections 4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a) and 14(a) violates Art. III Sec. 4 of the Philippine Constitution
as it causes a disturbing effect on the exercise by the people of the right to peaceably assemble.
Held: Section 4 of Article III of the Philippine Constitution provides that no law shall be passed
abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances. The right to
peaceably assemble and petition for redress of grievances, together with freedom of speech, of
expression, and of the press, is a right that enjoys dominance in the sphere of constitutional
protection. For this rights represent the very basis of a functional democratic polity, without which
all the other rights would be meaningless and unprotected.
However, it must be remembered that the right, while sacrosanct, is not absolute. It may be
regulated that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor
injurious to the rights of the community or society. The power to regulate the exercise of such and
other constitutional rights is termed the sovereign police power, which is the power to prescribe
regulations, to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general
welfare of the people.
B.P. No 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the
time, place and manner of the assemblies. B.P. No. 880 thus readily shows that it refers to all
kinds of public assemblies that would use public places. The reference to lawful cause does not
make it content-based because assemblies really have to be for lawful causes, otherwise they
would not be peaceable and entitled to protection. Neither the words opinion, protesting, and certiorari case. Under the Rules of Court, a prejudicial question is a ground to suspend the criminal
influencing in of grievances come from the wording of the Constitution, so its use cannot be
avoided. Finally, maximum tolerance is for the protection and benefit of all rallyist and is
independent of the content of the expression in the rally.
Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground of clear and present danger to public
order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or public health. This is a recognized
exception to the exercise of the rights even under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
Wherefore, the petitions are GRANTED in part, and respondents, more particularly the Secretary
of the Interior and Local Governments, are DIRECTED to take all necessary steps for the
immediate compliance with Section 15 of Batas Pambansa No. 880 through the establishment or
designation of at least one suitable freedom park or plaza in every city and municipality of the
country. After thirty (30) days from the finality of this Decision, subject to the giving of advance
notices, no prior permit shall be required to exercise the right to peaceably assemble and petition
in the public parks or plaza in every city or municipality that has not yet complied with section 15
of the law. Furthermore, Calibrated pre-emptive response (CPR), insofar as it would purport to
differ from or be in lieu of maximum tolerance, is NULL and VOID and respondents are ENJOINED
to REFRAIN from using it and to STRICTLY OBSERVE the requirements of maximum tolerance,
The petitions are DISMISSED in all other respects, and the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa
No. 880 is SUSTAINED.
Integrated Bar of the Philippines vs Mayor Jose Atienza
In June 2006, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) filed an application for a rally permit with
the office of Manila Mayor Jose Lito Atienza. The IBP sought their rally to be staged at the
Mendiola Bridge. Atienza granted the permit but indicated thereon that IBP is only allowed to stage
their rally at the Plaza Miranda, a freedom park.
IBP President Jose Anselmo Cadiz received the rally permit on the day before the scheduled rally.
Cadiz immediately went to the Court of Appeals to assail the permit because what Atienza did
was only a partial grant which was alleged to be a violation of the constitutional right to freedom
of expression and a grave abuse of discretion on the part of Atienza.
Meanwhile, IBP pushed through with the rally not at Plaza Miranda but at the Mendiola Bridge.
Subsequently, the Manila Police District (MPD) filed a criminal case against Cadiz for allegedly
violating the Public Assembly Act or specifically, for staging a rally in a place different from what
was indicated in the rally permit.
The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Atienza. The CA ruled that what Atienza did was within his
power; that freedom of expression is not absolute.
Cadiz appealed before the Supreme Court. Cadiz also prayed for the suspension of the criminal
case against him on the ground that the certiorari case he filed against Atienza is a prejudicial
question to the criminal case.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the certiorari case Cadiz filed against Atienza is a prejudicial question to the
criminal case filed against him (Cadiz).
2. Whether or not it is within Mayor Jose Atienzas power to modify the rally permit without
consulting with the IBP.
HELD:
1. No. It is improper for Cadiz to raise the issue of prejudicial question at this stage and in this
proceeding. However, Cadiz must first file a petition to suspend the criminal proceeding in the said
criminal case. The determination of the pendency of a prejudicial question should be made at the
first instance in the criminal action, and not before the Supreme Court in an appeal from the civil
action.
2. No. In modifying a rally permit or in granting a rally permit which contains a time and place
different from that applied for, the mayor must first consult with the applicant at the earliest
opportunity. This is in order to give the applicant some time to determine if such change is
favorable to him or adverse (and if adverse, he can seek judicial remedies) Section 6 of the
Public Assembly Act.
It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and present danger
test be the standard for the decision reached. If he is of the view that there is such an imminent
and grave danger of a substantive evil, the applicant must be heard on the matter. In this case,
Atienza did not consult with the IBP. Atienza capriciously and whimsically changed the venue
without any reason therefor. Such is a grave abuse of discretion and a violation of the freedom of
expression.
In Re: Petition to Annul En Banc Resolution A.M. 98-7-02-SC Ricardo C. Valmonte and
Union of Lawyers and Advocates for Transparency in Government [ULAT], G.R. No. 134621,
Sept. 29, 1998
FACTS:
On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was activated
pursuant to Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the
mission of conducting security operations within its area of responsibility and peripheral areas, for
the purpose of establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining peace and order, and
providing an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political development of the
National Capital Region. 1 As part of its duty to maintain peace and order, the NCRDC installed
checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
Petitioners aver that, because of the installation of said checkpoints, the residents of Valenzuela Freedom of Religion
are worried of being harassed and of their safety being placed at the arbitrary, capricious and
whimsical disposition of the military manning the checkpoints, considering that their cars and
Imbong vs. Ochoa, Jr.
vehicles are being subjected to regular searches and check-ups, especially at night or at dawn,
without the benefit of a search warrant and/or court order. Their alleged fear for their safety
FACTS:
increased when, at dawn of 9 July 1988, Benjamin Parpon, a supply officer of the Municipality of
Valenzuela, Bulacan, was gunned down allegedly in cold blood by the members of the NCRDC
Nothing has polarized the nation more in recent years than the issues of population growth control,
manning the checkpoint along McArthur Highway at Malinta, Valenzuela, for ignoring and/or
abortion and contraception. As in every democratic society, diametrically opposed views on the
refusing to submit himself to the checkpoint and for continuing to speed off inspire of warning
subjects and their perceived consequences freely circulate in various media. From television
shots fired in the air. Petitioner Valmonte also claims that, on several occasions, he had gone thru
debates to sticker campaigns, from rallies by socio-political activists to mass gatherings organized
these checkpoints where he was stopped and his car subjected to search/check-up without a court
by members of the clergy -the clash between the seemingly antithetical ideologies of the religious
order or search warrant.
conservatives and progressive liberals has caused a deep division in every level of the society.
Despite calls to withhold support thereto, however, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise
Petitioners further contend that the said checkpoints give the respondents a blanket authority to
known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was
make searches and/or seizures without search warrant or court order in violation of the
enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.
Constitution; 2 and, instances have occurred where a citizen, while not killed, had been harassed.
Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on the said law, challengers from various sectors
Petitioners' concern for their safety and apprehension at being harassed by the military manning
of society came knocking on the doors of the Court, beckoning it to wield the sword that strikes
the checkpoints are not sufficient grounds to declare the checkpoints as per se illegal. No proof
down constitutional disobedience. Aware of the profound and lasting impact that its decision may
has been presented before the Court to show that, in the course of their routine checks, the military
produce, the Court now faces the iuris controversy, as presented in fourteen petitions and 2
indeed committed specific violations of petitioners' right against unlawful search and seizure or
petitions-in-intervention.
other rights.
A perusal of the foregoing petitions shows that the petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of
In a case filed by the same petitioner organization, Union of Lawyers and Advocates for People's
RH Law on the following grounds: The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn, the right to
Right (ULAP) vs. Integrated National Police, 3 it was held that individual petitioners who do not
health and the right to protection against hazardous products, and to religious freedom, equal
allege that any of their rights were violated are not qualified to bring the action, as real parties in
protection clause, involuntary servitude, among others.
interest.
It is also contended that the RH Law threatens conscientious objectors of criminal prosecution,
The constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right invocable
imprisonment and other forms of punishment, as it compels medical practitioners 1] to refer
only by those whose rights have been infringed, 4 or threatened to be infringed. What constitutes
patients who seek advice on reproductive health programs to other doctors; and 2] to provide full
a reasonable or unreasonable search and seizure in any particular case is purely a judicial
and correct information on reproductive health programs and service, although it is against their
question, determinable from a consideration of the circumstances involved. 5
religious beliefs and convictions.
Petitioner Valmonte's general allegation to the effect that he had been stopped and searched
It is also argued that the RH Law providing for the formulation of mandatory sex education in
without a search warrant by the military manning the checkpoints, without more, i.e., without
schools should not be allowed as it is an affront to their religious beliefs.
stating the details of the incidents which amount to a violation of his right against unlawful search
and seizure, is not sufficient to enable the Court to determine whether there was a violation of
While the petitioners recognize that the guarantee of religious freedom is not absolute, they argue
Valmonte's right against unlawful search and seizure. Not all searches and seizures are
that the RH Law fails to satisfy the "clear and present danger test" and the "compelling state
prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be
interest test" to justify the regulation of the right to free exercise of religion and the right to free
determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each case.
speech.
RULING:
In this connection, it is claimed that "Section 7 of the RH Law violates the right to due process by
B.P. Blg. 880 did not establish streets and sidewalks, among other places, as public fora. A close
removing from them (the people) the right to manage their own affairs and to decide what kind of
look at the law will reveal that it in fact prescribes reasonable time, place, and manner regulations.
health facility they shall be and what kind of services they shall offer." It ignores the management
Thus, it requires a written permit for the holding of public assemblies in public places subject,
perogative inherent in corporations for employers to conduct their affairs in accordance with their
even, to the right of the mayor to modify the place and time of the public assembly, to impose a
own discretion and judgment.
rerouting of the parade or street march, to limit the volume of loud speakers or sound system and
to prescribe other appropriate restrictions on the conduct of the public assembly.
The respondents, aside from traversing the substantive arguments of the petitioners, pray for the
dismissal of the petitions for the principal reasons that 1] there is no actual case or controversy
To insulate the judiciary from mob pressure, friendly or otherwise, and isolate it from public
and, therefore, the issues are not yet ripe for judicial determination.; 2] some petitioners lack
hysteria, this Court merely moved away the situs of mass actions within a 200-meter radius from
standing to question the RH Law; and 3] the petitions are essentially petitions for declaratory relief
every courthouse. In fine, B.P. Blg. 880 imposes general restrictions to the time, place and manner
over which the Court has no original jurisdiction.
of conducting concerted actions. On the other hand, the resolution of this Court regulating
demonstrations adds specific restrictions as they involve judicial independence and the orderly
Meanwhile, on March 15, 2013, the RH-IRR for the enforcement of the assailed legislation took
administration of justice. There is thus no discrepancy between the two sets of regulatory
effect.
measures. Simply put, B.P. Blg. 880 and the assailed resolution complement each other.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

On March 19, 2013, after considering the issues and arguments raised, the Court issued the
Status Quo Ante Order (SQAO), enjoining the effects and implementation of the assailed
legislation for a period of one hundred and twenty (120) days, or until July 17, 2013.
The petitioners are one in praying that the entire RH Law be declared unconstitutional. Petitioner
ALFI, in particular, argues that the government sponsored contraception program, the very
essence of the RH Law, violates the right to health of women and the sanctity of life, which the
State is mandated to protect and promote.
ISSUES: 1) Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy; 2)
Whether the RH law is unconstitutional.
REMEDIAL LAW: facial challenge
The OSG also assails the propriety of the facial challenge lodged by the subject petitions,
contending that the RH Law cannot be challenged "on its face" as it is not a speech regulating
measure.
The Court is not persuaded.
In United States (US) constitutional law, a facial challenge, also known as a First Amendment
Challenge, is one that is launched to assail the validity of statutes concerning not only protected
speech, but also all other rights in the First Amendment. These include religious freedom, freedom
of the press, and the right of the people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government
for a redress of grievances. After all, the fundamental right to religious freedom, freedom of the
press and peaceful assembly are but component rights of the right to one's freedom of expression,
as they are modes which one's thoughts are externalized.
In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the U.S. has been generally
maintained, albeit with some modifications. While this Court has withheld the application of facial
challenges to strictly penal statutes, it has expanded its scope to cover statutes not only regulating
free speech, but also those involving religious freedom, and other fundamental rights. The
underlying reason for this modification is simple. For unlike its counterpart in the U.S., this Court,
under its expanded jurisdiction, is mandated by the Fundamental Law not only to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. Verily, the framers
of Our Constitution envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever vigilant with its duty to maintain the
supremacy of the Constitution.
Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged that the
constitutional human rights to life, speech and religion and other fundamental rights mentioned
above have been violated by the assailed legislation, the Court has authority to take cognizance
of these kindred petitions and to determine if the RH Law can indeed pass constitutional scrutiny.
To dismiss these petitions on the simple expedient that there exist no actual case or controversy,
would diminish this Court as a reactive branch of government, acting only when the Fundamental
Law has been transgressed, to the detriment of the Filipino people.
Lemon vs. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 29 L Ed 2d 745, 91 S
Ct 2105 (1971)
Facts of the case
Both Pennsylvania and Rhode Island adopted statutes that provided for the state to pay for
aspects of non-secular, non-public education. The Pennsylvania statute was passed in 1968 and
provided funding for non-public elementary and secondary school teachers salaries, textbooks,
and instructional materials for secular subjects. Rhode Islands statute was passed in 1969 and
provided state financial support for non-public elementary schools in the form of supplementing
15% of teachers annual salaries.
The appellants in the Pennsylvania case represented citizens and taxpayers in Pennsylvania who
believed that the statute violated the separation of church and state described in the First
Amendment. Appellant Lemon also had a child in Pennsylvania public school. The district court
granted the state officials motion to dismiss the case. In the Rhode Island case, the appellees
were citizens and tax payers of Rhode Island who sued to have the statute in question declared
unconstitutional by arguing that it violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The
district court found in favor of the appellees and held that the statute violated the First Amendment.
Question
Do statutes that provide state funding for non-public, non-secular schools violate the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment?
Conclusion
Yes. Chief Justice Warren E. Burger delivered the opinion for the 8-0 majority. The Court held that
a statute must pass a three-pronged test in order to avoid violating the Establishment Clause. The
statute must have a secular legislative purpose, its principal or primary effect must be one that
neither promotes nor inhibits religion, and it must not foster excessive government entanglement
with religion. The Court held that both the state statutes in question had secular legislative
purposes because they reflected the desire of the states to ensure minimum secular education
requirements were being met in the non-public schools. The Court did not reach a holding
regarding the second prong of the test, but it did find that the statutes constituted an excessive
government entanglement with religion. In the Rhode Island program, the amount of oversight of
teachers and curricula required to ensure that there is no unnecessary injection of religion into
secular topics would require the government to become excessively involved in the nuances of
religious education. The same danger holds true for the Pennsylvania statute, which additionally
provides state funding directly to a church-related organization. Government financial involvement
in such institutions inevitably leads to an intimate and continuing relationship between church
and state. The Court also noted the potential political implications of public funding, as there is a
risk of religious issues becoming politically divisive.
In his concurring opinion, Justice William O. Douglas wrote that the intrusion of the government
into the running of non-public schools through grants and other funding creates the entanglement
that the Establishment Clause prohibits. He also argued that non-secular schools are so
thoroughly governed by religious ideologies that any amount of public funding supports those
doctrines, which the Framers of the Constitution dictated the government must not do. Justice
Hugo L. Black joined in the concurrence, and Justice Thurgood Marshall joined in the parts relating
to case numbers 569 and 570. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr. wrote a separate concurrence in
which he argued that the danger was not only that religion would infiltrate the government, but
also that the government would push secularization onto religious creeds. An analysis of the
statutes in question shows that they impermissible involve the government in essentially religious
activities, which the Establishment Clause is meant to prevent. In his opinion concurring in part
and dissenting in part, Justice Byron R. White wrote that the majority opinion goes too far and, in
restricting the use of state funds in non-secular schools, creates an obstacle to the use of public
funds for secular education. He argued that there was no proof that religion would invade secular
education or that the government oversight of the use of public funds would be so extensive as to
constitute entanglement.
Justice Thurgood Marshall did not participate in the discussion or decision of case number 89.
Taruc Vs De La Cruz
G.R. No. 144801. March 10, 2005 DOMINADOR L. TARUC, WILBERTO DACERA, NICANOR
GALANIDA, RENERIO CANTA, JERRY CANTA, CORDENCIO CONSIGNA, SUSANO ALCALA,
LEONARDO DIZON, SALVADOR GELSANO and BENITO LAUGO, Petitioners, vs. BISHOP
PORFIRIO B. DE LA CRUZ, REV. FR. RUSTOM FLORANO and DELFIN BORDAS,
Respondents.
FACTS: The antecedents show that petitioners were lay members of the Philippine Independent
Church (PIC) in Socorro, Surigao del Norte. Respondents Porfirio de la Cruz and Rustom Florano
were the bishop and parish priest, respectively, of the same church in that locality. Petitioners, led
by Dominador Taruc, clamored for the transfer of Fr. Florano to another parish but Bishop de la
Cruz denied their request. It appears from the records that the family of Fr. Floranos wife belonged
to a political party opposed to petitioner Tarucs, thus the animosity between the two factions with
Fr. Florano being identified with his wifes political camp. Bishop de la Cruz, however, found this
too flimsy a reason for transferring Fr. Florano to another parish Taruc tried to organize an open
mass to be celebrated by a certain Fr. Renato Z. Ambong during the town fiesta of Socorro. When
Taruc informed Bishop de la Cruz of his plan, the Bishop tried to dissuade him from pushing
through with it because Fr. Ambong was not a member of the clergy of the diocese of Surigao and
his credentials as a parish priest were in doubt On June 28, 1993, Bishop de la Cruz declared
petitioners expelled/excommunicated from the Philippine Independent Church Because of the
order of expulsion/excommunication, petitioners filed a complaint for damages with preliminary
injunction against Bishop de la Cruz before the Regional Trial Court of Surigao City, Branch 32.
They impleaded Fr. Florano and one Delfin T. Bordas on the theory that they conspired with the
Bishop to have petitioners expelled and excommunicated from the PIC. They contended that their
expulsion was illegal because it was done without trial thus violating their right to due process of
law
ISSUE: WON the court has jurisdiction
HELD: The SC hold the Church and the State to be separate and distinct from each other. "Give
to Ceasar what is Ceasars and to God what is Gods." upon the examination of the decisions it
will be readily apparent that cases involving questions relative to ecclesiastical rights have always
received the profoundest attention from the courts, not only because of their inherent interest, but
because of the far reaching effects of the decisions in human society. [However,] courts have
learned the lesson of conservatism in dealing with such matters, it having been found that, in a
form of government where the complete separation of civil and ecclesiastical authority is insisted
upon, the civil courts must not allow themselves to intrude unduly in matters of an ecclesiastical
nature The SC agree with the Court of Appeals that the expulsion/excommunication of members
of a religious institution/organization is a matter best left to the discretion of the officials, and the
laws and canons, of said institution/organization The amendments of the constitution, restatement
of articles of religion and abandonment of faith or abjuration alleged by appellant, having to do
with faith, practice, doctrine, form of worship, ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of a church and
having reference to the power of excluding from the church those allegedly unworthy of
membership, are unquestionably ecclesiastical matters which are outside the province of the civil
courts
Austria v. NLRC. 312 S 410
FACTS:
Pastor Dionisio V. Austria worked with the Seventh-Day Adventists (SDA) for twenty eight (28)
years from 1963 to 1991. He started as a literature evangelist and worked his way up until he
became District Pastor of the Negros Mission of the SDA. In January 1991, Austria was transferred
to Bacolod City. He held the position of District Pastor until his services were terminated on
October 31, 1991. Before his termination, Austria had received communications from Mr. Eufronio
Ibesate, the treasurer of the Negros Mission, asking Austria to admit accountability and
responsibility for the church tithes and offerings collected by his wife, Mrs. Thelma Austria, in his
district which amounted to P15,078.10, and to remit the same to the Negros Mission. Austria
reasoned in his written explanation dated October 11, 1991 that he should not be made
accountable for the unremitted collections since it was Pastor Gideon Buhat and Mr. Eufronio
Ibesate who authorized his wife to collect the tithes and offerings since Pastor Austria was very
sick to do the collecting at that time. On October 16, 1991, Austria went to the office of Pastor
Buhat, who was the president of the Negros Mission, to persuade Buhat to convene the Executive
Committee to settle a dispute between Pastor Austria and Pastor David Rodrigo. But that meeting
ended in a heated altercation between Austria and Buhat. The next day, the Austria couple
received an invitation to attend the Executive Committee meeting on October 21, 1991 to discuss
the non-remittance of the church collection and the events that transpired on October 16, 1991. A
fact-finding committee was created to investigate Austria. Sensing that the investigation would be
one-sided, Pastor Austria wrote to Pastor Rueben Moralde, president of the SDA and chairman of
the fact-finding committee, to request that certain members of the fact-finding committee be
excluded in the investigation and resolution of the case. Out of the six (6) members requested to
inhibit, only two (2) were actually excluded, namely: Pastor Buhat and Pastor Rodrigo. On October
29, 1991, Austria received a letter of dismissal citing misappropriation of denominational funds,
willful breach of trust, serious misconduct, gross and habitual neglect of duties, and commission
of an offense against the person of employers duly authorized representative as grounds for the
termination of his services. Austria filed a complaint on November 14, 1991 before the Labor
Arbiter for illegal dismissal against the SDA and its officers and prayed for reinstatement with back
wages and benefits, moral and exemplary damages and other labor law benefits. On February 15,
1993, Labor Arbiter Cesar D. Sideo rendered a decision in favor of the petitioner. The SDA
appealed the decision of the Labor Arbiter to the NLRC which vacated the findings of the Labor
Arbiter on August 26,1994 and dismissed the case for lack of merit. Austria filed a motion for
reconsideration but the NLRC issued a Resolution reversing its original decision. The SDA filed a
motion for reconsideration saying that the Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction over the complaint due
to the constitutional provision on the separation of church and state since the case allegedly
involved an ecclesiastical affair to which the State cannot interfere. The NLRC, without ruling on
the merits of the case, reversed itself once again, sustained the argument posed by SDA and,
accordingly, dismissed the complaint of Austria. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a
manifestation and motion saying it cannot sustain the resolution of the NLRC and submitting that
the termination of petitioner of his employment may be questioned before the NLRC as the same
is secular in nature, not ecclesiastical.
ISSUE:
Was the termination of Pastor Austrias services an ecclesiastical affair and, as such, involved the
separation of church and state?
HELD:
No. An ecclesiastical affair involves the relationship between the church and its members and
relates to matters of faith, religious doctrines, worship and governance of the congregation.
Examples of so-called ecclesiastical affairs to which the State cannot meddle are proceedings for
excommunication, ordinations of religious ministers, and administration of sacraments. While the
matter at hand relates to the church and its religious minister, it does not give the case a religious
significance. What is involved is the relationship of the church as an employer and the minister as
an employee. It is purely secular and has no relation whatsoever with the practice of faith, worship
or doctrines of the church. Pastor Austria was not excommunicated or expelled from the
membership of the SDA but was terminated from employment. As pointed out by the OSG in its
memorandum, the grounds invoked for Austrias dismissal are all based on Article 282 of the Labor
Code which enumerates the just causes for termination of employment. It is palpable by this alone
that the reason for Austrias dismissal from the service is not religious in nature. Coupled with this
is the act of the SDA in furnishing NLRC with a copy of Austrias letter of termination which again
is an eloquent admission by the SDA that NLRC has jurisdiction over the case. Aside from these,
SDA admitted in a certification issued by Mr. Ibesate that Austria has been its employee for twenty-
eight (28) years. SDA even registered petitioner with the Social Security System (SSS) as its
employee. As a matter of fact, the workers records of Austria have been submitted by SDA as
part of their exhibits. It is clear from all of these that when the SDA terminated the services of
Austria, it was merely exercising its management prerogative to fire an employee which it believes
to be unfit for the job. As such, the State, through the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, has the right
to take cognizance of the case and to determine whether the SDA, as employer, rightfully
exercised its management prerogative to dismiss an employee. This is in consonance with the
mandate of the Constitution to afford full protection to labor.
Ebralinag vs. The Division Superintendent of Schools of
Cebu, GR No. 95770, March 1, 1993
Facts:
All the petitioners in these two cases were expelled from their classes by the public school
authorities in Cebu for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic
pledge as required by Republic Act No. 1265 and DECS Department Order No. 8 which stipulated
compulsory flag ceremonies in all educational institutions. Jehovah's Witnesses admittedly teach
their children not to salute the flag, sing the national anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge for
they believe that those are "acts of worship" or "religious devotion" which they "cannot
conscientiously give . . . to anyone or anything except God". They consider the flag as an image
or idol representing the State. They allege that the action of the local authorities in compelling the
flag salute and pledge transcends constitutional limitations on the State's power and invades the
sphere of the intellect and spirit which the Constitution protects against official control. In requiring
school pupils to participate in the flag salute, the State thru the Secretary of Education is not
imposing a religion or religious belief or a religious test on said students. It is merely enforcing a
non-discriminatory school regulation applicable to all alike. Under the Administrative Code of 1987,
Any teacher or student or pupil who refuses to join or participate in the flag ceremony may be
dismissed after due investigation. In 1989, the DECS Regional Office in Cebu received complaints
about teachers and pupils belonging to the Jehovah's Witnesses, and enrolled in various public
and private schools, who refused to sing the Philippine national anthem, salute the Philippine flag
and recite the patriotic pledge. Cebu school officials resorted to a number of ways to persuade the
children of Jehovah's Witnesses to obey the memorandum. In the Buenavista Elementary School,
the children were asked to sign an Agreement promising to sing the national anthem, place their
right hand on their breast until the end of the song and recite the pledge of allegiance to the flag.
However, things took a turn for the worst. In the Daan Bantayan District, the District Supervisor,
Manuel F. Biongcog, ordered the "dropping from the rolls" of students who "opted to follow their
religious belief which is against the Flag Salute Law" on the theory that "they forfeited their right
to attend public schools." 43 students were subsequently expelled after refusing to sing. The
petition in G.R. No. 95887 was filed by 25 students who were similarly expelled because Dr. Pablo
Antopina, who succeeded Susana Cabahug as Division Superintendent of Schools, would not
recall the expulsion orders of his predecessor. Instead, he verbally caused the expulsion of some
more children of Jehovah's Witnesses. The petitioning students filed on account of grave abuse
of discretion on the part of the respondents in violating their due process and their right to
education. They alleged for the nullity of the expulsion or dropping from the rolls of petitioners from
their respective schools, prohibiting respondents from further barring the petitioners from their
classes, and compelling the respondent and all persons acting for him to admit and order the re-
admission of petitioners to their respective schools. They also prayed for a TRO. On November
27, 1990, the Court issued a TRO and a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction commanding the
respondents to immediately re-admit the petitioners to their respective classes until further orders
from this Court. The OSG commented on the defense of the expulsion orders and claimed that
the flag salute was devoid of any religious significance and the State had compelling interests to
expel the children.
Issue:
Whether school children who are members of Jehovah's Witnesses may be expelled
from school (both public and private), for refusing, on account of their religious beliefs, to take part
in the flag ceremony which includes playing or singing the Philippine national anthem, saluting the
Philippine flag and reciting the patriotic pledge.
Held:
No. Religious freedom is a fundamental right which is entitled to the highest priority and
the amplest protection among human rights, for it involves the relationship of man to his
Creator. The right to religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect, vis., freedom to
believe and freedom to act on one's belief. The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined
within the realm of thought. The second is subject to regulation where the belief is translated into
external acts that affect the public welfare. Petitioners stress, however, that while they do not take
part in the compulsory flag ceremony, they do not engage in "external acts" or behavior that would
offend their countrymen who believe in expressing their love of country through the observance of
the flag ceremony. The sole justification for a prior restraint or limitation on the exercise of religious
freedom is the existence of a grave and present danger of a character both grave and imminent,
of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest,
that the State has a right and a duty to prevent. We are not persuaded that by exempting the
Jehovah's Witnesses from saluting the flag, singing the national anthem and reciting the patriotic
pledge, this religious group which admittedly comprises a "small portion of the school population"
will shake up our part of the globe and suddenly produce a nation "untaught and uninculcated in
and unimbued with reverence for the flag, patriotism, love of country and admiration for national
heroes. Expelling or banning the petitioners from Philippine schools will bring about the very
situation that this Court had feared in Gerona. Forcing a small religious group, through the iron
hand of the law, to participate in a ceremony that violates their religious beliefs, will hardly be
conducive to love of country or respect for dully constituted authorities. Furthermore, let it be noted
that coerced unity and loyalty even to the country, assuming that such unity and loyalty can be
attained through coercion, is not a goal that is constitutionally obtainable at the expense of
religious liberty. A desirable end cannot be promoted by prohibited means. Moreover, the
expulsion of members of Jehovah's Witnesses from the schools where they are enrolled will violate
their right as Philippine citizens, under the 1987 Constitution, to receive free education, for it is the
duty of the State to "protect and promote the right of all citizens to quality education . . . and to
make such education accessible to all. We hold that a similar exemption may be accorded to the
Jehovah's Witnesses with regard to the observance of the flag ceremony out of respect for their
religious beliefs, however "bizarre" those beliefs may seem to others. Nevertheless, their right not
to participate in the flag ceremony does not give them a right to disrupt such patriotic exercises.
Paraphrasing the warning cited by this Court in Non vs. Dames II, while the highest regard must
be afforded their right to the free exercise of their religion, "this should not be taken to mean that
school authorities are powerless to discipline them" if they should commit breaches of the peace
by actions that offend the sensibilities, both religious and patriotic, of other persons. If they quietly
stand at attention during the flag ceremony while their classmates and teachers salute the flag,
sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge, we do not see how such conduct may
possibly disturb the peace, or pose "a grave and present danger of a serious evil to public safety,
public morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest that the State has a right (and
duty) to prevent.
INC vs. CA, 259 SCRA 529, July 26, 1996
Facts This is a petition for review on the decision of the CA affirming action of respondent Board
of Review For Moving Pictures and Television that x-rated the TV Program "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo"
classifying it not for public viewing on grounds that they offend and constitute an attack against
other religions which is expressly prohibited by law. Respondent contends the Board acted without
jurisdiction and in grave abuse of discretion by requiring them to submit VTR tapes and x-rating
them and suppression of freedom of expression. Trial court rendered judgment ordering the Board
to give petitioner the permit for their TV program while ordering petitioners to refrain from attacking
and offending other religious sectors from their program. In their motion for reconsideration the
petitioner prays for the deletion of the order of the court to make them subject to the requirement
of submitting the VTR tapes of their programs for review prior to showing on television. Such
motion was granted. Respondent board appealed before the CA which reversed the decision of
the lower court affirming the jurisdiction and power of the board to review the TV program. In their
petition for review on certiorari, petitioner assails the jurisdiction of the Board over reviewing of
their TV program and its grave abuse of discretion of its power to review if they are indeed vested
with such.
Issue: whether or not the Board has jurisdiction over the case at bar and whether or not it has
acted with grave abuse of discretion.
Held: The court affirmed the jurisdiction of the Board to review TV programs by virtue of the powers
vested upon it by PD 1986. On the account of suppression of religious freedom, the court ruled
that any act that restrains speech is accompanied with presumption of invalidity. The burden lies
upon the Board to overthrow this presumption. The decision of the lower court is a suppression of
the petitioners freedom of speech and free exercise of religion. Respondent board cannot censor
the speech of petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo simply because it attacks other religions. It is only where
it is unavoidably necessary to prevent an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare
of the community that infringement of religious freedom may be justified. There is no showing
whatsoever of the type of harm the tapes will bring about especially the gravity and imminence of
the threatened harm. Prior restraint on speech, including religious speech, cannot be justified by
hypothetical fears but only by the showing of a substantive and imminent evil. Thus the court
affirmed the jurisdiction of the Board to review the petitioners TV program while it reversed and
set aside the decision of the lower court that sustained the act of respondent in x-rating the TV
program of the petitioner.
2 fold aspects of religious profession and worship namely:
1. Freedom to believe (absolute)
Freedom to act on ones belief where an individual externalizes his beliefs in acts or omissions
affecting the public, this freedom to do so becomes subject to the regulation authority of the state.
Centeno vs. Villalon-Pornillos, 236 SCRA 197,
September 1, 1994
Facts:
This petition is an appeal on the decision of the Trial Court convicting Centeno and Yco for violating
P.D. 1564 known as the Solicitation Permit Law when they both solicited money for the renovation
of their chapel without a permit from the DSWD.
In 1985, the petitioners, officers of Samahang Katandaan ng Nayon ng Tikay, launched a fund
drive for the renovation of their chapel in Bulacan.
The petitioners approached and solicited from Judge Adoracion G. Angeles, a resident of Tikay,
a contribution of P1,500.00. The solicitation was made without a permit from the Department of
Social Welfare and Development (DSWD). Hon. Angeles filed a complaint against the petitioners
for violation of P.D. 1564 known as the Soliciation Permit Law.
P.D. 1564 provides as follows:
Sec. 2. Any person, corporation, organization, or association desiring to solicit or receive
contributions for charitable or public welfare purposes shall first secure a permit from the
Regional Offices of the Department of Social Services and Development as provided in the
Integrated Reorganization Plan.
In 1992, the trial court found the petitioners guilty of violating the Solicitation Permit Law.
In this instant case, the petitioners assert among others that the term religious purpose is not
expressly included in the provisions of the statute, hence what the law does not include, it
excludes.
Issue: Whether or not the phrase charitable purposes should be construed in the broadest sense
so as to include a religious purpose.
Held/Ratio:
The 1987 Constitution and other statutes treat the words charitable and religious separately
and independently of each other.
In P.D. 1564, it merely stated charitable or public welfare purposes which means that it was not
the intention of the framers of the law to include solicitations for religious purposes. The world
religious purpose is not interchangeable with the expression charitable purpose.
The acts of the petitioners cannot be punished under the said law because the law does not
contemplate solicitation for religious purposes.
The solicitation for religious purposes may be subject to proper regulation by the State in the
exercise of police power. However, in the case at bar, considering that solicitations intended for a
religious purpose are not within the coverage of Presidential Decree No. 1564, as earlier
demonstrated, petitioner cannot be held criminally liable therefor.
The decision appealed from is reversed and set aside, and petitioner Martin Centeno is acquitted
of the offense charged.
Estrada vs. Escritor, 492 SCRA 1, AM No. P-02-1651, June
22, 2006 and August 4, 2003
FACTS:
Soledad Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City. Alejandro Estrada,
the complainant, wrote to Judge Jose F. Caoibes, presiding judge of Branch 253, RTC of Las
Pinas City, requesting for an investigation of rumors that Escritor has been living with Luciano
Quilapio Jr., a man not her husband, and had eventually begotten a son. Escritors husband, who
had lived with another woman, died a year before she entered into the judiciary. On the other
hand, Quilapio is still legally married to another woman. Estrada is not related to either Escritor
or Quilapio and is not a resident of Las Pinas but of Bacoor, Cavite. According to the complainant,
respondent should not be allowed to remain employed in the judiciary for it will appear as if the
court allows such act.
Escritor is a member of the religious sect known as the Jehovahs Witnesses and the Watch Tower
and Bible Tract Society where her conjugal arrangement with Quilapio is in conformity with their
religious beliefs. After ten years of living together, she executed on July 28, 1991 a Declaration
of Pledging Faithfulness which was approved by the congregation. Such declaration is effective
when legal impediments render it impossible for a couple to legalize their union. Gregorio,
Salazar, a member of the Jehovahs Witnesses since 1985 and has been a presiding minister
since 1991, testified and explained the import of and procedures for executing the declaration
which was completely executed by Escritor and Quilapios in Atimonan, Quezon and was signed
by three witnesses and recorded in Watch Tower Central Office.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent should be found guilty of the administrative charge of gross and
immoral conduct and be penalized by the State for such conjugal arrangement.
HELD:
A distinction between public and secular morality and religious morality should be kept in mind.
The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality.
The Court states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality approach that gives room
for accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause. This
benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it
does not offend compelling state interests.
The states interest is the preservation of the integrity of the judiciary by maintaining among its
ranks a high standard of morality and decency. There is nothing in the OCAs (Office of the Court
Administrator) memorandum to the Court that demonstrates how this interest is so compelling that
it should override respondents plea of religious freedom. Indeed, it is inappropriate for the
complainant, a private person, to present evidence on the compelling interest of the state. The
burden of evidence should be discharged by the proper agency of the government which is the
Office of the Solicitor General.
In order to properly settle the case at bar, it is essential that the government be given an
opportunity to demonstrate the compelling state interest it seeks to uphold in opposing the
respondents position that her conjugal arrangement is not immoral and punishable as it is within
the scope of free exercise protection. The Court could not prohibit and punish her conduct where
the Free Exercise Clause protects it, since this would be an unconstitutional encroachment of her
right to religious freedom. Furthermore, the court cannot simply take a passing look at
respondents claim of religious freedom but must also apply the compelling state interest test.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the case is REMANDED to the Office of the Court Administrator. The
Solicitor General is ordered to intervene in the case where it will be given the opportunity (a) to
examine the sincerity and centrality of respondent's claimed religious belief and practice; (b) to
present evidence on the state's "compelling interest" to override respondent's religious belief and
practice; and (c) to show that the means the state adopts in pursuing its interest is the least
restrictive to respondent's religious freedom. The rehearing should be concluded thirty (30) days
from the Office of the Court Administrator's receipt of this Decision.
a. Strict Separation and Strict Neutrality/Separation
The Strict Separationist believes that the Establishment Clause was meant to protect the state
from the church, and the states hostility towards religion allows no interaction between the two.
According to this Jeffersonian view, an absolute barrier to formal interdependence of religion and
state needs to be erected. Religious institutions could not receive aid, whether direct or indirect,
from the state. Nor could the state adjust its secular programs to alleviate burdens the programs
placed on believers.29 Only the complete separation of religion from politics would eliminate the
formal influence of religious institutions and provide for a free choice among political views, thus
a strict "wall of separation" is necessary. 30
Strict separation faces difficulties, however, as it is deeply embedded in American history and
contemporary practice that enormous amounts of aid, both direct and indirect, flow to religion from
government in return for huge amounts of mostly indirect aid from religion.31 For example, less
than twenty-four hours after Congress adopted the First Amendments prohibition on laws
respecting an establishment of religion, Congress decided to express its thanks to God Almighty
for the many blessings enjoyed by the nation with a resolution in favor of a presidential
proclamation declaring a national day of Thanksgiving and Prayer.32 Thus, strict separationists
are caught in an awkward position of claiming a constitutional principle that has never existed and
is never likely to.33
The tamer version of the strict separationist view, the strict neutrality or separationist view, (or, the
governmental neutrality theory) finds basis in Everson v. Board of Education,34 where the Court
declared that Jeffersons "wall of separation" encapsulated the meaning of the First Amendment.
However, unlike the strict separationists, the strict neutrality view believes that the "wall of
separation" does not require the state to be their adversary. Rather, the state must be neutral in
its relations with groups of religious believers and non-believers. "State power is no more to be
used so as to handicap religions than it is to favor them."35 The strict neutrality approach is not
hostile to religion, but it is strict in holding that religion may not be used as a basis for classification
for purposes of governmental action, whether the action confers rights or privileges or imposes
duties or obligations. Only secular criteria may be the basis of government action. It does not
permit, much less require, accommodation of secular programs to religious belief.36
The problem with the strict neutrality approach, however, is if applied in interpreting the
Establishment Clause, it could lead to a de facto voiding of religious expression in the Free
Exercise Clause. As pointed out by Justice Goldberg in his concurring opinion in Abington School
District v. Schempp,37 strict neutrality could lead to "a brooding and pervasive devotion to the
secular and a passive, or even active, hostility to the religious" which is prohibited by the
Constitution.38 Professor Laurence Tribe commented in his authoritative treatise, viz:
To most observers. . . strict neutrality has seemed incompatible with the very idea of a free
exercise clause. The Framers, whatever specific applications they may have intended, clearly
envisioned religion as something special; they enacted that vision into law by guaranteeing the
free exercise of religion but not, say, of philosophy or science. The strict neutrality approach all
but erases this distinction. Thus it is not surprising that the [U.S.] Supreme Court has rejected
strict neutrality, permitting and sometimes mandating religious classifications.39
Thus, the dilemma of the separationist approach, whether in the form of strict separation or strict
neutrality, is that while the Jeffersonian wall of separation "captures the spirit of the American ideal
of church-state separation," in real life, church and state are not and cannot be totally separate.
This is all the more true in contemporary times when both the government and religion are growing
and expanding their spheres of involvement and activity, resulting in the intersection of
government and religion at many points.40
b. Benevolent Neutrality/Accommodation
The theory of benevolent neutrality or accommodation is premised on a different view of the "wall
of separation," associated with Williams, founder of the Rhode Island colony. Unlike the
Jeffersonian wall that is meant to protect the state from the church, the wall is meant to protect
the church from the state.41 This doctrine was expressed in Zorach v. Clauson,42 which held, viz:
The First Amendment, however, does not say that in every and all respects there shall be a
separation of Church and State. Rather, it studiously defines the manner, the specific ways, in
which there shall be no concert or union or dependency one or the other. That is the common
sense of the matter. Otherwise, the state and religion would be aliens to each other - hostile,
suspicious, and even unfriendly. Churches could not be required to pay even property taxes.
Municipalities would not be permitted to render police or fire protection to religious groups.
Policemen who helped parishioners into their places of worship would violate the Constitution.
Prayers in our legislative halls; the appeals to the Almighty in the messages of the Chief Executive;
the proclamations making Thanksgiving Day a holiday; "so help me God" in our courtroom oaths-
these and all other references to the Almighty that run through our laws, our public rituals, our
ceremonies would be flouting the First Amendment. A fastidious atheist or agnostic could even
object to the supplication with which the Court opens each session: "God save the United States
and this Honorable Court."
Philippine jurisprudence articulates several tests to determine these limits. Beginning with the first
case on the Free Exercise Clause, American Bible Society, the Court mentioned the "clear and
present danger" test but did not employ it. Nevertheless, this test continued to be cited in
subsequent cases on religious liberty. The Gerona case then pronounced that the test of
permissibility of religious freedom is whether it violates the established institutions of society and
law. The Victoriano case mentioned the "immediate and grave danger" test as well as the
doctrine that a law of general applicability may burden religious exercise provided the law is the
least restrictive means to accomplish the goal of the law. The case also used, albeit
inappropriately, the "compelling state interest" test. After Victoriano, German went back to the
Gerona rule. Ebralinag then employed the "grave and immediate danger" test and overruled the
Gerona test. The fairly recent case of Iglesia ni Cristo went back to the "clear and present danger"
test in the maiden case of American Bible Society. Not surprisingly, all the cases which employed
the "clear and present danger" or "grave and immediate danger" test involved, in one form or
another, religious speech as this test is often used in cases on freedom of expression. On the
other hand, the Gerona and German cases set the rule that religious freedom will not prevail over
established institutions of society and law. Gerona, however, which was the authority cited by
German has been overruled by Ebralinag which employed the "grave and immediate danger" test.
Victoriano was the only case that employed the "compelling state interest" test, but as explained
previously, the use of the test was inappropriate to the facts of the case.