MA in Political Science
11685174
domestic and international institutions, (2) the extent of the influence of International
Under the Open Economy Politics Framework, it begins with individuals, sectors, or
factors of production as the units of analysis and derives their interests over economic policy
from each units position within the international economy. It treats domestic political
institutions as mechanisms that aggregate interests and structure the bargaining of competing
societal groups. Finally, it introduces, when necessary, bargaining between states with different
Hiscox argued that preferences are influenced by the abundance of factors. Individual trade
policy preference may be affected by two factors namely, (a) economic factors, which have
personal effects on real income asset values and consumption and (b) non-economic factors such
as education and norms. But in contrast, realist believed that individual interest is irrelevant since
only state interest matters. But it should be noted that policy makes have their own personal
preferences, and can be considered as economic actors. Policy makers institutions shape policy
space or the range of policy options available and incentives to respond to certain groups over
the others. While domestic interest groups institutions shape those who represent capital owners,
labor, skilled or unskilled workers, importers vs exporters, generally industries competing, the
range of actions available to influence policy or the strategy space and the incentives to organize
Political regimes also affect trade policies. Milner and Kubota explained how political
regimes affected the shift to trade liberation, (1) the economic crises, before 1980s many
developing countries are protectionist (2) the pressure from Western Country especially the USA
and (3) the spread of neoliberal policy ideas. But trade liberation occurred the same time as
democratization among developing countries. Are the two trades related? Answers may vary. It
can be yes because any change in a political regime is likely to induce trade reforms. It can also
be no since democracy is nor propitious for economic reform. Orouke and Taylor (2006) suggest
that democratization promoted trade in both land scare countries and land abundant countries,
presented a 2x3 matrix of causal arguments on the relationship between the probability that a
trading structure will be open and the distribution of potential economic power. He argued that a
system with one dominant state will be most likely to have open trade, somewhat less likely
when there are many smaller states, and even less likely when there are many large states. Also,
when states are at similar levels of development, they will be more likely to have open trade.
Openness can be measured by flows of goods and by policies like tariffs, trade
proportions (the ratio of trade to national income), and the concentration of trade within certain
regions are examined. The theory of state power explains trade openness in period I, II, and V
(up to 1960). But it does not explain III, IV and V (after 1960). In period III, openness grew
while Britain was declining; in period IV, openness failed to grow while the USA was rising; and
in latter period V, openness failed to decline as the USA did. Krasner amends his argument by
explaining that domestic trade policies often fail to change when there are no cataclysmic
external events to encourage that change, because states become locked in by the impact of
prior choices on their domestic political structures. When crises (wars, depressions), indicate
that their current policy is ineffective, then they will change them, but there does not have to be a
International Monetary Fund, World Bank, and General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) paved way to an era of increasing economic interdependence. By the end of the 1960s,
as the tariff cuts negotiated at the Kennedy Round of the GATT took full effect, trade as a
proportion of economic activity began to rise rapidly in all advanced industrialized democracies,
leading to a new focus on the political impact of deepening economic ties This new era was
expected by some to transform the nature of international politics, opening a new model of
Technological advancement and open borders affect the pace of economic. The advent
of globalization and the development of technology made capital increasingly mobile, moving
freely across borders and become flexible in how it adapts to changes in domestic and
international politics. As observed by Frankel, the world has been increasingly integrated with
finance and trade since the end of the World War II. Globalization was more dramatic, even if
theres a popular impression that national borders and geography still impede trade and
investment. Hence technology advancement ease the barriers such as, difference in currencies,