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Pauline Mariz V.

Garcia JD4A

Valencia vs. CA, 263 SCRA 275

GR No. 111401 October 17, 1996

Private Respondents were lessees of a 24-hectare fishpond owned by petitioner as
substituted by his heirs located at Paombong, Bulacan. The lease is covered by a lease contract
by and between the said parties. The lease was supposed to have expired on May 1987, but
before the said date, petitioner filed on June 25, 1984 a complaint against private respondents
for the rescission of the lease contract. The RTC of Malolos, Bulacan which took cognizance of
said case issued a writ of preliminary Mandatory Injunction ordering private respondents to
surrender to the petitioner possession of the fishpond. In view whereof, private respondents filed
a Petition for Certiorari with the IAC. The said court issued a restraining order enjoining petitioner
and the RTC from enforcing the mandatory injunction.

Whether or not there is a litis pendentia

No, the court consistently held, in a long line of cases, that the requisites for existence of litis
pendentia as a ground for dismissal of an action are as follows: 1) identity of the parties, or at
least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions; 2) identity of rights asserted
and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and 3) the identity with respect
to the two preceding particulars in the two cases is such that any judgment that may rendered
in the pleading case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res adjudicate in
other case. Morever, the court stated that if a party-litigant splits his single cause of action, the
other action or actions filed may be dismissed by invoking litis pendentia, pursuant to Section
1(e), Rule 16 of the Revised Rules of Court. A party who splits his single cause of action cannot be
accuses of also violating the rule against litis pendentia as the former, a malpractice, gives rise
to the latter, a ground for a motion dismiss. This is made clear by Section 4, Rule 2 of the Rules.
Pauline Mariz V. Garcia JD4A

Allied Banking vs. CA, 259 SCRA 371

Gr No. 95223 July 26, 1996

Private Respondent Ekman & Company, Inc. obtained a loan in the amount of
P5,700,000.00 from petitioner Allied Banking Corporation. Private respondent executed a
promissory note, secured by US750,000.00 deposited in the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank in
Hongkong. The transaction involves what is called in banking parlance as a back-to-back loan.
Allied Bank filed a complaint for sum of money against private respondent in the CFI of
Pasig, Rizal. Upon the reorganization of the judiciary in 1983, the case was transferred to the RTC
in Makati. Allied Bank alleged that after applying private respondents dollar deposit to its
indebtedness, there remained a balance of P387,936.08, exclusive of interest and other charges
owing to it but despite demands made on private respondent, the amount had not been paid.
The case was then dismissed by the RTC for failure of Allied Bank to prosecute its case. However,
upon petitioners explanation that it did not know that its case had been transferred to Makati
as a result of the reorganization of the courts, the RTC reconsidered its order and directed that
summons be served on private respondent.

Whether the action sought to be dismissed was filed merely to preempt the later action
or to anticipate its filing and lay the basis for its dismissal

The action sought to be dismissed was filed to anticipate its filing and lay the basis for its
dismissal. The court ruled that the pendency of a case as a ground for dismissal of actions, like
res judicata, is based on the policy against multiplicity of suits. Since in most cases the actions are
not filed at the same time, but one after the other, the question is which one should be dismissed.
The rule in general is that it should be the later case. This rule, however, is not absolute. Indeed,
as noted in Teodoro v. Mirasol, the Rules do not require as a ground for dismissal of a complaint
that there is a prior pending action. They provide that there is a pending action, not a pending
prior action. It may happen, therefore, that the first case may have to be dismissed. For example,
if, as in Teodoro, the action to fix the period of the lease was filed evidently to preempt an action
for ejectment, the fact that it was filed first cannot be used as basis to dismiss the later action for