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Maria Carolina Araullo

vs Benigno Aquino III

W hen President Benigno Aquino III took office, his administration noticed the sluggish
growth of the economy. The World Bank advised that the economy needed a stimulus plan.
Budget Secretary Florencio Butch Abad then came up with a program called the
Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP).
The DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up the funding of government projects. DAP
enables the Executive to realign funds from slow moving projects to priority projects instead
of waiting for next years appropriation. So what happens under the DAP was that if a certain
government project is being undertaken slowly by a certain executive agency, the funds
allotted therefor will be withdrawn by the Executive. Once withdrawn, these funds are
declared as savings by the Executive and said funds will then be reallotted to other priority
projects. The DAP program did work to stimulate the economy as economic growth was in
fact reported and portion of such growth was attributed to the DAP (as noted by the Supreme
Other sources of the DAP include the unprogrammed funds from the General Appropriations
Act (GAA). Unprogrammed funds are standby appropriations made by Congress in the GAA.
Meanwhile, in September 2013, Senator Jinggoy Estrada made an expos claiming that he,
and other Senators, received Php50M from the President as an incentive for voting in favor
of the impeachment of then Chief Justice Renato Corona. Secretary Abad claimed that the
money was taken from the DAP but was disbursed upon the request of the Senators.
This apparently opened a can of worms as it turns out that the DAP does not only realign
funds within the Executive. It turns out that some non-Executive projects were also funded;
to name a few: Php1.5B for the CPLA (Cordillera Peoples Liberation Army), Php1.8B for the
MNLF (Moro National Liberation Front), P700M for the Quezon Province, P50-P100M for
certain Senators each, P10B for Relocation Projects, etc.
This prompted Maria Carolina Araullo, Chairperson of the Bagong Alyansang Makabayan,
and several other concerned citizens to file various petitions with the Supreme Court
questioning the validity of the DAP. Among their contentions was:
DAP is unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional rule which provides that no
money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by
Secretary Abad argued that the DAP is based on certain laws particularly the GAA (savings
and augmentation provisions thereof), Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the Constitution (power of the
President to augment), Secs. 38 and 49 of Executive Order 292 (power of the President to
suspend expenditures and authority to use savings, respectively).
I. Whether or not the DAP violates the principle no money shall be paid out of the Treasury
except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law (Sec. 29(1), Art. VI, Constitution).
II. Whether or not the DAP realignments can be considered as impoundments by the
III. Whether or not the DAP realignments/transfers are constitutional.
IV. Whether or not the sourcing of unprogrammed funds to the DAP is constitutional.
V. Whether or not the Doctrine of Operative Fact is applicable.
I. No, the DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. DAP was merely a
program by the Executive and is not a fund nor is it an appropriation. It is a program for
prioritizing government spending. As such, it did not violate the Constitutional provision cited
in Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. In DAP no additional funds were withdrawn from
the Treasury otherwise, an appropriation made by law would have been required. Funds,
which were already appropriated for by the GAA, were merely being realigned via the DAP.
II. No, there is no executive impoundment in the DAP. Impoundment of funds refers to the
Presidents power to refuse to spend appropriations or to retain or deduct appropriations for
whatever reason. Impoundment is actually prohibited by the GAA unless there will be an
unmanageable national government budget deficit (which did not happen). Nevertheless,
theres no impoundment in the case at bar because whats involved in the DAP was the
transfer of funds.
III. No, the transfers made through the DAP were unconstitutional. It is true that the President
(and even the heads of the other branches of the government) are allowed by the Constitution
to make realignment of funds, however, such transfer or realignment should only be made
within their respective offices. Thus, no cross-border transfers/augmentations may be
allowed. But under the DAP, this was violated because funds appropriated by the GAA for
the Executive were being transferred to the Legislative and other non-Executive agencies.
Further, transfers within their respective offices also contemplate realignment of funds to an
existing project in the GAA. Under the DAP, even though some projects were within the
Executive, these projects are non-existent insofar as the GAA is concerned because no funds
were appropriated to them in the GAA. Although some of these projects may be legitimate,
they are still non-existent under the GAA because they were not provided for by the GAA. As
such, transfer to such projects is unconstitutional and is without legal basis.
On the issue of what are savings
These DAP transfers are not savings contrary to what was being declared by the Executive.
Under the definition of savings in the GAA, savings only occur, among other instances,
when there is an excess in the funding of a certain project once it is completed, finally
discontinued, or finally abandoned. The GAA does not refer to savings as funds withdrawn
from a slow moving project. Thus, since the statutory definition of savings was not complied
with under the DAP, there is no basis at all for the transfers. Further, savings should only be
declared at the end of the fiscal year. But under the DAP, funds are already being withdrawn
from certain projects in the middle of the year and then being declared as savings by the
Executive particularly by the DBM.
IV. No. Unprogrammed funds from the GAA cannot be used as money source for the DAP
because under the law, such funds may only be used if there is a certification from the
National Treasurer to the effect that the revenue collections have exceeded the revenue
targets. In this case, no such certification was secured before unprogrammed funds were
V. Yes. The Doctrine of Operative Fact, which recognizes the legal effects of an act prior to it
being declared as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, is applicable. The DAP has
definitely helped stimulate the economy. It has funded numerous projects. If the Executive is
ordered to reverse all actions under the DAP, then it may cause more harm than good. The
DAP effects can no longer be undone. The beneficiaries of the DAP cannot be asked to return
what they received especially so that they relied on the validity of the DAP. However, the
Doctrine of Operative Fact may not be applicable to the authors, implementers, and
proponents of the DAP if it is so found in the appropriate tribunals (civil, criminal, or
administrative) that they have not acted in good faith.

G.R. No. 202242 July 17, 2012

and REP. NIEL C. TUPAS, JR., Respondents.
The case is in relation to the process of selecting the nominees for the vacant
seat of Supreme Court Chief Justice following Renato Coronas departure.
Originally, the members of the Constitutional Commission saw the need to
create a separate, competent and independent body to recommend nominees
to the President. Thus, it conceived of a body representative of all the
stakeholders in the judicial appointment process and called it the Judicial and
Bar Council (JBC).

In particular, Paragraph 1 Section 8, Article VIII of the Constitution states that

(1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the
Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the
Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio
Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired
Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector. In
compliance therewith, Congress, from the moment of the creation of the JBC,
designated one representative from the Congress to sit in the JBC to act as
one of the ex officio members.

In 1994 however, the composition of the JBC was substantially altered.

Instead of having only seven (7) members, an eighth (8th) member was
added to the JBC as two (2) representatives from Congress began sitting in
the JBC one from the House of Representatives and one from the Senate,
with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. During the existence of the case,
Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr.
(respondents) simultaneously sat in JBC as representatives of the legislature.

It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition.

The respondents claimed that when the JBC was established, the framers
originally envisioned a unicameral legislative body, thereby allocating a
representative of the National Assembly to the JBC. The phrase, however,
was not modified to aptly jive with the change to bicameralism which was
adopted by the Constitutional Commission on July 21, 1986. The respondents
also contend that if the Commissioners were made aware of the consequence
of having a bicameral legislature instead of a unicameral one, they would
have made the corresponding adjustment in the representation of Congress in
the JBC; that if only one house of Congress gets to be a member of JBC
would deprive the other house of representation, defeating the principle of

The respondents further argue that the allowance of two (2) representatives of
Congress to be members of the JBC does not render JBCs purpose of
providing balance nugatory; that the presence of two (2) members from
Congress will most likely provide balance as against the other six (6)
members who are undeniably presidential appointees

Supreme Court held that it has the power of review the case herein as it is an
object of concern, not just for a nominee to a judicial post, but for all the
citizens who have the right to seek judicial intervention for rectification of legal

Whether the practice of the JBC to perform its functions with eight (8)
members, two (2) of whom are members of Congress, defeats the letter and
spirit of the 1987 Constitution.
No. The current practice of JBC in admitting two members of the Congress to
perform the functions of the JBC is violative of the 1987 Constitution. As such,
it is unconstitutional.
One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the
words of a statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its
literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. It is a well-settled
principle of constitutional construction that the language employed in the
Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical
terms are employed. As such, it can be clearly and unambiguously discerned
from Paragraph 1, Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution that in the
phrase, a representative of Congress, the use of the singular letter a
preceding representative of Congress is unequivocal and leaves no room for
any other construction. It is indicative of what the members of the
Constitutional Commission had in mind, that is, Congress may designate only
one (1) representative to the JBC. Had it been the intention that more than
one (1) representative from the legislature would sit in the JBC, the Framers
could have, in no uncertain terms, so provided.

Moreover, under the maxim noscitur a sociis, where a particular word or

phrase is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings, its
correct construction may be made clear and specific by considering the
company of words in which it is founded or with which it is associated. Every
meaning to be given to each word or phrase must be ascertained from the
context of the body of the statute since a word or phrase in a statute is always
used in association with other words or phrases and its meaning may be
modified or restricted by the latter. Applying the foregoing principle to this
case, it becomes apparent that the word Congress used in Article VIII,
Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in its generic sense. No particular
allusion whatsoever is made on whether the Senate or the House of
Representatives is being referred to, but that, in either case, only a singular
representative may be allowed to sit in the JBC

Considering that the language of the subject constitutional provision is plain

and unambiguous, there is no need to resort extrinsic aids such as records of
the Constitutional Commission. Nevertheless, even if the Court should
proceed to look into the minds of the members of the Constitutional
Commission, it is undeniable from the records thereof that it was intended that
the JBC be composed of seven (7) members only. The underlying reason
leads the Court to conclude that a single vote may not be divided into half
(1/2), between two representatives of Congress, or among any of the sitting
members of the JBC for that matter.

With the respondents contention that each representative should be admitted

from the Congress and House of Representatives, the Supreme Court, after
the perusal of the records of Constitutional Commission, held that Congress,
in the context of JBC representation, should be considered as one body.
While it is true that there are still differences between the two houses and that
an inter-play between the two houses is necessary in the realization of the
legislative powers conferred to them by the Constitution, the same cannot be
applied in the case of JBC representation because no liaison between the two
houses exists in the workings of the JBC. No mechanism is required between
the Senate and the House of Representatives in the screening and
nomination of judicial officers. Hence, the term Congress must be taken to
mean the entire legislative department.

The framers of Constitution, in creating JBC, hoped that the private sector and
the three branches of government would have an active role and equal voice
in the selection of the members of the Judiciary. Therefore, to allow the
Legislature to have more quantitative influence in the JBC by having more
than one voice speak, whether with one full vote or one-half (1/2) a vote each,
would negate the principle of equality among the three branches of
government which is enshrined in the Constitution.

It is clear, therefore, that the Constitution mandates that the JBC be

composed of seven (7) members only. Thus, any inclusion of another
member, whether with one whole vote or half (1/2) of it, goes against that
mandate. Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution, providing Congress with
an equal voice with other members of the JBC in recommending appointees
to the Judiciary is explicit. Any circumvention of the constitutional mandate
should not be countenanced for the Constitution is the supreme law of the
land. The Constitution is the basic and paramount law to which all other laws
must conform and to which all persons, including the highest officials of the
land, must defer. Constitutional doctrines must remain steadfast no matter
what may be the tides of time. It cannot be simply made to sway and
accommodate the call of situations and much more tailor itself to the whims
and caprices of the government and the people who run it.

Notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition of

the JBC, all its prior official actions are nonetheless valid. In the interest of fair
play under the doctrine of operative facts, actions previous to the declaration
of unconstitutionality are legally recognized. They are not nullified.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The current numerical composition of the

Judicial and Bar Council IS declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Judicial and Bar
Council is hereby enjoined to reconstitute itself so that only one ( 1) member of
Congress will sit as a representative in its proceedings, in accordance with Section 8(
1 ), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. This disposition is immediately executory.
Civil Service Commission vs. Cortez, G.R. No. 200103,
April 23, 2014
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; NEPOTISM; DEFINITION. Nepotism is defined as an appointment issued in favor
of a relative within the third civil degree of consanguinity or affinity of any of the following: (1) appointing
authority; (2) recommending authority; (3) chief of the bureau or office; and (4) person exercising immediate
supervision over the appointee. Here, it is undisputed that respondent Cortes is a relative of Commissioner
Mallari in the first degree of consanguinity, as in fact Cortes is the daughter of Commissioner Mallari.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; NEPOTISM; EXCEPTIONS. By way of exception, the following shall not be
covered by the prohibition: (1) persons employed in a confidential capacity; (2) teachers; (3) physicians;
and (4) members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. In the present case, however, the appointment of
respondent Cortes as IO V in the CHR does not fall to any of the exemptions provided by law.

on the rule against nepotism is to take out the discretion of the appointing and recommending authority on
the matter of appointing or recommending for appointment a relative. The rule insures the objectivity of the
appointing or recommending official by preventing that objectivity from being in fact tested. Clearly, the
prohibition against nepotism is intended to apply to natural persons. It is one pernicious evil impeding the
civil service and the efficiency of its personnel.


Moreover, basic rule in statutory construction is the legal maxim that "we must interpret not by the letter
that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life." To rule that the prohibition applies only to the Commission, and
not to the individual members who compose it, will render the prohibition meaningless. Apparently, the
Commission En Banc, which is a body created by fiction of law, can never have relatives to speak of.

Indeed, it is absurd to declare that the prohibitive veil on nepotism does not include appointments made by
a group of individuals acting as a body. What cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly. This
principle is elementary and does not need explanation. Certainly, if acts that cannot be legally done directly
can be done indirectly, then all laws would be illusory.
200103, APRIL 23, 2014)
The Commission en banc of the Commission of Human Rights approved the appointment of
Maricelle M. Cortes as Information Officer V. Eligio P. Mallari Maricelles father, was a CHR
Commissioner but he abstained from voting and instead requested CHR to render an opinion on
the legality of Maricelles appointment.
CHRs Legal Division opined that Maricelles appointment was not nepotic, hence valid, because
the Commission En Banc had a separate and distinct personality from its members. Subsequently
though, CSC-NCR invalidated Maricelles appointment on the ground of nepotism. According to
CSC-NCR, Commissioner Mallari is still considered an appointing authority despite being a mere
member of the Commission En Banc.
Maricelle argued that her appointment was not nepotic because the appointing authority referred
to in Sec. 59 of the Administrative Code is the Commission En Banc and not the individual
Commissioners who compose it.
Is Maricelles appointment covered by the prohibition against nepotism?

Yes. In dismissing Maricelles arguments, the Supreme Court held that the prohibition is intended
to apply to natural persons and not juridical persons because the latter can never have relatives.
Neither did the Court appreciate Commissioner Mallaris abstention from voting since his mere
presence during the deliberation already casted doubt on the impartiality and neutrality of
the Commission En Banc. To quote the Supreme Court:
Indeed, it is absurd to declare that the prohibitive veil on nepotism does not include appointments
made by a group of individuals acting as a body. What cannot be done directly cannot be done
indirectly. This principle is elementary and does not need explanation. Certainly, if acts
that cannot be legally done directly can be done indirectly, then all laws would be illusory.
In the present case, respondent Cortes appointment as IO V in the CHR by the Commission En
Banc, where his father is a member, is covered by the prohibition. Commissioner Mallaris
abstention from voting did not cure the nepotistic character of the appointment because the evil
sought to be avoided by the prohibition still exists. His mere presence during the deliberation for
the appointment of IO V created an impression of influence and cast doubt on the impartiality and
neutrality of the Commission En Banc.


G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010
FACTS: The compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May
17, 2010 occurs just days after the coming presidential elections on May 10,
These cases trace their genesis to the controversy that has arisen from the
forthcoming compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010, or
seven days after the presidential election. Under Section 4(1), in relation to
Section 9, Article VIII, that vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the
occurrence thereof from a list of at least three nominees prepared by the
Judicial and Bar Council for every vacancy. Also considering that Section 15,
Article VII (Executive Department) of the Constitution prohibits the President
or Acting President from making appointments within two months
immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the end of his
term, except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued
vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.

The JBC, in its en banc meeting of January 18, 2010, unanimously agreed to
start the process of filling up the position of Chief Justice.

Conformably with its existing practice, the JBC automatically considered for
the position of Chief Justice the five most senior of the Associate Justices of
the Court, namely: Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio; Associate Justice
Renato C. Corona; Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales; Associate
Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.; and Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B.
Nachura. However, the last two declined their nomination through letters
dated January 18, 2010 and January 25, 2010, respectively.
The OSG contends that the incumbent President may appoint the next Chief
Justice, because the prohibition under Section 15, Article VII of the
Constitution does not apply to appointments in the Supreme Court. It argues
that any vacancy in the Supreme Court must be filled within 90 days from its
occurrence, pursuant to Section 4(1), Article VIII of the Constitution; that had
the framers intended the prohibition to apply to Supreme Court
appointments, they could have easily expressly stated so in the Constitution,
which explains why the prohibition found in Article VII (Executive
Department) was not written in Article VIII (Judicial Department); and that
the framers also incorporated in Article VIII ample restrictions or limitations
on the Presidents power to appoint members of the Supreme Court to ensure
its independence from political vicissitudes and its insulation from political
pressures, such as stringent qualifications for the positions, the
establishment of the JBC, the specified period within which the President shall
appoint a Supreme Court Justice.

A part of the question to be reviewed by the Court is whether the JBC properly
initiated the process, there being an insistence from some of the oppositors-
intervenors that the JBC could only do so once the vacancy has occurred (that
is, after May 17, 2010). Another part is, of course, whether the JBC may
resume its process until the short list is prepared, in view of the provision of
Section 4(1), Article VIII, which unqualifiedly requires the President to
appoint one from the short list to fill the vacancy in the Supreme Court (be it
the Chief Justice or an Associate Justice) within 90 days from the occurrence
of the vacancy.
ISSUE: Whether the incumbent President can appoint the successor of Chief
Justice Puno upon his retirement.
Prohibition under Section 15, Article VII does not apply to appointments to fill
a vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other appointments to the Judiciary.

Two constitutional provisions are seemingly in conflict.

The first, Section 15, Article VII (Executive Department), provides: Section 15.
Two months immediately before the next presidential elections and up to the
end of his term, a President or Acting President shall not make appointments,
except temporary appointments to executive positions when continued
vacancies therein will prejudice public service or endanger public safety.
The other, Section 4 (1), Article VIII (Judicial Department), states: Section 4.
(1). The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen
Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its discretion, in division of three,
five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from
the occurrence thereof.

Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15,
Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could
have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering
of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition
made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most
likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only
reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting President making
appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and up
to the end of the Presidents or Acting Presidents term does not refer to the
Members of the Supreme Court.

Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15,
Article VII to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could
have explicitly done so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering
of the provisions. They would have easily and surely written the prohibition
made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally applicable to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court in Article VIII itself, most
likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII. That such specification was not done only
reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting President making
appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and up
to the end of the Presidents or Acting Presidents term does not refer to the
Members of the Supreme Court.

Section 14, Section 15, and Section 16 are obviously of the same character, in
that they affect the power of the President to appoint. The fact that Section 14
and Section 16 refer only to appointments within the Executive Department
renders conclusive that Section 15 also applies only to the Executive
Department. This conclusion is consistent with the rule that every part of the
statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e. that every part
must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the
general intent of the whole enactment. It is absurd to assume that the framers
deliberately situated Section 15 between Section 14 and Section 16, if they
intended Section 15 to cover all kinds of presidential appointments. If that was
their intention in respect of appointments to the Judiciary, the framers, if only
to be clear, would have easily and surely inserted a similar prohibition in
Article VIII, most likely within Section 4 (1) thereof.

Case Digest: De la Salle University, Petitioner, v. De la Salle

University Employees Association
G.R. No. 169254 : August 23, 2012

De la Salle University, Petitioner, v. De la Salle University Employees Association, Respondent.



On May 30, 2000, some of De La Salle University Employees Association (DLSUEA-NAFTEU) members
headed by Belen Aliazas (the Aliazas faction) filed a petition for the election of union officers in the
Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR). They alleged therein that there has been no election for DLSUEA-
NAFTEUs officers since 1992 in supposed violation of the unions constitution and by-laws which
provided for an election of officers every three years. It would appear that DLSUEA-NAFTEU repeatedly
voted to approve the hold-over of the previously elected officers led by Baylon Baez (Baez faction).

When the matter was eventually elevated to the BLR Director, the latter ruled that the Baez factions
tenure in office is valid and subsisting until their successors have been duly elected and qualified.

Thereafter, DLSUEA-NAFTEU entered into a five-year CBA with De La Salle University (DLSU). The
Aliazas faction wrote a letter to DLSU requesting it to place in escrow the union dues and other fees
deducted from the salaries of employees pending the resolution of the intra-union conflict. DLSUEA-
NAFTEU filed a complaint for unfair labor practice in the NLRC alleging that DLSU violated Article 248(a)
and (g) of the Labor Code. DLSUEA-NAFTEU asserted that that the creation of escrow accounts was not
an act of neutrality as it was influenced by the Aliazas factionss letter and was an act of interference with
the internal affairs of the union. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for unfair labor practice.

Subsequently, DLSUEA-NAFTEU sent a letter to DLSU requesting for the renegotiation of the economic
terms for the fourth and fifth years of the then current CBA. DLSU denied the request prompting
DLSUEA-NAFTEU to file a notice of strike. The Secretary of Labor assumed jurisdiction and found DLSU
guilty of unfair labor practice.

Consequently, DLSUEA-NAFTEU reiterated its demand on DLSU to bargain collectively pursuant to the
aforementioned Decision of the Secretary of Labor. Again, DLSU declined the request. Thus, DLSUEA-
NAFTEU filed another notice of strike. The Secretary of Labor cited his earlier decision and ruled that
DLSU is guilty of unfair labor practice. In accordance with the said decision, DLSU turned over to
DLSUEA-NAFTEU the collected union dues and agency fees from employees which were previously
placed in escrow.

Aggrieved, DLSU appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA dismissed the petition. When the matter
was elevated to the Supreme Court, the Court affirmed the CA. DLSU moved to reconsider but the Court
denied the same. Thus, the decision attained finality. Meanwhile, DLSUEA-NAFTEU was ordered to file a
comment, and, subsequently, this petition was given due course.

ISSUE: Whether or not DLSU is guilty of unfair labor practice when it refused to bargain collectively with
DLSUEA-NAFTEU in light of the intra-union dispute between DLSUEA-NAFTEU two opposing factions?

HELD: The petition is denied.

Inevitably, G.R. No. 168477 and this petition seek only one relief, that is, to absolve petitioner from
respondents charge of committing an unfair labor practice, or specifically, a violation of Article 248(g) in
relation to Article 252 of the Labor Code. In other words, our previous affirmance of the Court of Appeals
finding that petitioner erred in suspending collective bargaining negotiations with the union and in
placing the union funds in escrow considering that the intra-union dispute between the Aliazas and Baez
factions was not a justification therefor is binding herein.

The law of the case has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal. It means that
whatever is once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule or decision between the same
parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case, whether correct on general principles or not,
so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the

Neither can petitioner seek refuge in its defense that as early as November 2003 it had already released
the escrowed union dues to respondent and normalized relations with the latter. The fact remains that
from its receipt of the July 28, 2003 Decision of the Secretary of Labor in OS-AJ-0015-2003 until its
receipt of the November 17, 2003 Decision of the Secretary of Labor in OS-AJ-0033-2003, petitioner
failed in its duty to collectively bargain with respondent union without valid reason.

Petition is DENIED.

G.R. No. 160261. November 10, 2003.

On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, sponsored by Representative
Felix William D. Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an investigation, in
aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)." On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph
E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven
Associate Justices of this Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust
and other high crimes." The complaint was endorsed by Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo
B. Zamora and Didagen Piang Dilangalen, and was referred to the House Committee. The House
Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the first impeachment complaint was "sufficient
in form," but voted to dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in substance. To
date, the Committee Report to this effect has not yet been sent to the House in plenary in accordance
with the said Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution. Four months and three weeks since the filing
on June 2, 2003 of the first complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day after the House Committee on
Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General
of the House by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B. Fuentebella against
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the legislative inquiry initiated by
above-mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a
"Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the
House of Representatives.

1. Whether or not the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives falls within the one year bar provided in the Constitution.
2. Whether the resolution thereof is a political question has resulted in a political crisis.

1. Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of the impeachment complaint
and referral to the House Committee on Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section
3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated in the foregoing
manner, another may not be filed against the same official within a one year period following Article
XI, Section 3(5) of the Constitution. In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed
by former President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., along with seven associate
justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003 and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5,
2003, the second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix
William Fuentebella against the Chief Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional
prohibition against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same impeachable officer
within a one-year period.

2.From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, it is clear that
judicial power is not only a power; it is also a duty, a duty which cannot be abdicated by the mere
specter of this creature called the political question doctrine. Chief Justice Concepcion hastened to
clarify, however, that Section 1, Article VIII was not intended to do away with "truly political questions."
From this clarification it is gathered that there are two species of political questions: (1) "truly political
questions" and (2) those which "are not truly political questions." Truly political questions are thus
beyond judicial review, the reason for respect of the doctrine of separation of powers to be maintained.
On the other hand, by virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution, courts can review questions
which are not truly political in nature.

G.R. No. 171092.

March 15, 2010. EDNA DIAGO LHUILLIER, petitioner, vs. BRITISH AIRWAYS, respondent.
FACTS: On April 28, 2005, petitioner Edna Diago Lhuillier filed a Complaint for damages against
respondent British Airways before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City. The tortuous
conduct by the flight attendants of said Airways, which prompted petitioner to file a case for damages,
allegedly transpired when petitioner
boarded respondents flight 548 from London, United Kingdom to Rome, Italy. On May
30, 2005, respondent, by way of special appearance through counsel, filed a Motion to Dismiss on
grounds of lack of jurisdiction over the case and over the person of the respondent. Respondent
alleged that only the courts of London, United Kingdom or Rome, Italy, have jurisdiction over the
complaint for damages pursuant to the Warsaw Convention, Article 28(1) of which provides:
An action for damages must be
brought at the option of the plaintiff, either before the court of domicile of the carrier or his principal
place of business, or where he has a place of business through which the contract has been made, or
before the court of the place
of destination.
ISSUE: Whether or not Philippines, a signatory to the Warsaw Convention, should adhere to the
provision of the Warsaw Convention in the determination of its jurisdiction with respect to a case for
damages involving a tortuous conduct committed by an airline personnel while in an international
carrier against a Filipino citizen.
HELD: Yes. It is settled that the Warsaw Convention has the force and effect of law in this country. In
Santos III v. Northwest Orient Airlines, 210 SCRA 256 (1992), we held that: The Republic of the
Philippines is a party to the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air, otherwise known as the Warsaw Convention. It took effect on February 13,
1933. The Convention was concurred in by the Senate, through its Resolution No. 19, on May 16, 1950.
The Philippine instrument of accession was signed by President Elpidio Quirino on October 13, 1950,
and was deposited with the Polish government on November 9, 1950. The Convention became
applicable to the Philippines on February 9, 1951. On September 23, 1955, President Ramon
Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 201, declaring our formal adherence
thereto, to the end that the same and every article and clause thereof may be observed
and fulfille
d in good faith by the Republic of the Philippines and the citizens thereof.
The Convention is thus a treaty commitment voluntarily assumed by the Philippine government and,
as such, has the force and effect of law in this country.


December 4, 2007
Issue: Validity of Electric Cooperative Election Code.Ruling:The ECEC is invalid. The ECEC applies to all
electriccooperatives in the country. It is not a mere internalmemorandum, interpretative regulation,
or instruction tosubordinates. No proof was presented to show that it waspublished in OG or other
newspaper of general circulation.Article 2 of the New Civil Code provides that laws shall takeeffect
after fifteen (15) days following the completion of their publication in the
Official Gazette
or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwiseprovided.Executive
Order No. 292, otherwise known asthe
Administrative Code of 1987
, reinforced the requirementof publication and outlined the procedure, as follows: Sec. 3.Filing.(1)
Every Agency shall file withthe University of the PhilippinesLawCenterthree (3) Certifiedcopies of
every rule adopted by it.Rules inforce on the date of effectivity of this Codewhich are not filed within
three (3) monthsfrom that date shall not thereafter be thebasis of any sanction against any party
orpersons. (2)The Records Officer of the agency, or hisequivalent functionary, shall carry out
therequirements of this section under pain of disciplinary action. (3)A permanent register of all rules
shall bekept by the issuing agency and shall beopen to public inspection. Sec. 4.Effectivity In addition
to other rule-making requirements provided by law notinconsistent with this Book, each rule
shallbecome effective fifteen (15) days from thedate of filing as above provided unless adifferent date
is fixed by law, or specifiedin this rule. Sec. 18.When Laws Take Effect Laws shalltake effect after
Fifteen (15) days followingthe completion of their publication in theOfficial Gazette or in a newspaper
of general circulation, unless it is otherwiseprovided
Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance
The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and properties as well as on the
sale or exchange of services. RA 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its
administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code. There are various suits challenging the
constitutionality of RA 7716 on various grounds.

One contention is that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as required by
Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution, because it is in fact the result of the consolidation of 2 distinct bills, H. No.
11197 and S. No. 1630. There is also a contention that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings as required by the

Whether or not RA 7716 violates Art. VI, Secs. 24 and 26(2) ofthe Constitution

The argument that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as required by Art.
VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution will not bear analysis. To begin with, it is not the law but the revenue bill which
is required by the Constitution to originate exclusively in the House of Representatives. To insist that a
revenue statute and not only the bill which initiated the legislative process culminating in the enactment of
the law must substantially be the same as the House bill would be to deny the Senates power not only to
concur with amendments but also to propose amendments. Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is
that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private
bills and bills of local application must come from the House of Representatives on the theory that, elected as
they are from the districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs
and problems. Nor does the Constitutionprohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of
its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of
the House bill.
AUTHORITY, et al.,Respondent.

2009-04-24 | G.R. No. 177333

On 23 February 1995, R.A. No. 7903 was enacted into law, to which it conceived the Zamboanga City Special
Economic Zone (ZAMBOECOZONE) and the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority. Among other things, the law gives
the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority the following power under Sec. 7 (f)
Section 7.
(f) To operate on its own, either directly or through a subsidiary entity, or license
to others, tourism-related activities, including games, amusements and
recreational and sports facilities;

In the exercise of its power granted under the above provision, public respondent ZAMBOECOZONE Authority
approved the application of private respondent Philippine E-Gaming Jurisdiction, Inc. (PEJI) to be a Master
Licensor/Regulator of on-line/internet/electronic gaming/games of chance within the economic zone.

Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) filed the present petition for Prohibition which
assails the authority of the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority to operate, license, or regulate the operation of games
of chance in the ZAMBOECOZONE.

Issue: WoN ZAMBOECOZONE Authority has the mandate of authorizing a private company, PEJI, to be a
Master Licensor/Regulator of on-line/internet/electronic gaming/games of chance within the economic zone.

No. Public respondent Zamboanga Economic Zone Authority is DIRECTED to CEASE and DESIST from
exercising jurisdiction to operate, license, or otherwise authorize and regulate the operation of any games of

The words "game" and "amusement" have definite and unambiguous meanings in law which are clearly
different from "game of chance" or "gambling." In its ordinary sense, a "game" is a sport, pastime, or contest;
while an "amusement" is a pleasurable occupation of the senses, diversion, or enjoyment. On the other hand, a
"game of chance" is "a game in which chance rather than skill determines the outcome," while "gambling" is
defined as "making a bet" or "a play for value against an uncertain event in hope of gaining something of

The plain meaning rule or verba legis, derived from the maxim index animi sermo est (speech is the index of
intention), rests on the valid presumption that the words employed by the legislature in a statute correctly
express its intention or will, and preclude the court from construing it differently. For the legislature is
presumed to know the meaning of the words, to have used them advisedly, and to have expressed the intent
by use of such words as are found in the statute. Verba legis non est recedendum. From the words of a
statute there should be no departure.

The spirit and reason of the statute may be passed upon where a literal meaning would lead to
absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or defeat the clear purpose of the lawmakers. Using the literal
meanings of "games" and "amusement" to exclude" games of chance" and "gambling" does not lead to
absurdity, contradiction, or injustice. Neither does it defeat the intent of the legislators. The lawmakers could
have easily employed the words "games of chance" and "gambling" or even "casinos" if they had intended to
grant the power to operate the same to the ZAMBOECOZONE Authority.
People vs. Jabinal
55 SCRA 607 27 February 1974
Antonio J.
The instant case was an appeal form the judgment of the Municipal Court of Batangas finding the accused
guilty of the crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition. The validity of the conviction was based
upon a retroactive application of the Supreme Courts ruling in People vs. Mapa.
As to the facts, a determined by the trial court, the accused admitted that on September 5, 1964, he was in
possession of the revolver and the ammunition described in the complaint was without the requisite license a
permit. He however, contended that he was a SECRET AGENT appointed by the governor, and was likewise
subsequently appended as Confidential Agent, which granted him the authority to possess fire arm in the
performance of his official duties as peace officer. Relying on the Supreme Courts decision in People vs.
Macarandang and People vs. Lucero, the accused sought for his aquittal.
Noting and agreeing to the evidence presented by the accused, the trial court nonetheless decided otherwise,
citing that People vs. Macarandang and People vs. Lucero were reversed and subsequently abandoned in
people vs. mapa.

Should appellant be acquitted on the bases of Supreme Court rulings in Macarandana and Lucero, or should
his conviction stand in view of the completer reversal of Macarandang and Lucero doctrine in Mapa?

The judgment appealed was reversed, and the appellant was acquitted.

The doctrine laid down in lucero and Macarandang was part of the jurisprudence, hence, of the law, at the
time appellant was found in possession of fire arm in question and he was arraigned by the trial court. It is
true that the doctrine was overruled in Mapa case in 1967, but when a doctrine of the Supreme Court is
overruled and a new one is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied prospectively, and should not apply
to partres who had relied on the old doctrine and acted on the faith thereof.
Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc vs COMELEC
G.R. No. 190529
Ponente: Justice Brion

The Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. (PGBI) files a petition for review and a motion for
reconsideration to nullify Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Resolution No. 8679 dated October 13,
2009 insofar as it relates to PGBI and the Resolution dated December 9, 2009. These resolutions delisted
PGBI from the roster of registered national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions under
the party-list system.

According to Section 6(8) of Republic Act No. 7941, known as Party-List System Act, COMELEC, upon
verified complaint of any interested party, may remove or cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration
of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition if: (1) it fails to participate in the last two
preceding elections or (2)fails to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list
system in the two preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered.
For May 2010 Elections, the COMELEC en banc issued Resolution No. 8679 deleting several party-list
groups or organizations from the list of registered national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations or

Among the party-list organizations affected was PGBI; it was delisted because it failed to get 2% of the votes
cast in 2004 and it did not participate in the 2007 elections.

PGBI filed its opposition to Resolution No. 8679 and likewise, sought for accreditation as a party-list
organization. One of the arguments cited is that the Supreme Court's ruling in G.R. No. 177548 MINERO
(Philippine Mines Safety Environment Association) vs COMELEC cannot apply in the instant controversy.

One of the reasons is because the factual milieu of the cited case is removed from PGBI's. Additionally, the
requirement of Section 6(8) has been relaxed by the Court's ruling in G.R. No. 179271 - BANAT (Barangay
Association for Advancement and National Transparency) vs COMELEC.

COMELEC denied the motion and in response, pointed out that the MINERO ruling is squarely in point, as
MINERO failed to get 2% of the votes in 2001 and did not participate at all in the 2004 elections.

Whether the MINERO ruling can be use as a legal basis in delisting PGBI.

According to the Court, the MINERO ruling is an erroneous application of Section 6(8) of RA 7941; hence,
it cannot sustain PGBI's delisting from the roster of registered national, regional or sectoral parties,
organizations or coalitions under the party-list system.

First the law is clear in that the word "or" is a disjunctive term signifying disassociation and independence
of one thing from the other things enumerated; it should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it
ordinarily implies, as a disjunctive word. Thus, the plain, clear and unmistakable language of the law provides
for two separate reasons for delisting.

Second, MINERO is diametrically opposed to the legislative intent of Section 6(8) of RA 7941 and therefore,
simply cannot stand. Its basic defect lies in its characterization of the non-participation of a party-list
organization in an election as similar to a failure to garner the 2% threshold party-list vote.

What MINERO effectively holds is that a party list organization that does not participate in an election
necessarily gets, by default, less than 2% of the party-list votes. To be sure, this is a confused interpretation
of the law, given the law's clear and categorical language and the legislative intent to treat the two scenarios
differently. A delisting based on a mixture or fusion of these two different and separate grounds for delisting
is therefore a strained application of the law - in jurisdictional terms, it is an interpretation not within the
contemplation of the framers of the law and hence is a gravely abusive interpretation of the law.

Instead, what should be taken into account is the ruling in BANAT vs COMELEC where the 2% party-list
vote requirement provided in RA 7941 is partly invalidated.

The Court rules that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the two
percent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of
R.A. No. 7941 is unconstitutional; it finds that the two percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible
to achieve the maximum number of available party list seats when the number of available party list seats
exceeds 50.The continued operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution of the additional seats
frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the House of Representatives
shall consist of party-list representatives.

To reiterate, Section 6(8) of RA 7941 provides for two separate grounds for delisting; these grounds cannot
be mixed or combined to support delisting; and the disqualification for failure to garner 2% party-list votes
in two preceding elections should now be understood, in light of the BANAT ruling, to mean failure to qualify
for a party-list seat in two preceding elections for the constituency in which it has registered. This is how
Section 6(8) of RA 7941 should be understood and applied under the authority of the Supreme Court to state
what the law is and as an exception to the application of the principle of stare decisis (to adhere to precedents
and not to unsettle things which are established).

The most compelling reason to abandon MINERO and strike it out from ruling case law is that it was clearly
an erroneous application of the law - an application that the principle of stability or predictability of decisions
alone cannot sustain. MINERO did unnecessary violence to the language of the law, the intent of the
legislature and to the rule of law in general.

Therefore, the Supreme Court grants PGBIs petition and accordingly, annul COMELEC Resolution No.
8679 dated October 13, 2009 insofar as the petitioner PGBI is concerned and the Resolution dated December
9, 2009 which denied PGBI's motion for reconsideration. PGBI is qualified to be voted upon as a party-list
group or organization in the May 2010 elections.
MARCH 28, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ

KAREN E. SALVACION, minor, thru Federico N. Salvacion, Jr., father and

Natural Guardian, and Spouses FEDERICO N. SALVACION, JR., and
G.R. No. 94723 August 21, 1997
FACTS: Greg Bartelli, an American tourist, was arrested for committing four
counts of rape and serious illegal detention against Karen Salvacion. Police
recovered from him several dollar checks and a dollar account in the China
Banking Corp. He was, however, able to escape from prison. In a civil case
filed against him, the trial court awarded Salvacion moral, exemplary and
attorneys fees amounting to almost P1,000,000.00.
Salvacion tried to execute the judgment on the dollar deposit of Bartelli with
the China Banking Corp. but the latter refused arguing that Section 11 of
Central Bank Circular No. 960 exempts foreign currency deposits from
attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court,
legislative body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever.
Salvacion therefore filed this action for declaratory relief in the Supreme

ISSUE: Should Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and Section 8 of
Republic Act No. 6426, as amended by PD 1246, otherwise known as the
Foreign Currency Deposit Act be made applicable to a foreign transient?
The provisions of Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and PD No.
1246, insofar as it amends Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6426, are hereby held
to be INAPPLICABLE to this case because of its peculiar circumstances.
Respondents are hereby required to comply with the writ of execution issued
in the civil case and to release to petitioners the dollar deposit of Bartelli in
such amount as would satisfy the judgment.

Supreme Court ruled that the questioned law makes futile the favorable
judgment and award of damages that Salvacion and her parents fully deserve.
It then proceeded to show that the economic basis for the enactment of RA
No. 6426 is not anymore present; and even if it still exists, the questioned law
still denies those entitled to due process of law for being unreasonable and
oppressive. The intention of the law may be good when enacted. The law failed
to anticipate the iniquitous effects producing outright injustice and inequality
such as the case before us.

The SC adopted the comment of the Solicitor General who argued that the
Offshore Banking System and the Foreign Currency Deposit System were
designed to draw deposits from foreign lenders and investors and,
subsequently, to give the latter protection. However, the foreign currency
deposit made by a transient or a tourist is not the kind of deposit encouraged
by PD Nos. 1034 and 1035 and given incentives and protection by said laws
because such depositor stays only for a few days in the country and, therefore,
will maintain his deposit in the bank only for a short time. Considering that
Bartelli is just a tourist or a transient, he is not entitled to the protection of
Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246 against
attachment, garnishment or other court processes.
Further, the SC said: In fine, the application of the law depends on the extent
of its justice. Eventually, if we rule that the questioned Section 113 of Central
Bank Circular No. 960 which exempts from attachment, garnishment, or any
other order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or
any administrative body whatsoever, is applicable to a foreign transient,
injustice would result especially to a citizen aggrieved by a foreign guest like
accused Greg Bartelli. This would negate Article 10 of the New Civil Code
which provides that in case of doubt in the interpretation or application of
laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to

On February 4, 1989, Greg Bartelli y Northcott, an American tourist, coaxed
and lured petitioner Karen Salvacion, then 12 years old to go with him to his
apartment. Therein, Greg Bartelli detained Karen Salvacion for four days, or
up to February 7, 1989 and was able to rape the child once on February 4, and
three times each day on February 5, 6, and 7, 1989. On February 7, 1989, after
policemen and people living nearby, rescued Karen, Greg Bartelli was arrested
and detained at the Makati Municipal Jail. The policemen recovered from
Bartelli the following items: 1.) Dollar Check No. 368, Control No.
021000678-1166111303, US 3,903.20; 2.) COCOBANK Bank Book No. 104-
108758-8 (Peso Acct.); 3.) Dollar Account China Banking Corp.,
US$/A#54105028-2; 4.) ID-122-30-8877; 5.) Philippine Money (P234.00)
cash; 6.) Door Keys 6 pieces; 7.) Stuffed Doll (Teddy Bear) used in seducing
the complainant.


JOY C. CABILES, Respondent.

G.R. No. 170139 August 5, 2014


TOPIC: Section 10 of RA 8042 vis-a-vis Section 7 of RA 10022


Petitioner, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc., is a recruitment

and placement agency.

Respondent Joy Cabiles was hired thus signed a one-year employment

contract for a monthly salary of NT$15,360.00. Joy was deployed to work for
Taiwan Wacoal, Co. Ltd. (Wacoal) on June 26, 1997. She alleged that in her
employment contract, she agreed to work as quality control for one year. In
Taiwan, she was asked to work as a cutter.

Sameer claims that on July 14, 1997, a certain Mr. Huwang from
Wacoal informed Joy, without prior notice, that she was terminated and that
she should immediately report to their office to get her salary and passport.
She was asked to prepare for immediate repatriation. Joy claims that she was
told that from June 26 to July 14, 1997, she only earned a total of NT$9,000.15
According to her, Wacoal deducted NT$3,000 to cover her plane ticket to

On October 15, 1997, Joy filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with
the NLRC against petitioner and Wacoal. LA dismissed the complaint. NLRC
reversed LAs decision. CA affirmed the ruling of the National Labor Relations
Commission finding respondent illegally dismissed and awarding her three
months worth of salary, the reimbursement of the cost of her repatriation, and
attorneys fees


Whether or not Cabiles was entitled to the unexpired portion of her

salary due to illegal dismissal.


YES. The Court held that the award of the three-month equivalent of
respondents salary should be increased to the amount equivalent to the
unexpired term of the employment contract.

In Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation

Co., Inc., this court ruled that the clause or for three (3) months for every year
of the unexpired term, whichever is less is unconstitutional for violating the
equal protection clause and substantive due process.
A statute or provision which was declared unconstitutional is not a
law. It confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it
creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not been passed at all.

The Court said that they are aware that the clause or for three (3)
months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less was reinstated
in Republic Act No. 8042 upon promulgation of Republic Act No. 10022 in

Ruling on the constitutional issue

In the hierarchy of laws, the Constitution is supreme. No branch or

office of the government may exercise its powers in any manner inconsistent
with the Constitution, regardless of the existence of any law that supports such
exercise. The Constitution cannot be trumped by any other law. All laws must
be read in light of the Constitution. Any law that is inconsistent with it is a

Thus, when a law or a provision of law is null because it is

inconsistent with the Constitution, the nullity cannot be cured by
reincorporation or reenactment of the same or a similar law or provision. A law
or provision of law that was already declared unconstitutional remains as such
unless circumstances have so changed as to warrant a reverse conclusion.

The Court observed that the reinstated clause, this time as provided in
Republic Act. No. 10022, violates the constitutional rights to equal protection
and due process.96 Petitioner as well as the Solicitor General have failed to
show any compelling change in the circumstances that would warrant us to
revisit the precedent.
The Court declared, once again, the clause, or for three (3) months
for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less in Section 7 of Republic
Act No. 10022 amending Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is declared
unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void.
Taada vs. Tuvera 136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985) 146
SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)

136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985)


Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern as well as the principle that
laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette, petitioners filed for writ of
mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish and/or cause to publish various presidential
decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of
implementations and administrative orders.

The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for the dismissal of the case, contending that
petitioners have no legal personality to bring the instant petition.


Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law or statute becomes valid and


Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the
law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of this provision is to give the general
public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens.
Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim ignoratia
legis nominem excusat. It would be the height of injustive to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the
transgression of a law which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.

The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be published in the Official Gazette. The
word shall therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if
the constitutional right of the people to be informed on matter of public concern is to be given substance
and validity.

The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a requirement of

due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and
specifically informed of its contents. The Court declared that presidential issuances of general application
which have not been published have no force and effect.


146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)


This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on April 24, 1985. Respondent argued
that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was otherwise as when the decrees
themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval.

1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not as
to their publication;
2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of general circulation.


The clause unless it is otherwise provided refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of
publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature
may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or in any other date, without its previous

Laws should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking, all laws
relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. A law without any
bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires
act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest eve if it might be
directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as a whole.

All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for
their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the

Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its purpose is to inform the public of the
content of the law.

Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazette, and not
elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity. The Supreme Court is not called upon to rule upon the
wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if it finds it impractical.

The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible.

J. Cruz:

Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with their
dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding
unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full disclosure
and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot faint, parry or
cut unless the naked blade is drawn.