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SECOND DIVISION would be barred by the Statute of Municipal Trial Court of Cebu City from or precondition for were

ity from or precondition for were it not so, the


Limitations if he had to course his action taking cognizance of an ejectment suit Clerk of Court would not have accepted
[G.R. No. L-63277. November 29, to the Barangay Lupon. for failure of the plaintiff to refer the the filing of the case especially that there
1983.] dispute to the Barangay Lupon for is a standing circular from the Chief
2. REMEDIAL LAW; SECTION 4 (A) OF conciliation. Justice of the Supreme Court without
PETRA VDA. DE P.D. No. 1508; CONSTRUED. Under even mentioning the Letter of Instruction
BORROMEO, Petitioner, v. HON. Section 4(a) of PD 1508, referral of a The intestate estate of the late Vito of the President of the Philippines that
JULIAN B. POGOY, Municipality/City dispute to the Barangay Lupon is Borromeo is the owner of a building civil cases and criminal cases with certain
Trial Court of Cebu City, and ATTY. required only where the parties thereto bearing the deceaseds name, located at exceptions must not be filed without
RICARDO REYES, Respondents. are "individuals." An "individual" means F. Ramos St., Cebu City. Said building passing the barangay court." (Order
"a single human being as contrasted with has been leased and occupied by dated December 14, 1982, Annex "c", P.
Antonio T. Uy for Petitioner. a social group or institution." Obviously, petitioner Petra Vda. de Borromeo at a 13, Rollo).
the law applies only to cases involving monthly rental of P500.00 payable in
Numeriano G. Estenzo natural persons, and not where any of advance within the first five days of the Unable to secure a reconsideration of said
for Respondents. the parties is a juridical person such as a month. order, petitioner came to this Court
corporation, partnership, corporation through this petition for certiorari. In
sole, testate or intestate, estate, etc. On August 28, 1982, private respondent both his comment and memorandum,
Atty. Ricardo Reyes, administrator of the private respondent admitted not having
3. ID.; JURIDICAL PERSON; REAL PARTY estate and a resident of Cebu City, availed himself of the barangay
SYLLABUS IN INTEREST; REFERRAL TO BARANGAY served upon petitioner a letter conciliation process, but justified such
LUPON, NOT REQUIRED. In Civil Case demanding that she pay the overdue omission by citing paragraph 4, section 6
No. R-239l5, plaintiff Ricardo Reyes is a rentals corresponding to the period from of PD 1508 which allows the direct filing
mere nominal party who is suing in March to September 1982, and thereafter of an action in court where the same may
behalf of the Intestate Estate of Vito to vacate the premises. As petitioner otherwise be barred by the Statute of
1. CIVIL LAW; ACTIONS FOR FORCIBLE Borromeo. while it is true that Section 3, failed to do so, Atty. Reyes instituted on Limitations, as applying to the case at
ENTRY AND DETAINER; PRESCRIPTIVE Rule 3 of the Rules of Court allows the September 16, 1982 an ejectment case bar.
PERIOD; ACTION NOT BARRED IN THE administrator of an estate to sue or be against the former in the Municipal Trial
CASE AT BAR. Under Article 1147 of sued without joining the party for whose Court of Cebu City. The complaint was The excuse advanced by private
the Civil Code, the period for filing benefit the action is presented or docketed as Civil Case No. R-23915 and respondent is unsatisfactory. Under
actions for forcible entry and detainer is defended, it is indisputable that the real assigned to the sala of respondent judge. Article 1147 of the Civil Code, the period
one year, and this period is counted from party in interest in Civil Case No. R- for filing actions for forcible entry and
demand to vacate the premises. 23915 is the intestate estate under On November 12, 1982, petitioner moved detainer is one year, 1 and this period is
(Desbarat v. Vda. de Laureano, 18 SCRA administration. Since the said estate is a to dismiss the case, advancing, among counted from demand to vacate the
116, Calubayan v. Pascual, 21 SCRA 146, juridical person (Limjoco v. Intestate of others, the want of jurisdiction of the trial premises. 2
Development Bank of the Philippines v. Fragante, 80 Phil. 776) plaintiff court. Pointing out that the parties are
Canonoy, 35 SCRA 197) In the case at administrator may file the complaint residents of the same city, as alleged in In the case at bar, the letter-demand was
bar, the letter-demand was dated August directly in court, without the same being the complaint, petitioner contended that dated August 28, 1982, while the
28, 1982, while the complaint for coursed to the Barangay Lupon for the court could not exercise jurisdiction complaint for ejectment was filed in court
ejectment was filed in court on arbitration. over the case for failure of respondent on September 16, 1982. Between these
September 16, 1982. Between these two Atty. Reyes to refer the dispute to the two dates, less than a month had
dates, less than a month had elapsed, Barangay Court, as required by PD No. elapsed, thereby leaving at least eleven
thereby leaving at least eleven (11) full 1508, otherwise known as Katarungang (11) full months of the prescriptive period
months of the prescriptive period Pambarangay Law. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary provided for in Article 1147 of the Civil
provided for in Article 1147 of the Civil DECISION Code. Under the procedure outlined in
Code. Under the procedure outlined in Respondent judge denied the motion to Section 4 of PD 1508, 3 the time needed
Section 4 of PD 1508, the time needed dismiss. He justified the order in this for the conciliation proceeding before the
for the conciliation proceeding before the wise:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph Barangay Chairman and the Pangkat
Barangay Chairman and the Pangkat should take no more than 60 days. Giving
should take no more than 60 days. Giving ESCOLIN, J.: "The Clerk of Court when this case was private respondent nine (9) months
private respondent nine (9) months- filed accepted for filing same. That from ample time indeed within which to
ample time indeed- within which to bring the acceptance from (sic) filing, with the bring his case before the proper court
his case before the proper court should plaintiff having paid the docket fee to should conciliation efforts fail. Thus, it
conciliation efforts fail. Thus, it cannot be show that the case was docketed in the cannot be truthfully asserted, as private
truthfully asserted, as private respondent Petitioner herein seeks to stop civil division of this court could be respondent would want Us to believe,
would want Us to believe, that his case respondent Judge Julian B. Pogoy of the considered as meeting the requirement that his case would be barred by the
Statute of Limitations if he had to course the Barangay Lupon is required only RAMON QUE, SOUTHERN SALES CORP. Reservation of rights.
his action to the Barangay Lupon. where the parties thereto are and HENRY TAN, petitioners, LESSOR reserves the
"individuals." An "individual" means "a rights to sell, mortgage,
With certain exceptions, PD 1508 makes single human being as contrasted with a vs. hypothecate or encumber
the conciliation process at the Barangay social group or institution." 5 Obviously, the property so long as it
level a condition precedent for filing of the law applies only to cases involving HON. RICARDO M. ILARDE, Judge, RTC of requires the purchase(r) or
actions in those instances where said law natural persons, and not where any of Iloilo (Br. 26), and STAR GROUP mortgage creditors to
RESOURCES AND DEVELOPMENT, respect the terms of this
applies. For this reason, Circular No. 22 the parties is a juridical person such as a
INC., respondents. lease contract; provided
addressed to "ALL JUDGES OF THE corporation, partnership, corporation
further that LESSEE shall
COURTS OF FIRST INSTANCE, CIRCUIT sole, testate or intestate, estate, etc. be duly informed about
CRIMINAL COURTS, JUVENILE AND LESSOR's plan to sell the
DOMESTIC RELATIONS COURT, COURTS In Civil Case No. R-23915, plaintiff property.
NARVASA, C.J.:
OF AGRARIAN RELATIONS, CITY Ricardo Reyes is a mere nominal party
COURTS, MUNICIPAL COURTS AND who is suing in behalf of the Intestate On September 18, 1989, after the expiration of
The principal question in the proceedings at bar
THEIR CLERKS OF COURT" was issued by Estate of Vito Borromeo. While it is true the period fixed in the lease agreements, the
is whether or not an action of unlawful detainer
Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando on that Section 3, Rule 3 of the Rules of lessors executed a public instrument entitled
filed in the Municipal Trial Court against a
November 9, 1979. Said Circular Court allows the administrator of an lessee grounded on the expiration of the "Deed of Absolute Sale," 4 in virtue of which they sold
reads:chanrobles.com:cralaw:red estate to sue or be sued without joining latter's lease should be abated or suspended
the leased property to Star Group Resources and Development
Inc. (hereafter, simply referred to as Star Group). The deed
the party for whose benefit the action is by an action filed in the Regional Trial Court by provided inter alia that the "Vendee shall henceforth deal with
"Effective upon your receipt of the presented or defended, it is indisputable the defendant lessee on the claim that he is the lessees and occupants of the properties herein sold without
any further warranty or obligation on the part of the Vendors."
certification by the Minister of Local that the real party in interest in Civil Case entitled to a right of preemption (or prior
Government and Community No. R-23915 is the intestate estate under purchase) of the premises in question and
On November 22, 1989, the buyer, Star Group,
Development that all the barangays administration. Since the said estate is a wishes to have said right judicially enforced.
brought separate actions of unlawful detainer in
within your respective jurisdictions have juridical person 6 plaintiff administrator
the Municipal Trial Court In Cities of Iloilo City
organized their Lupons provided for in may file the complaint directly in court, The question arises from facts not disputed and against the lessees, which were docketed as
Presidential Decree No. 1508, otherwise without the same being coursed to the now briefly narrated. follows:
known as the Katarungang Pambarangay Barangay Lupon for arbitration.
Law, in implementation of the barangay Wilmon Auto Supply Corporation (or Ramon 1) that filed against Virgilio Ang: Civil Case
system of settlement of disputes, you are ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby Que), Iloilo, Multi Parts Supply Corporation (or No. 227 (89), assigned to Branch 3;
hereby directed to desist from receiving dismissed. Respondent judge is ordered Ramon Que), Virgilio Ang, Henry Tan, Southern
complaints, petitions, actions or to try and decide Civil Case No. R-23915 Sales Corporation, and Chang Liang, Jr. were
2) that instituted against Chang Liang, Jr.: Civil
proceedings in cases falling within the without unnecessary delay. No costs. lessees of a commercial building and bodegas
Case No. 230 (89), raffled to Branch 2;
authority of said Lupons." cralaw virtua1aw library
standing on registered land in Iloilo City owned
SO ORDERED. in common by Lucy A. Solinap, Fr. Jerry R.
Locsin, Lourdes C. Locsin, Manuel C. Locsin 3) that filed against Henry Tan and Southers
While respondent acknowledged said Sales Corporation: Civil Case No. 232 (89),
and Ester L. Jarantilla. 1 The leases were embodied in
Circular in his order of December 14, __ uniformly worded deeds executed by the individual petitioners, assigned to Branch 2:
1982, he nevertheless chose to overlook as lessees, and Lourdes C. Locsin, representing the lessors-co-
the failure of the complaint in Civil Case owners. 2 The lease contracts, among others 4) that filed against Ramon Que "(for the
FIRST DIVISION
No. R-23915 to allege compliance with premises occupied by WILMON AUTO SUPPLY
the requirement of PD 1508. Neither did 1) stipulated fixed terms or periods (September CORPORATION):" Civil Case No. 233,
he cite any circumstance as would place 1, 1987 to August 30, 1989); assigned to Branch 2; and
the suit outside the operation of said law.
G.R. No. 97637 April 10, 1992 2) provided for a deposit of an amount equal to 5) that commenced against Ramon Que "(for
Instead, he insisted on relying upon the
two months' rents; the premises occupied by ILOILO MULTI
pro tanto presumption of regularity in the
WILMON AUTO SUPPLY CORPORATION, PARTS SUPPLY CORPORATION):" Civil Case
performance by the clerk of court of his
ILOILO MULTI PARTS SUPPLY CORP., 3) provided that the lessee should give the No. 234, raffled to Branch 2.
official duty, which to Our mind has been VIRGILIO ANG, SOUTHERN SALES CORP. lessor 30 days prior notice of the intention to
sufficiently overcome by the disclosure by and CHANG LIANG, JR., petitioners, terminate or renew the contract, and that if no The lessees refused to concede, and indeed
the Clerk of Court that there was no vs. such written notice were given, the lessor would impugned, Star Group's right to eject them.
certification to file action from the Lupon HON. COURT OF APPEALS and STAR consider the contract terminated on the They argued that in so selling the properties
or Pangkat secretary attached to the GROUP RESOURCES AND DEVELOPMENT, expiration of the term; and and seeking their ejectment therefrom, the
complaint. 4 INC., respondents. lessors and their buyer had violated their
4) contained a "reservation of lights" reading as leasehold rights because (i) they (the lessees)
Be that as it may, the instant petition G.R. Nos. 98700-01 April 10, 1992 follows: 3 were not accorded the right of preemption, (b)
should be dismissed. Under Section 4(a) the buyer was not required to honor the leases,
of PD No. 1508, referral of a dispute to
and (c) the lessees were denied the option to Corporation), must be so tried, but not Civil From the decision of March 11, 1991, Ramon a) whether or not, in light
renew their leases upon the expiration thereof. Cases Numbered 232 (against Henry Tan and Que, Southern Sales Corporation and Henry of Vda. de Murga v. Chan,
Southern Sales Corporation ) and 233 (against Tan have appealed to this Court on the legal 25 SCRA 441
These propositions they set forth in their Wilmon Auto Supply Corporation), as to which issue of "whether or not . . . (Judge Ilarde) and Valderama Lumber
answers with counterclaims in the unlawful the summary procedure rules were erred in finding that the Municipal Trial Court in Manufacturers Co.,
detainer actions against them in the Municipal inapplicable. The lessees moved for Cities did not abuse its discretion in denying the Inc. v. L.S. Sarmiento
Trial Courts (Branches 2 and 3). reconsideration of the order and additionally petitioners' motion to dismiss or to hold in Co., 5 SCRA 287, the
prayed for dismissal of the ejectment suits on abeyance the proceedings in the subject Municipal Trial Court has
The same propositions were also set out as the grounds of litis pendentia (adverting no unlawful detainer cases." (Rollo, G.R. No. jurisdiction over the actions
causes of action in a complaint filed on doubt to Civil Case No. 18931 instituted by 98700-01, p. 5) Their appeal was docketed which are real in nature
December 1, 1989 by some of them Wilmon, them in the RTC) and lack of jurisdiction over as G.R. Nos. 98700-01. 11 and involve interpretation
Iloilo Multi Parts, Virgilio Ang (doing business the nature of the actions. Their pleas were of lease contracts over
under the name and style of "Iloilo Rightway denied. On the other hand, two (2) of the lessees, immovables;
Marketing"), Southern Sales and Chang Liang, Wilmon Auto Supply Corporation (represented
Jr. (doing business under the name and style of Thereupon three of the lessees Ramon Que, by Ramon Que) and Chang Liang who are b) whether or not the Court
"Iloilo Bright Construction Supply") 5 in the Southern Sales Corporation, and Henry T. Tan among the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 18931 of Appeals deviated from
Regional Trial Court of Iloilo. Impleaded as defendants in the quite precipitately and improperly, filed pending in Branch 28 of the Regional Trial the doctrine laid down
complaint were the Star Group Resources and Development,
Inc. and its President, Juanito Sio alias Juanito Sio Soy Liong,
petitions for certiorari with this Court for the Court, Iloilo City took a different tack. They in Vda. de Legaspi
and the co-owners-vendors, namely: Lucy A. Solinap, Lourdes annulment and setting aside of the orders of the filed a motion in said Court praying for a writ of v.Avendao, 79 SCRA 135,
C. Locsin, Manuel C. Locsin, Ester Locsin Jarantila, and Fr. Municipal Trial Court (Branch 2), which were preliminary injunction to stop the Municipal Trial 145;
Jerry R. Locsin, the latter as Administrator of the Estate of the
docketed as G.R. Nos. 94855 and 94856. Court from hearing their ejectment cases. They
deceased Jose C. Locsin. 6 The action thus commenced was
docketed as Civil Case No. 18931 and raffled to Branch 28. In Another lessee, Antonio Chua also instituted a argued that the decision in Civil Case No. c) whether or not, pursuant
their complaint, the plaintiffs-lessees prayed chiefly that similar action of certiorari in this Court, 18931 would be decisive of the rights of the to Quiambao v. Osorio,
docketed as G.R. No. 95371. 7Predictably, the Court parties, particularly on the question of the 158 SCRA 674,
1) the sale of the building, refused to take cognizance of their petitions. G.R. No. 9537l lessees' claimed option to renew their leases. and Orellano v. Alvestir, 76
was referred to the Court of Appeals by Resolution of the
bodegas and the land on Second Division dated October 15, 1990 "for proper SCRA 536, the actions in
which they stand be determination and disposition" that Court's jurisdiction being The Trial Court however denied their motion. To the Municipal Trial Court
declared null and void ab concurrent with this Court's. G.R. Nos. 94855 and 94856 were nullify the Trial Court's denial of their plea for for the ejectment of the
referred to the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, 8 to which the
initio; injunctive relief, they repaired to the Court of lessees from the property
lessees should have gone for relief in the first place. 9 In the
Regional Trial Court, the cases were docketed as Civil Cases Appeals by way of a petition for certiorari. Their occupied by them should
2) they be allowed to Numbered 19420 (Ramon Que v. Hon. Honrado, etc., et al.) action was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. be suspended until
and 19421 (Southern Sales Corporation and Henry T. Tan v. 23750. The Court of Appeal ruled adversely to adjudgment of the cases in
exercise their right of pre- Hon. Honrado, etc., et al.).
emption or redemption, them. In its Decision promulgated on February the RTC involving the sale,
and to recover their two- 28, 1991, the Appellate Tribunal pointed out (a) ownership and physical
The Executive Judge of the Trial Court (Hon.
month deposits; that "the issues . . (the petitioners) are raising in possession of said
Ricardo M. Ilarde) issued a restraining order
the Regional Trial Court are the very same property; and
dated October 18, 1990 enjoining proceedings
3) the titles to the issues they, as defendants in the ejectment
in the unlawful detainer cases. However, on
properties be conveyed to cases, are raising" . . and (considering that "the d) whether or not Dante
March 11, 1991, His Honor promulgated
them; Municipal Trial Court's jurisdiction is not in v. Sison, 174 SCRA 517
judgment on the merits dismissing the petitions
question") there is no reason why simply and other precedents
and dissolving the preliminary injunction of
4) they be paid by the because the same issues are raised in the invoked by the petitioners
October 18, 1990. Judge Ilarde ruled that the
defendants jointly and action brought in the Regional Trial Court the should apply.
unlawful detainer cases fall within the
severally moral damages in ejectment proceedings should be suspended,
jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities,
the sum of 1.5 million and (b) that in truth," questions pertaining to the As stated in this opinion's opening paragraph,
Iloilo City, and that the pendency of Civil Case
pesos, exemplary relation between landlord and tenant, the period the crucial question, at bottom, is whether or
No. 18931 in the RTC did not warrant
damages in the amount of or life of the lease or tenancy, the not Star Group's unlawful detainer suits in the
suspension of the unlawful detainer cases, "the
P10,000.00, and reasonableness, of the rental, the right of the Municipal Trial Court against petitioner lessees
only issue in the . . . (the latter suits being)
attormey's fees in the sum tenant (to remain in occupancy) against the will for the reason that their leases had expired,
physical possession or possession de
of P200,000.00. of the landlord, etc. are (precisely) the sort of should be abated by the actions filed in the
facto while the issue involved in Civil Case No.
questions which should be decided in the Regional Trial Court by said petitioner lessees
18931 . . . is basically one of ownership," and it
In the unlawful detainer actions, position papers ejectment case." 12 From this judgment, the lessees have based on the contention that they are entitled to
being "settled rule that the pendency of an taken an appeal to this Court. Their appeal was docketed
were required by the courts and submitted by action involving ownership and annulment of a right of preemption or prior purchase of the
as G.R. No 97637. 13
the parties on the issue of whether or not the sale . . . does not stay the proceedings in the leased premises. It is a question that is far from
unlawful detainer actions should be covered by ejectment case." 10 The lessees filed a motion for novel, one that has been passed upon and
The issues raised in G.R. No. 97637 and G.R.
the rules of summary procedure. The courts reconsideration, but this was denied by Judge Ilarde, by Order resolved by this Court in numerous cases, and
Nos. 98700-01, are substantially the
ruled that Cases Numbered 227 (against dated April 22, 1991. one to which a negative answer has invariably
same, viz.: 14
Virgilio Ang), 230 (against Chang Liang, Jr.) been given. The relevant precedents are
and 234 (against Iloilo Multi Parts Supply hereunder outlined.
1. Injunction suits instituted in the RTC by 8. Neither do suits for annulment of sale, or an action in the regional Chit, 21 SCRA 1364
defendants in ejectment actions in the title, or document affecting property operate to trial court contesting the [1967]).
municipal trial courts or other courts of the first abate ejectment actions respecting the same plaintiff's ownership over
level (Nacorda v. Yatco, 17 SCRA 920 [1966] property (Salinas v. Navarro [annulment of the property from which . . . The pendency of the
do not abate the latter; and neither do deed of sale with assumption of mortgage defendant is sought to be action for reconveyance
proceedings on consignation of rentals (Lim Si and/or to declare the same an equitable evicted. Hence, the does not constitute a
v. Lim, 98 Phil. 868 [1956], citing Pue, et al. v. mortgage], 126 SCRA 167 [1983]; Ang Ping v. obvious intimation of compelling reason to delay
Gonzales, 87 Phil. 81 [1950]). RTC [annulment of sale and title], 154 SCRA private respondents that the termination of an
153 [1987]; Caparros v. C.A. [annullment of the regular procedure, and ejectment case for it gives
2. An "accion publiciana" does not suspend an title], 170 SCRA 758 [1989]; Dante v. Sison not the summary rise merely to an
ejectment suit against the plaintiff in the former [annulment of sale with damages], 174 SCRA procedure, should be expectnacy that the
(Ramirez v. Bleza, 106 SCRA 187 [1981]). 517; Galgala v. Benguet Consolidated, Inc. followed . . . does not documents assailed therein
[annulment of document], 177 SCRA 288 impress us as being may be nullified and the
3. A "writ of possession case" where ownership [1989]). endowed with legal or subject properties may be
is concededly the principal issue before the logical support. ordered reconveyed to
Regional Trial Court does not preclude nor bar The underlying reasons for the above rulings private respondents, as
the execution of the judgment in an unlawful were that the actions in the Regional Trial Court xxx xxx xxx compared to the clear,
detainer suit where the only issue involved is did not involve physical or de facto possession actual and existing legal
the material possession or possession de and, on not a few occasions, that the case in Thus, the fact that the right of petitioner to the
facto of the premises (Heirs of F. Guballa, Sr. v. the Regional Trial Court was merely a ploy to tenant had previously filed possession of the subject
C.A., et al.; etc., 168 SCRA 518 [l988]). delay disposition of the ejectment proceeding, a separate action in the property as the registered
or that the issues presented in the former could former Court of First owner. (Galgala, et al. vs.
4. An action for quieting of title to property is not quite as easily be set up as defenses in the Instance involving the Benguet Consolidated, Inc.
a bar to an ejectment suit involving the same ejectment action and there resolved. This is ownership of the land is not et al., 177 SCRA 288
property (Quimpo v. de la Victoria, 46 SCRA specially true in the cases at bar, where the a valid reason to frustrate [1989]).
139 [1972]). petitioners-lessees' claims that the lessors the summary remedy of
(and the buyer of the leased premises) had ejectment. Such action The precedents invoked by the petitioners 17 do
5. Suits for specific performance with violated their leasehold rights because (a) they filed by the tenant only not represent current and prevailing doctrine; they might at
most be deemed exceptions justifying the general rule.
damages do not affect ejectment actions (e.g., (the lessees) were not accorded the right of lends credence to the fact Moreover, the facts in the rulings invoked by them are quite
to compel renewal of a lease contract) preemption, (b) the buyer was not required to that the ejectment case readily distinguishable from the numerous precedents
(Desamito v. Cuyegkeng. 18 SCRA 1184 respect their leases, and (c) the lessees were filed by plaintiffs against upholding said general rule.

[1966], Pardo de Tavera v. Encarnacion, 22 denied the option to renew their leases upon the former does not involve
SCRA 632 [1968], Rosales v. CFI, 154 SCRA the expiration thereof constituted their the question of title. Thus, as regards the seemingly contrary ruling
153 [1987]; Commander Realty, Inc. v. C.A., causes of action in the suits commenced by (Lozada vs. Abragan, et al., in Vda. de Legaspi v. Avendao, 79 SCRA 135
161 SCRA 264 [1988]). them in the Regional Court. 15 66 SCRA 600 [1975]). This (1977), this Court observed, in Salinas
is so because the judgment v. Navarro, 126 SCRA, 167, 172-173 (1983),
6. An action for reformation of instrument (e.g., In Leopoldo Sy v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. rendered in an ejectment that "the exception to the rule in this case
from deed of absolute sale to one of sale No. 95818, August 2, 1991, 16 for instance, the case shall not bar an action ofVda. de Legaspi is based on strong reasons
with pacto de retro) does not suspend an
following pronouncements were made: between the same parties of equity not found in the present petition. The
ejectment suit between the same parties (Judith respecting title to the land right of the petitioners is not so seriously placed
v. Abragan, 66 SCRA 600 [1975]). Private respondents insist nor building nor shall it be in issue in the annulment case as to warrant a
that the Rule on Summary held conclusive of the facts deviation, on equitable grounds, from the
Procedure does not apply therein found in a case imperative nature of the rule. In the Vda. de
7. An action for reconveyance of property or
since there is a question of between the same parties Legaspi case, execution of the decision in the
"accion reivindicatoria" also has no effect on
ownership involved albeit upon a different cause of ejectment case would also have meant
ejectment suits regarding the same property
in another case pending in action involving demolition of the premises, a factor not present
(Del Rosario v. Jimenez, 8 SCRA 549 [1963];
another court, that is, the possession. (Ang Ping, et in this petition."
Salinas v. Navarro, 126 SCRA 167; De la Cruz
aforesaid Civil Case No. al. vs. Regional Trial Court
v. C.A., 133 SCRA 520 [1984]; Drilon v.
88-47264 in the Regional of Manila, Branch 40, et al., Vda. de Murga v. Chan, 25 SCRA. 441 (1968)
Gaurana, 149 SCRA 352 [1987]; Ching v.
Trial Court of Manila. We 154 SCRA 77 [1987]). is not in point. In that case, the essential
Malaya, 153 SCRA 412 [1987]; Philippine
apprehend that if this Furthermore, in ejectment requisite of an unequivocal demand to vacate
Feeds Milling Co., Inc. v. C.A., 174 SCRA 108;
theory is adopted, the cases the jurisdiction of the and surrender the premises had not been
Dante v. Sison, 174 SCRA 517 [1989]; Guzman
applicability of the Rule on court is determined by the fulfilled, as the demand actually made on the
v. C.A. [annulment of sale and reconveyance],
Summary Procedure in allegations of the lessee was in the alternative: either pay rentals
177 SCRA 604 [1989]; Demamay v. C.A., 186
ejectment cases could complaint, not by the at an increased rate, or if this be unacceptable,
SCRA 608 [1990]; Leopoldo Sy v. C.A., et al.,
easily be thwarted by the defense raised by to surrender the leased property. Furthermore,
[annulment of sale and reconveyance], G.R.
defendant through the defendant. (Ramirez v. it appeared that the defendant's lease had not
No. 95818, Aug. 2, 1991).
simple expedient of filing been legitimately ended but, on the contrary,
had been automatically renewed in virtue of a adjudged to have the right to continue in land in dispute is decided, and the petitions are DISMISSED. Costs
special clause in this lease contract. It was for possession of a parcel of land despite the sale the matter of who between against petitioners.
these reasons that this Court held that the case thereof by the Archbishop of Manila to Orellano appellant and appellee has
was "outside the jurisdiction of the municipal because said sale had been executed in the better right of SO ORDERED.
court . . ." 18 violation of "Republic Act 1162 as amended by possession over it cannot
Republic Act No. 1599 to the effect that: 'That be determined. We are not __

Neither is Valderrama Lumber Manufacturer's no lot or portion thereof actually occupied by a in any way suggesting that
Co., Inc. v. L.S. Sarmiento, Co., 5 SCRA 287 tenant or occupant shall be sold by the appellee's action for FIRST DIVISION
(1962), also relied upon by the petitioners, in landowner to any other persons than such recission is clearly
point. Here, the ejectment complaint was also tenant or occupant unless the latter renounces meritorious. What is
found to be fatally defective in that it failed to in a public instrument his right under this Act.'" apparent is that it is not on
allege that the plaintiff had been in prior What Orellano did was to file a suit of unlawful its face groundless. The G.R. No. 76031 March 2, 1994
possession of the premises in question, or had detainer against Alvestir in the city court contention of appellant that
been deprived thereof by any of the means set invoking his superior right of possession in Alvestir cannot have any MIGUEL SEMIRA, petitioner,
forth in Section 1, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court virtue of said sale to him by the Archbishop of standing in law, even under vs.
or that possession was being unlawfully Manila of the premises in question. Upon these the provisions of Republic COURT OF APPEALS and BUENAVENTURA
withheld from said plaintiff. facts, this Court held: 19 Act 1162, as amended, AN, respondents.
invoked by him is a matter
The facts in Quiambao vs. Osorio, 158 SCRA . . . Orellano's claim of that We cannot resolve Antonio M. Chavez for petitioner.
674 (1988) are also quite peculiar and differ better right of possession here. It is but proper,
from those in the cases at bar. Quiambao in his complaint for therefore, from any point of Onofre K. Quizon for private respondent.
v. Osorio originated from a complaint for ejecment is already in view, that Civil Case No.
forcible entry filed against Quiambao in the issue in Alvestir's action for 63664 be allowed to follow
Malabon Municipal Court by persons claiming recission pending in the its course and the
to be legitimate possessors of a 30,835-square- Court of First Instance. It ejectment suit be BELLOSILLO, J.:
meter lot by virtue of Agreement to Sell No. does not matter that dismissed.
3482 executed in their favor by the former Land Orellano is defendant in Juana Gutierrez owned a parcel of land, later
Tenure Administration (later, the Land Authority, that case whereas he is As will be seen, a special law was a necessary designated as Lot 4221, situated in Sto. Nio,
then the Department of Agrarian Reform). plaintiff in the city court, as factor in the controversy, which is a feature that Taysan, Batangas which she sold to private
Quiambao moved to dismiss the action, long as the issues raised in may well serve to distinguish the case from the respondent Buenaventura An for P850.00 by
alleging that the agreement had been the pleadings by either of precedents relied upon by the Trial Court and means of a "Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng Lupa"
impugned in an administrative case before the the parties require the the Court of Appeals in their adjudication of the executed on 4 January 1961. 1 Aside from the
Land Authority and said case constituted a resolution of the same cases at bar. In any event, even assuming that estimated area of 822.5 square meters appearing in the deed of
"prejudicial question." The motion was denied, cause. There is no there is irreconcilable conflict sale, the following boundaries of the lot are also stated: on the
question here that the between Orellanoand the other precedents north, by Taysan-Lobo-Sto. Nio-Pinagbayanan and Sto. Nio-
and Quiambao instituted a special action Dagatan Road (Junction or Intersection road); on the east, by
of certiorari in the Court of First Instance to same parties are involved listed and outlined in this opinion, there is no Sto. Nio-Pinagbayanan Road and Juana Gutierrez; on the
nullify the order of denial and cause dismissal in both cases, albeit in Civil difficulty whatever in concluding that the south, by Sto. Nio School site; and, on the west, by Sto. Nio-
Case No. 53664, there are overwhelming weight of authority is decidedly Dagatan Road.
of the ejectment suit. In this certiorari suit, the
Land Authority, by leave of court, intervened other parties who are not contrary to Orellano, precluding application
"praying that the petition for certiorari be parties in the ejectment thereof to the present cases. Thereafter, private respondent entered the
granted and . . . (it, the Land Authority) be suit. (Alzua vs. Johnson, premises observing thereby the boundaries of
allowed to decide the matter exclusively." It 21 Phil 308; Juan vs. Go It may well be stressed in closing that as the the property and not the area given. 2
further appears that subsequently, the Land Cotay, 26 Phil. 328). The law now stands, even when, in forcible entry
Authority promulgated judgment in the subject matter is and lawful detainer cases, "the defendant Subsequently, he acquired two (2) other parcels
administrative case "affirming the cancellation possession of the identical raises the question of ownership in his of land, Lot 4215 with an area of 8,606-square
of Agreement to Sell No. 3482" thus making land in dispute. And the pleadings and the question of possession meters located on the east of Lot 4221 from the
more apparent "the folly of allowing the cause of Alvestir in the cannot be resolved without deciding that issue spouses Pascual Hornilla and Gliceria Ilao on
ejectment case to proceed . . ." Upon these Court of First Instance of ownership," the Metropolitan Trial Courts, 30 June 1964, and another lot with an area of
facts, it appearing that the contract on which case is the same cause he Municipal Trial courts, and Municipal Trial 11,000-square meters from Santiago Asi.
the plaintiff's cause of action for ejectment was alleged as affirmative Courts nevertheless have the undoubted Pascual Hornilla is the son of Juana Gutierrez.
founded had been cancelled by the proper defense in the detainer competence to resolve "the issue of
administrative authority, this Court ordered case. In any event, it is ownership . . . only to determine the issue of On 18 October 1972, private respondent sold
dismissal of the ejectment case. beyond cavil of doubt that possession." 20 Lot 4221 to his nephew, Cipriano Ramirez, and
until the question of spouse by means of another "Kasulatan ng
Orellano v. Alvestir, 76 SCRA 536 (1977), whether or not Alvestir has WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of the Bilihan ng Lupa" for P2,500.00, 3 where the lot was
a right of priority, under the described with the same area and boundaries mentioned in the
another precedent cited by the petitioners, Court of Appeals, being entirely in accord with 4 January 1961 "Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng Lupa" with the
originated from an action instituted by Alvestir in laws invoked by him, over the facts on record and applicable law and exception of the boundary on the east; which was changed
the Court of First Instance praying that he be Orellano to purchase the jurisprudence, the same is AFFIRMED in toto,
from "Juana Gutierrez" to "Buenaventura An" to reflect the be resolved without deciding the ownership," 7 the trial court the latter, in turn, depends on whether such the contract, the vendor
acquisition by private respondent of the adjoining Lot 4215. modified its earlier resolution and adjudged petitioner the
rightful and lawful owner and possessor of the area in question
portion is part of Lot 4215 of private respondent shall be bound to deliver
and cannot therefore be ejected therefrom. 8 or of Lot 4221 of petitioner. all that is included within
Like his uncle before him, Cipriano Ramirez said boundaries, even
occupied the lot by observing the boundaries when it exceeds the area
Private respondent appealed to the Regional It is not disputed that Lot 4221 of petitioner was
stated in the document of sale. Subsequently, or number specified in the
Trial Court which reversed the Municipal Circuit once owned by private respondent; that the
he applied for a new tax declaration to replace contract; and, should he
Trial Court, ruling that it was not necessary to latter sold the same to his nephew, Cipriano
the one in the name of his uncle but was denied not be able to do so, he
delve on the issue of ownership since the Ramirez, in 1972 for the lump sum of
in view of an existing mortgage executed by shall suffer a reduction in
question of prior physical possession could be P2,500.00; that the "Kasulatan ng Bilihan ng
Buenaventura An in favor of the Taysan Rural the price, in proportion to
resolved independently, and that since Lupa" incorporated both the estimated area and
Bank, which was only settled in 1979. what is lacking in the area
petitioner admitted having possessed the the definite boundaries of the land; and, that
disputed area on 12 March 1979 while the private respondent's nephew in turn sold the lot or number, unless the
On 12 March 1979, Cipriano Ramirez sold the to petitioner in 1979 with the very same contract is rescinded
lot to petitioner Miguel Semira for P20,000.00. possession of private respondent began way
back in 1964, the latter clearly had prior boundaries mentioned in the deed of sale because the vendee does
However, the area stated in the "Kasulatan ng executed in his favor by his uncle not accede to the failure to
Bilihan ng Lupa" 4 was 2,200 square meters and not 822.5 possession.9 Since petitioner did not specifically deny the
allegation of forcible deprivation of property in his Answer, the Buenaventura An. deliver what has been
appearing in the previous document. As delimited by its
boundaries, the lot is actually much bigger than 822.5 square
averment in that regard was deemed admitted under Sec. 1, stipulated.
meters. This was confirmed by the Taysan Cadastral Mapping Rule 9, of the Rules of Court. 10 As a final word, the RTC held
that "no matter how righteous defendant's claim of ownership
Petitioner claims that owns the entire 2,200
Survey conducted in 1974 where it is definitely stated that the
area of Lot 4221 is 2,200 square meters; hence, the reason for over the property may be, he has not the right to take the law square meters since it is the size of Lot 4221 Hence, when private respondent Buenaventura
the change. into his own hands by forcibly depriving plaintiff of his prior following its established boundaries. On the An sold Lot 4221 to his nephew Cipriano
actual possession of the property." 11 other hand, private respondent insists that he Ramirez by means of a "Kasulatan ng Bilihan
On 17 March 1979, Miguel Semira entered the only sold 822.5 square meters, hence, his ng Lupa" which incorporated both the area and
very same premises previously occupied by Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, but nephew could not have transferred a bigger the definite boundaries of the lot, the former
Ramirez and began the construction of a new without success. 12 In its Decision of 22 April 1986, area to petitioner. transferred not merely the 822.5 square meters
respondent appellate court dismissed the petition for review
rice-mill. However, on 18 April 1979, a stated in their document of sale but the entire
and affirmed the RTC decision in toto. 13
complaint for forcible entry was filed against We sustain petitioner as did the Municipal area circumscribed within its boundaries.
him by private respondent in the Municipal Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals Circuit Trial Court. We have repeatedly ruled
Circuit Trial Court of Taysan-Lobo. 5 The latter that where land is sold for a lump sum and not The fact that the area turned out to be 2,200
erred: (1) in upholding this ejectment from the
claimed that the area of Lot 4221 was 822.5 square meters only so much per unit of measure or number, the square meters; instead of only 822.5 square
and that the excess of 1,377 square meters forcibly occupied disputed area despite the absence of clear and
boundaries of the land stated in the contract meters, is of no moment and does not entitle
by petitioner formed part of Lot 4215 which he acquired from indubitable proof that private respondent had
the Hornillas in 1964. determine the effects and scope of the sale, not private respondent to the difference because
prior physical possession and that he was
the area thereof. 15 Hence, the vendors are obligated to the definite object sold was Lot 4221 in its
deprived of the same by force, intimidation,
Petitioner admits having entered the disputed deliver all the land included within the boundaries, regardless of entirety and not just any unit of measure or
strategy or stealth; and, (2) in not holding that whether the real area should be greater or smaller than that
portion on 17 March 1979, but denies having number. 17 That the sale resulted in a disadvantage to private
the question of ownership is so necessarily recited in the deed. This is particularly true where the area is
respondent does not confer on him any cause of action against
illegally done so. In his answer, petitioner involved that it would be impossible to decide described as "humigit kumulang," that is, more or less. 16 These
petitioner. 18
claims ownership over the property by invoking the question of bare possession without first
conclusions are drawn from Art. 1542 of the Civil code which
states
the 1979 deed of sale in his favor by Cipriano setting that of ownership. 14 Besides, we are hardly convinced that
Ramirez.
In the sale of real estate, Buenaventura An entered into the sale unaware
We agree with the position of petitioner and made for a lump sum and that Lot 4221 actually had a much bigger area
Meanwhile, during the pendency of the case, sustain the Municipal Circuit Trial Court in not at the rate of a certain than it purported to be. Even as early as the
private respondent applied for and was issued holding that in the case at bench the issue of sum for a unit of measure sale between him and his nephew, private
original Certificate of Title No. P-12694 over the possession cannot be decide independently of or number, there shall be respondent was already aware of the difference
lots he purchased from the Hornillas and that the question of ownership. Hence, we reverse no increase or decrease of between the stated area of Lot 4221 and its
from Santiago Asi with a combined area of the Court of Appeals as well as the Regional the price, although there be actual size. His nephew Cipriano Ramirez
19,606 square meters. However, the title was Trial Court. a greater or less are or testified, and private respondent did not
issued for 2 hectares, 8 ares and 33 centares
number than that stated in dispute, that when asked why the area of Lot
or 20,833 square meters. No explanation was In his complaint in the MCTC, private the contract. 4221 stated in their deed of sale was much
given for the difference. respondent claims constructive possession of smaller than the actual size, private respondent
the disputed portion since 30 June 1964 when The same rule shall be explained that it was to minimize taxes. 19 Private
The case was initially dismissed for lack of he bought the same as part of Lot 4215 of the respondent likewise did not deny that his nephew merely
applied when two or more
jurisdiction. 6 The municipal court of Taysan-Lobo ruled that Hornilla spouses. Likewise, petitioner bases his transferred to petitioner the very same area which he himself
since the issue of prior physical possession could not be immovables are sold for a had acquired and possessed in 1961 when he bought the same
resolved without first deciding on the ownership, dismissal was occupancy of the disputed portion on the 1979 single price; but if, besides from Juana Gutierrez, the original owner of the lot.
proper since forcible entry cases involve the sole issue of prior sale of Lot 4221 in his favor, which he contends mentioning the boundaries,
physical possession. However, upon motion, and in view of the is separate and distinct from Lot 4215 of private
passage of B.P. Blg. 129, which took effect 14 August 1981, which is indispensable in Considering the foregoing, it is not difficult to
providing that "[m]etropolitan trial courts, municipal trial courts, respondent. Clearly, the question of who has every conveyance of real sustain petitioner over private respondent when
and municipal circuit trial courts, without distinction, may try prior possession hinges on the question of who estate, its area or number the latter failed even to prove prior possession
cases of forcible entry and detainer even if the question of the real owner of the disputed portion is. And
ownership is raised in the pleadings and possession could not should be designated in in his favor. Absent such element, it cannot be
said that he was forcibly deprived of the No. 13) ordering the dismissal of the complaint businessman and small farm house after
disputed portion. Hence, his action for forcible as well as the counterclaim. storekeeper by occupation making some clearings and
entry must fail. and resides at Lower Sta. fenced the boundaries. He
The undisputed facts of this case, as found by Maria, Davao del Sur while also placed signboards
It should be emphasized, however, that the both the trial court and the then Court of First the land in litigation is at (T.S.N., pp. 14-15, hearing
case before us is merely an action for forcible Instance of Davao del Sur, are as follows: Colongan, Sta. Maria. of September 15, 1977).
entry and that the issue of ownership was Neither did he put any sign On September 27, 1976,
decided for the sole purpose of resolving On the basis of the or hut to show that he is in plaintiff Manuel Mercado
priority of possession. Hence, any admission of parties in their actual possession (p. 8, again went to the land in
pronouncement made affecting ownership of respective pleadings, the T.S.N., p. 7, hearing of suit to make copras. That
the disputed portion is to be regarded merely as oral testimonies of all January 14, 1978). He was the time the matter
provisional, hence, does not bar nor prejudice witnesses for both plaintiff knew defendants' laborers was brought to the
an action between the same parties involving and defendants and the were in the land in suit as attention of the police of
title to the land. 20 documentary evidence early as August, 1976 and Sta. Maria, Davao del Sur
offered and admitted this that they have a hut there and the incident entered in
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Intermediate Court finds that plaintiff but he did not do anything the police blotter (Exhibit
Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals) dated Manuel Mercado acquired to stop them. Instead 11). Then on November 18,
22 April 1986 affirming that of the Regional Trial his rights to possess the plaintiff was happy that 1976, defendant Wong
Court of 13 January 1984 in toto is REVERSED land in litigation, there were people and a ordered the hooking of the
and SET ASIDE and another one entered particularly lot 3 (LRC) hut on the land in suit (p. coconuts from the land in
REINSTATING, AFFIRMING and Pcs-295, (situated at 14, T.S.N., hearing of litigation and nobody
REITERATING the Decision of 4 May 1983 of Colonga, Sta. Maria, January 14, 1978). disturbed him. But on
the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Taysan- Davao del Sur) and which November 29, 1976,
Lobo, Batangas, with costs against private is particularly described Before July, 1976, defendant received a copy
respondent Buenaventura An. and embraced in Transfer defendant Ignacio Wong of plaintiff's complaint for
Certificate of title No. (T- went to the land in litigation forcible entry with
SO ORDERED. 4244) T-972 from William to find out if there were summons to answer which
Giger by virtue of a deed of other people residing there is the case now before the
__ sale with right to or claiming it besides the Court. During the
repurchase which was owner and he found none. pendency of this instant
THIRD DIVISION executed in 1972 for a So, in July, 1976, complaint for forcible entry,
consideration of P3,500.00 defendant Ignacio Wong spouses William Giger and
G.R. No. L-50264 October 21, 1991 (testimony of plaintiff, bought the parcel of land in Cecilia Valenzuela filed a
T.S.N., p. 3, hearing of litigation from William Giger case for reformation of
IGNACIO WONG, petitioner, January 7, 1977). Then, in and his wife Cecilia instrument with the Court
vs. 1973, William Giger again Valenzuela (Exhibit 5). of First Instance of Digos,
HON. LUCAS D. CARPIO, as Presiding asked an additional After the execution of Davao del Sur against
Judge, Court of First Instance of Davao del amount of P2,500.00 from Exhibit 5, defendant plaintiff Mercado (Exhibit
Sur, Branch V and MANUEL plaintiff and so he required Ignacio Wong asked for the 4). The case pertains to
MERCADO, respondents. William Giger to sign a new delivery of the title to him Exhibit "A" of plaintiff. (pp.
deed of Pacto de and so he has in his 1-3, CA Decision, pp. 82-
Rodolfo B. Quiachon for petitioner. Retro Sale (Exhibit "A") on possession TCT No. (T- 84,Rollo).
November 5,1973 at 4244) T-974 (Exhibit 6) in
Jose M. Ilagan for private respondent. Davao City before Notary the name of William Giger. On the basis of the aforestated undisputed
Public Gregorio C. Batiller Mr. Wong declared the facts, the Municipal Court of Sta. Maria, Davao
(T.S.N., p. 5, hearing of land in suit for taxation del Sur in its February 20, 1978 Decision found
January 7, 1977). In 1972, purposes in his name that herein petitioner (defendant Ignacio Wong)
BIDIN, J.: plaintiff began harvesting (Exhibit 7). He tried to had prior, actual and continuous physical
only the coconut fruits and register the pacto de possession of the disputed property and
p

he paid the taxes on the retro sale with the Register dismissed both the complaint and the counter-
This is a petition for review on certiorari,
land (Exhibits B to E) for of Deeds by paying the claim.
certified to this Court by the Court of Appeals as
Mr. Giger. He went registration fee (Exhibit 8)
it involves purely question of law, seeking the
periodically to the land to but due to some On appeal, the then Court of First Instance of
annulment of the September 29, 1978 decision
make copra but he never technicalities, the pacto de Davao del Sur, in its September 29, 1978
of the then Court of First Instance **of Davao
placed any person on the retro sale could not be Decision drew a completely different conclusion
del Sur, Branch V, in Civil Case No. 1258 which
land in litigation to watch it. registered. The defendant from the same set of facts and ruled in favor of
reversed the February 20, 1978 decision of the
Neither did he reside on Wong placed laborers on herein private respondent (plaintiff Manuel
Municipal Court of Sta. Maria, *** Davao del
the land as he is a the land in suit, built a
Sur in an action for Forcible Entry (Civil Case
Mercado). The decretal portion of the said harvest season to comply with the contract of and this is all that is necessary. Under the rule, that of the other and hence
decision, reads: labor with the true owner of the property. entering upon the premises by strategy or as between themselves
stealth is equally as obnoxious as entering by their rights would be as if
WHEREFORE, the Court The argument is untenable. force. The foundation of the action is really the both of them had acted in
finds the plaintiff to have forcible exclusion of the original possessor by a good faith at the time of the
taken possession of the It should be stressed that "possession is person who has entered without right. The transaction, this legal
property earlier in point of acquired by the material occupation of a thing words "by force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or fiction of Yap's good faith
time and defendant is an or the exercise of a right, or by the fact that it is stealth" include every situation or condition ceased when the complaint
intruder and must, as he is subject to the action of our will, or by the proper under which one person can wrongfully enter against him was filed, and
hereby ordered to return, acts and legal formalities for acquiring such upon real property and exclude another who consequently the court's
the possession of the land right." (Art. 531, Civil Code; Rizal Cement Co., has had prior possession therefrom. If a declaration of liability for
in question for the plaintiff, Inc. vs. Villareal, 135 SCRA 15 [1985]); and that trespasser enters upon land in open daylight, the rents thereafter is
paying a monthly rental of the execution of a sale thru a public instrument under the very eyes of person already clothed correct and proper. A
P400.00 from August, shall be equivalent to the delivery of the thing, with lawful possession, but without the consent possessor in good faith is
1976, till the property is unless there is stipulation to the contrary . . . . of the latter, and there plants himself and entitled to the fruits only so
returned with costs against If, however, notwithstanding the execution of excludes such prior possessor from the long as his possession is
the defendant. Judgment is the instrument, the purchaser cannot have the property, the action of forcible entry and not legally interrupted, and
reversed. enjoyment and material tenancy of the thing detainer can unquestionably be maintained, such interruption takes
and make use of it herself, because such even though no force is used by the trespasser place upon service of
Petitioner filed the instant petition with the Court tenancy and enjoyment are opposed by other than such as is necessarily implied from judicial summons (Arts.
of Appeals. But the Court of Appeals, in its another, then delivery has not been effected. the mere acts of planting himself on the ground 544 and 1123, Civil Code).
March 1, 1979 Resolution **** found that the only issue is a pure question of law the correctness of the conclusion drawn from the undisputed facts and certified the case (Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. II, and excluding the other party. (Tolentino, Civil
Code of the Philippines, Vol. II, 1983 Ed., pp. A perusal of the records of the case shows that
to this Court.

1989 Ed., p. 400).


In its April 4, 1979 Resolution, the Second 243-244; Drilon vs. Gaurana, 149 SCRA 342 petitioner received private respondent's
Division of this Court docketed the case in this Applying the above pronouncements on the [1987]). complaint for forcible entry with summons on
Court and considered it submitted for decision. instant case, it is clear that possession passed November 29, 1976 (Rollo, p. 46). His good
from vendor William Giger to private Anent the award of rentals in favor of private faith therefore ceased on November 29,1976.
Petitioner alleged two (2) errors committed by respondent Manuel Mercado by virtue of the respondent, the same is in order. Petitioner's Accordingly, the computation of the payment of
respondent judge, to wit: first sale a retro (Exhibit A), and accordingly, the argument that there is no legal or factual basis monthly rental should start from December,
later sale a retro (Exhibit 5) in favor of petitioner for the payment of monthly rentals because bad 1976, instead of August, 1976.
failed to pass the possession of the property faith on the part of petitioner was never proved
A) THE CONCLUSION DRAWN BY
because there is an impediment the deserves no merit. WHEREFORE, with the modification that the
RESPONDENT JUDGE THAT PETITIONER IS
AN INTRUDER IS WITHOUT FACTUAL AND possession exercised by private respondent. computation of the monthly rental should start
LEGAL BASIS FOR PURPOSES OF A Possession as a fact cannot be recognized at It should be noted that possession acquired in from December, 1976 instead of August, 1976,
FORCIBLE ENTRY. the same time in two different personalities good faith does not lose this character except in the September 29, 1978 decision of respondent
except in the cases of co-possession. Should a the case and from the moment facts exist which judge is Affirmed in all other respects, with
question arise regarding the fact of possession, show that the possessor is not unaware that he costs against petitioner.
B) THE CONCLUSION DRAWN BY
the present possessor shall be preferred; if possesses the thing improperly or wrongfully.
RESPONDENT JUDGE THAT PETITIONER
there are two possessions, the one longer in (Art. 528, Civil Code). SO ORDERED.
MUST PAY A MONTHLY RENTAL OF P400.00
FROM AUGUST, 1976 TILL THE PROPERTY possession, if the dates of possession are the
IS RETURNED HAS NO LEGAL AND same, the one who presents a title; and if these Possession in good faith ceases from the __

FACTUAL BASIS. conditions are equal, the thing shall be placed moment defects in the title are made known to
in judicial deposit pending determination of its the possessors, by extraneous evidence or by FIRST DIVISION
possession or ownership through proper suit for recovery of the property by the true
The petition is without merit.
proceedings (Art. 538, Civil Code). owner. Whatever may be the cause or the fact
from which it can be deduced that the
Petitioner, in claiming that the private G.R. No. L-48050 October 10, 1994
As to petitioner's query that "Is the entry of possessor has knowledge of the defects of his
respondent has not established prior
petitioner to the property characterized by title or mode of acquisition, it must be
possession, argues that private respondent's FELICIDAD JAVIER, petitioner,
force, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth in considered sufficient to show bad faith.
periodic visit to the lot to gather coconuts may vs.
order to show that private respondent has had (Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. II,
have been consented to and allowed or HON. REGINO T. VERIDIANO II, Presiding
possession so that the case is within the p. 226). Such interruption takes place upon
tolerated by the owner thereof for the purposes Judge, Branch I, Court of First Instance of
jurisdiction of the inferior court?" (p. 15, service of summons (Manotok Realty vs. Judge
of paying an obligation that may be due to the Zambales and REINO ROSETE, respondents.
Petition; p. 16, Rollo). The same is answered in Tecson, 164 SCRA 587 [1988] citing Mindanao
person gathering said nuts and that a person
the affirmative. Academy, Inc. v. Yap (13 SCRA 190 [1965]). In
who enters a property to gather coconut fruits the latter case, this Court held: Cesar E. Palma for petitioner.
and convert the same to copras may only be a
hired laborer who enters the premises every The act of entering the property and excluding
the lawful possessor therefrom necessarily . . . Although the bad faith Saturnino V. Bactad for private respondent.
implies the exertion of force over the property, of one party neutralizes
with galvanized iron posts province of Zambales. . . . action, he simply states that neither of the two
embedded in concrete, Sometime in December, cases, i.e., the complaint for forcible entry and
BELLOSILLO, J.: likewise destroying plants 1970, and until present, the subsequent petition for quieting of title,
introduced by plaintiff by defendants, relying on an alleges a cause of action. Thus, private
Petitioner Felicidad Javier questions before us removing existing BL application filed on respondent continues, both cases have to be
the order of a regional trial court citing the final (Bureau of Lands) December 23, 1969, with dismissed.
decision of the city court previously dismissing monuments thereon, and the Bureau of Lands,
her complaint for forcible entry, and on the by these actions, however have squatted, Time and again it has been said that for res
basis thereof, dismissed her petition to quiet defendant started illegally occupied and judicata to bar the institution of a subsequent
title on the ground of res judicata. We summon exercising illegal unlawfully possessed the action the following requisites must concur: (1)
the time-honored remedies accion possession of said portion southwestern portion of There must be a final judgment or order; (2)
interdictal, accion publiciana and accion of land which contains an plaintiff's above-described The court rendering the judgment must have
reivindicatoria or accion de reivindicacion to area of 200 square meters, property of about 200 jurisdiction over the subject matter; (3) The
resolve the issues presented in the petition. more or less. 1 square meters, then by former judgment is a judgment on the merits;
defendant BEN BABOL and, (4) There is between the first and second
It appears that on 25 January 1963, petitioner On 7 November 1972 the City Court of and now by defendant actions identity of parties, of subject matter and
filed a Miscellaneous Sales Application for Lot Olongapo City, Br. 4, 2 dismissed Civil Case No. 926 on REINO ROSETE, the of causes of action. 10 The presence of the first three
No. 1641, Ts-308 of the Olongapo Townsite the ground that "it appears to the Court that the Bureau of former having sold the requirements and the identity of subject matter in the fourth
Lands has considered the area in question to be outside Lot requirement are not disputed. Hence, the only issues remaining
Subdivision, Lower Kalaklan, Olongapo City, entirety of his property to
1641 of the plaintiff. . . ." 3 The Decision of the City Court of are whether as between Civil Case No. 926 and Civil Case No.
with the District Land Officer, Bureau of Lands, Olongapo City became final and executory on 30 April 1973 the latter, including the 2203-0 there is identity of parties and of causes of action which
Olongapo City. Sometime in December 1970, when the then Court of First Instance of Zambales and portion in question. . . . 6 would bar the institution of Civil Case No. 2203-0.
Olongapo City, Br. 3, 4 dismissed the appeal and affirmed the
alleging that she was forcibly dispossessed of a findings and conclusions of the City Court holding that appellant
portion of the land by a certain Ben Babol, she Instead of filing a responsive pleading, therein Petitioner's argument that there is no identity of
(herein petitioner) failed to give sufficient evidence to prove that
instituted a complaint for forcible entry before the area in question was within the boundaries of Lot No. defendant Reino Rosete (private respondent parties between the two actions is without
the City Court of Olongapo City, docketed as 1641. 5 herein) moved to dismiss the complaint on the merit. We have repeatedly ruled that for res
Civil Case No. 926, stating in pars. 2 and 3 ground of res judicata. Defendant Ben Babol judicata to apply, what is required is not
therein that Subsequently, on 17 December 1973, petitioner did not file any pleading. absolute but only substantial identity of
was granted Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. parties. 11 It is fundamental that the application of res
judicata may not be evaded by simply including additional
. . . plaintiff is the true, 5548 and issued Original Certificate of Title No. In its Order dated 27 January 1978, 7 the then Court parties in a subsequent litigation. In fact we have said that there
lawful and in actual, prior P-3259 covering Lot No. 1641. Meanwhile, Ben of First Instance of Zambales, Br. 1, 8 sustained the argument of is still identity of parties although in the second action there is
Babol who was the defendant and appellee in Rosete and granted his motion to dismiss. Thereafter, one party who was not joined in the first action, if it appears that
physical possession of a petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied. 9 Hence, this such party is not
certain parcel of land the complaint for forcible entry had sold the petition for review on certiorari. a necessary party either in the first or second action, 12 or is a
situated at Lower Kalaklan, property he was occupying, including the mere nominal party. 13 Thus, Sec. 49, par. (b), Rule 39, Rules of
City of Olongapo, said lot portion of about 200 square meters in question, Court, provides that ". . . the judgment or order is, with respect
Petitioner contends that res judicata cannot
being designated as Lot to a certain Reino Rosete. Thus petitioner to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that
apply in the instant case since there is no could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between
No. 1641, Ts-308 of the demanded the surrender of the same area in
identity of parties and causes of action between the parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent
Olongapo Townsite dispute from Reino Rosete who repeatedly to the commencement of the action or special proceeding,
her complaint for forcible entry, which had long
Subdivision since 1961 and refused to comply with the demand. litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the
become final and executory, and her same capacity."
up to the present time, until subsequent petition for quieting of title. She
the day and incidents On 29 June 1977, or after about four (4) years argues that private respondent Reino Rosete,
from the finality of the dismissal of Civil Case In the case at bench, it is evident that private
hereinafter narrated. . . . who invokes the defense or res judicata, was respondent Reino Rosete is a successor in
Sometime on December No. 926, petitioner instituted a complaint for never impleaded in the forcible entry case,
quieting of title and recovery of possession with interest of Ben Babol by title subsequent to the
12, 1970, the defendant, which is an action in personam; neither was he commencement and termination of the first
without express consent of damages against Ben Babol and Reino Rosete a purchaser pendente lite who, perhaps, could
before the then Court of First Instance of action. Hence, there is actual, if not substantial,
plaintiff and without lawful have validly invoked the defense of res identity of the parties between the two actions.
authority, through scheme, Zambales and Olongapo City, docketed as Civil judicata. With regard to the cause of action, she
Case No. 2203-0, alleging in pars. 2 and 3 But, there is merit in petitioner's argument that
strategy and stealth, maintains that there is no identity of causes of there is no identity of causes of action between
forcibly entered a portion therein that action since the first case was for forcible entry, Civil Case
on the southwestern part of which is merely concerned with the possession No. 926 and Civil Case No. 2203-0.
Lot No. 1641, Ts-308, with . . . plaintiff is the absolute of the property, whereas the subsequent case
the assistance of hired owner in fee simple of a was for quieting of title, which looks into the
parcel of land identified as Civil Case No. 926 is a complaint for forcible
helpers, started ownership of the disputed land.
Lot No. 1641, Ts-308, entry, where what is at issue is prior
construction of riprap along
Olongapo Townsite possession, regardless of who has lawful title
the Kalaklan River Private respondent however submits that there
Subdivision . . . covered by over the disputed property. 14 Thus, "[t]he only issue in
perimeter of said portion of is identity of parties in the two cases since he is an action for forcible entry is the physical or material
land; said entry was further Original Certificate of Title a successor in interest by title of the defendant possession of real property, that is, possession de facto and not
augmented by removing No. P-3259, issued by the in the first case after the commencement of the
possession de jure. The philosophy underlying this remedy is
that irrespective of the actual condition of the title to the
plaintiff's chain link, fence Register of Deeds for the first action. On the issue of identity of causes of property, the party in peaceable quiet possession shall not be
turned out by strong hand, violence or terror." 15 And, a ownership and clearly gives defendants therein The facts are not disputed as related by the appropriate key produced negative
judgment rendered in a case for recovery of possession is
conclusive only on the question of possession and not on the
notice of plaintiff's claim of exclusive and respondent Court of Appeals in its questioned result, hence, this suit where plaintiff
ownership. It does not in any way bind the title or affect the absolute ownership, including the right to decision dated December 7, 1988 incurred expenses in the form of
ownership of the land or building. 16 possess which is an elemental attribute of such attorney's fees and costs of suit.
ownership. Thus, this Court has ruled that a The record reveals that on October 23, 1987,
On the other hand, Civil Case No. 2203-0 while judgment in forcible entry or detainer case the appellee, Reginaldo Y. Lim, had filed a ALLEGATIONS IN SUPPORT OF
inaccurately captioned as an action for disposes of no other issue than possession and complaint before the Metropolitan Trial Court of PRAYER FOR PRELIMINARY
"Quieting of Title and Recovery of Possession declares only who has the right of possession, Manila, in part, alleging, as follows: MANDATORY
with Damages" is in reality an action to recover but by no means constitutes a bar to an action INJUNCTION/RESTRAINING
a parcel of land or an accion for determination of who has the right or title of 3. Plaintiff and his family had for ORDER
reivindicatoria under Art. 434 17 of the Civil Code, and ownership. 23 some time resided in Room 301 of
should be distinguished from Civil Case No. 926, which is the building adverted to in the next 10. Plaintiff repleads all the foregoing
anaccion interdictal. From the averments of the complaint in
Civil Case No. 2203-0, plaintiff therein (petitioner herein) clearly And, applying the ruling of the Court En preceding paragraph, until they allegations by way of reference to
sets up title to herself and prays that respondent Rosete be Banc in Quimpo v. De la Victoria, 24 even if we treat transferred to their present residence form part of the prayer for the
ejected from the disputed land and that she be declared the Civil Case No. 2203-0 as a petition to quiet title, as its caption at No. 3 Igdalig Street, Quezon City; issuance of a writ of preliminary
owner and given possession thereof. Certainly, the allegations suggests, still it has a cause of action different from that for
partake of the nature of an accion reivindicatoria. 18 ejectment. Consequently, there being no identity of causes of mandatory injunction;
action between Civil Case No. 926 and Civil Case No. 2203-0, 4. The said room 301 has thereafter
the prior complaint for ejectment cannot bar the subsequent
The doctrine in Emilia v. Bado, 19, decided more than action for recovery, or petition to quiet title.
been utilized by plaintiff as a place 11. The failure and/or refusal of
twenty-five years ago, is still good law and has preserved the where he keeps some of his defendant to furnish plaintiff the
age-old remedies available under existing laws and
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The important belongings, such as his law appropriate key, above-cited,
jurisprudence to recover possession of real property,
namely accion interdictal, which is the summary action for Order dated 27 January 1978 of the then Court books, important documents, constitutes a violation of the
forcible entry (detentacion) where the defendant's possession of First Instance of Zambales, Br. I, with station appliances, etc.; substantial rights of plaintiff, who has
of the property is illegal ab initio, or the summary action for
in Olongapo City, dismissing Civil Case No. a clear and unmistakable right to the
unlawful detainer (desahuico) where the defendant's
possession was originally lawful but ceased to be so by the 2203-0, and its subsequent Order denying 5. The aforementioned building has use and enjoyment of Room 301 of
expiration of his right to possess, both of which must be brought reconsideration of the dismissal are only one common main door through the building owned by defendant
within one year from the date of actual entry on the land, in
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. which all the occupants of the various corporation, such that there is an
case of forcible entry, and from the date of last demand, in case
of unlawful detainer, in the proper municipal trial court or rooms therein, including that of urgent and paramount necessity for
metropolitan trial court; 20 accion publiciana which is a plenary plaintiff, can get in and out therefrom; the issuance of the writ of preliminary
The Clerk of Court is directed to remand the
action for recovery of the right to possess and which should be injunction/restraining order
brought in the proper regional trial court when the records immediately to the court of a quo and
6. Accordingly, each and every commanding defendant to furnish
dispossession has lasted for more than one year; and, accion the latter to proceed with the trial of Civil Case
reivindicatoria or accion de reivindicacion which seeks the occupant of any and all of the rooms plaintiff the appropriate key in order
No. 2203-0 with deliberate dispatch. This
recovery of ownership and includes the jus utendi and the jus of the building including plaintiff has to prevent great and and/or
fruendi brought in the proper regional trial court. decision is immediately executory.
been given a key or a duplicate key irreparable damages and injury upon
to the doorlock by Rafael Lim, the plaintiff.
Accion reivindicatoria or accion de SO ORDERED.
Officer-in-Charge of defendant
reivindicacion is thus an action whereby plaintiff corporation; In conclusion, the said appellee prayed, as
__
alleges ownership over a parcel of land and follows:
seeks recovery of its full possession. 21 It is
different from accion interdictal or accion publicianawhere FIRST DIVISION 7. When plaintiff wanted to go inside
plaintiff merely alleges proof of a better right to possess without his room in the following morning of PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is most
claim of title. 22 G.R. No. 93451 March 18, 1991 September 30, 1987 to fetch three (3) respectfully prayed of the Honorable
of his law books, which he needed to Court that a writ of preliminary
In Civil Case No. 926 petitioner merely claimed LIM KIEH TONG, INC., petitioner, read in connection with a case he is mandatory injunction/restraining
a better right or prior possession over the vs. handling, he was surprised to find out order commanding defendant to
disputed area without asserting title thereto. It THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JUDGE that the key given him could no provide plaintiff the appropriate key
should be distinguished from Civil Case No. ROGELIO M. PIZARRO, Presiding Judge of longer fit the door lock which was or a duplicate key to the lock of the
2203-0 where she expressly alleged ownership, Branch 16 of the Metropolitan Trial Court of then already changed; main door of the building be
specifically praying that she be declared the Manila, and REGINALDO Y. LIM, respondents. immediately issued, and, after
rightful owner and given possession of the 8. Consequently, plaintiff had to buy hearing the case on its merits,
disputed portion. Hence, in Civil Case No. 926 Balgos & Perez for petitioner. three (3) new law books for which he judgment be rendered in favor of
petitioner merely alleged that she was "the true, Madamba, Lim & Tan for private respondent. incurred expenses in the sum of plaintiff and against defendant
lawful (possessor) and in actual, prior physical Pl,253.00, if only to be able to ordering:
possession" of the subject parcel of land, GANCAYCO, J.: prepare for his cases;
whereas in Civil Case l. the injunction prayed for in the
No. 2203-0 she asserted that she was "the 9. Plaintiff was only able to contact complaint;
The issue of whether a complaint filed in the
absolute owner in fee simple" of the parcel of defendant through its Officer-in-
Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila is one for
land "covered by Original Transfer Certificate of Charge, Mr. Rafael Lim, the following 2. defendant to pay plaintiff the sum
forcible entry and detainer or one for specific
Title No. P-3259." The complaint in Civil Case day, October 1, 1987, but his request of Pl,253.00 as actual compensatory
performance is the center of this litigation.
No. 2203-0 definitely raises the question of for him to be provided with the damages;
3. defendant to pay plaintiff the sum On the morning of September 30, enforcement of the temporary Petitioner's contentions is (sic) not
of P5,000.00 as and for attorney's 1987, private respondent tried to go restraining order earlier issued by well-taken.
fees; and to Room 301 but found that the key respondent judge and from further
given him could not fit and open the taking cognizance of said Civil Case In Singson vs. Aragon, 92 Phil. 514,
4. the cost of suit. main door. As one of the occupants No. 122775; . . . the Supreme Court held that
of the building in question, private exemplary damages must be
Plaintiff prays for such other reliefs respondent demanded from In ruling in favor of the private appellee, the specified and if not, the municipal trial
and/or remedies which the Honorable petitioner's officer-in-charge the appellee judge, in part, stated: court could still grant it, if together
Court may deem just and proper in delivery to him of the appropriate with the other money claims, the
the premises. (p. 13, orig. rec.) keys to the said common main door In this case force was used by amount of the total claim does not
so that he could enter the premises petitioner to deprive private exceed P10,000.00 (now
The opening paragraphs of the questioned and be restored to possession of said respondent of the physical P20,000.00).
decision relate what had happened in the Room No. 301 of the building, but his possession of Room 301 when the
courts below: efforts proved futile as the officer in lock of the main door was changed As to moral damages, the aforesaid
charge did not heed his demand . . . without his knowledge and consent. ruling can likewise be made to apply.
This is a special civil action
for certiorari under Rule 65, On October 2, 1987, by reason of the The issued (sic) involved is mere What confers jurisdiction on the
grounded on pure questions of law. unjustifiable ouster of private physical possession (possession de inferior court in forcible entry and
respondent from said premises, he facto) and not juridical possession illegal detainer cases is NOT the
The case is simplicity itself. instituted Civil Case No. 122546 (possession de jure) nor ownership amount of unpaid rentals or damages
entitled Reginaldo Y. Lim vs. Rafael (Mercado vs. Go Bio, 78 Phil. 279; involved, but rather the nature of the
Lim and Lim Kieh Tong & Co., Inc. Masallo, vs. Cesar, 39 Phil. 134). action because the rents or damages
The undisputed facts are as follows:
before the Metropolitan Trial Court are only incidental to the main action
which was raffled to Branch 25. Said The purpose of forcible entry is that (Vichanco vs. Laurilla, L-13935, June
Petitioner is a duly organized
complaint was denominated as an regardless of the actual condition of 30, 1960).
domestic corporation and is the
1

action for damages with injunction the title to property, the party in
owner of a building located at 1231
despite the allegations contained peaceable and quiet possession shall An appeal was taken to the Court of Appeals.
Piedad Street corner Benavidez
therein . . .. The aforesaid case was not be turned out by strong hand, The appeal was dismissed for lack of merit. A
Street, Manila; 2

subsequently dismissed for lack of violence or terror . . . In affording this motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner
jurisdiction . . . remedy, breaches of the peace and was denied in a resolution dated May 9, 1990.
Public respondent is the Presiding
3

Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court, criminal disorder would be minimized.


On October 23, 1987, private A party out of possession must Hence, this petition for review the main thrust of
Branch 16;
respondent again instituted another respect and resort to the law alone to which is that the action being one for specific
action at the Metropolitan Trial Court obtain what he claims is his. (Supia performance the jurisdiction thereof is vested in
For sometime prior to the filing of this docketed as Civil Case No. 122775 and Batioco vs. Quintero and Ayala, the Regional Trial Court.
petition, Lim Eng Piao, father of which was raffled to Branch 16. The 59 Phil. 312).
private respondent, occupied said complaint reiterated the same
premises as a dwelling unit at the The petition must fail.
allegations . . . Considering that respondent judge
above given address together with all
the members of his family. Lim Eng found the applicability of the Rule in A reading of the allegations of the complaint
On November 2, 1987, a temporary Summary Procedure, the motion to show that private respondent and his family
Piao subsequently died. Said
restraining order was issued by dismiss was correctly denied. A resided in Room 301 of the building of
occupancy was continued by private
respondent judge pending trial on the motion to dismiss being one of the petitioner until they transferred to their present
respondent. Later, the latter was able
merits, commanding petitioner to prohibited pleadings and motions residence at No. 3 Igdalig St., Quezon City.
to acquire a house and lot at No. 3
deliver the appropriate keys to private under Section 15 of the 1983 Rules However, private respondent retained
Igdalig Street, Quezon (sic). In spite
respondent and allow him to enter on Summary Procedure. possession of said room to keep his important
of having transferred residence,
the premises and occupancy of belongings, such as his law books, important
private respondent did not vacate
Room No. 301 of the building . . . Hence, the petition must fail on this documents, appliances, etc. The building has
Room 301 of the building in question.
Instead, he utilized the same as a score alone. only one common main door through which all
On November 3, 1987, petitioners the occupants of the various rooms therein can
place where he keeps some of his
instituted the instant petition; Anent the second issue, petitioner get in and out. Accordingly, all occupants
important belongings, papers, books, 1wphi1

documents and appliances . . . contended that when the amount of including private respondent were given a key
On the same date after an ex- damages claimed is not specifically to the main doorlock by petitioner.
parte hearing, the Executive Judge of alleged in the complaint, jurisdiction
On or about September 1987,
this Court, in order to obviate any over the case would fall under the However, when private respondent wanted to
petitioner changed the lock of the
possible injustice pending the Regional Trial Courts, as the failure go inside his room on September 30, 1987 to
common main door of the building.
determination of the issuance of the to so allege would characterize the get three (3) of his lawbooks which he needed
injunctive writ, issued a temporary subject matter as one which is to read in connection with a case he was then
restraining order, enjoining the incapable of pecuniary estimation. handling, he found that the key he possessed
was no longer compatible with the lock, i.e., the SPOUSES NAZARIO P. PENAS, JR. Jr. executed an extra effective March 1990, he
same was changed. Private respondent had to represented by ELPIDIO R. VIERNES, judicial settlement of her deposited the monthly
buy three (3) new lawbooks for Pl,253.00 to ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, petitioners, estate. As time [went] on, rentals in the subject
prepare for his cases. He requested private vs. the monthly rental on the premises with the PNB in
respondent to provide him the appropriate key COURT OF APPEALS and LUPO subject premises had been his name ITF (in trust for)
but his request was denied. Petitioner also CALAYCAY, respondents. gradually increased by the spouses Lucila and
alleges that he has a clear and unmistakable [petitioners], the latest of Nazario Penas, Jr. under
right to the use of said room entitling him to the Mark Anthony B. Plotea for petitioners. which was Six Hundred Account No. 688930. Prior
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction to Ninety One and 20/100 to such deposit, [private
command petitioner to provide him the David B. Agoncillo for private respondent. (P691.20) Pesos, respondent] together with
appropriate key to the lock of the main building; Philippine Currency. others, in a letter of March
and to pay damages in the amount of 26, 1990, informed the
Pl,253.000, P5,000.00 attorney's fees and In a letter of January 18, [petitioners], inter alia, that
costs of the suit. PADILLA, J.: 1990, [petitioner]-spouses since [petitioners']
Penas, through counsel representative refused to
From the foregoing facts alleged in the notified the [private accept the rentals, he will
The only issue to be resolved in this ejectment
complaint, the Court holds that the suit is one respondent] that effective deposit the same with a
case is whether or not the Metropolitan Trial
for forcible entry and detainer under Rule 70 of March 1990, they were reputable bank and he will
Court had jurisdiction over the complaint filed
the Rules of Court. Private respondent retained terminating the written [hold] the same intact for
by herein petitioner-spouses represented by
the possession of Room 301 of petitioner's month to month lease the [petitioners]. There was
their attorney-in-fact Elpidio R. Viernes.
building which he claimed to have the right to contract as they were no no instance that
use and enjoy, but petitioner prevented him longer interested to renew [petitioners] manifested
The undisputed facts of the case as summed
from enjoying his right by depriving him of the the same and demanded any desire to withdraw the
up by the trial court and adopted by respondent
right of egress and ingress through the main from the latter to vacate the same deposit in the bank.
Court of Appeals are as follows:
door of the building. Through stealth, petitioner premises in question on or
changed the key to the main door thus before February 28, 1990. On August 10, 1992,
Subject of this controversy
depriving private respondent of the possession In the same letter, plaintiffs through counsel
[are the] premises
of his rented room. [petitioners] opted to allow sent another letter to the
identified as 24-B Scout
the defendant to continue defendant to vacate the
Santiago Street, Barangay
Any person deprived of possession of any land occupying the leased subject premises and to
Laging Handa, Quezon
or building or part thereof, may file an action for premises provided he will pay back rental arrearages
City, also identified as 26-B
forcible entry and detainer in the proper inferior agree to execute a new in the sum of Two
[South] D Street, Quezon
court against the person unlawfully depriving or lease contract for a period Thousand (P2,000.00)
City. It was the object of a
withholding possession from him 4 of one (1) year at an Pesos, Philippine
written lease contract
increased monthly rental of Currency, per month from
executed by the late
This relief is not only available to a landlord, Two Thousand Five March 1990 in the total
Nazario Penas in favor of
vendor, or vendee, but also to a lessee or Hundred Pesos sum of Sixty Thousand
[private respondent] Lupo
tenant or any other person against whom the (P2,500.00) Pesos, (P60,000.00) Pesos,
Calaycay on June 26,
possession of any land or building, or a part Philippine Currency, plus Philippine Currency, which
1964, at an agreed monthly
thereof, is unlawfully withheld, or is otherwise two (2) months deposit defendant failed to satisfy.
rental of One Hundred Ten
unlawfully deprived possession thereof, within and, further, gave the
(P110.00) Pesos,
one (1) year after such unlawful deprivation or [private respondent] up to Accordingly, on September
Philippine Currency. The
withholding of possession. February 28, 1990 to 25, 1992, after the
written lease contract was
decide, otherwise judicial corresponding Certification
on a month to month basis.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. No action for unlawful detainer to File Action was issued
Nazario Penas, Sr. died on
costs. against the [private by Barangay Laging
February 5, 1976 and,
respondent] shall ensue. Handa, Quezon City,
thereafter, on June 15,
SO ORDERED. [Petitioners] later finally [petitioners] filed the
1976, an extra-judicial
reduced the monthly rental present suit for unlawful
settlement of his estate
__ to Two Thousand detainer on the grounds of
was executed by his
(P2,000.00) Pesos, termination of the month to
surviving heirs, one of
SECOND DIVISION Philippine Currency, only. month lease contract and
whom is his son, Nazario
failure of the defendant to
Penas, Jr. Likewise, after
[Private respondent] failed execute a new lease
the death of plaintiff's
to abide by the demand of agreement with increased
mother Concepcion P.
G.R. No. 112734 July 7, 1994 the [petitioners]. However, rentals. [Petitioners] tried to
Penas on March 2, 1985,
he continued staying on impress the Court that after
her children including
the leased premises and they [had] agreed [to] a
[petitioner] Nazario Penas,
new monthly rental of Two either vacate the premises on or before 28 3. Ordering private respondent to pay Ten fee of P1,000.00 per hearing and expenses of
Thousand (P2,000.00) February 1990 or agree to execute a new lease Thousand (P10,000.00) Pesos as attorney's litigation.
Pesos, Philippine contract for one (1) year at an increased rental fees.
Currency, [private rate of P2,500 per month. In Vda. de Murga On November 9, 1992, private respondent
respondent] refused to v. Chan 4 we held that: Costs against private respondent. moved to dismiss the complaint but his motion
enter into a new contract was denied by the MTC. On January 20, 1993
and insisted in paying at a The notice giving the SO ORDERED. he filed his answer,1 in which he alleged that he
lower rate; that they gave lessee the alternative had stopped paying the monthly amortizations
defendant allowance of either to pay the increased __ because the townhouse unit sold to him by
more than one (1) year rental or otherwise vacate petitioner was of defective construction. He
within which to sign a new the land is not the demand SECOND DIVISION alleged that he had in fact filed a complaint for
contract of lease but still he contemplated by the Rules "unsound real estate business practice" in the
refused to do so; that even of Court in unlawful G.R. No. 117051 January 22, 1996 Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
if conciliation before the detainer cases. When after (HLURB Case No. REM-07-9004-80) against
barangay is unnecessary such notice, the lessee FRANCEL REALTY petitioner. Private respondent prayed that
as [petitioners] reside elects to stay, he thereby CORPORATION, petitioner, petitioner be ordered to pay P500,000.00 as
abroad, their attorney-in- merely assumes the new vs. moral damages, P500,000.00 as exemplary
fact referred the case to rental and cannot be COURT OF APPEALS and FRANCISCO T. damages, P75,000.00 as attorney's fees and
the barangay level. ejected until he defaults in SYCIP, respondents. that he be given "all other remedies just and
(reference to Annexes said obligation and equitable."
omitted) 1 necessary demand is first DECISION
made. In its resolution dated February 24, 1993, the
The parties were required to submit their MENDOZA, J.: MTC ruled that the answer was filed out of time
respective position papers after which the The facts of this case do not warrant a on the ground that it was filed more than ten
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 33 of Quezon departure from said settled doctrine. It should Petitioner Francel Realty Corporation filed a days after the service of summons.2 On March
City rendered a decision dated 16 March 1993 be noted that even if the private respondent complaint for unlawful detainer against private 17, 1993, however, it dismissed the complaint
dismissing herein petitioners' complaint for lack was depositing rentals in trust for the respondent Francisco T. Sycip. The case was for lack of jurisdiction. The MTC held that the
of jurisdiction. The trial court based its decision petitioners, what was being deposited were filed in the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of case was cognizable by the HLURB. But it also
on the finding that the complaint was filed more rentals at the old rate, which petitioners were Bacoor, Cavite. ordered petitioner to pay private respondent
than one (1) year after private respondent not bound to accept or withdraw. When private P10,000.00 as moral damages, P10,000.00 as
began unlawfully occupying the premises. respondent elected to remain in the premises In its complaint, petitioner alleged that it had exemplary damages, P3,000.00 as attorney's
after petitioners had sent him the letter of 18 executed a Contract to Sell to private fees, and to pay costs.
On appeal to the Regional Trial Court, the trial January 1990 giving him the option to vacate by respondent Lot 16, Building No. 14 of the
court decision was upheld, the RTC ruling that 28 February 1990 or to sign a new lease Francel Townhomes, at 22 Real Street, Maliksi, On appeal the Regional Trial Court affirmed the
herein petitioners' remedy was converted from contract for one (1) year at an increased rental Bacoor, Cavite, for P451,000.00. The Contract decision of the MTC. It held that the case was
an actio de mero hecho to an accion rate of P2,500.00 (later reduced to P2,000.00) to Sell provides inter alia that in case of default exclusively cognizable by the HLURB which
publiciana since more than one (1) year had a month, he assumed the new rental rate and in the payment of two or more installments, the had jurisdiction not only over complaints of
elapsed from the demand upon defendants to could be ejected from the premises only upon whole obligation will become due and buyers against subdivision developers but also
vacate. The Regional Trial Court concluded that default and by a proper demand from the demandable and the seller will then be entitled over actions filed by developers for the unpaid
herein petitioners could initiate a proper petitioners. The demand was made on 10 to rescind the contract and take possession of price of the lots or units.
complaint with the Regional Trial Court. August 1992, followed by the action for unlawful the property; the buyer will vacate the premises
detainer on 25 September 1992. without the necessity of any court action and Petitioner filed a petition for review in the Court
Respondent Court of Appeals in a decision * in CA G.R. SP No. 31480

dated 19 November 1993 upheld the RTC. The Court of Appeals ruled that sin ce herein petitioners were not collecting the rentals being deposited by private respondent, there no lo nger was any lease contract between the parties for two (2) years since the first le tter of petitio ners to private respondent. The Court of Appeals thus agreed that the proper remedy of the petitioners is to
the downpayment will be treated as earnest of Appeals, alleging that:
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the
file an action for recovery of possession in the Regional Trial Court.

money or as rental for the use of the premises.


We do not agree with the decision of the Court decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP Petitioner alleged that private respondent failed (a) The amounts of damages prayed
of Appeals, and hence set it aside. No. 31480 is hereby SET ASIDE and a new to pay the monthly amortization of P9,303.00 for by the private respondent in his
decision rendered: since October 30, 1990 despite demands to Answer are enormous and way
Petitioners correctly cite our ruling in Sy Oh update his payments and to vacate the beyond the jurisdiction of the inferior
v. Garcia 2 upholding the established rule that the one (1) 1. Ordering private respondent Lupo Calaycay premises, the latest of which was the demand court; and
year period provided for in section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of to immediately vacate the premises located at made in the letter dated September 26, 1992,
Court within which a complaint for unlawful detainer can be filed 24-B Scout Santiago Street, Barangay Laging and that because of private respondent's unjust (b) Since the inferior court and the
should be counted from the LAST letter of demand to vacate,
the reason being that the lessor has the right to waive his right
Handa, Quezon City. refusal to vacate, petitioner was constrained to respondent court ruled that it has no
of action based on previous demands and let the lessee remain engage the services of counsel. Petitioner jurisdiction over this case, then it has
meanwhile in the premises. 3 2. Ordering private respondent Lupo Calaycay prayed that private respondent be ordered to no reason, much more jurisdiction to
to pay back rentals in the amount of Two vacate the premises and pay a monthly rental award damages in excess of the
In the present case, it is of note that the first Thousand (P2,000.00) Pesos per month from of P9,303.00 beginning October 30, 1990 until P20,000.00 jurisdiction of the inferior
demand letter addressed by petitioners to March 1990 until he finally vacates the leased he shall have vacated the premises, and court.3
private respondent gave the latter the option to premises. P25,000.00 as attorney's fees plus appearance
The appellate court dismissed the petition, right of petitioner must be determined by the for damages for expenses incurred and Before this Court is a petition for review
holding that the MTC had jurisdiction over agency. inconveniences allegedly suffered by him as a on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer, result of the filing of the ejectment case.7 Court seeking to set aside the Decision1 and
regardless of the amount of damages on Petitioner's cause of action against private the Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals, dated
unpaid rentals sought to be recovered in view respondent should instead be filed as a Pursuant to Rule 6, 8 a party may file a April 6, 2001 and February 15, 2002,
of 1A(1) of the Revised Rule on Summary counterclaim in HLURB Case No. REM-07- counterclaim only if the court has jurisdiction to respectively, (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 49994.
Procedure.4 9004-80 in accordance with Rule 6, 6 of the entertain the claim. Otherwise the counterclaim
Rules of Court which is of suppletory cannot be filed.8 The antecedents are as follows:
Petitioner moved for reconsideration. It application to the 1987 HLURB Rules of
contended that since the MTC had ruled that it Procedure per 3 of the same. In the case Even assuming that the MTC had jurisdiction, On February 24, 1997, petitioners, spouses
had no jurisdiction over this case, then it had no of Estate Developers and Investors Corporation however the award of damages to private Marcos Esmaquel and Victoria Sordevilla
jurisdiction either to grant the counterclaim for v. Antonio Sarte and Erlinda Sarte6 the respondent must be disallowed for the following (Victoria) filed an ejectment case3 against
damages in the total sum of P23,000.00. Its developer filed a complaint to collect the reasons: respondent Maria V. Coprada before the 2nd
motion was, however, denied for lack of any balance of the price of a lot bought on Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of
"cogent reason" to reverse the appellate court's installment basis, but its complaint was (1) The MTC decision itself stated that the Magdalena, Liliw and Majayjay Laguna.
resolution of June 15, 1994.5 dismissed by the Regional Trial Court for lack of answer with its counterclaim was filed out of Petitioners claimed that they are the registered
jurisdiction. It appealed the order to this Court. time or more than 10 days from private owners of a parcel of land situated in M.H. Del
Hence this petition for review on certiorari. In dismissing the appeal, we held: respondent's receipt of summons. In effect, Pilar St., Barangay San Miguel, Majayjay,
therefore, private respondent did not make any Laguna, containing an area of Two Hundred
It is important to first determine whether the The action here is not a simple action counterclaim. Fifty-Three (253) square meters and covered
MTC has jurisdiction over petitioner's to collect on a promissory note; it is a by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-
complaint. For if it has no jurisdiction, then the complaint to collect amortization (2) Moreover, a reading of the MTC decision 93542. In 1945, respondent was able to
award of damages made by it in its decision is payments arising from or in showed no justification for the award of moral persuade the petitioners to allow her and her
indeed without any basis. It is only if the MTC connection with a sale of a and exemplary damages and attorney's fees. family to use and occupy the land for their
has jurisdiction of the subject matter of the subdivision lot under PD Nos. 957 As held in Buan v. Camaganacan,9 an award of residence, under the condition that they will
action that it is necessary to determine the and 1344, and accordingly falls within attorney's fees without justification is a vacate the premises should petitioners need to
correctness of the award of damages, including the exclusive original jurisdiction of "conclusion without a premise, its basis being use the same. Respondent and her family were
attorney's fees. the HLURB to regulate the real estate improperly left to speculation and conjecture." It allowed to construct their residential house.
trade and industry, and to hear and should accordingly be stricken out. With respect Since then, the petitioners never made an
Petitioner's complaint is for unlawful detainer. decide cases of unsound real estate to the award of moral and exemplary damages, attempt to drive them away out of pity, knowing
While generally speaking such action falls business practices. Although the the record is bereft of any proof that petitioner that respondent and her eight children have no
within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of case involving Antonio Sarte is still acted maliciously or in bad faith in filing the other place to live in. Also, respondent and her
the MTC, the determination of the ground for pending resolution before the HLURB present action which would warrant such an family have been occupying the subject
ejectment requires a consideration of the rights Arbiter, and there is as yet no order award.10 premises free of rent, including payment of
of a buyer on installment basis of real property. from the HLURB authorizing realty taxes. Respondent's present
Indeed private respondent claims that he has a suspension of payments on account WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of circumstances have completely improved, i.e.,
right under P.D. No. 957, 23 to stop paying of the failure of plaintiff developer to Appeals is REVERSED and the complaint some of her children are already working; they
monthly amortizations after giving due notice to make good its warranties, there is no against private respondent is DISMISSED. The are regularly sending her financial assistance;
the owner or developer of his decision to do so question to our mind that the matter private respondent's counterclaim is likewise and she has acquired her own residential
because of petitioner's alleged failure to of collecting amortizations for the DISMISSED. house at Barangay Panglan, Majayjay, Laguna.
develop the subdivision or condominium project sale of the subdivision lot is Because of this, petitioners verbally demanded
according to the approved plans and within the necessarily tied up to the complaint SO ORDERED. that respondent vacate the subject land, but the
time for complying with the same. The case against the plaintiff and it affects the latter refused. Thus, petitioners were forced to
thus involves a determination of the rights and rights and correlative duties of the __ send a demand letter dated August 22, 1996,
obligations of parties in a sale of real estate buyer of a subdivision lot as giving respondent until November 30, 1996 to
under P.D. No. 957, Private respondent has in regulated by NHA pursuant to PD SECOND DIVISION vacate the subject premises. However,
fact filed a complaint against petitioner for 957 as amended. It must accordingly respondent still ignored said demand, which
unsound real estate business practice with the fall within the exclusive original G.R. No. 152423 December 15, 2010 prompted petitioners to bring a complaint
HLURB. jurisdiction of the said Board, and We before the barangay authorities. No settlement
find that the motion to dismiss was SPOUSES MARCOS R. ESMAQUEL and was reached, hence, a certification to file action
This is, therefore, not a simple case for unlawful properly granted on the ground that VICTORIA SORDEVILLA, Petitioners, in Court was issued. Petitioners were,
detainer arising from the failure of the lessee to the regular court has no jurisdiction to vs. therefore, constrained to lodge an ejectment
pay the rents, comply with the conditions of a take cognizance of the complaint. MARIA COPRADA, Respondent. case against the respondent before the MCTC.
lease agreement or vacate the premises after
the expiration of the lease. Since the Accordingly, we hold that the MTC correctly DECISION Respondent admitted that petitioners are the
determinative question is exclusively held itself to be without jurisdiction over registered owners of the subject land. However,
cognizable by the HLURB, the question of the petitioner's complaint. But it was error for the PERALTA, J.: she averred that in 1945, it was Emiliana
MTC to grant private respondent's counterclaim Coprada (petitioner Victoria Sordevilla's mother
and original owner of the subject land) and not the petitioners and to remove any and all SECTION 1. Who may institute proceedings, they are entitled to the possession thereof and
the petitioners who gave permission to her late improvements she introduced on the parcel of and when. - Subject to the provisions of the their right to recover possession over it is never
husband Brigido Coprada to use the subject lot. land.5 next succeeding section, a person deprived of barred by laches. They maintain that
Emiliana allowed her nephew Brigido and his the possession of any land or building by force, respondent's claim of ownership is based on an
family to occupy the lot as their permanent Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration, intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a unproven oral sale, which does not exist.
abode, because of her love and affection for which was denied by the RTC in an lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against Further, respondent cannot rely on the Tax
her nephew, and also, due to the fact that the Order6 dated November 24, 1998. Obviously whom the possession of any land or building is Declarations as she was paying taxes in the
said lot is virtually a wasteland. Thereafter, dissatisfied by the Decision, respondent filed unlawfully withheld after the expiration or petitioners' name, as the declared owners of
Brigido and his family cleared the area and built with the CA a petition for review with prayer for termination of the right to hold possession by the property. Moreover, she started paying the
therein a nipa hut to dwell in. When Emiliana temporary restraining order and preliminary virtue of any contract, express or implied, or the taxes only in 1984 despite her claim that the
died, the ownership of the property was injunction.7 legal representatives or assigns of any such property was sold to her in 1962. Even
inherited by her only child, petitioner Victoria lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person, may, at assuming that the sale took place in 1962,
Sordevilla. Respondent alleged that sometime In its Decision dated April 6, 2001, the CA any time within one (1) year after such unlawful respondent is guilty of laches as she failed to
in the early 1960's, petitioner Victoria offered granted respondent's petition, reversed the deprivation or withholding of possession, bring take any positive action for the delivery and
the said lot for sale for P2,000.00 to Decision of the RTC and affirmed in toto the an action in the proper Municipal Trial Court conveyance to her of the portion of the property
respondent, who readily agreed. The purchase Decision of the MCTC. Petitioners filed a against the person or persons unlawfully she is occupying. Finally, respondent cannot
price was paid in installments and was fully Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied withholding or depriving of possession, or any collaterally attack the title of the petitioners to
paid in 1962. Due to their close relationship, the by the CA in a Resolution8 dated February 15, person or persons claiming under them, for the the subject land.
agreement was never reduced to writing. 2002. Hence, the instant petition raising the restitution of such possession, together with
Respondent further maintained that since the following grounds: damages and costs. On her part, respondent, although admitting
execution of the oral sale of the subject lot, she that the property is registered in petitioners'
has been the one paying the realty taxes due I In unlawful detainer cases, the possession of name, claimed that the 100-square-meters
on the property. After the sale, respondent built the defendant was originally legal, as his portion of the property, where her house was
on the subject land a semi-concrete structure. THE RIGHT OF THE REGISTERED OWNERS possession was permitted by the plaintiff on erected, was already sold to her by petitioner
Respondent stated that petitioners' claim is TO RECOVER POSSESSION IS NEVER account of an express or implied contract Victoria. Thus, by virtue of the sale, she and her
barred by laches. Even granting, without BARRED BY LACHES AND/OR THE PERSON between them. However, defendant's family have the right to possess the said
admitting, that respondent's claim of ownership WHO HAS A TORRENS TITLE OVER A possession became illegal when the plaintiff property. The non-presentation of receipt and
over the property is improper because PARCEL OF LAND IS ENTITLED TO THE demanded that defendant vacate the subject deed of sale, non-delivery of the owner's
petitioners are the registered owners thereof, POSSESSION THEREOF. property due to the expiration or termination of certificate of title, and her payment of the real
respondent argued that she is a builder in good the right to possess under their contract, and property taxes in the name of the petitioners
faith, because she was able to build the defendant refused to heed such demand.10 were due to the close relationship between the
II
structure on the subject lot with the prior parties and the existing practice of palabra de
permission of the owner. The sole issue for resolution in an unlawful honor in their day to day transactions.
THE OWNERSHIP AND RIGHT OF
detainer case is physical or material possession Respondent further alleged that she is not guilty
PETITIONERS TO RECOVER POSSESSION
In its Decision4 dated September 11, 1997, the of the property involved, independent of any of laches; rather, it is the registered owners'
OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY CANNOT BE
MCTC rendered judgment dismissing the claim of ownership by any of the parties. Where right to recover possession of their property
DEFEATED BY UNPROVEN ORAL SALE.
complaint. It held that laches had already set in the issue of ownership is raised by any of the which is barred by laches.
which prevented petitioners from questioning parties, the courts may pass upon the same in
III
the validity of the purported sale between order to determine who has the right to possess In the present case, respondent failed to
Victoria and Maria. the property. The adjudication is, however, present evidence to substantiate her allegation
LACHES HAD SET IN AGAINST
merely provisional and would not bar or that a portion of the land was sold to her in
[RESPONDENT].
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) prejudice an action between the same parties 1962. In fact, when petitioners sent a letter12 to
reversed the MCTCs judgment. The RTC ruled involving title to the property.11 Since the issue the respondent, demanding her to vacate the
that respondent's occupation of the subject IV of ownership was raised in the unlawful subject property, the respondent, in reply13 to
property was by virtue of petitioners' tolerance detainer case, its resolution boils down to which the said letter, never mentioned that she
and permission. Hence, respondent is bound by THE CERTIFICATE OF TITLE IS NOT of the parties' respective evidence deserves purchased the subject land in 1962. If the sale
an implied promise that she will vacate the SUBJECT TO COLLATERAL ATTACK.9 more weight. really took place, the respondent should have
property upon demand. Thus, her possession immediately and categorically claimed that in
over the subject property became unlawful after The petition is meritorious. In the case at bar, petitioners' cause of action her letter response. Clearly therefore,
the petitioners demanded her to vacate the for unlawful detainer is based on their respondent's submission that there was an oral
property. The RTC found that respondent failed The pertinent point of inquiry in this case is ownership of the land covered by TCT No. T- sale is a mere afterthought.
to prove the alleged oral sale and that whether or not petitioners have a valid ground 93542 and on their claim that they merely
petitioners have adequately proven that they to evict respondent from the subject property. tolerated respondent's stay thereat. On the other hand, it is undisputed that the
are entitled to the possession of the subject Respondent's possession, as well as those subject property is covered by Transfer
land as registered owners thereof. The RTC An action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer persons claiming right under her, became Certificate of Title No. T-93542, registered in
ordered the respondent and all other persons is governed by Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules unlawful upon her refusal to vacate the the name of the petitioners. As against the
claiming rights under her to vacate and of Court, which provides: premises. Petitioners contend that since they respondent's unproven claim that she acquired
surrender the possession of the subject land to are the registered owners of the subject land, a portion of the property from the petitioners by
virtue of an oral sale, the Torrens title of over the subject land bars them from recovering since 1962, and were it not for the filing of the tolerated possession may be terminated any
petitioners must prevail. Petitioners' title over the same is without basis. Also, the doctrine ejectment suit in 1997, she would not have time and she cannot be considered as builder
the subject property is evidence of their invoked by the appellate court that a registered bothered to assert her rights under the alleged in good faith.22 It is well settled that both Article
ownership thereof. It is a fundamental principle owner may loose his right to recover its sale. Respondent's failure to assert that right 44823 and Article 54624 of the New Civil Code,
in land registration that the certificate of title possession by reason of laches is not only goes to prove that no sale ever transpired which allow full reimbursement of useful
serves as evidence of an indefeasible and applicable here. between the parties. improvements and retention of the premises
incontrovertible title to the property in favor of until reimbursement is made, apply only to a
the person whose name appears therein. Laches is the failure or neglect, for an Moreover, as the registered owners, petitioners' possessor in good faith, i.e., one who builds on
Moreover, the age-old rule is that the person unreasonable and unexplained length of time, right to eject any person illegally occupying land with the belief that he is the owner thereof.
who has a Torrens title over a land is entitled to to do that which, by exercising due diligence, their property is not barred by laches. Verily, persons whose occupation of a realty is
possession thereof.14 could or should have been done earlier; it is In Gaudencio Labrador, represented by Lulu by sheer tolerance of its owners are not
negligence or omission to assert a right within a Labrador Uson, as Attorney-in-Fact v. Spouses possessors in good faith.25 At the time
Further, respondent's argument that petitioners reasonable time, warranting the presumption Ildefonso Perlas and Pacencia Perlas and respondent built the improvements on the
are no longer the owners of a portion of the that the party entitled to assert it either has Spouse Rogelio Pobre and Melinda Fogata premises in 1945, she knew that her
subject land because of the sale in her favor is abandoned or declined to assert it.18 There is Pobre,20 the Court held that: possession was by mere permission and
a collateral attack on the title of the petitioners, no absolute rule as to what constitutes laches tolerance of the petitioners; hence, she cannot
which is not allowed. The validity of petitioners' or staleness of demand; each case is to be x x x As a registered owner, petitioner has a be said to be a person who builds on land with
certificate of title cannot be attacked by determined according to its particular right to eject any person illegally occupying the belief that she is the owner thereof.
respondent in this case for ejectment. Under circumstances, with the question of laches his property. This right is imprescriptible
Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, a addressed to the sound discretion of the court. and can never be barred by laches. In Bishop Respondent's reliance on her payment of realty
certificate of title shall not be subject to Because laches is an equitable doctrine, its v. Court of Appeals, we held, thus: taxes on the property is unavailing. She started
collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified application is controlled by equitable paying taxes only in 1984 despite her claim that
or canceled, except in a direct proceeding for considerations and should not be used to As registered owners of the lots in question, the she bought the property in 1962. Further, aside
that purpose in accordance with law. The issue defeat justice or to perpetuate fraud or private respondents have a right to eject any from the rule that tax declarations and
of the validity of the title of the petitioners can injustice.19 person illegally occupying their property. This corresponding tax receipts cannot be used to
only be assailed in an action expressly right is imprescriptible. Even if it be supposed prove title to or ownership of a real property
instituted for that purpose. Whether or not the Respondent first acquired possession of the that they were aware of the petitioners' inasmuch as they are not conclusive evidence
respondent has the right to claim ownership subject lot by mere tolerance. From 1945 until occupation of the property, and regardless of of the same,26 the RTC found that although the
over the property is beyond the power of the the filing of the complaint for ejectment in 1997, the length of that possession, the lawful owners payment for said taxes were received from
trial court to determine in an action for unlawful the nature of that possession has never have a right to demand the return of their respondent, the declared owner was petitioner
detainer.15 changed. Petitioners allowed the respondent to property at any time as long as the possession Victoria.
possess the property with the knowledge that was unauthorized or merely tolerated, if at all.
In Rodriguez v. Rodriguez,16 citing the case the respondent will vacate the same upon This right is never barred by laches. It must be stressed, however, that the court's
of Co v. Militar,17 the Court held that: demand. Hence, until such demand to vacate adjudication of ownership in an ejectment case
was communicated by the petitioners to the Since respondent's occupation of the subject lot is merely provisional, and affirmance of the
[T]he Torrens System was adopted in this respondent, petitioners are not required to do is by mere tolerance or permission of the RTC's decision would not bar or prejudice an
country because it was believed to be the most any act to recover the subject land, precisely petitioners, without any contract between them, action between the same parties involving title
effective measure to guarantee the integrity of because they knew of the nature of the respondent is bound by an implied promise that to the property, if and when such action is
land titles and to protect their indefeasibility respondent's possession, i.e., possession by she will vacate the same upon demand, failing brought seasonably before the proper forum.27
once the claim of ownership is established and mere tolerance. Thus, it cannot be said that which a summary action for ejectment is the
recognized. petitioners are guilty of failure or neglect to proper remedy against her.21 WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
assert a right within a reasonable time. Further, Decision and the Resolution of the Court of
It is settled that a Torrens Certificate of title is after the petitioners gave a demand letter to the In respondent's Answer filed before the MCTC, Appeals, dated April 6, 2001 and February 15,
indefeasible and binding upon the whole world respondent giving the latter until November 30, she claimed that since she was able to build a 2002, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 49994,
unless and until it has been nullified by a court 1996 to vacate the subject premises, which structure on the subject lot with the prior affirming the Decision of the 2nd Municipal
of competent jurisdiction. Under existing respondent failed to heed, they immediately permission from the owner, she is a builder in Circuit Trial Court in Civil Case No. 1875,
statutory and decisional law, the power to pass filed a complaint before the barangay good faith and thus entitled to be reimbursed are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision
upon the validity of such certificate of title at the authorities and, thereafter, lodged an ejectment the necessary and useful expenses under of the Regional Trial Court of Santa Cruz,
first instance properly belongs to the Regional case before the MCTC on February 24, 1997. Articles 546 and 548 of the Civil Code of the Laguna, Branch 26, in Civil Case No. SC-3580,
Trial Courts in a direct proceeding for In sum, We find that petitioners are not guilty of Philippines. Without such reimbursement, she is REINSTATED.
cancellation of title. laches as would bar their claim to the property has the right of retention over the property and
in question. she cannot just be ejected from the premises. SO ORDERED.
As the registered owner, petitioner had a right
to the possession of the property, which is one In contrast, respondent, who is claiming that a Respondent's argument does not hold water.
__

of the attributes of ownership. x x x portion of the property was sold to her in 1962, Since respondent's occupation of the subject
has herself failed within a long period of time to EN BANC
property was by mere tolerance, she has no
Anent the issue on laches, the CA's ruling that have that portion transferred in her name. right to retain its possession under Article 448
petitioners' long inaction to assert their rights Respondent had to wait for almost 35 years of the Civil Code. She is aware that her G.R. No. L-11977 April 29, 1959
LEONARDO AZARCON, MANUEL AZARCON dismissed. The answer was filed on June 2, the defendants on October 7, 1955; (b) said defendants-appellants had presented, after
and ESTEBAN ABOBO, petitioner, 1954 and on motion of plaintiffs dated March order of execution was set aside in an order of receipt of the order of execution, a motion to set
vs. 15, 1955, the defendants were declared in October 21, 1955, which order authorized the aside the said order of execution, and this
VICTOR EUSEBIO, respondent. default. A motion to set aside the default was defendants-appellants to file a supersedeas motion to stay execution was granted.
denied, and a judgment by default was entered bond in the amount of P1,000, the same to be Defendants furthermore presented a bond in
Leonardo N. Azarcon in his own behalf and for by the court on April 26, 1955. It ordered approved by the Court of First Instance of accordance with the order of the court and had
his co-petitioners. defendants to restore possession of the land to Nueva Ecija; (c) said supersedeas bond was it approved by the Court of First Instance. It
Melion Pajarillaga for respondent. plaintiff. Having failed to obtain a filed with Court of First Instance on November was perhaps in expectation of this resolution of
reconsideration of the above decision, 21, 1955, but the certificate showing such filing the court setting aside the order of execution
LABRADOR, J.: defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals. of the bond was issued by the clerk of the Court that defendants-appellants may have felt
of First Instance of Nueva Ecija only on justified in entering the land and harvesting the
Appeal from an order of the Court of Appeals, While the case was pending in the Court of December 14, 1955; and the Court of Appeals, fruits existing thereon.
Fourth Division, in CA-G.R. No. 15444-R, Appeals, a writ for the execution of the not having been notified of the fact that the
promulgated September 5, 1956, finding judgment of the lower court was issued on defendants have already secured the approval Again the order of the court setting aside its
Leonardo Azarcon, Manuel Azarcon and October 3, 1955. On October 8, 1955, of their supersedeas bond, set aside the order order to stay execution was issued in the belief
Esteban Abobo guilty of contempt of court, defendants moved and the court on October 21 to stay execution on December 2, 1955. that the defendants-appellants had not
ordering each of them to pay a fine of P100, to ordered that the said writ of execution be presented before the Court of First Instance of
remove certain improvements that they have stayed upon defendants' depositing of a The evidence shows that in spite of the receipt Nueva Ecija and which said court actually
constructed on the land, etc. supersedeas bond of P1,000. The writ of by the defendants of the notice of the writ of approved). Under the circumstances above
execution was actually served on the execution of October 3, 1955, which writ of stated, we are not ready to conclude that the
The record discloses that respondent Victor defendants on October 7, 1955. Various execution commanded defendants "to defendants-appellants can be held to have
Eusebio and petitioners herein had a dispute petitions were submitted by the parties, and forthwith remove from said premises and that committed a clear defiance of the order of the
over the possession of a certain parcel of public among them was that of defendants-appellants plaintiff have restitution of the same," court. Their act in harvesting the pending fruits
land in the year 1954. Victor Eusebio had filed asking for the lifting of the writ of execution. defendants-appellants nevertheless entered the was not only justified by law but was not
a lease application, No. V-79, for a parcel of This petition, dated October 14, 1955, was land to gather palay which was then pending expressly prohibited by the court's order, and
land known as lot No. 3807, containing an area granted on November 1, 1955, and the court harvest. We gather further from the record that was even ratified when the court ordered the
of about 349 hectares. A portion thereof was again fixed the supersedeas bond to stay the rice found on the disputed land at the time suspension of the execution. There was,
occupied by petitioners herein, Leonardo L. execution in the amount of P1,000 to be filed of the service of the order of execution had therefore, no open, clear and contumacious
Azarcon and his companions, under a with and approved by the Court of First been planted by defendants-appellants, who refusal to obey a definite order of the court such
homestead application. The conflict between Instance of Nueva Ecija as to its sufficiency. In appear to have been in possession of the land as would constitute contempt. Furthermore, a
the lessee and the homesteaders was ordered the same order of November 7, the Court of from 1951. While the court order of October 3, person who has been ordered to leave certain
to be investigated on May 25, 1955 by the Appeals denied a petition of the plaintiff- 1955 ordered the defendant-appellant to move premises is ordinarily not prohibited from taking
Director of Lands and again on August 3, 1955 appellee to file a counter-supersedeas bond as out from the premises, it did not prohibit them with him his own effects and possession,
by the Secretary of Agriculture and natural well as plaintiff appellee's motion for injunction. from gathering the crop then existing thereon. unless there is an express prohibition to this
Resources. In the meanwhile the defendants-appellants Under the law a person who is in possession effect. No such, prohibition was contained in
had presented on November 21, 1955 the and who is being ordered to leave a parcel of the order for the defendants to leave the land.
Before the dispute could be settled and on April supersedeas bond required for the approval of land while products thereon are pending There may have been a technical violation of
28, 1954, Victor Eusebio filed a complaint in the the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija and harvest, has the right to a part of the net an order not to enter the premises, but not of
Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, alleging the said bond was filed and approved on harvest, as expressly provided by Article 545 of one prohibiting them from removing anything
that he had acquired a big parcel of land, 349 November 21, 1955. This fact was certified to the Civil Code. therefrom. Such technical violation of the order
hectares in area, by lease from the Bureau of by the clerk of the Court of First Instance of cannot be considered as one amounting to a
Lands (lease application No. V-79); that while Nueva Ecija on November 14, 1955. ART. 545. If at the time the good faith defiance of the court's authority, punishable as
he was in possession thereof defendants ceases, there should be any natural contempt.
occupied a portion, known as lot No. 2807, On December 2, 1955 the Court of Appeals on or industrial fruits, the possessor
containing an area of six hectares more or less. motion of plaintiff, reconsidered its order or shall have a right to a part of the For the foregoing considerations, the order
He, therefore, prayed that defendants be resolution of November 7, 1955 authorizing the expenses of cultivation, and to a part appealed from should be, as it is hereby, set
ordered to vacate the six hectares occupied by stay of execution upon the filing of the bond by of the net harvest, both in proportion aside, and the defendants-appellants acquitted
them and pay damages. Defendant Leonardo the defendants-appellants, on the ground that to the time of the possession. of the charge against them. Without costs.
Azarcon answered the complaint alleging that the defendants-appellants have not filed any
he is in actual possession of a portion of 24 supersedeas bond as required. On January 19, xxx xxx xxx Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor,
hectares since 1941 by virtue of a homestead 1956, the Court of Appeals denied a petition of Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion and
application, No. V-42995; that the lease defendants-appellants to reconsider said order As the order of execution did not expressly Endencia, JJ., concur.
application of plaintiff is subsequent to said of December 2, 1955 on the ground that the prohibit the defendants-appellants from
homestead application of Leonardo Azarcon; writ of execution issued on October 3, 1955 had gathering the pending fruits, which fruits were __

that Azarcon had occupied the land since 1941 already been executed. the result of their possession and cultivation of
the land, it cannot be said that the defendants- FIRST DIVISION
with interruption during the war and again in
1950 up to the time of the filing of the action. The following appear to be clear: (a) the writ of appellants committed an act which is clear
He, therefore, prayed that the action be execution dated October 3, 1955 was furnished violation of the courts' order. Besides, the G.R. No. L-30402 January 28, 1980
MANGULON CALAGAN, FERNANDO On April 15, 1966, petitioners brought this petitioners to pay private respondent another repurchasing homesteader or his heir. Resort
CALAGAN, ASUNCION CALAGAN, action for reconveyance against private amount of P3,000.00 representing the value of may, however, be had to the general provisions
MIRASOL CALAGAN, ARSENIA CALAGAN, respondent On October 10, 1968, the trial Court the residential house built by private of the Civil Code on the subject, particularly
PAULA CALAGAN, CRISTITUTO CALAGAN, rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of respondent on the portion of the land which Article 1616 (formerly Article 1518), which
CANDELARIA CALAGAN and CRISPINA which reads: petitioners seek to repurchase. provides:
CALAGAN,petitioners,
vs. IN VIEW OF THE Petitioner present their digest of arguments Art. 1616. The vendor
HON. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF FOREGOING judgment is thus: cannot avail himself of the
DAVAO (BRANCH II) and PETRA hereby entered for the right of repurchase without
SANDOVAL, respondents. plaintiffs and against the 1. Only necessary returning to the vendee the
defendant: expenses are subject to price of the sale, and in
G. F. Vega for petitioners. reimbursement. House addition:
(1) That the defendant is constructed on a coconut
T Q. Osorio for private respondent. ordered to reconvey unto land is not necessary It is 1) The expenses of the
the plaintiffs the piece of only useful, contract, and any other
land having an area of ligitimate payments made
9,230 described in the 2. In a repurchase under by reason of the sale;
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.: complaint upon returning of Section 119 of the Public
the sum of P2,340.00 and Land Act,, a homesteader 2) The necessary and
Sought to be reviewed herein is that portion of payment of P3,000 as is only supposed to tender useful expenses made on
the judgment of the Court of First Instance of value of the house the purchase price. To the thing sold.
Davao, Branch II, ordering the payment by constructed in good faith require him to pay for the
petitioners to private respondent of the amount by the defendant on the value of the house Under the above-quoted codal provision, the
of P3,000.00 representing the value of the said lot. constructed on the land vendor a retro cannot avail himself of the right
house constructed on the homestead in sought to be repurchased, of repurchase without returning to the vendee
question by said private respondent. (2) To deliver to the in addition to the purchase the price of the sale, the expenses of the
plaintiffs the duplicate price, constitutes a contract and other legitimate payments, and the
The antecedent facts show that in 1954, certificate of Title No. P- circumvention of the Public necessary and useful expenses made on the
petitioner Mangulon Calagan and his wife, 2388. Land Act. thing sold.
Takura, were granted a Homesstead Patent
over a 5.2905 hectares in Dawis Digos Davao, (3) To pay attorney's fees 3. A vendee who There can be no question but that the house
and were issued Original Certificate of Title No. in the sum of P500.00. introduced a building on a which private respondent constructed is a
P-2388 therefor. land sought to be useful expense, defined as that which
(4) And to pay the costs. repurchased under the increases the value or augments the income of
In 1955, Takura died. survived by her husband, Public Land Act, and during the property, as contrasted to a necessary
Mangulan and their children, Fernando, SO ORDERED. the time when the expense which is incurred for the preservation
Asuncion, Mirasol, Arsenia, Paula, Cristituto, homesteader can validly of the thing. 3
Candelaria and Crispina, all surnamed In this appeal petitioners maintain solely that repurchase the same,
Calagan, all of whom are petitioners herein. the Court erred in ordering petitioners to pay cannot be considered a in We agree that the provision of Article 1616 of
the sum of P3,000.00 "as value of the house good faith, because his the Civil Code, supra, on redemption, is, in
On August 8, 1961, Mangulon and his constructed in good faith." possesion over the land is general, the applicable law to a homesteader
daughter, Paula sold a portion of 9,230 square of a precarious character: 1 desirous to redeem his property. However,
meters of their homestead to private There is no dispute on the following basic considering the purpose of the law on
respondent, Petra Sandoval in consideration of points: 1) the subject land is a portion of a Private respondent's counter-argument is that homesteads, which is to conserve ownership in
the sum of P2,340.00. Petitioners title to the homestead belonging to petitioners; 2) a when she bought the land in dispute "she was the hands of the homesteader and his family
land was borrowed by private respondent so repurchase is proper pursuant to Section 119 of not merely a tenant nor a lessee or a possessor Article 1616 of the Civil Code should be
that the latter could have the sale annotated the Public Land Act (CA No. 141) providing that in good faith therein but the owner of the construed in conjunction with Articles 546 and
thereon. In 1963, Mangulon offered to the "every conveyance of land acquired under the tenement itself. 2 As she needed a house where she and 547 of the Civil Code prescribing the rules on
her family could live, she constructed a modest house in the refund of necessary and useful expenses,
portion sold but private respondent refuse. free patent or homestead provisions, when lawful exercise of her rights as an owner.
Petition subsequent offers to repurchase but proper, shall be subject to repurchase by the inasmuch as a vendee a retro is, as a rule,
private was adamant. The latter maintains that applicant, his widow or legal heir within a period considered in good faith. Said Articles read
There is no provision in the Public Land Act (CA
she was to comply with petitioners' demands of five years from the date of the conveyance"; thus:
No. 141) which provides for the terms and
provided she was imbursed the value of the and 3) this action for repurchase was filed conditions under which repurchase may be
house that she had constructed on the subject within the five-year period from the date of sale. effected by a homesteader except that it should ART. 546. Necessary
land be made within five years from the date of expenses shall be
The controversy revolves around the legality of conveyance. That Act is silent as to the nature refunded to every
that portion of the judgment requiring of expenses that should be reimbursed by a possessor; but only the
possessor in good faith
may retain the thing until land by reason of such expenses as provided Pahati admitted having bought the automobile At that time, plaintiff's certificate of registration
he has been reimbursed for in Article 546 of the Civil Code, private from Bulahan, for the sum of P4,900 which he was missing and, upon the suggestion of
therefor. respondent, as the vendee a retro, may remove paid in check. When the Manila Police Belizo, plaintiff wrote a letter addressed to the
her house since this can be done without Department impounded the automobile, he Motor Section of the Bureau of Public Works for
Useful expenses shall be damage to the principal thing, as stipulated in cancelled the sale and stopped the payment of the issuance of a new registration certificate
refunded only to the Article 547 of the Civil Code. Petitioners should the check and as a result he returned the alleging as reason the loss of the one
possessor in good faith not, as opined by the trial Court, be made to automobile to Bulahan who in turned surrended previously issued to him and stating that he
with the same right of refund the value of that house to private the check for cancellation. He set up a was intending to sell his car. This letter was
retention, the person who respondent, else, the salutary policy behind the counterclaim for the sum of P2,000 as delivered to Belizo on March 3, 1952. He also
has defeated him in the Public Land Law would be thwarted and attorney's fees. turned over Belizo the automobile on the latter's
possession having the rendered meaningless. pretext that he was going to show it to a
option of refunding the Bulahan on his part claims that he acquired the prospective buyer. On March 7, 1952, the letter
amount of the expenses or WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is automobile from Jesusito Belizo for value and was falsified and converted into an authorized
of paying the increase in modified by eliminating that portion requiring without having any knowledge of any defect in deed of sale in favor of Belizo by erasing a
value which the thing may petitioners to pay private respondent the the title of the latter; that plaintiff had previously portion thereof and adding in its place the
have acquired by reason amount of P3,000.00 representing the value of acquired title to said automobile by purchase words "sold the above car to Mr. Jesusito
thereof. the house constructed by her. Private from Belizo as evidenced by a deed of sale Belizo of 25 Valencia, San Francisco del Monte,
respondent, however, is given the right to executed to that effect; that later plaintiff for Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000)." Armed with
ART. 547. If the useful remove her house without damage to the land delivered the possession of the automobile to this deed of sale, Belizo succeeded in ontaining
improvements can be on which it is built. In all other respects, the Belizo for resale and to facilitate it he gave the a certificate of registration in his name on the
removed without damage judgment of the trial Court is affirmed. latter a letter of authority to secure a new same date, March 7, 1952, and also on the
to the principal thing, the certificate of registration in his name (plaintiff's) same date, Belizo sold the car to Felixberto
possessor in good faith No costs. and that by having clothed Belizo with an Bulahan who in turn sold it to Reynaldo Pahati,
may remove them unless apparent ownership or authority to sell the a second hand car dealer. These facts show
the person who recovers SO ORDERED. automobile, plaintiff is now estopped to deny that the letter was falsified by Belizo to enable
the possession exercises such ownership or authority. Bulahan claims him to sell the car to Bulahan for a valuable
the option under paragraph __ that between two innocent parties, he who gave consideration.
2 of the preceding article. occasion, through his conduct, to the
EN BANC falsification committed by Belizo, should be the This is a case which involves a conflict of rights
Applying Article 547, therefore, the one to suffer the loss and this one is the of two persons who claim to be the owners of
homesteader desiring to repurchase should be G.R. No. L-8257 April 13, 1956 plaintiff. Bulahan also set up a counterclaim for the same property; plaintiff and defendant
given the option to require the vendee a retro to P17,000 as damages and attorney's fees. Bulahan. Both were found by the lower court to
remove the useful improvements on the land JOSE R. CRUZ, plaintiff-appellant, be innocent and to have acted in good faith.
subject of the sale a retro, which option is not vs. After the presentation of the evidence, the court They were found to be the victims of Belizo who
granted the vendor a retro under Article 1616. REYNALDO PAHATI, ET AL., defendants- rendered judgment declaring defendant falsified the letter given him by plaintiff to
Under the latter Article, the vendor a retro must appellees. Bulahan entitled to the automobile in question enable him to sell the car of Bulahan for profit.
pay for the useful improvements introduced by and consequently ordered the plaintiff to return Who has, therefore, a better right of the two
the vendee a retro, otherwise, the latter may Panganiban Law Offices and Arsenio Roldan it to said defendant and, upon his failure to do over the car?.
retain possession of the property until for appellant. so, to pay him the sum of P4,900, with legal
reimbursement is made. 4 To allow a vendee a retro of a Carlos, Laurea, Fernando and Padilla for interest from the date of the decision. The claim The law applicable to the case is Article 559 of
homestead, however, the right of retention until payment of appellees. for damages and attorney's fees of Bulahan the new Civil Code which provides:
useful expenses is made by the redemptioner would be to
render nugatory the right of repurchase granted by law to a
was denied. Defendant Belizo was however
homesteader because all a vendee a retro can do to prevent BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.: ordered to indemnify the plaintiff in the amount ART. 559. The possession of
repurchase is to build something on the homestead beyond the of P4,900 and pay the sum of P5,000 as moral movable property acquired in good
capacity to pay of the homesteader who seeks to repurchase.
Such a situation should not be allowed to pass. To the same This is an action of replevin instituted by plaintiff damages. The counterclaim of defendant faith is equivalent to a title.
effect was our ruling in Philippine National Bank v. in the Court of Firts Instance of Manila to Pahati was denied for lack of evidence. The Nevertheless, one who has lost any
Landeta 5 where we held that although the mortgagee-bank recover the possession of an automobile and case was taken directly to this Court by the movable or has been unlawfully
therein (after it had bought it at the foreclosure sale), had sold plaintiff.
the homestead to a third party within the five-year period, the certain amount as damages and attorney's fees deprived thereof, may recover it from
homesteader should be allowed to repurchase the mortgaged resulting from his illegal deprivation thereof. the person in possession of the
homestead from the bank and not from the third person for, The lower court found that the automobile in same.
otherwise, a vendee a retro could make "conveyance of the
property for amounts beyond the capacity of said owner to pay. The original defendants were Reynaldo Pahati question was originally owned by the Nothern
and Felixberto Bulahan but, upon amendment Motors, Inc. which later sold it to Chinaman Lu If the possessor of a movable lost or
of the complaint, Jesusito Belizo was included Dag. This Chinaman sold it afterwards to of which the owner has been
To recapitulate, it being obvious that petitioners
as party defendant who was summoned by Jesusito Belizo and the latter in turn sold it to unlawfully deprived, has acquired it in
are not exercising the option to refund the
publication because his whereabouts were not plaintiff. Belizo was then a dealer in second good faith at a public sale, the owner
amount of the expenses incurred by private
known. Belizo failed to appear or answer the hand cars. One year thereafter, Belizo offered cannot obtain its return without
respondent for the house that the latter built,
complaint and so he was declared default. the plaintiff to sell the automobile for him reimbursing the price paid therefor.
not to pay the increase in value acquired by the
claiming to have a buyer for it. Plaintiff agreed.
It appears that "one who has lost any movable fundamental principle of our law of personal JOSE B. AZNAR, plaintiff-appellant, sale to his son, Irineo, and instructed him not to
or has been unlawfully deprived thereof, may property that no man can be divested of it vs. part with them until Marella shall have given the
recover it from the person in possession of the without his own consent; consequently, even an RAFAEL YAPDIANGCO, defendant-appellee; full payment for the car. Irineo Santos and L. De
same" and the only defense the latter may have honest purchaser, under a defective title, TEODORO SANTOS, intervenor-appellee. Dios then proceeded to 1642 Crisostomo
is if he "has acquired it in good faith at a public cannot resist the claim of the true owner. The Street, Sampaloc, Manila where the former
sale" in which case "the owner cannot obtain its maxim that 'No man can transfer a better title Florentino M. Guanlao for plaintiff-appellant. demanded the payment from Vicente Marella.
return without reimbursing the price paid than he has himself "obtain in the civil as well Rafael Yapdiangco in his own behalf as Marella said that the amount he had on hand
therefor." And supplementing this provision, as in the common law." (p. 158). defendant-appellee. then was short by some P2,000.00 and begged
Article 1505 of the same Code provides that Lorenzo Sumulong, R. B. Hilao and B. S. off to be allowed to secure the shortage from a
"where goods are sold by a person who is not Counsel for appellee places much reliance on Felipe for intervenor-appellee. sister supposedly living somewhere on
the owner thereof, and who does not sell them the common law principle that "Where one of Azcarraga Street, also in Manila. Thereafter, he
under authority or with the consent of the two innocent parties must suffer by a fraud REGALA, J.: ordered L. De Dios to go to the said sister and
owner, the buyer acquires no better title to the perpetrated by another, the law imposes the suggested that Irineo Santos go with him. At the
goods than the seller had, unless the owner of loss upon the party who, by his misplaced This is an appeal, on purely legal questions, same time, he requested the registration
the goods is by his conduct precluded from confidence, has enabled the fraud to be from a decision of the Court of First Instance of papers and the deed of sale from Irineo Santos
denying the seller's authority to sell. committed" (Sager vs. W. T. Rawleight Co. 153 Quezon City, Branch IV, declaring the on the pretext that he would like to show them
Va. 514, 150 S. E. 244, 66 A.L.R. 305), and intervenor-appellee, Teodoro Santos, entitled to to his lawyer. Trusting the good faith of Marella,
Applying the above legal provisions to the facts contends that, as between plaintiff and the possession of the car in dispute. Irineo handed over the same to the latter and
of this case, one is inevitably led to the Bulahan, the former should bear the loss thereupon, in the company of L. De Dios and
conclusion that plaintiff has a better right to the because of the confidence he reposed in Belizo The records before this Court disclose that another unidentified person, proceeded to the
car in question than defendant Bulahan for it which enabled the latter to commit the sometime in May, 1959, Teodoro Santos alleged house of Marella's sister.
cannot be disputed that plaintiff had been falsification. But this principle cannot be applied advertised in two metropolitan papers the sale
illegally deprived thereof because of the to this case which is coverred by an express of his FORD FAIRLANE 500. In the afternoon At a place on Azcarraga, Irineo Santos and L.
ingenious scheme utilized by Belizo to enable provision of our new Civil Code. Between a of May 28, 1959, a certain L. De Dios, claiming De Dios alighted from the car and entered a
him to dispose of it as if he were the owner common law principle and a statutory provision, to be a nephew of Vicente Marella, went to the house while their unidentified companion
thereof. Plaintiff therefore can still recover the the latter must undoubtedly prevail in this Santos residence to answer the ad. However, remained in the car. Once inside, L. De Dios
possession of the car even if defendant jurisdiction. Moreover we entertain serious Teodoro Santos was out during this call and asked Irineo Santos to wait at the sala while he
Bulahan had acted in good faith in purchasing it doubt if, under the circumstances obtaining, only the latter's son, Irineo Santos, received went inside a room. That was the last that
from Belizo. Nor can it be pretended that the Bulahan may be considered more innocent and talked with De Dios. The latter told the Irineo saw of him. For, after a considerable
conduct of plaintiff in giving Belizo a letter to than the plaintiff in dealing with the car in young Santos that he had come in behalf of his length of time waiting in vain for De Dios to
secure the issuance of a new certificate of question. We prefer not to elaborate on this uncle, Vicente Marella, who was interested to return, Irineo went down to discover that neither
registration constitutes a sufficient defense that matter it being necessary considering the buy the advertised car. the car nor their unidentified companion was
would preclude recovery because of the conclusion we have reached. there anymore. Going back to the house, he
undisputed fact that that letter was falsified and On being informed of the above, Teodoro inquired from a woman he saw for L. De Dios
this fact can be clearly seen by a cursory Wherefore, the decision appealed from is Santos instructed his son to see the said and he was told that no such name lived or was
examination of the document. If Bulahan had reversed. The Court declares plaintiff to be Vicente Marella the following day at his given even known therein. Whereupon, Irineo Santos
been more diligent he could have seen that the entitled to recover the car in question, and address: 1642 Crisostomo Street, Sampaloc, rushed to 1642 Crisostomo to see Marella. He
pertinent portion of the letter had been erased orders defendant Jesusito Belizo to pay him the Manila. And so, in the morning of May 29, 1959, found the house closed and Marella gone.
which would have placed him on guard to make sum of P5,000 as moral damages, plus P2,000 Irineo Santos went to the above address. At this Finally, he reported the matter to his father who
an inquiry as regards the authority of Belizo to as attorney's fees. The Court absolves meeting, Marella agreed to buy the car for promptly advised the police authorities.
sell the car. This he failed to do. defendant Bulahan and Pahati from the P14,700.00 on the understanding that the price
complaint as regards the claim for damages, would be paid only after the car had been That very same day, or on the afternoon of May
The right of the plaintiff to the car in question reserving to Bulahan whatever action he may registered in his name. 29, 1959 Vicente Marella was able to sell the
can also be justified under the doctrine laid deem proper to take against Jesusito Belizo. car in question to the plaintiff-appellant herein,
down in U. S. vs. Sotelo, 28 Phil., 147. This is a No costs. Irineo Santos then fetched his father who, Jose B. Aznar, for P15,000.00. Insofar as the
case of estafa wherein one Sotelo together with L. De Dios, went to the office of a above incidents are concerned, we are bound
misappropriated a ring belonging to Alejandra Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, certain Atty. Jose Padolina where the deed of by the factual finding of the trial court that Jose
Dormir. In the course of the decision, the Court Jugo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., the sale for the car was executed in Marella's B. Aznar acquired the said car from Vicente
said that "Whoever may have been deprived of and Endencia, JJ.,concur. favor. The parties to the contract thereafter Marella in good faith, for a valuable
his property in consequence of a crime is Reyes, A., J., concur in the result. proceeded to the Motor Vehicles Office in consideration and without notice of the defect
entitled to the recovery thereof, even if such Quezon City where the registration of the car in appertaining to the vendor's title.
property is in the possession of a third party __
Marella's name was effected. Up to this stage
who acquired it by legal means other than of the transaction, the purchased price had not While the car in question was thus in the
those expressly stated in Article 464 of the Civil EN BANC possession of Jose B. Aznar and while he was
been paid.
Code" (p. 147), which refers to property attending to its registration in his name, agents
pledged in the "Monte de Piedad", an G.R. No. L-18536 March 31, 1965 of the Philippine Constabulary seized and
From the Motor Vehicles Office, Teodoro
establishment organized under the authority of confiscated the same in consequence of the
Santos returned to his house. He gave the
the Government. The Court further said: It is a registration papers and a copy of the deed of
report to them by Teodoro Santos that the said case, the applicable provision of the Civil Code So long as property is not delivered, Raymundo, 19 Phil. 46. Tolentino, id., Vol. II, p.
car was unlawfully taken from him. is Article 1506 and not Article 559 as was held the ownership over it is not 261.)
by the decision under review. Article 1506 transferred by contract merely but by
In due time, Jose B. Aznar filed a complaint for provides: delivery. Contracts only constitute In the case of Cruz v. Pahati, et al., 52 O.G.
replevin against Captain Rafael Yapdiangco, titles or rights to the transfer or 3053 this Court has already ruled
the head of the Philippine Constabulary unit ART. 1506. Where the seller of goods acquisition of ownership, while that
which seized the car in question Claiming has a voidable title thereto, but his, delivery or tradition is the method of
ownership of the vehicle, he prayed for its title has not been voided at the time accomplishing the same, the title and Under Article 559 of the new Civil
delivery to him. In the course of the litigation, of the sale, the buyer acquires a the method of acquiring it being Code, a person illegally deprived of
however, Teodoro Santos moved and was good title to the goods, provided he different in our law. (Gonzales v. any movable may recover it from the
allowed to intervene by the lower court. buys them in good faith, for value, Roxas, 16 Phil. 51) person in possession of the same
and without notice of the seller's and the only defense the latter may
At the end of the trial, the lower court rendered defect of title. In the case on hand, the car in question was have is if he has acquired it in good
a decision awarding the disputed motor vehicle never delivered to the vendee by the vendor as faith at a public sale, in which case,
to the intervenor-appellee, Teodoro Santos. In The contention is clearly unmeritorious. Under to complete or consummate the transfer of the owner cannot obtain its return
brief, it ruled that Teodoro Santos had been the aforequoted provision, it is essential that the ownership by virtue of the contract. It should be without reimbursing the price paid
unlawfully deprived of his personal property by seller should have a voidable title at least. It is recalled that while there was indeed a contract therefor. In the present case, plaintiff
Vicente Marella, from whom the plaintiff- very clearly inapplicable where, as in this case, of sale between Vicente Marella and Teodoro has been illegally deprived of his car
appellant traced his right. Consequently, the seller had no title at all. Santos, the former, as vendee, took possession through the ingenious scheme of
although the plaintiff-appellant acquired the car of the subject matter thereof by stealing the defendant B to enable the latter to
in good faith and for a valuable consideration Vicente Marella did not have any title to the same while it was in the custody of the latter's dispose of it as if he were the owner
from Vicente Marella, the said decision property under litigation because the same was son. thereof. Plaintiff, therefore, can still
concluded, still the intervenor-appellee was never delivered to him. He sought ownership or recover possession of the car even if
entitled to its recovery on the mandate of Article acquisition of it by virtue of the contract. Vicente There is no adequate evidence on record as to it is in the possession of a third party
559 of the New Civil Code which provides: Marella could have acquired ownership or title whether Irineo Santos voluntarily delivered the who had acquired it in good faith from
to the subject matter thereof only by the key to the car to the unidentified person who defendant B. The maxim that "no
ART. 559. The possession of delivery or tradition of the car to him. went with him and L. De Dios to the place on man can transfer to another a better
movable property acquired in good Azcarraga where a sister of Marella allegedly title than he had himself" obtains in
faith is equivalent to title. Under Article 712 of the Civil Code, "ownership lived. But even if Irineo Santos did, it was not the civil as well as in the common
Nevertheless, one who lost any and other real rights over property are acquired the delivery contemplated by Article 712 of the law. (U.S. v. Sotelo, 28 Phil. 147)
movable or has been unlawfully and transmitted by law, by donation, by testate Civil Code. For then, it would be indisputable
deprived thereof, may recover it from and intestate succession, and in consequence that he turned it over to the unidentified Finally, the plaintiff-appellant here contends that
the person in possession of the of certain contracts, by tradition." As interpreted companion only so that he may drive Irineo inasmuch as it was the intervenor-appellee who
same. by this Court in a host of cases, by this Santos and De Dios to the said place on had caused the fraud to be perpetrated by his
provision, ownership is not transferred by Azcarraga and not to vest the title to the said misplaced confidence on Vicente Marella, he,
If the possessor of a movable lost or contract merely but by tradition or delivery. vehicle to him as agent of Vicente Marella. the intervenor-appellee, should be made to
of which the owner has been Contracts only constitute titles or rights to the Article 712 above contemplates that the act be suffer the consequences arising therefrom,
unlawfully deprived, has acquired it in transfer or acquisition of ownership, while coupled with the intent of delivering the thing. following the equitable principle to that effect.
good faith at a public sale, the owner delivery or tradition is the mode of (10 Manresa 132) Suffice it to say in this regard that the right of
cannot obtain its return without accomplishing the same (Gonzales v. Rojas, 16 the owner to recover personal property
reimbursing the price paid therefor. Phil. 51; Ocejo, Perez and Co. v. International The lower court was correct in applying Article acquired in good faith by another, is based on
Bank, 37 Phil. 631, Fidelity and Deposit Co. v. 559 of the Civil Code to the case at bar, for his being dispossessed without his consent.
From this decision, Jose B. Aznar appeals. Wilson, 8 Phil. 51; Kuenzle & Streiff v. Wacke & under it, the rule is to the effect that if the owner The common law principle that where one of
Chandler, 14 Phil. 610; Easton v. Diaz Co., 32 has lost a thing, or if he has been unlawfully two innocent persons must suffer by a fraud
The issue at bar is one and simple, to wit: Phil. 180). deprived of it, he has a right to recover it, not perpetrated by another, the law imposes the
Between Teodoro Santos and the plaintiff- only from the finder, thief or robber, but also loss upon the party who, by his misplaced
appellant, Jose B. Aznar, who has a better right For the legal acquisition and transfer from third persons who may have acquired it in confidence, has enabled the fraud to be
to the possession of the disputed automobile? of ownership and other property good faith from such finder, thief or robber. The committed, cannot be applied in a case which is
rights, the thing transferred must be said article establishes two exceptions to the covered by an express provision of the new
We find for the intervenor-appellee, Teodoro delivered, inasmuch as, according to general rule of irrevindicability, to wit, when the Civil Code, specifically Article 559. Between a
Santos. settled jurisprudence, the tradition of owner (1) has lost the thing, or (2) has been common law principle and a statutory provision,
the thing is a necessary and unlawfully deprived thereof. In these cases, the the latter must prevail in this jurisdiction. (Cruz
indispensable requisite in the possessor cannot retain the thing as against v. Pahati, supra)
The plaintiff-appellant accepts that the car in
acquisition of said ownership by the owner, who may recover it without paying
question originally belonged to and was owned
virtue of contract. (Walter Laston v. E. any indemnity, except when the possessor UPON ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant
by the intervenor-appellee, Teodoro Santos,
Diaz & Co. & the Provincial Sheriff of acquired it in a public sale. (Del Rosario v. appeal is hereby dismissed and the decision of
and that the latter was unlawfully deprived of
Albay, supra.) Lucena, 8 Phil. 535; Varela v. Finnick, 9 Phil. the lower court affirmed in full. Costs against
the same by Vicente Marella. However, the
482; Varela v. Matute, 9 Phil. 479; Arenas v. the appellant.
appellant contends that upon the facts of this
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, La Bulakea restaurant recognized her ring in the finger of Mrs. ring, nor did she answer plaintiff's letter of to pay plaintiff P1,000.00 as attorney's fee and
Garcia and inquired where she bought it, which the defendant
Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, answered from her comadre. Plaintiff explained that that ring demand, ... asserting ownership. Further P1,000.00 as exemplary damages. Hence this
Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., and Zaldivar, JJ., was stolen from her house in February, 1952. Defendant confirmation may be found in the extra-judicial appeal.
concur. handed the ring to plaintiff and it fitted her finger. Two or three admissions, contained in defendant's original
days later, at the request of plaintiff, plaintiff, her husband Lt.
Col. Juan Guevara, Lt. Cementina of Pasay PD, defendant and and first amended answers ..."4 To repeat, there is no occasion to reverse
EN BANC her attorney proceeded to the store of Mr. Rebullida to whom respondent Court. It correctly applied the law to
they showed the ring in question. Mr. Rebullida a examined the These further facts likewise appeal therein: the facts as found.
ring with the aid of high power lens and after consulting the
stock card thereon, concluded that it was the very ring that "The foregoing proof is not counter-balanced by
plaintiff bought from him in 1947. The ring was returned to the denial on the part of defendant or the 1. The controlling provision is Article 559 of the
defendant who despite a written request therefor failed to presentation of the ring, Exhibit I, which has a
G.R. No. L-20264 January 30, 1971 deliver the ring to plaintiff. Hence, this case. Later on when the
Civil Code. It reads thus: "The possession of
sheriff tried to serve the writ of seizure (replevin), defendant diamond-solitaire 2.57 cts., or much heavier movable property acquired in good faith is
refused to deliver the ring which had been examined by Mr. than the lost diamond weighing 2.05 cts. only. It equivalent to a title. Nevertheless, one who has
CONSUELO S. DE GARCIA and ANASTACIO Rebullida, claiming it was lost."2 is noteworthy that defendant gave a rather lost any movable or has been unlawfully
GARCIA, petitioners,
dubious source of her ring. Aling Petring from deprived thereof may recover it from the person
vs. How the defendant, Consuelo S. de Garcia, the whom the ring supposedly came turned out to in possession of the same. If the possessor of a
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ANGELINA D. present petitioner before us, along with her be a mysterious and ephemeral figure. Miss movable lost of which the owner has been
GUEVARA and JUAN B. husband Anastacio Garcia, sought to meet Hinahon did not even know her true and full unlawfully deprived, has acquired it in good
GUEVARA, respondents. plaintiff's claim was narrated thus: "On the other name, nor her forwarding address. She faith at a public sale, the owner cannot obtain
hand, defendant denied having made any appeared from nowhere, boarded three months its return without reimbursing the price paid
Deogracias T. Reyes and Jose M. Luison for admission before plaintiff or Mr. Rebullida or the in the house of Miss Hinahon long enough to therefor." Respondent Angelina D. Guevara,
petitioners. sheriff. Her evidence tends to show that the ring sell her diamond ring, disappearing from the having been unlawfully deprived of the diamond
(Exhibit 1) was purchased by her from Mrs. scene a week thereafter. Indeed, the case was ring in question, was entitled to recover it from
Tolentino and Garcia and D.R. Cruz for private Miranda who got it from Miss Angelita Hinahon terminated without any hearing on the third- petitioner Consuelo S. de Garcia who was
respondents. who in turn got it from the owner, Aling Petring, party and fourth-party complaints, which would found in possession of the same. The only
who was boarding in her house; that the ring have shown up the falsity of defendant's theory. exception the law allows is when there is
she bought could be similar to, but not the Moreover, Mrs. Baldomera Miranda, third-party acquisition in good faith of the possessor at a
same ring plaintiff purchased from Mr. Rebullida defendant, who tried to corroborate defendant public sale, in which case the owner cannot
FERNANDO, J.: which was stolen; that according to a pawn- on the latter's alleged attempt to exchange the obtain its return without reimbursing the price.
shop owner the big diamond on Exhibit 1 was ring defendant bought through her, is [belied] As authoritative interpreted in Cruz v.
This petition for certiorari to review a decision of before the trial never dismantled. When by her judicial admission in her Answer that Pahati, 6 the right of the owner cannot be defeated even by
respondent Court of Appeals was given due dismantled, defendant's diamond was found to appellee `suggested that she would make proof that there was good faith by the acquisition by the
weigh 2.57 cts."3 possessor. There is a reiteration of this principle in Aznar v.
course because it was therein vigorously alterations to the mounting and structural
Yapdiangco.7Thus: "Suffice it to say in this regard that the right
asserted that legal questions of gravity and of design of the ring to hide the true identity and of the owner to recover personal property acquired in good faith
moment, there being allegations of an Plaintiff lost in the lower court. She elevated the appearance of the original one' (Cunanan vs. by another, is based on his being dispossessed without his
unwarranted departure from and a patent matter to respondent Court of Appeals with the Amparo, 45 O.G. 3796). Finally, defendant is consent. The common law principle that where one of two
innocent persons must suffer by a fraud perpetrated by the
misreading of applicable and controlling judgment of the lower court being reversed. It is refuted by her own extra-judicial admissions ... another, the law imposes the loss upon the party who, by his
decisions, called for determination by this this decision now under review. although made by defendant's counsel. For an misplaced confidence, has enabled the fraud to be committed,
Tribunal. The brief for petitioners-spouses, attorney who acts as counsel of record and is cannot be applied in a case which is covered by an express
provision of the new Civil Code, specifically Article 559.
however, failed to substantiate such imputed These are the facts as found by respondent permitted to act such, has the authority to Between a common law principle and statutory provision, the
failings of respondent Court. The performance Court of Appeals: "That the ring brought by the manage the cause, and this includes the latter must prevail in this jurisdiction." 8
did not live up to the promise. On the basis of parties for examination by Rafael Rebullida on authority to make admission for the purpose of
the facts as duly found by respondent Court, December 14, 1953 was the same ring the litigation... Her proffered explanation that 2. It is thus immediately apparent that there is
which we are not at liberty to disregard, and the purchased by plaintiff from R. Rebullida, Inc. on her counsel misunderstood her is puerile no merit to the contention raised in the first
governing legal provisions, there is no basis for October 27, 1947 and stolen in February, 1952 because the liability to error as to the identity of assigned error that her possession in good
reversal. We affirm. has been abundantly established by plaintiff's the vendor and the exchange of the ring with faith, equivalent to title, sufficed to defeat
evidence. Before plaintiff lost the ring, she had another ring of the same value, was rather respondent Guevara's claim. As the above
The nature of the case presented before the been wearing it for six years and became remote."5 cases demonstrate, even on that assumption
lower court by private respondent Angelina D. familiar with it. Thus, when she saw the missing the owner can recover the same once she can
Guevara, assisted by her spouse, Juan B. ring in the finger of defendant, she readily and It is in the light of the above facts as well as the show illegal deprivation. Respondent Court of
Guevara, as plaintiffs, was noted in the decision definitely identified it. Her identification was finding that the discrepancy as to the weight Appeals was so convinced from the evidence
of respondent Court of Appeals thus: "Plaintiff confirmed by Mr. Rafael Rebullida, whose between the diamond-solitaire in Exhibit I and submitted that the owner of the ring in litigation
seeks recovery of `one (1) lady's diamond ring candid testimony is entitled to great weight, with the lost diamond was due to defendant having is such respondent. That is a factual
18 cts. white gold mounting, with one (1) 2.05 his 30 years experience behind him in the "substituted a diamond-solitaire of plaintiff with determination to which we must pay heed.
cts. diamond-solitaire, and four (4) brills 0.10 jewelry business and being a disinterested a heavier stone" that the decision was Instead of proving any alleged departure from
cts. total weight' which she bought on October witness since both parties are his customers. rendered, respondent Court reversing the lower legal norms by respondent Court, petitioner
27, 1947 from R. Rebullida, Inc."1 Then came a Indeed, defendant made no comment when in court and ordering defendant, now petitioner would stress Article 541 of the Civil Code,
summary of now respondent Guevara of her evidence: her presence Rebullida after examining the ring Consuelo S. de Garcia, to return plaintiff's ring which provides: 'A possessor in the concept of
"Plaintiff's evidence tends to show that around October 11,
1953 plaintiff while talking to Consuelo S. de Garcia, owner of and stock card told plaintiff that that was her or fact value of P1,000.00 and costs, as well as owner has in his favor the legal presumption
that he possesses with a just title and he Angelina D. Guevara, did testify as to the was no substitution. It is not necessary to state Andres T. Velarde for petitioner.
cannot be obliged to show or prove it." She identity of the ring. that respondent Court, exercising its appellate
would accord to it a greater legal significance power reversed the lower court. What was held Rafael G. Suntay for respondent.
than that to which under the controlling The third assigned error of petitioners would by it is controlling. What is clear is that there is
doctrines it is entitled. The brief for
lwph1.t
find fault with respondent Court relying "on the no factual basis for the legal arguments on
respondents did clearly point out why weakness of the title or evidence" of petitioner which the fourth assigned error is predicated.
petitioner's assertion is lacking in support not Consuelo S. de Garcia. It is true, in the decision FERNANDO, J.: p

only from the cases but even from under review, mention was made of petitioner What is said takes care of the fifth assigned
commentators. Thus: "Actually, even under the Consuelo S. de Garcia making no comment error that respondent Court was mistaken in its In essence there is nothing novel in this petition
first clause, possession in good faith does not when in her presence Rebullida, after finding that there was such a substitution. Again for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals
really amount to title, for the reason that Art. examining the ring the stock card, told petitioner would have us pass on a question of affirming a lower court judgment sustaining the
1132 of the Code provides for a period of respondent Angelina L. Guevara that that was credibility which is left to respondent Court of right of an owner of a diamond ring, respondent
acquisitive prescription for movables through her ring, nor did petitioner answer a letter of the Appeals. The sixth assigned error would Lourdes G. Suntay, as against the claim of
`uninterrupted possession for four years in latter asserting ownership. It was likewise complain against the reversal of the lower court petitioner Dominador Dizon, who owns and
good faith' (Art. 1955 of the old Spanish Code, stated in such decision that there were extra- judgment as well as petitioner Consuelo S. de operates a pawnshop. The diamond ring was
which provided a period of three years), so that judicial admissions in the original and first Garcia being made to pay respondent Angelina turned over to a certain Clarita R. Sison, for
many Spanish writers, including Manresa, amended answers of petitioner. In the appraisal D. Guevara exemplary damages, attorney's sale on commission, along with other pieces of
Sanchez Roman, Scaevola, De Buen, and of her testimony, respondent Court likewise fees and costs. The reversal is called for in the jewelry of respondent Suntay. It was then
Ramos, assert that under Art. 464 of the spoke of her giving a rather dubious source of light of the appraisal of the evidence of record pledged to petitioner. Since what was done was
Spanish Code (Art. 559 of the New Civil her ring, the person from whom she allegedly as meticulously weighed by respondent Court. violative of the terms of the agency, there was
Code), the title of the possessor is not that of bought it turning out "to be a mysterious and As to the attorney's fees and exemplary an attempt on her part to recover possession
ownership, but is merely a presumptive title ephemeral figure." As a matter of fact, as set damages, this is what respondent Court said in thereof from petitioner, who refused. She had to
sufficient to serve as a basis of acquisitive forth a few pages back, respondent Court did the decision under review: "Likewise, plaintiff is file an action then for its recovery. She was
prescription (II Tolentino, Civil Code of the Phil. enumerate the flaws in the version given by entitled to recover reasonable attorney's fees in successful, as noted above, both in the lower
p. 258: IV Manresa, Derecho Civil Espaol, 6th petitioner. From the weakness of the testimony the sum of P1,000, it being just and equitable court and thereafter in the Court of Appeals.
Ed., p. 380). And it is for the very reason that offered which, as thus made clear, petitioner, under the circumstances, and another P1,000 She prevailed as she had in her favor the
the title established by the first clause of Art. did not even seek to refute, she would raise the as exemplary damages for the public good to protection accorded by Article 559 of the Civil
559 is only a presumptive title sufficient to legal question that respondent Court relied on discourage litigants from resorting to fraudulent Code. 1 The matter was then elevated to us by petitioner.
serve as a basis for acquisitive prescription, the "weakness of [her] title or evidence" rather devices to frustrate the ends of justice, as Ordinarily, our discretion would have been exercised against
that the clause immediately following provides than on the proof justifying respondent Angelina defendant herein tried to substitute the ring, giving due course to such petition for review. The vigorous plea
however, grounded on estoppel, by his counsel, Atty. Andres T.
that `one who has lost any movable or has D. Guevara's claim of ownership. Petitioner Exhibit 1, for plaintiff's ring." 10 Considering the Velarde, persuaded us to act otherwise. After a careful perusal
been unlawfully deprived thereof, may recover here would ignore the finding of fact of circumstances, the cursory discussion of the sixth assigned of the respective contentions of the parties, we fail to perceive
error on the matter by petitioner fails to demonstrate that
it from the person in possession of the same.' respondent Court that such ownership on her respondent Court's actuation is blemished by legal defects.
any sufficient justification for a departure from the literal
language of the applicable codal provision as uniformly
As stated by the Honorable Justice Jose B. L. part "has been abundantly established" by her interpreted by this Court in a number of decisions. The
Reyes of this Court in Sotto vs. Enage (C.A.), evidence. Again here, in essence, the question WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent invocation of estoppel is therefore unavailing. We affirm.
43 Off. Gaz. 5075, Dec. 1947: `Article 559 in raised is one of fact, and there is no justification Court of Appeals of August 6, 1962 is hereby
fact assumes that possessor is as yet not the for us to reverse respondent Court. affirmed. With costs. The statement of the case as well as the
owner; for it is obvious that where the controlling facts may be found in the Court of
possessor has come to acquire indefeasible The legal question raised in the fourth Appeals decision penned by Justice Perez.
Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar,
title by, let us say, adverse possession for the assignment of error is that the matter of the Thus: "Plaintiff is the owner of a three-carat
Castro, Teehankee, Barredo, Villamor and
necessary period, no proof of loss or illegal substitution of the diamond on the ring was a diamond ring valued at P5,500.00. On June 13,
Makasiar JJ., concur.
deprivation could avail the former owner of the question raised for the first time on appeal as it 1962, the plaintiff and Clarita R. Sison entered
chattel. He would no longer be entitled to was never put in issue by the pleadings nor the into a transaction wherein the plaintiff's ring was
recover it under any condition.' "9 Reyes, J.B.L., J., concurs in the result, Art. 85
subject of reception of evidence by both parties of the Code of Commerce not being applicable. delivered to Clarita R. Sison for sale on
and not touched upon in the decision of the commission. Upon receiving the ring, Clarita R.
The second assigned error is centered on the lower court. Why no such question could be __ Sison executed and delivered to the plaintiff the
alleged failure to prove the identity of the raised in the pleadings of respondent Angelina receipt ... . The plaintiff had already previously
diamond ring. Clearly the question raised is one D. Guevara was clarified by the fact that the EN BANC known Clarita R. Sison as the latter is a close
of the fact. What the Court of Appeals found is substitution came after it was brought for friend of the plaintiff's cousin and they had
conclusive. Again, petitioner could not examination to Mr. Rebullida. After the frequently met each other at the place of the
demonstrate that in reaching such a conclusion knowledge of such substitution was gained, plaintiff's said cousin. In fact, about one year
the Court of Appeals acted in an arbitrary however, the issue was raised at the trial G.R. No. L-30817 September 29, 1972 before their transaction of June 13, 1962 took
manner. As made mention of in the brief for according to the said respondent resulting in place, Clarita R. Sison received a piece of
respondents two disinterested witnesses, Mr. that portion of the decision where the lower jewelry from the plaintiff to be sold for P500.00,
DOMINADOR DIZON, doing business under
Rafael Rebullida as well as Lt. Col. Reynaldo court reached a negative conclusion. As a and when it was sold, Clarita R. Sison gave the
the firm name "Pawnshop of Dominador
Cementina of the Pasay City Police result, in the motion for reconsideration, one of price to the plaintiff. After the lapse of a
Dizon", petitioner,
Department, both of whom could not be the points raised as to such decision being considerable time without Clarita R. Sison
vs.
accused of being biased in favor of respondent contrary to the evidence is the finding that there having returned to the plaintiff the latter's ring,
LOURDES G. SUNTAY, respondent.
the plaintiff made demands on Clarita R. Sison committed, cannot be applied in a case which is covered by an because of the difficulty of resisting opportunity based on the express statutory provision of
express provision of the new Civil Code, specifically Article 559.
for the return of her ring but the latter could not Between a common law principle and a statutory provision, the for profit, he should be the last to complain if article 559 of our Civil Code (formerly article
comply with the demands because, without the latter must prevail in this jurisdiction." " 5 thereafter the right of the true owner of such 464 of the old Civil Code) that the owner "who
knowledge of the plaintiff, on June 15, 1962 or jewelry should be recognized. The law for this has lost any movable or has been unlawfully
three days after the ring above-mentioned was 2. It must have been a recognition of the sound reason accords the latter protection. So deprived thereof may recover it from the person
received by Clarita R. Sison from the plaintiff, compulsion exerted by the above authoritative it has always been since Varela v. in possession of the same," the only exception
said ring was pledged by Melia Sison, niece of precedents that must have caused petitioner to Finnick, 19 a 1907 decision. According to Justice Torres: "In expressly provided in the codal article being
the husband of Clarita R. Sison, evidently in invoke the principle of estoppel. There is clearly the present case not only has the ownership and the origin of that "if the possessor of a movable lost of which
the jewels misappropriated been unquestionably proven but
connivance with the latter, with the defendant's a misapprehension. Such a contention is also that the accused, acting fraudulently and in bad faith, the owner has been unlawfully deprived, has
pawnshop for P2,600.00 ... ." 2 Then came this portion devoid of any persuasive force. disposed of them and pledged them contrary to agreement, acquired it in good faith at a public sale, the
of the decision under review: "Since the plaintiff insistently with no right of ownership, and to the prejudice of the injured owner cannot obtain its return without
demanded from Clarita R. Sison the return of her ring, the latter party, who was thereby illegally deprived of said jewels;
finally delivered to the former the pawnshop ticket ... which is Estoppel as known to the Rules of Court 6 and therefore, in accordance with the provisions of article 464, the reimbursing the price paid therefor." 1
the receipt of the pledge with the defendant's pawnshop of the prior to that to the Court of Civil Procedure, 7 has its roots in owner has an absolute right to recover the jewels from the
plaintiff's ring. When the plaintiff found out that Clarita R. Sison equity. Good faith is its basis. 8 It is a response to the demands possession of whosoever holds them, ... ." 20 There have been Senator Tolentino's submittal in his
pledged, she took steps to file a case of estafa against the latter many other decisions to the same effect since then. At least
of moral right and natural justice. 9 For estoppel to exist though, commentaries on the Civil Code "that the better
with the fiscal's office. Subsequently thereafter, the plaintiff, nine may be cited. 21 Nor could any other outcome be expected,
it is indispensable that there be a declaration, act or omission
through her lawyer, wrote a letter ... dated September 22, 1962,
by the party who is sought to be bound. Nor is this all. It is considering the civil code provisions both in the former Spanish view is to consider 'unlawfully deprived' as
to the defendant asking for the delivery to the plaintiff of her ring limited to unlawful taking, such as theft or
equally a requisite that he, who would claim the benefits of such legislation 22 and in the present Code. 23 Petitioner ought to have
pledged with defendant's pawnshop under pawnshop receipt
serial-B No. 65606, dated June 15, 1962 ... . Since the a principle, must have altered his position, having been so been on his guard before accepting the pledge in question. robbery, and should not include disposition
intentionally and deliberately led to comport himself thus, by Evidently there was no such precaution availed of. He
defendant refused to return the ring, the plaintiff filed the
what was declared or what was done or failed to be done. If therefore, has only himself to blame for the fix he is now in. It
through abuse of confidence. Thus, if the owner
present action with the Court of First Instance of Manila for the has entrusted personal property to a bailee,
thereafter a litigation arises, the former would not be allowed to would be to stretch the concept of estoppel to the breaking
recovery of said ring, with P500.00 as attorney's fees and costs.
The plaintiff asked for the provisional remedy of replevin by the disown such act, declaration or omission. The principle comes point if his contention were to prevail. Moreover, there should such as for transportation, pledge, loan or
into full play. It may successfully be relied upon. A court is to have been a realization on his part that courts are not likely to
delivery of the ring to her, upon her filing the requisite bond,
see to it then that there is no turning back on one's word or a be impressed with a cry of distress emanating from one who is
deposit, without transmitting ownership, and the
pending the final determination of the action. The lower court latter alienates it to a third person who acquires
repudiation of one's act. So it has been from our earliest in a business authorized to impose a higher rate of interest
issued the writ of replevin prayed for by plaintiff and the latter
was able to take possession of the ring during the pendency of decisions. As Justice Mapa pointed out in the first case, a 1905 precisely due to the greater risk assumed by him. A it in good faith, the owner cannot recover it from
decision, Rodriguez v. Martinez, 10 a party should not be predicament of this nature then does not suffice to call for less
the action upon her filing the requisite bond." 3 It was then noted than undeviating adherence to the literal terms of a codal
such third person, "is, as he himself admits,
permitted "to go against his own acts to the prejudice of
that the lower court rendered judgment declaring that plaintiff,
[another]. Such a holding would be contrary to the most provision. Moreover, while the activity he is engaged in is no based on the express provision of the French
now respondent Suntay, had the right to the possession of the
ring in question. Petitioner Dizon, as defendant, sought to have rudimentary principles of justice and law." 11 He is not, in the doubt legal, it is not to be lost sight of that it thrives on taking Code which allows the true owner of personal
advantage of the necessities precisely of that element of our
the judgment reversed by the Court of Appeals. It did him no language of Justice Torres, in Irlanda v. Pitargue, 12 promulgated
population whose lives are blighted by extreme poverty. From
property to recover it from the possessor in
good. The decision of May 19, 1969, now on review, affirmed in 1912, "allowed to gainsay [his] own acts or deny rights which good faith without reimbursement only "if it has
whatever angle the question is viewed then, estoppel certainly
the decision of the lower court. [he had] previously recognized." 13 Some of the later cases are
to the effect that an unqualified and unconditional acceptance
cannot be justly invoked. been stolen from him." He concedes likewise
of an agreement forecloses a claim for interest not therein that "our Code, following the Spanish code,
In the light of the facts as thus found by the provided. 14 Equally so the circumstance that about a month WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of uses broader language than that used in the
Court of Appeals, well-nigh conclusive on use, after the date of the conveyance, one of the parties informed Appeals of May 19, 1969 is affirmed, with costs French code" since our Code provides that
with the applicable law being what it is, this the other of his being a minor, according to Chief Justice Paras,
against petitioner. the owner who has been "unlawfully deprived"
"is of no moment, because [the former's] previous
petition for review cannot prosper. To repeat, misrepresentation had already estopped him from disavowing of personal property may recover it from the
the decision of the Court of Appeals stands. the contract. 15 It is easily understandable why, under the Concepcion, C.J., Zaldivar, Makasiar, Antonio possessor without reimbursement, with the sole
circumstances disclosed, estoppel is a frail reed to hang on to.
There was clearly the absence of an act or omission, as a result
and Esguerra, JJ., concur. exception where the possessor acquired the
1. There is a fairly recent restatement of the of which a position had been assumed by petitioner, who if such article in good faith at a public sale. 2
force and effect of the governing codal norm elements were not lacking, could not thereafter in law be Makalintal and Barredo, JJ., took no part.
in De Gracia v. Court of Appeals. 4 Thus: "The prejudiced by his belief in what had been misrepresented to
He thus concedes finally that "(T)here are
controlling provision is Article 559 of the Civil Code. It reads him. 16 As was put by Justice Labrador, "a person claimed to be
thus: 'The possession of movable property acquired in good estopped must have knowledge of the fact that his voluntary Castro, J., reserves his vote. writers who believe that the phrase 'unlawfully
faith is equivalent to a title. Nevertheless, one who has lost any acts would deprive him of some rights because said voluntary deprived' in our Code does not have the same
movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof may recover it acts are inconsistent with said rights."17 To recapitulate, there is
from the person in possession of the same. If the possessor of
meaning as stolen in the French code; that it is
this pronouncement not so long ago, from the pen of Justice
a movable lost of which the owner has been unlawfully Makalintal, who reaffirmed that estoppel "has its origin in equity used in the general sense, and is not used in
deprived, has acquired it in good faith at a public sale, the and, being based on moral right and natural justice, finds the specific sense of deprivation by robbery or
owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the price applicability wherever and whenever the special circumstances
paid therefor.' Respondent Angelina D. Guevara, having been
theft. Under this view, it extends to all cases
of a case so demand." 18
unlawfully deprived of the diamond ring in question, was where there has been no valid transmission of
entitled to recover it from petitioner Consuelo S. de Garcia who ownership, including the case where the
was found in possession of the same. The only exception the How then can petitioner in all seriousness proprietor has entrusted the thing to a borrower,
law allows is when there is acquisition in good faith of the assert that his appeal finds support in the Separate Opinions
possessor at a public sale, in which case the owner cannot depositary, or lessee who has sold the same. It
obtain its return without reimbursing the price. As authoritatively doctrine of estoppel? Neither the promptings of is believed that the owner in such case is
interpreted in Cruz v. Pahati, the right of the owner cannot be equity nor the mandates of moral right and undoubtedly unlawfully deprived of his property,
defeated even by proof that there was good faith in the natural justice come to his rescue. He is
acquisition by the possessor. There is a reiteration of this and may recover the same from a possessor in
principle in Aznar v. Yapdiangco. Thus: 'Suffice it to say in this engaged in a business where presumably TEEHANKEE, J., concurring: good faith" (citing De Buen: 2-II Colin &
regard that the right of the owner to recover personal property ordinary prudence would manifest itself to Capitant 1008; 1 Bonet
acquired in good faith by another, is based on his being ascertain whether or not an individual who is I concur in the main opinion of Mr. Justice
dispossessed without his consent. The common law principle 234) 3 and cites the long unbroken line of decisions of the
that were one of two innocent persons must suffer by a fraud offering a jewelry by way of a pledge is entitled Fernando, tracing and confirming the long Court of Appeals and of this Court upholding the import of the
perpetrated by another, the law imposes the loss upon the party to do so. If no such care be taken, perhaps settled and uniform jurisprudence since 1905 broader language of the codal article in question.
who, by his misplaced confidence, has enabled the fraud to be
Indeed, if our legislature had intended to narrow of the value of the said legal or contractual bond reimbursement of the sum received by the
the scope of the term "unlawfully deprived" to jewelry. out of which legal embezzler from the pawnshop only after a
"stolen" as advocated by Tolentino, it certainly obligations arise. criminal conviction of the embezzler, is to add a
would have adopted and used such a narrower Article 1857 of the Civil requirement that is not in the codal article and
term rather than the broad language of article Code prescribes as one of xxx xxx xxx to unduly prejudice the victim of embezzlement,
464 of the old Spanish Civil Code with its long- the essential requisites of as pointed out by the Court in Arenas, supra.
established and accepted meaning in the contracts of pledge and The business of
accordance with our jurisprudence. of mortgage, that the thing pawnshops, in exchange The civil action that the owner must resort to for
pledged or mortgaged for the high and onerous the recovery of his personal property of which
Petitioner's contentions at bar had long been must belong to the person interest which constitutes he has been unlawfully deprived as against the
disposed of in the Court's 1911 decision who pledges or mortgages its enormous profits, is possessor (where the latter refuses to honor
of Arenas vs. Raymundo, 4per Mr. Justice Florentino it. This essential requisite always exposed to the the claim, presumably on same valid doubts as
Torres, reiterating the doctrine of the earlier cases and holding for the contract of pledge contingency of receiving in to the genuineness of the claim) gives the
that
between Perello and the pledge or security for the possessor every adequate protection and
defendant being absent as loans, jewels and other opportunity to contest the owner's claim of
Even supposing that the the former was not the recovery. The owner must therein establish by
articles that have been
defendant Raymundo had owner of the jewelry given competent evidence his lawful claim, and show
robbed, stolen, or
acted in good faith in in pledge, the contract is as to the court's satisfaction his lawful ownership
embezzled from their
accepting the pledge of the devoid of value and force of the article claimed and that he had been
legitimate owners; and as
jewelry in litigation, even as if it had not been made, unlawfully deprived thereof.
the owner of the pawnshop
then he would not be and as it was executed accepts the pledging of
entitled to retain it until the with marked violation of an jewelry from the first bearer I therefore find no reason to set aside the long
owner thereof reimburse express provision of the who offers the same and settled interpretation given by our jurisprudence
him for the amount loaned law, it can not confer upon asks for money on it, to article 559 (formerly article 464) of our Civil
to the embezzler, since the the defendant any rights in without assuring himself Code in accordance with its clear and
said owner of the jewelry, the pledged jewelry, nor whether such bearer is or unambiguous language, as reaffirmed in the
the plaintiff, did not make impose any obligation is not the owner thereof, he case at bar.
any contract with the toward him on the part of can not, by such
pledgee, that would the owner thereof, since procedure, expect from the
obligate him to pay the the latter was deprived of law better and more
amount loaned to Perello, her possession by means preferential protection than
and the trial record does of the illegal pledging of the the owner of the jewels or
not disclose any evidence, said jewelry, a criminal act. other articles, who was Separate Opinions
even circumstantial, that
deprived thereof by means
the plaintiff Arenas
Between the supposed of a crime and is entitled to TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
consented to or had
good faith of the defendant be excused by the courts.
knowledge of the pledging
Raymundo and the
of her jewelry in the I concur in the main opinion of Mr. Justice
undisputed good faith of Antonio Matute, the owner
pawnshop of the Fernando, tracing and confirming the long
the plaintiff Arenas, the of another pawnshop,
defendant. settled and uniform jurisprudence since 1905
owner of the jewelry, being convinced that he based on the express statutory provision of
neither law nor justice was wrong, refrained from
For this reason, and article 559 of our Civil Code (formerly article
permit that the latter, after appealing from the
because Concepcion 464 of the old Civil Code) that the owner "who
being the victim of judgment wherein he was
Perello was not the has lost any movable or has been unlawfully
embezzlement, should sentenced to return,
legitimate owner of the deprived thereof may recover it from the person
have to choose one of the without redemption, to the
jewelry which she pledged in possession of the same," the only exception
two extremes of a plaintiffs, another jewel of
to the defendant expressly provided in the codal article being
dilemma, both of which, great value which had
Raymundo, for a certain that "if the possessor of a movable lost of which
without legal ground or been pledged to him by the
sum that she received from the owner has been unlawfully deprived, has
reason, are injurious and same Perello. He
the latter as a loan, the acquired it in good faith at a public sale, the
prejudicial to her interests undoubtedly had in mind
contract of pledge entered owner cannot obtain its return without
and rights, that is, she some of the previous
into by both, is of course, reimbursing the price paid therefor." 1
must either lose her jewelry decisions of this court, one
null and void, and, or pay a large sum of which was against
consequently the jewelry Senator Tolentino's submittal in his
received by the embezzler himself.
so pawned can not serve commentaries on the Civil Code "that the better
as a loan from the
as security for the payment view is to consider 'unlawfully deprived' as
defendant, when the By the same token, the contention that the
of the sum loaned, nor can limited to unlawful taking, such as theft or
plaintiff Arenas is not owner may recover the lost article of which he
the latter be collected out robbery, and should not include disposition
related to the latter by any has been unlawfully deprived without through abuse of confidence. Thus, if the owner
has entrusted personal property to a bailee, jewelry in litigation, even as if it had not been made, the owner of the pawnshop
such as for transportation, pledge, loan or then he would not be and as it was executed accepts the pledging of
deposit, without transmitting ownership, and the entitled to retain it until the with marked violation of an jewelry from the first bearer
latter alienates it to a third person who acquires owner thereof reimburse express provision of the who offers the same and
it in good faith, the owner cannot recover it from him for the amount loaned law, it can not confer upon asks for money on it,
such third person, "is, as he himself admits, to the embezzler, since the the defendant any rights in without assuring himself
based on the express provision of the French said owner of the jewelry, the pledged jewelry, nor whether such bearer is or
Code which allows the true owner of personal the plaintiff, did not make impose any obligation is not the owner thereof, he
property to recover it from the possessor in any contract with the toward him on the part of can not, by such
good faith without reimbursement only "if it has pledgee, that would the owner thereof, since procedure, expect from the
been stolen from him." He concedes likewise obligate him to pay the the latter was deprived of law better and more
that "our Code, following the Spanish code, amount loaned to Perello, her possession by means preferential protection than
uses broader language than that used in the and the trial record does of the illegal pledging of the the owner of the jewels or
French code" since our Code provides that not disclose any evidence, said jewelry, a criminal act. other articles, who was
the owner who has been "unlawfully deprived" even circumstantial, that deprived thereof by means
of personal property may recover it from the the plaintiff Arenas Between the supposed of a crime and is entitled to
possessor without reimbursement, with the sole consented to or had good faith of the defendant be excused by the courts.
exception where the possessor acquired the knowledge of the pledging Raymundo and the
article in good faith at a public sale. 2 of her jewelry in the undisputed good faith of Antonio Matute, the owner
pawnshop of the the plaintiff Arenas, the of another pawnshop,
He thus concedes finally that "(T)here are defendant. owner of the jewelry, being convinced that he
writers who believe that the phrase 'unlawfully neither law nor justice was wrong, refrained from
deprived' in our Code does not have the same For this reason, and permit that the latter, after appealing from the
meaning as stolen in the French code; that it is because Concepcion being the victim of judgment wherein he was
used in the general sense, and is not used in Perello was not the embezzlement, should sentenced to return,
the specific sense of deprivation by robbery or legitimate owner of the have to choose one of the without redemption, to the
theft. Under this view, it extends to all cases jewelry which she pledged two extremes of a plaintiffs, another jewel of
where there has been no valid transmission of to the defendant dilemma, both of which, great value which had
ownership, including the case where the Raymundo, for a certain without legal ground or been pledged to him by the
proprietor has entrusted the thing to a borrower, sum that she received from reason, are injurious and same Perello. He
depositary, or lessee who has sold the same. It the latter as a loan, the prejudicial to her interests undoubtedly had in mind
is believed that the owner in such case is contract of pledge entered and rights, that is, she some of the previous
undoubtedly unlawfully deprived of his property, into by both, is of course, must either lose her jewelry decisions of this court, one
and may recover the same from a possessor in null and void, and, or pay a large sum of which was against
good faith" (citing De Buen: 2-II Colin & consequently the jewelry received by the embezzler himself.
Capitant 1008; 1 Bonet so pawned can not serve as a loan from the
234) 3 and cites the long unbroken line of decisions of the as security for the payment defendant, when the By the same token, the contention that the
Court of Appeals and of this Court upholding the import of the of the sum loaned, nor can plaintiff Arenas is not owner may recover the lost article of which he
broader language of the codal article in question.
the latter be collected out related to the latter by any has been unlawfully deprived without
of the value of the said legal or contractual bond reimbursement of the sum received by the
Indeed, if our legislature had intended to narrow jewelry. out of which legal embezzler from the pawnshop only after a
the scope of the term "unlawfully deprived" to obligations arise. criminal conviction of the embezzler, is to add a
"stolen" as advocated by Tolentino, it certainly
Article 1857 of the Civil requirement that is not in the codal article and
would have adopted and used such a narrower
Code prescribes as one of xxx xxx xxx to unduly prejudice the victim of embezzlement,
term rather than the broad language of article
the essential requisites of as pointed out by the Court in Arenas, supra.
464 of the old Spanish Civil Code with its long-
the contracts of pledge and The business of
established and accepted meaning in
of mortgage, that the thing pawnshops, in exchange The civil action that the owner must resort to for
accordance with our jurisprudence.
pledged or mortgaged for the high and onerous the recovery of his personal property of which
must belong to the person interest which constitutes he has been unlawfully deprived as against the
Petitioner's contentions at bar had long been who pledges or mortgages its enormous profits, is possessor (where the latter refuses to honor
disposed of in the Court's 1911 decision it. This essential requisite always exposed to the the claim, presumably on same valid doubts as
of Arenas vs. Raymundo, 4per Mr. Justice Florentino for the contract of pledge
Torres, reiterating the doctrine of the earlier cases and holding contingency of receiving in to the genuineness of the claim) gives the
that between Perello and the pledge or security for the possessor every adequate protection and
defendant being absent as loans, jewels and other opportunity to contest the owner's claim of
Even supposing that the the former was not the articles that have been recovery. The owner must therein establish by
defendant Raymundo had owner of the jewelry given robbed, stolen, or competent evidence his lawful claim, and show
acted in good faith in in pledge, the contract is as embezzled from their to the court's satisfaction his lawful ownership
accepting the pledge of the devoid of value and force legitimate owners; and as
of the article claimed and that he had been by an impostor who sold it to the private To begin with, the Court expresses its at bar that EDCA has been unlawfully deprived
unlawfully deprived thereof. respondents. Ownership of the books was disapproval of the arbitrary action of the of the books.
recognized in the private respondents by the petitioner in taking the law into its own hands
I therefore find no reason to set aside the long Municipal Trial Court, which was sustained by
1
and forcibly recovering the disputed books from The petitioner argues that it was, because the
settled interpretation given by our jurisprudence the Regional Trial Court, which was in turn
2
the private respondents. The circumstance that impostor acquired no title to the books that he
to article 559 (formerly article 464) of our Civil sustained by the Court of Appeals. The 3
it did so with the assistance of the police, which could have validly transferred to the private
Code in accordance with its clear and petitioner asks us to declare that all these should have been the first to uphold legal and respondents. Its reason is that as the payment
unambiguous language, as reaffirmed in the courts have erred and should be reversed. peaceful processes, has compounded the check bounced for lack of funds, there was a
case at bar. wrong even more deplorably. Questions like the failure of consideration that nullified the contract
This case arose when on October 5, 1981, a one at bar are decided not by policemen but by of sale between it and Cruz.
__
person identifying himself as Professor Jose judges and with the use not of brute force but of
Cruz placed an order by telephone with the lawful writs. The contract of sale is consensual and is
FIRST DIVISION petitioner company for 406 books, payable on perfected once agreement is reached between
delivery. EDCA prepared the corresponding
4
Now to the merits the parties on the subject matter and the
G.R. No. 80298 April 26, 1990 invoice and delivered the books as ordered, for consideration. According to the Civil Code:
which Cruz issued a personal check covering It is the contention of the petitioner that the
EDCA PUBLISHING & DISTRIBUTING the purchase price of P8,995.65. On October
5
private respondents have not established their Art. 1475. The contract of sale is
CORP., petitioner, 7, 1981, Cruz sold 120 of the books to private ownership of the disputed books because they perfected at the moment there is a
vs. respondent Leonor Santos who, after verifying have not even produced a receipt to prove they meeting of minds upon the thing
THE SPOUSES LEONOR and GERARDO the seller's ownership from the invoice he had bought the stock. This is unacceptable. which is the object of the contract
SANTOS, doing business under the name showed her, paid him P1,700.00. 6
Precisely, the first sentence of Article 559 and upon the price.
and style of "SANTOS BOOKSTORE," and provides that "the possession of movable
THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. Meanwhile, EDCA having become suspicious property acquired in good faith is equivalent to From that moment, the parties may
over a second order placed by Cruz even a title," thus dispensing with further proof. reciprocally demand performance,
Emiliano S. Samson, R. Balderrama-Samson, before clearing of his first check, made inquiries subject to the provisions of the law
Mary Anne B. Samson for petitioner. with the De la Salle College where he had The argument that the private respondents did governing the form of contracts.
Cendana Santos, Delmundo & Cendana for claimed to be a dean and was informed that not acquire the books in good faith has been
private respondents. there was no such person in its employ. Further dismissed by the lower courts, and we agree. xxx xxx xxx
verification revealed that Cruz had no more Leonor Santos first ascertained the ownership
account or deposit with the Philippine Amanah of the books from the EDCA invoice showing Art. 1477. The ownership of the thing
Bank, against which he had drawn the payment that they had been sold to Cruz, who said he sold shall be transferred to the
check. EDCA then went to the police, which
7
was selling them for a discount because he was vendee upon the actual or
CRUZ, J.: set a trap and arrested Cruz on October 7, in financial need. Private respondents are in the constructive delivery thereof.
1981. Investigation disclosed his real name as business of buying and selling books and often
The case before us calls for the interpretation of Tomas de la Pea and his sale of 120 of the deal with hard-up sellers who urgently have to Art. 1478. The parties may stipulate
Article 559 of the Civil Code and raises the books he had ordered from EDCA to the private part with their books at reduced prices. To that ownership in the thing shall not
particular question of when a person may be respondents. 8
Leonor Santos, Cruz must have been only one pass to the purchaser until he has
deemed to have been "unlawfully deprived" of of the many such sellers she was accustomed fully paid the price.
movable property in the hands of another. The On the night of the same date, EDCA sought to dealing with. It is hardly bad faith for any one
article runs in full as follows: the assistance of the police in Precinct 5 at the in the business of buying and selling books to It is clear from the above provisions, particularly
UN Avenue, which forced their way into the buy them at a discount and resell them for a the last one quoted, that ownership in the thing
Art. 559. The possession of movable store of the private respondents and threatened profit. sold shall not pass to the buyer until full
property acquired in good faith is Leonor Santos with prosecution for buying payment of the purchase only if there is a
equivalent to a title. Nevertheless, stolen property. They seized the 120 books But the real issue here is whether the petitioner stipulation to that effect. Otherwise, the rule is
one who has lost any movable or has without warrant, loading them in a van has been unlawfully deprived of the books that such ownership shall pass from the vendor
been unlawfully deprived thereof, belonging to EDCA, and thereafter turned them because the check issued by the impostor in to the vendee upon the actual or constructive
may recover it from the person in over to the petitioner.9
payment therefor was dishonored. delivery of the thing sold even if the purchase
possession of the same. price has not yet been paid.
Protesting this high-handed action, the private In its extended memorandum, EDCA cites
If the possessor of a movable lost or respondents sued for recovery of the books numerous cases holding that the owner who Non-payment only creates a right to demand
of which the owner has been after demand for their return was rejected by has been unlawfully deprived of personal payment or to rescind the contract, or to
unlawfully deprived has acquired it in EDCA. A writ of preliminary attachment was property is entitled to its recovery except only criminal prosecution in the case of bouncing
good faith at a public sale, the owner issued and the petitioner, after initial refusal, where the property was purchased at a public checks. But absent the stipulation above noted,
cannot obtain its return without finally surrendered the books to the private sale, in which event its return is subject to delivery of the thing sold will effectively transfer
reimbursing the price paid therefor. respondents. As previously stated, the
10
reimbursement of the purchase price. The ownership to the buyer who can in turn transfer
petitioner was successively rebuffed in the petitioner is begging the question. It is putting it to another.
The movable property in this case consists of three courts below and now hopes to secure the cart before the horse. Unlike in the cases
books, which were bought from the petitioner relief from us. invoked, it has yet to be established in the case
In Asiatic Commercial Corporation v. Ang, the
11
. . . The fraud and deceit practiced by had not yet been paid the purchase price Narvasa, Gancayco, Grio-Aquino and
plaintiff sold some cosmetics to Francisco Ang, Warner L. Feist earmarks this sale as therefor. The buyer in the second sale would be Medialdea, JJ., concur.
who in turn sold them to Tan Sit Bin. Asiatic not a voidable contract (Article 1390 left holding the bag, so to speak, and would be
having been paid by Ang, it sued for the N.C.C.). Being a voidable contract, it compelled to return the thing bought by him in __

recovery of the articles from Tan, who claimed is susceptible of either ratification or good faith without even the right to
he had validly bought them from Ang, paying for annulment. If the contract is ratified, reimbursement of the amount he had paid for it. THIRD dIVISION
the same in cash. Finding that there was no the action to annul it is extinguished
conspiracy between Tan and Ang to deceive (Article 1392, N.C.C.) and the It bears repeating that in the case before us, G.R. No. L-54598 April 15, 1988
Asiatic the Court of Appeals declared: contract is cleansed from all its Leonor Santos took care to ascertain first that
defects (Article 1396, N.C.C.); if the the books belonged to Cruz before she agreed JOSE B. LEDESMA, petitioner,
Yet the defendant invoked Article contract is annulled, the contracting to purchase them. The EDCA invoice Cruz vs.
464 of the Civil Code providing,
12 parties are restored to their showed her assured her that the books had HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Spouses
among other things that "one who respective situations before the been paid for on delivery. By contrast, EDCA PACIFICO DELMO and SANCHA DELMO (as
has been unlawfully deprived of contract and mutual restitution was less than cautious in fact, too trusting in private respondents),respondents.
personal property may recover it from follows as a consequence (Article dealing with the impostor. Although it had never
any person possessing it." We do not 1398, N.C.C.). transacted with him before, it readily delivered The Solicitor General for petitioner.
believe that the plaintiff has been the books he had ordered (by telephone) and
unlawfully deprived of the cartons of However, as long as no action is as readily accepted his personal check in Luzel D. Demasu-ay for respondent.
Gloco Tonic within the scope of this taken by the party entitled, either that payment. It did not verify his identity although it
legal provision. It has voluntarily of annulment or of ratification, the was easy enough to do this. It did not wait to
parted with them pursuant to a contract of sale remains valid and clear the check of this unknown drawer. Worse,
contract of purchase and sale. The binding. When plaintiff-appellant it indicated in the sales invoice issued to him, GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
circumstance that the price was not Trinidad C. Tagatac delivered the car by the printed terms thereon, that the books
subsequently paid did not render to Feist by virtue of said voidable had been paid for on delivery, thereby vesting This petition seeks to reverse the decision of
illegal a transaction which was valid contract of sale, the title to the car ownership in the buyer. the respondent Court of Appeals which afirmed
and legal at the beginning. passed to Feist. Of course, the title the decision of the Court of First Instance of
that Feist acquired was defective and Surely, the private respondent did not have to Iloilo, adjudging the petitioner, who was then
In Tagatac v. Jimenez, the plaintiff sold her car
13 voidable. Nevertheless, at the time go beyond that invoice to satisfy herself that the the President of the West Visayas College
to Feist, who sold it to Sanchez, who sold it to he sold the car to Felix Sanchez, his books being offered for sale by Cruz belonged liable for damages under Article 27 of the Civil
Jimenez. When the payment check issued to title thereto had not been avoided to him; yet she did. Although the title of Cruz Code of the Philippines for failure to graduate a
Tagatac by Feist was dishonored, the plaintiff and he therefore conferred a good was presumed under Article 559 by his mere student with honors.
sued to recover the vehicle from Jimenez on title on the latter, provided he bought possession of the books, these being movable
the ground that she had been unlawfully the car in good faith, for value and property, Leonor Santos nevertheless The facts are not disputed.
deprived of it by reason of Feist's deception. In without notice of the defect in Feist's demanded more proof before deciding to buy
ruling for Jimenez, the Court of Appeals held: title (Article 1506, N.C.C.). There them. An organization named Student Leadership
being no proof on record that Felix Club was formed by some students of the West
The point of inquiry is whether Sanchez acted in bad faith, it is safe It would certainly be unfair now to make the Visayas College. They elected the late Violets
plaintiff-appellant Trinidad C. Tagatac to assume that he acted in good faith. private respondents bear the prejudice Delmo as the treasurer. In that capacity, Delmo
has been unlawfully deprived of her sustained by EDCA as a result of its own extended loans from the funds of the club to
car. At first blush, it would seem that The above rulings are sound doctrine and negligence. We cannot see the justice in
1wphi1

some of the students of the school. "the


she was unlawfully deprived thereof, reflect our own interpretation of Article 559 as transferring EDCA's loss to the Santoses who petitioner claims that the said act of extending
considering that she was induced to applied to the case before us. had acted in good faith, and with proper care, loans was against school rules and regulations.
part with it by reason of the chicanery when they bought the books from Cruz. Thus, the petitioner, as President of the School,
practiced on her by Warner L. Feist. Actual delivery of the books having been made, sent a letter to Delmo informing her that she
Certainly, swindling, like robbery, is Cruz acquired ownership over the books which While we sympathize with the petitioner for its was being dropped from the membership of the
an illegal method of deprivation of he could then validly transfer to the private plight, it is clear that its remedy is not against club and that she would not be a candidate for
property. In a manner of speaking, respondents. The fact that he had not yet paid the private respondents but against Tomas de any award or citation from the school.
plaintiff-appellant was "illegally for them to EDCA was a matter between him la Pea, who has apparently caused all this
deprived" of her car, for the way by and EDCA and did not impair the title acquired trouble. The private respondents have Delmo asked for a reconsideration of the
which Warner L. Feist induced her to by the private respondents to the books. themselves been unduly inconvenienced, and decision but the petitioner denied it. Delmo,
part with it is illegal and is punished for merely transacting a customary deal not thus, appealed to the Office of the Director of
by law. But does this "unlawful One may well imagine the adverse really unusual in their kind of business. It is they the Bureau of Public Schools.
deprivation" come within the scope of consequences if the phrase "unlawfully and not EDCA who have a right to complain.
Article 559 of the New Civil Code? deprived" were to be interpreted in the manner The Director after due investigation, rendered a
suggested by the petitioner. A person relying on WHEREFORE, the challenged decision is decison on April 13, 1966 which provided:
xxx xxx xxx the seller's title who buys a movable property AFFIRMED and the petition is DENIED, with
from him would have to surrender it to another costs against the petitioner.
person claiming to be the original owner who
Records of the preliminary members of the Club Delmo had acted in good In view of all the foregoing,
investigation conducted by pursuant thereto are illegal faith, in her capacity as this Office believes and so
one of the legal officers of (sic), hence, she and the Club Treasurer, in holds and hereby directs
this Office disclosed the other students involved are extending loans to the that appellant Violeta. M.
following: That Violeta deemed guilty of officers and members of Delmo, and for that matter
Delmo was the treasurer of misappropriating the funds the Student partnership all other Club members or
the Student Leadership of the Club. On the other Club. Resolution No. 2 officers involved in this
Club, an exclusive student hand, Raclito Castaneda, authorizing the Club case, be not deprived of
organization; that pursuant Nestor Golez and Violeta treasurer to discharge finds any award, citation or
to Article IX of the of the Delmo, President, to students in need of honor from the school, if
Constitution and By-Laws Secretary and Treasurer of financial assistance and they are otherwise entitled
of the club, it passed the Club, respectively, other humanitarian thereto. (Rollo, pp. 28-30)
Resolution No. 2, testified that the Club had purposes had been
authorizing the treasurer to adopted its Constitution approved by the Club On April 27, 1966, the petitioner received by
disburse funds of the Club and By-Laws in a meeting adviser, Mr. Jesse Dagoon, mail the decision of the Director and all the
to student for financial aid held last October 3, 1965, with the notation that records of the case. On the same day,
and other humanitarian and that pursuant to Article approval was given in his petitioner received a telegram stating the
purposes; that in I of said Constitution and capacity as adviser of the following:
compliance with said By-Laws, the majority of Club and extension of the
resolution and as treasurer the members of the Superintendent's "AIRMAIL RECORDS
of the Club, Violeta Delmo Executive Board passed personality. Aside from DELMO CASE MISSENT
extended loans to some Resolution No. 2, which misleading the officers and THAT OFFICE"
officers and members of resolution became the members of the Club, Mr.
the Club upon proper basis for the extension on Dagoon, had The Director asked for the return only of the
application duly approved of loans to some officers unsatisfactorily explained records but the petitioner allegedly mistook the
by the majority of the and members of the Club, why he failed to give the telegram as ordering him to also send the
members of the Executive that the Club honestly Constitution and By-Laws decision back. On the same day, he returned by
Board; and that upon believed that its of the Club to the mail all the records plus the decision of the
receiving the report from Constitution and By-Laws Superintendent for Director to the Bureau of Public Schools.
Mr. Jesse Dagoon, adviser has been approved by the approval despite his
of the funds of the Club, superintendent because assurance to the Club The next day, the petitioner received another
that Office conducted an the adviser of the Club, Mr. president that he would do telegram from the Director order him to furnish
investigation on the matter Jesse Dagoon, assured the so. With this finding of Delmo with a copy of the decision. The
and having been convinced President of the Club that negligence on the part of petitioner, in turn, sent a night letter to the
of the guilt of Violets Delmo he will cause the approval the Club adviser, not to Director informing the latter that he had sent the
and the other officers and of the Constitution and By- mention laxity in the decision back and that he had not retained a
members of the Club, that Laws by the performance of his duties copy thereof..
Office rendered the order Superintendent; the as such, this Office
or decision in question. In officers of the Club have considers as too severe On May 3, 1966, the day of the graduation, the
justifying that Office's order been inducted to office on and unwarranted that petitioner received another telegram from the
or decision, it is contended October 9,1965 by the portion of the questioned Director ordering him not to deprive Delmo of
that approval by that Office Superintendent and that order stating that Violeta any honors due her. As it was impossible by
of the Constitution and By- the Club had been likewise Delmo "shall not be a this time to include Delmo's name in the
Laws of the Club is allowed to cosponsor the candidate for any award or program as one of the honor students, the
necessary for its effectivity Education Week citation from this school or petitioner let her graduate as a plain student
and validity and since it Celebration. any organization in this instead of being awarded the Latin honor of
was never submitted to school." Violeta Delmo, it is Magna Cum Laude.
that Office, the Club had no After a careful study of the noted, has been a
valid constitution and By- records, this Office consistent full scholar of
To delay the matter further, the petitioner on
Laws and that as a sustains the action taken the school and she alone
May 5, 1966, wrote the Director for a
consequence, Resolution by the Superintendent in has maintained her
reconsideration of the latters" decision because
No. 2 which was passed penalizing the adviser of scholarship. The decision
he believed that Delmo should not be allowed
based on the Constitution the Club as well as the in question would,
to graduate with honors. The Director denied
and By-Laws- is without officers and members therefore, set at naught all
the petitioner's request.
any force and effect and thereof by dropping them her sacrifice and frustrate
the treasurer, Violeta from membership therein. her dreams of graduating
Delmo, who extended with honors in this year's On July 12, 1966, the petitioner finally
However, this Office is
loans to some officers and commencement exercises. instructed the Registrar of the school to enter
convinced that Violets M.
into the scholastic records of Delmo the honor, kept Id information to . He Bernardino, informing the by bim And certainly, not
"Magna Cum Laude." told the Court that he knew latter that he had returned the least of Miss Delmo's
that the letter of Director the decision (Exh. "l3"), embarrassment. His acts
On July 30, 1966, Delmo, then a minor, was Bernardino directed him together with the record. speak eloquently of ho bad
joined by her parents in flag action for damages not to deprive Miss Delmo Why a night letter when the faith and unjust of
against the petitioner. During the pendency of the honors due her, but she matter was of utmost mindwarped by his delicate
the action, however, Delmo passed away, and (sic) says that he has not urgency to the parties in sensitivity for having been
thus, an Amended and Supplemental Complaint finished reading the letter- the case, because challenged by Miss Delmo,
was filed by her parents as her sole and only decision, Exhibit "L," of graduation day was only a mere student.
heirs. Director Bernardino 0, him four days ahead? An
to give honors to Miss examination of the xxx xxx xxx
The trial court after hearing rendered judgment Delmo. (Tsn, Feb. 5, 1974, telegrams sent by the
against the petitioner and in favor of the testimony of Mr. Ledesma, defendant shows that he Finally the defendant's
spouses Delmo. The court said: pp. .33-35). It could not be had been sending ordinary behaviour relative to Miss s
true that he has not telegram and not night case smacks of
Let us go to specific finished reading the letter- letters. (Exh. "5", Exhibit contemptuous arrogance,
badges of the defendants decision, Exh. "L," because "7"). At least, if the oppression and abuse of
(now petitioners) bad faith. said letter consisted of only defendant could not furnish power. Come to think of it.
Per investigation of Violeta three pages, and the a copy of the decision, He refused to obey the
Delmo's appeal to Director portion which directed that (Exh. "L"), to Miss Delmo, directive of Be o and
Vitaliano Bernardino of the Miss Delmo "be not he should have told her instead, chose to feign
Bureau of Public Schools deprived of any award, about it or that Miss ignorance of it." (Reward
(Exhibit L it was the citation or honor from the Delmo's honors and on Appeal, p. 72-76).
defendant who inducted school, if otherwise entitled citation in the
the officers of the Student thereto is found at the last commencement be The trial court awarded P20,000.00 to the
Leadership Club on paragraph of the same. announced or indicated. estate of Violeta Delmo and P10,000.00 to her
October 9, 1965. In fact the How did he know the last But Mr. Ledesma is one parents for moral damages; P5,000.00 for
Club was allowed to paragraph if he did not who cannot admit a nominal damages to Violeta's estate; exemplary
cosponsor the Education read the letter. mistake. Very damages of P10,000.00 and P2,000.00
Week Celebration. (Exh. ungentlemanly this is home attorney's fees.
"L"). If the defendant he not Defendants actuations out by his own testimony
approve of the constitution regarding Miss Delmo's despite his knowledge that On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
and by-laws of the Club, cam had been one of bias his decision to deprive decision. Hence, this petition.
why did he induct the and prejudice. When his Miss Delmo of honors due
officers into office and action would favor him, he to her was overturned by The issues raised in this petition can be
allow the Club to sponsor was deliberate and aspect Director Bernardino, he on reduced to the sole question of whether or not
the Education Week to the utter prejudice and his wrong belief. To quote the respondent Court of Appeals erred in
Celebration"? It was detriment of Miss Delmo. the defendant,1 believed affirming the trial court's finding that petitioner is
through his own act that Thus, although, as early as that she did not deserve liable for damages under Article 27 of the New
the students were misled to April 27, 1966, he knew of those honors(Tsn Feb. 5, Civil Code.
do as they did. Coupled the exoneration of Miss 1974, p. 43,Empasized
with the defendants tacit Delino by Director supplied). Despite the
We find no reason why the findings of the trial
recognition of the Club was Bernardino, he withheld the telegram of Director
and appellate courts should be reversed. It
the assurance of Mr. Jemm information from Miss Bernardino which the
cannot be disputed that Violeta Delmo went
Dagoon, Club Adviser, who Delmo. This is eloquently defendant received hours
through a painful ordeal which was brought
made the students believe dramatized by Exh. "11" before the commencement
about by the petitioner's neglect of duty and
that he was acting as an and Exh. "13" On April executory on May 3-
callousness. Thus, moral damages are but
extension of Mr. Ledesma's 29,1966, Director 4,1966, he did not obey
proper. As we have affirmed in the case of
personality. (Exhibit "L"). Bernardino cabled him to Director Bernardino
(Prudenciado v. Alliance Transport System,
furnish Violeta Delmo copy because he said in his
Inc., 148 SCRA 440, 448):
Another badge of the of the Decision, Exh. "L," testimony that he would be
defendan'ts want of good but instead of informing embarrassment . Tan Feb
5,1974, P. 46). Evidently, There is no argument that
faith is the fact that, Miss Delmo about the
he knew only his moral damages include
although, he kaew as early decision, since he said he
embarrassment and not physical suffering, mental
as April 27,1966 that per mailed back the decision
that of r Bernardino whose anguish, fright, serious
on of r Bernardino, Exhibit on April 28,1966, he sent a
order was being flagrantly anxiety, besmirched
"L," he was directed to give night letter on April
and wantonly disregarded reputation, wounded
honors to Miss Delmo, he 29,1966, to Director
feelings, moral shock,
social humiliation, and disregard of Miss Delmo's awarded to the spouses in Considering the provisions of Article
similar injury. Though rights. their own behalf. 105 of the Revised Penal Code, the
incapable of pecuniary said 700 sheets, except five of them
computation, moral Fifth, defendant did not WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for which are to be retained for purposes
damages may be even extend the courtesy lack of merit. The decision of the Court of of evidence, are hereby ordered
recovered if they are the of meeting Mr. Pacifico Appeals is AFFIRMED with the slight returned to the complainant, subject,
proximate result of Delmo, father of Miss modification as stated in the preceding however, to the condition that the
defendant's wrongly act or Delmo, who tried several paragraph. This decision is immediately complainant post a bond in an
omission." (People v. times to see defendant in executory. amount equal to twice the value of
Baylon, 129 SCRA 62 his office thus Mr. Delmo 100 sheets in favor of Chua Hai who
(1984). suffered extreme SO ORDERED. has a claim of ownership to the said
disappointment and 100 sheets, and without prejudice on
The Solicitor-General tries to cover-up the humiliation. __ the part of said Chua Hai to file the
petitioner's deliberate omission to inform Miss corresponding action on the matter of
Delmo by stating that it was not the duty of the xxx xxx xxx EN BANC ownership thereof by virtue of his
petitioner to furnish her a copy of the Director's purchase from the herein accused.
decision. Granting this to be true, it was Defendant, being a public G.R. No. L-11108 June 30, 1958
nevertheless the petitioner's duty to enforce the officer should have acted From the facts alleged in the pleadings
said decision. He could have done so with circumspection and CHUA HAI, petitioner, presented in this case, we gather the following:
considering that he received the decision on due regard to the rights of vs. On January 31, 1956, Roberto Soto purchased
April 27, 1966 and even though he sent it back Miss Delmo. Inasmuch as HON. RUPERTO KAPUNAN, JR. as Judge of from Youngstown Hardware, owned by Ong
with the records of the case, he undoubtedly he exceeded the scope of the Court of First Instance of Manila and Shu, 700 corrugated galvanized iron sheets
read the whole of it which consisted of only his authority by defiantly ONG SHU,respondents. and 249 pieces of round iron bar for P6,137.70,
three pages. Moreover, the petitioner should disobeying the lawful and in payment thereof he issued a check
have had the decency to meet with Mr. Delmo, directive of his superior, Pedro Panganiban y Tolentino for petitioner. drawn against the Security Bank and Trust
the girl's father, and inform the latter, at the very Director Bernardino, German Lee for respondent Ong Shu. Company for P7,000.00, without informing Ong
least of the decision. This, the petitioner defendant is liable for Shu that he had no sufficient funds in said bank
likewise failed to do, and not without the damages in his personal REYES, J. B. L., J.: to answer for the same. When the check was
attendant bad faith which the appellate court capacity. . . . (Rollo, pp- 57- presented for payment, it was dishonored for
correctly pointed out in its decision, to wit: 58) Certiorari against an order of the Court of First insufficiency of funds. Soto sold 165 sheets in
Instance of Manila, Hon. Ruperto Kapunan, Jr. Pangasinan and 535 sheets in Calapan,
Third, assuming that Based on the undisputed facts, exemplary presiding, ordering the return to the Mindoro. Of those sold in Pangasinan, 100
defendant could not furnish damages are also in order. In the same case complainant in criminal case No. were sold to petitioner Chua Hai. When the
Miss Delmo of a copy of of Prudenciado v. Alliance Transport System, 34250, People vs. Roberto Sotto, of 100 sheets case was filed in the Court of First Instance of
the decision, he could have Inc., supra., at p. 450, we ruled: of galvanized iron roofing which had been sold Manila against Roberto Soto, for estafa, the
used his discretion and by the accused in said case to petitioner herein, offended party filed a petition asking that the
plain common sense by The rationale behind Chua Hai. The order is as follows: 700 galvanized iron sheets, which were
informing her about it or he exemplary or corrective deposited with the Manila Police Department,
could have directed the damages is, as the name Counsel for the complainant in this be returned to him, as owner of the Youngstown
inclusion of Miss Delmo's implies, to provide an case seeks the return of the 700 Hardware. Petitioner herein opposed the
honor in the printed example or correction for sheets of galvanized iron now with motion with respect to the 100 sheets that he
commencement program the public good (Lopez, et the Manila Police Department which had bought from Soto. Notwithstanding the
or announced it during the al. v. Pan American World form part of the hardware materials opposition, the court ordered the return of the
commencement exercises. Airways, 16 SCRA 431). involved in this case. Chua Hai, one galvanized iron sheets to Ong Shu. Petitioner
of the persons who purchased from then presented a motion to reconsider the
Fourth, defendant despite the accused one hundred (100) order, alleging that by the return thereof to the
However, we do not deem
receipt of the telegram of pieces of the said galvanized iron offended party, the court had not only violated
it appropriate to award the
Director Benardino hours sheets, opposes the said motion on the contract of deposit, because it was in that
spouses Delmo damages
before the commencement the ground that the question of concept that petitioner had delivered the 100
in the amount of
exercises on May 3-4, ownership should be determined in sheets to the Manila Police Department, and
P10,000.00 in their
1966, disobeyed his the proper proceedings, claiming that that said return to Ong Shu amounted to a
individual capacity,
superior by refusing to give he has a valid title to the 100 pieces, deprivation of his property without due process
separately from and in
the honors due Miss Delmo having bought them from the of law. It is also claimed that Article 105 of the
addition to what they are
with a lame excuse that he accused Roberto Soto on February 1, Revised Penal Code, under whose authority the
already entitled to as sole
would be embarrassed if 1956. Roberto Soto is presently at return was ordered, can be invoked only after
heirs of the deceased
he did so, to the prejudice large, his arrest having been ordered the termination of the criminal case and not
Violeta Delmo. Thus, the
of and in complete by this Court on June 13, 1956, for while said criminal case is still pending trial.
decision is modified insofar
as moral damages are failure to appear for trial.
The court having given no heed to these We find the case meritorious, since petitioner's The thing itself shall be restored, its rule exists and has been confirmed by Article
protests on the part of the petitioner, the latter good faith is not questioned. To deprive the even though it be found in the 1505 of the new Civil Code:
brought the present petition to this Court possessor in good faith, even temporarily and possession of a third person who has
alleging that the order of the respondent judge provisionally, of the chattels possessed, acquired it by lawful means, saving to ART. 1505. Subject to the provisions
constitutes a deprivation of petitioner's property violates the rule of Art. 559 of the Civil Code. the latter his action against the of this Title, where goods are sold by
without due process of law, violating the The latter declares that possession of chattels proper person who may be liable to a person who is not the owner
contract of deposit under which the sheets were in good faith is equivalent to title; i.e., that for all him. thereof, and who does not sell them
delivered to the police department of the City of intents and purposes, the possessor is the under authority or with consent of the
Manila, and determining the respective rights of owner, until ordered by the proper court to This provision is not applicable in owner, the buyer acquires no better
petitioner and respondent Ong Shu without a restore the thing to the one who was illegally cases in which the thing has been title to the goods than the seller had,
previous trial of the criminal case all of which deprived thereof. Until such decree is rendered acquired by the third person in the unless the owner of the goods is by
constitute a grave abuse of discretion and (and it can not be rendered in a criminal manner and under the requirements his conduct precluded from denying
excess of jurisdiction. In answer to the petition, proceeding in which the possessor is not a which, by law, bar an action for its the seller's authority to sell.
it is claimed that as respondent Ong Shu is the party), the possessor, as presumptive owner, is recovery. (R.P.C.) (Emphasis
owner of the property, he has the right to entitled to hold and enjoy the thing; and "every supplied) Nothing in this Title, however, shall
recover possession thereof even if said possessor has a right to be respected in his affect:
property appears to have fallen into the possession; and should he be disturbed therein The last paragraph of Article 105 plainly refers
possession of a third party who acquired it by he shall be protected in or restored to said to those cases where recovery is denied by the xxx xxx xxx
legal means, provided that said form of possession established by the means civil law, notwithstanding the fact that the
acquisition is not that provided for in Article 464 established by the laws and the Rules of former owner was deprived of his chattels (3) Purchases made in a merchant's
of the Civil Code (where property has been Court."(Art. 539, New Civil Code). through crime. One of these cases is that store, or in fairs, or markets in
pledged in a monte de piedad established provided for in Art. 85 of the Code of accordance with the Code of
under authority of the Government) ; that even The decision of the court below, instead of Commerce: Commerce and special laws. (C.C.)
if the property was acquired in good faith, the conforming to Arts. 559 and 539 of the Civil
owner who has been unlawfully deprived Code, directs possessor to surrender the ART. 85. La compra de But even if the articles in dispute had not been
thereof may recover it from the person in chattel to the claimant Ong Shu before the mercaderias en almacenes o tiendas acquired in a market, fair or merchant's store,
possession of the same unless a person in latter has proved that he was illegally deprived abiertas al publico causara still, so far as disclosed, the facts do not justify
possession acquired it in good faith at a public thereof, without taking into account that the prescripcion de derecho a favor del a finding that the owner, respondent Ong Shu,
sale. (Art. 559, Civil Code of the Philippines). It mere filing of a criminal action for estafa is no comprador respecto de las was illegally deprived of the iron sheets, at
is also claimed that under the provisions of proof that estafa was in fact committed. Instead mercaderias adquiridas, quedando a least in so far as appellant was concerned. It is
Article 105 of the Revised Penal Code, under of regarding the possessor as the owner of the salvo en su caso los derechos del not denied that Ong Shu delivered the sheets to
which restitution is made by a return of the chattel until illegal deprivation is shown, the propietario de los objetos vendidos Soto upon a perfected contract of sale, and
thing itself whenever possible, the galvanized court below regards the possessor of the para ejercitar las acciones civiles o such delivery transferred title or ownership to
iron sheets in question should be returned to chattel not as an owner, but as a usurper, and criminales que puedan the purchaser. Says Art. 1496:
the offended party, the owner, and that there is compels him to surrender possession even corresponderle contra el que los
no provision of law requiring that the criminal before the illegal deprivation is proved. We see vendiere indebidamente. (Civ. 464) ART. 1496. The ownership of the
case must first be finally disposed of before no warrant for such a reversal of legal rules. thing sold is acquired by the vendee
restitution of the goods swindled can be Para los efectos de esta prescripcion, from the moment it is delivered to him
ordered returned to the owner. In answer to the It can not be assumed at this stage of the se reputaran almacenes o tiendas in any of the ways specified in
allegation that petitioner has been deprived of proceedings that respondent Ong Shu is still abiertas al publico: articles 1497 to 1501, or in any other
his property without due process of law, it is the owner of the property; to do so it take for manner signifying an agreement that
alleged that same is without foundation granted that the estafa was in fact committed, 1. Los que establezcan los the possession is transferred from
because the petitioner was given ample time to when so far, the trial on the merits has not even comerciantes inscritos. the vendor to the vendee. (C.C.)
be heard. As to the claim that the galvanized started, and the presumption of innocence
iron sheets in question were deposited with the holds full sway. 2. Los que establezcan los The failure of the buyer to make good the price
Manila Police Department, it is argued that the
comerciantes no inscritos, siempre does not, in law, cause the ownership to revest
delivery to the Manila Police Department was In the third place, the civil liability of the que los almacenes o tiendas in the seller until and unless the bilateral
by virtue of the order of the court, because the offender to make restitution, under Art. 105 of permanezcan abiertos al publico por contract of sale is first rescinded or resolved
said sheets, were the subject of or are the the Revised Penal Code,does not arise until his espacio de echo dias consecutivos, o pursuant to Article 1191 of the new Civil Code.
instruments of the commission of the crime criminal liability is finally declared, since the se hayan anunciado por medio de
of estafa, and the court had the power to order former is a consequence of the latter. Art. 105 rotulos, muestras o titulos en el local And, assuming that the consent of Ong Shu to
the return thereof to the owner after it had of the Revised Penal Code, therefore, can not mismo, o por avisos repartidos al the sale in favor of Sotto was obtained by the
satisfied itself of the ownership thereof by the be invoked to justify the order of the court publico o insertos en los diarios de la latter through fraud or deceit, the contract was
offended party. It is also alleged in defense that below, since that very article recognizes the title localidad. not thereby rendered void ab initio, but only
petitioner's rights, if any, are sufficiently of an innocent purchaser when it says:
protected by the bond that the court has voidable by reason of the fraud, and Article
required to be filed. Notwithstanding the claim of some authors that 1390 expressly provides that:
ART. 105. Restitution . . . this Art. 85 has been repealed, the fact is that
ART. 1390. The following contracts Summing up, we hold: was charged with estafa, is tried and said goods, specially when he acted in good
are voidable or annullable, even convicted." faith and for value. Had those goods been sold
though there may have been no 1) That the acquirer and possessor in good on credit by Ong Shu to Roberto Sotto, the
damage to the contracting parties: faith, of a chattel or movable property is entitled I concur with the reasons adduced in the failure of the latter to pay the purchase price
to be respected and protected in his majority decision but the main basis of my vote thereof would not entitle the vendor, under the
(1) Those where one of the parties is possession, as if he were the true owner with the majority of the Court is based on the circumstances obtaining in the instant case, to
incapable of giving consent to a thereof, until a competent court rules otherwise; principle that Article 105 of the Revised Penal take the goods from Chua Hai and much less
contract; Code relied upon by the lower Court for the without a previous court action. And the same
2) That being considered, in the meantime, as issuance of the order which We revoked and thing can be said in the case at bar where the
(2) Those where the consent is the true owner, the possessor in good faith set aside in this instance, cannot be invoked vendor was induced to part with his property by
vitiated by mistake, violence, cannot be compelled to I surrender possession and made applicable to the case at bar. the issuance of a rubber check. Both in the
intimidation, undue influence or fraud. nor to be required to institute an action for the case of sale on credit as well as on the case of
recovery of the chattel, whether or not an As it is known, among the civil liabilities sale through the payment with rubber check,
These contracts are binding, unless indemnity bond is issued in his favor; established by Articles 100 to 103 of the the transaction is perfected and the transfer of
they are annulled by a proper action Revised Penal Code restitution is included and ownership verified, the difference being only
in court. They are susceptible of 3) That the filing of an information charging that Article 105 of the same Code dealing on circumscribed to the liability of the first
ratification. (C.C.) the chattel was illegally obtained through estafa restitution, provides the following: purchaser (Sotto) which in the first case would
from its true owner by the transferor of the bona be merely civil, while in the latter case is also
Agreeably to this provision, Article 1506 fide possessor does not warrant disturbing the ART. 105. Restitution. How Made. criminal.1 The first sale of the property having
prescribes: possession of the chattel against the will of the The restitution of the thing itself must been legally consummated, the 100 sheets of
possessor; and be made whenever possible, with galvanized iron herein involved could not be
allowance for the deterioration or recovered from Chua Hai even in case of
ART. 1506. Where the seller of goods
4) That the judge taking cognizance of the diminution of value as determined by Sotto's conviction of estafa, because under the
has a voidable title thereto, but his
criminal case against the vendor of the the court. terms of Article 105 of the Revised Penal Code,
title has not been avoided at the time
possessor in good faith has not right to interfere the restitution of the thing is not possible for the
of the sale, the buyer acquires a
with the possession of the latter, who is not a The thing itself shall be restored, reason that said thing has been acquired by the
good title to the goods, provided he
party to the criminal proceedings, and such even though it be found in the third persons (Chua Hai) in the manner under
buys them in good faith, for value,
unwarranted interference is not made justifiable possession of a third person who has the requirements which (in addition to the other
and without notice of the seller's
by requiring a bond to answer for damages acquired it by lawful means, saving to means enumerated in the majority
defect of title. (C.C.)
caused to the possessor. the latter his action against the decision) bar, by law an action for its recovery. I
proper person who may be liable to am, therefore, of the opinion and thus hold that
Hence, until the contract of Ong Shu with Sotto
him. in cases where the ownership of the effects of
is set aside by a competent court (assuming Wherefore, the writ of certiorari is granted, and
the crime has already been transferred by the
that the fraud is established to its satisfaction), the order of the Court of First Instance of
offender to an innocent third party, the
the validity of appellant's claim to the property Manila in Criminal Case No. 34250, dated July This provision is not applicable in
restitution of the thing itself referred to in Article
in question cannot be disputed, and his right to 31, 1956, is hereby revoked and set aside, as cases in which the thing has been
105 of the Revised Penal Code must
the possession thereof should be respected. issued in abuse of discretion amounting to acquired by the third person in the
necessarily be limited to cases in which the
excess of jurisdiction. Costs against appellant manner and under the requirements
offended party was illegally deprived of the
It is no excuse that the respondent Ong Shu Ong Shu. which, by law, bar an action for its
property involved in the crime committed, such
was required to post a redelivery bond. An recovery.
as in cases of robbery and theft, but not to
indemnity bond, while answering for damages, Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Reyes, A.,
cams wherein the offended party has not
is not, by itself alone, sufficient reason for Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, and Endencia, There is no dispute that petitioner herein, Chua
been deprived of his property which he
disturbing property rights, whether temporarily JJ., concur. Hai, purchased from Roberto Sotto 100 sheets
delivered to the purchaser with the expectation
or permanently. If the invasion is not warranted, of galvanized iron roofing in good faith and for
of course, of receiving the consideration of the
the filing of a bond will not make it justifiable. value, and there is no denial either that this
sale.
stock comes from and is a part of the 700
Questions of ownership and possession being sheets that Roberto Sotto bought and paid with
I, therefore, concur in the majority decision
eminently civil in character, they should not be Separate Opinions a check that bounced for lack of funds. Under
penned by Mr. Justice J. B. L. Reyes.
settled by exclusive reference to the Revised such circumstances, there is no question that
Penal Code. If Ong Shu has reason to fear that FELIX, J., concurring: the purchase was perfected by the agreement
petitioner Chua Hai may dispose of the chattels of the respondent Ong Shu and defendant
in dispute and thereby render nugatory his The issue in this case revolves around the Sotto and as a consequence of the transaction,
eventual right to restitution, then the proper proposition of whether or not "goods purchased upon delivery of the sheets to the latter,
ownership of the same was conveyed and LABRADOR, J., dissenting:
remedy lies in a civil suit and attachment, not in by an accused, for which he paid with a rubber
an order presuming to adjudicate in a criminal check, can be seized from a third party who transferred legally to the purchaser who, from
case the civil rights of one who is not involved that moment, with or without payment of the I dissent. Before proceeding to the discussion
bought the same in good faith and for a
therein. consideration therefor was in turn entitled to sell of the facts it seems necessary for an
valuable consideration before the offender, who
and convey all or a portion of the property in understanding of this dissent that this is a
question to a third party who definitely acquired certiorari originally instituted in this Court
against an order of Judge Ruperto Kapunan, Jr. ownership thereof by virtue of his owner of the property, he has the right to contended that the galvanized iron sheet in
of the Court of First Instance of Manila. As a purchase from the herein accused. recover possession thereof even if said question were not the ones that the accused
case of certiorari, not a petition for review, the property appears to have fallen into the had taken away from the offended party by
only pertinent issue, as I see it, is whether From the facts alleged in the pleadings possession of a third party who acquired it by illegal means, there is no advantage to be
under the facts and circumstances of the case prescribed in this case, we gather the following: legal means, provided that said form of gained by postponing the determination of the
the order against which the petition is instituted On January 31, 1956, Roberto Sotto purchased acquisition is not that provided for in Article 464 ownership of the stolen property as between
was issued in excess of jurisdiction or with from Youngstown Hardware, owned by Ong of the Civil Code (where property has been the offended party and the purchaser. Anyway,
grave abuse of discretion. The order issued by Shu, 700 corrugated galvanized iron sheets pledged in a monte de piedad established the order of the court is merely provisional in
the respondent judge was provisional in and 249 pieces of round iron bar for P6,137.70, under authority of the Government) ; that even character and it is expressly provided therein
character, subject to the outcome of the and in payment thereof he issued a check if the property was acquired in good faith, the that the claims of the parties to the property are
criminal case and any other future litigation drawn against the Security Bank and Trust owner who has been unlawfully deprived to be determined in the final action that the
respecting the property subject of the Company for P7,000.00, without informing Ong thereof may recover it from the person in petitioner may file, if he desires to do so.
proceedings. Shu that had no sufficient funds in said bank to possession of the same unless a person in
answer for the same. When the check was possession acquired it in good faith at a public The decision of the majority supposedly rests
The certiorari seeks to set aside the order for presented for payment it was dishonored for sale (Art. 559, Civil Code of the Philippines). It on the provisions of Article 599 of the Civil
the return to the complainant in criminal case insufficiency of funds. Sotto sold 165 sheets in is also claimed that under the provisions of Code, which is as follows:
No. 34250, People vs. Roberto Sotto, of 100 Pangasinan and 535 sheets in Calapan, Article 105 of the Revised Penal Code, under
sheets of galvanized iron roofing which had Mindoro. Of those sold in Pangasinan, 100 was which restitution is made by a return of the The possession of movable property
been sold by the accused in said case to sold to petitioner Chua Hai. When the case was thing itself whenever possible, the galvanized acquired in good faith is equivalent to
petitioner herein, Chua Hai. The order is as filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila iron sheets in question should be returned to a title. Nevertheless, one who has
follows: against Roberto Sotto, for estafa, the offended the offended party, the owner, and that there is lost any movable or has been
party filed a petition asking that the 700 no provision of law requiring that the criminal unlawfully deprived thereof, may
Counsel for the complainant in this galvanized iron sheets which were deposited case must first be finally disposed of before recover it from the person in
case seeks the return of the 700 with the Manila Police Department be returned restitution of the goods swindled can be possession of the same.
sheets of galvanized iron now with to him, as owner of the Youngstown Hardware. ordered returned to the owner. In answer to the
the Manila Police Department which Petitioner herein opposed the motion with allegation that petitioner has been deprived of If the possessor of a movable lost or
form part of the hardware materials respect to the 100 sheets that he had bought his property without due process of law, it is of which the owner has been
involved in this case. Chua Hai, one from Sotto. Notwithstanding the opposition the alleged that same is without foundation unlawfully deprived, has acquired it in
of the persons who purchased from court ordered the return of the galvanized iron because the petitioner was given ample time to good faith at a public sale, the owner
the accused one hundred (100) sheets to Ong Shu. Petitioner then presented a be heard. As to the claim that the galvanized can not obtain its return without
pieces of the said galvanized iron motion to reconsider the order, alleging that by iron sheets in question were deposited with the reimbursing the price paid therefor.
sheets, opposes the said motion on the return thereof to the offended party, the Manila Police Department, it is argued that the
the ground that the question of court had not only violated the contract of delivery to the Manila Police Department was We fully agree with the majority that this Article
ownership should be determined in deposit, because it was in that concept that by virtue of the order of the court, because the covers the case, but we are of the humble
the proper proceedings, claiming that petitioner had deliver the 100 sheets to the said sheets were the subject of or are the opinion that the provision that is applicable is
he has a valid title to the 100 pieces, Manila Police Department, and that said return instruments of the commission of the crime not paragraph 1, but paragraph 2. Granting that
having bought them from the to Ong Shu amounted to a deprivation of his of estafa, and the court had the power to order the petitioner was a possessor in good faith, the
accused Roberto Sotto on February property without due process of law. It is also the return thereof to the owner after it had facts disclosed not by the information alone, but
1, 1956. Roberto Sotto is presently at claimed that Article 105 of the Revised Penal satisfied itself of the ownership thereof by the by the motion for the return of the goods and
large, his arrest having been ordered Code, under whose authority the return was offended party. It is also alleged in defense that other parts of the record show that these
by this Court on June 13, 1956, for ordered, can be invoked only after the petitioner's rights, if any, are sufficiently movable properties used to belong to the
failure to appear for trial. termination of the criminal case and not while protected by the bond that the court has respondent Ong Shu and that he was deprived
said criminal case is still pending trial. required to be filed. thereof unlawfully because a certain person
Considering the provisions of Article purchased it with a bogus check. As between
105 of the Revised Penal Code, the The court giving no heed to these protests on I find no merit in the contention that petitioner the purchaser and Ong Shu, the lawful owner,
said 700 sheets, except five of them the part of the petitioner, the latter brought the was deprived of the possession and ownership even if the former is clothed with all the good
which are to be retained for purposes present petition to this Court alleging that the of the galvanized iron sheets without due faith, the owner of the property Ong Shu has a
of evidence, are hereby ordered order of the respondent judge constitutes a process of law, it appearing that sufficient better right to recover possession thereof. The
returned to the complainant, subject, deprivation of petitioner's property without due opportunity was given him to explain his right to criminal law provides that the subject of a crime
however, to the condition that the process of law, violating the contract of deposit the possession and ownership thereof when he can always be recovered from whoever is in
complainant post a bond in an under which the sheets were delivered to the presented him motion for reconsideration which possession of the same, irrespective of the
amount equal to twice the value of police department of the City of Manila, and the court heard and which it finally denied. The good faith of the possessor. Were we to adopt
100 sheets in favor of Chua Hai who determining the respective rights of petitioner claim that the respective rights of the petitioner the ruling of the majority, we will be
has a claim of ownership to the said and respondent Ong Shu without a previous and the respondent owner can only be decided encouraging crooks because by artful
100 sheets, and without prejudice on trial of the criminal case all of which in the final criminal action is also without merit. connivance with supposed buyers in good faith
the part of said Chua Hai to file the constitute a grave abuse of discretion and The criminal case seeks to determine the fact (and the worst part of it is good faith is always
corresponding action on the matter of excess of jurisdiction. In answer to the petition it of the commission of the crime by the accused. presumed), we will have a holiday for crooks,
is claimed that as respondent Ong Shu is the When as in this case it cannot be seriously thieves and robbers.
While it is true that the information does not
deny the good faith of petitioner, but as against
that of the lawful owner, Ong Shu, the latter
should be given preference.

It is not disputed that the respondent Ong Shu


was originally the lawful owner. If that is so and
he was deprived of the property by a criminal
act, how can such ownership now have been
destroyed and can now be denied. The only
way by which the petitioner, the buyer from the
thief, can be protected in his possession is by
applying the provisions of paragraph 2 of Article
599 of the Civil Code, which reads:

If the possessor of a movable lost or


of which the owner has been
unlawfully deprived, has acquired it in
good faith at a public sale, the owner
can not obtain its return without
reimbursing the price paid therefor.

Note that we have underlined the words public


sale. This he has not proved and no evidence
has been shown or is insinuated in the record.
Even if he had acquired it at public sale, the
right for reimbursement of the price still
remains. The price is fully guaranteed by the
bond approved by the court.