HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND RISK ANALYSIS OF

FIRE/EXPLOSION FOR EMERGENCY RESPONSE DESIGN

IN PRODUCTION PROCESS PT. X

IDENTIFIKASI BAHAYA DAN ANALISIS RISIKO

KEBAKARAN/LEDAKAN SEBAGAI DASAR PERANCANGAN
SISTEM TANGGAP DARURAT PADA
KEGIATAN PRODUKSI PT. X

Resti Ayu Lestari1 dan Katharina Oginawati2

Master program of Environmental Engineering
Faculty of Civil and Environmental Engineering, Institut Teknologi Bandung
Institut Teknologi Bandung
Jl. Ganesha 10 Bandung 40132
E-mail: 1lestari.restiayu@gmail.com, 2katharina.oginawati@gmail.com

Abstract: Increasing of fertilizer industry in the world forced the increasing of ammonia industry as well.
Ammonia was used as nitrogen source in fertilizer industry. Ammonia process production involved
natural gas (flammable) with high temperature and high pressure in the process. Reformer (primary and
secondary) were the unit that had the highest temperature and pressure among all the ammonia unit
process. Beside that, reformers had the highest risk to fail and make fire/explosion. Reformers are one of
the unit process used to get hydrogen from natural gas. Ammonia storage tank also had explosion risk due
to certain pressure in the tank and released ammonia thats dangerous for human health. Hazard
identification for reformer and ammonia storage tank known by using Fault Tree Analysis (FTA). The
results of FTA analysis for reformer and for ammonia could be group into technical and non technical
aspects. Analysis using Dows Fire & Explosion Index (DFEI) resulted that the farthest radius effect due
to explosion are 51meter (primary reformer), 74 meter (secondary reformer) and 10 meter (ammonia
storage tank). The actual probable property damages was US$ 23.640.285 (primary reformer), US$
11.649.269 (secondary reformer) and US$ 180.959 (ammonia storage tank). Radius of toxic area was
calculated by using ALOHA software and the result was 3700 m.

Keywords: fire/explosion, reformer, Dows Fire Explosion Index, FTA

Abstrak: Peningkatan industri pupuk di dunia berimplikasi pada peningkatan jumlah industri amonia.
Amonia memegang peranan penting pada proses produksi pupuk dalam hal penyediaan nitrogen. Proses
pembuatan amonia melibatkan bahan baku berupa gas alam yang bersifat flammable dengan temperatur
dan tekanan yang tinggi dalam setiap tahapan prosesnya. Reformer (primary dan secondary) merupakan
unit proses produksi amonia dengan temperatur dan tekanan paling tinggi serta paling berisiko
mengalami kegagalan yang dapat mengakibatkan terjadinya kebakaran/ledakan. Reformer berperan
sebagai salah satu tahapan pemurnian gas alam untuk mendapatkan hidrogen. Tangki ammonia juga
memiliki risiko ledakan dan melepaskan ammonia yang berbahaya bagi kesehatan manusia. Identifikasi
bahaya pada unit reformer dan tangki ammonia dilakukan dengan menggunakan metode Fault Tree
Analysisi (FTA). Hasil analisis FTA menghasilkan bahwa sumber bahaya dari ledakan reformer dan
tangki ammonia dapat ditinjau dari faktor teknis dan faktor non teknis. Hasil analisis menggunakan
risiko menggunakan Dows Fire & Explosion Index (DFEI) menghasilkan radius terjauh dampak
ledakan/kebakaran pada unit reformer adalah 51 meter (primary reformer) dan 74 meter (secondary
reformer). Nilai kerugian finansial mencapai US$ 23.640.285 (primary reformer) dan US$ 11.649.269
(secondary reformer). Metode DFEI juga diterapkan pada tangki ammonia dan menghasilkan radius
dampak ledakan terbesar 10 meter dengan kerugian finansial US$ 180.959 Radius area toksik dihitung
dengan menggunakan software ALOHA dan didapatkan nilai maksimum untuk tangki ammonia 3700 m.

Kata kunci: kebakaran/ledakan, reformer, Dows Fire Explosion Index, FTA

17-161
INTRODUCTION
Increasing the demand of chemical fertilizer from year to year needed the bigger
of ammonia production. Based on data from IFA (Industrial Fertilizer Industry
Association) on June 2014, the demand of chemical fertilizer was 111,3 MT and
predicted to be higher in 2018 become 119,5 MT. The main function of ammonia was
taking a part as ready to use nitrogen.
Ammonia industry was one of major hazard industry. Major hazard consisted of
fire, explosion and chemical leaking (Less, 1996). Fire was kind of dangerous hazard
that had higher frequency to happend than other major hazard (Gultom, 2009).
The source of fire and explosion in ammonia industry was raw material (natural
gas) that had high flammability and used high temperature and high pressure in
processing. According to Ojha and Dhiman (2010), refomer and ammonia storage were
the unit having the highest risk in ammonia production steps. Reformer process was
kind of ammonia production process using high temperature to form hidrogen (H2) from
methan (CH4). Reformer failed caused by tube failed in the primary reformer and
became the source of burning or explosion.
Some researches had conducted the reformer failed causes. Sing et al (2000)
explained that reformer failed caused by leaking of tube so that igniting the fire. Beside
that, Bhaumik et al (2002) explained that the reformer failed caused by the corrosion in
the tube. In another side, the research about ammonia dispersion had been explained by
Inanloo and Tansel in 2015. This research showed us that meteorogical condition and
quantity of ammonia released influenced the ammonia dispersion in the air.
Based on the previous researches, this research also analyzed the risk and
identified the hazard in PT. X Cikampek. This research gave the information about the
consequences must be approved if the failed of reformer and ammonia storage tank
occured.
Identification hazard methode used was Fault Tree Analysis (FTA). This methode
could be used to identify the cause of major event like explosion, fire or chemical toxic
release. (Woodside in Cokro, 2009).
Risk analysis methode used was Dows Fire & Explosion Index (DFEI), ALOHA
software and MARPLOT. DFEI gave information about the radius of fire/explosion
impact, business interuption and probable daily outage that must be approved by PT. X.
ALOHA software and MARPLOT gave information about the radius including in red
zone, orange zone or yellow zone. Beside that, the information also included the public
facilities getting impact.

METODOLOGY
Research Location
The research was conducted on November 2015 March 2016 in PT. X
Cikampek that concerned in chemical fertilizer production. PT. X Cikampek had
660.000 MT/year ammonia production capacity. The raw material used were natural
gas, air and water. Natural gas was supplied by Pertamina, the air as the source of
nitrogen was supplied by pumping the air around the factory in to the unit process and
water was supplied by Parungkadali river and Cikao river.
Research Object
The research focused on primary reformer, secondary reformer and ammonia
storage tank. Reformer was one of step to get hidrogen from natural gas. Primary
reformer in PT. X consisted of 192 tubes, temperature and pressure were 799oC and

17-162
39.17 kg/cm2. Secondary reformer was like a reactor that consisted of mixing zone and
reaction zone. Temperature and pressure in secondary reformer were 989,9oC and 34,6
kg/cm2. Ammonia storage tank in PT. X Cikampek consisted of two units with capacity
10.000 MT and 5000 MT. Figure 1 shows the location of the research.

Lokasi Penelitian
Figure 1. Research location; Ammonia storage tank (left); reformer (right)
Analysis Stage
Analysis in this research used data from unit spesification, meteorogical
condition, process condition and emergency response existing in PT. X Cikampek.
These data were used to identify the source of fire/explosion using Fault Tree Analysis
(FTA), to analyze the risk of fire/explosion using Dows Fire & Explosion Index
(DFEI) and to analyze the dispersion of gas if the fire/explosion was happened by using
software Arial Location of Hazardous Atmospheres (ALOHA) in reformer and
ammonia storage tank.
DFEI aimed to give information about the radius of fire/explosion impact,
probable daily outage and business interuption if the emergency condition happened.
The analysis resulted in ALOHA was continued to MARPLOT. MARPLOT aimed to
map the analysis resulted in ALOHA such as impacted fasilities. MARPLOT also
divided the radius to some zone based on the severity of the area (red, orange, yellow).

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Primary Reformer Hazard Identification
Hazard identification using FTA aimed to give information about the source of
fire/explosion in reformer and ammonia storage tank. Based on FTA, the general source
of fire/explosion in primary reformer were natural disaster like earhtquake, fire ignition,
breaking tube in primary reformer and high pressure drop (>5 kg/cm2). These kind of
events were analyzed continually by using FTA showing at Figure 2.
Secondary Reformer Hazard Identification
Hazard identification for secondary reformer was explained at Figure 3. Based on
Figure 3, we know that the general source of fire/explosion in secondary reformer are
natural disaste like earthquake, broken catalyst in secondary reformer an fire ignition.
These kind of general event are continually analyze by using FTA and the results are
electrical tools, bad maintenance, less control or using the obsolete material.

17-163
Ammonia Storage Tank Hazard Identification
The general causes of ammonia release to environment are overfilling, leaking in
the ammonia storage tank and natural disaster. Leaking in the ammonia tank is caused
by the leaking at the bottom of ammonia storage tank, overpressure, underpressure and
leaking in outlet/inlet of ammonia storage tank. Hazard identification in ammonia
storage tank by using FTA is explained at Figure 4.
Risk Analysis of Fire/Explosion
DFEI analysis was conducted by using some data like specification of reformer
and ammonia storage tank, the economic value of reformer and ammonia storage tank
and safety tools used around the object of study. DFEI methode used two scenarios fo
each reformer and ammonia storage tank. The first scenario was primary reformer and
secondary reformer fire or exploded partially and for the second scenario, primary
reformer and second reformer fire/exploded together. These scenarios also applied to
ammonia storage tank. Table 1 shows the result of DFEI methode.
Table 1. Result DFEI Methode
Actual Probable Bisnis
DFEI Radius
Unit Property daily Interuption
point impact (m)
Damage Outage
Primary Reformer 199,77 51 23.640.285 138 US$ 20.936.279
Secondary Reformer 289,74 74 11.649.269 129 US$ 19.570.870
Ammonia Storage
40,12 10 180.959 4 Rp 386.789,00
Tank 10000 MT
Ammonia Storage
39,44 10 62.576 2 Rp 96.645,00
Tank 5000 MT
DFEI point for primary reformer and secondary reformer is categorized to severe
and DFEI point for ammonia is categorized to light. The radius impact of explosion/fire
in secondary reformer can break almost all of ammonia process unit 1B including
desulfurizer, methanator, shift converter, compressor house and area of cooling tower.
The impact looks different in ammonia storage tank. In ammonia storage tank the
explosion/fire impact just for the tank and not included the other unit but, ammonia is
very dangerous to the environment and cause death to human being.
Risk Analysis of Gas Dispersion
Risk analysis by using ALOHA were conducted to reformer and ammonia storage
tank. For unit reformer the analysis included toxic area, flammable area, jet fire area and
blast force area and the analysis for ammonia storage tank included toxic area and
flammable area. The result of ALOHA analysis is explained at Table 2.
Based on Table 2, there is no significant differences for impact area for the same
unit with different wind direction. This is happend because the meteorogical condition
in ALOHA scenario is not significantly different. Meteorogical condition will influence
the atmospher stability and in PT. X Cikampek the atmospher stability is categorized in
B (unstable). The unstable atmospher gives advantage for environment because the
concentration of gas in the air will decrease cause of dipersion by wind (Inanloo and
Tansel, 2015). Unstable atmospher map the gas dispersion wider than stable atmosphere
(D-F). Stable atmospher results the straight exposure area stand in wind direction
(Damayanti, 2014). Dispersion for ammonia and methan in ammonia storage tank and
reformer are explained at Figure 5.

17-164
 Fire/
Explosion

Ignition of fire Broken tube High pressure drop

Natural Disaster
(>5kg/cm2)

Static
Short circuit electricity Failed in start up Cracking Hotspot
Safety valve fail Clogged pipes

Burner fail

Gas flow in the unit

Bad
Electrical tools Catalyst is Bad
maintenance Fail of catalyst Impurities from
Corrosion Overheating Eccentricity condensated by Bad Pecahan katalis
function inspection raw material
steam Maintenance
schedule

Not all of burner

Bad turn on Kesalahan
maintenance fabrikasi
High friction
coefficient High gas
flow
Welding Not Obeying Obsolete Fractional Bad Bad Bad
the procedure catalyst catalyst Not Obeying the First Start up Bad
inspection inspection Maintenace
procedure (N2 heating) fail Maintenace
schedule schedule

Wrong temperature Setting the wrong Wrong when

setting at the first temperature rise choosing furnace
will be on
Bad Operator
Maintenance fault
Wrong
Catalyst fail
temperature
setting Bad Not Obeying
Maintenance the procedure

Not Obeying
Less training
the procedure
Not Obeying
Less training
the procedure
Obsolete catalyst Broken catalyst
Not Obeying
Less training
the procedure

Less Not obey

maintenance procedure

Figure 2. Primary Reformer Hazard Identification by Using FTA

17-165
 Fire/Explosion

Ignition of fire Broken catalyst High pressure drop

Natural Disaster (>5kg/cm2)

Short circuit Static electricity Metal dusting

Obsolete catalyst
Safety valve fail Clogged pipes

Bad Fractional Flow The catalyst in the

Electrical tools Gas flow in the unit secondary reformer
maintenance catalyst of primary
reformer broke
Bad Impurities from
Bad Pecahan katalis
inspection raw material
Maintenance
schedule

High friction
coefficient High gas
flow Bad Bad
Less control Less control
maintenance maintenance

Bad Bad Bad

Bad
inspection inspection Maintenace
Maintenace
schedule schedule

Bad
Less control
maintenance

Figure 3. Secondary Reformer Hazard Identification by Using FTA

17-166
 Ammonia release in to
the environment

Cracking tank
Overfilling Natural disaster

Cracking in inlet/
Cracking bottom Overpressure Underpressure
Ammonia outlet
Alarm fail plate
touch the
highest level

Unbalance Unbalance
Obsolete Bottom plate between ammonia Safety instrument between ammonia Safety instrument Broken flexible Clogged Inlet/
Broken alarm Wet perlite
alarm lifted demand and fail demand and fail joint outlet
ammonia supply ammonia supply

Ammonia Bad Bad

Unknown the ice Forming ice under Wrong Bad Urea process Ammonia keep Bad Bad
Bad Compressor fail Safety valve fail Alarm fail process Urea keep Vacuum valve fail Alarm fail inspection inspection
Bad forming location the bottom plate procedure in inspection shutdown producing maintenance maintenance
inspection shutdown producing schedule schedule
maintenance tank schedule
schedule maintenance

Water under the Broken safety Broken vacuum

Low temperature
bottom plate valve Obsolete valve Obsolete Bad Obsolete
Power off
safety valve vacuum valve maintenance alarm
Covered by
Less control
tank/others
Bad Obsolete
maintenance Power off alarm

Leakege of
Heater fail Result of sprinkler/hydrant Annual The pressure in
Bad The pressure in Bad
condensation sprinkler test tank is out of the tank is out of the maintenance
maintenance
pressure handled pressure handled
by safety valve by vacuum valve

corrosion

Shutdown
Konsleting
process

Late Less
inspection maintenance

Puddle of water Damaged coils

Electric current

Bad
Bad drainage Clogged Bad
inspection
system design drainage maintenance
schedule

Figure 4. Ammonia Storage Tank Hazard Identification by Using FTA

17-167
Emergency Response Recomendation for PT. X
PT. X Cikampek had had emergency response system simulated periodically. There
were two kind of protection systems, the passive protection and the active protection.
Passive protection included build wall protecting from fire and active protection
included alarm system, hydrant system and some detectors. Recommendation for
emergency response system in PT. X Cikampek included active protection that were fire
alarm, extinguishers and gas ammonia and methan detector.
Table 2. ALOHA Analysis for Reformer and Ammonia Storage Tank
Area Toxic
Wind Direction Radius impact (m)
Unit
From AEGL-1 AEGL-2 AEGL-3
Ammonia Storage
845 1900 3700
Tank 1000MT
West
Ammonia Storage
653 1500 2900
Tank 5000 MT
Ammonia Storage
846 1900 3700
Tank 1000MT
North East
Ammonia Storage
656 1400 2900
Tank 5000 MT
Area Flammable
Wind Direction Radius impact (m)
Unit
From LOC-1 LOC-2 LOC-3
Primary Reformer 49 64 119
Secondary Reformer 41 53 98
Ammonia Storage
West 85 164 304
Tank 1000MT
Ammonia Storage
60 116 226
Tank 5000 MT
Primary Reformer 65 85 159
Secondary Reformer 42 55 102
Ammonia Storage
North East 85 162 302
Tank 1000MT
Ammonia Storage
60 114 227
Tank 5000 MT
Area Blast Force
Wind Direction Radius impact (m)
Unit
From LOC-1 LOC-2 LOC-3
Primary Reformer 48 59 73
West
Secondary Reformer 41 50 62
Primary Reformer 46 57 71
North East
Secondary Reformer 39 48 60
Area Jet Fire
Wind Direction Radius impact (m)
Unit
From LOC-1 LOC-2 LOC-3
Primary Reformer 13 18 28
West
Secondary Reformer 11 16 24
Primary Reformer 13 18 28
North East
Secondary Reformer 11 16 24

17-168
 30000 ppm U 30000 ppm U 1,0 psi U
U
17500 ppm 17500 ppm 0,7 psi 0,7 psi
1,0 psi

5000 ppm 5000 ppm 0,5 psi 0,5 psi

(a) (b) (c) (d)

U U U U

10 kW/m2 10 kW/m2 1100 ppm 65000 ppm

2 2
5 kW/m 5 kW/m 160 ppm 31500 ppm

2 kW/m2 2 kW/m2 30 ppm 15000 ppm

(e) (f) (g) (h)

Figure 5. ALOHA Analysis (a)Area of flammable primary reformer (b) Area of flammable secondary reformer
(c) Area of blast force primary reformer (d) Area of blast force secondary reformer (e) Area of jet fire primary
reformer (f) Area of jet fire secondary reformer (g)Toxic Area of Ammonia Storage Tank 1000MT (h)
Flammable area of Ammonia Storage Tank 10000MT

CONCLUSION
The explosion/fire happend in reformer and ammonia storage tank was caused by
technical aspects and nontechnical aspects that were explained by using FTA. Actual
property damage for the reformer at least US$ 11.6 milion and US$ 62.5 hundred
thousand for ammonia storage tank. The radius impact for explosion/fire in reformer
and ammonia storage tank at least were 167 ft and 33 ft. This dispersion was dangerous
for creatures and environment especially for the health and continually fire. Because of
that, emergency response system in PT. X Cikampek needed some recommendations
especially in active protection. Active protection include fire alarm, gas detector for
CH4 and NH3 and some extinguishers.

REFERENCES
American Institute of Chemical Engineers. 1994. Dows Fire & Explosion Index Hazard Classification
Guide. AlChE Technical Manual.
Andriansyah, Gunawan. 2013. Identifikasi Bahaya dan Analisis Risiko Menggunakan Metode SWeHI,
DOW F&EI dan Dow LL-F&EI Sebagai Dasar Perancangan Sistem Tanggap Darurat Pada
Kegiatan Produksi Resin Sintetik (Studi Kasus: PT. Alkindo Mitra Jaya). Laporan Tesis. Institut
Teknologi Bandung: Bandung-Indonesia.
Anonymous. 1999. Marplot Users Manual. U.S Environmental Protection Agency: Washington DC.
Anonymous. 2007. ALOHA Users Manual. U.S Environmental Protection Agency: Washington DC.
Aiyou, WU dkk. 2014. City Fire Risk Analysis Based on Coupling Fault Tree Method and Triangle Fuzzy
Theory. International Symposium on Safety Science and Technology. Science Direct.
Burris, Cecil Bradley. 2012. The Effects of Hazardous Chemical Release Areas of Dense Urban
Population: A Study of The Vulnerability of Sumter County, Florida. Thesis. Emergency and
Disaster Management. American Public University System: West Virginia.
Cokro, Hadi. 2009. Analisis Potensi Ledakan PT. X. Tugas Akhir. Fakultas Kesehatan Masyarakat
Universitas Indonesia: Jakarta.

17-169
Damayanti, Aditya. 2014. Identifikasi Bahaya dan Analisis Risiko Menggunakan Metode DOW F&EI dan
ALOHA Sebagai Dasar Perancangan Sistem Tanggap Darurat di Pertamina Riau. Thesis. Institut
Teknologi Bandung: Bandung.
Drager. 2010. Gas Dispersion. Risk Management Program. Lubeck, Germany.
Gultom, Imran Zulkarnain. 2009. Analisis Konsekuensi Penyebaran Amonia Pada Kebocoran Storage
Tank Ammonia 2101-F Di PT. Pupuk Kujang Cikampek Pada Tahun 2009 dengan Menggunakan
ALOHA (Area Locations Of Hazardous Athmosphere). Tugas Akhir. Fakultas Ilmu Kesehatam
Masyarakat Universitas Indonesia: Jakarta.
Hamonangan, Andy. 2010. Perancangan Tanggap Darurat Kebakaran di Depot Bahan Bakar Minyak
dengan Metode Analisis Risiko Dow Fire and Explosion Index dan Archie. Laporan Tesis. Institut
Teknologi Bandung: Bandung-Indonesia.
Inanloo and Tansel. 2015. Explosion impacts during transport of hazardous cargo: GIS-based
characterization of overpressure impacts and delineation of flammable zones for ammonia.
Journal of Environmental Management. United States.
Index Mundi. 2012. Ammonia Production by Country. Akses tanggal 02 November 2015.
http://www.indexmundi.com/minerals/?product=ammonia
International Fertilizer Industry Association. 2014. Fertilizer Outlook 2014-2018. Akses tanggal 02
November 2015.
http://www.fertilizer.org/imis20/images/Library_Downloads/2014_ifa_sydney_summary.pdf?Web
siteKey=411e9724-4bda-422f-abfc-
8152ed74f306&=404%3bhttp%3a%2f%2fwww.fertilizer.org%3a80%2fen%2fimages%2fLibrary_
Downloads%2f2014_ifa_sydney_summary.pdf
Ojha, Madhusoo and Dhiman. 2010. Problem, Failure and Safety Analysis of Ammonia Plant: a Review.
International Review of Chemical Engineering Vol 2.
Sparrow, R.E. Firebox Explosion in a Primary Reformer Furnace. Western Co-operative Fertilizer:
Canada.

17-170