G.R. No. 149926.

February 23, 2005]

UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. EDMUND SANTIBAEZ and
FLORENCE SANTIBAEZ ARIOLA, respondents.

o The First Countryside Credit Corporation (FCCC) and Efraim M. Santibaez

entered into a loan agreement. Efraim and his son, Edmund, executed a
promissory note in favor of the FCCC.

o Sometime in February 1981, Efraim died, leaving a holographic will.

Subsequently in testate proceedings commenced before the RTC.

o Edmund, as one of the heirs, was appointed as the special administrator of the
estate of the decedent.

o During the pendency of the testate proceedings, the surviving heirs,

Edmund and his sister Florence Ariola, executed a Joint Agreement wherein
they agreed to divide between themselves and take possession of the three (3)
tractors.

o Each of them was to assume the indebtedness of their late father to FCCC,
corresponding to the tractor respectively taken by them.

o FCCC assigned its liabilities to Union Savings and Mortgage Bank.Demand

letters for the settlement of his account were sent by petitioner Union Bank of
the Philippines (UBP) to Edmund, but the latter failed to heed the same and
refused to pay.

o Thus, petitioner filed a Complaint for sum of money against the heirs of Efraim
Santibaez, Edmund and Florence, before the RTC.

o Summonses were issued against both, but the one intended for Edmund was
not served since he was in the United States. Accordingly, the complaint was
narrowed down to respondent Florence S. Ariola.

o Ariola filed her Answer and alleged that the loan documents did not bind her
since she was not a party thereto. Considering that the joint agreement
signed by her and her brother Edmund was not approved by the probate
court, it was null and void; hence, she was not liable to the petitioner
under the joint agreement.

o The Complaint was dismissed for lack of merit. The CA affirmed the RTC
decision.

Issues:

o Whether or not the partition in the Agreement executed by the heirs is valid;

Ruling
o At the outset, well-settled is the rule that a probate court has the jurisdiction to
determine all the properties of the deceased, to determine whether they should
or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be
administered.[20] The said court is primarily concerned with the administration,
liquidation and distribution of the estate.

o In our jurisdiction, the rule is that there can be no valid partition among the
heirs until after the will has been probated.

o In testate succession, there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after
the will has been probated. The law enjoins the probate of a will and the public
requires it, because unless a will is probated and notice thereof given to the
whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his property by will may be
rendered nugatory.

o The authentication of a will decides no other question than such as touch upon
the capacity of the testator and the compliance with those requirements or
solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of a will.

o This, of course, presupposes that the properties to be partitioned are the same
properties embraced in the will. In the present case, the deceased, Efraim, left
a holographic will which contained, inter alia, the provision which reads as
follows:

(e) All other properties, real or personal, which I own and may be
discovered later after my demise, shall be distributed in the proportion
indicated in the immediately preceding paragraph in favor of Edmund and
Florence, my children.

o We agree with the appellate court that the above-quoted is an all-

encompassing provision embracing all the properties left by the decedent
which might have escaped his mind at that time he was making his will, and
other properties he may acquire thereafter. Included therein are the three (3)
subject tractors. This being so, any partition involving the said tractors among
the heirs is not valid. The joint agreement executed by Edmund and Florence,
partitioning the tractors among themselves, is invalid, specially so since at the
time of its execution, there was already a pending proceeding for the probate
of their late fathers holographic will covering the said tractors.

o It must be stressed that the probate proceeding had already acquired

jurisdiction over all the properties of the deceased, including the three (3)
tractors. To dispose of them in any way without the probate courts approval is
tantamount to divesting it with jurisdiction which the Court cannot allow.

o Every act intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or
devisees is deemed to be a partition, although it should purport to be a sale, an
exchange, a compromise, or any other transaction.

o Thus, in executing any joint agreement which appears to be in the nature of an

extra-judicial partition, as in the case at bar, court approval is imperative, and
the heirs cannot just divest the court of its jurisdiction over that part of the
estate. Moreover, it is within the jurisdiction of the probate court to determine
the identity of the heirs of the decedent.
 o In the instant case, there is no showing that the signatories in the joint
agreement were the only heirs of the decedent. When it was executed, the
probate of the will was still pending before the court and the latter had yet to
determine who the heirs of the decedent were.

o Thus, for Edmund and respondent Florence S. Ariola to adjudicate unto

themselves the three (3) tractors was a premature act, and prejudicial to the
other possible heirs and creditors who may have a valid claim against the
estate of the deceased.

G.R. No. 189121 July 31, 2013

AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON, JENNETH QUIAZON and MARIA JENNIFER
QUIAZON, Petitioners,
vs.
MA. LOURDES BELEN, for and in behalf of MARIA LOURDES ELISE
QUIAZON, Respondent.

Facts

o This case started as a Petition for Letters of Administration of the Estate of

Eliseo Quiazon (Eliseo), filed by herein respondents who are Eliseos common-
law wife and daughter.

o The petition was opposed by herein petitioners Amelia Garcia-Quaizon

(Amelia) to whom Eliseo was married.

o Eliseo died intestate. Elise, represented by her mother, Lourdes, filed a Petition
for Letters of Administration before the RTC.

o In her Petition, Elise claims that she is the natural child of Eliseo having been
conceived and born at the time when her parents were both capacitated to
marry each other.

o Insisting on the legal capacity of Eliseo and Lourdes to marry, Elise impugned
the validity of Eliseos marriage to Amelia by claiming that it was bigamous for
having been contracted during the subsistence of the latters marriage with one
Filipito Sandico (Filipito). To prove her filiation to the decedent, Elise, among
others, attached to the Petition for Letters of Administration her Certificate of
Live Birth4 signed by Eliseo as her father.

o Elise sought her appointment as administratrix of her late fathers estate.

o Claiming that the venue of the petition was improperly laid, Amelia, together
with her children, Jenneth and Jennifer, opposed the issuance of the letters of
administration by filing an Opposition/Motion to Dismiss.
 o The petitioners asserted that as shown by his Death Certificate, Eliseo was a
resident of Capas, Tarlac and not of Las Pias City, at the time of his death.

o Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court, the petition for
settlement of decedents estate should have been filed in Capas, Tarlac and
not in Las Pias City.

o In addition to their claim of improper venue, the petitioners averred that there
are no factual and legal bases for Elise to be appointed administratix of
Eliseos estate.

o The RTC directed the issuance of Letters of Administration to Elise upon

posting the necessary bond. CA affirmed.

Issues

o Whether or not Eliseo was a resident of Las Pias, and therefore, the petition
for letters of administration was properly filed with the RTC of Las Pias.

o Whether or not Elise Quiazon has shown any interest in the petition for letters
of administration.

Ruling

o Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of
administration of the estate of a decedent should be filed in the RTC of the
province where the decedent resides at the time of his death.

o The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished

from "legal residence or domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing"
and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or
purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed.

o In the application of venue statutes and rules Section 1, Rule 73 of the

Revised Rules of Court is of such nature residence rather than domicile is
the significant factor.

o Resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the

personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of
abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. Venue
for ordinary civil actions and that for special proceedings have one and the
same meaning. As thus defined, "residence," in the context of venue
provisions, means nothing more than a persons actual residence or place of
abode, provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency.

o Viewed in light of the foregoing principles, the Court of Appeals cannot be

faulted for affirming the ruling of the RTC that the venue for the settlement of
the estate of Eliseo was properly laid in Las Pias City. It is evident from the
records that during his lifetime, Eliseo resided at No. 26 Everlasting Road,
 Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Pias City. For this reason, the venue for the
settlement of his estate may be laid in the said city.

o Neither are we inclined to lend credence to the petitioners contention that Elise
has not shown any interest in the Petition for Letters of Administration.

o Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court lays down the preferred
persons who are entitled to the issuance of letters of administration, thus:

o Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. If no executor

is named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the
trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be
granted:

(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin,
or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving
husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and
willing to serve;

(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin,
or the person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband
or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the
person to apply for administration or to request that administration be granted
to some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal
creditors, if competent and willing to serve;

(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be

granted to such other person as the court may select.

o Upon the other hand, Section 2 of Rule 79 provides that a petition for Letters of
Administration must be filed by an interested person, thus:

Sec. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. A petition for

letters of administration must be filed by an interested person and must
show, so far as known to the petitioner:

(a) The jurisdictional facts;

(b) The names, ages, and residences of the heirs, and the names and
residences of the creditors, of the decedent;
(c) The probable value and character of the property of the estate;
(d) The name of the person for whom letters of administration are prayed.

But no defect in the petition shall render void the issuance of

letters of administration.

o An "interested party," in estate proceedings, is one who would be benefited in

the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as
a creditor. Also, in estate proceedings, the phrase "next of kin" refers to those
whose relationship with the decedent Is such that they are entitled to share in
the estate as distributees.

o In the instant case, Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to be

benefited by the distribution of Eliseos estate, is deemed to be an
 interested party. With the overwhelming evidence on record produced by
Elise to prove her filiation to Eliseo, the petitioners pounding on her lack of
interest in the administration of the decedents estate, is just a desperate
attempt to sway this Court to reverse the findings of the Court of Appeals.
Certainly, the right of Elise to be appointed administratix of the estate of Eliseo
is on good grounds. It is founded on her right as a compulsory heir, who, under
the law, is entitled to her legitime after the debts of the estate are satisfied.
Having a vested right in the distribution of Eliseos estate as one of his natural
children, Elise can rightfully be considered as an interested party within the
purview of the law.

G.R. No. 150175

Erlinda Pilapil and Heirs of Donata Ortiz

v.
Heirs of Maximo Briones

Facts

o Petitioners are the heirs of the late Donata Ortiz-Briones (Donata), consisting
of her surviving sister, Rizalina Ortiz
Aguila (Rizalina); Rizalinas daughter, Erlinda Pilapil(Erlinda); and the other
nephews and nieces of Donata, in representation of her two other sisters who
had also passed away.

o Respondents, on the other hand, are the heirs of the

late Maximino Briones (Maximino), composed of his nephews and nieces, and
grandnephews and grandnieces, in representation of the deceased siblings
of Maximino.

o Maximino was married to Donata but their union did not produce any children.
When Maximino died, Donata instituted intestate proceedings to settle her
husbands estate with the Cebu City Court of First Instance.

o The CFI issued Letters of Administration appointing Donata as

the administratrix of Maximinos estate.

o She submitted an Inventory of Maximinos properties. The CFI would

subsequently issue an Order, awarding ownership of certain real properties
to Donata.

o Silverio, a nephew of Maximino, filed a Petition with the RTC for Letters of
Administration for the intestate estate of Maximino, which was initially granted
by the RTC.

o The RTC also issued an order allowing Silverio to collect rentals

from Maximinos properties. But then, Gregorio filed with the RTC a Motion to
Set Aside the Order, claiming that the said properties were already under his
and his wifes administration as part of the intestate estate of Donata.
 o The heirs of Maximino filed a Complaint with the RTC against the heirs
of Donata for the partition, annulment, and recovery of possession of real
property.

o They alleged that Donata, as administratrix of the estate of Maximino, through

fraud and misrepresentation, in breach of trust, and without the knowledge of
the other heirs, succeeded in registering in her name the real properties
belonging to the intestate estate of Maximino.

o RTC rendered a decision in favor of the heirs of Maximino. CA reversed.

o According to the CA, in summary, the heirs of Maximino failed to prove by clear
and convincing evidence that Donata managed, through fraud, to have the real
properties, belonging to the intestate estate of Maximino, registered in her
name. In the absence of fraud, no implied trust was established
between Donata and the heirs of Maximino under Article 1456 of the New Civil
Code. Donata was able to register the real properties in her name, not through
fraud or mistake, but pursuant to an Order.

o Respondents move for the reconsideration of the Decision of this Court raising
still the arguments that Donata committed fraud in securing the CFI order
which declared her as the sole heir of her deceased husband Maximino and
authorized her to have Maximinos properties registered exclusively in her
name;

o They also argued that, by virtue of the High Courts ruling in Quion v. Claridad
and Sevilla, et al. v. De Los Angeles, respondents action to recover title to and
possession of their shares in Maximinos estate, held in trust for their benefit
by Donata, and eventually, by petitioners as the latters successors-in-interest,
is imprescriptible.

Issue

o Whether or not the right to recover of the Heirs of Maximino, has already
prescribed.

Ruling

o The Court ruled that there was no fraud in the case at bar. Assuming, for the
sake of argument, that Donatas misrepresentation constitutes fraud that would
impose upon her the implied trust provided in Article 1456 of the Civil Code,
this Court still cannot sustain respondents contention that their right to recover
their shares in Maximinos estate is imprescriptible. It is already settled in
jurisprudence that an implied trust, as opposed to an express trust, is subject
to prescription and laches.

o The case of Ramos v. Ramos already provides an elucidating discourse on the

matter, to wit: "Trusts are either express or implied. Express trusts are created
by the intention of the trustor or of the parties. Implied trusts come into being by
operation of law" (Art. 1441, Civil Code).
o "No particular words are required for the creation of an express trust, it being
sufficient that a trust is clearly intended". "Express trusts are those which are
created by the direct and positive acts of the parties, by some writing or deed,
or will, or by words either expressly or impliedly evincing an intention to create
a trust" (89 C.J. S. 122).

o "Implied trusts are those which, without being expressed, are deducible from
the nature of the transaction as matters of intent, or which are superinduced on
the transaction by operation of law as matters of equity, independently of the
particular intention of the parties".

o They are ordinarily subdivided into resulting and constructive trusts. "A
resulting trust is broadly defined as a trust which is raised or created by the act
or construction of law, but in its more restricted sense it is a trust raised
by implication of law and presumed always to have been contemplated by the
parties, the intention as to which is to be found in the nature of their
transaction, but not expressed in the deed or instrument of conveyance".

o On the other hand, a constructive trust is a trust "raised by construction of

law, or arising by operation of law." In a more restricted sense and as
contradistinguished from a resulting trust, a constructive trust is "a trust not
created by any words, either expressly or impliedly evincing a direct intention
to create a trust, but by the construction of equity in order to satisfy the
demands of justice. It does not arise by agreement or intention but by
operation of law."

o "If a person obtains legal title to property by fraud or concealment, courts of

equity will impress upon the title a so-called constructive trust in favor of the
defrauded party." A constructive trust is not a trust in the technical sense
(Gayondato vs. Treasurer of the P.I., 49 Phil. 244; See Art. 1456, Civil Code).

o The High Court ruled that the rule of imprescriptibility was misapplied to
constructive trusts.

o Acquisitive prescription may bar the action of the beneficiary against the
trustee in an express trust for the recovery of the property held in trust where
(a) the trustee has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an
ouster of the cestui qui trust; (b) such positive acts of repudiation have been
made known to the cestui qui trust and (c) the evidence thereon is clear and
conclusive.

o With respect to constructive trusts, the rule is different. The prescriptibility of an

action for reconveyance based on constructive trust is now settled .

o Prescription may supervene in an implied trust. And whether the trust is

resulting or constructive, its enforcement may be barred by laches.

o Prescription of the action for reconveyance of the disputed properties based on

implied trust is governed by Article 1144 of the New Civil Code, which reads

ART. 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years from
the time the right of action accrues:
 (1) Upon a written contract;

(2) Upon an obligation created by law;

(3) Upon a judgment.

o Since an implied trust is an obligation created by law (specifically, in this case,

by Article 1456 of the New Civil Code), then respondents had 10 years within
which to bring an action for reconveyance of their shares
in Maximinos properties.

o The next question now is when should the ten-year prescriptive period be
reckoned from. The general rule is that an action for reconveyance of real
property based on implied trust prescribes ten years from registration and/or
issuance of the title to the property, not only because registration under the
Torrens system is a constructive notice of title, but also because by registering
the disputed properties exclusively in her name, Donata had already
unequivocally repudiated any other claim to the same.

o By virtue of the CFI Order, Donata was able to register and secure certificates
of title over the disputed properties in her name on 27 June 1960. The
respondents filed with the RTC their Complaint for partition, annulment, and
recovery of possession of the disputed real properties, only on 3 March 1987,
almost 27 years after the registration of the said properties in the name
of Donata. Therefore, respondents action for recovery of possession of the
disputed properties had clearly prescribed.

o Moreover, even though respondents Complaint before the RTC also prays for
partition of the disputed properties, it does not make their action to enforce
their right to the said properties imprescriptible.

o While as a general rule, the action for partition among co-owners does not
prescribe so long as the co-ownership is expressly or impliedly recognized, as
provided for in Article 494, of the New Civil Code, it bears to emphasize
that Donata had never recognized respondents as co-owners or co-heirs,
either expressly or impliedly. Her assertion before the CFI in Special
Proceedings No. 928-R that she was Maximinos sole heir necessarily
excludes recognition of some other co-owner or co-heir to the inherited
properties; Consequently, the rule on non-prescription of action for partition of
property owned in common does not apply to the case at bar.