Crim Law 1 Case Digest: People V.

Wong
Cheng (1922)
People v. Wong Cheng, 46 Phil. 729
G.R. No.L-18924 October 19, 1922
ROMUALDEZ, J.

FACTS:
appellee is accused of having illegally smoked opium, aboard the merchant vessel Changsa of
English nationality while said vessel was anchored in Manila Bay two and a half miles from the
shores of the city.
Lower court dismissed the case

ISSUE: W/N the courts of the Philippines have jurisdiction over crime committed aboard
merchant vessels anchored in our jurisdiction waters

HELD: The order appealed from is revoked and the cause ordered remanded to the court of
origin for further proceedings in accordance with law, without special findings as to costs.
YES.
2 fundamental rules on this particular matter in connection with International Law
1. French rule-according to which crimes committed aboard a foreign merchant vessels should
not be prosecuted in the courts of the country within whose territorial jurisdiction they were
committed
UNLESS: their commission affects the peace and security of the territory
2. English rule
-based on the territorial principle and followed in the United States
-according to which crimes perpetrated under such circumstances are in general triable in the
courts of the country within territory they were committed.
As to whether the United States has ever consented by treaty or otherwise to renouncing such
jurisdiction or a part thereof, we find nothing to this effect so far as England is concerned, to
which nation the ship where the crime in question was committed belongs.
mere possession of opium aboard a foreign vessel in transit was held by this court not triable
by or courts, because it being the primary object of our Opium Law to protect the inhabitants of
the Philippines against the disastrous effects entailed by the use of this drug, its mere possession
in such a ship, without being used in our territory, does not being about in the said territory those
effects that our statute contemplates avoiding. Hence such a mere possession is not considered a
disturbance of the public order.
 to smoke opium within our territorial limits, even though aboard a foreign merchant ship, is
certainly a breach of the public order here established, because it causes such drug to produce its
pernicious effects within our territory. It seriously contravenes the purpose that our Legislature
has in mind in enacting the aforesaid repressive statute.

Crim Law 1 Case Digest: People V. Ah Chong

(1910)
People v. Ah Chong 15 Phil. 488
G.R. No. L-5272 March 19, 1910
CARSON, J.

Lesson: mistake of fact, definition of felony

Laws: Article 1 RPC, Art 3 RPC

FACTS:
August 14, 1908 About 10 pm: Ah Chong, a cook was suddenly awakened by some trying to
force open the door of the room. He sat up in bed and called out twice, "Who is there?" He heard no
answer and was convinced by the noise at the door that it was being pushed open by someone bent
upon forcing his way into the room. The defendant, fearing that the intruder was a robber or a thief,
leaped to his feet and called out. "If you enter the room, I will kill you." At that moment he was struck
just above the knee by the edge of the chair (thought to be an unlawful aggression) which had been
placed against the door. Seizing a common kitchen knife which he kept under his pillow, the
defendant struck out wildly at the intruder who, it afterwards turned out, was his roommate, Pascual
who is a house boy or muchacho who in the spirit of mischief was playing a trick on him
Seeing that Pascual was wounded, he called to his employers and ran back to his room to secure
bandages to bind up Pascual's wounds.
There had been several robberies not long prior to the date of the incident, one of which took
place in a house where he was employed as cook so he kept a knife under his pillow for his personal
protection.
trial court held it as simple homicide

ISSUE: W/N defendant can be held criminally responsible who, by reason of a mistake as to the
facts, does an act for which he would be exempt from criminal liability if the facts were as he
supposed them to be, but which would constitute the crime of homicide or assassination if the actor
had known the true state of the facts at the time when he committed the act.

HELD: trial court should be reversed, and the defendant acquitted of the crime
NO.
GR: acts constituting the crime or offense must be committed with malice or with criminal intent in
order that the actor may be held criminally liable
EX: it appears that he is exempted from liability under one or other of the express provisions of
article 8 of the code
Article 1 RPC of the Penal Code is as follows:
Crimes or misdemeanors are voluntary acts and ommissions punished by law.
o A person voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor shall incur criminal liability, even though
the wrongful act committed be different from that which he had intended to commit.
o voluntary act is a free, intelligent, and intentional act
o "malice" signifying the intent
o Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea - "the act itself does not make man guilty unless his
intention were so
o Actus me incito factus non est meus actus - an act done by me against my will is not my act
GR: courts have recognized the power of the legislature to forbid, in a limited class of cases, the
doing of certain acts, and to make their commission criminal WITHOUT regard to the intent of the
doer
EX: intention of the lawmaker to make the commission of certain acts criminal without regard to
the intent of the doer is clear and beyond question the statute will not be so construed
ignorantia facti excusat applies only when the mistake is committed without fault or carelessness
defendant at the time, he acted in good faith, without malice, or criminal intent, in the belief that
he was doing no more than exercising his legitimate right of self-defense; that had the facts been as
he believed them to be he would have been wholly exempt from criminal liability on account of his
act; and that he can not be said to have been guilty of negligence or recklessness or even
carelessness in falling into his mistake as to the facts, or in the means adopted by him to defend
himself from the imminent danger which he believe threatened his person and his property and the
property under his charge.

People vs. Silvestre and Atienza (Crim1)

People of the Philippine Islands, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Romana Silvestre and Martin Atienza, defendants-
appellants.

En Banc
Villareal, December 14, 1931

Topic: Elements of criminal liability (Art 3.) -- Physical element -- Act/Omission

Facts:

Romana Silvestre is the wife of Domingo Joaquin by his second marriage

Romana cohabited with codefendant Martin Atienza from March 1930 in Masocol, Paombong,
Bulacan
On May 16, 1930, Domingo filed with the justice of the peace for Paombong, Bulacan a sworn
complaint for adultery
After being arrested and released on bail, the two defendants begged the municipal president of
Paombong to speak to the complainant and urge him to withdraw the complaint
The two accused bound themselves to discontinue cohabitation and promised not to live again in
Masocol (Atienza signed the promise)
On May 20, 1930, Domingo Joaquin filed a motion for the dismissal of his complaint and the
justice of the peace dismissed the adultery case
The accused left Masocol and wen to live in Santo Nio, in Paombong
About November 20, 1930: Romana met her son by her former marriage, Nicolas de la Cruz, in
Santo Nio and followed him home to Masocol (under the pretext of asking him for some nipa leaves)
Martin Atienza, who continued to cohabit with Romana, followed her and lived in the home of
Nicolas
On the night of November 25, 1930, while Nicolas, his wife Antonia, and the appellants were
gathered after supper, Martin told Nicolas and Antonia to take their furniture out of the house because he
was going to set fire to it
He said that that was the only way he could be revenged upon the people of Masocol
who, he said, had instigated the charge of adultery against him and Romana
Martin was armed with a pistol so no one dared say anything to him
Nicolas and Antonia went to ask for help but were too late
The fire destroyed about 48 houses
Witnesses saw Martin and Romana leaving the house on fire
The Court of First Instance of Bulacan convicted Martin and Romana of arson
Martin was convicted as principal by direct participation (14 years, 8 months, and 1 day of
cadena temporal)
Romana was convicted as accomplice (6 years and 1 day of presidio mayor)
The court-appointed counsel for the accused-appellant prays for the affirmance of the CFI
decision with regard to Martin, but assigns errors with reference to Romana:
The lower court erred in convicting Romana as acoomplice
The court erred in not acquitting Romana upon ground of insufficient evidence, or at
least, of reasonable doubt
Issue:
Whether or not Romana can be convicted as accomplice
Holding:
No.
 Ratio:
Art. 14 of the Penal Code, in connection with Art. 13 defines an accomplice to be one who does
not take a direct part in the commission of the act, who does not force or induce other to commit it, nor
cooperates in the commission of the act by another act without which it would not have been
accomplished, yet cooperates in the execution of the act by previous or simultaneous actions.
In the case of Romana: there is no evidence of moral or material cooperation and none of an
agreement to commit the crime in question. Her mere presence and silence while they are simultaneous
acts, do not constitute cooperation, for it does not appear that they encouraged or nerved Martin Atienza
to commit the crime of arson; and as for her failure to give the alarm, that being a subsequent act it does
not make her liable as an accomplice.
Mere passive presence at the scene of another's crime, mere silence and failure to give the
alarm, without evidence of agreement or conspiracy, do not constitute the cooperation required by Art. 14
of the Penal Code for complicity in the commission of the crime witnessed passively, or with regard to
which one has kept silent
Decision is affirmed with reference to Martin Atienza, reversed with reference to Romana Silvestre, who is
acquitted.

Crim Law 1 Case Digest: People V. Oanis

1943
People v. Oanis, 74 Phil. 257
G.R. No.L-47722 July 27, 1943
MORAN, J.

Lesson applicable: mitigating circumstances

FACTS:
Captain Godofredo Monsod, Constabulary Provincial Inspector at Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, received from
Major Guido a telegram of the following tenor: "Information received escaped convict Anselmo Balagtas
with bailarina and Irene in Cabanatuan get him dead or alive." Captain Monsod accordingly called for his first
sergeant and asked that he be given four men.
The same instruction was given to the chief of police Oanis who was likewise called by the Provincial Inspector.
Defendants Oanis and Galanta then went to the room of Irene, and an seeing a man sleeping with his back
towards the door where they were, simultaneously or successively fired at him with their .32 and .45 caliber
revolvers. Awakened by the gunshots, Irene saw her paramour already wounded, and looking at the door where
the shots came, she saw the defendants still firing at him. Shocked by the entire scene. Irene fainted; it turned
out later that the person shot and killed was not the notorious criminal Anselmo Balagtas but a peaceful and
innocent citizen named Serapio Tecson, Irene's paramour.
 According to Appellant Galanta, when he and chief of police Oanis arrived at the house, the latter asked Brigida
where Irene's room was. Brigida indicated the place, and upon further inquiry as to the whereabouts of
Anselmo Balagtas, she said that he too was sleeping in the same room.
ISSUE: W/N they may, upon such fact, be held responsible for the death thus caused to Tecson

HELD: appellants are hereby declared guilty of murder with the mitigating circumstance
YES.
ignorantia facti excusat, but this applies only when the mistake is committed without fault or carelessness
appellants found no circumstances whatsoever which would press them to immediate action. The person in the
room being then asleep, appellants had ample time and opportunity to ascertain his identity without hazard to
themselves, and could even effect a bloodless arrest if any reasonable effort to that end had been made, as the
victim was unarmed.
"No unnecessary or unreasonable force shall be used in making an arrest, and the person arrested shall not be
subject to any greater restraint than is necessary for his detention."
a peace officer cannot claim exemption from criminal liability if he uses unnecessary force or violence in
making an arrest
The crime committed by appellants is not merely criminal negligence, the killing being intentional and not
accidental. In criminal negligence, the injury caused to another should be unintentional, it being simply the
incident of another act performed without malice.
2 requisites in order that the circumstance may be taken as a justifying one:
1. offender acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right-present
2. injury or offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of such duty or the
lawful exercise of such right or office.-not present
According to article 69 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty lower by 1 or 2 degrees than that prescribed by
law shall, in such case, be imposed.

88 Phil. 368

JUGO, J.:
Federico Soriano was charged on August 22, 1945, with the crime of theft of
one electric motor marked "Cyclix," with Western Electric Company cable,
and one lantern slide projector, with their corresponding accessories, for
the operation of motion pictures, valued at P6,000, belonging to the Eagle
Cinema Co., Inc., represented by its President-Manager, Teodoro S.
Benedict.
After trial he was convicted by the Court of First Instance of Iloilo and
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of from six (6) months
of arresto mayor to two (2) years, eleven (11) months and eleven (11) days
of prision correctional, with the accessory penalties of the law, and to pay
the costs. He appealed to the Court of Appeals, which modified the above
judgement and sentenced him to three (3) months of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days
of prision correctional, as maximum, with the accessory penalties of the
law, and to pay the costs, ordering that the lantern slide projector (Exhibit
C) and the "Cyclix" motor generator (Exhibit D) be returned to the owner,
the Eagle Cinema Co., Inc.

The defendant filed a petition for certiorari in this Court against the Court
of Appeals. Only questions of law are raised which may be reduced to the
issue whether or not the acts of the accused, as found by the Court of
Appeals, constitute theft.

The Court of Appeals, in a carefully prepared opinion, held as follows:

"Taking into account the respective contentions of the parties and the
evidence produced in support thereof, We are of the opinion despite Emilia
Saenz' letter (Exhibit E) where she writes to Benedicto that Federico
Soriano was only in charge of collecting the rents and of transmitting them
to her, that appellant was their representative and duly appointed
substitute administrator in her stead. It seems also clear that, because of
the disturbance caused by the war, the Eagle Cinema Co., Inc., was
indebted to the Saenz for rents due on account of the lease; and that
appellant in the exercise of the powers conferred upon him (Exhibit 16)
could have sued said debtor to foreclose the mortgage executed by the Eagle
Cinema Co., Inc., in favor of his principals, if he could not have come to a
better understanding with Teodoro S. Benedicto. It is no longer disputed
that the properties of the Eagle Cinema Co., Inc., in the building were lost,
and that the lantern slide projector (Exhibit C) and the "Cyclix" motor
generator (Exhibit D) have been found in the house and in the possession of
the appellant after having repeatedly denied any knowledge of the
equipment and accessories of the Cine and disclaimed any responsibility for
their loss. Considering these facts that have been fully established in the
case, and particularly the manner and circumstances under which said
projector and generator were taken from the building of the Eagle-Theater,
can appellant be held liable for the crime of theft of such properties?

"Counsel for appellant contends that the latter is entitled to an acquittal,

because in the case at bar

"1. All the elements of theft are not present;

"2. There was no criminal intent (on the part of the appellant) ;

"3. The action of the appellant is susceptible of two interpretations, both

consistent with his innocence or guilt. Therefore, he should be acquitted;
and

"4. The guilt of the appellant has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt.

"The crime of theft of which appellant stands charged and convicted, is

covered by the 1st paragraph of Article 308 of the Kevised Penal Code,
which read as follows:

'Art. 308. Who are liable for theft. Theft is committed by any person who,
with intent of gain but without violence against or intimidation of persons
nor force upon things, shall take personal property of another without the
latter's consent.',
and we agree with counsel for appellant that in order to justify a conviction
for theft the following elements must concur, namely: (a) that a chattel or
personal property must have been taken or abstracted; (b) that there be
intent of gain when the taking away of the article took place; (c) that the
property stolen be owned by another; and (d) that in the taking, neither
violence or intimidation against persons or force upon things be employed.

"With regard to the 'taking,' appellant contends that he did not execute this
element of theft because being an attorney-in-fact of the heirs of Saenz, he
acted for his principals, and for all intents and purposes of the power
conferred upon him, he was the principal himself and, naturally, he could
not steal something belonging to him under the principle that 'Rei nostrae
furtum facera rum possumtis'. The power of attorney (Exhibit 16) clearly
empowered the appellant 'to ask, demand, sue for, recover, collect and
receipt for any and all sums of money * * * and other things of value of
whatsoever nature or kind,' and gave him 'full power to do anything
requisite and necessary to be done in the premises as fully as I (Emilia
Saenz) could if personally present, hereby ratifying and confirming all that
my said attorney and substitute attorney shall lawfully do or cause to be
done by virtue hereof.' But appellant fails to take two important factors into
consideration, to writ: firstly, that when he took, as he finally admitted to
have taken, the lantern slide projector and the 'Cyclix' motor generator
from the Eagle-Theater, he did not really act in behalf and representation of
his principals, for otherwise he would not have repeatedly denied having
taken said properties and insinuated that they had been taken by the
Japanese; and secondly, that even his principals could not have taken and
appropriated said properties for themselves without previous and proper
action in court, because no mortgage creditor can foreclose the property
mortgage to him without judicial proceedings. Thus, the doctrines laid
down by the Supreme Court in the case of United States vs. Reyes, (Phil.,
441); People vs.Soriano, (50 Phil., 203) Manila Mercantile Co. vs. Flores
(50 Phil., 759) and Levy Hermanos, Inc., vs. Ramirez (60 Phil., 978), on
which appellant builds up his contention, are of no bearing on the case at
bar.

"Discussing further this element of 'taking,' it can be added that the

projector (Exhibit C) and the generator (Exhibit D) were in the premises of
the Eagle Theater, and that sometime in September, 1944, when the
Japanese Ishii ceased to operate the Cine, appellant received the keys of the
building where said equipment was stored. So, the question that remains to
be determined in connection with this point is whether appellant, having
received those properties, could, for the purposes of the crime of theft, take
things already in his possession. It is to be remembered that the apparatus,
accessories and equipment of the Cine belonged to the Eagle Cinema Co.,
Inc., though they were mortgaged to appellant's principals; that the
mortgage was never foreclosed, and that neither Teodoro S. Benedicto, as
President, General Manager and majority stockholder of said corporation,
nor any other duly authorized person in his stead, had ever entrusted said
properties to him for the execution of the mortgage, or for any other
purpose. And even conceding for the sake of argument that with the return
of the keys and the delivery of the building to appellant, he would
have received the physical possession of the machinery therein located, yet,
the acquisition of such possesion did not carry with it the power to exercise
any act of dominion over said chattels. Among the leading cases that can be
cited to illustrate this phase of the problem, we quote the following from
Question No. XXXI of Viada (vol. 3, page 433, 4th ed.) ;
"'Is the shepherd, who takes away and converts to his own use several head
of cattle under his care, guilty of the crime of estafa within case No. 5 of
article 548, or of theft, defined and punished in article 533, No. 2, of the
Spanish Penal Code' The Supreme Court has decided that it was this latter
and more serious crime that was committed: 'Considering that the crime of
theft is committed when one, with intent of gain, and without using
violence or intimidation against persons, or force upon things, takes away
personal property of another without the owner's consent; and in the
present case Manuel Diaz Castilla undoubtedly committed the crime
defined, for, with intent of gain, he took away two bucks and a female goat,
against the will of his master, the owner of said animals, which were under
his care as shepherd; Considering that, in holding that the crime committed
was that of theft and not of estafa, as claimed by the appellant, ignorant of
the true elements which constitute the latter crime, the lower court did not
commit any error of law, nor violate any legal provision, as contended by
defendant's counsel in support of this appeal.' (Decision rendered on June
23, 1886, published in the Gazette of September 16, p. 189.)

"And this is so, because as stated in the case of United States vs. Nieves de
Vera, (43 Phil. 1000):

'When the delivery of a chattel or cattle has not the effect of transferring the
juridical possession thereof, or title thereto, it is presumed that the
possession of, and title to, the thing so delivered remains in the owner; and
the net of disposing thereof with intent of gain and without the consent of
the owner constitutes the crime of theft'
"As to the element of 'intent of gain,' We further declare that whenever a
cattle or other personal property value is abstracted without the consent of
the owner, and the evidence on record does not show any other reason for
the abstraction, it is to be presumed and logically inferred that such act was
motivated by an intent of gain." (Decision, pp. 7-12.)
The petitioner shields himself behind the power-of-attorney, Exhibit 16,
granted to him by Emilia Saenz, the owner of the building which was rented
by the Eagle Cinema Co., Inc., the essential part of which reads as follows:

"To ask, take, sue for, recover, collect and receive any and all sums of
money, debts, dues, accounts, interests, demands, and other things of value
of whatsoever nature or kind as may be or hereafter be due, owing, payable
or belonging to the community entrusted to me (Emilia Saenz) in the City
of Iloilo and to have, use, and take any and all lawful ways and means for
the recovery thereof by suit, attachment or otherwise, and to compromise,
settle and agree for (Decision, 5-6.)
It is clear that said power of attorney did not authorize the petitioner to
take away the projector and the generator, hiding them in his house and
denying to the owner and the police authorities that he had them in his
possession, which was an illegal act, not covered by his power-of-attorney.
He was authorized only to ask, take, sue for, recover, collect, etc., sums of
money, debts, dues, accounts and other things which were or might
thereafter be due, etc., to his principal Emilia Saenz. This authority referred
mainly to the collection of the rents of the building rented by the Eagle
Cinema Co., Inc. The projector and the generator were not due or owing to
Emilia Saenz. It is not to be supposed that Saenz herself would have denied
the possession of those articles. If it was the purpose of the petitioner only
to protect those instruments from looting, there is no reason why he should
have concealed them from the owner and denied having them.

Even though the equipment, including those articles, were mortgaged to

Saenz to guarantee the payment of the rents due on the building, yet there
had been no foreclosure and neither she nor the petitioner had the
authority to take away and conceal those articles from the owner or the
police authorities. The Eagle Cinema Co., Inc., had the right to possess said
articles.

With regard to the element of taking or asportation, there is no doubt that it

existed, notwithstanding that the petitioner had been entrusted with the
keys of the building where they were kept. This point has been settled by
Viada, numerous decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain and of the
Philippines, some of which authorities are cited above.

As to the element of intent, it is clear that when the petitioner carried away
and concealed from the owner and the police authorities the above-
mentioned articles, he acted with intent of gain. Intent is a mental state, the
existence of which is shown by the overt acts of a person, which in the
present case unmistakably point to that intent.

In view of the foregoing, the petition for the writ of certiorari is denied, with
costs against the petitioner. So ordered.
Moran, C. J., Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Tuason,
Montemayor and Reyes, JJ., concur.

DISSENTING

PARAS, J.,

I dissent.

Under the facts of this case, as found by the Court of Appeals, the petitioner
cannot rightly be convicted of the crime of theft, because he had not acted
with intent of gain. The Eagle Cinema Co., Inc. was indebted to the Saenz
heirs (represented by Emilia Saenz) for rents of a building leased by the
company. The apparatus, accessories and equipment of the Eagle Cinema
Co., Inc, contained in the leased building, were mortgaged to Saenz to
secure the payment of said rents. The petitioner was the representative and
duly appointed substitute administrator of the premises, in place of Emilia
Saenz. Indeed, the petitioner could have sued the Eagle Cinema Co., Inc.,
and foreclosed its mortgage.

The fact that the lantern slide projector and the "Cyclix" motor generator
forming part of the equipment of the Eagle Co., Inc., were taken by the
petitioner (after the Japanese Ishii, who had ceased to operate the business,
delivered to the petitioner the keys of the building where said equipment
was stored) and removed to and kept in petitioner's house, is consistent
with the theory that the petitioner, to protect the interest of his principals,
in good faith believed that he had the right to do so under his powers and
by virtue of the mortgage covering said equipment, especially because the
petitioner was empowered not only to recover, collect or receive money,
debts or dues, but also to take or recover "other things of value of
whatsoever nature or kind" that may be due from the lessee. That the
petitioner was wrong in his belief, or had been so over-zealous in the matter
 as to have even denied that the articles in question were in his possession,
made him at most civilly liable but does not go to show that he acted with
intent of personal profit. The intent of gain cannot be inferred from the
bare acts of the petitioner, in view of the peculiar circumstances of the case
that supply plausible reasons for said acts. Had he sold or tried to dispose
of the articles, intent of gain would have been established.

Criminal Law Case Digest: Calimutan V.

People

Calimutan v. People

G.R. No. 152133, February 9, 2006

Lesson: Proof beyond reasonable doubt, Defense of Stranger, Proximate Cause, intentional felonies and
culpable felonies

Laws Applicable: Art. 3, Art. 4, Par. 1

FACTS:

February 4, 1996 around 10 am: Cantre and witness Saano, together with two other companions, had a
drinking spree at a videoke bar but as they were headed home, they crossed paths with Calimutan and Michael
Bulalacao.

Cantre, 26 years old and 5 ft. 9 inches, had a grudge against Bulalacao, a 15 year-old boy of 5ft. for
suspecting that he threw stones at the his house on a previous night so he punched him

Seeking to protect Bulalacao and to stop Cantre, Calimutan picked a stone, as big as a mans fist and hitting
Cantre at the left side of his back not noticing that Bulalacao was already able to ran away.

o Cantre stopped for a moment and held his back and Calimutan desisted from any other act of violence
 Witness Saano then brought Cantre home where he complained of backache and also of stomach ache and
was unable to eat

By night time, he felt cold then warm then he was sweating profusely and his entire body felt numb

o Having no vehicle, they could not bring him to a doctor so his mother just continue to wipe him with a piece of
cloth and brought him some food when he asked.

o After eating a little, he vomited.

o Shortly after complaining again of his backache and stomach ache, he died.

The Post-Mortem Examination Report and Certification of Death, issued and signed by Dr. Ulanday, stated
that the cause of death of victim Cantre was cardio-respiratory arrest due to suspected food poisoning

With the help of the Lingkod Bayan-Circulo de Abogadas of the ABS-CBN Foundation, an autopsy was done
by Dr. Ronaldo B. Mendez which showed that there was internal hemorrhage and massive accumulation of
blood in his abdominal cavity due to his lacerated spleen caused by a blunt object like a stone.

RTC issued a warrant of arrest and during arraignment Calimutan pleaded not guilty to the crime of homicide

RTC: Essentially adopting the prosecutions account of the incident, held that Calimutan was guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of homicide with a penalty of imprisonment from 8 years of Prision Mayor as minimum, to
12 years and 1 day of Reclusion Temporal as maximum, and to indemnify the heirs of Philip Cantre the sum of
P50,000 as compensatory damages and the sum of P50,000 as moral damages

o NOT defense of stranger , because after the boxing Bulalacao, he was able to run thereby the unlawful
aggression by Cantre ceased

o The act of throwing a stone from behind which hit the victim at his back on the left side was a treacherous

o criminally liable for all the direct and natural consequences of this unlawful act even if the ultimate result had
not been intended

CA: Affirmed RTC

Calimutan filed a petition for review on certiorari contending that the dissimilar findings on the cause of death
constituted reasonable doubt

ISSUE: W/N he is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide

HELD: NO. MODIFIED Calimutan is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide, under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, and is accordingly sentenced to
imprisonment for a minimum period of 4 months of arresto mayor to a maximum period of two years and one
 day of prision correccional. Petitioner Calimutan is further ORDERED to pay the heirs of the victim Cantre the
amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the latters death and P50,000.00 as moral damages

Proof beyond reasonable doubt requires only a moral certainty or that degree of proof which produces
conviction in an unprejudiced mind (NOT absolute certainty and the exclusion of all possibility of error)

o Dr. Mendezs testimony as an expert witness is evidence, and although it does not necessarily bind the courts, it
is accorded great weight and probative value

may sufficiently establish the causal relationship between the stone thrown by the Calimutan and the lacerated
spleen of the Cantre which resulted in the latters death

Proximate cause - cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening
cause, produces the injury, and WITHOUT which the result would NOT have occurred

o Prosecution was able to establish that the proximate cause of the death of the Cantre was the stone thrown at
him by petitioner Calimutan.

Comparing the limited autopsy conducted by Dr. Ulanday and her unconfirmed suspicion of food poisoning of
the victim Cantre, as opposed to the exhaustive autopsy performed by Dr. Mendez and his definitive finding of
a ruptured spleen as the cause of death, then the latter, without doubt, deserves to be given credence by the
courts

Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code classifies felonies according to the means by which they are committed, in
particular:

o (1) intentional felonies - existence of malicious intent

act is performed with deliberate intent (with malice)

o (2) culpable felonies - absence of malicious intent

act or omission of the offender is NOT malicious

the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight or lack of skill

Absence of intent, Calimutan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the culpable felony of reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code

o Reckless imprudence consists in voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which
material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or
failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence,
physical condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
CASE: People v. Custodio Gonzales
DOCKET No: G.R. 80762, March 19, 1990
FACTS:
In a previous decision in the Regional Trial Court, the Court found the accused-appellants
Gonzales et al. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder as defined under Article 248
of
the Revised Penal Code.
Through their counsel, all the accused filed a notice of appeal from the trial courts decision.
However, during the pendency of appeal, all accused-appellants except Custodio Gonzales Sr.
withdrew their appeal and chose instead to pursue their respective applications for parole before the
then Ministry now Department of Justice Parole Division.
Thus, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision on Gonzales appeal. It modified the appealed
decision in that the lone appellant was sentenced to reclusion perpetua and indemnification of the
heirs
of Lloyd in the amount of P30,000.00.
***
e antecedent facts show that:
At around 9pm on February 1981, the barangay captain of Barangay Tipacla Iloilo was awakened
from his sleep by the spouses Augusto and Fausta Gonzales. Augusto informed Paja that his wife had
just killed their landlord Lloyd Penacerrada and thus would like to surrender to the authorities.
Seeing
Augusto still holding the knife allegedly used in the killing and Fausta with her dress smeared in
blood,
Paja immediately ordered his nephew to take the spouses to the police authorities at their municipal
hall.
Thus, an investigation was made behind the killing, and two days after the said incident, Augusto
appeared before the police station and voluntarily surrendered for detention and protective custody
for
having been involved in the killing of Lloyd. He requested that he be taken in the same
headquarters
where his wife Fausta was detained.
During arraignment, the spouses entered a plea of not guilty. Before trial however, Huntoria,
who claimed to have witnessed the killing, presented himself to Nanie Penacerradathe victims
widow, and volunteered to testify for the prosecution.
***
A reinvestigation was therefore conducted, and the prosecutions case rested on Huntorias
alleged eyewitness account of the incident, who alleges to have seen the incident.
The Court of Appeals affirmed Huntorias testimony and found lone accused-appellant Custodio
Gonzales guilty, who, among all the accused-appellants, did not seek for parole before the
Department
of Justice.
***
ISSUE: On appeal, the issue raised in this case was whether or not Custodio Gonzales is guilty of
murder, based on Hustorias account where the prosecutions case rested.
COURT RULING:
The Supreme Court found that the prosecutions stand is insufficient to convict Custodio
Gonzales guilty of the crime charged.
1.
The investigation conducted by the police authorities leave much to be desired. During
investigation, there were conflicts as to where the scene of the crime was. While the sketch
indicated are the alleged various blood stains and their locations relative to the scenes of the
crime, there was however no indication as to their quantity. Considering there were two
versions where the killing was carried out, the extent of blood stains found would have
provided a definite clue as to which version was more credible.
2.
The police also failed to state the reason of Augusto Gonzales surrender. Further, Augusto
never mentioned the participation of other persons in the killing of the victim.
CASE DIGEST: CRIMINAL LAW
3.
Furthermore, the autopsy report would show that the killing would have been caused by two
or more bladed instrument, but opined that one bladed instrument is still possible. And insofar
as Dr. Rojas testimony was concerned, while Huntoria admitted that he saw six persons
taking turns in killing the victim, he however could not determine who among the six accused
did the stabbing and what particular weapon was used.
Considering the abovesaid facts, Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code provides how criminal
liability is incurred:
a.)
By any person committing a felony (delitos) although the wrongful act done be different from
that which he intended,
b.)
By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property, were
it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishments or on account of the employment
of inadequate or ineffectual means.
Further, Article 3 defines how felony is committedwhich is either by means of deceit (dolo) or
by means of fault (culpa). Thus there is deceit when the act performed is by deliberate intent, while
there is fault when the wrongful act results from imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of
skill.
In this case, while the prosecution accuses and the two lower courts both found that the appellant
has committed felony in Lloyds death, there is paucity of proof as to what act was performed by the
appellant.
Yet, Huntoria, as earlier emphasized, admitted candidly that he failed to see who stabbed or
hacked the victim. In fact, he does not even know what specific act was performed in the killing. This
lack of specificity then makes the case fall short of the test laid down by Article 3 of the Revised
Penal
Code.
Moreover, Huntorias credibility as witness is tarnished by the fact that he only came out eight
months since he allegedly saw the incident. He also failed to explain satisfactorily the reason for his
long delay in revealing what he allegedly witnessed.
Case Title: US vs Bull, 15 Phil 7
Subject Matter: Applicability of Art. 2 of the Revised Penal Code
Facts:

On December 2, 1908, a steamship vessel engaged in the transport of animals named Stanford
commanded by H.N. Bull docked in the port of Manila, Philippines. It was found that said vessel
from Ampieng, Formosa carried 674 heads of cattle without providing appropriate shelter and proper
suitable means for securing the animals which resulted for most of the animals to get hurt and others
to have died while in transit.

This cruelty to animals is said to be contrary to Acts No. 55 and No. 275 of the Philippine
Constitution. It is however contended that cases cannot be filed because neither was it said that the
court sitting where the animals were disembarked would take jurisdiction, nor did it say about ships
not licensed under Philippine laws, like the ships involved.

Issue:

Whether or not the court had jurisdiction over an offense committed on board a foreign ship while
inside the territorial waters of the Philippines.

Held:

Yes. When the vessel comes within 3 miles from the headlines which embrace the entrance of Manila
Bay, the vessel is within territorial waters and thus, the laws of the Philippines shall apply. A crime
committed on board a Norwegian merchant vessel sailing to the Philippines is within the jurisdiction
of the courts of the Philippines if the illegal conditions existed during the time the ship was within
the territorial waters - regardless of the fact that the same conditions existed when the ship settled
from the foreign port and while it was on the high seas,

In light of the above restriction, the defendant was found guilty and sentenced to pay a fine of two
hundred and fifty pesos with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.

G.R. No. 163267 Case Digest

G.R. No. 163267, May 5, 2010
Teofilo Evangelista, petitioner
vs People of the Philippines, respondent
Ponente: Del Castillo
Facts:
There was an information saying that on January 30, 1996 at NAIA
the accused feloniously have in possession of the firearms without
the corresponding permit or license from competent authority.

RTC's ruling: Evangelista guilty beyond reasonable doubt for

violation of the illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions.

Petitioner filed a motion for new trial which the RTC granted. RTC
then found the petitioner liable still for the offense charged but
modified the penalty of imprisonment.

CA's ruling: CA affirmed the findings of the trial court in its

decision. It ruled that the stipulations during the trial are
binding on petitioner.

Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether CA gravely erred in not acquitting Evangelista from

the charge of the illegal possession of firearms.

Held:
Appeal is devoid of merit.

Contrary to the arguments put forward by petitioner, we entertain

no doubt that the crime of illegal possession of firearms and
ammunition for which he was charged was committed in the
Philippines. The accomplishment by petitioner of the Customs
Declaration Form upon his arrival at the NAIA is very clear
evidence that he was already in possession of the subject firearms
in the Philippines.

In contrast, petitioner failed to establish by sufficient and

competent evidence that the present charge happened in Dubai. It
may be well to recall that while in Dubai, petitioner, even in a
situation between life and death, firmly denied possession and
ownership of the firearms. Furthermore, there is no record of any
criminal case having been filed against petitioner in Dubai in
connection with the discovered firearms. Since there is no pending
criminal case when he left Dubai, it stands to reason that there
was no crime committed in Dubai. The age-old but familiar rule that
he who alleges must prove his allegation applies.

Petition denied.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JULIO GUILLEN, defendant-appellant

GR No. L-1477 January 18, 1950 FACTS Julio Guillen y Corpus, brought two hand grenades to a
populated meeting held by the Liberal Party at Plaza de Miranda, Quiapo. President Roxas gave a
speech of the advantages of the parity rights in the meeting. Upon the close of the speech,
defendant threw one of the said grenades toward the platform, but the presence of mind of General
Castaneda, who kicked the grenade and threw his body over that of the President s, saved the
latter s life. However, the grenade still seriously injured Simeon Varela who died on the following
day as a result of mortal wounds caused by the grenade fragments, as well as Alfredo Eva, Jose
Fabio, Pedro Carillo and Emilio Maglalang. Guillen testifying in his own behalf said that although it
was not his main intention to kill those surrounding the President, he felt no conjunction in killing
them also in order to attain his main purpose of killing the President. The defendant was charged by
the CFI (see decision below), to which the counsel of the defendant submitted contentions of error,
including: (1) in finding the appellant guilty of the murder of Simeon Varela, (2) in finding the
appellant guilty of the complex crime of murder and multiple frustrated murder (that of the said other
victims and the President). DECISION COURT OF ORIGIN CFI rendered the defendant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder of Simeon Valera and multiple frustrated murders of
the said victims including the President. ISSUE W/N a mistake in the blow, inflicted with malice,
exempts one from criminal liability DECISION APPELLATE COURT The Court, writing per
curiam, AFFIRMED the decision of the CFI, stating that the facts do not support the contention of
counsel that the appellant is guilty only of homicide through reckless imprudence in regard to the
death of Simeon Varela and of less physical injuries in regard to other said victims. In throwing said
hand grenade at the President with the intention of killing him, the Court stated that the appellant
acted with malice, and was therefore liable for all consequences of his wrongful act, for in
accordance with Article 4 of the RPC, criminal liability is incurred by any person committing felony
(delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. The act cannot be
classified as criminal negligence because such requires that the injury incurred be unintentional as
the incident of an act performed without malice (People v Sara, 55 Phil 939). The Court finds that a
deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is inconsistent with the idea of reckless imprudence. A mistake
in the identity of the intended victim cannot be considered as reckless imprudence (People v Gona,
54 Phil 605).